Introduction
Our deep gratitude and thanks goes to Karen A. for her precious time
donated to the transcribing of this book. We've checked many sources and
cannot find a publishing house now offering the book for sale. If you know of a
source where people may purchase, please let us know.
As our time permits we'll be adding to the historical information surrounding
the orchestration, implementation and tragic results of WWII. Most of all, our
readers will discover major lies that have been told, which proves once again
the victors of war write the history.
In this case, as in all cases of war (that we've been able to ascertain) the
'victors' are never a nation, regardless appearances, modern history books, or
reporting by the media. Why? Because the real victors are the same group of
international financiers control the major publishing houses, education (from
K-12, into and through all levels of higher learning), as well as the media. And
let us not disregard the major role the entertainment industry plays in the
thought control process. Books, movies, games, videos, music. . . all of it
geared to create the International Citizen/Slave.
Notice that on May 10, 1942, Major Jordan reported to "UNITED NATIONS
DEPOT NO. 8, LEND-LEASE DIVISION, NEWARK AIRPORT, NEWARK,
NEW JERSEY, INTERNATIONAL SECTION, AIR SERVICE COMMAND, AIR
CORPS, U.S. ARMY."
How could that be?!!! U.S. history and government documents assert that
the U.S. didn't join the United Nations until three and a half years later!
October 24th, 1945. And then again. . . maybe not. Maybe it's just one more
lie in a nest of lies, liars and traitors.
Before you read the shocking revelations from Major Jordan's Diaries
about the billions of dollars, airplanes, tanks, munitions, foodstuffs, whole
factories, blueprints and material for building the Atomic Bomb, personal
luxuries for despotic Bolshevik Talmudic Communist rulers, as well as the
paper and plates enabling them to print U.S. Federal Reserve Notes -- all this
sent to the U.S.S.R. from UN Depot No 8, Newark, N.J., U.S.A., -- let us set
the scene.
From Voices of History, Volume II, which claims to present "a permanent
record of all the important speeches of the momentous year, 1942. In one
chronological order are the official, unabridged, unedited speeches, state
papers, messages, declarations and important letters of the leaders of the
world. . ." on page 6 we read:
JOINT DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS
Washington, D.C., January 1, 1942
White House news release
DECLARATION BY UNITED NATIONS:
A Joint Declaration by The United States of America, The
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, The Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, China, Australia, Belgium, Canada,
Costa Rica, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dominican Republic, El
Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway,
Panama, Poland, South Africa, Yugoslavia.
The Governments signatory hereto,
Having subscribed to a common program of purposes and
principles embodied in the Joint Declaration of the President of
the United States of America and the Prime Minister of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland dated August 14th,
1941, known as the Atlantic Charter,
Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is
essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious
freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own
lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in
a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to
subjugate the world, Declare:
(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full
resources, military or economic, against those members of the
Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such government is at
war,
(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the
Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate
armistice or peace with the enemies.
The foregoing declaration may be adhered to by other nations
which are, or which may be, rendering material assistance and
contributions in the struggle for victory over Hitlerism.
Done at Washington
January First, 1942
And don't kid yourself! Communism is NOT dead. The new name for
Communism today is DEMOCRACY. Please visit this section from time to
time. As with all sections, it will be expanded as our time permits with added
information that will hopefully dispel the lies into which we were born. If Karen
is able to continue her help, updating will be more timely. God bless us
everyone.
-- Jackie -- May 28th, 2003
From Major Jordan’s Diaries
George Racey Jordan
With Richard L. Stokes
PREFACE
My reason for writing this book is very simple: I would like to keep the
record straight. I want to put in permanent form the full story of my
experiences as a Lend-Lease expediter and liaison officer with the Russians
during the war, when I served for two crucial years, from May 1942 to June
1944, both at Newark Airport and at the big air base at Grand Falls, Montana.
I went into the Army as a businessman in my forties and a veteran of World
War I. From the First, as my story shows, I worked wholeheartedly on behalf
of the Russians because, like everyone else, I considered it my duty to do so.
That they were satisfied with my efforts is indicated by the fact that it was
Colonel Kotikov, head of the Russian mission at Great Falls, who requested
my promotion to Major.
But the tremendous volume of Lend-Lease material going through under
“diplomatic immunity,” the infiltration of Soviet agents through the Pipeline, the
shipments of non-military supplies and even military secrets, were more than I
could stomach. I finally protested through proper channels, first in Great Falls,
and then in Washington; nothing happened. This was in 1944, while I was still
in the Army.
When the atom bomb was first dropped in August, 1945 I learned the full
meaning of a word- uranium, I had already encountered in my contact with
Colonel Kotikov. When the President announced in 1949 that the Russians
had the bomb, I went to see Senator Bridge and my story was thoroughly
investigated by the F.B.I. as well as by Fulton Lewis, Jr., who interviewed me
on his broadcasts. There followed one Congressional hearing in December,
1949 and another in March, 1950.
I have been shocked at the efforts of the character assassins and press
experts to keep the implications of this story from being brought into proper
focus. A vicious attack was launched against Fulton Lewis, Jr., and the
sniping at me has continued for nearly three years, in the vain hope that this
story would never be evaluated and understood by the public. (Incidentally, I
wish to state that Mr. Lewis has not seen the manuscript of this book, nor had
any connection with it.)
As late as June, 1952 the Long Island Daily Press falsely declared:
"A Congressional committee, however, found no basis for (Major
Jordan’s) charges."
On the contrary, three members of the Committee stated just the opposite.
First there is the following summary by Senator Richard M. Nixon, Republican
nominee for Vice President. His questions are addressed to Donald T. Appell,
former F.B.I. agent and the special investigator for the Committee on Un-American
Activities:
Mr. Nixon: Your investigation shows first, then, that Major Jordan did,
at least on two occasions, make a report concerning the passage of
materials through Great Falls?
Mr. Appell: Yes.
Mr. Nixon: As I recall, Mr. Chambers had to tell his story five times
before any cognizance was taken of his charges. So apparently if
Major Jordan had told his more than twice he might have gotten
the Government to do something about it. But be that as it may,
as I see it at present time the issues are five.
First of all, the charge was made that if the shipments were going
through, Major Jordan should have made a report. In this regard,
he did make a report of the charges at least on two occasions. Is
that correct?
Mr. Appell: Yes.
Mr. Nixon: As far as you have been able to find, at least two
reports were made?
Mr. Appell: Yes; that is correct.
Mr. Nixon: Another point that was made was whether or not he
tore radar equipment out of C-47 planes. As I understand, this
particular phase of his story was questioned in the article in Life
magazine, in which they said that the report that Mr. Jordan
ripped out radar equipment from C-47's was preposterous, and
they quoted his superior officer, Meredith, in that respect; and it
was further said that as a matter of fact no C-47's were equipped
with radar at the time mentioned by Major Jordan.
The investigation of the committee, in addition to your own, has
shown, (1) that the C-47's equipped with radar and going to
Russia did go through Great Falls; and (2) that Mr. Jordan
specifically asked permission of Colonel Gitzinger in Daytona to
tear the radar equipment out of a specific plane on one occasion.
Mr. Appell: That is correct, and he received that permission from
Colonel Gitzinger.
Mr. Nixon: Then on the point of whether Mr. Jordan did or did not
tear radar out of a plane, your investigation substantiates Major
Jordan?
Mr. Appell: That is correct.
Mr. Nixon: Another point that Major Jordan made was that certain
documents were going through Great Falls under diplomatic
immunity; that he broke into the cases, examined the documents,
and that some of the material in there which he examined
consisted of plans, secret material, and so on, which it would be
assumed would not be regarded under diplomatic immunity.
I think it is quite clear from your testimony that that phase of Major
Jordan’s testimony stands up; is that correct?
Mr. Appell: Well, we do know, we are in contact with a witness, a
former employee of the Russian Purchasing Commission, who
helped pack one pouch of so-called diplomatic mail that went
through, and we know it contained material highly secretive on
industrial and war developments . . .
Mr. Nixon: Is it the intention of the staff, then, to present the
witness [Victor A. Kravchenko] who may be able to substantiate,
at least in part, Major Jordan’s testimony that secret material was
going through?
Mr. Appell: That is correct. [Mr. Kravchenko’s testimony is quoted
on pages 257-67.]
Mr. Nixon: On the point of the so-called shipments of uranium . . .
the shipments went through. Is that correct?
Mr. Appell: Two specific shipments of uranium oxide and uranium
nitrate and shipments of heavy water have been completely
documented to include even the number of the plane that flew the
uranium and heavy water to Great Falls.
Mr. Nixon: And the final point is the matter of Mr. Hopkins having
attempted to expedite the shipments. Major Jordan’s testimony on
that was that his notes, written at the time, showed the initials
“H.H.” on one of the consignments which he broke into. Your
investigation has shown no correspondence of Mr. Hopkins in
which he used the initials “H.H.” Is that correct?
Mr. Appell: That which we reviewed.
Mr. Nixon: I understand that. My point is that as far as the
investigation you have been able to make is concerned, you as
yet have been unable to substantiate Major Jordan’s story on that
point; is that correct?
Mr. Appell: Yes.
Mr. Nixon: But you have substantiated it on the four other points I
mentioned?
Mr. Appell: Generally, yes.
Mr. Nixon: That is all.
Representative Harold H. Velde, also a member of the Committee, put this
question to the investigator:
"Was Major Jordan’s story, as far as your investigation was concerned,
ever discredited by any of the witnesses whom you contacted?"
Mr. Appell: "No."
Finally, Representative Bernard W. Kearney of New York State made this
statement:
"Listening to the testimony here, it seems to me the only one who did do
his duty was Major Jordan. On two separate occasions, Major Jordan not
only brought all this to the attention of his superior officers, but as a
result conferences were held by various (Government) agencies named *
- then it was dropped."
With regard to the Hopkins note and the Hopkins telephone call (which are
fully discussed in Chapter 6), I realize that there is only my word for them. But
suppose that a letter of Hopkins signed "H.H." existed, would that prove my
charge that I saw a particular note on White House stationery in a black
suitcase on a plane headed for Russia? Of course not. Why, then, have some
persons insisted that producing such a signature is necessary, when such
evidence would prove nothing?
Perhaps because they were impelled to raise a smoke screen. My point
was that my notation of the signature (reproduced in center section of this
edition) was "H.H.", just as President Roosevelt sent Hopkins memos
addressed "H.H." (See Roosevelt and Hopkins by Robert Sherwood, page
409).
Since I have neither the letter itself or the transcript of the phone call, I
have only my word to offer. I ask the reader only one thing: please reserve
your judgment until you finish this book.
I am not a professional soldier, though I have served in two wars. I am a
businessman who volunteered in the interests of my country. There is no
reason, fortunately, for me to pull punches because of any pressures which
can be applied to me. I have called the plays as I saw them.
I most sincerely acknowledge the assistance of those who have helped me
with this volume: Colonel William L. Rich, Paul R. Berryman, John Frank
Stevens, and Colonel Theodore S. Watson and his friends for their advice and
insistence that I take leave of my business and spend the two years of effort
necessary; and the writer whom a good friend of mine prevailed upon to
undertake the Herculean job of sorting, rewriting, checking and preparing the
data I have used – Richard L. Stokes, General Robert E. Wood and Eldon
Martin of Chicago, for securing documents for reproduction; Mr. Robert A.
Hug, N.Y. Public Library, microfilm division, for patient aid in research; and
finally, my publishers for their patience and perseverance in seeing this book
through this press.
George Racey Jordan
East Hampton, Long Island
August 1, 1952
CHAPTER ONE
"Mr. Brown" and the Start of a Diary
Late one day in May, 1942, several Russians burst into my office at Newark
Airport, furious over an outrage that had just been committed against Soviet
honor. They pushed me toward the window where I could see evidence of the
crime with my own eyes.
They were led by Colonel Anatoli N. Kotikov, the head of the Soviet mission
at the airfield. He had become a Soviet hero in 1935 when he made the first
seaplane flight from Moscow to Seattle along the Polar cap; Soviet
newspapers of that time called him the "Russian Lindbergh." He had also
been an instructor of the first Soviet parachute troops, and he had 38 jumps to
his credit.
I had met Colonel Kotikov only a few days before, when I reported for duty
on May 10, 1942. My orders gave the full title of the Newark base as "UNITED
NATIONS DEPOT NO. 8, LEND-LEASE DIVISION, NEWARK AIRPORT,
NEWARK, NEW JERSEY, INTERNATIONAL SECTION, AIR SERVICE
COMMAND, AIR CORPS, U.S. ARMY." [So there you are,the UN has depots before the 'official story' says they even came into existence DC]
I was destined to know Colonel Kotikov very well, and not only at Newark.
At that time he knew very little English, but he had the hardihood to rise at
5:30 every morning for a two-hour lesson. Now he was pointing out the
window, shaking his finger vehemently.
There on the apron before the administration building was a medium
bomber, an A-20 Douglas Havoc. It had been made in an American factory. It
had been donated by American Lend-Lease, is was to be paid for by
American taxes, and it stood on American soil. Now it was ready to bear the
Red Star of the Soviet Air Force. As far as the Russians and Lend-Lease were
concerned, it was a Russian plane. It had to leave the field shortly to be
hoisted aboard one of the ships in a convoy that was forming to leave for
Murmansk and Kandalaksha. On that day the Commanding Officer was
absent and, as the acting Executive Director, I was in charge.
I asked the interpreter what "outrage" had occurred. It seemed that a DC-3,
a passenger plane, owned by American Airlines, had taxied from the runway
and, in wheeling about on the concrete plaza to unload passengers, had
brushed the Havoc’s engine housing. I could easily see that the damage was
not too serious and could be repaired. But that seemed to be beside the point.
What infuriated the Russians was that it be tolerated for one minute that an
American commercial liner should damage, even slightly, a Soviet warplane!
The younger Russians huddled around Colonel Kotikov over their Russian English
dictionary, and showed me a word: "punish." In excited voices they
demanded: "Pooneesh -- peelote!" I asked what they wanted done to the
offending pilot. One of them aimed an imaginary revolver at his temple and
pulled the trigger.
"You’re in America," I told him. "We don’t do things that way. The plane will
be repaired and ready for the convoy."
They came up with another word: "Baneesh!" They repeated this excitedly
over and over again. Finally I understood that they wanted not only the pilot,
but American Airlines, Inc., expelled from the Newark field.
I asked the interpreter to explain that the U.S. Army has no jurisdiction over
commercial companies. After all, the airlines had been using Newark airport
long before the war and even before La Guardia Airport existed. I tried to calm
down the Russians by explaining that our aircraft maintenance officer, Captain
Roy B. Gardner, would have the bomber ready for its convey even if it meant
a special crew working all night to finish the job.
I remembered what General Koenig had said about the Russians when I
went to Washington shortly after Pearl Harbor. He knew that in 1917 I had
served in the Flying Machine Section, U.S. Signal Corps, and that I had been
in combat overseas. When he told me there was an assignment open for a
Lend-Lease liaison officer with the Red Army Air Force, I was eager to hear
more about it.
"It’s a job, Jordan, that calls for an infinite amount of tact to get along with
the Russians," the General said. "They’re tough people to work with, but I
think you can do it."
Thus I had been assigned to Newark for the express purpose of expediting
the Lend-Lease program. I was determined to perform my duty to the best of
my ability. I was a "re-tread" as they called us veterans of World War I and a
mere Captain by the age of 44,but I had a job to do and I knew I could do it.
The first days had gone reasonably well and I rather liked Kotikov. But there
was no denying it, the Russians were tough people to work with.
As my remarks about repairing the bomber on time were being translated, I
noticed that Colonel Kotikov was fidgeting scornfully. When I finished, he
made an abrupt gesture with his hand. "I call Mr. Hopkins," he announced.
It was the first time I had heard him use this name. It seemed such an idle
threat, and a silly one. What did Harry Hopkins have to do with Newark
Airport? Assuming that Kotikov carried out his threat, what good would it do?
Commercial planes, after all, were under the jurisdiction of the Civil
Aeronautics Board.
"Mr. Hopkins fix," Colonel Kotikov asserted. He looked at me and I could
see now that he was amused, in a grim kind of way. "Mr. Brown will see Mr.
Hopkins -- no?" he said smiling.
The mention of "Mr. Brown" puzzled me, but before I had time to explore
this any further, Kotikov was barking at the interpreter that he wanted to call
the Soviet Embassy in Washington. All Russian long-distance calls had to be
cleared through my office, and I always made sure that the Colonel’s, which
could be extraordinarily long at times, were put through "collect." I told the
operator to get the Soviet Embassy, and I handed the receiver to Kotikov.
By this time the other Russians had been waved out of the office, and I was
sitting at my desk. Colonel Kotikov began a long harangue over the phone in
Russian, interrupted by several trips to the window. The only words I
understood were "American Airlines," "Hopkins," and the serial number on the
tail which he read out painfully in English. When the call was completed, the
Colonel left without a word. I shrugged my shoulders and went to see about
the damaged Havoc. As promised, it was repaired and ready for hoisting on
shipboard when the convoy sailed.
That, I felt sure, was the end of the affair.
I was wrong. On June 12th the order came from Washington not only
ordering American Airlines off the field, but directing every aviation company
to cease activities at Newark forthwith. The order was not for a day or a week.
It held for the duration of the war, though they called it a “Temporary
Suspension.”
I was flabbergasted. It was the sort of thing one cannot quite believe, and
certainly cannot forget. Would we have to jump whenever Colonel Kotikov
cracked the whip? For me, it was going to be a hard lesson to learn.
Captain Gardner, who had been at Newark longer than I, and who was
better versed in what he called the "push-button system," told me afterwards
that he did not waste a second after I informed him that Colonel Kotikov had
threatened to "call Mr. Hopkins." He dashed for the best corner in the terminal
building, which was occupied by commercial airlines people, and staked out a
claim by fixing his card on the door. A few days later the space was his.
I was dazed by the speed with which the expulsion proceedings had taken
place. First, the CAB inspector had arrived. Someone in Washington, he said,
had set off a grenade under the Civil Aeronautics Board. He spent several
days in the control tower, and put our staff through a severe quiz about the
amount of commercial traffic and whether it was interfering with Soviet
operations. The word spread around the field that there was going to be hell to
pay. Several days later, the order of expulsion arrived. A copy of the order is
reproduced in chapter nine of this edition, a masterpiece of bureaucratic
language.
I had to pinch myself to make sure that we Americans, and not the
Russians, were the donors of Lend-Lease. "After all, Jordan," I told myself,
"you don’t know the details of the whole operation; this is only one part of it.
You’re a soldier, and besides you were warned that this would be a tough
assignment." At the same time, however, I decided to start a diary, and to
collect records of one kind and another, and to make notes and memos of
everything that occurred. This was a more important decision than I realized.
Keeping a record wasn’t exactly a revolutionary idea in the Army. I can still
see Sergeant Cook, at Kelly Field, Texas, in 1917, with his sandy thatch and
ruddy face, as he addressed me, a 19-year-old corporal, from the infinite
superiority of a master sergeant in the regular Army: "Jordan, if you want to
get along, keep your eyes and your ears open, keep your big mouth shut, and
keep a copy of everything!"
Now I felt a foreboding that one day there would be a thorough
investigation of Russian Lend-Lease. I was the only one cog in the machinery.
Yet because of the fact that I couldn’t know the details of high-level strategy, I
began the Jordan diaries.
These diaries consist of many components. The first was started at
Newark, and later grew into two heavy binders stuffed with an exhaustive
documentation of Army orders, reports, correspondence, and names of
American military persons. It covers the Soviet Lend-Lease movement by ship
from Newark, and by air from Great Falls and Fairbanks from early in 1942 to
the summer of 1944.
The record is not only verbal but pictorial. Among many photographs there
are eight which commemorate the visit to Great Falls of the most famous
member of any World War I outfit -- Captain "Eddie" Rickenbacker. A sort of
annex, or overflow, contains oddments like a file of Tail Winds, newspaper of
the 7th Ferrying Group.
The second section, also begun in Newark, is a small book with black
leather covers. In this I entered the name, rank and function of every Russian
who came to my knowledge as operating anywhere in the United States. The catalog identifies 418 individuals not a few of whom were unknown to the
FBI. Mr. Hoover’s men were interested enough to Photostat every page of this
book.
The list proved to be of value, I was told, in tracing Communist espionage
in America during the war. Incidentally, this ledger opens with what authorities
have praised is a very complete roster of Soviet airbases -- 21 in all, with
mileages --from Bering Strait across Siberia to Moscow.
The third part, a sizable date-book in maroon linen, is the only one that
follows the dictionary definition of a diary as "a record or register of daily
duties and events." It is a consecutive notation of happenings, personal and
official during nine months of 1944. But we are two years ahead of ourselves,
and we shall come to that period later.
An official explanation of the expulsion of the airlines from Newark Airport
was necessary for public consumption, but the one given could hardly have
been more preposterous. The CAB press release stated: "All air transport
service at the Newark, N.J. airport was ordered suspended immediately by the
Civil Aeronautics Board today . . . The Board attributed the suspension to the
reduced number of airplanes available and the necessity for reducing stops as
a conservative move."
We at the airport were told there was too much commercial airplane traffic;
the public was told that the ban was imposed because there were now fewer
planes! And the idea that "conservation" resulted from the ban was absurd:
the planes now stopped at La Guardia, which they hadn’t before, instead of at
Newark!
On June 12th, the day of the ban, the identity of the "Mr. Brown" mentioned
by Colonel Kotikov was revealed. His name was Molotov.
Front pages revealed that he was the President’s overnight guest at the
White House. The newspapermen all knew that Molotov had been in
Washington from May 29th to June 4th, traveling incognito as "Mr. Brown."
(One reporter asked Stephen Early, "Why didn’t you call him ‘Mr. Red’?")
At Early’s request they had imposed a voluntary censorship on themselves
and the visit was called the "best kept secret of the war." At one point during
this period, Molotov visited New York. Though I don’t know whether Colonel
Kotikov saw him then, he obviously knew all about Molotov’s movements.
Late in the evening of Molotov’s first day at the White House, Harry
Hopkins made an entry in his diary. I think it is shocking. Hopkins wrote:
"I suggested that Molotov might like to rest [Hopkins wrote].
Litivinov acted extremely bored and cynical throughout the
conference. He made every effort to get Molotov to stay at the
Blair House tonight but Molotov obviously wanted to stay at the
White House at least one night, so he is put up in the room across
the way [across from Hopkins’, that is].
I went in for a moment to talk to him after the conference and he
asked that one of the girls he brought over as secretaries be
permitted to come, and that has been arranged." [1]
1. Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History, Robert E. Sherwood, (Harper, 1948), p. 560.
Ten days after the Molotov story broke, Harry Hopkins came to New York
to address a Russian Red Rally at Madison Square Gardens. He cried:
"A second front?
"Yes, and if necessary, a third and a fourth front . . . The American
people are bound to the people of the Soviet Union in the great
alliance of the United Nations. They know that in the past year
you have in your heroic combat against our common foe
performed for us and for all humanity a service that can never be
repaid.
"We are determined that nothing shall stop us from sharing with you all
that we have and are in this conflict, and we look forward to sharing with
you the fruits of victory and peace."
Mr. Hopkins concluded:
"Generations unborn will owe a great measure of their freedom to the
unconquerable power of the Soviet people."[2]
2. Ibid, p. 588.
CHAPTER TWO
The "Bomb Powder" Folders
In my capacity as Liaison Officer, I began helping the Russians with
necessary paper work and assisted them in telephoning various factories to
expedite the movement of supplies to catch particular convoys. I soon got to
know Eugene Rodzevitch, the field man who visited the plants and reported
daily by phone as to possible expectations of deliveries.
As Colonel Kotikov communicated with many different officials of the Soviet
Government Purchasing Commission, their names became more and more
familiar to me. For instance, Mr. I.A. Eremin, a member of the Commission,
was in charge of raw materials. Others were B.N. Fomin, in charge of powder
and explosives in the military division; N.S. Formichev, assistant chief to Mr.
Eremin in the chemical division under raw materials; and A.D. Davyshev, in
charge of electric furnaces.
These names appeared more and more frequently, because we were
destined to accumulate chemicals and chemical plants in increasing intensity
in the months ahead. Major General S.A. Piskounov was chief of the aviation
section, with his assistants, Colonel A. P. Doronin, in charge of medium
bombers; and Colonel G. E. Tavetkov, in charge of fighter pursuit planes. I got
to know the latter two officers very well.
Few of the American officers who came in casual contact with the Russians
ever got to see any of their records. But the more I helped Rodzevitch and
Colonel Kotikov, the more cordial they became. It became customary for me
to leaf through their papers to get shipping documents, and to prepare them in
folders for quick attention when they reported back to Washington.
At this time I knew nothing whatever about the atomic bomb. The words
“uranium” and “Manhattan Engineering District” were unknown to me.
But I became aware that certain folders were being held to one side on
Colonel Kotikov’s desk for the accumulation of a very special chemical plant.
In fact, this chemical plant was referred to by Colonel Kotikov as a “bomb
powder” factory. By referring to my diary, and checking the items I now know
went into an atomic energy plant, I am able to show the following records
starting with the year 1942, while I was still at Newark. These materials, which
are necessary for the creation of atomic pile, moved to Russia in 1942:
Graphite: natural, flake, lump or chip, costing American taxpayers
$812,437.
Over thirteen million dollars’ worth of aluminum tubes (used in the
atomic pile to “cook” or transmute the uranium into plutonium), the
exact amount being $13,041,152.
We sent 834,989 pounds of cadmium metal for rods to control the
intensity of an atomic pile; the cost was $781,472.
The really secret material, thorium, finally showed up and started
going through immediately. The amount during 1942 was 13,440
pounds at a cost of $22,848.*
*On Jan. 30, 1943 we shipped an additional 11,912 pounds of thorium nitrate
to Russia from Philadelphia on the S.S. John C. Fremont. It is significant that
there were no shipments from 1944 and 1945, due undoubtedly to General
Groves’ vigilance.
Regarding thorium the Smyth Report (p. 5) says:
“The only natural element which exhibit this property of emitting alpha
or beta particles are (with a few minor exceptions) those of very high
atomic numbers and mass numbers, such as uranium, thorium, radium,
and actinium, i.e., those known to have the most complicated nuclear
structures.”
It was about this time that the Russians were anxious to secure more
Diesel marine engines which cost about $17,500 and were moving heaven
and earth to get another 25 of the big ones of over 200 horsepower variety.
Major General John R. Deane, Chief of our Military Mission in Moscow,
had overruled the Russians’ request for any Diesel engines because General MacArthur needed them in the South Pacific. But the Russians were
undaunted and decided to make an issue of it by going directly to Hopkins
who overruled everyone in favor of Russia.
In the three-year period, 1942-44, a total of 1,305 of these engines were
sent to Russia! They cost $30,745,947. The engines they had previously
received were reported by General Deane and our military observers to be
rusting in open storage. It is now perfectly obvious that these Diesels were
post-war items, not at all needed for Russia’s immediate war activity.
Major General Deane, an expert on Russian Lend-Lease, has this to say in
his excellent book, The Strange Alliance, which bears the meaningful subtitle,
“The Story of Our Efforts at Wartime Cooperation with Russia”:
With respect to Russian aid, I always felt that their mission (that is, the
mission of Harry Hopkins and his aide, Major General james H. Burns)
was carried out with a zeal which approached fanaticism. Their
enthusiasm became so ingrained that it could not be tempered when
conditions indicated that a change in policy was desirable . . .
When the tide turned at Stalingrad and a Russian offensive started which
ended only in Berlin, a new situation was created. We now had a Red
Army which was plenty cocky and which became more so with each
successive victory.
The Soviet leaders became more and more demanding. The fire in our
neighbor’s house had been extinguished and we had submitted ourselves
to his direction in helping to extinguish it. He assumed that we would
continue to submit ourselves to his direction in helping rebuild the
house, and unfortunately we did. He allowed us to work on the outside
and demanded that we furnish the material for the inside, the exact use of
which we were not allowed to see. Now that the house is furnished, we
have at best only a nodding acquaintance. [1]
1 - The "Bomb Powder" Folders
It is true that we never knew the exact use to which anything sent under
Russian Lend-Lease was put, and the failure to set up a system of
accountability is now seen to have been an appalling mistake. But could
anything be more foolish than to suppose that the atomic materials we sent
have not been used for an atomic bomb which materialized in Russia long
before we expected it?
The British let us inspect their installations openly, and exchanged
information freely. The Russians did not. Our Government was intent on
supplying whatever the Russians asked for, as fast as we could get it to them
– and I was one of the expediters. And when I saw “our Government,” I mean
of course Harry Hopkins, the man in charge of Lend-Lease, and his aides. We
in the Army knew where the orders were coming from, and so did the
Russians. The “push-button system” worked splendidly; no one knew it better
than Colonel Kotikov.
One afternoon Colonel Kotikov called me to the door of the hangar. He
pointed to a small plane which bore a red star in a white circle. “Who owns
this?” he asked. I recognized it as a Texaco plane, and explained that it
belonged to an oil firm, the Texaco Company.
What right had the Texas Company, he asked, to usurp the red star? He
would phone Washington and have it taken away from them immediately. I
grabbed his arm and hastily explained that the state of Texas had been known
as the “Lone Star State” long before the Russian revolution. I said that if he
started a fight about this star, the state of Texas might declare war on Russia
all by itself.
Kotikov wasn’t really sure whether I was joking, but he finally dropped the
idea of phoning. I always remember with amusement that this was one of the
few times that Harry Hopkins was not called upon for help.
The various areas of Russia that were being built or rebuilt were apparent
from the kind of supplies going forward on Lend-Lease. Many of the suppliers
were incredibly long-range in quantity and quality. Here are some of the more
important centers:
Soviet City -- Nature of U.S.
Lend-Lease Material
Chelyabinsk -- Tractor and farm machinery
Chirchik -- Powder and explosive factories
Kamensk -- Uralski Aluminum manufacture
Nizhni Tagil -- Railway car shops
Novosibirsk -- Plane factory and parts
Magnitogorsk -- Steel mill equipment
Omsk -- Tank center
Sverdlovsk -- Armament plants
The Russians were great admirers of Henry Ford. Often the interpreter
would repeat to me such statements of theirs as, “These shipments will help
to Fordize our country,” or “We are behind the rest of the world and have to
hurry to catch up.”
It became clear, however, that we were not going to stay at Newark much
longer. The growing scope of our activities, the expansion of Lend-Lease, the
need for more speedy delivery of aircraft to Russia – all these factors were
forcing a decision in the direction of air delivery to supplant ship delivery. It
had long been obvious that the best route was from Alaska across to Siberia.
From the first the Russians were reluctant to open the Alaskan-Siberian
route. Even before Pearl Harbor, on the occasion of the first Harriman/Beaverbrook
mission to Moscow in September, 1941, Averell Harriman had
suggested to Stalin that American aircraft could be delivered to the Soviet
Union from Alaska through Siberia by American crews. Stalin demurred and
said it was “too dangerous a route.” It would have brought us, of course,
behind the Iron Curtain.
During the Molotov visit to the White House, Secretary of State Cordell Hull
handed Harry Hopkins a memorandum with nine items of agenda for the
Russians, the first of which was: “The Establishment of an Airplane Ferrying
Service from the United States to the Soviet Union Through Alaska and
Siberia.”
When the President brought this up, Molotov observed it was under
advisement, but “he did not as yet know what decision had been reached.”
Major General John R. Deane has an ironic comment on Russian
procrastination in this regard:
Before I left for Russia, General Arnold, who could pound the desk and
get things done in the United States, had called me to his office, pounded
the desk, and told me what he wanted done in the way of improving air
transportation between the United States and Russia.
He informed me that I was to obtain Russian approval for
American operation of air transport planes to Moscow on any of
the following routes in order of priority: one, the Alaskan-Siberian
route; two, via the United Kingdom and Stockholm; or three, from Tehran to Moscow. I saluted, said Yes, sir, and tried for two
years to carry out his instructions. [2]
2 - The Strange Alliance, John R. Deane, (Viking, 1947), pp. 90-91
Where the U.S. was not able to force Russia’s hand, Nazi submarines
succeeded. Subs out of Norway were attacking our Lend-Lease convoys on
the Murmansk route, apparently not regarded as “too dangerous a route” for
American crews.
A disastrous limit was finally reached when out of one convoy of 34 ships,
21 were lost. The Douglas A-20 Havoc's, which were going to the bottom of
the ocean, were more important to Stalin than human lives. So first we started
flying medium bombers from South America to Africa, but by the time they got
across from Africa to Tiflis, due to sandstorms the motors had to be taken
down and they were not much use to the Russians. Nor were we able to get
enough of them on ships around Africa to fill Russian requirements for the big
offensive building up for the battle of Stalingrad.
Finally, Russia sent its OK on the Alaskan-Siberian route. Americans
would fly the planes to Fairbanks, Alaska: Americans would set up all the
airport facilities in Alaska*; Soviet pilots would take over on our soil; Soviet
pilots only, would fly into Russia.
*Later it came out that we actually built bases for the Russians in Siberia. Colonel Maxwell E. Erdofy, the famous airport builder, and crews from the Alcan Highway project were ordered to Russia and kept in isolation and under Soviet guard as they build Siberian airports. I find no record anywhere of this work having been changed to Lend-Lease.
The chief staging-point in the U.S. was to be Gore Field in Great Falls,
Montana. A few years before the war General Royce, who had been
experimenting in cold-weather flying with a group of training planes called
“Snow Birds,” had found that Great Falls, with its airport 3,665 feet above sea
level on the top of a mesa tableland 300 feet above the city itself, had a
remarkable record of more than 300 clear flying days per year, despite its very
cold dry climate in the winter.
If you look at a projection of the globe centered on the North Pole, you will
see that Great Falls is almost on a direct line with Moscow. This was to be
called the new and secret Pipeline. The Army called it ALSIB.
*Later it came out that we actually built bases for the Russians in Siberia.
Colonel Maxwell E. Erdofy, the famous airport builder, and crews from the
Alcan Highway project were ordered to Russia and kept in isolation and under
Soviet guard as they build Siberian airports. I find no record anywhere of this
work having been changed to Lend-Lease.
TO BE CONTINUED...NEXT
We Move to Montana
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