The Devil's Chessboard:
Allen Dulles,the CIA,and the Rise of
America's Secret Government
By David Talbot
Sunrise
Allen Dulles’s most audacious intervention on behalf of a major Nazi war
criminal took place in the waning days of the war. The story of the relationship
between Dulles and SS general Karl Wolff—Himmler’s former chief of staff and
commander of Nazi security forces in Italy—is a long and tangled one. But
perhaps it’s best to begin at a particularly dire moment for Wolff, in the still-dark
early morning hours of April 26, 1945, less than two weeks before the end of the
war in Europe.
That morning, soon after arriving at the SS command post in Cernobbio, a
quaint town nestled in the foothills of the Italian Alps on the shores of Lake
Como, Wolff was surrounded by a well-armed unit of Italian partisans. The
partisans had established positions around the entire SS compound, a luxurious
estate that had been seized by the Nazis from the Locatelli family, a wealthy
dynasty of cheese manufacturers. With only a handful of SS soldiers standing
guard outside his villa, Wolff had no way to break through the siege and his
capture seemed imminent. As chief of all SS and Gestapo units in Italy, Wolff
was well known to the Italian resistance, who blamed him for the reprisal
killings of many civilians in response to partisan attacks on Nazi targets, as well
as for the torture and murder of numerous resistance fighters. If he fell into the
partisans’ hands, the SS commander was not likely to be treated charitably.
At age forty-four, the tall, fair-haired, blue-eyed Wolff carried himself with
the supreme self-confidence of a man who had long been paraded around by the
Nazi high command as an ideal Aryan specimen. A former advertising
executive, Wolff understood the power of imagery. His climb through the Nazi
Party ranks had been paved by his Hessian bearing, his imperial, hawk-nosed
profile, and the erect figure he cut in his SS dress uniform. Himmler, the former
chicken farmer, drew confidence from Wolff’s suave presence and fondly called
him “Wolffie.” The SS chief made Wolff his principal liaison to Hitler’s
headquarters, where he also quickly became a favorite.
Hitler enjoyed showing off Wolff at his dinner parties and made sure that the
SS-Obergruppenführer was by his side during the war’s tense overture, when
German forces invaded Poland and Hitler prepared to join his troops at the front.
“To my great and, I openly admit, joyful surprise, I was ordered to the innermost
Führer headquarters,” Wolff proudly recalled as an old man. “Hitler wanted to
have me nearby, because he knew that he could rely on me completely. He had
known me for a long time, and rather well.”
But in April 1945, encircled by his enemies at the Villa Locatelli, Wolff was
far from these glory days. The desperation of his situation was underlined the
following day when Benito Mussolini, Italy’s once all-powerful Duce, whose
status had been reduced to that of Wolff’s ward, was captured by partisans at a
roadblock on the northern tip of Lake Como while fleeing with his dwindling
entourage for Switzerland. Taken to the crumbling but still grand city hall in the
nearby lakeside village of Dongo, Mussolini was assured he would be treated
mercifully. “Don’t worry,” the mayor told him, “you will be all right.”
A horde of partisans and curious townspeople crowded into the mayor’s
office, to fire questions at the man who had ruled Italy for over two decades.
Mussolini answered each question thoughtfully. In the final months of his life, he
had grown increasingly reflective and resigned to his fate. He spent more time
reading—his tastes ranged from Dostoyevsky and Hemingway to Plato and
Nietzsche—than dealing with governmental affairs. “I am crucified by my
destiny,” Mussolini had told a visiting Italian army chaplain in his final days.
When his captors asked him why he had allowed the Germans to exact harsh
retributions on the Italian people, Mussolini mournfully explained that it was
beyond his power. “My hands were tied. There was very little possibility of
opposing General Albert Kesselring field commander of the German armed
forces in Italy and General Wolff in what they did. Again and again in
conversations with General Wolff, I mentioned that stories of people being
tortured and other brutal deeds had come to my ears. One day Wolff replied that
it was the only means of extracting the truth, and even the dead spoke the truth
in his torture chambers.”
In the end, Mussolini found no mercy. He and his mistress, Claretta Petacci,
who insisted on sharing his fate, were machine-gunned and their bodies were put
on display in Milan’s Piazzale Loreto. Mussolini’s body was subjected to
particular abuse by the large, frantic crowd in the square; one woman fired five
shots into Il Duce’s head—one for each of her five dead sons. The bodies were
then strung up by their feet from the overhanging girders of a garage roof, where
they were subjected to further indignities. When he heard about Mussolini’s
grotesque finale, Hitler—who, near the end, had told the Duce that he was
“perhaps the only friend I have in the world”—ordered that his own body be
burned after he killed himself.
General Wolff knew that he, too, faced a merciless end if he fell captive at
Villa Locatelli. But unlike Mussolini, the SS commander had a very dedicated
and powerful friend in the enemy camp.
At eleven in the morning on April 26, Allen Dulles received an urgent phone
call in his Bern office from Max Waibel, his contact in Swiss intelligence.
Waibel reported that Karl Wolff was surrounded by partisans at Villa Locatelli
and “there was a great danger they might storm the villa and kill Wolff.”
The SS general was the key to Dulles’s greatest wartime ambition: securing a
separate peace with Nazi forces in Italy before the Soviet army could push into
Austria and southward toward Trieste. With the Communists playing a dominant
role in the Italian resistance, Dulles knew that blocking the advance of the Red
Army into northern Italy was critical if Italy was to be prevented from falling
into the Soviet orbit after the war. Dulles and his intelligence colleagues had
been secretly meeting with Wolff and his SS aides since late February, trying to
work out a separate surrender of German forces in Italy that would save the Nazi
officers’ necks and win the OSS spymaster the glory that had eluded him
throughout the war.
The negotiations for Operation Sunrise, as Dulles optimistically christened
his covert peace project, were a highly delicate dance. Exposure could spell
disaster for both men. According to Wolff, during their diplomatic courtship,
Dulles identified himself as a “special representative” and “a personal friend” of
President Roosevelt—neither of which was true. In fact, by negotiating with the
SS general, Dulles was clearly violating FDR’s emphatic policy of unconditional
surrender. Just days before Wolff was trapped at Villa Locatelli, Dulles had been
expressly forbidden by Washington from continuing his contacts with Wolff.
Meanwhile, the SS commander’s secret diplomatic efforts both dovetailed
and competed with the numerous other Nazi peace initiatives coming Dulles’s
way, including that of his boss, Heinrich Himmler, who was also shrewd enough
to realize that the German war effort was doomed and he along with it, unless he
managed to cut his own deal. Even the Führer himself was toying with the idea
of how he might save the Reich by splitting the Allies and winning a favorable
peace settlement. In his backroom dealing with Dulles, Wolff at times found
himself an emissary of the Nazi high command and at other times a traitorous
agent working at cross-purposes to save his own skin.
But with Wolff now surrounded by Italian resistance fighters at Villa
Locatelli, his end seemed near—and with it, all the painstaking and duplicitous
efforts undertaken by the two men over the previous two months on behalf of
Operation Sunrise. Dulles had too much at stake to let his happen. Alerted to
Wolff’s predicament, he flew into action, mounting a rescue party to cross the
border and reach the villa before it was too late.
Dulles knew that risking brave men to save a Nazi war criminal’s life—in the
interests of his own unsanctioned peace mission—was an act of brazen
insubordination that could cost him his intelligence career. So, to give himself
cover, Dulles arranged for his loyal subordinate, Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz,
to oversee the rescue.
Dulles later related the story with typical bonhomie—but, as was often the
case, his glib delivery masked a darker tale. “I told Gaevernitz that under the
strict orders I had received, I could not get in touch with Wolff. . . . Gaevernitz
listened silently for a moment. Then he said that since the whole Operation
Sunrise affair seemed to have come to an end, he would like to go on a little trip
for a few days. I noticed a twinkle in his eye, and as he told me later, he noticed
one in mine. I realized, of course, what he was going to do, and that he intended
to do it on his own responsibility.”
When it came to saving Wolff, Gaevernitz shared his boss’s zeal. Gaevernitz
was the handsome scion of an illustrious European family and a relative of the
Stinnes family, whose fortune had helped finance Hitler’s political rise. The
Gaevernitzes had broken from the Nazis early on, and Dulles helped funnel their
money to safe havens outside of Germany, as he did for many wealthy Germans,
including those who remained loyal to the Nazi regime, before and during the
war. Dulles and Gaevernitz were also tied together by their political views—they
both believed that “moderate” members of Hitler’s regime must be salvaged
from the war’s wreckage and incorporated into postwar plans for Germany. By
the extremely generous standards of Dulles and Gaevernitz, even Karl Wolff
qualified as one such redeemable Nazi.
After being dispatched by Dulles, Gaevernitz, accompanied by the Swiss
secret agent Waibel, jumped on an Italy-bound train, arriving at the Swiss border
town of Chiasso late that evening. There they met one of Dulles’s top agents,
Don Jones, a man well known to the Italian resistance fighters in the border area
as “Scotti.” Gaevernitz thought that Scotti, a man who risked his life each day
fighting SS soldiers, would balk at the idea of saving the general who
commanded them. But Scotti gamely agreed to lead the mission.
And so, as midnight approached, a convoy of three cars set off toward the
western shore of Lake Como. One vehicle carried OSS agent Scotti and three
Swiss intelligence operatives, the second was filled with Italian partisans, and
the third conveyed two SS officials Dulles had recruited to ease the convoy’s
passage through German-controlled areas. It was one of the most bizarre
missions in wartime Europe: a joint U.S.-German rescue effort organized for the
benefit of a high-ranking Nazi general.
As the convoy crawled through the dark toward the lake, partisans opened
fire on the cars. Scotti bravely jumped out of his vehicle and stood in the
headlights, praying that the resistance soldiers would recognize him and stop
shooting. Fortunately, one did. There was more gunfire and even a grenade
attack as they continued their journey, but finally, the odd rescue team arrived at
the Villa Locatelli. After talking their way past the partisans’ blockade as well as
the SS guard, they entered the villa and found General Wolff in full SS uniform,
as if he had been expecting them all along. He offered the rescue party some of
the vintage Scotch he kept for special occasions, volunteering that the whiskey
had been expropriated from the British by Rommel during the North African
campaign.
It was after two in the morning when the caravan arrived safely back in
Chiasso with their special passenger, who had changed into civilian clothes for
the journey and was slumped low in the backseat of the middle car. Gaevernitz
was anxiously awaiting the rescue team’s return in the dingy railroad station
café. He had no intention of greeting Wolff in public. But when the SS general
heard that Dulles’s aide was there, he bounded over to him and shook his hand.
“I will never forget what you have done for me,” Wolff declared.
Dulles and Gaevernitz would learn that the SS man had a strange sense of
gratitude. In the coming years, Wolff would become a millstone around their
necks.
Later that morning, an exhausted Gaevernitz, who had not been out of his
clothes all that night, took a train to his family’s lovely villa in Ascona, on Lake
Maggiore, so he could enjoy a long sleep. At the railway station in Locarno,
where he stopped for breakfast, he listened to the 7:00 a.m. radio broadcast,
which was filled with news of Mussolini’s capture and other dramatic bulletins
from the Lake Como area. Gaevernitz kept expecting to hear news of General
Wolff’s rescue by a U.S.-led team of commandos; he was determined that his
boss’s name must be kept out of the story.
“It would have made a lovely headline in the papers,” Gaevernitz later
mused in his diary. “‘German S.S. General Rescued From Italian Patriots by
American Consul’!!! Poor Allen!! I really felt I had to spare him this embarrassment.”
It took Wolff several more days of high-stakes diplomacy before his maneuvers
finally resulted in the surrender of German forces on the Italian front on May 2,
1945. By then, Hitler was dead, the German military machine had all but
collapsed, and it was just six days before the capitulation of all Axis forces in
Europe. In the end, Operation Sunrise saved few lives and had little impact on
the course of the war. It did succeed, however, in creating a new set of
international tensions that some historians would identify as the first icy fissures
of the Cold War.
The Dulles-Wolff maneuvers aggravated Stalin’s paranoid disposition. While
he was still alive, Roosevelt, whom Stalin genuinely liked and trusted, was able
to reassure the Soviet leader that the United States had no intention of betraying
an alliance forged in blood. But after FDR’s death, Stalin’s fears of a stab in the
back at Caserta—where the surrender on the Italian front was signed by German
and American military commanders—only grew more intense. His suspicions
were not unfounded. After the separate peace was declared at Caserta, some
German divisions in Italy were told not to lay down their arms but to get ready to
begin battling the Red Army alongside the Americans and British.
Even Roosevelt’s successor, Harry S. Truman, who would become a
dedicated Cold Warrior, took a dim view of Operation Sunrise and tried
unsuccessfully to shut it down. Truman later wrote in his memoir that Dulles’s
unauthorized diplomacy stirred up a tempest of trouble for him during his first
days as president.
Operation Sunrise would become Allen Dulles’s creation myth, the legend
that loomed over his entire intelligence career. For the rest of his life, the
spymaster would energetically work the publicity machinery on “the secret
surrender,” generating magazine articles and more than one book and attempting
to turn the tale into a Hollywood thriller. It was, according to the story that
Dulles assiduously spun throughout the rest of his life, a feat of daring personal
diplomacy. Time magazine—which, under the ownership of his close friend
Henry Luce, could always be counted on to give Dulles good press—trumpeted
Operation Sunrise as “one of the most stunning triumphs in the history of secret
wartime diplomacy.” The reality, however, was far from triumphant.
Karl Wolff was Allen Dulles’s kind of Nazi. Like Hitler and Himmler, Dulles
admired Wolff’s gentlemanly comportment and found him “extremely good looking.” He struck Dulles as a man with the right sort of pedigree, the type of
trustworthy fellow with whom he could do business.
Wolff liked to present himself as a high-level administrator who was
unsullied by the more inhumane operations of his government. He was not one
of the Nazi Party’s vulgar anti-Semites, he would later insist. He took pride in
rescuing the occasional prominent Jewish prisoner from the Gestapo dungeons—
a banker, a tennis celebrity, for instance. Eichmann sneeringly referred to Wolff
as one of the “dandy officers of the SS, who wore white gloves and didn’t want
to know anything about what’s going on.”
Wolff was a financially savvy fixer, a man whom the Nazi hierarchy could
rely on to get things done. After serving with distinction as a young army officer
on the western front during World War I, Wolff originally pursued a career in
banking, before going into advertising. But his ambitions in both fields were
thwarted by Germany’s postwar economic crash. His decision to join Hitler’s
rapidly growing enterprise, where he rose quickly through the ranks, was more
of a professional decision than an ideological one. There were unlimited
opportunities in the Nazi movement for a polished blond warrior like Wolff.
His business background gave Wolff cachet in the SS, where such skills were
in short supply. It was Wolff who was put in charge of Himmler’s important
“circle of friends,” a select group of some three dozen German industrialists and
bankers who supplied the SS with a stream of slush money. “Himmler was no
businessman and I took care of banking matters for him,” Wolff later recalled. In
return for their generosity, the corporate donors were given special access to
pools of slave labor. They were also invited to attend high-level government
meetings and special Nazi Party ceremonies. It was said that Wolff took such
good care of the wealthy contributors at the 1933 Nuremberg rally that they were
pampered more than the Führer himself. On other occasions, the privileged
circle of friends was even taken on private tours of the Dachau and
Sachsenhausen concentration camps, escorted by Himmler and Wolff.
Presumably the SS shut down the camps’ crematoria during the distinguished
guests’ visits to spare them the unpleasant stench.
In pursuing the Sunrise peace pact, Dulles and Wolff harbored similar
political motives. Both viewed the Soviet army’s advance into Western Europe
as a catastrophe. But they also shared business interests. Throughout the war,
Dulles had used his OSS command post in Switzerland to look out for Sullivan
and Cromwell business clients in Europe. Stopping the war before these clients’
manufacturing and power plants in industrial northern Italy were destroyed was
a priority for both men.
Under the terms of Operation Sunrise, Wolff specifically agreed not to blow
up the region’s many hydroelectric plants, which generated power from the
water roaring down from the Alps. Most of these installations were owned by a
multinational holding company called Italian Superpower Corporation.
Incorporated in Delaware in 1928, Italian Superpower’s board was evenly
divided between American and Italian utility executives, and by the following
year the power company was swallowed by a bigger, J. P. Morgan–financed
cartel. The ties between Italian Superpower and Dulles’s financial circle were
reinforced when, toward the end of the war, the spymaster’s good friend—New
York banker James Russell Forgan—took over as his OSS boss in London.
Forgan was one of Italian Superpower’s directors.
Dulles concluded that Wolff was, in effect, a member of his international
club—a man with similar views, connections, and willingness to do business.
Neither man was particularly interested in the clash of ideas or human tragedies
associated with the war. They were fixed on the calculus of power; each
understood the other’s intense ambition. Operation Sunrise was for both of them
a bold, high-wire career move.
After he decided that Wolff was a dependable partner, Dulles went to great
lengths to rehabilitate the SS commander’s image. In his reports back to OSS
headquarters, he framed Wolff in the best possible light: he was a “moderate”
and “probably the most dynamic [German] personality in North Italy.” Although
some U.S. and British intelligence officials suspected that Wolff was serving as
an agent of Hitler and Himmler and trying to drive a wedge between the Allies,
Dulles insisted that the German general was acting heroically and selflessly to
bring peace to Italy and to spare its land, people, and art treasures from a final,
scorched-earth conflagration.
Dulles knew from the beginning that working with Wolff was an extremely
risky proposition—not just because of the Allies’ strict prohibition against a
separate peace deal but because Himmler’s right-hand man was certain to be
placed high on the list of Nazi war criminals. Even many years later, when the
evidence against Wolff had grown to utterly damning proportions, the old spy
refused to pass judgment on him. “The conclusions about Wolff must be left to
history,” wrote Dulles in his carefully calibrated Operation Sunrise memoir. He
was delaying a judgment that, for many, had long since been obvious.
When Wolff was later confronted with the obscenity of the Nazi leadership’s
war crimes, he would inevitably plead ignorance, claiming he occupied such a
lofty perch in the Reich’s clouds that he did not learn about the death camps until
the final days of the war. When this tactic failed, he would claim that he had
been powerless to stop the mass slaughter, or he would fall back on legalisms
and other technical evasions. But the stains on Wolff were not so easily erased.
Karl Wolff, who would go down in history as “one of the unknown giants of
Hitler’s Reich,” was content to operate in the shadows. While little known by the
public, however, he played a prominent administrative role in Hitler’s lethal
assembly line. He was, as Time magazine later branded him, the “Bureaucrat of
Death.”
The Nuremberg trials would firmly establish the principle that administrators
of murder—not just the actual executioners—could be found guilty of war
crimes. Although he was not a central cog in the daily operations of the
Holocaust like Adolf Eichmann, Wolff, as Himmler’s top troubleshooter,
frequently intervened to ensure the smooth efficiency of the extermination
process.
During the Nuremberg trials, a highly incriminating letter written by Wolff
would emerge that made it clear how important his intervention could be in
keeping the trains rolling to the death camps. In July 1942, after the trains
hauling Polish Jews to the Treblinka gas chambers were temporarily halted
because of the German military’s demand for railcars, Wolff appealed to a Nazi
transportation official for help. After the rail shortage was successfully resolved,
Wolff sent off a heartfelt letter of thanks.
“I was especially pleased,” Wolff wrote the transportation minister in a
chillingly bureaucratic note, “to receive the information that, for the last 14 days,
a train has been leaving daily for Treblinka with 5,000 members of the chosen
people, and that in this way we are in a position to carry out this population
movement at an accelerated tempo.”
Wolff also played a key administrative role in a series of medical
experiments on human subjects at the notorious Dachau camp from 1942
through 1943. The research was conducted by Luftwaffe doctors who were
intent on increasing the survival rates of German pilots, and was strongly
supported by Himmler, who fancied himself a man of science. In the first round
of experiments, human guinea pigs culled by the SS from Dachau’s ranks of the
damned were forced inside special low-oxygen chambers to determine how long
Luftwaffe pilots could fly at high altitudes before passing out. Inside the
chambers, victims gasped for air, frantically cried out, and finally collapsed. It
was up to the Luftwaffe doctor in charge of the experiments, a sadist named
Siegmund Rascher, whether the victims would be revived in time or allowed to
die. Rascher oversaw about 150 such high-altitude experiments, of which at least
half resulted in death.
A subsequent round of medical experiments at Dachau was aimed at finding
the best ways to revive German aviators who were rescued after crashing into
the frigid North Sea. Camp inmates were forced to stand naked in freezing
weather for up to fourteen hours. Others were submerged in tanks of iced water
for three hours at a time. The subjects of the initial freezing experiments all died.
But then the doctors added a new twist to their experiments. They “rewarmed”
their victim in a hot bath and then revived him further with “animal heat”
provided by four female Gypsies. The victim, after being nearly frozen to death,
suddenly found his naked body warmly embraced by four women who brought
him back to life.
Wolff should have been sitting in the dock at Nuremberg as part of the first
round of defendants. But it was the cruder and less-connected executioner Ernst
Kaltenbrunner who would hang for the sins of the SS. Nor was Wolff in the dock
the following year, when the Doctors’ Trial began, though he would be singled
out by prosecutors as one of the principal “masterminds” behind the Dachau
experiments. Throughout the Nuremberg proceedings and the legal challenges
that confronted him in later years, Wolff was watched over by his twin guardian
angels—Dulles and Gero von Schulze-Gaevernitz. They made sure that the
sword of justice never came down with its full might on SS-Obergruppenführer
Karl Wolff. Among the few lives saved by the Operation Sunrise peace gambit,
as it turned out, was that of Wolff himself and those of the SS officers who
conspired with him.
On May 13, 1945, shortly after the Operation Sunrise surrender, Karl Wolff
celebrated his forty-fifth birthday at the villa of the Dukes of Pistoia in Bolzano,
the royal estate he had requisitioned as his final SS command post. Before his
lunch party began, Wolff relaxed on the villa’s terrace with his SS aide and
Sunrise partner Eugen Dollmann, who had served as the interpreter for Hitler
and Himmler in Italy. “It’s really rather pleasant here, Eugenio,” remarked the
SS-Obergruppenführer, using his affectionate name for the Italy-besotted
Dollmann as the two men gazed at Wolff’s children and Dollmann’s Alsatian
hound gamboling in the rose garden. But Dollmann, who could hear American
tanks rumbling nearby, could not let himself enjoy their idyll. “I have a feeling
that this is going to be your last birthday in sunny Italy, Herr General,” he
remarked. Dollmann’s grave mood brought a burst of laughter from Wolff. “My
dear Eugenio! You’re not going to get the wind up in these lovely surroundings?
And on my birthday too!”
Shortly afterward, Wolff’s wife, Ingeborg, a tall, blond beauty and former
countess, who had left her aging, aristocratic husband for her perfect Aryan
match, came onto the terrace and announced that lunch was ready.
Dollmann’s instincts, as usual, proved correct. As Wolff and his guests—
staff officers of the Wehrmacht in dress uniform—sipped champagne in the
villa’s flower-adorned entrance hall, they suddenly heard the growl of tanks
outside. “The Americans,” Wolff said in a deflated voice, as he looked out the
windows. Soldiers in the white helmets of military policemen burst through the
doors, carrying machine guns and herding Wolff’s children in front of them. One
of their officers, chewing a wad of gum, unceremoniously approached the SS
commander and announced that he was under arrest.
Wolff was aghast, protesting indignantly that Allen Dulles, the president’s
personal representative in Switzerland, had promised him “honorable treatment.”
But the military police officer was unimpressed. “Put your things in a small
case,” he snapped at Wolff, still working his Wrigley’s. “Go on, get a move on.”
As the Obergruppenführer bid farewell to his wife and children outside the
villa, a mob of Italians gathered to also send the SS officers on their way, pelting
Wolff and Dollmann with rocks and rotten eggs as the MPs stood by laughing.
The two Nazi VIPs were then stuffed inside an American jeep and whisked away
—first to a gloomy Bolzano dungeon and then, more hospitably, to Cinecittà, the
sprawling film studio in Rome that the Allies had transformed into a POW camp.
Wolff began invoking the name of Allen Dulles to anyone who would listen
as soon as he was behind bars. The question of whether Dulles had promised
Wolff immunity from war crimes prosecution in return for his Sunrise
collaboration would nag the intelligence chief for many years. Dulles would
repeatedly insist that Wolff had never asked for such protection and he had never
offered it. According to Dulles, the SS commander had maintained all along that
he was no war criminal and “he was willing to stand on his record.”
In truth, Wolff’s growing confidence as he successfully dodged prosecution
over the following years derived from the fact that Dulles had indeed offered
him immunity. Two of the Swiss intermediaries involved in the Sunrise
negotiations would later confirm that such an arrangement had been made.
Dulles’s negotiating team went so far as to promise Wolff that he and other
“decent” and “idealistic” members of the Nazi high command would be allowed
to participate in the leadership of postwar Germany. Wolff was even given to
believe that he might be awarded the minister of education post.
Dulles threw his cloak of protection over Wolff from the very start. The SS
general spent the first days of his confinement as a privileged guest of the U.S.
military. He had been warned by Gaevernitz that he might have to spend some
time behind bars, to deflect any criticism of preferential treatment. But Wolff
enjoyed VIP treatment, receiving better food than other prisoners and even being
allowed to wear his full uniform, complete with sidearm. In August, he was
transferred to a small U.S.-run POW camp near Gmunden, Austria—a lakeside
resort known for its health spas, featuring pinecone and salt-bath treatments.
According to a highly embarrassing article that ran in the New York Herald
Tribune, Wolff enjoyed a pleasant summer idyll on the lake, where he was
reunited with his family and even asked for his yacht to be delivered to him.
That summer was the period of greatest jeopardy for Wolff, as the
Nuremberg prosecutors selected their first list of defendants and the world outcry
for justice was at its peak, on the heels of the appalling revelations about the
Final Solution. Justice Robert Jackson and the Allied legal staff considered
Wolff to be a primary target, circulating a list that named him one of the “major
war criminals.” With Hitler and Himmler both dead, Wolff was among the
highest Nazi officials to survive the war, clearly outranking most of the
defendants who were subsequently put on trial at Nuremberg.
Determined to keep Wolff out of the defendants’ dock, however, Dulles went
so far as to bury incriminating evidence, including one particularly damning
OSS report that blamed the Nazi general not only for the “wholesale slaughter of
populations” and “the collective reprisals” against Italian civilians, but also for
the torture and murder of OSS agents in his Bolzano SS headquarters. The
feelings against Wolff were running understandably high in some OSS quarters,
where the SS general was suspected of personally interrogating American
intelligence officers. But Dulles betrayed his own men, blocking the OSS report
on Wolff from ever reaching the Nuremberg staff. Instead, it was Dulles’s
portrait of Wolff as a “moderate” and a “gentleman” that was sent to the
Nuremberg legal team, along with a recommendation that he not be prosecuted
for SS crimes.
Dulles succeeded in keeping Wolff off the Nuremberg defendants list. The
general would appear at the trial only as a witness, testifying on behalf of his
fellow war criminal Hermann Goering. But as Nuremberg prosecutors prepared
for new rounds of trials, and as war crimes tribunals were organized in Italy and
other countries that had fallen under the boot of Nazi occupation, Wolff still
found himself behind bars. Realizing that the SS general was still not safe from
prosecution, Dulles arranged for Wolff to be diagnosed with a nervous disorder,
and in spring 1946 he was transferred to a psychiatric institution in Augsburg,
Austria.
Wolff knew that Dulles had engineered his psychiatric diagnosis to shield
him from prosecution, but he also suspected that it was a way “to prevent me from talking.” The general knew that he continued to have great leverage over
Dulles: if he revealed the immunity deal that the two men had worked out, the
spymaster’s career would be jeopardized. Wolff was also privy to another
Sunrise dirty secret: the extent to which the separate peace pact was a cold
betrayal of the United States’ and Britain’s wartime Soviet allies. In fact, Dulles
was so concerned about what Wolff might be telling his interrogators behind bars
that he began to have his conversations secretly taped.
As Wolff’s imprisonment stretched on, he grew increasingly frustrated and
began talking more freely about the “mutual understanding” that he and Dulles
had struck and about the way he had been double-crossed. Wolff’s increasingly
vocal behavior was not lost on Dulles and the other American and British
authorities involved in the Sunrise deal. At one point, his jailers quietly offered
him an open door to his freedom. But Wolff did not want the life of a rat on the
run, hiding out in Argentina or Chile. He was determined to hold the Sunrise
cabal to their deal; he wanted to be fully exonerated and allowed to regain a
prominent position in the new Germany.
In February 1947, Wolff played his trump card, writing a letter to President
Truman in which he boldly revealed the terms of the Operation Sunrise
agreement. Wolff informed Truman that, in return for his cooperation on the
secret surrender, “I received from Mr. Dulles and his secretary, Mr. Gaevernitz,
an explicit promise” of freedom for himself and his fellow “meritorious” SS
collaborators on the Sunrise deal. It was now time, Wolff informed Truman, for
the United States to honor the bargain made by Dulles.
The German POW followed up his letter to Truman with an equally emphatic
note to Dulles, in which he managed to strike a tone at once courtly and
threatening. Wolff insisted that Dulles must come to his aid, and that of his
“entire Sunrise squadron,” to win their “honorable release from captivity.” His
direct appeal to Dulles, wrote Wolff, “is not only my right but my knightly
duty”; by negotiating secretly with the U.S. spymaster, Wolff reminded him, he
had “saved your honor and reputation . . . at the risk of our lives.”
Wolff stirred the pot further by sending a similar letter to Major General
Lyman Lemnitzer, who had worked closely with Dulles as the U.S. Army’s point
man on the Sunrise negotiations. Lemnitzer shared Dulles’s strong anti-Soviet
sentiments, and he had colluded with the OSS official to keep the secret talks
with Wolff going forward, even after President Roosevelt and the Allied
command thought they had pulled the plug on Sunrise. After the German
surrender, the ambitious Lemnitzer had also worked with Dulles to promote
Sunrise in the press as an espionage triumph. When Wolff’s letter reached
Lemnitzer, he was stationed at the Pentagon, where he had been appointed to a
prestigious position with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lemnitzer would ultimately
rise to become the Army chief of staff under President Kennedy, where once
again his career would be fatefully linked with that of Dulles.
As soon as Lemnitzer received the letter from Wolff, who appealed to him
“as one general to another” to make sure the Sunrise deal was honored,
Lemnitzer smelled trouble. As with his letter to Dulles, Wolff’s appeal to
Lemnitzer melded obsequious German courtesy with a flash of steel. Wolff
signed off with a clear warning, telling Lemnitzer that he was hoping to resolve
the situation “as a comrade” before he was forced to air his grievances
“publicly.” Lemnitzer fired off a letter to Dulles, who was in Switzerland at the
time, telling him that he was “anxious to discuss this matter with you” as soon as
Dulles returned home.
Thus began a series of carefully worded letters and private discussions
between the two most prominent Americans who were associated with the
Sunrise deal. Dulles, who was savvy enough to never put his agreement with
Wolff in writing, warned Lemnitzer to be “very careful” in communicating with
Wolff. “He has proved to be a clever, tricky and wily customer,” Dulles
cautioned Lemnitzer. The spymaster appeared to have a certain amount of
professional respect for the way the Nazi military man had played him.
The circumspect communications between Dulles and Lemnitzer led to a
flurry of behind-the-scenes efforts on Wolff’s behalf. The last thing anyone
wanted was a “sensational trial,” as Dulles put it, where Wolff would
undoubtedly spill the entire Sunrise story.
In March 1948, Wolff was transferred to a detention center in Hamburg, and
instead of being tried for war crimes, he was put through a much less threatening
“denazification” hearing in a German court. Dulles supplied Wolff’s defense
team with a glowing affidavit that was read aloud in the courtroom and
concluded, “In my opinion, General Wolff’s action . . . materially contributed to
bringing about the end of the war in Italy.” The ever-loyal Gaevernitz showed up
as a character witness, testifying for over an hour about Wolff’s Sunrise heroism
and insisting, falsely, that the SS general had never “demanded any special
treatment after the war.”
The German court was impressed by the defendant’s influential friends.
Found guilty of the relatively minor charge of “being a member of the SS with
knowledge of its criminal acts,” Wolff received a four-year sentence. Through
Dulles’s lobbying efforts, the sentence was reduced to time already served, and
in June 1949, Wolff walked out of the men’s prison at Hamburg-Bergedorf a free
man. Gaevernitz and other Sunrise intermediaries were there to celebrate the war
criminal’s release. “It seemed like old times and we missed you greatly,” he
wrote Dulles.
One of the first actions taken by the newly liberated Wolff was to, once again,
demand special treatment. He insisted that the U.S. government owed him at
least $45,000 for an itemized list of clothing and family belongings that he
claimed were looted by U.S. military police from his SS palace in Bolzano after
his arrest. The demand for reparations by Himmler’s former right-hand man was,
at last, even too much for Dulles. “Between you and me,” an exasperated Dulles
wrote the following year to his Swiss intelligence comrade Max Waibel, “KW
doesn’t realize what a lucky man he is not to be spending the rest of his days in
jail, and his wisest policy would be to keep fairly quiet about the loss of a bit of
underwear, etc. He might easily have lost more than his shirt.”
Wolff’s journey now came full circle, as the middle-aged SS veteran returned
to the advertising field he had abandoned two decades earlier for a career with
Hitler. Landing a job as an advertising sales manager with a weekly magazine in
Cologne—courtesy yet again of Dulles, who had helped pave the return to
civilian life by ensuring he was not subjected to an employment ban—Wolff
quickly proved to be a man on his way up. With the “circle of friends” he had
made as Himmler’s banker, Wolff found it easy to establish contacts with the
advertising departments of the leading German companies. As his sales soared,
so did his commissions. By 1953, he was prosperous enough to buy a manor for
his family on Lake Starnberg in southern Bavaria, complete with a dock and
bathhouse.
Wolff’s success emboldened him. He began talking more openly about his
past to friends and even journalists. He revealed that ten days before Hitler’s
suicide in a Berlin bunker, the Führer had promoted him to the rank of senior
general of the Waffen-SS, the military wing of Himmler’s empire.
The general wanted it both ways: he wanted to be seen as one of the clean
and honorable Germans, but his pride also had him crowing about his grand and
loyal service to Hitler’s Reich. Wolff’s ambivalence was highlighted again when
he told a newsletter published by an SS veterans club that Hitler had known
about and “completely approved” of his Operation Sunrise machinations,
presumably as a tactic for buying time and splitting the Allies. Wolff, regarded
with disdain by his former SS colleagues for his role in Sunrise, might have been
trying to ingratiate himself with his old Nazi brethren. But it was a dubious
claim. Eugen Dollmann undoubtedly came closer to the truth when he wrote in
his memoir that a fading Hitler—pumped full of drugs during their final meeting
in the bunker—gave Wolff “a vague sort of permission to maintain the contact
he had established with the Americans.”
In the mid-1950s, the increasingly self-assured Wolff, convinced that
Germany needed his leadership, became politically active again. In 1953, he
took a lead role in establishing the Reichsreferat, a neo-fascist party, and in 1956,
he began organizing an association of former SS officers. The old ideas came
slithering out once more: the demonization of non-Germanic races and the
Bolshevist menace, the glorification of power.
Karl Wolff was eager to return to center stage, and who better to help his
quest than his powerful American patron? Wolff had stayed in touch with Dulles
through the U.S. occupational authorities stationed in Germany, passing him
notes and books related to Operation Sunrise that he thought the spymaster
might find interesting. After his release from prison, Wolff had developed a side
business with U.S. intelligence agencies, selling information to a notorious
espionage freebooter named John “Frenchy” Grombach, who had served in
Army intelligence. Grombach gathered information from a far-flung network of
SS old boys and other ex-Nazis in Europe, peddling it to the CIA, State
Department, and corporate clients. But Wolff knew that his best connection in
the American intelligence world was Allen Dulles himself, who by 1953 had
become chief of the CIA.
On May 20, 1958, Wolff marched confidently into the U.S. embassy in Bonn
and asked to see two CIA officers he knew. Informed that those agents were no
longer in Bonn, Wolff was escorted into the office of the CIA station chief. As
usual, Wolff thoroughly charmed his host, who later reported that he “was most
polite, almost ingratiating for a former General.” Wolff, the station chief added,
was “sporting a tan which looked as though it had been acquired south of the
Alps and exuded prosperity.” Wolff informed his CIA host that he wanted to visit
the United States. He wanted to see his daughter, who was married to an
American, and his son, who was also residing there. He did not mention the
other person he wanted to see, but it was obvious to the station chief. Everyone
in the agency’s upper ranks knew about the CIA director’s long and intricate
history with Wolff.
Chatting with the Bonn station chief, Wolff soon got to the point. He wanted
assurances that he would have no trouble securing a visa for his visit to the
United States. Informed about his old wartime collaborator’s wishes, Dulles
pulled strings on his behalf in Washington. But the two men were never to be
reunited in America. Karl Wolff’s name still stirred too much unease in the
bowels of Washington’s bureaucracy. Some foreign service functionaries began
asking awkward questions about the general’s wartime activities. There were
some specters from the past, realized Dulles, that were best left in the past, to be
conjured only in one’s smoothly crafted memoirs.
5
Ratlines
Karl Wolff was not the only prominent SS officer who greatly benefited from
Dulles’s Operation Sunrise. In the fall of 1945, former SS colonel Eugen
Dollmann, Wolff’s principal intermediary during the Sunrise negotiations, found
himself living in a gilded cage in Rome. The apartment, which was located on
Via Archimede, a quiet, horseshoe-shaped street in the city’s exclusive Parioli
district, contained few distractions for the bored Dollmann. But he did discover
an extensive sadomasochistic literary collection left behind by the former tenant,
a German mistress of Mussolini, and he whiled away the hours reading about
feverishly inventive ways to mortify the flesh. Dollmann was not an entirely free
man, since he was a guest of U.S. intelligence officers. But, even though he
remained under close surveillance, compared to his accommodations after he
and Karl Wolff were arrested in May, the colonel’s Parioli lifestyle was sublime.
Before he was spirited off to Rome by the Strategic Services Unit, the
agency that replaced the disbanded OSS after the war, the Nazi diplomat had
been installed in a temporary cell at Cinecittà Studios. Spoiled by years of the
best Italian cuisine, Dollmann found the rations at Cinecittà so distasteful that he
considered joining a hunger strike started by fellow POW Gudrun Himmler, the
late Reichsführer’s daughter. Then he was transferred to a POW camp in Ascona,
on picturesque Lake Maggiore, where the daily fare—consisting mainly of
watery pea soup—was even more objectionable, and the inmates were forced to
sleep in tents that floated away in heavy downpours. Dollmann later had the
nerve to compare Ascona to Dachau. “At least in Dachau they had wooden
huts,” he observed.
Relief for Dollmann came when he was transferred to a low-security prison
camp run by the British military in Rimini, on the Adriatic coast. One night,
Dollmann found it remarkably easy—one American intelligence agent would
call it “suspiciously” easy—to cut through the wires encircling Rimini and flee
to Milan, where he knew he would find sanctuary. Here Dollmann presented
himself to the well-connected cardinal Alfredo Ildefonso Schuster in the
prelate’s palazzo adjoining the enormous Gothic cathedral. Dollmann, known as
one of Rome’s more elegant peacocks during his SS glory days, now sat before
the eminent cardinal in a filthy raincoat, looking the worse for wear after his
frantic trek from Rimini.
As they sipped liqueur from long-stemmed glasses, Dollmann reflected on
how the cardinal always put him in mind of “a delicate alabaster statue.” But
Schuster, who had worked with Wolff’s SS team on the Sunrise deal, was not as
refined as all that. The wily cardinal was part of the Vatican elite that had
collaborated with Mussolini’s fascist regime—and, out of self-interest, he was
inclined to help Dollmann now, to avoid an embarrassing war crimes trial.
Besides, Schuster thought that men like Dollmann might still play a useful role
in postwar Italy; he hoped to recruit the former SS officer in the campaign
against the Church’s nemesis, the Italian Communists, who had emerged from
the war as a powerful political force.
Dollmann, who was conniving by nature but not political, was uninterested
in the cardinal’s plot, but he was in no position to quibble. He allowed himself to
be safely hidden away in a Church-run asylum for wealthy drug addicts, where
his fellow inmates included a fading Italian film diva and an emotionally fragile
duchess. As he languished among the delicato junkies, Dollmann decided to
sample some of the forbidden fruit that the screen siren kept stashed in her room,
snorting a snowy mound of heroin. For a time, Dollmann—who had much to
forget in his life, but was plagued by a detailed memory—seemed in danger of
disappearing among the lotus eaters.
Salvation came in the form of James Jesus Angleton, a rising young star in
U.S. intelligence who had run the X-2 branch (OSS counterintelligence) in Italy
during the war and had stayed behind to use his wiles against the Communists.
After tracking down Dollmann in the Milan asylum, Angleton sent a big U.S.
Army Buick with a chauffeur to pick him up and drive him to the Eternal City,
where he installed Dollmann in the Via Archimede safe house in the Parioli
district.
Counterintelligence was the spy craft’s deepest mind game—it was not just
figuring out the enemy’s next moves in advance and blocking them, but learning
to think like him. Not yet thirty, Angleton was already being talked about in
American and British intelligence circles as one of the masters of the field. He
had been educated in British prep schools and at Yale, where he had edited the
avant-garde poetry magazine Furioso and courted the likes of Ezra Pound and
e.e. cummings as contributors, and he seemed to bring an artist’s intuition to his
profession. But he could get lost in the convolutions of his own fevered mind,
which drove him to prowl the streets of Rome late at night in a black overcoat so
big it looked like a cape, on the hunt for clues about the growing Communist
menace, and to crawl around on his office floor at 69 Via Sicilia in search of
hidden bugging devices.
Angleton was as gaunt as a saint. (His wife, Cicely, would rhapsodize about
his “El Greco face.” His colleagues called Angleton “the Cadaver.”) He smoked
incessantly, and his bony frame was wracked by consumptive fits of coughing.
When he introduced himself to Dollmann, Angleton must have struck the
colonel as yet another strung-out soul. But Angleton’s addiction was of a more
ideological nature.
As Angleton sat with Dollmann in the comfortable, five-room apartment on
Via Archimede, the young spy explained his vision for the new world. Dollmann
felt bound to listen politely, since Angleton had gone to the trouble of plucking
him from Cardinal Schuster’s madhouse. But Dollmann had heard it all before—
with even more fervor—from the Führer himself and his SS overlords: how
Bolshevism must be crushed for the new world to be born, why there must be no
rules in a clash like this between civilization and barbarity.
Angleton, however, was lost in his own passion. He had found strong support
for his views from Allen Dulles in the months after the war, as Dulles lingered in
Europe, hoping that President Truman would anoint him commander of the
shadow war against the Soviet Union. In October 1945, Dulles visited Rome
with Clover, ostensibly to revive their marriage after the strains of separation
during the war. But he had another mission as well: to organize the Italian front
in the new Cold War. Angleton, who was wired into the Vatican, helped arrange
a secret meeting for Dulles with Pope Pius XII, who had maintained a mutually
beneficial arrangement with Mussolini’s regime and was a determined foe of
Communism.
Angleton looked up to Dulles as a mentor—a powerful figure in the mold of
his adored father, James Hugh Angleton, an international businessman who had
paved his son’s path into the spy trade and continued to play an influential role
in the young spook’s life. Dulles would remain a strong, paternal figure for
Angleton junior throughout their deeply entwined intelligence careers. In Rome,
the two men conferred about the growing “Red challenge” and “the drastic, subrosa measures required to meet it,” as a colleague put it. These extreme measures
included recruiting agents “without overscrupulous concern for their past
fascist affiliations.”
Dollmann was high on their list of such recruitment targets. With his
continental sophistication and network of contacts, Dollmann might prove a
valuable espionage asset on the strategic front lines in both Italy and Germany.
As Angleton sat with the well-groomed colonel in the Via Archimede safe house
now, the American opened a bottle of Scotch whisky that he had brought along
and carried on with his enthusiastic recruitment pitch. But as he listened, sipping
the good Scotch, Dollmann was filled with utter contempt for his guest. “He was
talking like a young university lecturer who dabbled a bit in espionage in his
spare time,” mused the colonel. His views struck the world-weary German as
typically American—naïve and overblown.
As for Dulles, Dollmann had only contempt for his benefactor, whom he
later called “a leather-faced Puritan archangel . . . the type who had fled from
the European sink of iniquity on the Mayflower and now returned to scourge the
sinners of the old world.” He would ridicule the way that Dulles had
misrepresented himself at their secret Sunrise meetings in Switzerland as
President Roosevelt’s personal emissary, delivering little speeches to Wolff and
Dollmann about how “delighted” FDR supposedly was about the SS officers’
selfless mission for peace. “Wasn’t that nice now?” sneered Dollmann. “Such
manly, upright and heartening words from President Roosevelt and his special
representative in Europe, Mr. Allen W. Dulles!”
While Dollmann was unimpressed with Angleton’s political lecture, he did
appreciate the fake identity card the young spy gave him. The document—which
identified him as an Italian employee of an American organization—afforded
Dollmann the confidence to venture into the streets of his beloved Rome without
fear of being molested by the authorities. Sprung from his apartment, the colonel
found himself drawn to some of his favorite old haunts. He strolled through the
fashionable Via Condotti shopping district, where he paid a visit to the Bulgari
jewelry shop.
In the old days, he had been treated like royalty by the Bulgari brothers, who
would take him on tours of their vaults beneath the Tiber River, where there was
a red room for rubies, a blue room for sapphires, and a green room for emeralds.
The Bulgaris would pour him Napoleon brandy as they showed off the crown
jewels of the late czar and other dazzling treasures. But those pleasant days were
long gone. This time, when he suddenly appeared in the luxury shop, Giorgio
Bulgari greeted him as if he were a ghost. “We were all afraid you had been
killed,” the jeweler told Dollmann, after he recovered from his shock.
During the war, Giorgio Bulgari had been so revolted by the deportation of
Rome’s Jews—an order stamped by Dollmann’s boss, Wolff—that he and his
wife hid three Jewish women in their own home. Now, gazing at the resurrected
SS colonel, the jeweler undoubtedly wished Dollmann was dead. And Dollmann
knew it.
Afraid he’d been killed? That was rich. Bulgari’s false concern infuriated
Dollmann, but he adopted his usual droll manner. “How very amusing. People
like me don’t just disappear forever like that.”
Dollmann always liked to give the impression that he was too cosmopolitan
to indulge in the Nazis’ anti-Jewish mania. But now he felt offended by Bulgari’s
forced courtesy; Bulgari “sickened” him—he was a “corpulent Levantine . . . with fleshy lips and a greasy smile.” Dollmann turned abruptly and fled the
shop.
Once upon a time, Dollmann had had a love affair with Italy, and he was
certain that his sunny “arcadia,” as he called it, returned his ardor. But now he
was no longer certain. Dollmann had arrived in Italy two decades earlier, long
before the war, as a young graduate student in Renaissance history. The young
German was well educated, fluent in Italian, and boasted some sort of
connection to the doomed Habsburg dynasty. He was also gay and charming, and
he quickly shed as much of his stolid German upbringing as he could in favor of
la dolce vita. With his slickly groomed hair, sleek Italian suits, and year-round
tan, Dollmann went completely native, becoming Eugenio instead of Eugen.
Dollmann had been embraced by the German diplomatic set in Rome, who
appreciated his nuanced grasp of the local language and customs, and by the
Italian aristocratic set, who found him an amusing decoder of all things Deutsch.
His binational skills were increasingly in demand as the two countries’ fates
grew more closely linked. He was sought out by a principessa named Donna
Vittoria, who was the reigning queen of Roman salons. Her soirees, held at her
otherworldly palazzo in the imperial ruins of Teatro Marcello, were frequented
by Mussolini’s daughter Edda and her husband, Count Ciano, as well as the
leading Italian film stars of the day. She very much hoped to have Hitler, too, as
an honored guest someday, the principessa confided to Dollmann.
In Naples, he was invited to the midnight entertainments at Duchess
Rosalba’s decaying mansion, festivities so lavishly debauched that they could
have inspired a young Fellini. One night the lady of the house greeted Dollmann
as she reclined on a divan and was attended to by two slyly grinning female
dwarves and a well-built retainer packed into a form-fitting suit. The dwarves
later appeared on a stage with a troupe of other diminutive performers, who
enacted a long and baroque melodrama for the amusement of Duchess Rosalba’s
guests. Dollmann was haunted not just by the odd performance but by the
strange smile that his hostess fixed on him. The duchess, he noted, had “a
simultaneously charming and inhuman mouth.” He later learned the story of her
deformity. The duchess liked to prowl Naples’s rough waterfront bars for her
handsome henchmen, replacing them in quick succession with one rugged
seaman after another. One night she was attacked with a knife by one such
jealous sailor, who left the mark of his fury on her once beautiful face.
But not even this decadent world could prepare Dollmann for the life he
began when he joined the SS, where he would rise to become the link between
the courts of Hitler and Mussolini. Dollmann later tried to make sense of why he
had enlisted in Himmler’s death’s-head corps. It wasn’t political ambition that
drove him—he insisted that he had none. And it wasn’t monetary reward. “I already lived well and comfortably, and my life, after I had yielded to my so called motives, was no better than before, only more arduous.” Was it the way he
looked in his trimly tailored SS uniform? Vanity was always a factor with
Dollmann. Years later, he proudly displayed photos of himself standing in the
very center of history, between Hitler and his visiting Italian dignitaries, gazing
into the Führer’s magnetic eyes, ready to translate his every momentous word.
Dollmann, always up to date on the latest Rome gossip, became a court favorite
of Hitler. He was at the Führer’s side whenever Hitler and his retinue descended
on Italy, and he was there whenever Mussolini or his top ministers trekked to
summits in Germany.
By serving as the essential diplomatic link between Germany and Italy,
Dollmann ensured that his sojourn in his adopted land would not be interrupted
by the coming war. Dollmann would point to this as the primary reason why he
made his Faustian bargain. Italia was the great passion of his life. “I loved Italy
with the doomed love of all German romantics.”
It was the most peculiar of ironies, and one that Dollmann and his intimates
no doubt privately relished. The man who kept the Axis partners smoothly
aligned, with his impressive language and social skills, was a highly educated,
arts-loving homosexual who enjoyed trading in the most salacious gossip about
the personalities who ruled Germany and Italy. Dollmann was, in short, precisely
the type of person the Nazis sent to the gas chambers. But instead, Hitler’s
interpreter was free to attend gay and lesbian orgies in Venice, a city whose
shadows offered some protection from the authorities’ prying eyes. And he had
the pleasure of going on shopping safaris with Eva Braun, Hitler’s companion,
during her Italian holidays.
Braun was mad for crocodile shoes and accessories. “She loved crocodile in
every shape and form, and returned to her hotel looking as if she had come back
from a trip up the Congo rather than along the Tiber.”
Dollmann was fond of Braun, a sweet and simple young woman who
confided her sad life to him. She was known throughout the world as the
German strongman’s mistress, but, as she confessed to Dollmann, there was no
sexual intimacy between her and the Führer. “He is a saint,” Braun told
Dollmann wistfully. “The idea of physical contact would be for him to defile his
mission. Many times we sit and watch the sun come up after spending the whole
night talking. He says to me that his only love is Germany and to forget it, even
for a moment, would shatter the mystical forces of his mission.”
Dollmann strongly suspected that the Führer had other passions besides
Germany. On Christmas Eve 1923, when he was a university student in Munich,
Dollmann had been invited to an extravagant, candlelit party at the home of
General Otto von Lossow, who had helped put down Hitler’s Beer Hall putsch in
November 1923. During the evening, Lossow took Dollmann and some of his
other guests into his parlor, where he entertained them by reading selections
from Hitler’s thick police dossier. “In a café near the university on the evening
of, Herr Hitler was observed . . .” Lossow’s voice was matter-of-fact as he read
through the depositions and eyewitness reports about Germany’s future leader.
The general’s small audience listened in rapt silence, transfixed by the portrait of
a Hitler who was more interested in boyish men than in national politics.
These were the sorts of tales that Dollmann kept tucked away—stories that
would help the consummate survivor navigate what he called the “witches’
cauldron” of Rome as well as Berlin’s dark labyrinth. As the Nazis’ main fixer in
Rome, it helped to know everything he could about the dangerous men with
whom he was dealing.
The Nazi official Dollmann most dreaded escorting around Italy was
Reinhard Heydrich, Himmler’s top executioner. “Now there was a man clearly
meant to be murdered by someone or other,” Dollmann observed years later. “He
was a daemonic personality, a Lucifer with cold blue eyes.” One night, Heydrich
demanded that Dollmann take him to Naples’s finest brothel. Two dozen half naked women representing the full spectrum of the female form—from “slim
gazelles to buxom Rubenesque beauties”—were arranged for Heydrich’s
inspection in the brothel’s ornate lobby, with its gilt-edged mirrors and frescoes
of rosy nymphs. Heydrich gazed at the women on display with his blank, shark
eyes. Considering the SS butcher’s reputation, Dollmann did not know what to
expect next. Suddenly Heydrich flung a fistful of shiny gold coins across the
marble floor. “Then he jumped up, Lucifer personified, and clapped his hands.
With a sweeping gesture, he invited the girls to pick up the gold. A
Walpurgisnacht orgy ensued. Fat and thin, ponderous and agile, the women scrambled madly across the salotto floor on all fours.”
Afterward, Heydrich looked pale and spent, as if he himself had joined in the
frenzy. He coolly thanked Dollmann and disappeared into the night. The
interpreter was glad to see Heydrich go. He was, said Dollmann, “the only man I
instinctively feared.”
History has come to judge Eugen Dollmann as “a self-serving opportunist who
prostituted himself to fascism,” in the words of legal scholar Michael Salter, but
not a fanatic like the men he served. Nevertheless, as war criminal proceedings
got under way in Nuremberg in the fall of 1945, Dollmann knew that he was at
high risk of prosecution. The Nuremberg trials, where Foreign Minister Joachim
von Ribbentrop and Ambassador Franz von Papen were both convicted, firmly
established that diplomats like Dollmann who moved in rarefied Nazi circles
were not immune from judicial reckoning.
Dollmann was perhaps at even greater risk in Italy, where passions ran high
regarding Nazi massacres of Italian civilians, such as the infamous slaughter of
335 prisoners in the Ardeatine Caves near Rome in March 1944. Although
Roberto Rossellini modeled the effeminate, sadistic SS captain Bergmann on
Dollmann in his postwar film Rome, Open City, Dollmann was not directly
involved in the Ardeatine atrocity; in reality, the colonel had no taste for
brutality. After the war, Dollmann claimed that he had once even rescued several
Italian partisans who were being burned alive by fascist thugs. Regardless of his
degree of guilt or innocence, however, Dollmann was the most visible symbol of
the Nazi occupation of Rome. Italians were all too familiar with the numerous
newspaper photos of his slim, ben vestito figure taken at social events in
Mussolini’s Palazzo Quirinale or the Vatican. In the fall of 1945, as he strolled
around Rome with his fake ID card, Dollmann was acutely aware that if he fell
into the wrong hands—particularly those of Italian Communists—he could be
lynched.
Dollmann’s anxieties were heightened when American agents installed two
former SS colleagues in his Rome apartment—including the notorious Colonel
Walter Rauff, who had served as Karl Wolff’s second-in-command in northern
Italy—because he knew that the hideout might now attract increased interest
from Nazi hunters. Dollmann, who regarded Rauff as “one of my most
disagreeable acquaintances,” was well aware of his new roommate’s past. In
1941, Rauff had overseen the development and operation of a fleet of “Black
Raven” vans, in which victims were sealed inside and asphyxiated with exhaust
fumes. As many as 250,000 people on the war’s eastern front were murdered in
Rauff’s vehicles, which were eventually replaced by the gas chambers of
Auschwitz and Dachau. “In my opinion,” Dollmann mordantly remarked, “he
was quite certainly due for the high jump [at Nuremberg] when they got round to
him.” But Rauff had managed to save his neck by prudently jumping on board
the Operation Sunrise bandwagon with Wolff.
Weary of his roommate’s baleful presence, Dollmann often fled the Via Archimede apartment to go to the movies. As he sat in the dark day after day, he began getting the prickling sensation that he was being followed. One afternoon in November 1946, as the colonel watched a trifle titled Kisses You Dream Of at his neighborhood cinema, Dollmann felt a firm hand on his shoulder and heard a voice of authority: “Kindly leave the cinema with me.” He was taken into custody by a plainclothes detective who was accompanied by two armed carabinieri and then whisked away to a nearby police station.
Dollmann and his fellow SS escapees had been tracked for months by the 428th U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), a detachment of Nazi hunters based in Rome. Major Leo Pagnotta, the Italian American who was second-in command of the CIC unit, was a sharp investigator. He figured out that Dollmann, who knew it was unwise to show his face too much on the streets, would sooner or later reconnect with the Italian chauffeur who had driven him around during his SS days. Dollmann did indeed contact the chauffeur, but Pagnotta had gotten to him first, making him an offer he couldn’t refuse. “If you see Dollmann and you don’t tell me,” Pagnotta had told the driver, “I’ll arrest you and you’ll be shot.” The chauffeur quickly gave up Dollmann, pinpointing when and where he would be dropped off at the cinema.
Now, as Dollmann sat waiting in the police station holding room, the door suddenly opened and Major Pagnotta walked in. The two men took an immediate dislike to each other. Dollmann was predisposed to look down on Americans, whom he found in general to be a crass, illiterate, and mongrelized people. To make matters worse, this one was “rather fat”—a cardinal sin with Dollmann—and the American didn’t bother with any social niceties, treating the Nazi fugitive like “a pretty low sort of criminal.”
The situation appeared bleak for Dollmann—his next stop could well be Nuremberg. But he knew that he had an ace up his sleeve, and he immediately played it. Dollmann took a piece of paper from his pocket and handed it to Pagnotta. “Please call this number,” he told him. “Ask for Major Angleton. He knows who I am.”
Major Pagnotta was quite familiar with Major Angleton. In fact, Pagnotta’s team of Nazi hunters was headquartered in the same building on Via Sicilia as Angleton’s rival intelligence operation, the Strategic Services Unit’s X-2 branch. Pagnotta’s CIC unit was on the first floor, Angleton was on the second, and British intelligence was on the third. Pagnotta and his men didn’t trust Angleton —they thought he was “a devious and arrogant son of a bitch,” in the words of Pagnotta’s aide William Gowen. Angleton seemed to work more closely with the British spies than with his U.S. Army colleagues, and the British treated him like one of their own. Before transferring to Rome in 1944, Angleton had been stationed in London, where his X-2 unit was overseen by British intelligence.
The espionage scene in postwar Rome was rife with rivalries and competing agendas. Some U.S. intelligence units, such as Leo Pagnotta’s, were determined Nazi hunters. But other operatives, such as Angleton, had very different objectives. This spy-versus-spy atmosphere made Pagnotta’s investigative work extremely complicated.
As Pagnotta tracked top Nazi fugitives in Italy, many of whom had escaped from the British-run prisoner-of-war camp in Rimini, it became clear to him that he was often working at cross-purposes with Angleton and British intelligence. One of the most notorious fugitives, SS captain Karl Hass, who had overseen the Ardeatine Caves massacre, mysteriously escaped every time Pagnotta’s team tracked him down and turned him over to British occupational authorities in Italy. Finally, after his fourth arrest, Hass escaped for good. It was not until many years later that Hass was tracked down in Argentina and extradited to stand trial in Italy for his role in the massacre. Hass received a life sentence, but by then he was an old man, and his failing health kept him out of prison.
Unsurprisingly, after capturing Dollmann, Pagnotta decided to hang on to him, placing him in a U.S. military prison in Rome instead of handing him over to the British. In the beginning, Dollmann was a cooperative prisoner, readily revealing the address of his apartment on Via Archimede. When Pagnotta’s team raided the apartment, they narrowly missed catching Dollmann’s infamous roommate Walter Rauff, who managed to flee to Bari, on the Adriatic coast, where he boarded a ship for Alexandria, Egypt—the next stop in the Nazi exterminator’s long and winding ratline. Rauff would cap his bloody career in Chile, where he became a top adviser to DINA, military dictator Augusto Pinochet’s own Gestapo. When Rauff died in 1984—at age seventy-seven, after successfully rebuffing years of extradition attempts—hundreds of aging Nazis flocked to his funeral in Santiago, where he was laid to rest amid loud salutes of “Heil Hitler!”
Pagnotta did snare another fugitive who was living in the Via Archimede apartment, SS officer Eugen Wenner, who had also played a part in the Operation Sunrise maneuvers. It soon dawned on Pagnotta’s team that Angleton was operating a safe house on Via Archimede for a stream of Nazi fugitives who were connected to Sunrise and other Dulles operations. They even traced the car driven by Dollmann’s chauffeur to Angleton’s father, who kept a villa nearby in Parioli.
Nobody would get to know the deeply clever ways of Angleton in Rome better than William Gowen, who, at age eighteen, was one of the youngest members of Pagnotta’s crew of Nazi hunters.
It was only a matter of time before Jim Angleton—who made it his business to meet the important people in postwar Rome—crossed paths with Bill Gowen, who, despite his youth, was known to be well connected. Gowen’s father, Franklin, was a career diplomat who had served under Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy in London and was currently the assistant to Myron C. Taylor, the former U.S. Steel chairman whom FDR had appointed as his special representative to the Vatican during the war. Gowen’s family had money—one of his ancestors had been president of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange—but they were by tradition Democrats. Roosevelt was fond of Franklin Gowen, whom he regarded as one of the few blue-blooded members of the diplomatic corps he could trust.
The younger Gowen brought a special sense of mission to his Army counterintelligence job. His family owned property in Italy and had deep roots there. His grandfather Morris was living in Florence when war broke out. Although he was Episcopalian, Morris Gowen was denounced as a Jew and put on a train for Auschwitz. When the Germans realized he was American, he was taken off the train in northern Italy and put in an SS encampment, where the seventy-seven-year-old man died in July 1944 of what his death certificate stated was “exhaustion.” Bill Gowen’s family had a number of Jewish family friends in Italy who suffered similar fates. “When I got to Rome in 1946 as a young soldier,” he later remarked, “I didn’t need to read about the Nazi terror. My family had been touched by it.”
All in all, young Bill Gowen had a pedigree that Angleton clearly found both appealing and threatening. Gowen’s dedication as a war crimes investigator posed a distinct problem for Angleton, who viewed Nazi fugitives like Dollmann and Rauff in more pragmatic terms. And the Gowen family’s Italian background also infringed on Angleton’s turf. “I think that between the father and son, the Angletons thought they had a lock on Italy, and on the Vatican,” Gowen observed. “Jim Angleton was very jealous of my family, because he wanted to have a monopoly on Italy. And anything that might threaten him had to be taken care of.”
Angleton made a point of keeping Gowen close in Rome. In early 1947, Gowen and his father were invited to the Italian wedding of Angleton’s sister, Carmen, where Angleton chatted up the younger Gowen and insisted they meet for lunch someday. They got together soon afterward at Angleton’s favorite spot, a Jewish restaurant near Rome’s once thriving ghetto. Angleton was fond of the restaurant’s house specialty—carciofi fritti—and he took charge of ordering when the waiter arrived at their table. To Gowen’s surprise, however, Angleton —who presented himself as an expert on all things Italian—displayed so little mastery of the language that his younger lunch companion had to take over communication with the puzzled waiter. Gowen, who was born in his family’s Livorno villa, was impressively fluent in the local tongue. It was yet another thing that Angleton found irritating about Gowen.
Lunch companions like Bill Gowen always made Angleton uneasy. Gowen —whose family was filled with bankers, lawyers, diplomats, and Episcopalian ministers—had a solid Social Register background. And, despite his tender age, he was already a man of the world, having shuttled around Europe’s diplomatic posts with his father. With his cheery mid-Atlantic accent and his continental sartorial flair, Gowen seemed born and bred for the top tier.
Angleton was also raised in wealth. But his father, Hugh, was not the Main Line type. He was a swashbuckling, self-made man who had swept up his future wife, Carmen, when she was a teenager in Mexico, after he joined General John “Black Jack” Pershing’s 1916 expedition to capture Pancho Villa. Despite young Angleton’s British affectations, his face would always carry traces of his south of-the-border heritage. Even as he rose to the top ranks of the U.S. intelligence establishment, he remained something of an outsider in that thoroughly WASPy world, marked not just by his brilliant, idiosyncratic personality but by his mixed ethnicity. Angleton was, in short, what his Nazi associates would call a mongrelized American.
Gowen might have been Angleton’s social superior, with much better connections to the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, but in the end it was Angleton who prevailed in the spy games. In May 1947, after Dollmann had spent several bleak months in prison in Rome, Angleton succeeded in outwitting Pagnotta and Gowen and getting the former SS colonel transferred to a U.S. military prison in Frankfurt, where he was safe from the wrath of Italian political enemies and prosecutors. The clever Angleton had Dollmann smuggled out of his Roman cell on a stretcher. In Germany, Dollmann was soon switched to even more agreeable accommodations: a cozy guesthouse in the lush Main countryside that he shared with other former Nazi VIPs, such as the notorious propagandist “Axis Sally,” and Otto Skorzeny, the scar-faced Waffen-SS colonel who was famous for a daring glider raid that rescued Mussolini from mountaintop captivity. By November, after the U.S. military released him from incarceration, Dollmann was a completely free man.
Weary of his roommate’s baleful presence, Dollmann often fled the Via Archimede apartment to go to the movies. As he sat in the dark day after day, he began getting the prickling sensation that he was being followed. One afternoon in November 1946, as the colonel watched a trifle titled Kisses You Dream Of at his neighborhood cinema, Dollmann felt a firm hand on his shoulder and heard a voice of authority: “Kindly leave the cinema with me.” He was taken into custody by a plainclothes detective who was accompanied by two armed carabinieri and then whisked away to a nearby police station.
Dollmann and his fellow SS escapees had been tracked for months by the 428th U.S. Army Counterintelligence Corps (CIC), a detachment of Nazi hunters based in Rome. Major Leo Pagnotta, the Italian American who was second-in command of the CIC unit, was a sharp investigator. He figured out that Dollmann, who knew it was unwise to show his face too much on the streets, would sooner or later reconnect with the Italian chauffeur who had driven him around during his SS days. Dollmann did indeed contact the chauffeur, but Pagnotta had gotten to him first, making him an offer he couldn’t refuse. “If you see Dollmann and you don’t tell me,” Pagnotta had told the driver, “I’ll arrest you and you’ll be shot.” The chauffeur quickly gave up Dollmann, pinpointing when and where he would be dropped off at the cinema.
Now, as Dollmann sat waiting in the police station holding room, the door suddenly opened and Major Pagnotta walked in. The two men took an immediate dislike to each other. Dollmann was predisposed to look down on Americans, whom he found in general to be a crass, illiterate, and mongrelized people. To make matters worse, this one was “rather fat”—a cardinal sin with Dollmann—and the American didn’t bother with any social niceties, treating the Nazi fugitive like “a pretty low sort of criminal.”
The situation appeared bleak for Dollmann—his next stop could well be Nuremberg. But he knew that he had an ace up his sleeve, and he immediately played it. Dollmann took a piece of paper from his pocket and handed it to Pagnotta. “Please call this number,” he told him. “Ask for Major Angleton. He knows who I am.”
Major Pagnotta was quite familiar with Major Angleton. In fact, Pagnotta’s team of Nazi hunters was headquartered in the same building on Via Sicilia as Angleton’s rival intelligence operation, the Strategic Services Unit’s X-2 branch. Pagnotta’s CIC unit was on the first floor, Angleton was on the second, and British intelligence was on the third. Pagnotta and his men didn’t trust Angleton —they thought he was “a devious and arrogant son of a bitch,” in the words of Pagnotta’s aide William Gowen. Angleton seemed to work more closely with the British spies than with his U.S. Army colleagues, and the British treated him like one of their own. Before transferring to Rome in 1944, Angleton had been stationed in London, where his X-2 unit was overseen by British intelligence.
The espionage scene in postwar Rome was rife with rivalries and competing agendas. Some U.S. intelligence units, such as Leo Pagnotta’s, were determined Nazi hunters. But other operatives, such as Angleton, had very different objectives. This spy-versus-spy atmosphere made Pagnotta’s investigative work extremely complicated.
As Pagnotta tracked top Nazi fugitives in Italy, many of whom had escaped from the British-run prisoner-of-war camp in Rimini, it became clear to him that he was often working at cross-purposes with Angleton and British intelligence. One of the most notorious fugitives, SS captain Karl Hass, who had overseen the Ardeatine Caves massacre, mysteriously escaped every time Pagnotta’s team tracked him down and turned him over to British occupational authorities in Italy. Finally, after his fourth arrest, Hass escaped for good. It was not until many years later that Hass was tracked down in Argentina and extradited to stand trial in Italy for his role in the massacre. Hass received a life sentence, but by then he was an old man, and his failing health kept him out of prison.
Unsurprisingly, after capturing Dollmann, Pagnotta decided to hang on to him, placing him in a U.S. military prison in Rome instead of handing him over to the British. In the beginning, Dollmann was a cooperative prisoner, readily revealing the address of his apartment on Via Archimede. When Pagnotta’s team raided the apartment, they narrowly missed catching Dollmann’s infamous roommate Walter Rauff, who managed to flee to Bari, on the Adriatic coast, where he boarded a ship for Alexandria, Egypt—the next stop in the Nazi exterminator’s long and winding ratline. Rauff would cap his bloody career in Chile, where he became a top adviser to DINA, military dictator Augusto Pinochet’s own Gestapo. When Rauff died in 1984—at age seventy-seven, after successfully rebuffing years of extradition attempts—hundreds of aging Nazis flocked to his funeral in Santiago, where he was laid to rest amid loud salutes of “Heil Hitler!”
Pagnotta did snare another fugitive who was living in the Via Archimede apartment, SS officer Eugen Wenner, who had also played a part in the Operation Sunrise maneuvers. It soon dawned on Pagnotta’s team that Angleton was operating a safe house on Via Archimede for a stream of Nazi fugitives who were connected to Sunrise and other Dulles operations. They even traced the car driven by Dollmann’s chauffeur to Angleton’s father, who kept a villa nearby in Parioli.
Nobody would get to know the deeply clever ways of Angleton in Rome better than William Gowen, who, at age eighteen, was one of the youngest members of Pagnotta’s crew of Nazi hunters.
It was only a matter of time before Jim Angleton—who made it his business to meet the important people in postwar Rome—crossed paths with Bill Gowen, who, despite his youth, was known to be well connected. Gowen’s father, Franklin, was a career diplomat who had served under Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy in London and was currently the assistant to Myron C. Taylor, the former U.S. Steel chairman whom FDR had appointed as his special representative to the Vatican during the war. Gowen’s family had money—one of his ancestors had been president of the Philadelphia Stock Exchange—but they were by tradition Democrats. Roosevelt was fond of Franklin Gowen, whom he regarded as one of the few blue-blooded members of the diplomatic corps he could trust.
The younger Gowen brought a special sense of mission to his Army counterintelligence job. His family owned property in Italy and had deep roots there. His grandfather Morris was living in Florence when war broke out. Although he was Episcopalian, Morris Gowen was denounced as a Jew and put on a train for Auschwitz. When the Germans realized he was American, he was taken off the train in northern Italy and put in an SS encampment, where the seventy-seven-year-old man died in July 1944 of what his death certificate stated was “exhaustion.” Bill Gowen’s family had a number of Jewish family friends in Italy who suffered similar fates. “When I got to Rome in 1946 as a young soldier,” he later remarked, “I didn’t need to read about the Nazi terror. My family had been touched by it.”
All in all, young Bill Gowen had a pedigree that Angleton clearly found both appealing and threatening. Gowen’s dedication as a war crimes investigator posed a distinct problem for Angleton, who viewed Nazi fugitives like Dollmann and Rauff in more pragmatic terms. And the Gowen family’s Italian background also infringed on Angleton’s turf. “I think that between the father and son, the Angletons thought they had a lock on Italy, and on the Vatican,” Gowen observed. “Jim Angleton was very jealous of my family, because he wanted to have a monopoly on Italy. And anything that might threaten him had to be taken care of.”
Angleton made a point of keeping Gowen close in Rome. In early 1947, Gowen and his father were invited to the Italian wedding of Angleton’s sister, Carmen, where Angleton chatted up the younger Gowen and insisted they meet for lunch someday. They got together soon afterward at Angleton’s favorite spot, a Jewish restaurant near Rome’s once thriving ghetto. Angleton was fond of the restaurant’s house specialty—carciofi fritti—and he took charge of ordering when the waiter arrived at their table. To Gowen’s surprise, however, Angleton —who presented himself as an expert on all things Italian—displayed so little mastery of the language that his younger lunch companion had to take over communication with the puzzled waiter. Gowen, who was born in his family’s Livorno villa, was impressively fluent in the local tongue. It was yet another thing that Angleton found irritating about Gowen.
Lunch companions like Bill Gowen always made Angleton uneasy. Gowen —whose family was filled with bankers, lawyers, diplomats, and Episcopalian ministers—had a solid Social Register background. And, despite his tender age, he was already a man of the world, having shuttled around Europe’s diplomatic posts with his father. With his cheery mid-Atlantic accent and his continental sartorial flair, Gowen seemed born and bred for the top tier.
Angleton was also raised in wealth. But his father, Hugh, was not the Main Line type. He was a swashbuckling, self-made man who had swept up his future wife, Carmen, when she was a teenager in Mexico, after he joined General John “Black Jack” Pershing’s 1916 expedition to capture Pancho Villa. Despite young Angleton’s British affectations, his face would always carry traces of his south of-the-border heritage. Even as he rose to the top ranks of the U.S. intelligence establishment, he remained something of an outsider in that thoroughly WASPy world, marked not just by his brilliant, idiosyncratic personality but by his mixed ethnicity. Angleton was, in short, what his Nazi associates would call a mongrelized American.
Gowen might have been Angleton’s social superior, with much better connections to the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, but in the end it was Angleton who prevailed in the spy games. In May 1947, after Dollmann had spent several bleak months in prison in Rome, Angleton succeeded in outwitting Pagnotta and Gowen and getting the former SS colonel transferred to a U.S. military prison in Frankfurt, where he was safe from the wrath of Italian political enemies and prosecutors. The clever Angleton had Dollmann smuggled out of his Roman cell on a stretcher. In Germany, Dollmann was soon switched to even more agreeable accommodations: a cozy guesthouse in the lush Main countryside that he shared with other former Nazi VIPs, such as the notorious propagandist “Axis Sally,” and Otto Skorzeny, the scar-faced Waffen-SS colonel who was famous for a daring glider raid that rescued Mussolini from mountaintop captivity. By November, after the U.S. military released him from incarceration, Dollmann was a completely free man.
There was sharp disagreement over suspected war criminals like Dollmann
within the U.S. military command overseeing the occupation of Germany.
General George Price Hays, a decorated officer who led the 10th Mountain
Division’s assault on Monte Cassino during the Allies’ Italian campaign and
commanded the 2nd Infantry Division’s artillery on Omaha Beach during D-day,
was angered by the kid-glove treatment given Dulles’s Sunrise Nazis. Hays, who
became high commissioner for the U.S. occupation zone in Germany, tartly
pointed out in a November 1947 memo that it was the U.S. Army that was
responsible for the surrender of Nazi troops in Italy, not Dulles’s secret
maneuvers. Hays was adamantly opposed to granting amnesty to “possible war
criminals or war profiteers” like Dollmann, which, he observed, would “condone
their crimes without proper examination.” Nonetheless, by 1947, many in the
American military hierarchy shared the Dulles-Angleton view that fighting
Communism was a bigger priority than prosecuting fascist war criminals.
Even after securing Dollmann’s release, Angleton remained nervous about Bill Gowen. The young man knew too much about Angleton’s string-pulling on behalf of Dollmann and the other Nazi fugitives who had been harbored on Via Archimede. Angleton suspected that Gowen’s CIC unit kept extensive files on the ratlines that had allowed Sunrise collaborators like Dollmann and Rauff to escape justice. He was determined to see what was in those files—an interest undoubtedly shared by Angleton’s mentor, Dulles, as well as their allies in the U.S. intelligence complex.
In November 1947, as Dollmann walked free, the U.S. military moved to shut down its Nazi-hunting operation in Rome. That month, Bill Gowen hopped a train for Frankfurt, which was to be his new base of operations. By the time the slow-moving train crawled into the Frankfurt station, it was after midnight. A jeep driven by a hulking soldier with CIC insignia on his uniform was waiting for Gowen, who threw his duffel bag into the vehicle and jumped in.
Frankfurt was still pulverized from the war. One of the few buildings left miraculously untouched by Allied bombing was the massive IG Farben complex, which now served as the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command. The city’s demolished landscape was illuminated only by scattered pinpoints of light, and the darkness closed in on Gowen and his driver as the jeep pulled away from the train platform.
“I guess you’re tired,” the driver said. “You’ll want to go to a hotel.”
Gowen, exhausted from the long train ride, nodded emphatically. But instead of heading toward a hotel, the soldier drove deeper into the city’s ruins. Now the only light came from the jeep’s headlamps.
“Where are we going?” asked Gowen.
“I just want to show you something,” said the soldier. There was nothing to be seen, only dark piles of rubble.
“I’ve been to Germany before—I just want to go to bed,” Gowen said. But the jeep kept creeping slowly through the night shadows. Suddenly the driver came to a halt, jumped out, and told Gowen to follow him. Gowen didn’t like his situation. “He was armed and I wasn’t. I was alarmed, and I’m normally not scared.” Gowen cautiously followed the soldier, walking slowly behind him into the gloom. Gowen didn’t know how far they had walked when the soldier abruptly turned around and headed back to the jeep. When they got to the vehicle, Gowen immediately realized that his duffel bag was missing.
“I wasn’t dumb enough to ask him where my bag was,” Gowen recalled years later. “I knew what had happened. I knew what they were looking for.” As it turned out, there were no intelligence files in Gowen’s stolen bag. But the story wasn’t over.
In January 1948, while Gowen was still stationed in Germany with Army intelligence, he received a transatlantic phone call from syndicated columnist Drew Pearson. The influential Washington journalist told Gowen that he was working on a hot scoop and that Gowen was at the center of it. Pearson was going to report that Ferenc Vajta, a fugitive from war crimes charges in Hungary, where he had worked as an anti-Semitic propagandist for the fascist Arrow Cross Party, had slipped into the United States illegally—with the help of young Nazi hunter Bill Gowen. Pearson claimed he had proof: documents that showed Gowen had worked closely with Vajta on various covert missions. As he listened to Pearson, Gowen was so flabbergasted that he didn’t know what to say. Pearson’s exclusive story ran in newspapers across America on January 18 and was amplified further by his coast-to-coast radio broadcast.
There was some truth to Pearson’s report. Gowen did indeed know Vajta from his days in Rome, when he had used the Hungarian as an informer to help track the notorious Croatian fugitive Ante Pavelic´, the fascist leader of the Ustaše movement who led a genocidal campaign in the Balkans during the war that was so extreme he had to be restrained by German authorities. With the help of Ferenc Vajta, Gowen had traced Pavelic´ to a villa atop the Aventine Hill. Pavelic´ was under the protection of Croatian officials in the Vatican and other fascist sympathizers. From his villa, Pavelic´ was able to sneak into nearby safe houses through a series of secret passageways that honeycombed the Aventine.
Gowen was perfectly willing to rely on lesser criminals like Vajta to locate much bigger targets like Pavelic´. But he had had nothing to do with providing Vajta a special State Department security clearance and slipping him into the United States. That sleight of hand was likely performed by Frank Wisner, a close collaborator of Dulles’s from their days in the OSS who had recently been appointed head of the State Department’s clandestine operations unit, the Office of Policy Coordination.
But it was Gowen who would take the fall for the Vajta escapade. It did not take him long to figure out who was responsible for setting him up. Pearson had been fed the false story by Raymond Rocca, Angleton’s deputy in Rome.
Pearson’s exposé effectively ended Gowen’s budding intelligence career. Gowen never stopped trying to clear his name. At one point, he managed to get an appointment to see Dulles after Dulles became CIA director, but when Gowen showed up at the agency’s headquarters in Washington to plead his case, he was told that the spymaster had been called overseas.
Years after both men returned to America, Angleton continued to keep an eye on Gowen. Back in Washington, where he eventually became the all- powerful chief of CIA counterintelligence, Angleton invited Gowen to lunch at the Army-Navy Club and even to his home in Virginia. “You know, he was a very devious character,” Gowen said, “but he wanted to give me the impression that he was very friendly. He introduced me to his wife, Cicely, and their children, who were very young at the time.” Angleton’s betrayal of Gowen hovered silently in the air. “I never discussed it openly with him, I never trusted Angleton enough to do that.” Both men knew who had won the power struggle in Rome. But they also knew that the secret history they shared had the power to undo Angleton’s grand career and expose the underside of Sunrise.
Intelligence reports do not normally make for entertaining reading. Few station chiefs come close to having the literary touch of onetime spies like Graham Greene, David Cornwell (John le Carré), or Ian Fleming. But, following his release from U.S. military detention in 1947, Eugen Dollmann’s espionage career became such a flamboyant mess that he inspired some of the most colorful memoranda ever produced by the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy. Reading through these declassified CIA documents fills one with awe for Dollmann’s endless powers of reinvention, and a sense of wonder as to why men as knowing as Dulles and Angleton ever saw him as spy material.
U.S. surveillance of Dollmann began getting interesting in 1951, when he was located in a suite at the posh Hotel Paradiso, overlooking Lake Lugano in Switzerland, near northern Italy. By then, the colonel’s high life was beginning to catch up with him. He was reported to be in financial distress and looking for ways to make some quick cash. Among the schemes he was pondering was writing his memoirs—which he was promising would be dishy—and hustling various Nazi documents he claimed were authentic, including some supposedly written by Hitler. The colonel was shaking down the CIA for 200,000 lire in return for the “exclusive” rights to examine the documents.
Dulles and the CIA knew that there was great potential for embarrassment with Dollmann. As the years passed, the agency’s memos on the colorful SS veteran revealed rising levels of anxiety and exasperation.
In November 1951, Dollmann was reported to be in “close contact” with Donald Jones, which was an intriguing twist, since Jones was the OSS daredevil whom Dulles had asked to rescue Karl Wolff from the Italian partisans during the war. Jones was “still presumed to be an agent of U.S. intelligence,” but the memo made clear that Dollmann’s contact with him was not strictly professional. “The two are now divided because of a quarrel, presumed to have originated over a question of money, or perhaps jealousy, since both are suspected of being sexual perverts.” The memo concluded that Dollmann’s value as “an agent or informer” was “uncertain . . . he is not the man he was in 1940–45.”
Dollmann, no doubt, would have readily agreed. For one thing, he had less money. And he was stuck in purgatory in Switzerland rather than enjoying the sweet life in his beloved Italy because U.S. agents had warned him they still could not guarantee his safety there.
Nonetheless, Dollmann would soon find himself in Italy—at least briefly— after he outstayed his welcome in Switzerland. According to a U.S. intelligence report, Dollmann was expelled from Switzerland in February 1952 after he was caught having sex with a Swiss police official. In desperation, Dollmann appealed to his old fascist friends in the Italian church, and he was spirited across the border and given temporary sanctuary at a Franciscan monastery in Milan. Dollmann’s savior this time, Father Enrico Zucca, was famous for his role in raising Mussolini’s body from the grave on Easter 1946 in preparation for the day when Il Duce would be reburied with full honors on Rome’s Capitoline Hill. The abbot had less spectacular plans for Dollmann. He slipped a monk’s habit on him and smuggled him onto a boat in Genoa, from where Dollmann was shipped to General Franco’s fascist paradise in Spain.
In Madrid, Dollmann came under the protection of former Nazi commando leader Otto Skorzeny, who had put together a wide-ranging racket, trading in arms and helping SS fugitives flee justice. Skorzeny was joined for a time in Spain by Hjalmar Schacht, who had been acquitted at Nuremberg and would parlay his reputation as Hitler’s banker into a postwar career as an international financial consultant. Schacht knew where much of the wealth plundered from Europe by German corporations and Nazi officials had been hidden, and Skorzeny used this inside knowledge to help finance his SS ratlines. Angleton also found Skorzeny’s services useful, and he kept in regular touch with the entrepreneurial ex-Nazi.
Dollmann undertook errands for Skorzeny’s international neo-Nazi circuit. But Dollmann was no good at the freelance espionage game. In October 1952, he flew to Germany on some sort of political mission to make contact with German youth groups. His plans were betrayed and he was arrested at the airport as soon as he landed. The authorities accused him of traveling on a false passport, and he didn’t bother denying it. Even in his native Germany, Dollmann was a man without a country. No government wanted to claim him—at least not openly.
A November 1952 CIA memo reported that Dollmann was back in Rome. He started haunting his favorite cinemas again, but this time it nearly proved fatal when “he was noticed by certain Communist elements” in the theater and had to be “rescued by the police from a threatening mob.”
Still desperate for cash in Rome, Dollmann again tried his hand at selling Hitler documents that he insisted were genuine. This time he was dangling an Operation Sunrise angle that Dulles certainly found compelling. Among the papers in his possession, Dollmann swore, was a letter from Hitler to Stalin proposing a separate peace between Germany and Russia. Such a letter would have put Dulles’s own Operation Sunrise deal in a much better light. If Hitler and Stalin really did discuss their own pact near the end of the war, it made Dulles look like a brilliant chess player instead of an insubordinate troublemaker. Dulles’s friends at Life magazine let it be known that they would pay a staggering $1 million for such a letter. But Dollmann apparently never produced it.
Even after securing Dollmann’s release, Angleton remained nervous about Bill Gowen. The young man knew too much about Angleton’s string-pulling on behalf of Dollmann and the other Nazi fugitives who had been harbored on Via Archimede. Angleton suspected that Gowen’s CIC unit kept extensive files on the ratlines that had allowed Sunrise collaborators like Dollmann and Rauff to escape justice. He was determined to see what was in those files—an interest undoubtedly shared by Angleton’s mentor, Dulles, as well as their allies in the U.S. intelligence complex.
In November 1947, as Dollmann walked free, the U.S. military moved to shut down its Nazi-hunting operation in Rome. That month, Bill Gowen hopped a train for Frankfurt, which was to be his new base of operations. By the time the slow-moving train crawled into the Frankfurt station, it was after midnight. A jeep driven by a hulking soldier with CIC insignia on his uniform was waiting for Gowen, who threw his duffel bag into the vehicle and jumped in.
Frankfurt was still pulverized from the war. One of the few buildings left miraculously untouched by Allied bombing was the massive IG Farben complex, which now served as the headquarters of the Supreme Allied Command. The city’s demolished landscape was illuminated only by scattered pinpoints of light, and the darkness closed in on Gowen and his driver as the jeep pulled away from the train platform.
“I guess you’re tired,” the driver said. “You’ll want to go to a hotel.”
Gowen, exhausted from the long train ride, nodded emphatically. But instead of heading toward a hotel, the soldier drove deeper into the city’s ruins. Now the only light came from the jeep’s headlamps.
“Where are we going?” asked Gowen.
“I just want to show you something,” said the soldier. There was nothing to be seen, only dark piles of rubble.
“I’ve been to Germany before—I just want to go to bed,” Gowen said. But the jeep kept creeping slowly through the night shadows. Suddenly the driver came to a halt, jumped out, and told Gowen to follow him. Gowen didn’t like his situation. “He was armed and I wasn’t. I was alarmed, and I’m normally not scared.” Gowen cautiously followed the soldier, walking slowly behind him into the gloom. Gowen didn’t know how far they had walked when the soldier abruptly turned around and headed back to the jeep. When they got to the vehicle, Gowen immediately realized that his duffel bag was missing.
“I wasn’t dumb enough to ask him where my bag was,” Gowen recalled years later. “I knew what had happened. I knew what they were looking for.” As it turned out, there were no intelligence files in Gowen’s stolen bag. But the story wasn’t over.
In January 1948, while Gowen was still stationed in Germany with Army intelligence, he received a transatlantic phone call from syndicated columnist Drew Pearson. The influential Washington journalist told Gowen that he was working on a hot scoop and that Gowen was at the center of it. Pearson was going to report that Ferenc Vajta, a fugitive from war crimes charges in Hungary, where he had worked as an anti-Semitic propagandist for the fascist Arrow Cross Party, had slipped into the United States illegally—with the help of young Nazi hunter Bill Gowen. Pearson claimed he had proof: documents that showed Gowen had worked closely with Vajta on various covert missions. As he listened to Pearson, Gowen was so flabbergasted that he didn’t know what to say. Pearson’s exclusive story ran in newspapers across America on January 18 and was amplified further by his coast-to-coast radio broadcast.
There was some truth to Pearson’s report. Gowen did indeed know Vajta from his days in Rome, when he had used the Hungarian as an informer to help track the notorious Croatian fugitive Ante Pavelic´, the fascist leader of the Ustaše movement who led a genocidal campaign in the Balkans during the war that was so extreme he had to be restrained by German authorities. With the help of Ferenc Vajta, Gowen had traced Pavelic´ to a villa atop the Aventine Hill. Pavelic´ was under the protection of Croatian officials in the Vatican and other fascist sympathizers. From his villa, Pavelic´ was able to sneak into nearby safe houses through a series of secret passageways that honeycombed the Aventine.
Gowen was perfectly willing to rely on lesser criminals like Vajta to locate much bigger targets like Pavelic´. But he had had nothing to do with providing Vajta a special State Department security clearance and slipping him into the United States. That sleight of hand was likely performed by Frank Wisner, a close collaborator of Dulles’s from their days in the OSS who had recently been appointed head of the State Department’s clandestine operations unit, the Office of Policy Coordination.
But it was Gowen who would take the fall for the Vajta escapade. It did not take him long to figure out who was responsible for setting him up. Pearson had been fed the false story by Raymond Rocca, Angleton’s deputy in Rome.
Pearson’s exposé effectively ended Gowen’s budding intelligence career. Gowen never stopped trying to clear his name. At one point, he managed to get an appointment to see Dulles after Dulles became CIA director, but when Gowen showed up at the agency’s headquarters in Washington to plead his case, he was told that the spymaster had been called overseas.
Years after both men returned to America, Angleton continued to keep an eye on Gowen. Back in Washington, where he eventually became the all- powerful chief of CIA counterintelligence, Angleton invited Gowen to lunch at the Army-Navy Club and even to his home in Virginia. “You know, he was a very devious character,” Gowen said, “but he wanted to give me the impression that he was very friendly. He introduced me to his wife, Cicely, and their children, who were very young at the time.” Angleton’s betrayal of Gowen hovered silently in the air. “I never discussed it openly with him, I never trusted Angleton enough to do that.” Both men knew who had won the power struggle in Rome. But they also knew that the secret history they shared had the power to undo Angleton’s grand career and expose the underside of Sunrise.
Intelligence reports do not normally make for entertaining reading. Few station chiefs come close to having the literary touch of onetime spies like Graham Greene, David Cornwell (John le Carré), or Ian Fleming. But, following his release from U.S. military detention in 1947, Eugen Dollmann’s espionage career became such a flamboyant mess that he inspired some of the most colorful memoranda ever produced by the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy. Reading through these declassified CIA documents fills one with awe for Dollmann’s endless powers of reinvention, and a sense of wonder as to why men as knowing as Dulles and Angleton ever saw him as spy material.
U.S. surveillance of Dollmann began getting interesting in 1951, when he was located in a suite at the posh Hotel Paradiso, overlooking Lake Lugano in Switzerland, near northern Italy. By then, the colonel’s high life was beginning to catch up with him. He was reported to be in financial distress and looking for ways to make some quick cash. Among the schemes he was pondering was writing his memoirs—which he was promising would be dishy—and hustling various Nazi documents he claimed were authentic, including some supposedly written by Hitler. The colonel was shaking down the CIA for 200,000 lire in return for the “exclusive” rights to examine the documents.
Dulles and the CIA knew that there was great potential for embarrassment with Dollmann. As the years passed, the agency’s memos on the colorful SS veteran revealed rising levels of anxiety and exasperation.
In November 1951, Dollmann was reported to be in “close contact” with Donald Jones, which was an intriguing twist, since Jones was the OSS daredevil whom Dulles had asked to rescue Karl Wolff from the Italian partisans during the war. Jones was “still presumed to be an agent of U.S. intelligence,” but the memo made clear that Dollmann’s contact with him was not strictly professional. “The two are now divided because of a quarrel, presumed to have originated over a question of money, or perhaps jealousy, since both are suspected of being sexual perverts.” The memo concluded that Dollmann’s value as “an agent or informer” was “uncertain . . . he is not the man he was in 1940–45.”
Dollmann, no doubt, would have readily agreed. For one thing, he had less money. And he was stuck in purgatory in Switzerland rather than enjoying the sweet life in his beloved Italy because U.S. agents had warned him they still could not guarantee his safety there.
Nonetheless, Dollmann would soon find himself in Italy—at least briefly— after he outstayed his welcome in Switzerland. According to a U.S. intelligence report, Dollmann was expelled from Switzerland in February 1952 after he was caught having sex with a Swiss police official. In desperation, Dollmann appealed to his old fascist friends in the Italian church, and he was spirited across the border and given temporary sanctuary at a Franciscan monastery in Milan. Dollmann’s savior this time, Father Enrico Zucca, was famous for his role in raising Mussolini’s body from the grave on Easter 1946 in preparation for the day when Il Duce would be reburied with full honors on Rome’s Capitoline Hill. The abbot had less spectacular plans for Dollmann. He slipped a monk’s habit on him and smuggled him onto a boat in Genoa, from where Dollmann was shipped to General Franco’s fascist paradise in Spain.
In Madrid, Dollmann came under the protection of former Nazi commando leader Otto Skorzeny, who had put together a wide-ranging racket, trading in arms and helping SS fugitives flee justice. Skorzeny was joined for a time in Spain by Hjalmar Schacht, who had been acquitted at Nuremberg and would parlay his reputation as Hitler’s banker into a postwar career as an international financial consultant. Schacht knew where much of the wealth plundered from Europe by German corporations and Nazi officials had been hidden, and Skorzeny used this inside knowledge to help finance his SS ratlines. Angleton also found Skorzeny’s services useful, and he kept in regular touch with the entrepreneurial ex-Nazi.
Dollmann undertook errands for Skorzeny’s international neo-Nazi circuit. But Dollmann was no good at the freelance espionage game. In October 1952, he flew to Germany on some sort of political mission to make contact with German youth groups. His plans were betrayed and he was arrested at the airport as soon as he landed. The authorities accused him of traveling on a false passport, and he didn’t bother denying it. Even in his native Germany, Dollmann was a man without a country. No government wanted to claim him—at least not openly.
A November 1952 CIA memo reported that Dollmann was back in Rome. He started haunting his favorite cinemas again, but this time it nearly proved fatal when “he was noticed by certain Communist elements” in the theater and had to be “rescued by the police from a threatening mob.”
Still desperate for cash in Rome, Dollmann again tried his hand at selling Hitler documents that he insisted were genuine. This time he was dangling an Operation Sunrise angle that Dulles certainly found compelling. Among the papers in his possession, Dollmann swore, was a letter from Hitler to Stalin proposing a separate peace between Germany and Russia. Such a letter would have put Dulles’s own Operation Sunrise deal in a much better light. If Hitler and Stalin really did discuss their own pact near the end of the war, it made Dulles look like a brilliant chess player instead of an insubordinate troublemaker. Dulles’s friends at Life magazine let it be known that they would pay a staggering $1 million for such a letter. But Dollmann apparently never produced it.
Dollmann’s moneymaking schemes grew more frantic. In December 1952,
he quietly reached out to Charles Siragusa, a federal narcotics agent in the U.S.
embassy in Rome with close ties to the CIA. Siragusa had proved very useful to
Angleton over the years, as a bagman for political payoffs and as a link to the
criminal underworld when the agency required the Mafia’s services. Dollmann
had his own interesting offer for Siragusa. He proposed becoming a paid
informant for the narcotics agent and infiltrating the neo-Nazi movement in
Vienna, which he claimed was financing its activities by dealing cocaine.
Dollmann’s offer smacked of desperation, but, in fact, he was already spying on other ex-Nazi colleagues for the CIA. At the same time, in true Dollmann fashion, he was also hiring himself out to these neo-Nazi groups and reporting back to them about U.S. intelligence activities. As if this web of competing loyalties was not complicated enough, while Dollmann was living in Madrid by the grace of the Franco government, he was also working as a British spy.
By 1952, CIA station chiefs in Europe had grown deeply leery of Dollmann. That spring, an agency memo circulating among the field stations in Germany, Italy, and Spain warned “against [the operational] use of Dollmann . . . because he had already been involved with several intelligence organizations in Western Europe since 1945; his reputation for blackmail, subterfuge and double-dealing is infamous; [and] he is homosexual.” At one point, CIA officials even raised the possibility that Dollmann had sold himself to Moscow and was a Soviet double agent.
But it was not until 1955 that the CIA finally severed its ties to Dollmann. It took one last brazen blackmail attempt to persuade Dulles that he had to cut the cord. Dollmann had finished his memoirs that year, and, as promised, the book was rife with salacious details, including unflattering observations about Dulles and Angleton. Before the book went to the printers, Dollmann sent a message to Dulles through the U.S. consulate in Munich, letting it be known that he was eager “not to offend [my] great good friend” Dulles, and politely asking the CIA director to flag anything he found objectionable in the excerpts mailed to him. The implication was clear: They were men of the world who understood each other. They could certainly work out an appropriate arrangement.
After this, Dollmann abruptly disappeared from the CIA documentary record. The astute colonel undoubtedly realized that he had pushed his luck with the agency as far as he should, and, for his own good, it was time to retire from the spy game. He lived on for three more decades, trading on his notorious past to get by. He was a good storyteller, and his two colorful memoirs sold briskly in Europe. His astonishing tales even proved, for the most part, to be true. Dollmann also made frequent appearances on European television, and dabbled a bit in his beloved cinematic arts, writing the German subtitles for Fellini’s La Dolce Vita.
In 1967, an American writer named Robert Katz, who was working on a book about the Ardeatine Caves massacre, tracked down Dollmann, finding him in the comfortable residential hotel in Munich where he would live out the rest of his days. At sixty-seven, the silver-haired and still trim Dollmann seemed quite content with his life. His sunny garret in the blue-painted hotel was cluttered with photos, books, and memorabilia that recalled his former life. He was perfectly happy to live in the past, Dollmann told his visitor—after all, he had begun his career as a historian, until he was kidnapped by history.
At one point, Dollmann brought up Allen Dulles, his old American benefactor. Dulles had recently published The Secret Surrender, his Operation Sunrise memoir, and Dollmann was upset to read the spymaster’s description of him as a “slippery customer.”
“From the little English I know,” Dollmann told Katz in his perfect Italian, “‘sleeperee coostomer’ is not exactly a compliment. Is it?” Katz explained that it meant someone who was shrewd, cunning, Machiavellian.
The colonel broke into a radiant smile. “Oh! That is a compliment—for me.”
next
Part2
Useful People
Dollmann’s offer smacked of desperation, but, in fact, he was already spying on other ex-Nazi colleagues for the CIA. At the same time, in true Dollmann fashion, he was also hiring himself out to these neo-Nazi groups and reporting back to them about U.S. intelligence activities. As if this web of competing loyalties was not complicated enough, while Dollmann was living in Madrid by the grace of the Franco government, he was also working as a British spy.
By 1952, CIA station chiefs in Europe had grown deeply leery of Dollmann. That spring, an agency memo circulating among the field stations in Germany, Italy, and Spain warned “against [the operational] use of Dollmann . . . because he had already been involved with several intelligence organizations in Western Europe since 1945; his reputation for blackmail, subterfuge and double-dealing is infamous; [and] he is homosexual.” At one point, CIA officials even raised the possibility that Dollmann had sold himself to Moscow and was a Soviet double agent.
But it was not until 1955 that the CIA finally severed its ties to Dollmann. It took one last brazen blackmail attempt to persuade Dulles that he had to cut the cord. Dollmann had finished his memoirs that year, and, as promised, the book was rife with salacious details, including unflattering observations about Dulles and Angleton. Before the book went to the printers, Dollmann sent a message to Dulles through the U.S. consulate in Munich, letting it be known that he was eager “not to offend [my] great good friend” Dulles, and politely asking the CIA director to flag anything he found objectionable in the excerpts mailed to him. The implication was clear: They were men of the world who understood each other. They could certainly work out an appropriate arrangement.
After this, Dollmann abruptly disappeared from the CIA documentary record. The astute colonel undoubtedly realized that he had pushed his luck with the agency as far as he should, and, for his own good, it was time to retire from the spy game. He lived on for three more decades, trading on his notorious past to get by. He was a good storyteller, and his two colorful memoirs sold briskly in Europe. His astonishing tales even proved, for the most part, to be true. Dollmann also made frequent appearances on European television, and dabbled a bit in his beloved cinematic arts, writing the German subtitles for Fellini’s La Dolce Vita.
In 1967, an American writer named Robert Katz, who was working on a book about the Ardeatine Caves massacre, tracked down Dollmann, finding him in the comfortable residential hotel in Munich where he would live out the rest of his days. At sixty-seven, the silver-haired and still trim Dollmann seemed quite content with his life. His sunny garret in the blue-painted hotel was cluttered with photos, books, and memorabilia that recalled his former life. He was perfectly happy to live in the past, Dollmann told his visitor—after all, he had begun his career as a historian, until he was kidnapped by history.
At one point, Dollmann brought up Allen Dulles, his old American benefactor. Dulles had recently published The Secret Surrender, his Operation Sunrise memoir, and Dollmann was upset to read the spymaster’s description of him as a “slippery customer.”
“From the little English I know,” Dollmann told Katz in his perfect Italian, “‘sleeperee coostomer’ is not exactly a compliment. Is it?” Katz explained that it meant someone who was shrewd, cunning, Machiavellian.
The colonel broke into a radiant smile. “Oh! That is a compliment—for me.”
next
Part2
Useful People
No comments:
Post a Comment