THEY DARE TO SPEAK OUT
PEOPLE AND INSTITUTIONS
CONFRONT ISRAEL'S LOBBY
by Paul Findley
Chapter 3
The Deliberative Body
Fails to Deliberate
Just off the second-floor corridor connecting the central part of the
U.S. Capitol building with the Senate wing is the restored old Senate
chamber where visitors can look around and imagine the room echoing
with great debates of the past. Action there first gave the Senate its
reputation as the "world's greatest deliberative body" where no topic
was too controversial for open debate.
In most respects, that reputation is deserved and honored. In fact,
all five former Senators-John C. Calhoun, Daniel Webster, Henry
Clay, Robert LaFollette and Robert Taft-who are pictured in the ornate
reception room near the large chamber now used by the Senate,
were distinguished by their independence and courage, not their conformity.
Today, on Middle East issues' at least, independence and courage
are almost unknown, and the Senate deliberates not at all. This
phenomenon was the topic of discussion during a breakfast meeting in
1982 between Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan and Senator Claiborne
Pell of Rhode Island, the senior Democrat on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Pell explained with candor his own record of consistent
support for Israel and his failure to recognize Arab interests when
he told the Jordanian leader, "I can be honest with you, but I can't be
fair." Pell's record is typical of his colleagues.
Since the establishment of modern Israel in 1948, only a handful of
Senators have said or done anything in opposition to the policies of the
government of Israel. Those who break ranks find themselves in
difficulty. The trouble can arise from a speech, an amendment, a vote,
a published statement, or a combination of these. It may take the form
of a challenge in the next primary or general election. Or the trouble
may not surface until later,after service in the Senate has ended. Such
was the destiny of a Senator from Illinois.
"Adlai, You Are Right, But-"
The cover of the October 1982 edition of the monthly magazine
Jewish Chicago featured a portrait of Adlai E. Stevenson III, Democratic
candidate for governor of Illinois. In the background, over the
right shoulder of a smiling Stevenson, an Arab, rifle slung over his
shoulder, glared ominously through a kaffiyeh that covered his head
and most of his face. The headline announcing the issue's feature article
read, "Looking at Adlai Through Jewish Eyes."
The illustration and article were part of an anti-Stevenson campaign
conducted by some of the quarter-million people in Chicago's
Jewish community who wanted Stevenson to fail in his challenge to
Governor James R. Thompson, Jr.
Thompson, a Republican, was attempting a feat sometimes tried
but never before accomplished in Illinois history: election to a third
term as governor. Normally, a Republican in Illinois can expect only
minimal Jewish support at the polls.
A crucial part of the anti-Stevenson campaign was a caricature of
his Middle East record while he was a member of the United States
Senate. Stevenson was presented as an enemy of Israel and an ally of
the P.L.O.
Stevenson was attempting a political comeback after serving ten
years in the Senate, where he had quickly established himself as an
independent. During the oil shortage of the mid-1970's he alarmed corporate
interests by suggesting the establishment of a government corporation
to handle the marketing of all crude oil. He warned of the
"seeds of destruction" inherent in nuclear proliferation and called for
international safeguards to restrain other nations from using nuclear
technology to manufacture weapons. Concerned about the country's
weakening position in the international marketplace, he called for government-directed
national economic strategies to meet the challenge of
foreign competition.
Stevenson lacks the flamboyant extroverted character of many
politicians. Time magazine described him as "a reflective man who
seems a bit out of place in the political arena." Effective in committee,
where most legislation is hammered out, he did not feel comfortable
lining up votes. "I'm not a back slapper or log roller," he said. "I don't
feel effective running about buttonholing Senators."
Chicago Daily News columnist Mike Royko wrote of Stevenson's
lack of charisma in a tone of affectionate teasing:
The most dangerous element in politics is charisma. It makes people get glassy eyed
and jump and scream and clap without a thought in their heads. Adlai
Stevenson never does that. He makes people drowsy. His hair is thinning. He has all the oratorical fire of an algebra teacher. His clothes look like something
he bought from the coroner's office. When he feels good, he looks like he has a
virus. We need more politicians who make our blood run tepid.
Royko could have added that Stevenson also has none of the self righteousness
often found on Capitol Hill. Although a "blue-blood," as
close to aristocracy as an American can be, he displayed little interest
in the cocktail circuit or the show business of politics. On a Congressional
tour of China in 1975 he didn't seem to mind when the other
three Senators received lace-curtained limousines and he and his wife,
Nancy, were assigned a less showy sedan.
During his second Senate term, he became disillusioned with the
Carter administration. He saw it as "embarrassingly weak" and more
concerned with retaining its power than with exercising it effectively.
In 1979, he announced he would not seek re-election to the Senate, but
he mentioned a new interest: the presidency. He might run for the
White House the next year. "I'm going to talk about ideas and see if an
idea can still triumph, or even make a dent," he said. It didn't. Stevenson
ultimately decided not to run. With Senator Edward Kennedy in
the race, he felt he would get little media attention. By the time Kennedy
pulled out Stevenson concluded it was too late to get organized.
After a year's breather, in 1981 he announced his interest in running
for the governorship of Illinois. This time he followed through.
The make-up of his campaign organization, the character of his
campaign, and the support he had received in the past in Jewish neighborhoods
provided little hint of trouble ahead from pro-Israeli quarters.
Several of the most important members of his campaign team were
Jewish: Philip Klutznick, president emeritus of B'nai B'rith and an
organizer of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations,
who agreed to organize Stevenson's main campaign dinner; Milton
Fisher, prominent attorney and chairman of his finance committee;
Rick Jasculca, a public relations executive who became Stevenson's
full time press secretary.
Stevenson chose Grace Mary Stern as his running mate for the
position of lieutenant governor. Her husband was prominent in
Chicago Jewish affairs.
Stevenson himself had received several honors from Jewish
groups in preceding years. He had been selected by the Chicago Jewish
community as 1974 Israel Bond "Man of the Year," commended by
the American Jewish Committee for his legislative work against the
Arab boycott bf Israel in 1977, and honored by the government of
Israel-which established the Adlai E. Stevenson III Chair at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot. Stevenson had every reason to
expect that organized Illinois Jewry would overlook his occasional
mild position critical of Israeli policy.
But trouble developed. A segment of the Jewish community quietly launched an attack that would cost him heavily. Stevenson's detractors were determined to defeat him in the governor's race and thus discourage a future Stevenson bid for the presidency. Their basic tool was a document provided by the A.I.P.A.C in Washington. It was presented as a summary of Stevenson's Senate actions on Middle East issues-though it made no mention of his almost unblemished record of support for Israel and the tributes the Jewish community had presented to him in testimony of this support. Like most A.I.P.A.C documents, it would win no prizes for balance and objectivity.
For example, A.I.P.A.C pulled from a 21-page report Stevenson prepared after a 1976 trip to the Middle East just this lonely phrase: "There is no organization other than the PLO with a broadly recognized claim to represent the Palestinians." This was a simple statement of fact. But the writer of the Jewish Chicago article, citing the A.I.P.A.C "summary," asserted that these words had helped to give Stevenson "a reputation as one of the harshest critics of both Israel policy and of U.S. support for the Jewish state." Stevenson's assessment of the PLO's standing in the Palestinian community was interpreted as an
assault on Israel.
In fact, the full paragraph in the Stevenson report from which A.I.P.A.C took its brief excerpt is studied and reasonable:
The Palestinians are by general agreement the nub of the problem. Although badly divided, they have steadily increased in numbers, economic and military strength, and seriousness of purpose. They cannot be left out of any Middle East settlement. Their lack of unity is reflected in the lack of unity within the top ranks of the PLO, but there is no organization other than the PLO with a broadly recognized claim to represent the Palestinians.
The Stevenson report was critical of certain Israeli policies but hardly hostile to Israel. "The PLO," he wrote, "may be distrusted, disowned and despised, but it is a reality, if for no other reason than that it has no rival organization among Palestinians."
Stevenson went on to issue a challenge to the political leaders of America:
A new order of statesmanship is required from both the Executive and the Legislative Branches. For too long Congress has muddled or gone along without any real understanding of Middle Eastern politics. Neither the United States, nor Israel, nor any of the Arab states will be served by continued
ignorance or the expediencies of election year politics.
None of this positive comment found its way into the A.I.P.A.C report or
into the Jewish Chicago article or into any of the anti-Stevenson literature
which was distributed within the Jewish community during the
1982 campaign.
The anti-Stevenson activists noted with alarm that in 1980 Stevenson
had sponsored an amendment to reduce aid to Israel and the year
before had supported a similar amendment offered by Senator Mark O.
Hatfield, Republican of Oregon. The Hatfield amendment proposed to
cut by 10 per cent the amount of funds available to Israel for military
credits.
Stevenson's amendment had focused on Israeli settlements in occupied
territories, which President Carter and earlier administrations
characterized as both illegal and an obstacle to peace but did nothing to
discourage beyond occasional expressions of regret. Stevenson proposed
withholding $150 million in aid until Israel halted both the building
and planning of additional settlements. The amendment did not cut
funds; it simply withheld a fraction of the $2.18 billion total aid authorized
for Israel that year. In speaking for the amendment, Stevenson
noted that the outlay for Israel amounted to 43 percent of all U.S. funds
allocated for such purposes worldwide:
This preference for Israel diverts funds from the support of human life and vital
American interests elsewhere in an interdependent and unstable world.If it
could produce stability in the Middle East or enhance Israel's security, it could
be justified. But it reflects continued U.S. acquiescence in an Israeli policy
which threatens more Middle East instability, more Israeli insecurity, and a
continued decline of U.S. authority in the world. Our support for Israel is not
the issue here. Israel's support for the ideals of peace and justice which gave it
birth are at issue. It is, I submit, for the Israel government to recognize again
that Israel's interests are in harmony with our own and, for that to happen, it is
important that we do not undermine the voices for peace in Israel or justify
those, like Mr. Begin, who claim U.S. assistance from the Congress can be
taken for granted.
The amendment, like Hatfield's, was overwhelmingly defeated.
After the vote on his amendment, Stevenson recalls, he received
apologetic comments. "Several Senators came up and said, 'Adlai, you
are right, but you understand why I had to vote against you. Maybe
next time.'" Stevenson did understand why: lobby intimidation produced
the negative votes. He found intimidation at work on another
front too, the news media. He offered the amendment, he explained,"because I thought the public was entitled to a debate on this critical
issue," but news services gave it no attention.[And none of them do today either 38 BILLION over 10 years...disgrace DC]
That's another aspect of this problem. It's not only the intimidation of the
American politician, it's also the intimidation of some American journalists. If
it's not the journalists, then it's the editors and perhaps more so the publishers.
Anti-Stevenson campaigners also found it expedient to portray
him as a supporter of Arab economic blackmail, despite his widely
hailed legislative record to the contrary. Stevenson was actually the
principal author of the 1977 legislation to prohibit American firms from
cooperating with the Arab boycott of Israel. But in the smear campaign
conducted against him in his gubernatorial bid his legislative history
was rewritten. He was actually accused of trying to undermine the
anti-boycott effort.
In fact, Stevenson, in a lonely and frustrating effort, saved the
legislation from disaster. For this achievement, he received a plaque
and praise from the American Jewish Committee. The chairman of the
National Jewish Community Relations Council, Theodore R. Mann,
wrote to Stevenson, expressing the organization's "deep appreciation
for your invaluable contribution to the adoption of that landmark legislation.
" He added that the legislation "not only reassures the American
Jewish community as to the commitment of America to fairness and
nondiscrimination in international trade but, more fundamentally,
stands as a reaffirmation of our nation's profound regard for principle
and morality."
Jewish Chicago, making no mention of Stevenson's success in the
anti-boycott effort or the unstinting praise he received from Jewish
leaders, reported that he encountered "major conflicts" with "the
American Jewish leadership" over the boycott legislation.
A flyer distributed by an unidentified "Informed Citizens Against
Stevenson Committee," made the same charge. Captioned, "The Truth
About Adlai Stevenson," it used half-truths to brand Stevenson as anti Israel
during his Senate years and concluded: "It is vitally important
that Jewish voters be fully informed about Stevenson's record. Still
dazzled by the Stevenson name, many Jews are totally unaware of his
antagonism to Jewish interests." The "committee" provided no names
or addresses of sponsoring individuals. Shirley Friedman, a free-lance
writer in Chicago, later identified the flyer as her own. The message on
the flyer concluded:
"Don't forget: It is well-known that Stevenson considers the governor's
chair as a stepping-stone to the presidency. Spread the word Let
the truth be told!"
The word was indeed spread in the Chicago Jewish community
throughout the summer and fall of 1982. The political editor of the
Chicago Sun-Times reported in June that some activists for Thompson
had been "working quietly for months to assemble a group to mobilize
Jewish voters" against Stevenson.
The result of their efforts was "The Coalition for the Re-election of
Jim Thompson" which included Jewish Democrats who had not backed
Thompson previously. When Republican Senator Rudy Boschwitz of
Minnesota, a strong supporter of Israel, came to Chicago in October to
address a breakfast gathering sponsored by the Coalition, he declared
that, as Senator, Stevenson was "a very steadfast foe of aid to Israel."
"Smear and Innuendo"
A major problem was the unprinted but widely whispered charge
of Antisemitism against Stevenson-a man, who, like his father, had
spent his life championing civil rights for all Americans. "I learned
after election day there was that intimation throughout the campaign,"
recalls Stevenson.
Phil Klutznick's daughter, Mrs. Bettylu Saltzman, who worked on
Stevenson's campaign staff, remembers, "There was plenty of stuff
going around about him being anti-Semitic. It got worse and worse. It
was a much more difficult problem than anyone imagined."
Stevenson's running-mate, Grace Mary Stern, recalls: "There was
a very vigorous [anti-Stevenson] telephone campaign in the Jewish
community." She says leaflets charging Stevenson with being anti Israel
were distributed widely at local Jewish temples, and adds there
was much discussion of the Antisemitism accusation: "There was a
very vigorous campaign, man to man, friend to friend, locker room to
locker room. We never really came to grips with the problem."
Campaign fund raising suffered accordingly. The Jewish community
had supported Stevenson strongly in both of his campaigns for the
Senate. After his remarks in the last years of his Senate career, some of
the Jewish support dried up. "Many of my most generous Jewish contributors
stayed with me, but the organization types, the professionals
did not," Stevenson recalls. He believes the withdrawal of organized
Jewish support also cut into funds from out-of-state he otherwise
would have received. In the end, Thompson was able to outspend
Stevenson by better than two to one.
Fed up by early September with unfounded charges of antisemitism,
Stevenson finally responded, charging that a "subterranean
campaign of smear and innuendo" was being waged by supporters of Thompson. His press secretary, Rick Jasculca, complained that the
material distributed by the Coalition for the Re-election of Jim Thompson
"tries to give the impression that Adlai is unquestionably anti Israel."
Thompson's political director, Philip O'Connor, denied there
was a smear campaign and disavowed the Friedman flyer.
Thompson himself said of Stevenson, "I don't think he is an anti-Semite, but he is no particular friend of Israel." The Chicago SunTimes
published an editorial rebuke for this remark: "That's like
saying, no, I don't think Stevenson beats his wife, but she did have a
black eye last week." The editorial continued:
Far more important, the statement is not true; Stevenson as a Senator may
have occasionally departed from positions advocated by the Israeli government,
but out of well-reasoned motives and a genuine desire to secure a lasting
peace for the area. Thompson's coy phrasing was a reprehensible appeal to the
voter who measures a candidate's worth by a single, rubbery standard.
The only Jews who tried to counter the attack were those close to
Stevenson. Philip Klutznick, prominent in Jewish affairs and chairman
of the Stevenson Dinner Committee, said, "It is beneath the dignity of
the Jewish community to introduce these issues into a gubernatorial
campaign." Stevenson campaign treasurer Milton Fisher said: "Adlai's
views are probably consistent with 40 percent of the Knesset [Israeli
parliament]. "
Stevenson was ultimately defeated in the closest gubernatorial
election in the state's history. The margin was 5,074 votes-one seventh
of one percent of the total 3.5 million votes cast.
The election was marred by a series of mysterious irregularities
which Time magazine described as "so improbable, so coincidental, so
questionable that it could have happened only in Wonderland, or the
Windy City." On election night ballot boxes from fifteen Chicago precincts
inexplicably disappeared, and others turned up in the homes or cars of poll workers. Stevenson asked for a recount-past recounts had
resulted in shifts of 5,000 to 7,000 votes-but the Illinois Supreme
Court, by a 4-to-3 vote, denied his petition. Judge Seymour Simon, a
Democrat, joined the three Republicans on the court in voting against
Stevenson's request.
A post-election editorial in a suburban Chicago newspaper acknowledged
the impact of the concerted smear campaign on the election
outcome:
An intense last-minute effort among Chicago-area Jews to thwart Adlai Stevenson's
attempt to unseat Illinois Gov. James Thompson in last Tuesday's election
may have succeeded. The weekend before the election many Chicago and suburban rabbis spoke out against Stevenson and there were thousands of
pamphlets and leaflets distributed in Jewish areas ... all attacking the former
Senator.
After describing the attack, the editorial concluded,
The concentrated anti-Stevenson campaign, particularly since it went largely
unanswered, almost surely cost him thousands of votes among the 248,000
Chicago-area Jews-266,000 throughout the state-who traditionally have
leaned in his direction politically.
Campaign manager Joseph Novak agrees: "If that effort hadn't
happened, Stevenson would be governor today." In the predominantly
Jewish suburban Chicago precincts of Highland Park and Lake County
"We just got killed, just absolutely devastated." Press secretary Rick
Jasculca adds, "What bothers me is that hardly any rabbis, or Jewish
leaders beyond Phil Klutznick were willing to speak up, and say this
is nonsense to call Adlai anti-Israel."
Thomas A. Dine, executive director of the American Israel Public
Affairs Committee, gloated, "The memory of Adlai Stevenson's hostility
toward Israel during his Senate tenure lost him the Jewish vote in
Illinois-and that cost him the gubernatorial election."
Stevenson too believes the effort to discredit him among Jews
played a major role in his defeat: "In a race that close, it was more than
enough to make the difference."
Asked about the impact of the Israeli lobby on the U.S. political
scene, he responded without hesitation:
There is an intimidating, activist minority of American Jews that supports the
decisions of the Israeli government, right or wrong. They do so very vocally
and very aggressively in ways that intimidate others so that it's their voice even
though it's a minority-that is heard and felt in American politics. But it
still is much louder in the United States than in Israel. In other words, you have
a much stronger, more vocal dissent in Israel than within the Jewish community in the United States. The prime minister of Israel has far more influence
over American foreign policy in the Middle East than over the policies of his
own government generally.
The former Senator reports a profound change within the Jewish
community in recent years:
The old passionate commitment of Jewish leaders to civil liberties, social welfare,
in short, to liberalism has to a large extent dissipated. The issue now is
much more Israel itself. If given a choice between the traditional liberal commitment
and the imagined Israeli commitment, they'll opt now for the Israeli
commitment.
Reflecting on his career and the price he has paid for challenging
Israeli policies, Stevenson concluded:
I will have no hesitation about continuing. I wish I had started earlier and been
more effective. I really don't understand the worth of public office if you can't
serve the public. It's better to lose. It's better not to serve than to be mortgaged
or compromised.
Stevenson followed the tradition of a colleague, a famous Senator
from Arkansas who eloquently criticized Israeli policy and American
foreign policy over a period of many years.
The Dissenter
"When all of us are dead, the only one they'll remember is Bill
Fulbright." The tribute by Idaho Senator Frank Church, a fellow Democrat,
was amply justified. As much as any man of his time, J. William
Fulbright shaped this nation's attitudes on the proper exercise of
its power in a world made acutely dangerous by nuclear weapons.
Dissent was a hallmark of his career, but it was dissent with distinction.
The fact was, Fulbright was usually right.
Fulbright first gained national attention by condemning the "swinish
blight" of McCarthyism. In 1954 while many Americans cheered
the crusade of the Wisconsin Senator's Permanent Investigations Subcommittee,
Fulbright cast the lone vote against a measure to continue
the subcommittee's funding. Because of this vote he was accused of
being "a Communist, a fellow traveler, an atheist, and a man beneath
contempt. "
Fulbright opposed U.S. intervention in Cuba in 1961 and in the
Dominican Republic four years later, and was ahead of his time in
calling for detente with the Soviet Union and a diplomatic opening with
China. When he proposed a different system for selecting presidents,
Harry Truman was offended and called him "that over-educated Oxford
s.o.b." Twenty-five years later, in 1974, the New York Times recognized
him as "the most outspoken critic of American foreign policy
of this generation."
His deepest and most abiding interest is the advancement of international
understanding through education, and thousands of young
people have broadened their vision through the scholarships that bear
his name. But Fulbright also became well known for his outspoken
opposition to the Vietnam War as "an endless, futile war, debilitating
and indecent"-a stand which put him at odds with a former colleague
and close friend, President Lyndon B. Johnson. President Johnson believed that America was embarked on a noble mission in
Southeast Asia against an international Communist conspiracy. Fulbright
put no stock in the conspiracy theory, feared the war might
broaden into a showdown with China, and saw it as an exercise in "the
arrogance of power."
In 1963 Fulbright chaired an investigation that brought to public
attention the exceptional tax treatment of contributions to Israel and
aroused the ire of the Jewish community. The investigation was
managed by Walter Pincus, a journalist Fulbright hired after reading a
Pincus study of lobbying. Pincus recalls that Fulbright gave him a free
hand, letting him choose the ten prime lobbying activities to be examined
and backing him throughout the controversial investigation.
One of the groups chosen by Pincus, himself Jewish, was the Jewish
Telegraph Agency,at that time a principal instrument of the Israeli lobby. Both Fulbright and Pincus were accused of trying to destroy the
Jewish Telegraph Agency and of being anti-Semitic.
Pincus remembers, "Several Senators urged that the inquiry into
the Jewish operation be dropped. Senators Hubert Humphrey and
Bourke Hickenlooper senior Republican on the Foreign Relations
Committee were among them. Fulbright refused."
The Fulbright hearings also exposed the massive funding illegally
channeled into the American Zionist Council by Israel. More than five
million dollars had been secretly poured into the Council for spending
on public relations firms and pro-Israel propaganda before Fulbright's
committee closed down the operation.
Despite his concern over the pro-Israeli lobby, Fulbright took the
exceptional step of recommending that the United States guarantee
Israeli's borders. In a major address in 1970 he proposed an American Israeli
treaty under which the United States would commit itself to
intervene militarily if necessary to "guarantee the territory and independence
of Israel" within the lands it held before the 1967 war. The
treaty, he said, should be a supplement to a peace settlement arranged
by the United Nations. The purpose of his proposal was to destroy the
arguments of those who maintained that Israel needed the captured
territory for its security.
Fulbright saw Israeli withdrawal from the Arab lands it occupied
in the 1967 war as the key to peace: Israel could not occupy Arab
territory and have peace too. He said Israeli policy in establishing
settlements on the territories "has been characterized by lack of flexibility
and foresight." Discounting early threats by some Arab leaders to
destroy the state of Israel, Fulbright noted that both President Nasser
of the United Arab Republic and King Hussein of Jordan had in effect repudiated such Draconian threats, "but the Israelis seem not to have
noticed the disavowals."
During the 1970's Fulbright repeatedly took exception to the contention
that the Middle East crisis was a test of American resolve
against Soviet interventionism. In 1971, he accused Israel of "Communist-baiting
humbuggery" and argued that continuing Middle East tension,
in fact, only benefited Soviet interests.
Appearing on CBS television's "Face the Nation" in 1973, Fulbright
declared that the Senate was "subservient" to Israeli policies
which were inimical to American interests. He said the United States
bears "a very great share of the responsibility" for the continuation of
Middle East violence. "It's quite obvious that without the all-out
support by the United States in money and weapons and so on, the
Israelis couldn't do what they've been doing."
Fulbright said the United States failed to pressure Israel for a
negotiated settlement, because
The great majority of the Senate of the United States-somewhere around 80
percent-are completely in support of Israel, anything Israel wants. This has
been demonstrated time and time again, and this has made it difficult for our
government.
The Senator claimed that "Israel controls the Senate" and warned,
"We should be more concerned about the United States' interests." Six
weeks after his "Face the Nation" appearance, Fulbright again expressed
alarm over Israeli occupation of Arab territories. He charged
that the U.S. had given Israel "unlimited support for unlimited expansion.
"
His criticism of Israeli policy caused stirrings back home. Jews
who had supported him in the past became restless. After years of easy
election victories trouble loomed for Fulbright in 1974. Encouraged, in
part, by the growing Jewish disenchantment with Fulbright, on the eve
of the deadline for filing petitions of candidacy in the Democratic primary
Governor Dale Bumpers surprised the political world by becoming
a challenger for Fulbright's Senate seat. Fulbright hadn't expected
Bumpers to run, but recognized immediately that the popular young
governor posed a serious challenge: "He had lots of hair in contrast to
Fulbright, he looked good on television and he'd never done anything
to offend anyone."
There were other factors. Walter Pincus, who later became a
Washington Post reporter, believed Fulbright's decision to take a golfing
holiday in Bermuda just before the primary deadline may have
helped to convince Bumpers that Fulbright would not work hard for the nomination. It was also the year of Watergate-a bad year for incumbents.
In his campaign, Bumpers pointed with alarm to the "mess in
Washington" and called for a change. The New York Times reported
that he "skillfully exploited an old feeling that Mr. Fulbright spent
all his time dining with Henry Kissinger and fretting over the Middle
East."
The attitude of Jewish voters, both inside Arkansas and beyond,
was also a significant factor. "I don't think Bumpers would have run
without that encouragement," says Fulbright. Following the election, a
national Jewish organization actually claimed credit for the young governor's
stunning upset victory. Fulbright has a copy of a memorandum
circulated in May 1974 to the national board of directors of B'nai
B'rith. Marked "confidential," the memo from Secretary-General Herman
Edelsberg, announced that "all of the indications suggest that
our actions in support of Governor Bumpers will result in the ousting of
Mr. Fulbright from his key position in the Senate." Edelsberg later
rejected the memorandum as "phony."
Since his defeat, Fulbright has continued to speak out, decrying
Israeli stubbornness and warning of the Israeli lobby. In a speech just
before the end of his Senate term, Fulbright warned, "Endlessly pressing
the United States for money and arms-and invariably getting all
and more than she asks-Israel makes bad use of a good friend." His
central concern was that the Middle East conflict might flare into nuclear
war. He warned somberly that "Israel's supporters in the United
States by underwriting intransigence, are encouraging a course
which must lead toward her destruction-and just possibly ours as
well."
Pondering the future from his office three blocks north of the
White House, Fulbright sees little hope that Capitol Hill will effectively
challenge the Israeli lobby:
It's suicide for politicians to oppose them. The only possibility would be someone
like Eisenhower who already feels secure. Eisenhower had already made
his reputation. He was already a great man in the eyes of the country, and he
wasn't afraid of anybody. He said what he believed.
Then he adds a somewhat more optimistic note: "I believe a president
could do this. He wouldn't have to be named Eisenhower." Fulbright
cites a missed opportunity:
I went to Jerry Ford after he took office in 1975. I was out of office then. I had
been to the Middle East and visited with some of the leading figures. I came
back and told the president, 'Look, I think these Arab leaders are willing to
accept Israel, but the Israelis have got to go back to the 1967 borders. The
problem can be solved if you are willing to take a position on it.
Fulbright predicted that the American people would back Ford if
he demanded that Israel cooperate. He reminded him that Eisenhower
was re-elected by a large margin immediately after he forced Israel to
withdraw after invading Egypt:
Taking a stand against Israel didn't hurt Eisenhower. He carried New York
with its big Jewish population.
I told Ford I didn't think he would be defeated if he put it the right way. He
should say Israel had to go back to the 1967 borders; if it didn't, no more arms
or money. That's just the way Eisenhower did it. And Israel would have to
cooperate. And politically, in the coming campaign, I told him he should say he
was for Israel, but he was for America first.
Ford, Fulbright recalls, listened courteously but was noncommittal:
"Of course he didn't take my advice."
Yet the determination in the face of such disappointment echoes
through one of his last statements as a U.S. Senator:
History casts no doubt at all on the ability of human beings to deal rationally
with their problems, but the greatest doubt on their will to do so. The signals of
the past are thus clouded and ambiguous, suggesting hope but not confidence in
the triumph of reason. With nothing to lose in any event, it seems well worth a
try.
Warning Against "Absolutism"
James G. Abourezk of South Dakota came to the Senate in 1973
after serving two years in the House of Representatives. The son of
Lebanese immigrants-the first person of Arab ancestry elected to the
Senate-he spoke up for Arab interests and quickly became a center of
controversy.
Soon after he took office, Abourezk accepted an invitation to
speak at Yeshiva University in New York, but anxious school officials
called almost immediately to tell him of rising student protests against
his appearance. A few days later, the chairman of the dinner committee
asked Abourezk to make a public statement calling for face-to-face
negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors, assuring Abourezk
that this proposal, identical to the one being made by Israel's prime
minister, Golda Meir, would ease student objections and end the protest.
Although Abourezk favored such negotiations, he refused to
make the requested statement. He explained, "I do not wish to be in
the position of placating agitators." Rabbi Israel Miller, vice-president
of the school, came to Washington to urge Abourezk to reconsider.
When Abourezk again refused, the dinner chairman telephoned again,
this time to report that students were beginning to picket. Sensing that school officials wanted the event cancelled, Abourezk offered to withdraw
from the obligation. His offer was hastily accepted.
Soon after, Abourezk was announced as the principal speaker at a
rally to be held in Rochester, New York, to raise money for victims of
the Lebanese civil war. The rally's organizing committee was immediately
showered with telephoned bomb threats. In all, 23 calls
warned that the building would be blown up if Abourezk appeared on
the program. With the help of the FBI, local police swept the building
for bombs and, finding none, opened it for the program. A capacity
crowd, unaware of the threats, heard the event proceed without incident.
After making a tour of Arab states in December 1973, Abourezk
sympathized with Arab refugees in a speech at the National Press Club
in Washington. Covering his speech for the A.I.P.A.C newsletter, Near
East Report, Wolf Blitzer wrote, "If Abourezk's position were to
prevail, Israel's life would be jeopardized." Blitzer's report was sent to
Jews who had contributed to Abourezk's campaign, accompanied by a
letter in which I. L. Kenen, A.I.P.A.C director, warned that Abourezk
was "going to great lengths" to "undermine American friendship for
Israel." The mailing, Abourezk recalls, began an "adversary relationship"
with AIPAC. He adds, "I doubt that I would have spent so much
time on the Middle East had it not been for that particular unfair
personal attack." (In 1980, after retiring from the Senate, Abourezk
founded the American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, which
now has 20,000 members and whose purpose, he says, "is to provide a
countervailing force to the Israeli lobby. ")
On one occasion in the Senate, Abourezk turned lobby pressure to
his advantage. Wishing to be appointed in 1974 to fill a vacancy on the
Senate Judiciary Committee, he warned David Brody, lobbyist for the
B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League, that if he did not secure the
appointment he would seek a seat on the Foreign Relations Committee.
He recalls, with a chuckle, "This warning had the desired effect. The
last thing Brody wanted was to see me on Foreign Relations where aid
to Israel is decided. Thanks to the help of the lobby I received the
appointment to Judiciary, even though James Allen, a Senator with
more seniority, also wanted the position." The appointment enabled
Abourezk to chair hearings in 1977 on the legality of Israel's occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza. "They were the first-and last hearings-on
this subject," Abourezk recalls. "And not one of my
colleagues attended. I was there alone."
In 1975, Ahourezk invited the head of the PLO's Beirut office,
Shafiq al-Hout, to lunch in the Senate and learned that PLO-related
secrets are hard to keep. On Abourezk's assurance that the event
would be kept entirely private, eleven other Senators, including Abraham Ribicoff of Connecticut, who is Jewish, attended and heard al Hout
relate the PLO side of Middle East issues. Within an hour after
the event was concluded, Spencer Rich of the Washington Post telephoned
Abourezk for comment. He had already learned the identity of
all Senators who attended. The next day Israel's leading English language
daily newspaper, the Jerusalem Post, reported that Ribicoff and
the others had had lunch with "murderer" al-Hout.
A major storm erupted in 1977 when Abourezk agreed on short
notice to fill in for Vice-President Walter Mondale as the principal
speaker at the annual Jefferson-Jackson Day dinner sponsored in Denver
by the Colorado Democratic Party. Jewish leaders protested his
appearance, and John Mrozek, a labor leader in Denver, attacked
Abourezk as "pro-Arab and anti-Israel." Betty Crist, a member of the
dinner committee, moved that the invitation be withdrawn. When the
Crist motion was narrowly rejected, the committee tried to find a pro Israeli
speaker to debate Abourezk, with the intention of cancelling the
event if a debate could not be arranged. This gave the proceedings a
comic twist, as Abourezk at no point had intended to mention the
Middle East in his remarks. Unable to find someone to debate their
guest, the committee reconsidered and let the invitation to Abourezk
stand in its original form.
Arriving at the Denver airport, Abourezk told reporters, "As a
United States Senator, I have sworn to uphold the government of the
United States, but I never dreamed that I would be required to swear
allegiance to any other government." In his remarks to the dinner
audience of 700, he warned of the "extraordinary influence of the Zionist
lobby." He said the United States "is likely to become, if it has not
already, a captive of its client state."
He said, "The point of the controversy surrounding this dinner has
been my refusal to take an absolutist position for Israel. There is extreme
danger to all of us in this kind of absolutism. It implies that only
one position-that of being unquestionably pro-Israel-is the only position."
The Rocky Mountain News reported that his speech received a
standing ovation, "although there were pockets of people who sat on
their hands." The Denver newspaper editorialized, "James Abourezk
is not a fanatic screaming for the blood of Israel. Colorado Democratic
leaders should be proud to have him as their speaker. He is better than
they deserve."
"Sins of Omission"
The Israeli lobby's long string of Capitol Hill victories has been
broken only twice during the past twenty-five years. Both setbacks occurred in the Senate and involved military sales to Saudi Arabia. In
1978 the Senate approved the sale of F-15 fighter planes by a vote of 54
to 44, and in 1981 the sale of AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control
System) intelligence-gathering planes and special equipment for the
F-15's by a vote of 52 to 48. Curiously, both controversies entangled the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee in the politics of the state of
Maine.
This involvement began on the Senate floor one afternoon in the
spring of 1978 when Senator Edward "Ted" Kennedy received a whispered
message which brought an angry flush to his face. A.I.P.A.C had
forsaken a Senate Democrat with a consistently pro-Israeli record.
Senator William Hathaway of Maine, who had, without exception, cast
his vote in behalf of Israel's interests, was being "dropped" by the
lobby in favor of William S. Cohen, his Republican challenger. Kennedy
strode to the adjoining cloakroom and reached for a telephone.
Kennedy demanded an explanation from Morris J. Amitay, then
executive director of A.I.P.A.C. Flustered, Amitay denied that A.I.P.A.C
had taken a position against Hathaway. The organization, he insisted,
provides information on candidates but makes no endorsements.
Pressed by Kennedy, Amitay promised to issue a letter to Hathaway
complimenting him on his support of Israel.
The letter was sent, but the damage had already been done.
Though Amitay was technically correct-A.I.P.A.C does not formally
endorse candidates for the House or Senate-the lobby has effective
ways to show its colors, raise money and influence votes. In the Maine
race, it was making calls for Cohen and against Hathaway. The shift, so
astounding and unsettling to Kennedy, arose from a single "failing" on
Hathaway's part. It was a sin of omission, but a cardinal sin
nonetheless.
Over the years, Hathaway had sometimes refused to sign letters
and resolutions which A.I.P.A.C sponsored. The resolutions were usually
statements of opinion by the Senate-called "sense of the Senate"
resolutions-and had no legislative effect. The letters were directed
to the president or a cabinet officer, urging him to support Israel. In
refusing to sign, Hathaway did not single out A.I.P.A.C projects; he often
rejected such requests from other interest groups as well, preferring to
write his own letters and introduce his own resolutions. Nor did he
always refuse A.I.P.A.C. Sometimes, as a favor, he would set aside his
usual reservations and sign.
Hathaway cooperated in 1975 when A.I.P.A.C sponsored its famous
"spirit of 76" letter. It bore Hathaway's name and those of 75 of his
colleagues and carried this message to President Gerald R. Ford: "We
urge that you reiterate our nation's long-standing commitment to Israel's security by a policy of continued military supplies, and diplomatic
and economic support." At another moment, this expression
would cause no ripples. Since the administration of John F. Kennedy,
the U.S. government had been following a policy of "continued military
supplies." But when this letter was made public in January 1975, it
shook the executive branch as have few Senate letters in history.
Ford, dissatisfied with Israeli behavior, had just issued a statement
calling for a "reappraisal" of U.S. policies in the Middle East. His
statement did not mention Israel by name as the offending party, but
his message was clear: Ford wanted better cooperation in reaching a
compromise with Arab interests, and "reappraisal" meant suspension
of U.S. aid until Israel improved its behavior. It was a historic proposal,
the first time since Eisenhower that a United States president
even hinted publicly that he might suspend aid to Israel.
Israel's response came, not from its own capital, but from the
United States Senate. Instead of relying on a direct protest to the
White House, Jerusalem activated its lobby in the United States,
which, in turn, signed up as supporters of Israel's position more than
three-fourths of the members of the United States Senate.
A more devastating-and intimidating-response could scarcely
be conceived. The seventy-six signatures effectively told Ford he could
not carry out his threatened "reappraisal." Israel's loyalists in the Senate-Democrats
and Republicans alike-were sufficient in number to
reject any legislative proposal hostile to Israel that Ford might make,
and perhaps even enact a pro-Israeli piece of legislation over a presidential
veto.
The letter was a demonstration of impressive clout. Crafted and
circulated by A.I.P.A.C, it had been endorsed overnight by a majority of
the Senate membership. Several Senators who at first had said "No"
quickly changed their positions. Senator John Culver admitted candidly,
"The pressure was too great. I caved." So did President Ford. He
backed down and never again challenged the lobby.
This wasn't the only time Hathaway answered A.I.P.A.C's call to
oppose the White House on a major issue. Three years later, Ford's
successor, Jimmy Carter, fought a similar battle with the Israeli lobby.
At issue this time was a resolution to disapprove President Carter's
proposal to sell F-15 fighters to Saudi Arabia. The White House needed
the support of only one chamber to defeat the resolution. White House
strategists felt that the House of Representatives would overwhelmingly
vote to defeat the sale, so they decided to put all their resources
into the Senate.
Lobbying on both sides was highly visible and aggressive. Frederick
Dutton, chief lobbyist for Saudi Arabia, orchestrated the pro sale forces on Capitol Hill. The Washington Post reported, "Almost every
morning these days, the black limousines pull up to Washington's
Madison Hotel to collect their Saudi Arabian passengers. Their destination,
very often, is Capitol Hill, where the battle of the F-15's unfolds."
The Israeli lobby pulled out all the stops. It coordinated a nationwide
public relations campaign which revived, as never before,
memories of the genocidal Nazi campaign against European Jews during
World War II. In the wake of the highly publicized television series,
"Holocaust," Capitol Hill was flooded with complimentary copies of
the novel on which the TV series was based. The books were accompanied
by a letter from A.I.P.A.C saying, "This chilling account of the
extermination of six million Jews underscores Israel's concerns during
the current negotiations for security without reliance on outside
guarantees." Concerning the book distribution, A.I.P.A.C's Aaron Rosenbaum
told the Washington Post: "We think, frankly, that it will affect a
few votes here and there, and simplify lobbying."
Senator Wendell Anderson of Minnesota at first agreed to support
the proposed sale. He told an administration official: "Sure, I'll go for
it. It sounds reasonable." But a few days before the vote he called
back: "I can't vote for it. I'm up for election, and my Jewish co-chairman
refuses to go forward if I vote for the F-15's." Furthermore,
he said, a Jewish group had met with him and showed him that 70
percent of the contributions to the Democratic Senatorial Campaign
Committee the previous year came from Jewish sources.
The pressure was sustained and heavy. Major personalities in the
Jewish community warned the fighter aircraft would constitute a serious
threat to Israel. Nevertheless a prominent Jewish Senator, Abraham
Ribicoff of Connecticut, lined up with Carter. This was a hard
blow to Amitay, who had previously worked on Ribicoff's staff. Earlier
in the year Ribicoff, while keeping his own counsel on the Saudi arms
question, took the uncharacteristic step of criticizing sharply Israeli
policies as well as the tactics of A.I.P.A.C. In an interview with the Wall
Street Journal, Ribicoff described Israel's retention of occupied territory
as "wrong" and unworthy of U.S. support. He said A.I.P.A.C does "a
great disservice to the U.S., to Israel and to the Jewish community."
He did not seek re-election in 1980.
The Senate approved the sale, 52 to 48, but in the process Carter
was so bruised that he never again forced a showdown vote in Congress
over Middle East policy.
Hathaway was one of the forty-four who stuck with A.I.P.A.C. but
this was not sufficient when election time rolled around. A.I.P.A.C
wanted a Senator whose signature-and vote-it could always count on. Searching for unswerving loyalty, the lobby switched to Cohen. Its
decision came at the very time Hathaway was resisting pressures on
the Saudi issue. The staff at the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee
was outraged. One of them declared to a visitor: "A.I.P.A.C demands
100 percent. If a fine Senator like Hathaway fails to cooperate
just once, they are ready to trade in his career." A staff member of a
Senate committee declared: "To please A.I.P.A.C, you have to be more
pure than Ivory soap-99.44 percent purity is not good enough." Lacking
the purity A.I.P.A.C demanded, Hathaway was defeated in 1978.
Caught in the AWACS Dilemma
William S. Cohen was elected to the Senate but soon found himself
in a storm similar to the one Hathaway, his predecessor, had encountered.
Once again a proposal to sell military equipment to Saudi Arabia
raised concerns among pro-Israeli forces about a Senator from Maine.
It occurred soon after Ronald Reagan's inauguration, when the new
president decided to approve the same request that the Carter administration
had put off the year before. Saudi Arabia would be allowed to
purchase its own AWACS planes, along with extra equipment to give
Saudi F-15 fighters greater range and firepower. Israeli officials opposed
the sale, because, they said, this technology would give Saudi
Arabia the capacity to monitor Israeli air force operations.
As in 1978, the Senate became the main battleground, but the
White House was slow to organize. Convinced that Jimmy Carter the
year before had taken on too many diverse issues at once, the Reagan
forces decided to concentrate on tax and budget questions in the early
months of the new administration. This left a vacuum in the foreign
policy realm which A.I.P.A.C filled skillfully. New director Thomas A.
Dine orchestrated a bipartisan counter-attack against arms transfers to
Saudi Arabia. Even before Reagan sent the AWACS proposal to
Capitol Hill for consideration, the Associated Press reported that the
Israeli lobby had lined up "veto-strength majorities."
A.I.P.A.C's campaign against AWACS began in the House of Representatives
through a public letter attacking the sale sponsored by Republican
Norman Lent in New York and Democrat Clarence Long of
Maryland. Ultimately, in October, the House rejected the proposed
sale by a vote of 301 to 111, but the real battleground was the Senate.
Earlier in the year, before the Senate took up the question, Senator
Bob Packwood of Oregon, always a dependable supporter of Israel,
announced that fifty-four Senators, a majority, had signed a request that
Reagan drop the idea. Needing time to persuade the Senators to
change, the White House put off the showdown. By September, fifty Senators had signed a resolution to veto the sale and six more promised
to sign if needed. Once more, the White House had no choice but to
delay.
This time the Saudis were testing their relationship with the new
president and left more of the lobbying to the White House than was
true in 1978. Their case relied heavily on personal efforts of Republican
Senate leader Howard Baker, Senator John Tower, chairman of the
Armed Services Committee, and Senator Charles Percy, chairman of
the Foreign Relations Committee. Lobbyist Frederick Dutton was instructed
to keep in the background, though David Sadd, executive
director of the National Association of Arab Americans, helped organize
the support of U.S. industries with a stake in the sale.
Meanwhile, Dine's team roamed the Senate corridors while
A.I.P.A.C's grassroots contacts brought direct pressure from constituents.
The Post reported that ''A.I.P.A.C's fountain of research materials
reaches a readership estimated at 200,000 people." Senator John
Glenn of Ohio, said: "I've been getting calls from every Jewish organization
in the country. They didn't want to talk about the issues. The big
push was to get me to sign this letter and resolution." Glenn did not
sign, largely because he hoped to broker a deal with the White House.
Syndicated columnist Carl T. Rowan wrote "there is strong evidence"
that the A.W.A.C.S struggle increased "public resentment against
the 'Jewish lobby.'"
The issue was portrayed by some as a choice between President
Reagan and Prime Minister Begin. Bumper stickers appeared around
Washington which read, "Reagan or Begin?" When the Senate finally
voted, Cohen, although announced in opposition, switched and provided
one of the critical votes supporting the AWACS sale. He explained
his reversal by declaring that Israel would have been branded
the scapegoat for failure of the Middle East peace process if the proposal
were defeated.
Aside from this "sin," one of "commission" in the eyes of A.I.P.A.C,
his behavior was exemplary. Never once did he stray from the fold, and
in 1984 A.I.P.A.C did not challenge his bid for re-election.
Standing Up for Civility
One of the most popular members of the Senate, Charles "Mac"
Mathias of Maryland is something of a maverick,a role probably necessary
for his political survival. He is a Republican in a state where
Democrats outnumber Republicans by three to one.
During the Nixon administration especially, he frequently dissented
from the Republican party line. His opposition to the war in Vietnam and his staunch advocacy of civil rights and welfare initiatives
earned him a place on the Nixon administration's "enemies list" of
political opponents. In a December 1971 speech, before the Watergate
break-in at Democratic headquarters that led to Nixon's downfall, and
while the country was angrily divided by domestic tensions and the war
in Vietnam, Mathias advised Nixon to work to "bind the nation's
wounds." He urged the president to "take the high road" in the 1972
campaign and to disavow a campaign strategy "which now seems destined,
unnecessarily, to polarize the country even more." In the same
message Mathias criticized Nixon's advisers for "divisive exploitation
of the so-called social issues through, the use of hard-line rhetoric
on crime, civil rights, civil liberties and student unrest." Mathias was
alarmed at what he saw as the Republican drift to the right.
In 1975 and 1976 he even considered running for president as an
independent "third force" candidate in an effort to forge a "coalition of
the center." The late Clarence Mitchell, director of the Washington
office of the N.A.A.C.P, said: "He's always arrived at his position in a
reasoned way." In fact, early in his career he marked himself as a
progressive and a champion of civil rights, and his constituency takes
his liberalism on social issues in stride. A resident of Frederick,
Mathias's home town, told the Washington Post, "Why, a lot of people
around here think he's too liberal. But they seem to vote for him. The
thing is, he's decent. He's got class."
He also has flashes of daring. In the spring of 1981, he wrote an
article in the quarterly Foreign Affairs that he knew would put him in
hot water with some of his Jewish constituents, criticizing the role
played by ethnic lobbies-particularly the Israeli lobby-in the formation
of U.S. foreign policy. The controversial article upset Maryland's
influential Jewish community, which had consistently supported
Mathias's campaigns for office. Mathias had voted to sell fighter planes
to the Saudis in 1978 and his vote helped President Reagan get Senate
clearance for the AWACS sale in 1981.
The same year the controversial article appeared, just after voters
elected him to his third term in the Senate, Mathias took another step
which appeared so politically inexpedient that many people assumed
he had decided to retire from Congress in 1986. At the urging of
Senators Howard Baker and Charles Percy, who wanted another moderate
Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, Mathias gave
up a senior position on the Appropriations Committee in order to take
the foreign policy committee assignment.
His committee decision shook the leadership of Baltimore, the
largest city in the state and a competitor for federal grant assistance.
As the Baltimore Sun noted in an article critical of the move, "Had He remained on the Appropriations Committee, Mr. Mathias almost certainly
would have become chairman of the subcommittee that holds
the purse strings for the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
an agency of great importance to the 'renaissance' of Baltimore."
Contrary to the assumptions of Maryland political observers,
Mathias was not planning to retire. Although he left a committee important
to his constituents, the Senator welcomed the opportunity to
help shape the issues that come before the Foreign Relations Committee.
He was exhibiting a political philosophy admired by former
Senator Mike Mansfield, who once called Mathias "the conscience of
the Senate," and by former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, who
recognized Mathias as "one of the few statesmen I met in Washington."
These qualities led Mathias to write his controversial Foreign Affairs
article calling for "the re-introduction of civility" into the discussion
of "ethnic advocacy" in Congress. He acknowledged that ethnic
groups have the right to lobby for legislation, but he warned, "The
affirmation of a right, and of the dangers of suppressing it, does not, assure that the right will be exercised responsibly and for the general
good."
Mathias cited the Israeli lobby as the most powerful ethnic pressure
group, noting that it differs from others in that it focuses on vital
national security interests and exerts "more constant pressure." Other
lobbying groups "show up in a crisis and then disappear" and tend to
deal with domestic matters. Mathias continued:
With the exception of the Eisenhower administration, which virtually compelled
Israel's withdrawal from the Sinai after the 1956 war, American presidents,
and to an even greater degree Senators and Representatives, have been
subjected to recurrent pressures from what has come to be known as the Israel
lobby.
He added an indictment of his colleagues: "For the most part they have
been responsive ,to pro-Israeli lobbying pressure, and for reasons not
always related either to personal conviction or careful reflection on the
national interest."
Mathias illustrated his concern by reviewing the "spectacular"
success of A.I.P.A.C in 1975 when it promoted the "spirit of 76" letter:
"Seventy-six of us promptly affixed our signatures although no hearings
had been held, no debate conducted, nor had the administration
been invited to present its views." [That is fucking sad D.C]
The Maryland Republican felt the independence of Congress was
compromised by the intimidating effect of A.I.P.A.C's lobbying. He
wrote that "Congressional conviction" in favor of Israel "has been immeasurably reinforced by the knowledge that political sanctions will
be applied to any who fail to deliver" on votes to support high levels of
economic and military aid to Israel.
Although he signed the 1975 A.I.P.A.C letter to President Ford,
Mathias resisted A.l.P.A.C's 1978 lobbying against the Carter administration's
proposal to sell 60 F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. In the
Senate debate before the vote he said that both Israel and Saudi Arabia
were important friends of the United States and that "both need our
support."
Despite this attempt to balance American interests with Israel and
the Saudi Arabia, Mathias said an "emotional, judgmental atmosphere"
surrounded the arms sale issue. He quoted from a letter written to a
Jewish newspaper in New York condemning his vote:
Mr. Mathias values the importance of oil over the well-being of Jews and the
state of Israel. ... The Jewish people cannot be fooled by such a person, no
matter what he said, because his act proved who he was.
Yet Mathias had already responded to such criticism in his Foreign
Affairs article:
Resistance to the pressures of a particular group in itself signals neither a
sellout nor even a lack of sympathy with a foreign country or cause, but rather
a sincere conviction about the national interest of the United States.
He appealed to both the president and the Congress to "help to reduce
the fractiousness and strengthen our sense of common American purpose."
The president's national constituency afford him a unique opportunity
to work toward this end, but Congress, "although more
vulnerable to group pressures," must also be active, he wrote.
Mathias asserted that it is not enough simply to follow public
opinion: "An elected representative has other duties as well-to formulate
and explain to the best of his or her ability the general interest, and
to be prepared to accept the political consequences of having done so."
He warned that ethnic advocacy tends to excessiveness and can thwart
the higher good of national interests.[He is spot on in every thing he is saying,D.C]
The Baltimore Jewish Times reported that Jewish leaders faced "a
delicate dilemma" as they considered how to respond to the article:
Basically, they're damned if they do and damned if they don't. If they keep a
low profile and do not challenge Mathias's assertions, they feel they will be
shirking their duty and giving in. Yet if they "go after" the Senator, they will be
falling into a trap by proving his point about excessive pressure.
Some Jews decided to take the latter course. Arnold Blumberg, a
history professor at Towson State University, charged that Mathias "is
in the mainstream of a tradition which urged Americans to pursue trade with Japan and Nazi Germany right up to the moment when scrap
metal rained on the heads of American G.I's from German and Japanese
planes." A prominent Jewish community official charged that the article
was "malicious" and expressed hurt that Mathias had the "poison in
him to express these views." Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal, a
Democrat from New York and a senior member of the House Foreign
Affairs committee, charged that Mathias was "standing on the
threshold of bigotry" and denying "to the ethnic lobbies alone the right
to participate in shaping the American consensus on foreign policy."
Other critics expressed the fear that the article would encourage antisemitism.
A spokesperson for the Maryland Jewish War Veterans organization
said Mathias had "sold" himself "to the cause of the Saudis," while
a letter to the Baltimore Sun chided, "I wish that [Mathias] had had the
integrity to express those views one year prior to his re-election rather
than one year after." [LOL! Interesting,the beauty of hindsight.....Mathias had "sold" himself "to the cause of the Saudis,"....flash forward to 2017,the latest scuttlebutt out of the Middle East? Israel and Saudi Arabia making secret agreements and warring on their neighbors! DC]
One critic, identified as "a former lobbyist," told the Jewish Times
of Baltimore,
Mathias is a bright, well-respected legislator who's been effective on Soviet
Jewry, but when it comes to Israel he was always the last to come on board. He
was always reluctant, and was pressured by Jewish groups, and he resented the
pressure. He sees himself as a statesman above the fray. Now he obviously
feels he's in a position to say what he really believes.
The Jewish Community Relations Council in San Francisco
criticized Mathias in its August 3, 1981, "Backgrounder" issue for raising
the issue of "dual loyalty" within the "Jewish lobby." Mathias
dismissed the charge as a false issue. In Maryland, the article was
denounced by some rabbis, though Rabbi Jacob Angus of Baltimore
publicly defended Mathias.
Two journalist friends, Frank Mankiewicz and William Saflre,
warned Mathias at the time that his article would "cause trouble." Two
years later Mankiewicz assessed the Senator's future and said he felt
the article had created serious problems.
Ethnic lobbying still worries Mathias. Pondering each word over a
cup of tea one afternoon in the fall of 1983, he told me,
Ethnic ties enrich American life, but it must be understood they can't become
so important that they obscure the primary duty to be an American citizen.
Sometimes the very volume of this kind of activity can amount to an excessive
zeal.
Some of his critics had not read his article, Mathias recalls with a
smile. "In a way, they were saying, I haven't read it, but it's outrageous."
At breakfasts sponsored by Jewish groups, Mathias was regularly challenged. "When this happened, I would ask how many had
actually read my article. In a crowd of 200, maybe two hands would be
raised."
Did the article close off communication with Jewish constituents?
"I can't say it closed off access, but I have noticed that invitations have
fallen off in the past two years." Mathias did not seek a fourth term
in the Senate. He told a friend that controversy in the Jewish community
was a factor in his decision.
$3.1 Million from Pro-Israel Sources
Boy wonder of industry, self-made millionaire, tireless Republican
campaigner for progressive causes, Charles H. Percy was a bright prospect
for the presidency for a time in the late sixties. He skyrocketed to
prominence during his first term in the Senate, which began in 1967
after he won an upset victory over Paul Douglas, the popular but aging
liberal Democrat.
In his first election 60 percent of Jewish votes,Illinois has the
nation's fourth largest Jewish population-went to Douglas. But in the
next six years Percy supported aid for Israel, urged the Soviet Union to
permit emigration of Jews, criticized PLO terrorism, and supported
social causes so forcefully that Jews rallied strongly to his side when he
ran for re-election. In 1972 Percy accomplished something never before
achieved by carrying every county in the state and, even more remarkable
for an Illinois Protestant Republican, received 70 percent of the
Jewish vote.
His honeymoon with Jews was interrupted in 1975 when he returned
from a trip to the Middle East to declare, "Israel and its leadership, for
whom I have a high regard, cannot count on the United States in the
future just to write a blank check." He said Israel had missed some
opportunities to negotiate and he described PLO leader Yasser Arafat
as "more moderate, relatively speaking, than other extremists such as
George Habash." He urged Israel to talk to the PLO if the organization
would renounce terrorism and recognize Israel's right to exist behind
secure defensible borders, noting that David Ben Gurion, Israel's first
prime minister, had said that Israel must be willing to swap real estate
for peace.
A week later Percy received this memorandum from his staff: "We
have received 2,200 telegrams and 4,000 letters in response to your
Mideast statements They run 95 percent against. As you might
imagine, the majority of hostile mail comes from the Jewish community
in Chicago. They threaten to withhold their votes and support for any
future endeavors".
That same year Percy offended pro-Israel activists when he did not
sign the famous "spirit of 76" letter through which seventy-six of his
Senate colleagues effectively blocked President Gerald R. Ford's intended
"reappraisal" of Middle East policy. This brought another flood
of protest mail.
Despite these rumblings, the pro-Israel activists did not mount a
serious campaign against Percy in 1978. With the Senator's unprecedented
1972 sweep of the state fresh in mind, they did not seek out a
credible opponent either in the primary or the general election. In fact,
when the Democratic nomination went largely by default to an unknown
lawyer, Alex Seith, Jews took little interest. Even Percy's vote
to approve the sale of F-15 planes to Saudi Arabia during the campaign
year caused him no serious problem at that time.
In fact, only about one hundred Chicago Jews, few of them prominent,
openly supported Seith. Seith's scheduler, who is Jewish, called
every synagogue and every Jewish men's and women's organization in
the state, but only one agreed to let the candidate speak. His campaign
manager, Gary Ratner, concludes, "It was a ghetto mentality. Most
Jews felt there was no way Percy would lose, so why get him mad at
us." Of the $1 million Seith spent, less than $20,000 came from Jews.
Encouraged by Philip Klutznick, a prominent Chicago Jewish leader, Illinois Jews contributed several times that amount to Percy. Of 70
Jewish leaders asked to sign an advertisement supporting the Senator,
65 gave their approval. On election day, Jewish support figured heavily
in Percy's victory. He received only 53 percent of the statewide total
but an impressive 61 percent of the Jewish vote.
The 1984 campaign was dramatically different. Pro-Israel forces
targeted him for defeat early and never let up. Percy upset Jews by
voting to support the Reagan administration sale of AWACS radar
planes to Saudi Arabia (a sale also supported by the Carter administration).
These developments provided new ammunition for the attack
already underway against Percy. Percy's decision was made after staff
members who had visited Israel said they had been told by an Israeli
military official that the strategic military balance would not be affected,
but that they did not want the symbolism of the United States
doing business with Saudi Arabia.
Early in 1984, A.I.P.A.C decided to mobilize the full national resources
of the pro-Israel campaign against Percy. In the March primary,
it encouraged the candidacy of Congressman Tom Corcoran,
Percy's challenger for the nomination. One of Corcoran's chief advisers
and fundraisers was Morris Amitay, former executive director of
A.I.P.A.C. Corcoran's high-decibel attacks portrayed the Senator as anti Israel.
His fund-raising appeals to Jews cited Percy as "Israel's worst adversary in Congress." A full-page newspaper advertisement, sponsored
by the Corcoran campaign, featured a picture of Arafat and
headlined, "Chuck Percy says this man is a moderate." A letter to
Jewish voters defending Percy and signed by fifty-eight leading Illinois
Jews made almost no impact.
Although Percy overcame the primary challenge, Corcoran's attacks
damaged his position with Jewish voters and provided a strong
base for A.I.P.A.C's continuing assault. Thomas A. Dine, executive director
of A.I.P.A.C, set the tone early in the summer by attacking Percy's
record at a campaign workshop in Chicago. A.I.P.A.C encouraged fundraising
for Paul Simon and mobilized its political resources heavily
against Percy. It assigned several student interns full time to the task of
anti-Percy research and brought more than one hundred university
students from out-of-state to campaign for Simon.
Midway in the campaign, A.I.P.A.C took a devious step to make
Percy look bad. The key votes selected by A.I.P.A.C and used to rate all
Senators showed Percy supporting Israel 89 percent of the time during
his career. This put him only a few points below Simon's 99 percent
rating in the House of Representatives and was hardly the contrast
A.I.P.A.C wanted to cite in its anti-Percy campaign. The lobby solved the
problem by changing its own rule book in the middle of the game. It
added to the selected list a number of obscure votes Percy had cast in
the subcommittee and letters and resolutions that Percy had not signed.
The expanded list dropped the Senator's rating to only 51 percent, a
mark useful to Simon when he addressed Jewish audiences.
While most financial support from pro-Israel activists came to
Simon from individuals, political action committees figured heavily. By
mid-August these committees had contributed $145,870 to Simon,
more than to any other Senate candidate. By election day, the total had
risen to $235,000, with fifty-five committees participating.
In addition, a California Jewish activist, Michael Goland, using a
loophole in federal law, spent $1.6 million for billboard, radio and
television advertising which urged Illinoisans to "dump Percy" and
called him a "chameleon."
Percy undertook vigorous countermeasures. Former Senator
Jacob Javits of New York, one of the nation's most prominent and
respected Jews, and Senator Rudy Boschwitz, chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee subcommittee concerning the Middle
East, made personal appearances for Percy in Chicago, and one hundred
Illinois Jews led by former Attorney General Edward H. Levi
sponsored a full-page advertisement which declared that Percy "has
delivered for Illinois, delivered for America and,delivered for Israel."
The advertisement, in an unstated reference to Goland's attacks,warned, "Don't let our U.S. Senate race be bought by a Californian."
Except for charging in one news conference that Simon proclaimed
that he had a 100 percent voting record for the pro-Israel
lobby, Percy tried to avoid the Israel-Jewish controversy in the campaign.
These precautions proved futile, as did his strong legislative endeavors.
His initiatives as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee brought Israel $425 million more in grant aid than Reagan
had requested in 1983 and $325 million more in 1984, but these successes
for Israel seemed to make no difference. A poll taken a month
before the election showed a large majority of Jews supporting Simon.
The Percy campaign found no way to stem the tide.
When the votes were counted, Percy had lost statewide by 89,000
votes. One exit poll indicated that Percy won 35 percent of the Jewish
vote. In the same balloting Illinois Jews cast only 30 percent of their
votes for the re-election of President Ronald Reagan, despite their
unhappiness with the chief executive's views on the separation of
church and state, abortion, and other social issues,not to mention his
insistence on selling AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia. [But Saudi Arabia is no longer an issue given current Zionist activity around the Middle East D.C]
In an election decided by so few votes, any major influence could
be cited as crucial. Although broadly supportive of Reagan's program,
Percy was remembered by many voters mainly as a moderate, progressive,
Republican. Some conservative Republicans rejoiced at his defeat.
The "new right," symbolized by the National Conservative
Political Action Committee, withheld its support from Percy and early
in the campaign indicated its preference for Simon, despite the latter's
extremely liberal record in Congress.
Yet the Middle East controversy alone may have been sufficient to
cost Percy his Senate seat. Thousands of Jews who had voted for Percy
in 1978 left him for the Democratic candidate six years later. And these
votes fled to Simon mainly because Israel's lobby worked effectively
throughout the campaign year to portray the Senator as basically anti Israel.
Percy's long record of support for Israel's needs amounted to a
repudiation of the accusation, but too few Jews spoke up publicly in his
defense. The Senator found that once a candidate is labeled anti-Israel
the poison sinks so swiftly and deeply it is almost impossible to remove.
The Middle East figured heavily in campaign financing as well as
voting. Simon's outlay for the year was $5.3 million and Percy's about
$6 million. With Goland spending $1.6 million in his own independent
attack on Percy, total expenditures in behalf of the Simon candidacy
came to $6.9 million.
Forty percent, $3.1 million-came from Jews disgruntled over
Percy's position on Arab-Israel relations. Indeed, Simon was promised
half this sum before he became a candidate. While he was still pondering
whether to vacate his safe seat in the House of Representatives in
order to make the race,he was assured $1.5 million from Jewish
sources. The promise came from Robert Schrayer Chicago area businessman
and leader in the Jewish community, whose daughter,
Elizabeth, was helping to organize anti-Percy forces in her job as assistant
director of political affairs for A.I.P.A.C.
Reviewing the impact of the Middle East controversy on his defeat,
Percy says, "Did it make the difference? I don't know. But this I
believe: I believe Paul Simon would not have run had he not been
assured by Bob Schrayer that he would receive the $1.5 million."
Simon acknowledges, "This assurance was a factor in my decision."
A.I.P.A.C's Dine told a Canadian audience: "All the Jews in America,
from coast to coast, gathered to oust Percy. And American politicians-those
who hold public positions now, and those who aspire got
the message."
next
The Lobby and the Oval Office
