Part 1: Back Door to War The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 33-41...Historical Intro...American Relations with the Weimar Republic

Back Door to War 
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 
1933-1941
by 
CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION 

a. The Rise of 

Anglo-American Friendship 

THE MAIN OBJECTIVE in American foreign policy since 1900 has been the preservation of the British Empire. Intimate ties between Britain and the United States were first forged in 1898 when Britain realized that her policy of isolation had deprived her of any faithful allies upon whom she could depend in the event of war. The guns that brought victory to Admiral Dewey at Manila Bay sounded a new note of authority in the Far East and made the British Government aware of the fact that America could be made into a useful guardian of the life lines of empire. With John Hay as Secretary of State it was not difficult for the Foreign Office to arrive at an understanding with the United States that was as intimate as it was informal. 

The first Open Door note of September 6, 1899, was an exercise in Anglo-American co-operation, with Alfred E. Hippisley giving an interesting demonstration of how helpful a British official could be in the drafting of American diplomatic notes. Theodore Roosevelt was evidently impressed with this growing Anglo-American accord, and when certain European powers threatened to intervene in the war Britain waged against the Boers in South Africa, he sounded a note that became very familiar in the eventful years that preceded the outbreak of World War II: "Real liberty and real progress are bound up with the prosperity of the English-speaking peoples. .. . I should very strongly favor this country taking a hand .. . if the European continent selected this opportunity to try and smash the British Empire."1 

b. Japan Is Given a Green 

Light to Expand in Manchuria 

In the Far East this Anglo-American parallel policy had a definite pro-Japanese inclination, with the Anglo-Japanese alliance of January 30, 1902, as the cornerstone of an imposing imperialistic structure. It was inevitable that the Department of State would favor Japan in a struggle which it assumed would result in the emancipation of North China from Russian shackles. The American press was equally pro-Japanese. On the night of February 8, 1904, Japan launched a surprise attack upon the Russian fleet in the harbor of Port Arthur and thus started the war upon the same pattern she employed against the United States in December 1941. 

It was a "sneak attack" upon the Russian fleet, but in 1904 the American press had no criticisms of this Japanese stratagem. The New York Times praised "the prompt, enterprising and gallant feat of the Japanese,"2 while the St. Louis Globe-Democrat warmly commended the "dash and intelligence" of the resourceful sons of Nippon.3 The Cleveland Plain Dealer grew lyrical in its description of this Japanese exploit: "As Drake in the harbor of Cadiz singed the beard of the King of Spain, so the active island commanders have set the Czar's whiskers in a blaze."4 Other American newspapers expressed similar sentiments and public opinion moved swiftly to the support of Japan. This support remained unswerving until the peace conference at Portsmouth revealed the ambitious character of the Japanese terms. 

Although Japan gained substantial advantages through the terms of this treaty which established her as the dominant power in the Far East, the Japanese public was indignant that no indemnity had been secured. Rioting broke out in several Japanese cities, and Americans had to be carefully guarded against violence.5 Britain had been too astute to lend a helping hand to Roosevelt in arranging peace terms. The role of peacemaker had no attractions for the British Foreign Secretary. 

President Roosevelt soon discovered that his policy of "balanced antagonisms" in the Far East was a flat failure.6 Japanese statesmen were too clever to keep alive their diplomatic differences with Russia. The British Foreign Office, moreover, smiled upon an understanding between Japan and Russia. Britain was girding for an eventual conflict with Germany and it was to her obvious advantage to have strong allies whose assistance could be paid for in terms of Chinese territory. On July 30, 1907, Japan and Russia concluded important public and secret treaties which delimited their respective spheres of influence in Manchuria and Mongolia.7 As political control over these two Chinese provinces was gradually extended by Russia and Japan, the Open Door began to creak on its rusty hinges. President Roosevelt had no desire to keep them well oiled with American support. Indeed, as far as he was concerned, the Open Door was largely a fiction. 

In order to confirm this fact, he concluded with Japan the Root-Takahira Agreement (November 30, 1908). The most important article in this agreement was dedicated to the maintenance of the "existing status quo .. . in the region of the Pacific Ocean." In Manchuria the status quo meant only one thing to Japan—eventual political and economic control. To President Roosevelt this expansive phrase must have had a similar meaning, and it is the opinion of an outstanding scholar that the Root-Takahira Agreement gave Japan "a free hand in Manchuria" in return for a disavowal of aggressive intentions towards the Philippines.8 

It is obvious that the President, gravely concerned over our dispute with Japan relative to immigration into California, was ready to purchase peace by acquiescing in Japanese domination of a large area in North China. In a letter to President Taft in December 1910 he frankly stated that the Administration should take no step that would make Japan feel that we are "a menace to their interests" in North China. With special reference to Manchuria he remarked: "If the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war. . . . Our interests in Manchuria are really unimportant, and not such that the American people would be content to run the slightest risk of collision about them."9 

The Theodore Roosevelt viewpoint in 1910 with reference to Manchuria was a realistic one which could have been followed with profit by the Taft Administration. But Taft had his own ideas about what should be done in the Far East. As a firm believer in "dollar diplomacy" he adopted an ambitious program for increasing American interest and prestige in the Orient by building a firm financial flooring under American policy. He endeavored to push "big business" into placing large investments in China, and as one important item in this plan he proposed in November 1909 to put the railways in Manchuria under international control with the United States as one of the powers in this consortium.10 This proposal put the British Foreign Office "on the spot" and Sir Edward Grey's polite rejection of it clearly indicated that the so-called Anglo-American parallel policy in the Far East could be invoked only when it helped to achieve British objectives. But the British Foreign Secretary had to make some gestures of conciliation. America was too strong to be continually rebuffed. In 1909, after a series of notes in which Grey moved from one position to another with equal impudence, the British Government finally accepted arbitration of the age-old quarrel with America concerning the North Atlantic fisheries. Two years later he responded to American pressure and helped to write a profitable conclusion to the long story of the fur-seal dispute.11 Apparently he was clearing the decks of the British ship of state for a possible conflict with Germany. Friendly relations with the United States became a national necessity. 

c. Sir Edward Grey Scores 

a Diplomatic Success In his 

relations with the United States, 

Sir Edward Grey was singularly successful. He did not owe his brilliant record to any fluency of speech or unusual ability to draft cogent diplomatic notes. He moved right into American hearts because he seemed to have honesty written in large letters across his pleasant face. There was no trace of subtlety in his open countenance; no lines of cunning that pointed to a scheming mind. He made an instant appeal to most Americans who thought they saw candor and character in eyes that seldom wavered during long diplomatic conversations. To Theodore Roosevelt he appeared as a fellow naturalist who cared more for the pattern of wild life on his country estate than for the intricate web of international intrigue that covered so many of the walls in No. 10 Downing Street. To Colonel House he seemed to be a man of simple tastes and quiet pleasures. In the eyes of the American public he was a man who could be trusted. When the great storm of 1914 blew across the fields of Europe he was widely regarded as a fearless figure who boldly defied the Kaiser's lightning even though its bolts might blast all Britain. But the British people grew tired of a glorified lightning rod, so in 1916 he was retired from his perilous position. 

During the early years of the Wilson Administration he was an astounding success with amateur diplomats like Bryan, Secretary Lansing, and Colonel House. He was quick to see the importance of extending British support to the Bryan conciliation treaties and thereby he not only won the admiration of the "Great Commoner" but he also placed a large anchor to windward in case of a heavy American blow at some future time.12 In this regard he was immeasurably smarter than the German Foreign Secretary who had little liking for the Bryan "cooling off" treaties. If such a convention has been concluded by the German Foreign Office, there would have been no American intervention in 1917 and the history of American foreign policy would not have been marred by the many mistakes of President Wilson before and during the conference at Versailles. 

It was fortunate for Britain that the Germans were so inept as diplomats, and it was doubly fortunate that Sir Edward Grey was a great favorite with so many Americans. This cordial regard paid good dividends in the summer of 1914 when the shadows of war began to fall across the European landscape. It was obvious that American public opinion was friendly to both Britain and France while Germany was regarded with deep distrust. The many ties that bound us to Britain were easily discernible to multitudes of Americans. The political concert of recent years, even though on British terms, was a factor that could not be disregarded. Political accord was supplemented by intimate business connections that drew thousands of Americans into profitable relations with Britons throughout the vast regions of the Empire. 

The American political system traced its roots to British practices, and our legal institutions bore a definite British imprint. But the intellectual ties were far more potent than connections of any other character. Shakespeare, Milton, Scott, Dickens, Burns, Wordsworth, and a host of other British men of letters had knocked on the door of the American heart and had received a warm welcome. There had never been an American tariff on British intellectual goods nor any embargoes on British ideals. In the American mind in 1914 there was a deep substratum of British thought and it was easy for British propaganda to convince the average American that Britain's war was "our war." 

Skillfully using this friendly American attitude as a basis for far reaching belligerent practices, the British Government, after August 1914, began to seize American vessels under such specious pretexts that even our Anglophile President lost his patience and called for some action that would protect American rights. In 1916 legislation was enacted that provided for the construction of a navy second to none, but President Wilson had no real disposition to employ our naval strength as a weapon that would compel Britain to respect the historic American principle of the freedom of the seas. Instead of exerting pressure upon Britain, the President drifted into a quarrel with Germany over the conduct of submarine warfare. 

d. The Department of State 

Strikes a False Note 

It is apparent that the United States drifted into war with Germany because the Department of State condemned German submarine warfare as inhuman and illegal. It is not so well known that Robert Lansing, the counselor of the Department of State, was badly confused in his controversy with the German Government concerning this submarine warfare. On February 4, 1915, the German Foreign Office announced the establishment of a war zone around the British Isles. In this war zone after February 18 all "enemy merchant vessels" would be destroyed without much regard for the safety of the passengers and the crew. In a sharp note of February 10, 1915, the Department of State protested against the sinking of any merchant ships without the usual preliminary visit and search, and it gave a distinct warning that the German Government would be held to a "strict accountability" for every injury inflicted upon American citizens.13 

Professor Borchard has clearly demonstrated that this acrid note of February 10 was based upon an incorrect interpretation of international law. After discussing the background of the submarine controversy, he remarks: "It is thus apparent that the first American protest on submarines on February 10, 1915, with its challenging 'strict accountability,' was founded on the false premise that the United States was privileged to speak not only for American vessels and their personnel, but also on behalf of American citizens on Allied and other vessels. No other neutral country appears to have fallen into this error."14 

It is remarkable that Mr. Lansing, as the counselor of the Department of State, should have drafted a note that was so patently incorrect in its interpretation of the law of nations. Before entering upon his official duties in the Department of State, he had for many years been engaged in the practice of international law. He was quite familiar with American precedents and practices, and it is quite mystifying to find that at one of the great crossroads in American history a presumably competent lawyer should give the President and the Secretary of State a legal opinion that would have shamed a novice. 

Having made a fundamental error in his interpretation of international law with reference to submarine attacks upon unarmed merchant vessels of the Allied powers, he then hastened to make another error with regard to attacks upon armed merchantmen. It was Mr. Lansing's contention, and therefore that of President Wilson, that German submarines should not sink Allied armed merchant ships without first giving a warning that would permit the passengers and crew ample time to disembark with safety. The German Foreign Office hastened to point out that armed merchantmen would take advantage of this procedure to fire upon and destroy the undersea craft. For a brief period in January and February 1916, Mr. Lansing, Secretary of State since June 1915, accepted the German contention and the Department of State was ready to insist that Allied merchant ships either go unarmed or take the consequences. But Lansing, upon the insistence of Colonel House, retreated from the sound position he had temporarily assumed and once more asserted with vehemence that armed merchantmen were not vessels of war that could be sunk at sight.15 Thus, by reason of Secretary Lansing's final opinion, the President "and the House and Senate also, were misled into taking a position which had no foundation either in law or in common sense. Yet on that hollow platform Wilson stood in defending the immunity from attack of British armed merchantmen and of American citizens on board."16 

It is thus clear that America drifted into war in 1917 either because the chief legal adviser in the Department of State made fundamental errors of interpretation which a mere student of international law would have easily avoided, or because the adviser wanted a war with Germany and therefore purposely wrote erroneous opinions. These facts completely destroy the old popular thesis that America went to war in protest against German barbarities on the high seas. 

American intervention in World War I established a pattern that led America into a second world war in 1941. If we had not entered the war in Europe in 1917, World War I would have ended in a stalemate and a balance of power in Europe would have been created. Our intervention completely shattered the old balance of power and sowed the seeds of inevitable future conflict in the dark soil of Versailles. We had a deep interest in maintaining the political structure of 1919. Thousands of American lives and a vast American treasure had been spent in its erection. We could not see it demolished without deep concern. When dictators began to weaken its foundations, the Roosevelt Administration voiced its increasing disapproval of these actions. The bungling handiwork of 1919 had to be preserved at all costs, and America went to war again in 1941 to save a political edifice whose main supports had already rotted in the damp atmosphere of disillusion. The dubious political structure of 1919 is the subject of the next section of this chapter. 

e. The Allies Violate the 

Pre-Armistice Contract 

In the period immediately preceding the outbreak of World War II it was the habit of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull to talk constantly about the sanctity of treaties. They were international contracts that should never be broken. In this regard they were merely repeating an essential part of the ritual that became quite popular after 1919. But in Germany numerous persons could not forget the fact that the Treaty of Versailles was the cornerstone of a structure that had been built upon the dubious sands of betrayal. Lloyd George and Clemenceau had reluctantly agreed to a pre-Armistice contract that bound them to fashion the treaty of peace along the lines of the famous Fourteen Points.17 The Treaty of Versailles was a deliberate violation of this contract. In the dark soil of this breach of promise the seeds of another world war were deeply sown. 

It should be kept in mind that Woodrow Wilson acquiesced in this violation of contract. His ardent admirers have contended that he was tricked into this unsavory arrangement by Lloyd George and Clemenceau who were masters of the craft sinister. Ben Hecht, in his Erik Dorn, accepts this viewpoint and pungently refers to Wilson in Paris as a "long-faced virgin trapped in a bawdy house and calling in valiant tones for a glass of lemonade."18 In truth, Wilson ordered his glass of lemonade heavily spiked with the hard liquor of deceit, and the whole world has paid for the extended binge of a so-called statesman who promised peace while weaving a web of war. [yeah,he was a real pisser DC]

The story of this betrayal began on October 5, 1918, when Prince Max of Baden, addressed a note to President Wilson requesting him to negotiate a peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points. Three days later the President inquired if the German Government accepted these points as the basis for a treaty. On October 12, Prince Max gave assurance that his object in "entering into discussions would be only to agree upon practical details of the application" of the Fourteen Points to the terms of the treaty of peace. Two days later President Wilson added other conditions. No armistice would be signed which did not insure "absolutely satisfactory safeguards for the maintenance of the present military supremacy" of the Allied and Associated armies. Also, a democratic and representative government should be established in Berlin. When the German Government accepted these conditions, the President informed Prince Max (October 23) that he was now prepared to discuss with the Associated governments the terms of the proposed armistice. 

This discussion led to an agreement on their part to accept the Fourteen Points with two exceptions. With reference to "freedom of the seas" they reserved to themselves "complete freedom" when they entered the Peace Conference. In connection with the matter of reparations they understood that compensation would be made "by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies, and their property, by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air." These terms were conveyed to the German Government on November 5 and were promptly accepted by it. On November 11 an armistice placing Germany at the mercy of the Allied powers was signed in the Forest of Compiegne. With the cessation of hostilities the question of a treaty of peace came to the fore.19 

The good faith of the Allied governments to make this treaty in conformity with the Fourteen Points had been formally pledged. But hardly was the ink dry on the Armistice terms when Lloyd George openly conspired to make the pre-Armistice agreement a mere scrap of paper. During the London Conference (December 1-3) the wily Welshman helped to push through a resolution which recommended an inter-Allied Commission to "examine and report on amount enemy countries are able to pay for reparation and indemnity." The word "indemnity" could easily be stretched to cover the "costs of the war." Although such a move was "clearly precluded by the very intent of the Pre-Armistice Agreement," Lloyd George showed an "apparent nonchalance about principle and contract," and started on a slippery path that "led rapidly downhill into the morasses of the December British elections."20 

f. Reparations and Rascality 

In his pre-election promises Lloyd George revealed a complete disregard of the pre-Armistice contract. His assurances to the British electorate were in direct contradiction to his pledge to Colonel House that he would be guided by the Fourteen Points. At Bristol (December 11, 1918) he jauntily informed his eager audience that "we propose to demand the whole cost of the war [from Germany]."21 The spirit that animated the election was stridently expressed by Eric Geddes in a speech in the Cambridge Guildhall: "We shall squeeze the orange until the pips squeak."22 

At the Paris Peace Conference, Lloyd George (January 22, 1919) suggested the appointment of a commission to study "reparation and indemnity." President Wilson succeeded in having the word "indemnity" deleted but it was merely a temporary victory. The French gave ardent support to the position assumed by Lloyd George. Their schemes for the dismemberment of Germany would be promoted by an exacting attitude on the part of Britain. This concerted action against the pre-Armistice agreement was strongly contested by John Foster Dulles, the legal adviser of the American members on the Reparation Commission. He insisted upon a strict adherence to the pre-Armistice promises and was supported by President Wilson who unequivocally stated that America was "bound in honor to decline to agree to the inclusion of war costs in the reparation demanded. .. . It is clearly inconsistent with what we deliberately led the enemy to expect. . . ,"23 

But Lloyd George and Clemenceau quietly outflanked the American position by the simple device of expanding the categories of civilian damage so that they could include huge sums that properly belonged to the categories of "war costs." Lloyd George insisted that pensions and separation allowances should be included in the schedule of reparations, and Clemenceau hastened to his support. It was evident to both of them that these items were excluded by the express terms of the pre-Armistice agreement. If President Wilson adhered to the assurances he had given to his financial experts he would immediately reject this transparent scheme to violate the pledge of the Allied powers. But when these same experts indicated the obvious implications of the Lloyd George proposals and stated that they were ruled out by logic, Wilson profoundly surprised them by bursting out in petulant tones: "Logic! Logic! I don't give a damn for logic. I am going to include pensions."24 

Not content with adding an undeserved burden that helped to break German financial backs, Wilson followed the lead of Lloyd George along other roads of supreme folly. At the meeting of the Council of Four (April 5, 1919), the British Prime Minister suggested that in the treaty of peace the Allies should "assert their claim" and Germany should recognize "her obligation for all the costs of the war." When Colonel House remarked that such an assertion would be contrary to the pre-Armistice agreement, Clemenceau reassuringly murmured that it was largely "a question of drafting."25 

This experiment in drafting turned out to be the bitterly disputed Article 231 which placed upon Germany the responsibility "for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany." This so-called "War Guilt Clause" aroused a deep and widespread hatred in all classes in Germany against a decision that was regarded as fundamentally unfair. And then to add insult to injury, Article 232 repeated the language of the pre-Armistice agreement with its fake formula which limited reparations to civilian damages. The ease with which this language had been twisted to Allied benefit had clearly indicated that it would be no protection to Germany. 

These two American surrenders were followed by a third which meant a complete abandonment of the position that no "punitive treaty" should be imposed upon Germany. The American experts had placed much reliance upon the creation of a Reparation Commission which would have far-reaching powers to estimate what Germany could afford to pay on Allied claims and to modify the manner and date of these payments. But Clemenceau wanted this commission to be nothing more than a glorified adding machine designed merely to register the sums Germany should pay. It was to have no right to make independent judgments. The American contention that the payment of reparations should not extend more than thirty-five years was vetoed by the French who thought that fifty years might be required.26 

During the heated discussions in the meeting of the Council of Four (April 5, 1919), Colonel House was so obtuse that he did not realize that the French were storming the American position until one of the French experts informed him of that fact. Norman Davis shouted to him that the French banners bore the legend: "Allied claims and not German capacity to pay should be the basis for reparations." Although this French slogan was in direct violation of the principles which the American experts had been fighting for during three long months, the confused Colonel tore down the American flag and hoisted the dubious French tricolor. By this action he flouted "both the letter and the spirit of the Pre-Armistice Agreement."27 When President Wilson confirmed this surrender he thereby extended a favor to Adolf Hitler who warmly welcomed illustrations of Allied bad faith as one of the best means of promoting the Nazi movement. 

The financial experts at Versailles failed to fix any particular sum as the measure of German liability for having caused the World War. In 1921 the Reparation Commission remedied this omission by computing the amount to be approximately $33,000,000,000. One third of this sum represented damages to Allied property, "and one-half to two thirds, pensions and similar allowances. In short, Wilson's decision doubled and perhaps tripled the bill."28 Germany might have been able to pay a bill of not more than ten billion dollars, but when Wilson consented to play the part of Shylock and helped perfect a plan that would exact a pound of flesh from the emaciated frame of a war-wasted nation, he pointed the way to a financial chaos that inevitably overwhelmed Germany and Europe. He also helped to write several chapters in Mein Kampf. 

g. The Colonial Question 

The colonial question was dealt with in the fifth of the Fourteen Points. It provided for a "free, open-minded and absolutely impartial adjustment of colonial claims." At the Paris Peace Conference there was no attempt to arrive at this "absolutely impartial judgment." Long before the conference convened there had developed in the minds of prominent publicists in Britain, France, and the United States the opinion that Germany had forfeited all rights to her colonial dominion that had been conquered by Allied forces during the war. The usual argument in favor of this forfeiture was that German colonial administrators had cruelly mistreated the natives. Professor Thorstein Veblen wrote on this topic with his accustomed pontifical certitude: "In the [German] colonial policy colonies are conceived to stand to their Imperial guardian or master in a relation between that of step-child and that of an indentured servant; to be dealt with summarily and at discretion and to be made use of without scruple."29 In Britain, Edwyn Bevan argued that the return of her colonies would not "be to content Germany but to keep up her appetite for colonial expansion; it would be to restore a condition of things essentially unstable."30 

In 1917 the American Commission of Inquiry, under the direction of Dr. Sidney E. Mezes, asked Dr. George L. Beer to prepare a series of studies on the colonial question with special reference to German colonial policy. Beer had long been regarded as an outstanding expert on the commercial policy of England during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries. In an imposing series of volumes he had "presented the English point of view" with regard to colonial administration.31 After the outbreak of the World War "his sympathies were very decidedly with the Allies, and particularly with the British empire."32 

It was only natural that Dr. Beer, despite his alleged historical objectivity, should strongly condemn German colonial policy. In February 1918 he turned over to Dr. Mezes his manuscript on the German Colonies in Africa. After weighing a considerable amount of data he came to the conclusion that Germany had totally failed to "appreciate the duties of colonial trusteeship."33 Therefore, she should lose her colonial dominions. 

Dr. Beer accompanied the American delegation to the Paris Peace Conference as a colonial expert and it is evident that he influenced the opinions of President Wilson who stated on July 10, 1919, that the German colonies had not "been governed; they had been exploited merely, without thought of the interest or even the ordinary human rights of their inhabitants."34 

This accusation of the President was quite groundless. A careful American scholar who made a trip to the Cameroons in order to get an accurate picture of the prewar situation, summarizes his viewpoint as follows: "My own conclusion is that Germany's colonial accomplishments in thirty short years constitute a record of unusual achievement and entitle her to a very high rank as a successful colonial power, a view quite different from that reached in 1919 I feel that if Germany had been allowed to continue as a colonial power after the war, her civil rule would have compared favorably with the very best that the world knows today."35 

The Germans were deeply incensed because the Allied governments refused to count the colonies as an important credit item in the reparation account. Some Germans had estimated the value of the colonies at nine billion dollars. If this estimate had been cut in half there would still have been a large sum that could have been used to reduce the tremendous financial burden imposed upon weary German backs. Such action would have "spared Germany the additional humiliation of losing all her overseas possessions under the hypocritical guise of humanitarian motives."36 These needless humiliations prepared the way for the tragedy of 1939. It is obvious that the revelations in the Nuremberg documents concerning Hitler's design for aggression are merely the last chapter in a long and depressing book that began at Versailles. 

h. The Problem of Poland: Danzig—

The Polish Corridor—Upper Silesia In the discussion of questions relating to Poland, President Wilson had the advice of Professor Robert H. Lord, whose monograph on the Second Partition of Poland was supposed to make him an authority on the problems of 1919. His lack of objectivity was as striking as that of Professor Beer. It was largely a case of hysterical rather than historical scholarship.37 

While the President was formulating his Fourteen Points, some of the experts on the American Commission of Inquiry suggested that an independent Polish state be erected with boundaries based upon "a fair balance of national and economic considerations, giving due weight to the necessity for adequate access to the sea."38 In the thirteenth of the Fourteen Points, President Wilson changed the phraseology of this suggestion so that more stress would be laid upon ethnographic factors: "An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea." 

( i ) DANZIG 

If Poland were to be given access to the Baltic Sea the port of Danzig would be of fundamental importance. In order to guide the President in this difficult matter of Polish boundaries, the American experts prepared two reports (January-February 1919) . 39 In dealing with Danzig they granted it to Poland because of economic considerations. They conveniently overlooked the fact that from the viewpoint of population Danzig was 97 per cent German. On February 23, while Wilson was in the United States, Colonel House cabled to him concerning the disposition of Danzig: "Our experts also believe this [the cession of Danzig to Poland] to be the best solution."40 But the President was unwilling to confirm this suggestion, so the question of Danzig was postponed until March 17 when Lloyd George carried on a brisk exchange of opinions with Colonel House and Clemenceau. Two days later the British Prime Minister flatly refused to accept the proposal to cede both Danzig and the German Kreis of Marienwerder to Poland. He was not greatly impressed with the fact that the members of the Polish Commission and a large array of experts were in favor of this decision.41 

Despite pressure from Colonel House and Dr. Mezes (the brother-in-law of Colonel House), President Wilson (March 28) rushed to the support of Lloyd George. On April 5 he and Lloyd George reached an understanding that the city and area of Danzig should become a free city with local autonomy under a commissioner of the League of Nations but connected with Poland by a customs union and port facilities. The foreign relations of the free city were to be under Polish control.42 

To the Germans this large measure of Polish control over the city of Danzig was profoundly irritating, and at times the actions of the Polish authorities in connection with foreign relations and the establishment of export duties seemed unnecessarily provocative. From the viewpoint of economics, Polish control over Danzig had the most serious implications. By altering the customs tariff Poland could adversely affect the trade of the free city, and through control over the railways could extend important favors to the competing port of Gdynia.43 

This situation led Gustav Stresemann, one of the most moderate of German statesmen, to remark in September 1925 that the "third great task of Germany is the .. . recovery of Danzig."44 In 1931 the quiet, unaggressive Centrist leader, Heinrich Bruning, sounded out certain European governments in order to ascertain whether they would favor territorial revision at the expense of Poland. But this pressure to recover lost territory suddenly ended in Germany on January 26, 1934, when Marshal Pilsudski concluded with Hitler the well-known non aggression treaty.45 The price Poland paid for this agreement was an immediate acquiescence in a German program aimed at the nazification of Danzig. When Polish statesmen, after Pilsudski's death, tried to reverse this movement by courting British and French favor, they opened the floodgates that permitted the Nazi-Soviet tide to inundate all of Poland. 

( 2 ) THE POLISH CORRIDOR 

A Polish Corridor through German territory to the Baltic Sea was distinctly forecast in the thirteenth point of the Wilson program which expressly declared that Poland should be granted "free and secure access to the sea." This wide "right of way" was to go through territory inhabited by "indisputably Polish populations." The American experts in their reports of January-February 1919, outlined a broad Polish path to the sea through the German provinces of Posen and West Prussia. They admitted the hardships this action would entail upon some 1,600,000 Germans in East Prussia but they regarded the benefits conferred upon many millions of Poles as of more significance.46 

When the reports of these experts were accepted by the Polish Commission and were written into the text of the Treaty of Versailles, it meant that the valley of the Vistula had been placed under Polish control. In order to shut the Germans of East Prussia away, from any contact with the Vistula, "a zone fifty yards in width along the east bank was given to Poland, so that along their ancient waterway the East Prussians have no riparian rights. Though the river flows within a stone's throw of their doors, they may not use it."47 

The Corridor itself was a wedge of territory which ran inland from the Baltic Sea for 45 miles, with a width of 20 miles at the coast, 60 miles in the center, and 140 miles in the south. Transportation across it was made difficult by Polish authorities who "instead of maintaining and developing the existing excellent system of communications by rail and road, river and canal .. . at once scrapped a large part of it in the determination to divert the natural and historical direction of traffic." With reference to conditions in the Corridor in 1933, Professor Dawson wrote as follows: "It is true that a few transit trains cross the Corridor daily, but as they may neither put down nor pick up traffic on the way, this piece of now Polish territory, so far as provision for communication and transport goes, might be unpopulated."48 Traffic along the highways crossing the Corridor was also very unsatisfactory. In 1931, Colonel Powell discovered that only the main east-and-west highways were open for vehicular traffic and this was "hampered by every device that the ingenuity of the Poles can suggest. Here I speak from personal experience, for I have driven my car across the Corridor four times."49 

In 1938 and 1939, Hitler tried in vain to secure from the Polish Government the right to construct a railway and a motor road across the Corridor. Relying upon British support, the Polish Foreign Office in the spring of 1939 rejected any thought of granting these concessions. This action so deeply angered Hitler that he began to sound out the Soviet Government with reference to a treaty that would mean the fourth partition of Poland. Polish diplomats had not learned the simple lesson that concessions may prevent a catastrophe. 

( 3 ) UPPER SILESIA 

During the sessions of the Paris Peace Conference the decision with reference to Upper Silesia was one of the clearest indications that hysteria and not objective history guided the conclusions of some of the American experts. This was particularly so in the case of Professor Robert H. Lord. He was strongly of the opinion that Upper Silesia should go to Poland without a plebiscite to ascertain the desires of the inhabitants. When the treaty was turned over to the German delegation the Upper Silesian article was subjected to a great deal of cogent criticism. Lloyd George was convinced by the German arguments, but President Wilson still gave some heed to Professor Lord who complained that Germany had been sovereign over Upper Silesia for only two centuries. Even though Mr. Lamont countered with the remark that this territory had not "belonged to Poland for 400 years," the President retained a lingering faith in the vehement protestations of Professor Lord. But this faith received a further shock when the learned professor opposed the holding of a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. 

Lloyd George then pertinently inquired why plebiscites were to be held in "Allenstein, Schleswig, Klagenfurt but not in Silesia."50 There was no real answer Professor Lord could give to sustain his position so a provision was inserted in the treaty with reference to a plebiscite in Upper Silesia. 

But this plebiscite was held in an atmosphere of terror. The International Commission that took over the administration of the voting area consisted of three members: General Le Rond (France); Colonel Sir Harold Percival (Britain); and General de Marinis (Italy). France immediately sent 8,000 troops to maintain French domination over Upper Silesia and then procured the appointment of General Le Rond as the head of the civil administration. Although the Allied governments had assured the German delegation at Paris (June 16, 1919) that the International Commission would insist upon the "full impartiality of the vote," they broke faith in this regard as well as in others. Every possible concession was given to the Poles in the plebiscite area, but when the votes were taken on March 20, 1921, the results were a great shock to the French and Poles: 707,554, or 59.6 per cent, voted to remain under German control, while 478,802, or 40.4 per cent, voted to be placed under Polish administration.51 

When one considers the indefensible tactics of the French before the plebiscite was held, it is surprising that the vote was so pro-German. One of the best accounts of the situation in Upper Silesia in 1919-1920 is given in the monograph by Professor Rene Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany: 

On April 4, 1919, the Polish Supreme National Council of Upper Silesia got into touch with Korfanty. Adelbert Korfanty, a former journalist and a popular leader, was the man of action for whom Dmowski was looking to prepare and organize the rising. . . . On May 1, 1919, the Polish secret societies . . . demonstrated their patriotic sentiments by pursuing the Germans. The Terror had begun. . . . The secret organizations which he [Korfanty] had built up .. . continued to exist until the plebiscite. . . . The Germans were tortured, mutilated, put to death and the corpses defiled; villages and chateaux were pillaged, burnt or blown up. The German Government has published on the subject a series of White Papers, illustrated by photographs. . . . The scenes which have thus been perpetuated pictorially surpass in horror the worst imaginable atrocities.52 

When these bloody Polish outbreaks were finally suppressed, the League of Nations entrusted the task of partitioning Upper Silesia to a commission composed of representatives of Belgium, Brazil, China, Japan, and Spain. The unneutral composition of this commission is worth noting, and their decision reflected their prejudices. Under its terms Poland received nearly five-sixths of the industrial area in dispute. She also was granted "80 per cent of the coal-bearing area . . . besides all the iron ore mines; nearly all the zinc and lead ore mines and a large majority of the works dependent on the primary industries."53 

In commenting upon the farce of this plebiscite, Sir Robert Donald remarks: "Harder to bear than the material loss were the exasperating and cruel moral wrongs and injustices inflicted upon the German community. It is possible enough that had the Allies transferred Upper Silesia to Poland, basing their action upon no other law than brute force, Germany would have resigned herself to the inevitable. . . . But to inflict upon her the tragic farce of the plebiscite, with all its accompaniments of deceit, broken pledges, massacres, cruel outrages, carried out in an atmosphere of political putrescence, was to add insult to injury, moral torture to robbery under arms."54 

Despite Wilson's reassuring words about a peace that should not be punitive, Germany had been stripped and severely whipped. After these impressive examples of Allied ill faith it was not difficult for Nazi statesmen to plan for expansion without much thought about the usual principles of international law. Law is based upon logic, and, at Versailles, Woodrow Wilson had frankly condemned the science of right reasoning: "Logic! Logic! I don't give a damn for logic." Hitler could not have made a more damning pronouncement. 

i. The Occupation of the Rhineland 

President Wilson was not always on the wrong side of the diplomatic fence at Paris. In the matter of the Rhineland occupation he adopted a vigorous role which completely blocked the execution of an ambitious French program. One of the main French objectives in 1919 was the separation of the entire left bank of the Rhine from Germany and the establishment of autonomous republics friendly to France. Wilson refused to accept this program even though it was ardently advocated by Colonel House.55 With the support of Lloyd George he was able to write into the Treaty of Versailles a moderate provision: "German territory situated to the west of the Rhine, together with the bridgeheads, will be occupied by Allied and Associated troops for a period of fifteen years from the coming into force of the present treaty."56 

The last contingent of the American Army of Occupation left the Rhineland in February 1923; some of the Allied troops remained until 1930. The mere fact that German soil was occupied for a decade aroused resentment in most German minds. This resentment was turned into a feeling of outrage when France quartered a considerable number of her Negro colonial troops in private residences in parts of the Rhine territory. Their insulting and at times brutal conduct towards the German women was regarded as an indication that France would go to extreme lengths to humiliate Germany. In December 1921, General Henry T. Allen sent to Secretary Hughes a complaint that had been filed with the High Commision by a delegation of German workingmen: "We fear to leave our homes and go to work leaving our wives and daughters in our houses with these men. This question troubles us more than houses and more food."57 Felix Morley, during a vacation in France, was sharply critical of French behavior: "If England and America would leave France to herself, there wouldn't be a Frenchman on German soil after a week."58 Three years later the American consul at Cologne wrote to Secretary Hughes a bitter indictment of French practices in the Rhineland. He reported that once in a while German officials were handcuffed and the German police "beaten and kicked." At Aachen civilians and officials were "horsewhipped."59 Memories of these insults lingered in German minds and helped to produce a climate of opinion that justified many of the items in Hitler's program of expansion and revenge. 

j . The Starvation Blockade 

The armistice of November 11, 1918, did not put an end to the Allied blockade of Germany. For many months after the war was over the Allied governments did not permit food shipments to the millions of hungry persons in Germany. This callous attitude on the part of the Allied delegations in Paris shocked the Labour Party in England which sponsored the humane "save the children" movement. Funds were raised to buy food "when owing to the blockade, starvation stalked gaunt and livid through the streets of thousands of German towns."60 

In Paris, President Wilson appealed "again and again for a free exportation of foodstuffs to the half-starving populations of Central Europe, but always the French Government thwarted him. This French policy filled [Henry] White, who had small grandchildren in Germany and heard much from his daughter of the desperate plight of the people, with futile indignation."61 

The impact of the blockade upon the German people was described by George E. R. Gedye who was sent in February 1919 upon an inspection tour of Germany: 

Hospital conditions were appalling. A steady average of 10 per cent of the patients had died during the war years from lack of fats, milk and good flour. . . . We saw some terrible sights in the children's hospital, such as the "starvation babies" with ugly, swollen heads. . .. Our report naturally urged the immediate opening of the frontiers for fats, milk and flour . . . but the terrible blockade was maintained as a result of French insistence.62 

This graphic description by Gedye receives strong confirmation in a recent account written by ex-President Hoover who, in 1919, had been placed by President Wilson in charge of food distribution to the needy population of Europe. When Hoover arrived in London he suffered a severe shock: 

I met with Allied ministers to discuss programs and organization. The session was at once a revelation in intrigue, nationalism, selfishness, heartlessness and suspicion. . . . Much as I am devoted to the English, they had one most irritating quality—they were masters at wrapping every national action in words of sanctity which made one really ashamed not to support it all. .. . Within a few hours I found that the greatest famine since the Thirty Years' War did not seem to be of any great immediate concern. . . . They [the Allied governments] were determined to keep the food blockade not only on Germany and the other enemy states but also on the neutrals and liberated nations. . . . On February 1st [1919]  . . I gave him [President Wilson] the following: "Dear Mr. President: There is no right in the law of God or man that we should longer continue to starve people now that we have a surplus of food." . . . The President duly took up the question . . . [and] the Big Four ordered my proposed agreement with the Germans applied forthwith. 

To present the formula to the Germans they appointed a delegation to be headed by a British admiral, Sir Rosslyn Wemyss. .. . He said to me arrogantly, "Young man, I don't see why you Americans want to feed these Germans." My impudent reply was: "Old man, I don't understand why you British want to starve women and children after they are licked." . . . When the door for food to Germany opened, I promptly found hate so livid on the Allied side and also in some parts of America as to force me to issue a statement justifying my actions. . . . We had lost four months' time, and the problems in Germany had in the meantime multiplied. . . . The maintenance of the food blockade until March, 1919—four months after the Armistice—was a crime in statesmanship, and a crime against civilization as a whole.... Nations can take philosophically the hardships of war. But when they lay down their arms and surrender on assurances that they may have food for their women and children, and then find that this worst instrument of attack on them is maintained—then hate never dies.63 

Finally, under the terms of the Brussels Agreement (March 14, 1919) provision was made for the shipment of food to Germany, but before these supplies were made available thousands of Germans had gone through the tortures of slow starvation. At Versailles the beads in a long rosary of hatred and despair had been forged for the Germans by the Big Four. After 1919 they were counted over numberless times by large groups of unfortunate persons whose health had been wrecked by malnutrition. They neither forgot nor forgave. 

k. German Reaction to 

the Treaty of Versailles 

On May 7, 1919, the German delegation in Paris was formally presented with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles. When Johann Giesberts read through the long bill of indictment he burst out with vehemence: "This shameful treaty has broken me, for I had believed in Wilson until today. I believed him to be an honest man, and now that scoundrel sends us such a treaty."64 On May 12 at a great mass meeting in Berlin, Konstantin Fehrenbach, one of the leaders of the Centrist Party, alluded to the attitude that future generations in Germany would adopt relative to the treaty and ended his speech with words of warning that later were implemented by Hitler: "The will to break the chains of slavery will be implanted from childhood on."65 

These chains were confirmed by the Kellogg-Briand Pact which bestowed a formal blessing upon the injustices of Versailles. They could be broken only by force. When Hitler began to snap them, one by one, the noise was heard round the world and the American public was solemnly informed by Secretaries Stimson and Hull that a wild German bull was breaking the choicest dishes in the china shop of world peace. At Niirnberg men were hanged because they had planned to break these vessels filled with national hatreds. Nothing was said of the pseudo-statesmen who prepared at Paris the witches' brew that poisoned German minds. The results of their criminal bungling will be told in succeeding chapters. 

1.

American Relations with 

the Weimar Republic 

a. America Rejects 

Trials of War Criminals 

IN THE YEARS immediately after the close of the World War the attitude of the American Government towards the Weimar Republic was one of watchful waiting. In the Department of State there was a definite fear that sparks from Soviet Russia might find an easy lodgment in the broken structure of Germany and thus start a fire that would consume all the landmarks of the old German way of life. This fear was increased by the remarks of certain Germans who had held important diplomatic posts under the Kaiser. In October 1919, Count von Bernstorff stressed the importance of establishing close connections between Germany and Russia: "Russia is the country which we can most conveniently exploit. Russia needs capital and intelligence which our industry can provide. Above all, now that Bolshevism is beginning in Germany we are becoming 'cousin germains' of the Russians. We must come to terms with the Bolsheviks."1 

The mounting unrest in Germany had many unpleasant expressions. In November 1919 there was a large demonstration in Heidelberg in which anti-Semitism and a spirit of excessive nationalism were clearly in evidence.2 By April 1921 anti-Semitism reached a peak in certain German cities, although it was strongly opposed by Catholic prelates like the Cardinal of Munich.3 After 1933, Hitler merely played upon prejudices that had long existed in Germany. 

Fervid expressions of nationalism were in part caused by the loud talk of certain Allied statesmen with reference to holding trials for many prominent German leaders as war criminals. This talk led the ex-Kaiser, Wilhelm II, to write to President Wilson and offer to serve as a victim in place of other Germans: "If the Allied and Associated Governments want a victim let them take me instead of the nine hundred Germans who have committed no offence other than that of serving their country in the war."4 There was no real need for the ex-Kaiser to make this offer. The American Government was strongly opposed to any war-criminal trials. On February 6, 1920, Secretary Lansing sent a significant instruction to the American Embassy in Paris: "This Government has not yet ratified the Treaty; it is not joining in the demand of the Allies, and it is in no way backing the insistence of the Allies in the immediate carrying out of the demand [for the delivery of German war criminals]."5 

b. The Allies Balk at the Payment 

of American Army of Occupation 

The Allies soon abandoned the project of trying Germans as war criminals. Apparently they strongly resented the attitude of Secretary Lansing in this matter because they showed a most non-co-operative spirit with regard to the payment of the costs of the American Army of Occupation. The Wilson Administration had expected the payments to be made promptly out of German reparations, but this action was blocked for several years. In 1923 the British representative on the Reparation Commission expressed a doubt whether the United States, having rejected the Treaty of Versailles, could assert any just claim to be paid for the Rhineland occupation.6 Similar statements deeply angered George B. Lockwood, secretary of the Republican National Committee, who wrote to Secretary Hughes to express his indignation at the situation. He was certain that the "haggling and pettifogging, duplicity and downright dishonesty that has characterized the attitude of Great Britain and the other Allied Powers in their treatment of America's claims" indicated a strong desire to "bilk" the United States out of any payment for occupation costs.7 

On May 25, 1923, the governments of Belgium, Britain, France, and Italy signed an agreement with the United States providing for the reimbursement of the costs of the American Army of Occupation. This reimbursement was to be paid out of German reparations over a period of twelve years.8 Although the Allied governments had finally consented to this long-range schedule of payments, Secretary Hughes noted that in their own case they had insisted that the payments for occupation be "met practically in full as they fell due." It seemed to him that "they should have distributed the money received for these arms costs equitably; instead, they kept these moneys and left us out."9 

c. France Moves into the Ruhr 

In the matter of reparations the French Government proved exceedingly difficult to satisfy. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles provision was made for the appointment of a Reparation Commission which should determine the amount owed by Germany and prepare a schedule for "discharging the entire obligation within a period of thirty years from May 1, 1921." Up to that date the German Government was to pay the equivalent of five billion dollars. Early in 1921, Germany claimed that she had completed this payment in the form of gold, securities, coal, and other commodities, but the Reparation Commission declared that less than half of the required sum had really been paid. The German Government then appealed to the United States to "mediate the reparations question and to fix the sum to be paid .. . to the Allied Powers."10 Secretary Hughes refused to be drawn into this dispute, but he did admonish the Weimar Republic to make "directly to the Allied Governments clear, definite and adequate proposals which would in all respects meet its just obligations."11 

On April 28, 1921, the Reparation Commission announced that the total German indemnity had been fixed at 132,000,000,000 gold marks or approximately $33,000,000,000. The schedule of payments was forwarded to Germany on May 5 and was promptly accepted.12 Although the first installment of $250,000,000 was paid on August 31, the decline in the value of the mark indicated fundamental financial difficulties in Germany. During 1922 the German Government asked for a moratorium extending two and one-half years. Britain was inclined to favor this request; France was bitterly opposed to it. Under French pressure the Reparation Commission finally declared that Germany was in default and Poincare insisted upon reprisals. 

The American Government was deeply interested in this German problem. Peace between Germany and the United States had been effected under the terms of a joint resolution signed by President Harding on July 2, 1921.13 This action had been followed by a treaty (August 25, 1921) which went into effect on November 11 of that year.14 Under the terms of these instruments all the rights, privileges, indemnities, and reparations to which the United States was entitled under the Armistice and the Treaty of Versailles were "expressly reserved." Separate peace with Germany would not mean the loss of any of America's hard-won rights. 

These rights would have no value in a Germany whose economic structure was destroyed. Therefore, American representatives abroad looked with strong disapproval upon Poincare's determination to press for prompt payment of impossible reparations. In Rome, Ambassador Child talked the situation over with Barthou, the mouthpiece of Poincare. He reported to Secretary Hughes that this conversation revealed that Barthou had "an anti-German prejudice so strong as to vitiate sound judgment." He thought it might be necessary for the "world to weigh the necessity of acting independently of the French Government in joint appeals to public opinion."15 

The following month Ambassador Herrick, who was usually quite Francophile, wrote to Secretary Hughes and deprecated the attitude of Poincare with reference to pressure upon Germany: "There is now definitely no hope of making any impression on Poincare personally. He has learned nothing and forgotten nothing, not from lack of intelligence but rather from definite purpose. .. . He has staked his political life and reputation on his aggressive policy. If you want to do anything effective to stop this, you must in my judgment make some public utterance with the idea of helping reasonable French opinion."16 But Hughes replied that an appeal to the French people over the head of their government was a dangerous proceeding: "Previous efforts of this sort have caused more trouble than they cured."17 

In January 1923, French troops moved into the Ruhr as far east as Dortmund. The British Government regarded this action as illegal and refused to support it. Occupation of the Ruhr would paralyze German industry and seriously affect reparations and British trade with Germany. In order to counter this French policy of pressure, German workers in the Ruhr laid down their tools. Mines and factories shut down and telephone, telegraph, and railways services were discontinued. All reparation payments to the Allied governments ceased. 

The American commercial attache in Berlin looked at this French invasion of the Ruhr as an attempt permanently to "emasculate Germany as a Great Power."18 The American Ambassador reported in a similar vein: "The people have been treated as a subject and alien race; their trade has been harassed and largely destroyed; ineffectual troops have been quartered here and there in their villages. Apparently everything that would arouse hostility, and nothing that would conciliate, has been done. As a result, the Rhineland population today is savagely anti French."19 

To Herbert Hoover the repressive policy of the French had a world impact. French interference with the coal trade of the Ruhr would upset "the entire coal market of the world and would make life more difficult everywhere."20 The most graphic description of French terrorism in the Ruhr is given by George E. R. Gedye in The Revolver Republic: 

In Essen I saw a boy, one morning, sobbing bitterly after being thrashed by a French officer for failing to yield the pavement to him, and in Recklinghausen the French pursued with their riding-whips into the theatre some men who had taken refuge there, stopped the performance of "King Lear," and drove out the whole audience. . . . On the night of 11th March the bodies of a French chasseur subaltern and a Regie station master were found near Buer. . . . The next morning a seven o'clock curfew was proclaimed in Buer. . . . The order to be indoors by seven had been issued on a Sunday after many people had gone off on excursions for the day. On their return, all-unwitting, they were beaten with riding-whips, struck with rifle butts, chased through the streets by French soldiers, and shot at. A workman named Fabeck was shot dead as he stood with his young wife waiting for a tram.21 

These repressive tactics finally bore fruit in the agreement of September 26, 1923, when Germany promised to abandon the policy of passive resistance. But the price of victory had been high. The British Government had not looked with favor upon the occupation of the Ruhr with the consequent collapse of Germany's economic structure, and opinion in neutral countries was sharply critical. In France the fall in the value of the franc caused milder counsel to prevail. The way was thus prepared for discussions that led to the adoption of the Dawes Plan. The Inter-Allied Agreement providing for this plan was signed in London, August 30,1924, and the evacuation of French troops from the Ruhr began immediately.22 

d. President Hoover Suggests a 

Moratorium on Reparations 

The Dawes Plan was merely a financial sedative and not a cure for the ills of Germany. It was silent with reference to the total reparations bill. Therefore, in a technical sense, the old total bill of $33,000,000,000 fixed by the Reparation Commission was still in force. But it should have been evident to the so-called financial experts that Germany could not continue making huge annual reparations payments for an indefinite period. They should also have realized that no great power would be content to remain in the financial and political chains that were riveted upon Germany under the terms of the plan. In this regard the Commercial and Financial Chronicle made some highly pertinent remarks : 

Nothing like the proposed procedure is to be found in history. Germany is to be taken over and administered in the same way as a corporation no longer able to meet its obligations is taken over by the law and transferred to the hands of the bankruptcy commissioners. .. . In reality a foreign control of internal affairs has been imposed such as never before existed either in our times or in the past. . . . Never before has it been proposed to take such complete possession of the wealth of a nation.23 

Payments under the Dawes Plan increased each year until they reached (in the fifth year) 2,500,000,000 marks. The German Government was able to make them only because of the large volume of foreign loans. These loans began in 1924 when American financial promoters were scouring Europe in a fervid search for borrowers. According to Dr. Koepker-Aschoff, Prussian Minister of Finance during the years 1925-26, every week some representative of American bankers would call at his office and endeavor to press loans upon him. German officials were "virtually flooded with loan offers by foreigners."24 It made little difference whether a loan was actually needed. In Bavaria a little hamlet wished to secure $125,000 in order to improve the town's power station. An American promoter soon convinced the mayor that he should apply for $3,000,000 which would provide not only for the expansion of the power plant but would also finance the construction of various nonproductive projects. The possibility of repayment was given little thoughtful consideration.25 

But reparation payments had to be made and this was possible only through foreign loans. From 1924 to June 30, 1931, the following loans were advanced by American bankers: 

                                         Reichsmarks  

The Dawes and Young loans 875,000,000 

States and Municipalities      860,000.000 

Public utilities                   1,073,000,000 

Municipal Banks                  188,000,000 

Private borrowers             2,269,000,000 

                                      5,265,000,000 

These large American loans represented 55 per cent of the total amount loaned to Germany during these years. It is obvious that American businessmen had a very important stake in continued German solvency, and they scanned with deep interest the manner in which these loans were used in Germany. Her greatest achievement in the sphere of reconstruction was the entire remodeling of her iron and steel industry. Significant technical progress was made in the coal industry, and enormous strides were made in the production of coke and gas and the utilization of by-products. The chemical industry increased its prewar output by at least 25 per cent, and the electrical industries had a similar mushroom growth.26 

But the tremendous burden of reparation payments and interest charges on foreign loans was too much for the shaky German financial structure.27 Another financial palliative was now tried. On June 7, 1929, a group of financial experts headed by Owen D. Young handed to the Reparation Commission, and the governments concerned, a financial agreement that was conveniently called the Young Plan. Under its terms the total indemnity bill was reduced to $8,032,500,000 and was capitalized at 5.5 per cent. The period for its payment was limited to fifty-eight and one-half years. The Reparation Commission was abolished in favor of a Bank for International Settlements which would enjoy broad powers. As a concession to Germany, the extensive financial and political controls outlined under the Dawes Plan were abandoned.28 

The Young Plan went into effect in 1930, but it was a panacea that failed to cure the ills of a world that was on the brink of a breakdown. Some ascribed this desperate situation to an inadequate gold supply; others thought in terms of a surplus of silver. Technology was blamed because it had enabled man to multiply the output of industrial and agricultural products to the point where the world market was flooded with cheap commodities. Aristide Briand pointed to an economic federation of Europe as the best means of surmounting the difficulties that threatened to engulf the Continent, but the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Johann Schober, expressed the opinion that it would not be expedient to push things too fast. Perhaps the best step along the road to eventual European federation would be an Austro-German customs union! In March 1931 this proposed union was formally announced by the governments of Austria and Germany with a cogent explanation of its objectives. 

Although Britain was not opposed to this arrangement, France affected to see political motives back of it and expressed vehement disapproval. Her refusal to grant a much-needed loan to the principal bank in Austria (the Kredit Anstalt) helped to undermine confidence in the stability of that institution. This, in turn, had its effect upon the German economic structure that was already tottering under the weight of a large unfavorable trade balance.29 

Realizing that Austria and Germany were going through a period of frenzied finance, President Hoover (June 20) proposed a one-year world moratorium, from July 1, with reference to "all payments on inter-governmental debts, reparations and relief debts, both principal and interest. . . not including obligations of governments held by private citizens." He made it clear, however, that this action would not mean "the cancellation of the debts" due to the United States.30 

When France delayed acceptance of this proposal the situation in Europe grew rapidly worse. During the seventeen days "that France held up the Hoover Plan, a run on the German banks and the calling in of short-term credits drained the country of some $300,000,000. All banks in Germany for a time were closed. The Hoover Plan would have saved Germany $406,000,000 this year."31 

e. Chancellor Bruning 

Is Compelled to Resign 

With Germany in financial chaos, Secretary Stimson decided to pay a visit to Berlin in order to get a close-up of the situation. The German press, "without a single discordant note," gave him a "hearty welcome and the occasion was seized to express in front-page editorials the gratitude felt for America's . . . friendliness towards Germany."32 Stimson had a long conversation with Dr. Bruining, the German Chancellor. It was not long before they discovered that they had fought along the Western Front in opposing forces that had repeatedly clashed. The warrior tie drew them at once close together and with President Hindenburg it was much the same thing. To Stimson, the President of the Weimar Republic was an "impressive, fine old man."33 

But it required more than Stimson's good will to save the Weimar Republic. The failure of the Allied governments to carry out the disarmament pledges of the Treaty of Versailles, the heavy burden of the Young Plan with its consequent crushing taxation, and the difficulties in securing a market for manufactured goods made the situation in Germany seem almost hopeless. In the spring of 1932, Brining realized that generous concessions on the part of the Allies were badly needed in order to check the tide of National Socialism that was beginning to rise in a menacing manner. 

The only way to banish the shadow of Hitlerism was to strengthen the supports of the Briining Government. But France refused to see this plain fact. Indeed there is evidence to indicate that certain French statesmen conspired to destroy the Briining Government. According to Briining himself, "one major factor in Hitler's rise . . . was the fact that he received large sums of money from foreign countries in 1923 and later [France, Poland, and Czechoslovakia], and was well paid for sabotaging the passive resistance in the Ruhr district. .. . In later years he [Hitler] was paid to excite unrest and encourage revolution in Germany by people who imagined that this might weaken Germany permanently and make the survival of any constitutional, central government impossible."34 

In partial support of this statement by Dr. Brining there is the following paragraph from Louis P. Lochner intriguing book, What About Germany?: 

If there was one foreign statesman who thoroughly misjudged Hitler and his movement, it was Andre Francois-Poncet, the French Ambassador to Berlin. From what I know of behind-the-scenes activities towards the end of the Bruening era in 1932, I am forced to conclude that no other diplomat is more directly responsible for the elevation to power of Adolf Hitler than this brilliant, forever-wisecracking French politician. According to Francois Poncet, the incorruptible Chancellor, Heinrich Bruening, was too brainy and experienced in the wily game of international politics. Hitler, on the other hand, was a fool and a political dilettante.... With the Nazi leader in power, he thought it would be much easier to effect deals which would be favorable to France.35 

At any rate, the French Government in the spring of 1932 greatly helped to bring about Bringing fall. When the Disarmament Conference met in Geneva in February 1932, Brining presented a program that he thought would find favor in Germany. Ramsay MacDonald and Secretary Stimson expressed their approval of the Brining proposal, but Tardieu, of France, resorted to the usual French tactics of delay. When Brining returned to Berlin with empty hands, Hindenburg summoned him to the President's office and criticized him so sharply that resignation was the only course left open to him.36 

When Brining fell the fate of the Weimar Republic was sealed. And the fault did not lie solely on the shoulders of France. Walter Lippmann summarized the situation in a lucid commentary: 

Now that he [Brining] has fallen, tributes will be paid .. . all over the world, and everywhere there will be great regret that so experienced and upright a statesman is no longer the German spokesman. He is the best liked and most trusted man in Europe.... He has lacked only men of equal stature in other countries with whom he could work. . . . Though it appears that he has fallen because of intrigues by the Nationalists [in Germany], what undermined him and made the intrigues possible was the failure of France, Great Britain and the United States to take a single constructive step toward the restoration of international confidence and of the trade and credit which would depend upon it.37 

f. The Disarmament Problem 

Remains a Challenge 

The fall of the Briining Government emphasized the difficulties surrounding the problem of disarmament. It was the same old story of broken pledges by the Allied governments. They had the plausible excuse that the phraseology of Article 8 of the Covenant of the League of Nations was ambiguous: "The Members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." In discussing this phraseology, Lord Davies makes the following pertinent comment: "Here is an attempt to compromise, to square the circle, to combine as a basis for reduction two incompatible principles, namely the old doctrine of absolute self-defence . . . and the alternative idea of a police function."38 

It was inevitable that statesmen would differ with reference to the interpretation of this article. Andre Tardieu asserted that its language did not bind France to any plan for disarmament. Although there was a "legal obligation" to which Germany had subscribed, there was nothing to which France was bound except a "desire" to reduce her armaments.39 Aristide Briand did not agree with Tardieu in this matter. He argued that France was bound by Article 8 to agree to some plan for disarmament. She had partly carried out this pledge by making substantial reductions in her armaments, but was unable to go any further unless other nations took adequate steps to insure French security.40 

The American view relative to disarmament was clearly stated by Professor James T. Shotwell: "Germany had been disarmed with the understanding . . . that the other signatories would also voluntarily limit their armaments with due regard to what Germany was forced to do."41 In 1933 the American position was given cogent expression by Norman H. Davis, who told the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments that it would neither have been just or wise, nor was it intended, that the Central Powers should be subject for all times to a special treatment in armaments. 

There is and has been a corresponding duty on the part of the other Powers, parties to the peace treaties, that by successive stages they too would bring their armaments down to a level strictly determined by the needs of self defence.42 

In March 1933, Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald presented his plan to the Disarmament Conference. The proposed size of European armies was bound to arouse resentment in Germany: Czechoslovakia, 100,000; France, 200,000 for home country, 200,000 for overseas; Germany, 200,000; Italy, 200,000 for home country, 50,000 for overseas; Poland, 200,000; Russia, 500,000.43 

In order to ascertain with precision the viewpoint of Chancellor Hitler on the matter of disarmament, President Roosevelt decided to send Norman H. Davis to Berlin for a conversation that would explore the situation. On the afternoon of April 8, 1933, Davis had a long conference with Hitler who immediately referred to the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles which he regarded as "designed to keep Germany forever in a state of inferiority and to discredit them in the eyes of the world." He thought it was ridiculous for France to have any fear of Germany. France was the most heavily armed nation in the world; Germany had the pitiful force allowed her under the terms of Versailles. The only reason why "France could have any apprehension of Germany was because she knew she was doing an unjust thing in trying to force Germany forever to live under treaty conditions which no self-respecting nation could tolerate." In conclusion Hitler remarked that while he did not want "war, the Germans could not forever live under the terms of a Treaty which was iniquitous and based entirely upon false premises as to Germany's war guilt."44 

With these ominous words ringing in his ears, Davis hurried to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva to discuss the MacDonald Plan with its proposed army limitations that Germany would never accept. On April 25 he received definite instructions from Secretary Hull: 

Please be guided by the broad policy of United States in consistently pressing for immediate and practical actual disarmament. Our ultimate goal is twofold: First, reduction of present annual costs of armament maintenance in all national budgets and, Second, arrival at a goal of domestic policing armaments in as few years as possible. . . . We regard the MacDonald Plan as a definite and excellent step towards the ultimate objective, but that it is a step only and must be followed by succeeding steps.45 

In hurried attempts to expedite a solution of the disarmament problem, Prime Ministers MacDonald and Herriot paid visits to Washington, but they accomplished little. On April 26, President Roosevelt had an extended conference with Herriot during which many important topics were discussed. Herriot expressed the opinion that the most "dangerous spot in Europe" was the Polish Corridor. The President immediately observed that he could "not understand why some mechanical arrangement could not be made by which Germany and East Prussia could be more closely united either by air communication, by elevated train service or, if necessary, by underground tunnels." But Herriot quickly responded with warm praise of the existing train and highway service between the two frontiers. He then, unwittingly, put his ringer upon the real difficulty in arriving at any understanding between Germany and Poland by discussing the "artistic qualities of the Poles, how difficult they were to negotiate with and how even the French . . . found them exceedingly difficult to restrain and quiet whenever they became excited." At the end of the conference Herriot "did not offer any suggestion for overcoming the Polish Corridor danger spot nor did he seem to feel that there was any solution to the problem."46 

It was this "danger spot" that in 1939 was one of the prime causes of conflict. In 1933, Herriot realized that the "artistic qualities" of the Poles made it impossible to suggest to them a realistic solution of the Corridor question. These same qualities were even more in evidence in the summer of 1939 when the Polish Ambassador in Paris was not on speaking terms with either Bonnet or Daladier. Whom the Gods wish to destroy they first make mad! 

In 1933, Hitler regarded the Polish demands for an army of 200,000 as an evident indication of madness. He remembered only too well the bloody forays carried on by Korfanty's irregulars both before and after the plebiscite in Upper Silesia. A Polish army of 200,000, together with a Russian army of 500,000, constituted a most dangerous threat to Germany's Eastern Front. The MacDonald Plan was not welcomed in Berlin. It would have to be amended in favor of a larger German army. 

But any arguments for an increase in Germany's military forces met with instant opposition in Washington. On May 6, Dr. Schacht had a conference with President Roosevelt who quickly informed him that the "United States will insist that Germany remain in statu quo in armament." At the same time he was informed that the American Government would "support every possible effort to have the offensive armaments of every other nation brought down to the German level." At the conclusion of the conference the President intimated "as strongly as possible" that he regarded "Germany as the only possible obstacle to a Disarmament Treaty and that he hoped Dr. Schacht would give this point of view to Hitler as quickly as possible."47 

Hitler responded by calling a meeting of the Reichstag on May 17 to hear his address on the question of disarmament. In order to influence the remarks of the German Chancellor upon that occasion, President Roosevelt hurriedly issued (May 16) a statement to the "Chiefs of State of all countries participating in the General Disarmament or International Monetary and Economic Conferences." He stressed the hope that peace might be assured "through practical measures of disarmament and that all of us may carry to victory our common struggle against economic chaos." These practical measures included the "complete elimination of all offensive weapons." In addition to this momentous step all nations "should enter into a solemn and definite pact of nonaggression."48 

On May 17, Hitler answered the Roosevelt proposals in a very general manner. He professed to find in the suggestions of the President some items he could support as a means of overcoming "the international crisis." Although Germany would still insist upon "actual equality of rights as regards disarmament," she "would not resort to force in order to achieve her objectives."49 

These conciliatory remarks of the Fuhrer brought instant relief to many Americans. The Cincinnati Enquirer thought that Hitler had thrown upon other shoulders the responsibility for real disarmament,50 while the Christian Science Monitor expressed the belief that the movement for world peace had been greatly strengthened.51 

Encouraged by these signs of agreement, Norman H. Davis announced on May 22 that the American Government was ready to consult with other nations in the event of a threat to world peace and would take no action to hinder the efforts of other nations to restrain the activities of aggressor nations.52 America was moving down the road to collective security. 

g. American Press 
Opinion of Hitler in 1933 
While the Department of State was moving down the road of German-American relations with great caution, the American press was divided in its comments upon Hitler. After the Fuhrer had been elevated to the office of Chancellor (January 30, 1933), some papers expressed the opinion that the conservative elements in the German Cabinet would dampen Hitler's ardor for any radical action. In this regard the following excerpt from the New York Times is typical: 

It would be useless to try to disguise the qualms which the news from Berlin must cause to all friends of Germany. At the head of the German Republic has been placed a man who has openly scorned it and vowed that he would destroy it as soon as he could set up the personal dictatorship which was his boasted aim. A majority of the Cabinet, which he, as Chancellor, has been forced to accept would be strongly opposed to him if he sought to translate the wild words .. . of his campaign speeches into political action. . . . Best assurance of all is that President Hindenburg will retain supreme command and be prepared to unmake Hitler as quickly as he made him.53 

The Boston Evening Transcript leaned toward the view that responsibility had already sobered the new Chancellor: "The more power passes into Hitler's hands, the more sobriety enters his mind."54 The eagerness to see a silver lining to the clouds over Germany was evident in many newspaper editorials after the German election of March 5 had assured Hitler of a majority in the Reichstag. The New York Sun believed this majority was an indication of the yearning of the German people for a ruler with a "strong hand."55 The Philadelphia Public Ledger 56 and the Los Angeles Times 57 sought comfort from the fact that Hitler would suppress any internal disorder, while the Milwaukee Journal inclined toward the view that the Hitler majority might be a good thing for "the German people."58 The Atlanta Constitution was disposed to think that the Hitler victory at the polls might help stabilize conditions on the continent of Europe.59 

But there were many papers that expressed deep misgivings. Paul Block's Pittsburgh Post-Gazette gloomily commented on the passing of democracy in Germany.60 The Nashville Banner rejected the view that the election of March 5 was a true reflection of German sentiment,61 and the Washington News flatly declared that the election was a "fake."62 

The hope that President Hindenburg might prove a restraining force that would curb any radical moves by Hitler was soon dissipated when the Fuhrer pressed for the enactment of an Enabling Bill that would transfer the legislative power to the Chancellor and thus permit him to relieve "the President of unnecessary work." On the morning of March 23 (1933) thiss Enabling Bill came before the Reichstag, then sitting in the Kroll Opera House. While the bill was being discussed the incendiary chant of the Storm Troopers who surrounded the building came clearly to the ears of the anxious legislators: "Give us the Bill or else fire and murder." When the bill was finally passed by an overwhelming majority in the Reichstag, Hindenburg was prevailed upon to sign it and thus he gave clear evidence of his willingness to destroy the Weimar Republic he had sworn to uphold.63 

The reaction of certain newspapers to the passage of the Enabling Bill was immediate and bitterly critical. Their viewpoint was trenchantly expressed by the Baltimore Sun: "There is no escape from the conclusion that the Hitler dictatorship is an evil, sadistic and brutal affair, with most of whose declared aspirations it is impossible to sympathize."64 

h. American Diplomats Regard 
Germany with Misgivings 
Some of the dispatches from American representatives in Berlin confirmed the dark suspicions of pessimistic American newspapers. The consul general in Berlin was George S. Messersmith who wrote many long accounts that were critical of the Nazi regime. On the evening of May 10 some twenty thousand books by "Jewish and Marxistic authors" were burned in the great square between the State Opera House and the buildings of the University of Berlin. This pyrotechnic display was followed by pressure that compelled large numbers of persons with Jewish blood to retire from important public and semi-public positions. Authors, artists, educators, physicians, and scientists began to flee from Germany in increasing numbers. Concentration camps for political prisoners made their appearance in certain parts of Germany, but Mr. Messersmith hastened to add that there was "no reason to believe that the persons in these camps were . . . mistreated."65 

These critical comments of Mr. Messersmith were supplemented by the less acidulous remarks of George A. Gordon, the American charge d'affaires in Berlin. Mr. Gordon feared that the German Foreign Office was due for a "shakeup" which might have some unpleasant aspects. He then commented upon the rapprochement between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Both Goebbels and Goring were working hard to make this accord firm and lasting. 

With reference to Russia the situation was quite different. There was a fundamental antagonism between Hitlerism and Bolshevism. Bolshevism is essentially an international movement, based on a single class—the Proletariat—and on the international solidarity of the Proletariat. Its final goal is world revolution and the establishment of a communistic world-state. Hitlerism is an essentially national movement. .. . It believes that friendly international relations and universal peace cannot be secured by coordinating all nations on a proletarian basis and by wiping out their national differences.66 

By the middle of June the dispatches from Mr. Gordon took on a distinctly somber tinge. There were indications that the Nazi leaders believed that the time had arrived "for the complete absorption of all political parties in accordance with their philosophy of a 'total state' in which there can be no room for any party other than the Nazi Party Arrests of Catholic leaders and the suppression of Catholic journals have been reported from various parts of the country."67 

On the evening of June 22, Dr. Brining paid a visit to the American Embassy and expressed his profound concern at the "recent events and especially by the apathetic attitude evinced by President Hindenburg and his immediate entourage." The President had "done nothing whatever" about numerous outrages and it was Briining's fear that the lawless elements in the Nazi Party would always "prevail over Hitler in the long run."68 

But the Fuhrer soon showed surprising strength in his resistance to the clamor of the Nazi clique that was trying to speed the movement of the revolutionary tide that was sweeping over Germany. He rebuked Goebbels "who had recently been indulging in more than the usual inflammatory talk concerning the imminence of a Second Revolution." Hitler was strongly opposed to such a movement which he believed would lead to nothing but "chaotic results." It seemed apparent that he had "decided to take the bolder and more statesmanlike line of trying to curb the illegalities and excesses of his followers."69 

Mr. Messersmith shared Gordon's opinion that Hitler was determined to check the excesses of his restless followers. His assurances to German businessmen had been definite and forceful. The dissolution of political parties might have some good results. One could only say "that for the present time the outlook is decidedly more optimistic and encouraging than it has been at any time since March 5."70 

i. President Roosevelt "Torpedoes" 
the World Economic Conference 
After the fall of the Briining Government the Allies realized that the system of reparations was at an end. At the Lausanne Conference (June 16-July 8,1932) this fact was frankly recognized. The new German Chancellor, Franz von Papen, offered to pay a reasonable sum in order to liquidate all reparation claims. This suggestion was adopted with certain reservations, and the amount was fixed at $714,000,000.71 

After this important item had been settled, the German Government next turned to the task of finding some means of meeting the payments on the large public and private debts contracted before the banking crisis of July 1931. The "reflationary policy" of Hitler had resulted in an impressive increase in the production of coal and iron, and an equally impressive decline in unemployment, but despite these favorable factors the German export surplus was constantly dwindling, thus destroying any possibility of making payments on foreign loans. As the economic situation in Germany grew worse, Dr. Schacht, president of the Reichsbank, on May 29, 1933, had a conference with the representatives of Germany's creditors in six countries.72 After five days of discussion these representatives issued a statement which agreed that a continued decline in the Reichsbank's reserves might impair its functions and that an increase in reserves was required to strengthen the bank "in its successful endeavors to maintain the stability of the German currency." The statement concluded with a strong expression of hope that the permanent solution of the German transfer problem would be made "one of the most important and most urgent objectives of the World Economic Conference" soon to be held in London.73 

It was apparent to banking circles that Dr. Schacht was about to take some temporary step to protect the reserves of the Reichsbank. He could then wait and see what solution would be offered by the World Economic Conference. On June 9 he finally issued a regulation which decreed a transfer moratorium on the interest and sinking fund payments on foreign debts estimated at approximately 17,000,000,000 reichsmarks.74 John Foster Dulles, as the representative of American bankers, sent Dr. Schacht a telegram of sharp protest.75 Schacht, in turn, waited to see what the World Economic Conference would do with reference to the economic ills that were plaguing Europe. He did not have to spend much time in contemplation. When the conference convened on June 12, the representatives of Britain, France, and Italy were anxious as an initial step for President Roosevelt to agree upon a mild declaration of financial policy. Raymond Moley regarded the declaration as "wholly innocuous." It was merely a statement that "gold would ultimately be reestablished as a measure of international exchange value, but that each nation reserved the right to decide when it would return to a gold standard and undertake stabilization."76 

When this declaration was placed before President Roosevelt he abruptly declined to accept it and thereby "torpedoed" the conference. All Europe "exploded with resentment and wrath" at the President's action,77 and the delegations of experts dejectedly left London. On July 27 the conference formally adjourned without having reached any agreement on the important questions of credit policy, price levels, limitation of currency fluctuations, exchange control, tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and the resumption of foreign lending.78 If one may borrow a familiar phrase of Woodrow Wilson used in a different connection, President Roosevelt "broke the heart of the world" and spent the rest of his life trying to put it together again. 

After the failure of the World Economic Conference to find some answer to the questions that clamored for settlement, Dr. Schacht carried on negotiations with the representatives of American bankers and finally reached a compromise whereby the Dawes loan (1924) and the Young loan (1930) would be exempted from the scope of the moratorium he had announced on June 9. Other concessions were made to American banking interests, but the situation remained distinctly unsatisfactory. The collapse at London was a serious blow to the plans of European statesmen for a satisfactory adjustment of political and economic difficulties. 

j. The Four Power 

Pact Proves a Failure 

The collapse of the London Economic Conference had an immediate effect upon the political situation on the Continent, because it helped to sabotage the political accord arrived at in the Four Power Pact signed at Rome on July 15,1933. The concept of this Four Power Pact appears to have originated with Prime Minister MacDonald who talked the matter over at Geneva in March 1933. Mussolini then took up the matter and on March 18 transmitted to the British, French, and German ambassadors at Rome a tentative outline of a Four Power agreement. The draft not only provided for the collaboration of the powers in the preservation of European peace but recognized the need for a revision of the peace treaties concluded at the close of the World War. Particular reference was made to the need of some settlement of the colonial aspirations of Germany and Italy. With reference to the Polish Corridor the draft provided for the return to Germany of a strip of territory which would connect East Prussia "with the rest of the Reich." The British Government frowned upon these provisions and they were finally deleted.79 

As the negotiations for the Four Power Pact slowly proceeded at the different European capitals, the Italian Ambassador in London (Grandi) had a conversation with Norman Davis, with reference to the problem of disarmament. He expressed the opinion that the best way to speed an accord on the matter of disarmament and other questions was to have a meeting between Daladier, Hitler, MacDonald, and Mussolini. This could be brought about only on the initiative of the United States.80 The President failed to respond to this overture, but the negotiations proceeded so rapidly that the Four Power Agreement was initialed in Rome on June 7. Its provisions were a confirmation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The four powers would "consult together as regards all questions which appertain to them," and would "make every effort to pursue, within the framework of the League of Nations, a policy of effective co-operation between all Powers with a view to the maintenance of peace." The high contracting parties would also "make every effort to ensure the success of the Disarmament Conference and, should questions which particularly concern them remain in suspense on the conclusion of the Conference, they reserve the right to reexamine these questions between themselves in pursuance of the present agreement." This consultative arrangement also included "all economic questions which have a common interest for Europe and particularly for its economic restoration."81 

A week after the agreement had been initialed in Rome, Lord Tyrrell, the British Ambassador in Paris, had a conversation with Ambassador Jesse Straus. After an extended eulogy of Daladier, Tyrrell then expressed "great fear of the future." Hitler was faced with a tremendous task in Germany and would "lose out, unless he found means of carrying out his many promises which were to result from an Organized Germany. . . . Then the great danger of a communistic uprising might threaten the peace of Europe." He was distressed over the fact that a dictatorship existed in Germany because the only stable form of government was "the democratic form, and that the sort of medieval rule that Germany was now suffering from could not last. .. . He expressed the opinion that... both England and the United States are responsible for the rise of Hitlerism."82 [He would be right DC]

The fears of Lord Tyrrell were felt by many other statesmen who did not have much faith in the Four Power Pact that was formally signed at Rome on July 15, 1933. In confirming the Kellogg-Briand Pact, it merely guaranteed the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles which few recognized as a perfect treaty. Mussolini had been realistic in including in his first draft provisions to deal with the Polish Corridor and the colonial aspirations of the German and Italian governments. The refusal of Britain and France to agree to this draft made the Four Power Pact a scrap of worthless paper. 

k. William E. Dodd Goes to 
Germany as U.S. Ambassador 
There is ample evidence in the Colonel House Papers in the Yale University library that the selection of William E. Dodd as the American Ambassador to Germany was made upon the strong recommendations of Colonel House and Daniel C. Roper, one-time commissioner of internal revenue.83 Also, there is no doubt that this selection was an unfortunate one. The Colonel did not realize that Dodd knew little about American foreign policy and even less about the problems of Europe. His knowledge of the German language was so limited that his conversations in that tongue were as full of pauses as a hesitation waltz. In Berlin he was always uncomfortable. As an American liberal he had a deep-seated dislike for every aspect of the Nazi movement. If he had been as fluent as George Bancroft he would have had to watch his words so that some sharp edge of criticism did not thrust its way through the wide-spaced texture of his discourse. 

It is evident that a bigger man would have done a better job. Diplomacy is a profession that requires keen eyes that read between the lines of international relations, and sensitive ears that quickly detect the undertones of intrigue. With his second-rate mind that had mastered merely the dubious fundamentals of how to get ahead in the historical profession, Dodd was really a babe-in-the-woods in the dark forests of Berlin. Colonel House had moved with safety through those same deep shadows, but the Nazi wolf was far more dangerous than the Hohenzollern eagle. In the pages of Dodd's diary one gets occasional glimpses of the torments that flitted through his mind as he endeavored to size up a situation that defied definition. He was constantly hoping to discover some common denominator of culture that would solve all difficulties without seeming to realize that he and the Nazi leaders looked at culture through very different eyes. He was a tragic misfit in Berlin in the prewar years, and his selection as ambassador was one of the first mistakes of the Roosevelt Administration. 

1. The President Tells a Spurious Story 
Inasmuch as Ambassador Dodd would have to have frequent conferences in Berlin with reference to the payment of American loans, President Roosevelt thought it expedient to invite him to the White House and regale him with an anecdote that Dodd did not suspect was spurious. He was informed that in the spring of 1933, Schacht had paid a visit to the United States to confer with American officials concerning the matter of the repayment of loans that had been extended to the German Government, German municipalities, German corporations, and German nationals. When Schacht called at the White House to talk with the President, he was treated with Hyde Park courtesy. After detailing with relish that example of boorishness, the President told the following story which was patently untrue: 

He described the arrogant bearing of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht in May when he was threatening, as head of the German Reichsbank, to cease paying interest and principal on debts of more than one billion dollars due to American creditors next August. The President said he had told Secretary Hull to receive Schacht, but to pretend to be deeply engaged in looking for certain papers, leaving Schacht standing and unobserved for three minutes, with Hull's secretary watching the German's nervous reactions. Then Hull was to discover a note from the President which indicated serious opposition to any such defaults of German debtors. He was to turn to Schacht and hand him the document and watch the changing color of the German's face as he, Hull, greeted him. This, the President said, was to take a little of the arrogance out of the German's bearing, and he added that the effect was even more marked, as reported from Hall, than had been expected.84 

In the Memoirs of Cordell Hull this story is repeated with some additions. It is easy to demonstrate its falsity. 

On May 8, Dr. Schacht, head of the German Reichsbank, who was in Washington on an official visit . . . announced that his Government would cease payments abroad on Germany's external debts, totaling $5,000,000,000, of which nearly $2,000,000,000 were held by Americans. The following day I called Dr. Schacht into my office, determined to speak some bare-fisted words. I found Schacht simple and unaffected, thoroughly approachable. . . . The moment Schacht sat down alongside my desk, I went right to the point and said, with some anger: "I was never so deeply surprised as I was yesterday afternoon by your announcement. My Government is exercising every ounce of its power to bring the nation out of the depths of awful panic conditions. .. . Just as real progress is being made, you come over here and, after sitting in confidential conferences with our officials . . . suddenly let it be given out from our doorstep that Germany has suspended these payments. ... " I felt outraged at such a bald attempt to involve this Government in so odious an act by Germany. I said: "Any person ought to realize the serious possibilities of such steps." Dr. Schacht kept protesting that he had not foreseen or grasped these reactions. "I am extremely sorry," he said. I gave Dr. Schacht a written memorandum which stated: "The President has directed me to say to you in regard to your communication as to the decision of the German Government to stop transfers on obligations externally sold or externally payable, that he is profoundly shocked."85 

As one reads the Memoirs of Secretary Hull, it is noticeable that he makes no reference to the "arrogant bearing" of Dr. Schacht as described by the President to Dr. Dodd. Instead, he speaks of Dr. Schacht as "simple and unaffected." There is no confirmation of the President's story of the discourteous manner in which Schacht was supposed to be treated in the office of Secretary Hull. But the Memoirs of the Secretary are just as fictional, in places, as the story of President Roosevelt. As a matter of fact, Secretary Hull, or his genial "ghost," Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Berding, became badly confused when writing about this "Schacht incident." First of all, Dr. Schacht did not announce on May 8 that "his Government would cease payments abroad on Germany's external debts." That announcement came a month later (June 9). As early as January 19, 1933, Herr Wambold, Minister of Economics in the Reich, announced that repayments "of the principal of foreign private debts will be impossible in 1933."86 Dr. Schacht countered this statement by an assurance that all "foreign commercial debts will be fully paid."87 On May 8 an announcement appeared in the American press to the effect that the German "debt service is imperiled by drop in exports."88 A similar announcement had been previously made on January 19 and April 10. Schacht was not ready to take any definite action until he returned to Berlin and had a conference with the representatives of the principal creditor countries (May 29-June 2). 

On May 9 there was no reason for Secretary Hull to call Dr. Schacht to his office and assault him with some "bare-fisted words" with reference to Germany's default on her obligations to American creditors. There had been no announcement of such a proposed default, and the highly colored stories told by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull are mere flights of imagination. 

Ambassador Dodd was not sufficiently acquainted with the President to be able to draw the line between truth and mendacity, so he duly recorded the story for posterity and thereby afforded another illustration of the moral make-up of the Chief Executive. After listening to the President's dubious discourse on Dr. Schacht, Dodd went to New York City (July 3) for a conference with a group of prominent bankers who had no glib prescription with reference to a settlement of financial difficulties with Germany. They merely expressed the hope that the American Ambassador might be able to keep the German Government from "defaulting openly." As an inducement to this end they were willing to reduce the rate of interest on their loans from seven to four per cent.89 

After receiving these official and unofficial instructions with regard to proposed German defaults on American loans, Dodd then had to listen to advice on many other problems that vexed the course of German-American relations. One of the most important irritants that pointed to future trouble was the anti-Semitic campaign that had been launched by the Nazi Government. During his conversation with Dodd at the White House the President had remarked: "The German authorities are treating the Jews shamefully and the Jews in this country are greatly excited. But this is .. . not a governmental affair. We can do nothing except for American citizens who happen to be made victims. We must protect them, and whatever we can do to moderate the general persecution by unofficial and personal influence ought to be done."90 

On the following day Dodd met Raymond Moley who apparently held "entirely different views from the President about the American attitude toward the Jews in Germany." After listening to Moley's remarks for some moments, Dodd countered with an unrelated question about the operation of the Walker tariff of 1846. Moley was thrown off mental balance by this sudden shift in subject, and when he fumbled around for an answer that was not on the tip of his tongue, Dodd decided that he was an intellectual lightweight who "could not long hold his confidential relations with Roosevelt."91 

In the first week in July, Dodd was in New York City preparing to take the boat for Germany. He had a long conference with some outstanding Jews, including Rabbi Stephen S. Wise and Felix Warburg. They strongly urged him to press for an immediate change in the repressive policy that had been adopted by the Nazi Government towards the Jews, and Dodd assured them that he would "exert all possible personal influence against unjust treatment" of that unfortunate minority.92 

Dodd then hurried to keep an engagement with Colonel House at Beverly Farms near Boston. With reference to the Jewish question, the Colonel remarked: "You should try to ameliorate Jewish sufferings. They are clearly wrong and terrible; but the Jews should not be allowed to dominate the economic or intellectual life in Berlin as they have done for a long time." In New York City, at the home of Charles R. Crane, Dodd listened to a new viewpoint concerning anti-Semitism in Germany. Crane, though old and feeble, showed surprising animation against all Jews. His concluding words to Dodd were sharply sanguinary: "Let Hitler have his way."93 

One of Dodd's last visitors before his departure for Berlin was George Sylvester Viereck. Viereck was known to Dodd as a German propagandist during the years from 191410 1917, and he was held at arm's length as a "curious sort of journalist with whom one would best not be too free." After leaving Viereck he was driven to the steamboat pier where insistent reporters kept clamoring for photographs. Reluctantly, Dodd posed for a picture. Perhaps the "curious" personality of Viereck pursued him, for unfortunately, "unaware of the similarity of the Hitler salute .. . we raised our hands."94 In months to come, in Berlin, he would frequently raise his hands, not as a salute to Hitler, but by way of imprecation against a regime he quickly grew to loathe. 
93 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 
94 Ibid., p. 11.

Notes-Historic Introduction

1 John H..Ferguson, American Diplomacy and the Boer War (Philadelphia, 1939), pp. 208-9. 

2 February 10, 1904. 

3 February 10, 1904.

4 February 11, 1904.

5 Tatsuji Takeuchi, War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Umpire (New York, 1936), pp. 155-57.

6 Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East 1895—1914 (Philadelphia, 1946), pp. 101-60.

7 Ernest B. Price, The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 34-38. 

8 A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp. 129-34. 

9 Theodore Roosevelt to President William H. Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox MS, Library of Congress. 

10 John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1Q08-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), chaps. 4-10.

11 Charles Callan Tansill, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911 (New York, 1944), chaps. 1-4, 10-12. 

12 Merle E. Curti, "Bryan and World Peace," Smith College Studies in History, XVI (Northampton, 1931).

13 Charles Callan Tansill, America Goes to War (Boston, 1938), chaps. 2-6. 

14 Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), p. 183. 

15 Tansill, op. cit., pp. 459-60. 

16 Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 88. It is interesting to note that in the eventful days that just preceded America's entry into the World War, President Wilson had so little regard for Secretary Lansing that he complained bitterly to Colonel House about his shortcomings: "I [House] was surprised to hear him [the President] say that Lansing was the most unsatisfactory Secretary in his Cabinet; . . . that he had no imagination, no constructive ability, and but little real ability of any kind. He was constantly afraid of him because he often undertook to launch policies himself which he, the President, had on several occasions rather brusquely reversed." House Diary, March 28, 1917. House MS, Yale University Library.

17 President Wilson did not have a clear idea of the actual meaning of the Fourteen Points. In his Diary, December 20, 1918, Secretary Lansing makes the following significant comments: "There are certain phrases in the President's 'Fourteen Points' [Freedom of the Seas and Self-Determination] which I am sure will cause trouble in the future because their meaning and application have not been thought out. . . . These phrases will certainly come home to roost and cause much vexation. .. . He \t\\e President] apparently never thought out in advance where they would lead or how they would be interpreted by others. In fact he does not seem to care just so his words sound well." Lansing Papers, Library of Congress. 

18 Oscar Cargill, Intellectual America: Ideas on the March (New York, 1941), p. 504. 

19 The correspondence dealing with the pre-Armistice agreement is printed in full in Foreign Relations, 1918, Supplement, I, The World War, I (Washington, 1933), 337-38, 343, 357-58, 379-8i, 382-83, 425, 468-69. 

20 Paul Birdsall, Versailles Twenty Years After (New York, 1941), pp. 35~36. 

21 David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference (New Haven, 1939), I, 306-9. 

22 Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking, IQIQ (New York, 1939), p. 18. 

23 The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, ed. Charles Seymour (Cambridge, 1928), IV, 343- 

24 Philip M. Burnett, Reparation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1940), I, 63-64.

25 ibid., p. 69. 

26 Ibid., pp. 832-33.  

27 Birdsall, op. cit., p. 258. 

28 Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 240. 

29 Thorstein Veblen, The Nature of Peace (New York, 1917), P- 261. Secretary Lansing did not share the viewpoint that the Germans had forfeited their colonies through maladministration. In his Diary, January 10, 1918, he remarked: "This purpose of the retention of conquered territory is prima facie based upon conquest and is not in accord with the spirit of a peace based upon justice. .. . It is necessary for peace that the adjustment should be equitable." Lansing Papers. Library of Congress.

30 Edwyn Bevan, The Method in the Madness (London, 1917), pp. 305-6. 

31 Arthur P. Scott, "George Louis Beer," in the Marcus W. Jernegan Essays in American Historiography, ed. W. T. Hutchinson (Chicago, 1937), p. 315. 

32 Ibid., p. 319. 

33 George L. Beer, African Questions at the Paris Peace Conference, ed. L. H. Gray (New York, 1923), pp. 58-60. 

34 Bailey, op. cit., p. 163. 

35 Harry R. Rudin, Germany in the Cameroons, 1884-1914 (New Haven, 1938), pp. 11, 414, 419. 

36 Bailey, op. cit., p. 167. 

37 It is significant that most of Professor Lord's colleagues on the Inquiry thought that his zeal for Poland was "excessive." Birdsall, op. cit., p. 178. See also, Hunter Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris (privately printed, 1928), I, 289. 

38 Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement (Garden City, 1922), III, 37-38. 

39 Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-26. 

40 Seymour, op. cit., IV, 334-35. 

41 Lloyd George, op. cit., II, 637-42. 

42 Rene Martel, The Eastern Frontiers of Germany (London, 1930), pp. 49-50. 

43 William H. Dawson, Germany Under the Treaty (London, 1933), pp. 149-52. 

44 Diaries, Letters and Papers (London, 1935-37), II, 503. 

45 Documents on International Affairs, 1934, ed. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Stephen Heald (New York), p. 424. 

46 Miller, op. cit., IV, 224-28; VI, 49-52. 

47 E. Alexander Powell, Thunder Over Europe (New York, 1931), p. 62. 

48 Dawson, op. cit., pp. 102-9. See also, I. F. D. Morrow and L. M. Sieveking, The Peace Settlement in the German Polish Borderlands (London, 1936). 

49 Powell, op. cit., p. 66. 

50 Baker, op. cit., pp. 482-84. Apparently, Henry White did much to give President Wilson the correct view of the situation in Upper Silesia. See Allan Nevins, Henry White 51 In the learned account written by Georges Kaeckenbeeck, The International Experiment of Upper Silesia (London, 1942), p. 6, the vote is given as 707,605 for Germany; 479,359 for Poland. 

52 (London, 1930), pp. 79-88. 

53 Dawson, op. cit., pp. 206-9.(New York, 1930), p. 423. 

54 Sir Robert Donald, The Polish Corridor and the Consequences (London, 1929), PP- 197-98. See also, Sarah Wambaugh, Plebiscites Since the World War (Washington, 1933); W. J. Rose, The Drama of Upper Silesia (Brattleboro, 1936); Colonel E. S. Hutchinson, Silesia Revisited—1929 (London, 1930). 

55 Seymour, op. cit., IV, 347, 349, 383. 

56 Articles 428-432 of the Treaty of Versailles, The Treaties of Peace, 1919-1923 (New York, 1924), I, 254-55. 

57 General Henry T. Allen to Secretary Hughes, December 22, 1921. 862T.01/346, MS, National Archives. 

58 Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Hughes, Paris, April 27, 1920. 862.00/921, MS, National Archives. 

59 Emil Sauer to Secretary Hughes, Cologne, February 16, 1923. 862.00/1215, MS, National Archives. 

60 Dawson, op. cit., p. 84. 

61 Nevins, op. cit., p. 

62 G. E. R. Gedye, The Revolver Republic (London, 1930), pp. 29-31. 

63 Herbert Hoover, "Communism Erupts in Europe," Collier's, CXXVIII (September 8, 1951), pp. 26-27, 68-71. 

64 Alma Luckau, The German Delegation at the Paris Peace Conference (New York, 1941), p. 124. 

65 Ibid., pp. 98-100.

Chapter 1

1 American Embassy (Paris) to the Secretary of State, October 24, 1919. 862.00/ 754, MS, National Archives. 

2 Dyar to the Secretary of State, Berlin, December 31, 1919. 862.00/776, MS, National Archives. 

3 R. D. Murphy to the Secretary of State, January 5, 1924. 862.4016/12, MS, National Archives. 

4 Ex-Kaiser Wilhelm II to President Wilson, February 9, 1920. 763.7219/9116, MS, National Archives. 

5 Secretary Lansing to the American Embassy in Paris, February 6, 1920. 763.7219/ 8941a, MS, National Archives. 

6 Mr. Wadsworth to Secretary Hughes, Paris, May 16, 1923. 462.00R294/210, MS, National Archives. 

7 George B. Lockwood to Secretary Hughes, May 24, 1923. 462.00R293/232, MS, National Archives. 

8 Foreign Relations, 1923, II, 180.  

9 Secretary Hughes to Ambassador Herrick, February 23, March 15, 1924. 462.00R296/176, 212, MS, National Archives. 

10 Commissioner Dresel to Secretary Hughes, Berlin, April 20, 1921. 462.00R29/ 649, MS, National Archives. 

11 Secretary Hughes to the American Mission in Berlin. April 22, 1921. 462.00R.29/ 684, MS, National Archives. 

12 Foreign Relations, The Paris Peace Conference, 191Q, XIII, 862-67.

13 Ibid., pp. 18-19. 

14 Ibid., pp. 22-25. 

15 Ambassador Child to Secretary Hughes, Rome, October 24, 1922. 462.00R296/5, MS, National Archives. 

16 Ambassador Herrick to Secretary Hughes, Paris, November 22, 1922. 462.00R29/2184, MS, National Archives. 

17 Secretary Hughes to Mr. Boyden, November 24, 1922. 462.00R29/2187, MS, National Archives.

18 C.E Herring to Secretary Hughes, Berlin, September 10, 1923. 462.00R29/ 3333, MS, National Archives. 

19 Ambassador Houghton to Secretary Hughes, Berlin, July 27, 1923. 462.00R29/ 2923, MS, National Archives. 

20 Interview between W. R. Castle and Herbert Hoover, March 7, 1923. 862T.01/ 687, MS, National Archives. 

21 Ibid., pp. 102, 119-21.

22 Foreign Relations, Paris Peace Conference, XIII, 899-902. See also, Charles G. Dawes, A Journal of Reparations (London, 1939). 

23 Quoted in Max Sering, Germany Under the Dawes Plan (London, 1929), pp. 64-65. 

24 Max Winkler, Foreign Bonds, An Autopsy (Philadelphia, 1933), pp. 86-87.

25 ibid. 

26 On the whole matter of the financial situation in Germany in the pre-Hitler period see C. R. S. Harris, Germany's Foreign Indebtedness (London, 1935). 27 J. W. Angell, The Recovery of Germany (New Haven, 1932), pp. 170 ff.

28 John W. Wheeler-Bennett and H. Latimer, Information on the Reparation Settlement (London, 1930). 

29 P. Einzig, The World Economic Crisis, 1929-1931 (New York, 1932); F. W. Lawrence, This World Crisis (London, 1931); League of Nations, World Production and Prices, 1925-1933 (Geneva, 1934). 

The following table will indicate the rapid decline in German exports: 

(Rm. Millions) 

Monthly average    Imports  Exports    Balance 

1931                        560.7      799-8      239.1 

1933                        350.3      405-9        55-6 

1934                        371.0      347-2      -23.8 

30 New York Times, June 21, 1931. 

31 Sherwood Eddy to Secretary Stimson, Berlin, September 1, 1931. GK 862.00/ 2616, MS, Department of State. 

32 Frederick M. Sackett to Secretary Stimson, Berlin, July 30, 1931. 033.1140 Stimson, Henry L./144, MS, Department of State. 

33 Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Stimson and President von Hindenburg, Berlin, July 27, 1931. 033.1140 Stimson, Henry L./i42V^, MS, Department of State.

34 Dr. Heinrich Briining to Rev. Edward J. Dunne, S.J., cited in E. J. Dunne, The German Center Party in the Empire and the Republic, MS, dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Georgetown University library. 

35 (New York, 1942), pp. 42-43. 

36 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Hindenburg: Wooden Titan (New York, 1936), pp. 368-85. 

37 New York Herald-Tribune, June 1, 1932. 

38 The Problem of the Twentieth Century: A Study in International Relationships (London, 1934), p. 227. 39 Leon Blum, Peace and Disarmament (London, 1932), pp. 88-89. 

40 Ibid., pp. 90-91. 

41 James T. Shotwell, On the Rim of the Abyss (New York, 1936), p. 269. 

42 John W. Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on International Affairs, 1933 (London, 1934), p. 209. 

43 Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 45. 

44 Memorandum of a conversation between Norman H. Davis and Chancellor Hitler, Berlin, April 8, 1933. Ibid., p. 107. 

45 Secretary Hull to Norman H. Davis, April 25, 1933. Ibid., p. 107. 

46 Memorandum of a conversation between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Herriot, April 26, 1933. Ibid., pp. 109-11. 

47 Ibid., pp. 130-31. Secretary Hull to the ambassador in Great Britain (Bingham), May 8, 1933. 

48 President Roosevelt to various chiefs of state, May 16, 1933. Ibid., pp. 143-45. 

49 New York Times, May 18, 1933. 

50 May 18, 1933. 

51 May 18, 1933. 

52 Department of State, Press Releases, May 22, 1933. 

53 January 31, 1933. 

54 February 2, 1933. 

55 March 6, 1933. 

56 March 7, 1933. 

57 March 7, 1933. 

58 March 7, 1933. 

59 March 7, 1933.

60 March 7, 1933. 

61 March 6, 1933. 

62 March 15, 1933. 

63 Wheeler-Bennett, Wooden Titan, pp. 446-49. 

64 March 25, 1933.

65 George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 12, 1933. 862.00/2984, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 

66 George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, May 22, 1933. 862.00/2985-86, MS, Department of State. 67 George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 17, 1933. 862.00/3010, MS, Department of State. 

68 George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, June 23, 1933. 862.00/3017, MS, Department of State.

69 George A. Gordon to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3028-29, MS, Department of State. 

70 George S. Messersmith to Secretary Hull, July 10, 1933. 862.00/3033, MS, Department of State. 

71 The Final Act of the Lausanne Conference, July 9, 1932 (London, 1932), Cmd. 4126. 

72 The countries represented at this conference in Berlin were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.

73 New York Times, June 3, 1933. 

74 The United States was deeply concerned about this transfer moratorium because about 40 per cent of the German external debt, approximately $1,800,000,000, was owed to American creditors. For a different estimate see Cleona Lewis, America's Stake in International Investments (Washington, 1938), p. 414. 

75 New York Times, June 21, 1933. 

76 Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), p. 247. 

77 Ibid., pp. 261-62. 

78 The documents dealing with the London Economic Conference are given in great detail in Foreign Relations, 1933, I, 452-762.

79 Memorandum by the chief of the Division of Western European Affairs (Moffat), March 24, 1933. Ibid., pp. 396-98. 

80 Ibid., pp. 409-11. Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 12, 1933.  

81 Ibid., pp. 417—19. Agreement of understanding and co-operation. 

82 Memorandum by the ambassador in France (Straus) of a conversation with the British Ambassador in France (Tyrrell), June 15, 1933. Ibid., pp. 420-21.

83 Ambassador Dodd's Diary, 1933-1938, pp. 9-10. For July 4, 1933, Dodd records a conversation with Colonel House in which the aging colonel remarked: "I sent two nominations to the President, your's and Nicholas Butler's, but I felt that you ought to be given precedence."

84 Ibid., p. 5. 

85 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 237-38. 

86 New York Times, January 19, 1933. 

87 New York Times, March 19, 1933. 

88 New York Times, May 8, 1933.

89 Dodd, op. cit., p. 9. 

90 Ibid.,p. 5. 

91 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 

92 Ibid., p. 9. 

93 Ibid., pp. 10-11. 

94 Ibid., p. 11.