Back Door to War
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy
1933-1941
by
CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL
III
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy
1933-1941
by
CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL
III
Continued Friction with Japan
Points
towards Inevitable War
a. Congress Enacts an Exclusion
Law Which Angers Japan
As AMERICAN STATESMEN looked from the troubled scenes in China
to the quiet landscapes in Japan, it was not with relief but with suspicion
that they viewed the placid picture of Old Nippon. The orderly ways
of empire grated upon the sensibilities of many Americans who preferred the uneasy atmosphere of democracy to the regulated rhythm of
the Mikado's Government. Since 1913, Japan had been under almost
constant attack by the Department of State. The Wilson Administration
had led a sustained assault against Japan along several fronts, and the
inauguration of a Republican Administration in 1921 had led to the
calling of the Washington Conference for the express purpose of checking Japanese plans for expansion. The climate of opinion in the United
States was definitely hostile to Japan, and it was inevitable that clouds
of misunderstanding between the two countries should gather along
the diplomatic horizon. The first threat of a storm came in connection
with the immigration question.
After the close of the World War there was an increasing fear in
the United States that the war-impoverished countries of Europe would
send a huge wave of immigration to American shores. On May 19,
1921, in order to prevent such a contingency, Congress enacted a law
that limited the number of aliens of any particular nationality that
would be granted admission to the United States in any one year to 3
per cent of the "number of foreign-born persons of such nationality
resident in the United States" in the year 1910. Some months later a
new act was framed which reduced the annual admission of any nationality to 2 per cent of the foreign-born population of that nationality
resident in the United States in 1890.1
A high dyke had been erected
against the expected wave of immigration.
It was soon apparent that this new legislation would not be used
merely to supplement the gentlemen's agreement with Japan which
since 1907 had controlled the immigration of laborers from that country. In 1921 a movement began in the Far West to exclude by legislation any further immigration of Japanese laborers. This could be accomplished by employing a phrase suggested in 1922 by the Supreme Court
when it ruled that Japanese were ineligible for citizenship by naturalization. Federal legislation could be framed so that it would apply solely
to Japanese immigrants.2
In December 1923, bills were introduced in Congress prohibiting the
admission of aliens ineligible for citizenship. The Japanese Ambassador promptly voiced a strong protest. In the eyes of the Foreign Office
it was necessary to know "whether Japan as a nation is or is not entitled
to the proper respect and consideration of other nations."3
On February 8, Secretary Hughes sent a long letter to Representative
Albert Johnson, chairman of the House Committee on Immigration,
in which he criticized the proposed legislation as inconsistent with the
treaty of 1911. It would also "largely undo the work of the Washington
Conference on Limitation of Armament, which so greatly improved
our relations with Japan." He was certain that it was not "worth while
thus to affront a friendly nation with whom we have established the
most cordial relations."4
While this letter of protest was resting quietly in a pigeonhole in
Mr. Johnson's desk, Secretary Hughes and Ambassador Hanihara were
exchanging notes on the immigration issue. Hanihara insisted that his
country had no intention of "questioning the sovereign right of any
country to regulate immigration to its own territories." He could not,
however, understand the need for a measure that would "not only
seriously offend the just pride of a friendly nation . . . but would also
involve the question of the good faith and therefore of the honor of
their government." The enactment of the proposed legislation might
lead to "grave consequences" which he hoped might be avoided by
another type of restriction.5
When Secretary Hughes sent this correspondence to Congress, Senator Lodge declared that the phrase "grave consequences" was a "veiled
threat" which should be answered by the immediate passage of the
exclusion law. When this suggestion was acted upon by both houses
of Congress, Hanihara wrote to Secretary Hughes and asserted that he
was "unable to understand how the two words, read in their context, could be construed as meaning anything like a threat."6
Hughes agreed
with the ambassador's viewpoint and then wrote to Senator Lodge to
express the opinion that an irreparable injury had been done, "not to
Japan but to ourselves." It had been most unwise to arouse in the minds
of large numbers of Japanese a feeling of bitter resentment against the
United States: "I dislike to think what the reaping will be after the
sowing of this seed."7
b. Japan Invites United States
Capital to Invest in Manchuria
Many American newspapers were not deeply concerned about the crop
of hatred America was sowing in Japanese minds by the passage of the
exclusion law. According to the San Francisco Examiner, California
felt an "intense and triumphant satisfaction" that the interests of the
West Coast had apparently secured protection.8
Other papers in the
West and in the Rocky Mountain states expressed similar sentiments.
This feeling of hostility towards Japan was so deep and so widespread
that it colored Japanese-American relations down to the tragedy at
Pearl Harbor. A good indication of how this adverse public opinion
helped to continue tension between the two countries was clearly revealed in the negotiations between the Japanese Government and the
House of Morgan with reference to a loan to develop the facilities of
the South Manchuria Railway.
On October 29, 1927, there was a report in the New York Journal
of Commerce that the South Manchuria Railway was seeking an American loan of $40,000,000. The proceeds of this loan would be applied
to the enlargement of the Fushun colliery and to the improvement of
certain fertilizer projects. It would also assist in certain refunding operations. Arthur N. Young, in the Office of the Economic Adviser to the
Secretary of State, wrote at once to Mr. Kellogg and to Nelson T.
Johnson, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, to call their attention to this item in the Journal of Commerce. He then remarked
that the
Department has taken a position previously of objecting to such financing on
the ground that it amounted to the utilization of American capital to promote Japanese penetration in Manchuria, and that we stated that we did not view with favor the use of American funds for promoting in third countries
activities that might be disadvantageous to American interests.9
Nelson Johnson made an immediate reply to Mr. Young. He had
seen Secretary Kellogg who had assured him that he had "remembered
quite clearly the attitude which we had taken with regard to the question of financing the South Manchuria Railway and that if the matter
should come up we would continue to take this attitude."10
T. W. Lamont, of the House of Morgan, believed that the Department of State should revise its practice concerning the approval of loans
for the development of the facilities of the South Manchuria Railway.
In a letter to Mr. Olds, the Under Secretary of State, he discussed his
recent trip to Manchuria and the general outlook in that province:
My own observation .. . is that today Manchuria is about the only stable
region in all China and that with the Japanese there it is likely to be more
of a stabilizing force in Chinese affairs than it is to be a disturbing element.
The Japanese are developing Manchuria not chiefly in the military sense but
in an economic way. They are doing this not for the benefit of the Japanese
colonists who go to Manchuria in only small numbers. As a matter of fact,
development is working out in the interest of the Chinese. With the unsettled
and belligerent conditions covering so large a part of China, the Chinese are
now pouring by the thousands into South Manchuria in order to escape the
banditry, looting and despoiling to which they are subjected elsewhere.11
When Chiang Kai-shek heard of the proposed loan for the development of the facilities of the South Manchuria Railway, he was deeply
disturbed. Mayer, the counselor of the Embassy in Peking, was informed that the "Chinese generally would consider a loan of the above
description as a departure from American traditional attitude toward
China since this action would be of direct assistance to Japan in her
efforts to dominate in Manchuria." Chiang then indicated that he
would "more than welcome American capital seeking proper investment in Manchuria for which he would afford every possible facility."12
Inasmuch as Chiang Kai-shek had no control over Manchuria, his
offer to welcome the investment of American capital was a little premature. It was significant that Mr. Lamont discovered that Manchuria was the only province in China where lives and property were safe.
How quickly this situation would deteriorate under the rule of Chiang
the events at Nanking, Hankow, and Tsinan had clearly demonstrated.
On November 21, Secretary Kellogg sent an instruction of inquiry
to the American Legation in Peking. He was particularly anxious to
ascertain "what the reaction would be in China to the Japanese Government making such a loan in the United States for the Manchurian
Railway and any further information you may have in relation to discrimination against American commerce and opposition of Japan to
the construction of railways by China in Manchuria." The reply of
Mayer was particularly significant.
From a
purely humanitarian viewpoint it would be advantageous for China to have
America participate indirectly in Japanese development of Manchuria. With
our national ideals ... it seems inevitable that if we had certain creditor controls we would exert upon Japan an influence beneficent for China. .. . I
would submit that Japan is going ahead anyway in Manchuria consolidating
her position there with an eye to an ultimate conflict with Russia. . . . The
Powers cannot, and I firmly believe will not, be able to let China drift on
in her present anarchy indefinitely and even more disastrously for them—
particularly if the Russian influence is not curbed. It is too dangerous internationally. . . . We cannot oppose Japanese plans in Manchuria ethically
in view of measures we have taken in our correspondingly vital zone—the
Caribbean.13
Three days later, Mr. Mayer sent a second note to Secretary Kellogg.
Once more he sounded a note of realism that must have disturbed the
sentimental Secretary of State. With specific reference to the reaction
in China to the granting of a loan to develop the South Manchuria
Railway, he acidly remarked :
There would probably be considerable disillusionment throughout China regarding the United States but after all what has the so-called especially
friendly attitude of the Chinese ever meant to us ? It has not furthered our
commercial interests . . . nor has it saved us from the horrors and insults of
Nanking.14
From Tokyo, Secretary Kellogg received some more realistic advice.
Ambassador MacVeagh feared that:
The Japanese Government would
consider refusal of Department to pass loan as evidence of distrust of Japan's
intentions in Manchuria. . . . Japan is extremely anxious to obtain from
America rather than from other sources, financial assistance needed and believes that to have American people financially interested in Manchuria will
help her to develop the country along lines of making it desirable and safe
place for all nationals including Chinese. .. . I have long felt that we should
use the first opportunity to convince the Japanese of our honest desire to help
them when we can legitimately do so.... I think that Lamont was impressed
with the sincere desire of the Japanese bankers to put their affairs on a sound
basis.... Lamont also seemed to me to be convinced that Japan was earnestly
and sincerely trying to find a way by which she could assist China in solving
her own problems.15
Some American newspapers openly favored the loan to the South
Manchuria Railway. The New York Times pointed to the excellent
record of railway management and made the comment that few American transportation systems could do any better.16
Even the San Francisco Chronicle could see no reason for the Department of State to
oppose the loan.17
But the strong protests of the different factions in China against the
loan influenced American opinion so adversely that Mr. Lamont informed the Department of State that it would be unwise to continue
the negotiations.18
As an offset to this Chinese opposition the Japanese
Government invited international investment in the many industries
operated by the South Manchuria Railway. Jotaro Yamamoto, the president of the South Manchuria Railway, expressed the opinion that this
move should clearly indicate to the world the sincerity of Japan's assurances that she had no territorial designs upon Manchuria. The time
had come when it was important to "translate words into deeds and to
dispel suspicion."19
Peking entered a prompt protest against this second attempt to secure
the investment of American capital in Manchuria.20
Once again American banking interests were influenced by Chinese official opposition and
the opportunity for guiding Japanese policy by means of "credit controls" was allowed to slip by. War-ravaged, revolutionary China still
had a potent appeal to American sympathies.
c. Chinese Soldiers Provoke
the Tsinan Incident
On a few occasions Americans did view China through realistic eyes.
This was particularly true with reference to the Tsinan Incident. On May 3, 1928, when Chinese Nationalist soldiers began widespread
looting in the city of Tsinan, Japanese troops went into action against
them. Four days later the Japanese commander in Tsinan sent an ultimatum to Chiang Kai-shek demanding the immediate withdrawal of
Chinese armed forces from the city.21
When Chiang failed to comply
with this demand, Japanese troops in Tsinan launched an attack upon
the Chinese Army which resulted in considerable loss of life and
property.
The Nationalist Government sent an appeal to the League of Nations declaring Japan to be the aggressor. In reply, Japan indicated her
large interests in Shantung province and the considerable number of
Japanese nationals who needed protection.22
The Peking and Tientsin
Times was favorably impressed with this Japanese statement: "It is a
model of what such statements should be. .. . China has lost a great
deal of the faith once reposed in her veracity by the false propaganda
in which her immature and excited emissaries indulged."23
While the League was considering this dispute, the Japanese Government issued to the powers assurances that as soon as order was restored in Shantung province she would withdraw her troops. Everything depended upon the course of the negotiations between Japan and
Nationalist China. These were carried on with many interruptions until
an agreement was finally signed on March 28, 1929. The result was a
diplomatic victory for China. Japan consented to withdraw her troops
from Shantung within two months and the question of damages resulting from the Tsinan Incident would be settled by a Sino-Japanese Commission.24
The attitude of a large section of the American press concerning the
Tsinan Incident was significantly pro-Japanese. The Washington Post
thought it would be expedient, before people grew excited over alleged
Japanese aggression in China, to "inquire how and when the Nationalist faction acquired the right to call itself the government of China."25
The New York Herald-Tribune believed that the incident indicated the
"disappearance in China of even the semblance of national control and
responsible government."26
The Philadelphia Inquirer was of the opinion that "Tsinan had emphasized the lesson taught by Nanking. . . . Every Power concerned should show a firm front."27
The San Francisco
Chronicle expressed the view that was commonly held throughout the
United States: "Japan was forced to protect her people and property in
Shantung."28
Friction between China and Russia developed out of conflicting claims concerning the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Sino-Soviet agreements of 1924 provided for the joint administration of the railway as a commercial enterprise. There was also a clause forbidding the dissemination of propaganda inimical to the political and social institutions of either country. In January 1926 a quarrel broke out between Chang Tso-lin, war lord of the Three Eastern Provinces, and Ivanoff, the general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The dispute at first dealt with Ivanoff insistence upon the prompt payment by Chang of transportation charges for his troops. In the spring of 1927, Chang was informed that the Russians were breaking the agreement of 1924 by spreading propaganda favorable to bolshevism. On April 6, 1927, his troops raided the Soviet embassy in Peking and discovered a large number of documents that "abundantly proved that members of the Embassy staff" were distributing communistic literature in violation of treaty obligations.29
The Soviet Minister left Peking in a rage after this raid but Soviet consulates remained in Manchuria and North China. They continued to be focal points from which communist propaganda could be spread in North China, but before Chang could take further action he was mortally wounded by a bomb on June 4,1928. His son, Chang Hsueh-liang, nursed deep suspicions of communist activities, so on May 27, 1929, his troops made a raid upon the Soviet Consulate in Harbin and arrested forty-two consular officials. Documents seized in the consular buildings confirmed Chinese suspicions that Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway were busily spreading bolshevik literature.30
On June 1, 1929, the Soviet Government denied that any meetings of the Third International had been held in the cellar of the consulate. The Chinese police were denounced for their "stupidity and shamelessness" and their actions were declared to be in accordance with "jungle law." The Soviet Government, "with inexhaustible patience" was awaiting a note with the proper explanations.31 Chang replied with new raids. On July 10 the telegraph system of the Chinese Eastern Railway was taken over, Soviet unions were dissolved, the offices of the Soviet Mercantile Fleet and the Far Eastern Trading Organization were closed, and the Russian general manager of the railway was replaced by a Chinese appointee.
On July 13 the Soviet Foreign Office criticized these raids as an "outrageous violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924," and the government of Chang Hsueh-liang at Mukden and the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek were warned that an "extremely serious situation has arisen." A demand was then made that a conference be called "for the settlement of all questions connected with the Chinese Eastern Railway."32
In a note to the Soviet Government (July 16) explaining the reasons for these drastic measures, the Chinese Foreign Office stressed the fact that for years Soviet officials in China had been engaged in spreading communist propaganda in violation of the treaty of 1924.33 Moscow immediately replied that these Chinese charges were false and the note "unsatisfactory in content and hypocritical in tone." All means had "already been exhausted for settling by negotiation the controversial questions and conflicts concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway." It would be necessary, therefore, for the Soviet Government to recall all representatives from Chinese territory and to "sever all rail links between China and the USSR."34
It was now apparent that unless some formula for peace could be quickly found there would be war in North China. To Secretary Stimson, the very thought of war was profoundly disturbing. Both China and Russia had adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. Although the pact contained no provision for international consultation and no requirement that any nation or combination of nations should attempt to keep the peace of the world, Stimson was determined to infuse a vital spark into its lifeless phrases. He was eager to play the role of policeman in the dark jungles of international intrigue. His club would be the awakened opinion of mankind, which he regarded as one of the most potent sanctions in the world.35
On July 18 he called the attention of the Chinese and Russian governments to the obligations they had assumed under the Kellogg-Briand Pact.36 It was obvious to the rest of the world that Chinese and Russian statesmen could read the text of the treaty as easily as Secretary Stimson, and there was no doubt that they were thoroughly acquainted with all of its implications. The Chinese Foreign Minister quickly assured Mr. Stimson that his Government had "no intention of using force in the present controversy." The Russian answer to the Stimson admonition was equally reassuring. "Our signature of the Kellogg Pact was not just a diplomatic gesture. When we talk peace we mean peace."37
But despite this pacific talk there was continued friction concerning the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Finally, after a series of minor incidents, a Russian army marched into Manchuria on November 17 and soon imposed its will upon Hsueh-liang, who received no assistance from Chiang Kai-shek. There had been no declaration of war, but the peaceful play upon the plains of North China had been exceedingly rough even for Red Russians.38
Stimson was a stickler for the proper form of international conduct. He was resolute in his refusal to regard the Russian military movements in Manchuria as mere playful pranks. If he were not careful the merry Muscovites might overrun all of North China under the guise of a game. In order to dampen these high spirits and to restrain these wild antics, he entered into consultations with France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan in an endeavor to exert collective pressure upon Russia. Germany and Japan declined Stimson's invitation, but France, Great Britain, and Italy consented to follow Stimson's lead and a joint note was presented to the disputants on December 2, 1929.39 China gave prompt assurance that she had never departed from the letter or the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Russian reply indicated a strong belief that the Stimson action had been much ado about nothing. The dispute with China would be settled by "direct negotiations" between the two powers. As far as the United States was concerned, the commissar expressed great indignation that Stimson had assumed the right to invoke the Pact of Paris. That treaty did not "give any single State or group of States any rights of enforcement." Moreover, the Soviet Government could not forbear to express its amazement that the "Government of the United States, which by its own will has no official relations with the Soviet, deems it possible to apply to it with advice and counsel."40
Stimson refused to permit this Russian rebuff to cool his ardor for peace. He was so anxious for peace that he was ready to fight for it. He clearly realized that his defense of the Pact of Paris was merely a battle of the books. In the near future any further intervention into disputes that were constantly arising in the Far East might mean armed conflict. That contingency could never be overlooked by any statesman, and in 1931 Stimson directed a long verbal barrage against Japanese intervention in Manchuria which sounded to many persons like a call to arms. A decade later these same strident accents found expression in a chorus of war.
This fact seemed apparent to Japanese statesmen when they looked at the ominous failure of Chiang Kai-shek to cope with communist armies. In December 1930, Chiang mobilized troops from Hunan, Hopeh, and Kiangsi provinces and sent them against the Communists. The Reds soon annihilated the Eighteenth Corps under General Chang Huei-tsan and caused the rapid retreat of the Fiftieth Corps. In February 1931, General Ho Ying-chin was given three army corps to attack the Reds but by May his forces were compelled to withdraw. In July, Chiang Kai-shek himself led a large army to the Nanchang front but accomplished nothing decisive.41 The Red menace was daily becoming more formidable and Japanese fears rapidly increased. The only way to insure Japanese security was through adequate measures of defense in Manchuria. These might violate some shadowy rights of sovereignty that China had over Manchuria, but these rights had not been successfully asserted since 1912 and would soon be extinguished by Russia if Japan took no action. For Japan, expansion in Manchuria was a national imperative.
Railroads were the lifelines of empire in North China and this fact had been obvious to Japanese statesmen as early as 1905. Under the terms of the secret protocol to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December 22, 1905, the Chinese Government promised it would not construct any railway "in the neighborhood of and parallel to" the South Manchuria Railway.43 For many years Japan claimed that this prohibition prevented the building of any parallel lines closer than two hundred miles on each side of their trunk line. But when the sovereignty of China over Manchuria was reduced to a fiction by war lords like Chang Tso-lin and his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, the Japanese Government abandoned its negative attitude and entered into a transportation deal with them. The South Manchuria Railway and certain Japanese banks advanced loans to the Chang's and supplied engineers who built railways that produced rich returns.44 With these funds the Changs then proceeded to construct lines that were parallel to the South Manchuria Railway.45 In December 1930 the Japanese Government took the position that it would not object to these parallel lines as long as they did not adversely affect their large trunk line.46
But this conciliatory attitude was modified after Chang Hsueh-liang, in disregard of Japanese warnings, declared his allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek. Japan was not inclined to welcome any wave of nationalism in Manchuria with attendant outbreaks of violence like those in Hankow, Nanking, and Tsinan. In 1927, Mr. Lamont had reported that Manchuria was "about the only stable region in all China" and that large numbers of Chinese were pouring into that region to escape the "banditry, looting and despoiling to which they are subjected elsewhere."47 Manchuria had become a sanctuary where multitudes of immigrants found safety under a war lord who obeyed Japanese mandates. When this irresponsible war lord had provoked a Soviet invasion by seizing control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, it was high time that Japan took steps to safeguard her vast economic interests in Manchuria.48 Moreover, this same war lord had shown no disposition to repay the large Japanese loans (143,000,000 yen) that had made it possible for him and his father to construct the railway lines that brought in much-needed revenue. It was difficult to continue friendly relations with a ruler whose actions were becoming increasingly inimical to Japan.
"(a)composition: children shall be required to write anti-Japanese essays and verses;
(b) penmanship: children shall be required to copy anti-Japanese slogans;
(c) drawing: children shall be required to draw pictures representing atrocities committed by Japanese and tragic scenes at Tsinan."
With reference to propaganda the following prescription was required:
(a) teachers and pupils shall organize anti-Japanese patriotic propaganda parties in squads of five to deliver open-air speeches;
(b) the masses shall be taught to consider Japan their lifelong and greatest enemy;
(c) the masses shall be called upon to pledge themselves to the work of blotting out national disgrace and saving the country.50
During the decade 1930-40 this anti-Japanese program was pushed with increasing intensity and Japanese statesmen made its suspension one of the cardinal items in their lists of requirements for better relations between China and Japan. These lists received scant consideration in China.
To Japan it appeared obvious that Manchuria was essential to her as a bastion of defense and as the keystone of her economic structure. Her statesmen hoped that the Department of State would recognize that North China was just as important to Japan as the Caribbean area was to the United States. The American Government had sent military forces to Haiti and to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of establishing administrations that would be responsive to American desires.52 This armed intervention had been so recent and so effective that it led the American charge in Peking to send a dispatch to Secretary Kellogg which ended on a significant note: "We cannot oppose Japanese plans in Manchuria ethically in view of measures we have taken in our correspondingly vital zone—the Caribbean."53
In 1931, Japan felt that she was being pushed to the wall by Chinese Nationalists in Mukden and Nanking. A concerted attempt was being made to reduce the treaties of 1915 to scraps of paper. These treaties were essential to the defense of her tremendous interests in Manchuria and she would fight rather than give them up. She did not realize how close she was to conflict.
In 1930 a large part (17.7%) of the export trade of Japan went to China, and thus any interference with this trade would seriously affect the national economy of the Japanese Empire. In 1923, 1925, 1927, and 1928, Chinese boycotts were declared against Japan, and after the Mukden Incident in the late summer of 1931 another boycott was launched.54 The organizing force behind most of these boycotts was the Kuomintang which made effective use of anti-Japanese propaganda. According to the Lytton Report, a large number of "illegal acts" were committed by the Chinese during these periods when trade with Japan was prohibited. Inasmuch as the Kuomintang and the Chinese Government were largely identical, Japan held that Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers were really responsible for the economic pressure that was exerted upon the empire.
The Lytton Commission in weighing the evidence concerning the use of boycotts did not deny the right "of the individual Chinese to refuse to buy Japanese goods, use Japanese banks or ships, or to work for Japanese employers," but it did raise the question whether the use of these economic weapons was "consistent with friendly relations."55 It is certain that Chinese economic reprisals against Japan helped to widen the breach between the two countries.
The Japanese insisted that the killing of Captain Nakamura and his companions was unjustified and showed arrogant disrespect for the Japanese Army and nation; they asserted that the Chinese authorities in Manchuria delayed to institute official enquiries into the circumstances, were reluctant to assume responsibility for the occurrence, and were insincere in their claim that they were making every effort to ascertain the facts in the case.57
It is certainly true that long delays did occur in trying to "ascertain the facts in the case," and there is no doubt that they "put a severe strain on the patience of the Japanese." It is also true that this Nakamura case, "more than any other single incident, greatly aggravated the resentment of the Japanese and their agitation in favour of forceful means to effect a solution of outstanding Sino-Japanese difficulties in regard to Manchuria."58
While the Lytton Commission was studying the situation in China, it noted with concern the increasing strength of communism. In 1930 armies of the Nationalist Government had been unsuccessful in operations against communist forces, and during the following year Chiang Kai-shek was reported to be driving the Communists back in full retreat towards Fukien when the Mukden Incident occurred. But they were elusive and resourceful antagonists. During the autumn of 1931 they resumed their offensive and soon "large parts of the provinces of Fukien and Kiangsi, and parts of Kwantung were reliably reported to be completely sovietized."59
Japan was well aware of the danger that this Red tide might roll over most of China. In the documents presented to the Lytton Commission in 1932, emphasis was placed upon this communist menace and upon the apparent inability of the Chinese Nationalist Government to control it.60 It seemed to Tokyo that Japanese interests in North China were about to be crushed between the millstones of Chinese nationalism and Russian bolshevism. An appeal to the League of Nations would accomplish little. Chinese nationalism had found a sympathetic audience in the Western powers. Most of them were inclined to accept the fictions and pretensions put forward by the Nanking Government. The Japanese position in North China was in grave danger of being infiltrated by Reds or successfully attacked by fervent Chinese Nationalists whose patriotism had turned into a "flame of hatred."61
The dilemma that faced Japan is clearly and cogently stated by George Sokolsky who was used as an intermediary between China and Japan in 1931:
It needs to be recalled here that in 1931 the last efforts were made to reconcile these countries [China and Japan]. Actually, I was an instrument in that attempted reconciliation, going to Japan from China to hold meetings with Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others. I can say that the Japanese attitude was conciliatory; the Chinese, on the whole, antagonistic.
. . . Two forces were at work to keep China and Japan quarreling: Soviet Russia and the League of Nations. Soviet Russia had been engaged since 1924 in an active program of stirring hate among the Chinese people against all foreigners except the Russians, but particularly against the British and the Japanese. The League of Nations secretariat was developing in China a field of widespread activity through its agent, Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, who was spending most of his time in China. Rajchman was violently anti-Japanese, although Japan was a member of the League of Nations and Rajchman an employee. Rajchman is a Pole and is now associated with the United Nations.62
f. Secretary Stimson
Prepares a Path to War
One of the reasons why Japan was "conciliatory" towards China in 1931 was because of the shaky structure of Japanese finance. A war with China might lead to very serious consequences. On September 18,1931, the American press published a summary of a report made by Dr. Harold G. Moulton, of the Brookings Institution, on economic conditions in the Japanese Empire. This survey had been undertaken upon the invitation of the Japanese Minister of Finance. In conclusion the summary stated that "military retrenchment, continuation of peaceful relations with the United States, and sharp restriction of the present rates of population are all essential if serious economic and financial difficulties in Japan are to be averted.... A balanced budget and tax reduction can be accomplished only if military outlays are curtailed."63
It was only with the greatest reluctance, therefore, that Japanese statesmen consented to support a program of expansion in Manchuria. After it was apparent that the Japanese Kwantung Army had seized certain cities in North China, Hugh Byas, writing from Tokyo, reported that the sudden movement of troops had not been "foreseen" by the Japanese Government and had not been preventable.64 Byas, as well as many other veteran observers in the Far East, had great confidence in the pacific disposition of Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Relations. Secretary Stimson shared this view and at first he was anxious to refrain from exerting too much pressure upon the Japanese Government because he feared such a policy would play into the hands of the militarists.
Three days after the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at Mukden, Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations, asked Hugh Wilson (the American Minister at Geneva) to ascertain the views of Secretary Stimson with special reference to the "involvement of the Kellogg Pact in this matter."65 Stimson gave a cautious reply. He was "insufficiently informed of the facts of the situation," but he did think it was advisable that no steps be taken that would arouse Japanese nationalistic feeling "against the Foreign Office." The Department of State was "watching with concern the development of events" and the relationship of these events "to the Nine Power Treaty and to the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact."66
On September 23, Norman H. Davis, at Geneva, became a little hysterical over the situation in Manchuria and tried to talk with President Hoover over the trans-Atlantic telephone. Secretary Stimson was placed on the line and Davis expressed his fears that the situation in the Far East was "loaded with dynamite" which might explode any moment if great care were not exercised by the statesmen of the great powers. Davis was full of suggestions. First, he believed that it was important for the "United States to take a very drastic step and to come and sit on the Council of the League and help compose this thing." Next he would have the Department of State support a resolution calling for a committee of investigation to be appointed by the Council for the purpose of looking into the Manchurian incident.
Stimson was cold to both of these proposals. He was not in favor of authorizing an American representative to sit with the Council of the League and he would "not dream" of appointing any representative to sit with the proposed committee of investigation.67
Although Stimson was not ready to adopt these far-reaching proposals of Norman Davis, he was anxious to give ample evidence of a co-operative spirit, so on September 24 he sent some identic notes to China and Japan in which the ardent hope was voiced that they would refrain from "activities" that would prejudice a pacific settlement of the Manchurian dispute.68 After waiting ten days for this note to take effect, Stimson then advised Drummond to see to it that the League used all "the authority and pressure within its competence" to compel Japan to keep the peace in the Far East. On its part the American Government would "endeavor to reinforce League action and will make clear that the American Government's interest in the matter has not been lost."69
The bombing of Chinchow by Japanese planes on October 8 provoked Stimson to take more vigorous action to preserve peace. He now began to consider the employment of sanctions against Japan in order to compel her to "respect the great peace treaties."70 On October 10 he secured the President's approval of a suggestion to have an American representative participate in all the sessions of the League Council which dealt with the enforcement of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Next, he authorized Prentiss Gilbert, American Consul at Geneva, to take part in these sessions if an invitation were extended to him. Before he could receive an answer from the League in this regard, he requested Gilbert to place before Sir Eric Drummond the suggestion that the Council invoke the Kellogg Pact.71
Drummond neatly countered by indicating how effective it would be for the United States to take this step, but Stimson insisted that the League should take the initiative in invoking the pact. The American Government should "keep in the background" and not serve as a lightning rod that would invite the full discharge of Japanese resentment. With reference to Japanese assurances of good will towards the United States, he applied to them the vulgar but descriptive epithet—"eyewash."72
On October 17, with Mr. Gilbert in attendance, the Council of the League decided upon a joint invocation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. After Stimson had been assured that the League would take action he sent (October 20) identic notes to China and Japan reminding them of their obligations under the pact.73 The Council took the further step (October 24) of calling upon Japan to "begin immediately with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone" of the South Manchuria Railway. This withdrawal should be completed by November 16.74
Edwin Neville, the American charge at Tokyo, regarded this directive of the League as inopportune and ineffective and he requested the Department of State to refrain from giving it any support. American co-operation in this particular case would "weaken American influence in Japan" and would not "accomplish anything" in settling the Manchurian dispute.75
Stimson paid scant attention to this advice. On November 5, Ambassador Forbes handed to the Japanese Foreign Minister a memorandum which closely followed the phraseology of the League resolution with the exception that no time limit was set for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.76 On November 19 he fired another shot in this barrage against Japan. In a conversation with Debuchi he warned him that the American Government might publish the diplomatic correspondence that had passed between the Foreign Office and the Department of State and thus mobilize world opinion against the actions of Japanese militarists.77
After this thrust against Japan, Stimson once more turned to the League and explained the basis of American action. Pressure from President Hoover had softened the tone of his notes. When Stimson in Cabinet meetings began to talk about coercing Japan by all "means short of actual use of armed force," the President informed him that "this was simply the road to war itself and he would have none of it."78
Stimson, therefore, instructed Ambassador Dawes to tell certain members of the League Council that, while the American fleet would not take any adverse action against any embargo that would be enforced against Japanese commerce, it should be clearly understood that the United States would not participate in any economic sanctions. America would assist in mobilizing public opinion against Japan and would refuse to recognize "any treaties that were created under military force."79
Under the impact of this American pressure, Shidehara desperately strove to modify the policy of the militarists in Tokyo and on November 27 he was able to put a brief stop to the Manchurian advance. But the Japanese Cabinet fell two weeks later and these futile peace gestures ceased. On January 2, 1932, Chinchow was captured and the Japanese conquest of Manchuria was complete.
Before this took place Elihu Root, thoroughly alarmed by the active measures Secretary Stimson was taking to stop Japanese expansion in Manchuria, wrote the Secretary a long letter of protest. Root had been Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909 and had negotiated the Root Takahira Agreement that had given Japan a green light in Manchuria. He now warned Stimson about "getting entangled in League measures which we have no right to engage in against Japan." He also alluded to Japan's special interests in Manchuria through a long period of years, and spoke of the need for Japan to protect herself in a political sense against "the dagger aimed at her heart."
Root was a realist who did not want war with Japan. Stimson was a pacifist who loved peace so much he was always ready to fight for it. He wholeheartedly subscribed to the slogan—perpetual war for perpetual peace. In his answer to Root he expressed the belief that his intervention in the Manchurian muddle was necessary to save the whole structure of the peace treaties. He was the Atlas on whose stooping shoulders world peace was precariously balanced. A "new advance by Japan" would "undoubtedly create much adverse and even hostile sentiment in this country and much pressure upon us for some kind of action." As a man of action he was not inclined to draw back into any shell of neutrality.80
Perhaps his best policy would be to strive for some kind of tripartite (Britain, France, and the United States) pressure upon Japan. After acquainting the governments of these powers with the outline of this new offensive against Japan, and without waiting for formal replies to his overture, he dispatched identic notes (January 7) to China and Japan in which he developed the theory of nonrecognition. The American Government would not recognize any agreement that "would impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open-Door policy."81 This nonrecognition would also extend to any changes in the Far East which had been effected by "means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris."
After firing this sharp volley in the direction of Japan, Stimson waited for the response of the British Government. He was confident that the Foreign Office would answer with a shot that would be heard around the world. This expectation was fulfilled but the guns of the Foreign Office blasted at American suspicions of Japanese policy in the Far East: "His Majesty's Government have not considered it necessary to address any formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's note."82 The attitude of the Foreign Office was praised by the London Times which remarked: "Nor does it seem the immediate business of the Foreign Office to defend the 'administrative integrity' of China until that integrity is something more than an ideal. It did not exist in 1922 and it does not exist today."83
Delighted with this latest demonstration of the absurdity of the idea that Britain and the United States usually followed a parallel policy in the Far East, the Japanese Foreign Office, on January 16, 1932, sent a note to Stimson which used "almost literally" the phraseology of the critical paragraphs in the London Times.84
Stung by these words of calculated impudence, Stimson reached for the trans-Atlantic telephone and began a series of conversations with Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary. He was exceedingly anxious to secure British co-operation in a joint invocation of Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty.
Sir John was not accustomed to discuss state secrets over the telephone, and at Geneva he had to "receive one of the calls in a booth at the League of Nations." He had not been able to "arrange for stenographic notes to be taken of the conversations, and so could not study the precise words of what had been said and weigh their implications."85 The whole thing was so informal and unusual that Sir John refused to respond to Stimson's strongly worded importunities, and the Secretary of State finally realized that the old slogan "Hands across the Sea" is the exclusive property of the Foreign Office. It is properly used only when Uncle Sam can give John Bull a lift.86
For the next two months Stimson had to stand responsible for the nonrecognition policy without any help from Great Britain, but there were certain factors that slowly pushed the Foreign Office into line with the Department of State. Britain had extensive business interests in Shanghai, and when the Japanese, on January 28, 1932, opened an offensive against the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army stationed in that city, the situation took on a new aspect. The Foreign Office, however, did not at once take action to avert this threat to British big business. Stimson for a while had to continue his one-man offensive against Japan. On February 23 this took the form of a long letter to Senator Borah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Once more the nonrecognition theory was given vehement expression and it was extended to cover violations of the Nine-Power Treaty as well as of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.87
The Stimson letter met with a cool reception in Tokyo. Ambassador Forbes reported that the British and French ambassadors felt that its effect had been "extremely injurious." It had certainly tended to silence "for the present the influences working from within for the correction of this difficult situation." Many newspapers looked upon the letter as "distinctly provocative," and in the talk of "another world war" the United States was regarded as "the probable enemy." The British and French ambassadors expressed the strong hope that Stimson would cease writing letters of such a "provocative nature," and Ambassador Forbes frankly indorsed their viewpoint.88
But Stimson, clad in his usual armor of righteousness, gave little heed to this sharp shaft from his own ambassador in Tokyo. Time and British big business were working on his side. On February 16 the League Council sent an appeal to Japan for the purpose of dissuading her from making a full-scale attack upon Shanghai. In this appeal Japan was pointed out as the responsible party in the Far Eastern conflict, and she was reminded of her obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations and under the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty.89 On March 11 the Assembly of the League took a bolder step when it adopted a resolution which declared that it was "incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."90
Secretary Stimson had at last maneuvered the League of Nations into a formal approval of the nonrecognition theory. It was a fateful step along a "dead-end" street of fear and frustration, and its inevitable consequence was America's involvement in World War II.91
d. Russia Teaches the War Lord
of Manchuria a Lesson
The Nanking and Tsinan incidents were produced by the high tide of
Chinese nationalism that flowed northward as Chiang Kai-shek endeavored to unify China by means of armed force. Checked by American and Japanese military strength, the tide was diverted towards the
Russian position in Manchuria. Once more it was turned back after a
small advance. Friction between China and Russia developed out of conflicting claims concerning the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The Sino-Soviet agreements of 1924 provided for the joint administration of the railway as a commercial enterprise. There was also a clause forbidding the dissemination of propaganda inimical to the political and social institutions of either country. In January 1926 a quarrel broke out between Chang Tso-lin, war lord of the Three Eastern Provinces, and Ivanoff, the general manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway. The dispute at first dealt with Ivanoff insistence upon the prompt payment by Chang of transportation charges for his troops. In the spring of 1927, Chang was informed that the Russians were breaking the agreement of 1924 by spreading propaganda favorable to bolshevism. On April 6, 1927, his troops raided the Soviet embassy in Peking and discovered a large number of documents that "abundantly proved that members of the Embassy staff" were distributing communistic literature in violation of treaty obligations.29
The Soviet Minister left Peking in a rage after this raid but Soviet consulates remained in Manchuria and North China. They continued to be focal points from which communist propaganda could be spread in North China, but before Chang could take further action he was mortally wounded by a bomb on June 4,1928. His son, Chang Hsueh-liang, nursed deep suspicions of communist activities, so on May 27, 1929, his troops made a raid upon the Soviet Consulate in Harbin and arrested forty-two consular officials. Documents seized in the consular buildings confirmed Chinese suspicions that Soviet officials of the Chinese Eastern Railway were busily spreading bolshevik literature.30
On June 1, 1929, the Soviet Government denied that any meetings of the Third International had been held in the cellar of the consulate. The Chinese police were denounced for their "stupidity and shamelessness" and their actions were declared to be in accordance with "jungle law." The Soviet Government, "with inexhaustible patience" was awaiting a note with the proper explanations.31 Chang replied with new raids. On July 10 the telegraph system of the Chinese Eastern Railway was taken over, Soviet unions were dissolved, the offices of the Soviet Mercantile Fleet and the Far Eastern Trading Organization were closed, and the Russian general manager of the railway was replaced by a Chinese appointee.
On July 13 the Soviet Foreign Office criticized these raids as an "outrageous violation of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1924," and the government of Chang Hsueh-liang at Mukden and the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek were warned that an "extremely serious situation has arisen." A demand was then made that a conference be called "for the settlement of all questions connected with the Chinese Eastern Railway."32
In a note to the Soviet Government (July 16) explaining the reasons for these drastic measures, the Chinese Foreign Office stressed the fact that for years Soviet officials in China had been engaged in spreading communist propaganda in violation of the treaty of 1924.33 Moscow immediately replied that these Chinese charges were false and the note "unsatisfactory in content and hypocritical in tone." All means had "already been exhausted for settling by negotiation the controversial questions and conflicts concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway." It would be necessary, therefore, for the Soviet Government to recall all representatives from Chinese territory and to "sever all rail links between China and the USSR."34
It was now apparent that unless some formula for peace could be quickly found there would be war in North China. To Secretary Stimson, the very thought of war was profoundly disturbing. Both China and Russia had adhered to the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. Although the pact contained no provision for international consultation and no requirement that any nation or combination of nations should attempt to keep the peace of the world, Stimson was determined to infuse a vital spark into its lifeless phrases. He was eager to play the role of policeman in the dark jungles of international intrigue. His club would be the awakened opinion of mankind, which he regarded as one of the most potent sanctions in the world.35
On July 18 he called the attention of the Chinese and Russian governments to the obligations they had assumed under the Kellogg-Briand Pact.36 It was obvious to the rest of the world that Chinese and Russian statesmen could read the text of the treaty as easily as Secretary Stimson, and there was no doubt that they were thoroughly acquainted with all of its implications. The Chinese Foreign Minister quickly assured Mr. Stimson that his Government had "no intention of using force in the present controversy." The Russian answer to the Stimson admonition was equally reassuring. "Our signature of the Kellogg Pact was not just a diplomatic gesture. When we talk peace we mean peace."37
But despite this pacific talk there was continued friction concerning the administration of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Finally, after a series of minor incidents, a Russian army marched into Manchuria on November 17 and soon imposed its will upon Hsueh-liang, who received no assistance from Chiang Kai-shek. There had been no declaration of war, but the peaceful play upon the plains of North China had been exceedingly rough even for Red Russians.38
Stimson was a stickler for the proper form of international conduct. He was resolute in his refusal to regard the Russian military movements in Manchuria as mere playful pranks. If he were not careful the merry Muscovites might overrun all of North China under the guise of a game. In order to dampen these high spirits and to restrain these wild antics, he entered into consultations with France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan in an endeavor to exert collective pressure upon Russia. Germany and Japan declined Stimson's invitation, but France, Great Britain, and Italy consented to follow Stimson's lead and a joint note was presented to the disputants on December 2, 1929.39 China gave prompt assurance that she had never departed from the letter or the spirit of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The Russian reply indicated a strong belief that the Stimson action had been much ado about nothing. The dispute with China would be settled by "direct negotiations" between the two powers. As far as the United States was concerned, the commissar expressed great indignation that Stimson had assumed the right to invoke the Pact of Paris. That treaty did not "give any single State or group of States any rights of enforcement." Moreover, the Soviet Government could not forbear to express its amazement that the "Government of the United States, which by its own will has no official relations with the Soviet, deems it possible to apply to it with advice and counsel."40
Stimson refused to permit this Russian rebuff to cool his ardor for peace. He was so anxious for peace that he was ready to fight for it. He clearly realized that his defense of the Pact of Paris was merely a battle of the books. In the near future any further intervention into disputes that were constantly arising in the Far East might mean armed conflict. That contingency could never be overlooked by any statesman, and in 1931 Stimson directed a long verbal barrage against Japanese intervention in Manchuria which sounded to many persons like a call to arms. A decade later these same strident accents found expression in a chorus of war.
e. Background of the
Manchurian Incident
( 1. ) JAPAN IS WORRIED OVER THE
SPREAD OF
COMMUNISM IN CHINA
The outcome of the conflict between China and Soviet Russia in 1929
had important implications for Japan. First of all, it was clear that Russia had violated the provisions of the Sino-Russian agreement of 1924
which prohibited the spread of communistic propaganda in China. The
vast amount of data seized by Chinese police in the Harbin Consulate
left no doubt on this point. Russian denials carried no conviction to
Japanese minds, and the fact that Chang Hsueh-liang had to fight alone
against Soviet armed forces indicated that Chiang Kai-shek was either
too weak to guard the frontiers of Manchuria effectively or was not
deeply disturbed by the Russian chastisement of the war lord of the
Three Eastern Provinces. The Japanese bastions of defense in North
China were in evident danger. This fact seemed apparent to Japanese statesmen when they looked at the ominous failure of Chiang Kai-shek to cope with communist armies. In December 1930, Chiang mobilized troops from Hunan, Hopeh, and Kiangsi provinces and sent them against the Communists. The Reds soon annihilated the Eighteenth Corps under General Chang Huei-tsan and caused the rapid retreat of the Fiftieth Corps. In February 1931, General Ho Ying-chin was given three army corps to attack the Reds but by May his forces were compelled to withdraw. In July, Chiang Kai-shek himself led a large army to the Nanchang front but accomplished nothing decisive.41 The Red menace was daily becoming more formidable and Japanese fears rapidly increased. The only way to insure Japanese security was through adequate measures of defense in Manchuria. These might violate some shadowy rights of sovereignty that China had over Manchuria, but these rights had not been successfully asserted since 1912 and would soon be extinguished by Russia if Japan took no action. For Japan, expansion in Manchuria was a national imperative.
( 2 ) DIFFICULTIES CONCERNING
THE RAILWAYS IN
MANCHURIA
Expansion in Manchuria might mean war with China and eventually
conflict with Russia. These possibilities profoundly disturbed Japanese
statesmen, who realized the fact that 75 per cent of the employees of the
Chinese Eastern Railway were "Russians and they held all the controlling posts."42
This firm control over the operation of the railway gave
Russia a commercial and military advantage in North China that constituted an obvious threat to Japanese interests. Ultimately the road
would have to be purchased or taken by force. Railroads were the lifelines of empire in North China and this fact had been obvious to Japanese statesmen as early as 1905. Under the terms of the secret protocol to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of December 22, 1905, the Chinese Government promised it would not construct any railway "in the neighborhood of and parallel to" the South Manchuria Railway.43 For many years Japan claimed that this prohibition prevented the building of any parallel lines closer than two hundred miles on each side of their trunk line. But when the sovereignty of China over Manchuria was reduced to a fiction by war lords like Chang Tso-lin and his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, the Japanese Government abandoned its negative attitude and entered into a transportation deal with them. The South Manchuria Railway and certain Japanese banks advanced loans to the Chang's and supplied engineers who built railways that produced rich returns.44 With these funds the Changs then proceeded to construct lines that were parallel to the South Manchuria Railway.45 In December 1930 the Japanese Government took the position that it would not object to these parallel lines as long as they did not adversely affect their large trunk line.46
But this conciliatory attitude was modified after Chang Hsueh-liang, in disregard of Japanese warnings, declared his allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek. Japan was not inclined to welcome any wave of nationalism in Manchuria with attendant outbreaks of violence like those in Hankow, Nanking, and Tsinan. In 1927, Mr. Lamont had reported that Manchuria was "about the only stable region in all China" and that large numbers of Chinese were pouring into that region to escape the "banditry, looting and despoiling to which they are subjected elsewhere."47 Manchuria had become a sanctuary where multitudes of immigrants found safety under a war lord who obeyed Japanese mandates. When this irresponsible war lord had provoked a Soviet invasion by seizing control over the Chinese Eastern Railway, it was high time that Japan took steps to safeguard her vast economic interests in Manchuria.48 Moreover, this same war lord had shown no disposition to repay the large Japanese loans (143,000,000 yen) that had made it possible for him and his father to construct the railway lines that brought in much-needed revenue. It was difficult to continue friendly relations with a ruler whose actions were becoming increasingly inimical to Japan.
( 3 ) FRICTION WITH REFERENCE
TO THE NISHIHARA
LOANS
One of the important factors that promoted friction between Japan and
China was the failure of the Chinese Nationalist Government to repay
the large loans that had been advanced to China by Japanese financiers.
By 1930, Japan's unsecured loans to China had reached the large sum of
$953,000,000 (including interest). The Nationalist Government viewed a large part of this indebtedness with indifference. This was
particularly true of the so-called Nishihara loans of 1917-1918.49
These loans were spent by the Chinese Government on the construction
of railways, the extension of telegraph systems, the reorganization of
the Bank of Communications, the discharge of the military expenses
required for China's participation in the World War, and for other
similar items. The Nationalist Government refused to recognize this
indebtedness and paid little heed to Japanese pressure. Japan was not
rich enough to write off a total unsecured Chinese debt of close to a
billion dollars ($953,000,000). Official Chinese indifference to this
obligation was a source of increasing irritation in many Japanese circles
and was bound to lead to serious difficulties.
(4) ANTI-JAPANESE EDUCATIONAL
PROGRAMS IN CHINA
The Japanese Government was deeply disturbed by the anti-Japanese
educational programs inspired by the Nationalist Government of
China. They would lead not only to increasing bitterness between the
two nations but to eventual war. It was especially irritating to have this
hostile program pushed vigorously in Manchuria. In the primary
schools in Shanghai the pupils were indoctrinated by the following
method: "(a)composition: children shall be required to write anti-Japanese essays and verses;
(b) penmanship: children shall be required to copy anti-Japanese slogans;
(c) drawing: children shall be required to draw pictures representing atrocities committed by Japanese and tragic scenes at Tsinan."
With reference to propaganda the following prescription was required:
(a) teachers and pupils shall organize anti-Japanese patriotic propaganda parties in squads of five to deliver open-air speeches;
(b) the masses shall be taught to consider Japan their lifelong and greatest enemy;
(c) the masses shall be called upon to pledge themselves to the work of blotting out national disgrace and saving the country.50
During the decade 1930-40 this anti-Japanese program was pushed with increasing intensity and Japanese statesmen made its suspension one of the cardinal items in their lists of requirements for better relations between China and Japan. These lists received scant consideration in China.
(5) THE LEGALITY OF THE
TREATIES OF MAY 25, 1915
The refusal of the Chinese Nationalist Government to accept as legal
the treaties that were signed on May 25,1915, was a fundamental cause
of the deep bitterness that finally led to the outbreak of hostilities on
September 18, 1931. These treaties which resulted from the Twenty One Demands that had given Japanese interests in Manchuria a firm foundation.51
Nanking claimed that they were invalid because the government of Yuan Shih-k'ai had signed them under duress. Tokyo insisted
upon their legality and cogently argued that German hatred of Versailles as a dictated treaty did not invalidate its stringent provisions. To Japan it appeared obvious that Manchuria was essential to her as a bastion of defense and as the keystone of her economic structure. Her statesmen hoped that the Department of State would recognize that North China was just as important to Japan as the Caribbean area was to the United States. The American Government had sent military forces to Haiti and to the Dominican Republic for the purpose of establishing administrations that would be responsive to American desires.52 This armed intervention had been so recent and so effective that it led the American charge in Peking to send a dispatch to Secretary Kellogg which ended on a significant note: "We cannot oppose Japanese plans in Manchuria ethically in view of measures we have taken in our correspondingly vital zone—the Caribbean."53
In 1931, Japan felt that she was being pushed to the wall by Chinese Nationalists in Mukden and Nanking. A concerted attempt was being made to reduce the treaties of 1915 to scraps of paper. These treaties were essential to the defense of her tremendous interests in Manchuria and she would fight rather than give them up. She did not realize how close she was to conflict.
In 1930 a large part (17.7%) of the export trade of Japan went to China, and thus any interference with this trade would seriously affect the national economy of the Japanese Empire. In 1923, 1925, 1927, and 1928, Chinese boycotts were declared against Japan, and after the Mukden Incident in the late summer of 1931 another boycott was launched.54 The organizing force behind most of these boycotts was the Kuomintang which made effective use of anti-Japanese propaganda. According to the Lytton Report, a large number of "illegal acts" were committed by the Chinese during these periods when trade with Japan was prohibited. Inasmuch as the Kuomintang and the Chinese Government were largely identical, Japan held that Chiang Kai-shek and his advisers were really responsible for the economic pressure that was exerted upon the empire.
The Lytton Commission in weighing the evidence concerning the use of boycotts did not deny the right "of the individual Chinese to refuse to buy Japanese goods, use Japanese banks or ships, or to work for Japanese employers," but it did raise the question whether the use of these economic weapons was "consistent with friendly relations."55 It is certain that Chinese economic reprisals against Japan helped to widen the breach between the two countries.
(6) THE MURDER OF
CAPTAIN NAKAMURA
In the hostile atmosphere that had developed in the summer of 1931 it
required merely a spark to start an explosion. This spark was provided
by the murder of Captain Nakamura on June 27, 1931. The captain,
accompanied by three interpreters and assistants, was sent into Manchuria, during the summer of 1931, on a military mission. At Harbin,
where his passport was examined by Chinese authorities, he represented
himself as an agricultural expert. After proceeding some distance on
the Chinese Eastern Railway, he was "placed under detention by
Chinese soldiers under Kuan Yuheng, the Commander of the Third
Regiment of the Reclamation Army." On June 27 he and his companions "were shot by Chinese soldiers and their bodies were cremated
to conceal evidence of the deed."56 The Japanese insisted that the killing of Captain Nakamura and his companions was unjustified and showed arrogant disrespect for the Japanese Army and nation; they asserted that the Chinese authorities in Manchuria delayed to institute official enquiries into the circumstances, were reluctant to assume responsibility for the occurrence, and were insincere in their claim that they were making every effort to ascertain the facts in the case.57
It is certainly true that long delays did occur in trying to "ascertain the facts in the case," and there is no doubt that they "put a severe strain on the patience of the Japanese." It is also true that this Nakamura case, "more than any other single incident, greatly aggravated the resentment of the Japanese and their agitation in favour of forceful means to effect a solution of outstanding Sino-Japanese difficulties in regard to Manchuria."58
While the Lytton Commission was studying the situation in China, it noted with concern the increasing strength of communism. In 1930 armies of the Nationalist Government had been unsuccessful in operations against communist forces, and during the following year Chiang Kai-shek was reported to be driving the Communists back in full retreat towards Fukien when the Mukden Incident occurred. But they were elusive and resourceful antagonists. During the autumn of 1931 they resumed their offensive and soon "large parts of the provinces of Fukien and Kiangsi, and parts of Kwantung were reliably reported to be completely sovietized."59
Japan was well aware of the danger that this Red tide might roll over most of China. In the documents presented to the Lytton Commission in 1932, emphasis was placed upon this communist menace and upon the apparent inability of the Chinese Nationalist Government to control it.60 It seemed to Tokyo that Japanese interests in North China were about to be crushed between the millstones of Chinese nationalism and Russian bolshevism. An appeal to the League of Nations would accomplish little. Chinese nationalism had found a sympathetic audience in the Western powers. Most of them were inclined to accept the fictions and pretensions put forward by the Nanking Government. The Japanese position in North China was in grave danger of being infiltrated by Reds or successfully attacked by fervent Chinese Nationalists whose patriotism had turned into a "flame of hatred."61
The dilemma that faced Japan is clearly and cogently stated by George Sokolsky who was used as an intermediary between China and Japan in 1931:
It needs to be recalled here that in 1931 the last efforts were made to reconcile these countries [China and Japan]. Actually, I was an instrument in that attempted reconciliation, going to Japan from China to hold meetings with Baron Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and others. I can say that the Japanese attitude was conciliatory; the Chinese, on the whole, antagonistic.
. . . Two forces were at work to keep China and Japan quarreling: Soviet Russia and the League of Nations. Soviet Russia had been engaged since 1924 in an active program of stirring hate among the Chinese people against all foreigners except the Russians, but particularly against the British and the Japanese. The League of Nations secretariat was developing in China a field of widespread activity through its agent, Dr. Ludwik Rajchman, who was spending most of his time in China. Rajchman was violently anti-Japanese, although Japan was a member of the League of Nations and Rajchman an employee. Rajchman is a Pole and is now associated with the United Nations.62
f. Secretary Stimson
Prepares a Path to War
One of the reasons why Japan was "conciliatory" towards China in 1931 was because of the shaky structure of Japanese finance. A war with China might lead to very serious consequences. On September 18,1931, the American press published a summary of a report made by Dr. Harold G. Moulton, of the Brookings Institution, on economic conditions in the Japanese Empire. This survey had been undertaken upon the invitation of the Japanese Minister of Finance. In conclusion the summary stated that "military retrenchment, continuation of peaceful relations with the United States, and sharp restriction of the present rates of population are all essential if serious economic and financial difficulties in Japan are to be averted.... A balanced budget and tax reduction can be accomplished only if military outlays are curtailed."63
It was only with the greatest reluctance, therefore, that Japanese statesmen consented to support a program of expansion in Manchuria. After it was apparent that the Japanese Kwantung Army had seized certain cities in North China, Hugh Byas, writing from Tokyo, reported that the sudden movement of troops had not been "foreseen" by the Japanese Government and had not been preventable.64 Byas, as well as many other veteran observers in the Far East, had great confidence in the pacific disposition of Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Relations. Secretary Stimson shared this view and at first he was anxious to refrain from exerting too much pressure upon the Japanese Government because he feared such a policy would play into the hands of the militarists.
Three days after the clash between Japanese and Chinese troops at Mukden, Sir Eric Drummond, Secretary General of the League of Nations, asked Hugh Wilson (the American Minister at Geneva) to ascertain the views of Secretary Stimson with special reference to the "involvement of the Kellogg Pact in this matter."65 Stimson gave a cautious reply. He was "insufficiently informed of the facts of the situation," but he did think it was advisable that no steps be taken that would arouse Japanese nationalistic feeling "against the Foreign Office." The Department of State was "watching with concern the development of events" and the relationship of these events "to the Nine Power Treaty and to the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact."66
On September 23, Norman H. Davis, at Geneva, became a little hysterical over the situation in Manchuria and tried to talk with President Hoover over the trans-Atlantic telephone. Secretary Stimson was placed on the line and Davis expressed his fears that the situation in the Far East was "loaded with dynamite" which might explode any moment if great care were not exercised by the statesmen of the great powers. Davis was full of suggestions. First, he believed that it was important for the "United States to take a very drastic step and to come and sit on the Council of the League and help compose this thing." Next he would have the Department of State support a resolution calling for a committee of investigation to be appointed by the Council for the purpose of looking into the Manchurian incident.
Stimson was cold to both of these proposals. He was not in favor of authorizing an American representative to sit with the Council of the League and he would "not dream" of appointing any representative to sit with the proposed committee of investigation.67
Although Stimson was not ready to adopt these far-reaching proposals of Norman Davis, he was anxious to give ample evidence of a co-operative spirit, so on September 24 he sent some identic notes to China and Japan in which the ardent hope was voiced that they would refrain from "activities" that would prejudice a pacific settlement of the Manchurian dispute.68 After waiting ten days for this note to take effect, Stimson then advised Drummond to see to it that the League used all "the authority and pressure within its competence" to compel Japan to keep the peace in the Far East. On its part the American Government would "endeavor to reinforce League action and will make clear that the American Government's interest in the matter has not been lost."69
The bombing of Chinchow by Japanese planes on October 8 provoked Stimson to take more vigorous action to preserve peace. He now began to consider the employment of sanctions against Japan in order to compel her to "respect the great peace treaties."70 On October 10 he secured the President's approval of a suggestion to have an American representative participate in all the sessions of the League Council which dealt with the enforcement of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Next, he authorized Prentiss Gilbert, American Consul at Geneva, to take part in these sessions if an invitation were extended to him. Before he could receive an answer from the League in this regard, he requested Gilbert to place before Sir Eric Drummond the suggestion that the Council invoke the Kellogg Pact.71
Drummond neatly countered by indicating how effective it would be for the United States to take this step, but Stimson insisted that the League should take the initiative in invoking the pact. The American Government should "keep in the background" and not serve as a lightning rod that would invite the full discharge of Japanese resentment. With reference to Japanese assurances of good will towards the United States, he applied to them the vulgar but descriptive epithet—"eyewash."72
On October 17, with Mr. Gilbert in attendance, the Council of the League decided upon a joint invocation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact. After Stimson had been assured that the League would take action he sent (October 20) identic notes to China and Japan reminding them of their obligations under the pact.73 The Council took the further step (October 24) of calling upon Japan to "begin immediately with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone" of the South Manchuria Railway. This withdrawal should be completed by November 16.74
Edwin Neville, the American charge at Tokyo, regarded this directive of the League as inopportune and ineffective and he requested the Department of State to refrain from giving it any support. American co-operation in this particular case would "weaken American influence in Japan" and would not "accomplish anything" in settling the Manchurian dispute.75
Stimson paid scant attention to this advice. On November 5, Ambassador Forbes handed to the Japanese Foreign Minister a memorandum which closely followed the phraseology of the League resolution with the exception that no time limit was set for the withdrawal of the Japanese troops.76 On November 19 he fired another shot in this barrage against Japan. In a conversation with Debuchi he warned him that the American Government might publish the diplomatic correspondence that had passed between the Foreign Office and the Department of State and thus mobilize world opinion against the actions of Japanese militarists.77
After this thrust against Japan, Stimson once more turned to the League and explained the basis of American action. Pressure from President Hoover had softened the tone of his notes. When Stimson in Cabinet meetings began to talk about coercing Japan by all "means short of actual use of armed force," the President informed him that "this was simply the road to war itself and he would have none of it."78
Stimson, therefore, instructed Ambassador Dawes to tell certain members of the League Council that, while the American fleet would not take any adverse action against any embargo that would be enforced against Japanese commerce, it should be clearly understood that the United States would not participate in any economic sanctions. America would assist in mobilizing public opinion against Japan and would refuse to recognize "any treaties that were created under military force."79
Under the impact of this American pressure, Shidehara desperately strove to modify the policy of the militarists in Tokyo and on November 27 he was able to put a brief stop to the Manchurian advance. But the Japanese Cabinet fell two weeks later and these futile peace gestures ceased. On January 2, 1932, Chinchow was captured and the Japanese conquest of Manchuria was complete.
Before this took place Elihu Root, thoroughly alarmed by the active measures Secretary Stimson was taking to stop Japanese expansion in Manchuria, wrote the Secretary a long letter of protest. Root had been Secretary of State from 1905 to 1909 and had negotiated the Root Takahira Agreement that had given Japan a green light in Manchuria. He now warned Stimson about "getting entangled in League measures which we have no right to engage in against Japan." He also alluded to Japan's special interests in Manchuria through a long period of years, and spoke of the need for Japan to protect herself in a political sense against "the dagger aimed at her heart."
Root was a realist who did not want war with Japan. Stimson was a pacifist who loved peace so much he was always ready to fight for it. He wholeheartedly subscribed to the slogan—perpetual war for perpetual peace. In his answer to Root he expressed the belief that his intervention in the Manchurian muddle was necessary to save the whole structure of the peace treaties. He was the Atlas on whose stooping shoulders world peace was precariously balanced. A "new advance by Japan" would "undoubtedly create much adverse and even hostile sentiment in this country and much pressure upon us for some kind of action." As a man of action he was not inclined to draw back into any shell of neutrality.80
Perhaps his best policy would be to strive for some kind of tripartite (Britain, France, and the United States) pressure upon Japan. After acquainting the governments of these powers with the outline of this new offensive against Japan, and without waiting for formal replies to his overture, he dispatched identic notes (January 7) to China and Japan in which he developed the theory of nonrecognition. The American Government would not recognize any agreement that "would impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the Open-Door policy."81 This nonrecognition would also extend to any changes in the Far East which had been effected by "means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of Paris."
After firing this sharp volley in the direction of Japan, Stimson waited for the response of the British Government. He was confident that the Foreign Office would answer with a shot that would be heard around the world. This expectation was fulfilled but the guns of the Foreign Office blasted at American suspicions of Japanese policy in the Far East: "His Majesty's Government have not considered it necessary to address any formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's note."82 The attitude of the Foreign Office was praised by the London Times which remarked: "Nor does it seem the immediate business of the Foreign Office to defend the 'administrative integrity' of China until that integrity is something more than an ideal. It did not exist in 1922 and it does not exist today."83
Delighted with this latest demonstration of the absurdity of the idea that Britain and the United States usually followed a parallel policy in the Far East, the Japanese Foreign Office, on January 16, 1932, sent a note to Stimson which used "almost literally" the phraseology of the critical paragraphs in the London Times.84
Stung by these words of calculated impudence, Stimson reached for the trans-Atlantic telephone and began a series of conversations with Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary. He was exceedingly anxious to secure British co-operation in a joint invocation of Article 7 of the Nine-Power Treaty.
Sir John was not accustomed to discuss state secrets over the telephone, and at Geneva he had to "receive one of the calls in a booth at the League of Nations." He had not been able to "arrange for stenographic notes to be taken of the conversations, and so could not study the precise words of what had been said and weigh their implications."85 The whole thing was so informal and unusual that Sir John refused to respond to Stimson's strongly worded importunities, and the Secretary of State finally realized that the old slogan "Hands across the Sea" is the exclusive property of the Foreign Office. It is properly used only when Uncle Sam can give John Bull a lift.86
For the next two months Stimson had to stand responsible for the nonrecognition policy without any help from Great Britain, but there were certain factors that slowly pushed the Foreign Office into line with the Department of State. Britain had extensive business interests in Shanghai, and when the Japanese, on January 28, 1932, opened an offensive against the Chinese Nineteenth Route Army stationed in that city, the situation took on a new aspect. The Foreign Office, however, did not at once take action to avert this threat to British big business. Stimson for a while had to continue his one-man offensive against Japan. On February 23 this took the form of a long letter to Senator Borah, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Once more the nonrecognition theory was given vehement expression and it was extended to cover violations of the Nine-Power Treaty as well as of the Kellogg-Briand Pact.87
The Stimson letter met with a cool reception in Tokyo. Ambassador Forbes reported that the British and French ambassadors felt that its effect had been "extremely injurious." It had certainly tended to silence "for the present the influences working from within for the correction of this difficult situation." Many newspapers looked upon the letter as "distinctly provocative," and in the talk of "another world war" the United States was regarded as "the probable enemy." The British and French ambassadors expressed the strong hope that Stimson would cease writing letters of such a "provocative nature," and Ambassador Forbes frankly indorsed their viewpoint.88
But Stimson, clad in his usual armor of righteousness, gave little heed to this sharp shaft from his own ambassador in Tokyo. Time and British big business were working on his side. On February 16 the League Council sent an appeal to Japan for the purpose of dissuading her from making a full-scale attack upon Shanghai. In this appeal Japan was pointed out as the responsible party in the Far Eastern conflict, and she was reminded of her obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations and under the provisions of the Nine-Power Treaty.89 On March 11 the Assembly of the League took a bolder step when it adopted a resolution which declared that it was "incumbent upon the members of the League of Nations not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of Nations or to the Pact of Paris."90
Secretary Stimson had at last maneuvered the League of Nations into a formal approval of the nonrecognition theory. It was a fateful step along a "dead-end" street of fear and frustration, and its inevitable consequence was America's involvement in World War II.91
Notes
1 A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), pp.369-70.
2 Ibid., p. 369.
3 The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State, January 15, 1924. 711.945/ 1063, MS, Department of State.
4 Secretary Hughes to the chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives, February 8, 1924. 150.01/778, MS, Department of State.
5 Ambassador Hanihara to Secretary Hughes, April 10, 1924. 711.945/1043, MS, Department of State,
6 Ambassador Hanihara to Secretary Hughes, April 17, 1924. 711.945/1051, MS, Department of State. President Coolidge signed the Exclusion Act on May 26, 1924.
7 Secretary Hughes to Senator Lodge, April 17, 1924. Calvin Coolidge MS, Library of Congress.
8 April 17, 1924.
9 Arthur N. Young to Secretary Kellogg and to Nelson Johnson, November 1, 1927. 894.51 So 8/1, MS, Department of State.
10 Nelson T. Johnson to Arthur N. Young, November 1, 1927. 894.51 So 8/1, MS, Department of State.
11 T. W. Lamont to R. E. Olds, the Under Secretary of State, New York, November 11, 1927. 894.51 So 8/48, MS, Department of State.
12 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, November 19, 1927. 894.51 So 8/1, MS, Department of State.
13 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, November 22, 1927. 894.51 So 8/4, MS, Department of State.
14 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, November 25, 1927. 894.51 So 8/8, MS, Department of State.
15 Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, November 21, 1927. 894.51 So 8/2, MS, Department of State.
16 November 25, 1927.
17 November 25, 1927.
18 Secretary Kellogg to Ambassador MacVeagh, December 10, 1927. 894.51 So 8/20, MS, Department of State.
19 Memorandum of Division of Far Eastern Affairs, 894.51 So 8/61 a.
20 New York Times, October 28, 1928.
21 Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, May 4, 5, 1928. 893.00 Tsinan/2-7, MS, Department of State.
22 Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, June 6, 1928. 893.00 Tsinan/93, MS, Department of State.
23 June 1, 1928.
24 Ambassador MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, March 26, 1929. 893.00 Tsinan/127, MS, Department of State.
25 May 13, 1928.
26 May 11 , 1928.
27 May 7, 1928.
28 May 22, 1928.
29 Robert T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations, 1017-1931 (New York, 1933), p. 88
30 China Year Book, 1Q2Q-1Q30, p. 1217.
31 Pravda, June 1, 1929. For a translation of Russian documents published in Pravda I am indebted to Mr. Frederick L. Hetter.
32 Pravda, July 14, 1929.
33 China Year Book, 1Q2Q-1Q30, pp. 1217-20.
34 Pravda, July 18, 1929
35 Henry L. Stimson, "The Pact of Paris," an address delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, August 8, 1932 (Washington, 1932).
36 Stanley K. Hornbeck, "American Policy and the Chinese-Russian Dispute," Chinese Social and Political Science Review, XIV (January, 1930), 56-60.
37 Russell M. Cooper, American Consultation in World Affairs (New York, 1934), p. 91.
38 Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia (New York, 1938), chap. 14.
39 Department of State, Press Releases, December 7, 1929.
40 John Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on International Affairs, 192Q (London, I 93°)» PP- 278-80.
41 Communism in China, Document A, Appendix No. 3 (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 3-5. This document was published by the Japanese Government as a part of the case of Japan. For a sympathetic account of the struggle of Chiang Kai-shek with the Chinese Communists see T'ang Leang-li, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China (Shanghai, 1934), chap. 5.
42 Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1Q2Q-1Q41 (New York, 1947), I, 71.
43 J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, I, 554
44 The Supingkai-Chenchiah-Taonan line (with the Piayantala branch) 264 miles, and the Taonan-Anganchi (Tsitsihar) railway, 141 miles. See K. K. Kawakami, "Manchurian Backgrounds," Pacific Affairs, V (February, 1932), 111-30.
45 The Kirin-Hailung-Mukden lines (295 miles); the Piantala-Takusan line (134 miles), and the partly-built Tao Nan-Piayantala line.
46 New York Times, December 10, 1930.
47 See ante, p. 83.
48 Edith E. Ware, Business and Politics in the Far East (New Haven, 1932), p. 213, estimates Japanese investments in Manchuria at 2,147,000,000 yen.
49 Leading Cases of Chinese Infringement of Treaties, Document A, Appendix, No. 6, (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 105-7. See also, Thomas E. LaFargue, China and the World War (Stanford, 1937), p. 112.
50 Anti-Foreign Education in China, Document A, Appendix No. 5 (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 28-37. For a different viewpoint see Tang Leang-li, The Puppet State of Manchukuo (Shanghai, 1935), pp. 263-72.
51 Under the treaties of May 25, 191.5, Japan secured the following advantages: (a) the lease of the Kwantung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Dairen, was extended from 1923 to 1997; (b) the lease of the Antung-Mukden Railway was extended from 1923 to 2007; (c) the lease of the Dairen-Changchun Railway was extended to 2002; (d) the right to lease land in South Manchuria for industrial uses and agricultural purposes was expressly granted.
52 Hallett Abend, New York Times, November 4, 1931.
53 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, November 22, 1927. 894.51 So 8/4, MS, Department of State.
54 On the general subject of Chinese boycotts see C. F. Remer and William B. Palmer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts (Baltimore, 1933).
55 Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by the League of Nations on Manchuria (Washington, 1932), (hereafter referred to as the Lytton Report), p. 120.
56 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
57 Ibid., p. 64.
58 ibid., p. 65.
59 l bid., p. 22.
60 Communism in China, Document A, Appendix No. 3 (Tokyo, 1932).
61 Lytton Report, op. cit., p. 19.
62 George Sokolsky, "These Days," Washington Times-Herald, March 14, 1951.
63 Ware, op. cit., p. 206.
64 New York Times, September 19, 1931.
65 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Stimson, Geneva, September 21, 1931. Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 22.
66 Secretary Stimson to Hugh Wilson, September 22, 1931. Ibid., p. 26.
67 Memorandum of a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation among Secretary Stimson, Norman H. Davis, and Hugh Wilson, September 23, 1931. Ibid., pp. 43-47.
68 Secretary Stimson to Minister Johnson and to the United States charge d'affaires in Tokyo, September 24, 1931. Ibid., p. 58.
69 Secretary Stimson to the consul at Geneva (Gilbert), October 5, 1931. Ibid., pp. 116-17.
70 Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections and Observations (New York, 1936), pp. 51-57.
71 Secretary Stimson to Consul Gilbert, October 10, 1931. Foreign Relations, 1Q31, III, 154.
72 Memorandum of a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation between Secretary Stimson and Prentiss Gilbert, October 16, 1931. Ibid., pp. 203-7.
73 Secretary Stimson to the American Minister in China and to the American charge d'affaires in Japan, October 20, 1931. Ibid., p. 275.
74 Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, I, 29-30.
75 Charge in Japan (Neville) to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, November 4, 1931. Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 366-67.
76 Memorandum of a conversation between Ambassador Forbes (Tokyo) with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Shidehara), November 5, 1931. Ibid., pp. 375- 80.
77 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi), November 19, 1931. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 44-46.
78 Ray L. Wilbur and Arthur M. Hyde, The Hoover Policies (New York, 1937), p. 603.
79 Memorandum of a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation between Secretary Stimson and Ambassador Dawes, November 19, 1931. Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 488-98,
21 Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, May 4, 5, 1928. 893.00 Tsinan/2-7, MS, Department of State.
22 Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, June 6, 1928. 893.00 Tsinan/93, MS, Department of State.
23 June 1, 1928.
24 Ambassador MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, March 26, 1929. 893.00 Tsinan/127, MS, Department of State.
25 May 13, 1928.
26 May 11 , 1928.
27 May 7, 1928.
28 May 22, 1928.
29 Robert T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations, 1017-1931 (New York, 1933), p. 88
30 China Year Book, 1Q2Q-1Q30, p. 1217.
31 Pravda, June 1, 1929. For a translation of Russian documents published in Pravda I am indebted to Mr. Frederick L. Hetter.
32 Pravda, July 14, 1929.
33 China Year Book, 1Q2Q-1Q30, pp. 1217-20.
34 Pravda, July 18, 1929
35 Henry L. Stimson, "The Pact of Paris," an address delivered before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, August 8, 1932 (Washington, 1932).
36 Stanley K. Hornbeck, "American Policy and the Chinese-Russian Dispute," Chinese Social and Political Science Review, XIV (January, 1930), 56-60.
37 Russell M. Cooper, American Consultation in World Affairs (New York, 1934), p. 91.
38 Eugene Lyons, Assignment in Utopia (New York, 1938), chap. 14.
39 Department of State, Press Releases, December 7, 1929.
40 John Wheeler-Bennett, Documents on International Affairs, 192Q (London, I 93°)» PP- 278-80.
41 Communism in China, Document A, Appendix No. 3 (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 3-5. This document was published by the Japanese Government as a part of the case of Japan. For a sympathetic account of the struggle of Chiang Kai-shek with the Chinese Communists see T'ang Leang-li, Suppressing Communist Banditry in China (Shanghai, 1934), chap. 5.
42 Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, 1Q2Q-1Q41 (New York, 1947), I, 71.
43 J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, I, 554
44 The Supingkai-Chenchiah-Taonan line (with the Piayantala branch) 264 miles, and the Taonan-Anganchi (Tsitsihar) railway, 141 miles. See K. K. Kawakami, "Manchurian Backgrounds," Pacific Affairs, V (February, 1932), 111-30.
45 The Kirin-Hailung-Mukden lines (295 miles); the Piantala-Takusan line (134 miles), and the partly-built Tao Nan-Piayantala line.
46 New York Times, December 10, 1930.
47 See ante, p. 83.
48 Edith E. Ware, Business and Politics in the Far East (New Haven, 1932), p. 213, estimates Japanese investments in Manchuria at 2,147,000,000 yen.
49 Leading Cases of Chinese Infringement of Treaties, Document A, Appendix, No. 6, (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 105-7. See also, Thomas E. LaFargue, China and the World War (Stanford, 1937), p. 112.
50 Anti-Foreign Education in China, Document A, Appendix No. 5 (Tokyo, 1932), pp. 28-37. For a different viewpoint see Tang Leang-li, The Puppet State of Manchukuo (Shanghai, 1935), pp. 263-72.
51 Under the treaties of May 25, 191.5, Japan secured the following advantages: (a) the lease of the Kwantung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Dairen, was extended from 1923 to 1997; (b) the lease of the Antung-Mukden Railway was extended from 1923 to 2007; (c) the lease of the Dairen-Changchun Railway was extended to 2002; (d) the right to lease land in South Manchuria for industrial uses and agricultural purposes was expressly granted.
52 Hallett Abend, New York Times, November 4, 1931.
53 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, November 22, 1927. 894.51 So 8/4, MS, Department of State.
54 On the general subject of Chinese boycotts see C. F. Remer and William B. Palmer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts (Baltimore, 1933).
55 Report of the Commission of Enquiry Appointed by the League of Nations on Manchuria (Washington, 1932), (hereafter referred to as the Lytton Report), p. 120.
56 Ibid., pp. 63-64.
57 Ibid., p. 64.
58 ibid., p. 65.
59 l bid., p. 22.
60 Communism in China, Document A, Appendix No. 3 (Tokyo, 1932).
61 Lytton Report, op. cit., p. 19.
62 George Sokolsky, "These Days," Washington Times-Herald, March 14, 1951.
63 Ware, op. cit., p. 206.
64 New York Times, September 19, 1931.
65 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Stimson, Geneva, September 21, 1931. Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 22.
66 Secretary Stimson to Hugh Wilson, September 22, 1931. Ibid., p. 26.
67 Memorandum of a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation among Secretary Stimson, Norman H. Davis, and Hugh Wilson, September 23, 1931. Ibid., pp. 43-47.
68 Secretary Stimson to Minister Johnson and to the United States charge d'affaires in Tokyo, September 24, 1931. Ibid., p. 58.
69 Secretary Stimson to the consul at Geneva (Gilbert), October 5, 1931. Ibid., pp. 116-17.
70 Henry L. Stimson, The Far Eastern Crisis: Recollections and Observations (New York, 1936), pp. 51-57.
71 Secretary Stimson to Consul Gilbert, October 10, 1931. Foreign Relations, 1Q31, III, 154.
72 Memorandum of a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation between Secretary Stimson and Prentiss Gilbert, October 16, 1931. Ibid., pp. 203-7.
73 Secretary Stimson to the American Minister in China and to the American charge d'affaires in Japan, October 20, 1931. Ibid., p. 275.
74 Foreign Relations, Japan: 1931-1941, I, 29-30.
75 Charge in Japan (Neville) to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, November 4, 1931. Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 366-67.
76 Memorandum of a conversation between Ambassador Forbes (Tokyo) with the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs (Shidehara), November 5, 1931. Ibid., pp. 375- 80.
77 Memorandum by the Secretary of State of a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi), November 19, 1931. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 44-46.
78 Ray L. Wilbur and Arthur M. Hyde, The Hoover Policies (New York, 1937), p. 603.
79 Memorandum of a trans-Atlantic telephone conversation between Secretary Stimson and Ambassador Dawes, November 19, 1931. Foreign Relations, 1931, III, 488-98,
80 Secretary Stimson to Elihu Root, December 14, 1931, Strictly Personal and Confidential, Box 129, Root Papers, Library of Congress.
81 Secretary Stimson to Ambassador Forbes, January 7, 1932. Japan: 1031-1941, I, 76.
82 The charge in Great Britain (Atherton) to Secretary Stimson, London, January 9, 1932. Foreign Relations, 1932, III, 19.
83 January 11, 1932.
84 Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory (Princeton, 1947), p. 60.
85 Raymond Gram Swing, "How We Lost the Peace in 1937," Atlantic Monthly, CLXXIX (February 1947), 34.
86 Memoranda of trans-Atlantic conversations between Secretary Stimson and Sir John Simon, February 15, 24, 1932. Foreign Relations, 1932, III, 335-4°, 34I ~45> 432-36.
87 Secretary Stimson to Senator Borah, February 23, 1932. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 83 - 87.
84 Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory (Princeton, 1947), p. 60.
85 Raymond Gram Swing, "How We Lost the Peace in 1937," Atlantic Monthly, CLXXIX (February 1947), 34.
86 Memoranda of trans-Atlantic conversations between Secretary Stimson and Sir John Simon, February 15, 24, 1932. Foreign Relations, 1932, III, 335-4°, 34I ~45> 432-36.
87 Secretary Stimson to Senator Borah, February 23, 1932. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 83 - 87.
88 Ambassador Forbes to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, February 27, 1932. Foreign Relations, 1932, III, 457-58.
89 Irving S. Friedman, British Relations With China, 1931-1939 (New York, 1940), p. 33.
90 The consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to Secretary Stimson, Geneva, March 15, 1932. Foreign Relations, 1932, III, 585-86. Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (Baltimore, 1935), pp. 299-301.
91 The dangers that were inherent in the Far Eastern situation were discussed at length by the British Prime Minister (Ramsay MacDonald) in a conversation with Mr. Atherton, the American charge d'affairs at London, on April 4, 1932: "In substance the Prime Minister said that it was foreseen some time ago by critics of the League that members might well be actually in a state of war without a formal declaration of war, in order to escape the penalties placed upon war by the Covenant. This was in fact what had happened in the present instance, although the Chinese had almost 'put the fat in the fire.' During the last Far Eastern discussions in Geneva the Chinese had drawn up a resolution which a League representative agreed formally to present. This resolution declared that Japan by her actions was in fact in a state of war with members of the League. "The League representative showed this resolution to Sir John Simon who said that he would have nothing to do with it and that if it were presented he would deny all knowledge of it. Eventually the resolution just escaped presentation, but the Prime Minister said that this showed how near Japan had been to open conflict with members of the League." 793.94/4965. Confidential file, MS, Department of State.
89 Irving S. Friedman, British Relations With China, 1931-1939 (New York, 1940), p. 33.
90 The consul at Geneva (Gilbert) to Secretary Stimson, Geneva, March 15, 1932. Foreign Relations, 1932, III, 585-86. Westel W. Willoughby, The Sino-Japanese Controversy and the League of Nations (Baltimore, 1935), pp. 299-301.
91 The dangers that were inherent in the Far Eastern situation were discussed at length by the British Prime Minister (Ramsay MacDonald) in a conversation with Mr. Atherton, the American charge d'affairs at London, on April 4, 1932: "In substance the Prime Minister said that it was foreseen some time ago by critics of the League that members might well be actually in a state of war without a formal declaration of war, in order to escape the penalties placed upon war by the Covenant. This was in fact what had happened in the present instance, although the Chinese had almost 'put the fat in the fire.' During the last Far Eastern discussions in Geneva the Chinese had drawn up a resolution which a League representative agreed formally to present. This resolution declared that Japan by her actions was in fact in a state of war with members of the League. "The League representative showed this resolution to Sir John Simon who said that he would have nothing to do with it and that if it were presented he would deny all knowledge of it. Eventually the resolution just escaped presentation, but the Prime Minister said that this showed how near Japan had been to open conflict with members of the League." 793.94/4965. Confidential file, MS, Department of State.
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