Part 6: Drugging America....Custom's Complicity in Drugging America

The folly of the 'war on drugs', is laid open here in this chapter. There has to be a more intelligent way for society to look at this plague,courtesy of Washington.There are some passages in here that caught my eye,like this one....a U.S. News & World Report article (March 8, 1999) was “The Corrupting Allure of dirty drug money.” with the subtitle, “Are Mexico’s cartels buying U.S. cops?” ....and I ask myself 20 years later,has it got any better?Is this the reason for the internal opposition to a wall? These cartels have far too much reach in this country,more then most want to believe,the country needs to make the cartel's product worthless here.

Drugging America 

A Trojan Horse 

By Rodney Stich

CHAPTER SEVEN 

Custom’s Complicity in 

Drugging America 

The U.S. Customs Service is a division of the Treasury Department and charged with protecting the borders of the United States. It is the primary agency for drug interdiction into the United States. Customs has an air wing with over 100 aircraft. Experienced pilots are hired and trained to be law enforcement officers, flying various fixed-wing and rotary wing aircraft. These pilots are not required to be street agents as in the case of DEA pilots. It has airborne and ground-based radar detection sites to spot drug smuggling aircraft. 

As a comparison, pilots for the Drug Enforcement Administration Air Wing are taken from the ranks of street agents who have a commercial pilots license. DEA pilots do primarily surveillance and logistical support, while Customs Service pilots interdict and chase suspected drug traffickers to the point of landing.

In 1985, the U.S. Customs Service abolished the U.S. Customs Patrol (CPO) along the border and placed it into the Office of Investigations, which was later renamed the Office of Enforcement (OE). The Customs Patrol was created upon the abolishment of the Customs Security Officer (CSO) and the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration in 1973. The DEA was created by the transfer from U.S. Customs of a large number of Special Agents, leaving the remaining Customs Special Agents without any authority to conduct narcotics investigations because of the “White Paper” negotiated between DEA and Customs. 

The Customs Patrol was initiated as a non-investigative uniformed law enforcement agency responsible for interdicting narcotics and other illegal goods smuggled into the United States by land, sea, and air. All narcotics interdictions were referred to DEA for investigation. 

Written memorandums of understanding between the DEA and Customs in the mid-1990s gave the DEA responsibility for all domestic and foreign smuggling investigations, leaving Customs with drug investigations directly related to their work at the border. 

Veteran Customs Agent Whistleblower 

John Carman, a 20-year veteran of the U.S. Customs Service, started his government service with the U.S. Secret Service in Washington. This was followed by several years as an agent for U.S. Customs at the Calexico Port of Entry and then at the San Diego port of entry at San Ysidro. His primary duties were to detect and interdict narcotics, for which he received many commendations. His last position was as Senior Customs inspector in the San Diego office. Carman said his drug-interdiction work was repeatedly blocked by Customs supervisors, who allowed large quantities of drugs to enter the United States, and allowed interdicted drug traffickers to go back to Mexico. 

Definite Practice to Protect 

Powerful Drug Traffickers 

Carman repeatedly reported that his superiors were allowing major drug loads to go through border checkpoints at San Diego. Carman provided me with considerable information showing repeated actions by Customs personnel to protect large drug shipments crossing the border from Mexico. He filed a suit in U.S. District Court (September 1997) alleging that he was fired in June 1997 because he reported drug-related corruption within the Customs service. 

Carmen witnessed gross violations of government regulations, widespread drug smuggling by government employees, and aiding and abetting of drug trafficking by Customs agents and supervisors. He observed Customs personnel protecting and passing through major drug traffickers and drug loads. He repeatedly reported these violations in writing to Customs Office of Special Counsel and the Internal Affairs Division. The problems were ignored, the reports dismissed, and the perpetrators allowed to continue their criminal acts. The only “corrective” action taken was to retaliate against Carman. Here are a few examples of what Carman discovered and reported: 

• On October 29, 1985, he seized 400 grams of Mexican brown tar heroin and was then ordered by his supervisors to give the heroin back to the Mexican drug trafficker and release the person. This happened several times and Carman said the supervisors who ordered him to release the heroin were Charlie Gastellum and Honorio Garia. Carman reported this violation to Customs’ Office of Internal Affairs. No action was taken. 

• In June 1988, while working at the Commercial Export Gate at San Ysidro, a suspicious looking sealed container arrived from the Long Beach holding area. Before Carman could inspect the container, his supervisor, Filenon Fuentes, cleared it without conducting any examination. 

• He was ordered to remove data from Customs database that he had inserted earlier, that required a suspected Mexican drug trafficker, Jorge Hank Rhon, to be checked for drugs whenever he crossed the border checkpoint. Rhon had powerful political connections on both sides of the border; he had a private zoo near his Caliente racetrack in Tijuana, and was the son of one of Mexico’s top drug lords, Carlos Hank Gonzalez, a former Agriculture Minister. The senior Rhon was manager of the Grupo Hank Business Empire based in Tijuana, which had controlling interests in many businesses. These included banks on both sides of the border, and an interest in Taesa Airline, which had a drug-hauling reputation. Hank Gonzalez‘s son, Carlos Hank Rhon, was reportedly the one who used Citibank to hide the drug money of Raul Salinas, whose brother was the president of Mexico. Despite this history, Customs supervisors removed the red tag from the computer database. 

Customs Protecting Powerful Lords 

Carman said, “Jorge Hank Rhon is a person they don’t want to touch. They don’t want us to check him. They don’t want us to search him. They don’t want us to put his name in the computer.” Carman said the supervisor who told him this was John “Jack” Maryon. 

Protecting a Major Mexican 

Drug Trafficker 

The Zaragosa family that reportedly was heavy into drug shipments regularly sent trucks into the United States, often with large drug shipments inside. In 1990, a Zaragosa family propane truck, whose ownership was hidden in the company Hidrogas de Juarez, was stopped as it was crossing the border at San Ysidro. Drug-sniffing dogs were madly barking at the truck, indicating they detected drugs. The supervisor, Arthur Gilbert, tried to dissuade Customs agents from inspecting the truck, claiming the dogs were reacting to another smell. 

Release of Cartel Driver Caught 

with 8500 Pounds of Cocaine 

One of the agents threatened to report the matter to Customs Internal Affairs if the supervisor refused to allow the truck to be inspected. A search then revealed 8500 pounds of cocaine. Despite finding cocaine that would net an American citizen several life sentences, Customs Supervisor Art Gilbert allowed the Mexican truck driver to return to Mexico. Carman felt that the supervisor was there to be sure Customs agents did not detain the truck. 

Despite this and similar incidents, Gilbert was protected by U.S. attorney Alan Bersin in San Diego. Carman said a check of the phone records showed Gilbert making over 200 phone calls, as many as five a day, to a major drug trafficker in Mexico. Bersin was a former classmate to Bill Clinton, who appointed him U.S. attorney after the unprecedented firing of all U.S. attorneys upon taking the office of President of the United States. This action halted many ongoing criminal investigations, blocked obtaining indictments, and permitted placing in this key position people protective of the President and his cronies. 

Line Release Program 

Helped Drug Traffickers 

U.S. Customs inaugurated a program called “line release.” a plan to drastically reduce the number of inspections as trucks cross the border from Mexico into the United States. Under this program, large 18-wheeler trucks are routinely waved through without being inspected, permitting thousands of pounds of drugs to enter the United States. 

Non-Inspection List 

Customs had a non-inspection list, allowing Mexican companies and Mexican drivers to cross the border without being inspected. The commissioner of U.S. Customs Service said (October 1, 1995) that “drivers hauling goods into the United States from Mexico would have to undergo intensive background investigations before they would be approved for programs that allow importers to skirt routine cargo inspections.” Customs agents laughed at this statement, saying “The Mexicans don’t track people the way we do, and if they did, they wouldn’t share the information with us.” 

Fabulous Profits for Customs Agents 

Carman said that Customs inspectors make huge hidden incomes by waving vehicles through inspection points without stopping. In one instance at El Paso, Customs Inspector Jose de Jesus Ramos was arrested trying to wave a truck through without inspection that contained 2,000 pounds of cocaine. In  that instance, the Customs agent notified the drug trafficker by beeper that he was on duty and the lane number that he would be checking. When the vehicle carrying the drugs got to the Customs agent, it would be waved through without being inspected. The Customs agent was to have been paid $1 million for that simple and hard-to-prove act. 

A U.S. News and World Report article described the actions of Customs Agent Ricardo Felix who received hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes for waiving vehicles through without inspection. 

Carman cited an incident where he apprehended a Mexican female crossing the border with $16,000 cash stuffed into her clothing, bra, and handbag. Supervisor Filemon Fuentes, contrary to Customs regulations, gave the money back to her, allowed her to enter the United States, and suppressed the report. Carman reported this violation to Customs Internal Affairs, who cleared the supervisor of any wrongdoing, despite the fact it violated Customs rules and smelled of wrongdoing. 

Customs kept a “Red Book ” file on these incidents, and when Carman viewed the reference to the matter, he found the supervisor falsified the facts. Carman brought this alteration-of-records to the attention of Assistant District Director Gurdit Dillon who, instead of investigating the matter, started retaliating against Carman. 

Carman was quoted in a North County Times newspaper (September 13, 1997), “I hope to inform people about what’s going on down at the border. These people are involved in illegal activities.” The article continued: 

In the lawsuit and an interview, Carman accused Customs agents, including supervisors, of allowing people with drug connections to waltz across the border without being checked, as well as accepting bribes, falsifying reports and deleting information about certain people from intelligence files. “They don’t want you to do your duty,” he said. 

“They want you to look the other way. They don’t want you to search certain people. It’s obvious that they are trying to show preferential treatment for certain people. The drugs that are caught at the border are usually small amounts being carried by “non-professionals,” he said. “The type of stuff that we’re getting at the lower level is a mere pittance compared to what’s actually coming through, and when we do focus on a big one it’s by accident,” Carman said. 

“Customs agents’ anger borders on revolt,” read the headline on a San Diego Union-Tribune (October 1, 1995) article with the subtitle, “Many accuse bosses of corruption, indifference.” The article stated in part: 

Across the country, men and women on the front lines of the U.S. Customs Service are at war with their own superiors. They have alleged corruption at the highest levels, and many say that in doing their jobs they feel more like clerks than cops these days. Employees of the federal government’s oldest law enforcement agency laments that their very mission, collecting trade revenue, arresting import smugglers and inspecting everything from baby clothes to contraband, is being eroded from within. Nowhere has this criticism been more vocal than in San Diego County. 

Here, current and former Customs inspectors have made so much noise Custom’s Complicity in Drugging America 183 about what they feel is poor management and corruption that their complaints have prompted questions by politicians in Washington and several government investigations, including one by the FBI into Customs corruption all along the Southwest border. The agency, [U.S. Customs Service Commissioner George Weise], Weise said recently, is in the midst of a major reorganization and downsizing as a result of Vice President Al Gore’s program for reinventing government. [President Clinton promptly slashed personnel involved in drug interdiction upon becoming president.] 

One San Ysidro inspector said it has been made clear to him that the major responsibility of Customs is to facilitate trade and keep importers happy. Drugs, he said, “Just don’t seem to be a priority.” 

Ties Between Customs Officials 

and Mexican Drug Traffickers 

Carman told me about the ties between Customs supervisors and Mexican drug traffickers and drug money launderers, and the socializing between the two diverse groups. He described the ties between Jorge Hank, a former Mexican Minister of Agriculture, and Customs officials in San Diego, including the former District Director, Allan J. Rappoport. Customs officials in Washington refused to take any action. A Customs report (March 21, 1991) referring to Rappoport stated in part: 

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide a synopsis of the findings of this investigation. This investigation was predicated on allegations that Rappoport allegedly consorted with known criminals. It was also alleged that Rappoport was implicated in a conspiracy to smuggle illegal aliens and/or illicit drugs into the United States across the Mexican border. During the investigation it was determined that Rappoport retired and is no longer an employee of the U.S. Customs Service. Based on the above, this investigation has been closed administratively. 

Associate of Major Drug 

Kingpin on Crime Commission 

Making matters worse, Rappoport maintained a position on the San Diego Crime Commission. Wouldn’t the thousands of imprisoned people like to receive the same leniency shown to this DOJ-protected government official! 

Carman said that when Rappoport was advised that he was under investigation, Rappoport resigned within 24 hours. Despite considerable evidence against him, the U.S. Attorney did not pursue any prosecution, as they would have done if he were an ordinary citizen. To have prosecuted him would have reflected upon drug trafficking by U.S. Customs—and much more. 

Carman described an incident where a car passing through the San Ysidro border crossing was stopped, inspected, and after a check in the National Crime Information Center’s (NCIC) data computer, discovered the car was reported as stolen in the United States. Instead of seizing the car, Customs supervisor Filemon Fuentes and Customs liaison agent Sonny Manzano allowed the driver to return to Mexico—with the stolen car belonging to an American citizen. 

Entering False Information 

into Government Data Bases 

Carman reported that Customs officials were entering altered intelligence reports into the TECS computer database. (TECS: Treasury Enforcement Computer System, and MOIR) is Memorandum Of Information Received) For instance, Carman entered data on a murder suspect that Carman and another Customs agent found driving a stolen car. The information was reportedly, later altered by Supervisor Arthur Gilbert. 

Forged Release Authorization 

by Bogus Customs Inspector 

Carman reported alteration of an inspection record relating to a shipment in the commercial holding area at Long Beach by a Customs agent signing his or her name as Inspector Bluitt. Carman checked the TECS computer system database and found there was no Inspector Bluitt listed. 

Mexicans Caught with Drugs 

and Drug Money Protected 

Carman reported Mexicans, some of them Mexican law enforcement personnel, found with drugs and drug money in their possession, were allowed to proceed, and then the records falsified to omit the law violations. This benevolent attitude by Customs officials did not apply to Americans caught with drugs. 

Ordered to Remove Prominent 

Mexican Drug Traffickers 

from Computer Data Base 

In 1994, Supervisor and Branch Chief John “Jack” Maryon and another supervisor ordered Carman to remove from the TECS computer files the names of key Mexican drug traffickers and drug-related government officials who were the subject of Carman’s earlier reports. One was Roberto de la Madrid, a former governor of Baja, Mexico. Carman said one of the Mexicans was known for his violence and serious violations. 

DEA Drug-Carrying Aircraft 

Carman told me of one instance where a Beech King Air arrived at Brown Field in San Diego from Mexico, carrying DEA agents. Customs agents were instructed by supervisors not to go near the plane. Another Customs supervisor later told him the plane was carrying cocaine. Carman said he had heard from other agents about many DEA planes arriving from Mexico carrying cocaine. 

Over Flights for Mexican Aircraft 

Regional Director John Heinrich in the Long Beach Customs office signed a directive authorizing 167 specifically-named Mexicans flying in private planes from Mexico into the United States to over-fly border inspection points. Since Mexico is truly a narco-state, with endemic involvement in drug trafficking by local and national police, its politicians, and its military, this blanket over-flight authority was obviously prone to drug smuggling into the United States. Making this list even more preposterous, as long as any one of the Mexicans on the Customs list was on board the flight, everyone else on the aircraft was free to avoid the border checkpoints—including drug kingpins. 

One of the conditions that the Customs authorization said had to be met was that the pilots could not carry on board the aircraft any aviation charts from Mexico or Central and South America. This restriction was bizarre. No pilot would fly from Mexico without Mexican aeronautical charts. 

That U.S. Customs Service authorization was dated October 2, 1993, identified by the code, AIR-5-LA:I;LAX:0, and addressed to Mr. Jorge Alva Hernandez, Director of Operations, Jets Ejecutivos, Hangar 4 Plataforma Aviacion General, Delegacion Venustiano Curarra, Mexico City, D.F. Mexico 15620. The authorization, addressed to Mr. Alva Hernandez, said in part: 

Your application for...over-flight exemption has been approved. Your exemption expires on October 4, 1994. To continue your over-flight exemption in the future, you must file an application at least thirty (30) days prior to expiration. The aircraft listed below are approved for this over flight exemption: [List omitted] 

Carman said in April 1999 that Heinrich had been recently promoted and transferred to Washington, responsible for over 100 border inspection stations. 

Consequences Suffered by 

Honest Government Agents 

In 1995 after the media, including the San Diego Union Tribune, published Carman’s allegations, Customs supervisors fired Carman. As if this wasn’t enough, he was rushed to the hospital when a large pickup truck came crashing into his car on a side street, making no effort to stop or apply brakes. Carman received multiple broken ribs. The Filipino driver tried to flee but witnesses caught him. Carman had received death threats on the phone, his tires slashed, wheel lugs removed from his car, and items stolen from his property. 

Politically Correct Head of 

Customs Indifferent to Problems 

The pattern of corruption in Customs was repeatedly reported to politically correct Customs Commissioner Carol Hallett. Politicians recognized the votegetter value of politically correct appoints, such as the starry-eyed head of the FAA, Jane Garvey, and in this case, U.S. Customs. They simply do not know the ropes, or are too scared to fight the system, so problems go uncorrected. 

In response to questions, Customs spokesman George Weise made a standard off-the-shelf response, as stated in the San Diego Union-Tribune (October 1, 1995): 

Jobs and budget have been slashed, and that tends to make some of Customs’ 15,000 employees uneasy.” Weise... defended the integrity of the service, saying it always has policed itself and prosecuted wrongdoing within its ranks. Weise added that he has given personal assurances that no employee with information about corruption would be penalized for coming forward. 

Meaningless Whistleblower Posters 

on Government Walls 

Carman, and many other government employees, including myself, have been misled into thinking that the walls of posters encouraging employees to report government misconduct meant what they said. The Whistleblower Protection Act is mostly meaningless and intended for show. Carman discovered this too late. And so did I. 

A fairly standard reaction to government agents’ reports of criminal activities is to discredit the agent and then fire him or her. This happened to Carman. This tactic is standard in the FAA, the FBI, and virtually every government agency. Carman was fired on June 19, 1997, after almost 20 years of service with various government agencies. He exercised his Civil Service remedies and found, as many other government inspectors had found, that this “remedy” is meaningless. He then filed a civil complaint for damages, including a Bivens claim, in the US District Court at San Diego (June 19, 1995).

Poor Media Reporting 

Despite the enormous implications of a major government agency aiding and abetting the drug smuggling into the United States, the mainstream media kept the lid on years of reports by government insiders, except for a few brief watered-down television spots or short articles. Mike Wallace taped a three hour and thirty minute interview with Carman, but it was never aired. “Dateline” taped Carman, but made only a brief reference to the problems. 

Carman didn’t do any better with members of Congress. He contacted many of them, including Representatives Maxine Waters, Jim Kolbe and Charles Rangel, and Senators Diane Feinstein and Fred Thompson. None responded 

The local San Diego Union-Tribune did provide some coverage of the more minor problems, omitting reference to the serious corruption matters. In one article (October 1, 1995) the paper said: 

Agents contend that turf wars, red tape and pressure to produce have prompted some in their ranks to cut corners. “We are not only in a drug war. We are at war with the DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration),” one agent said. The two agencies have been locked in a battle for drug fighting supremacy ever since the DEA was literally cut from a rib of the Customs Service in the 1970s and given primary responsibility for fighting the drug war. 

Customs-Arranged Murder 

of Horner’s Informants? 

Customs agent Mike Horner was another Customs agent who “foolishly” tried to carry out his federal responsibilities by reporting the internal government corruption. One of Horner’s supervisors asked Horner to provide him the names of two of his informants who had provided information about a large drug shipment. Horner provided this information, and within days one informant was killed and the other nearly killed with multiple stab wounds. Eventually, Horner had enough and took a medical retirement. 

Chaos in Customs Revealed 

by Congressional Investigation 

The hundreds of complaints by government agents throughout the southwestern part of the United States finally forced an investigation (1992) by a subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations: Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs. This hearing was conducted by Representative Doug Barnard, Jr. The committee omitted considerable evidence of CIA drug smuggling, massive cover-ups of drug smuggling involving the CIA, and as will be seen in later pages, drug smuggling implicating key members of the Texas National Guard in collaboration with the Gulf Cartel, all of which was covered up by Texas and federal officials. 

Even with the omission of these serious criminal activities, the committee’s report was startling. As usual, nothing came of it. The criminal activities against the United States by people in key government positions continued, despite the gravity and consequences of such conduct. 

Serious Mismanagement and 

Misconduct in Customs 

The committee issued a 1553-page report titled “Serious Mismanagement and Misconduct In the Treasury Department, Customs Service, and Other Federal Agencies and the Adequacy of Efforts To Hold Officials Accountable.” The committee report stated that its function was to “investigate thoroughly allegations of mismanagement and misconduct, to hold accountable individuals at all levels who are responsible or otherwise culpable, who had information of misconduct and did not report it.” Excellent rhetoric, but absolutely devoid of any corrective actions. 

Throughout the huge House report were detailed incidents in which Justice Department employees, U.S. Attorneys (such as Linda Akers ), blocked federal investigators from obtaining information, from pursuing evidence of corruption by federal agents, and aiding and abetting the retaliation of those agents who sought to report such corruption. 

Texas Customs Supervisor 

Constantly Blocking Investigations 

One section of the report dealt with the Customs problems encountered by AUSA David Hall who headed a multi-agency task force in the southwestern part of the United States. The Justice Department in Washington decided in 1987 to set up several field offices for the Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Section (NDDS) of the Department of Justice Criminal Division, and one was in San Antonio, which Hall headed. In that position, Hall encountered repeated problems with Customs supervisors blocking the prosecution of major drug traffickers. 

Hall testified to the House committee that Customs was the lead agency in the task force and that Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Neil Lageman in the San Antonio office was the lead agent. Hall testified that Lageman repeatedly blocked finalizing investigations by transferring agents whenever their investigations were about to lead to indictments against major drug traffickers. Over 12 agents were taken off the project in this way, without any reason. 

Many Investigations Shut 

Down Short of Indictments 

When AUSA Hall protested these obstructionist tactics to Lageman, Hall was told, “It is none of your business what Customs did with its personnel.” Replacements caused many investigations to be shut down. In addition, there were six different supervisors over these agents in a two year period, creating further chaos in the San Antonio Customs office. Hall testified about these unexplained removals of Customs agents from the task force: 

Several of the reassignments were made even after I protested to Mr. Lageman that due to the agent he was removing I would lose an indispensable part of a particular investigation …. They were disruptive of the operations of the task force.... The overall effect of the Customs turnovers was to wreak havoc on the operation of the task force. 

One of our biggest problems was the constant change in the Customs hierarchy. [Referring to the major drug traffickers that escaped arrest, Hall testified] There were at least 12 investigations that died. Three or four of these, I considered to be very significant. One of the investigations hinged on a proposal to operate a money laundering store front for targeted and known heroin smugglers from Asia. Customs refused to approve this proposal.... Another investigation of a large-scale cocaine distributor failed when the undercover agent who was working with the violator was reassigned. The agent believed that the target dealt in 100-pound quantities of cocaine.... 

A third investigation was of a major cocaine smuggler and money launderer, and it was not pursued after reassignment of all three agents who had been working on the case. The agents had information that the target had imported over 1,000 kilograms of cocaine and was living on what was reported to be a $1 million ranch....[Because of Customs blocking action] I closed the task force in June 1990....abysmal mismanagement of the Customs cooperation in the task force.... 

The other agencies did not trust their information with the Customs Service and as a consequence did not share information freely....One particular individual with an exorbitant amount of cocaine dealing, living on a very big ranch in real luxury, and that was easily identifiable by our task force. And yet, that investigation ceased when the task force was stopped [due to internal sabotage by Customs, the FBI, and U.S. attorney]. 

Sabotage of Imminent Arrest 

of Major Drug Lord 

Neil Lageman, by AUSA David Hall’ s own testimony, did everything possible to block the arrest of major drug traffickers. In another chapter, contract undercover pilot Rodney Matthews, working out of the San Antonio office, was about to cause the arrest of a major international drug lord when Customs and DOJ sabotaged the operation, permitting the drug trafficking to continue. 

Customs Employees and 

Mexican Drug Traffickers 

A Report of Investigation (August 2, 1990), included in the House report, contained the following statements: 

A Customs official was seen at the racetrack in Mexico in the private box of a drug dealer...A former inspector was seen at the house of a target of the La Esperanza investigation....A target of the La Esperanza investigation stated, “Don’t worry, my friends in Customs will take care of the problem.” [Habiniak-La Esperanza Mining Company] 

One report of an interview with FBI Special Agent Claudio De La O, included in the House report, stated: 

De La O said that the FBI had considered opening a corruption investigation on Customs Employees, but it was never opened.... De La O referred to the Abrego drug organization as the “mob.” He explained that the mob would search out law enforcement officers who would provide information concerning potential search warrants, law enforcement aircraft coordinates, law enforcement scrutiny pointed toward members of their organization, information on border stops, NCIC lookouts, TECS lookouts, information on currency investigations and most of all, the ability for the officer to keep other officers away from members of the organization.... 

As another example, [Customs agent whose name was blacked out] was seen at many parties given by the mob. De La O stated that the agent was closer to the mob than anyone he knew....De La O stated that he also had problems working with the Cameron County Sheriff’s office due to similar allegations [of drug involvement and harassment of federal agents]. 

An April 21, 1990 letter to Customs Regional Commissioner James C. Piatt, included in the House report, stated: 

Customs agent Solomon Rodriguez was passing loads and making big bank deposits.... All the files were missing....I continued to gather information about ties between the Inspectors and different off-shots of the Guerras organization. 

Testimony of Many Agents Proved 

Widespread Obstruction of Justice 

The testimony of the government witnesses revealed chaos and mismanagement throughout the federal agencies responsible for fighting the so-called war-on-drugs. For instance, Customs Agent Jim Dukes, assigned to the Criminal Division of U.S. Customs in San Antonio, Texas, said in his opening statement to the House committee (March 27, 1992): 

We are what is commonly referred to as Whistleblowers and appear before you to testify honestly about serious breaches of integrity within the Customs Service by management officials, which are violations of criminal laws as proscribed under Title 18 of the United States Code and the Department of Treasury’s Minimum Standards of Conduct.... 

We all have, individually and separately, previously reported and made sworn statements about these matters to Customs Office of Internal Affairs, Treasury Inspector General’s Investigators, the Government Accounting Office, the FBI, and other government agencies [with no corrective action taken]....We had spoken to nine other investigative bodies, including Internal Affairs, and all we had done was ruin our career and our health practically. 

Dukes testified, as did other Customs agents, that after he started reporting corruption in Customs, including reports of Customs supervisors and other agents protecting drug traffickers, that the standard government reaction took place: supervisors started attacking his veracity and credibility. 

Three Internal Customs 

Investigations and Cover-Ups! 

Dukes made reference to three recent investigations of Customs corruption and mismanagement, all of which described the problems in general terms. The investigations included the September 16, 1991, report prepared by the Treasury Office of Inspector General, U.S. Customs Service, titled “Greater Management Attention Needed for Southwest Region Problems,” the Customs Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel titled “Review of Integrity and Management Issues of the United States Customs Service” (August 1991), and the report by the Inspector General of the Treasury Office titled “Management of Customs Southwest Region.” Dukes called them “just short of being a whitewash.” 

He added: “I will testify on serious matters of misconduct by Customs management officials. Everything that I will state here has been reported to Customs Internal Affairs and the Treasury OIG (Office Inspector General).” 

Customs Agent Testifying On 

Major Internal Problems 

Testifying before the House committee was Special Agent Thomas Grieve with U.S. Customs Service. Prior to joining the Customs Service he had been a criminal investigator with the IRS, and prior to that, a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration. Grieve testified: 

The mismanagement, misconduct, and criminal acts that we will discuss here today are real. The Customs Service in San Antonio has been primarily concerned with the perception of fighting drugs, rather than actually doing it. It didn’t matter if high-quality criminal cases were being made. What really mattered were statistics, no matter how obtained. It is easier to assign agents to task forces and pirate their statistics than it is to develop investigations from information gathered from outside sources. Upper management is more concerned with the perks of the job than they are with any real accomplishments. 

Grieve described how Customs supervisors, including Neil Lageman, repeatedly protected major drug traffickers by barring agents from performing their jobs or by transferring them when their investigations were about to bring arrests. He said: 

I had the opportunity to deal with a confidential informant (CI) who had been a major heroin smuggler. His knowledge of heroin trafficking was excellent. It was extraordinary. He had access to the highest levels of BCCI (Bank of Credit and Commerce International). The same CI gave me information that would have enabled us to tap into major smuggling rings. We would have used some pretty unique methods to tap into these organizations to both launder their money and monitor their couriers. 

Grieve described a conversation between Deputy SAC Jay Silvestro and SAC Neil Lageman, when Lageman said, “Drug cases are nothing but problems and I don’t want problems.” (This was the same attitude I and other inspectors encountered in the FAA, as managers didn’t want inspector reports of accident causing air safety problems.) 

Refusal to Take Action Caused 

Drugs to Enter the United States 

Grieve testified: “It is my opinion that since we took no action, we were responsible for unknown quantities of heroin being smuggled into and made available on the streets of this country. We had everything set up to accomplish our mission. When it came to actually doing the job, we were told we couldn’t do it.” This was similar to the FAA culture, where office Supervising Inspectors don’t want reports of air safety problems or violations because they cause problems for the office. 

Special Agent 

David Ruiz, San Antonio 

David Ruiz was a criminal investigator for Customs. His testimony and prepared statement, appearing in the House report, stated in part: 

Customs is an agency run amuck with leaders who hold their personal objectives above policies, procedures, and even the law. The Office of Enforcement is plagued with an incompetent and ill-trained management core. On this very core OE builds its policy and makes decisions from which to run the war on drugs. Resident Agent in Charge (RAC) Louis Dracoulis made it clear on one occasion when he told me that if he ever gave me an order he expected it to be followed, even though it was illegal. 

This [internal conduct] failure in the very core of OE takes a fatal turn in enforcement of law when management cannot be trusted even to be truthful and honest in its normal course of daily activity. Management has no regard for the truth, and is willingly lying both officially and unofficially. 

Lying to Confidential Informants 

Ruiz described the practice of lying to confidential informants and the deception played upon them by Customs Service supervisors. Sophisticated CIs or documented undercover agents Richard Pitt and Rodney Matthews, described elsewhere in these pages, did not know of this practice when they carried out highly sensitive and dangerous undercover operations on the basis of instructions and authorizations given to them by Customs agents in Texas. 

Threats to Kill Government Agent 

Exposing Narcotic Traffickers 

Ruiz testified about threats to his life for having arrested key drug traffickers: 

In September 1976, my former supervisor threatened to kill me or have me killed for arresting certain narcotic traffickers. This threat was witnessed by the then assistant U.S. Attorney and chief of the criminal section of the western judicial district of Texas. The assault was witnessed by two DEA special agents. On May 18, 1984, management chastised me for reporting Customs pilot Gerald Weatherman for smuggling endangered species, sea turtle-skins, into Kelly Air Force Base from the Grand Cayman Islands, utilizing a Customs Service aircraft. 

Special Agent Herbert P. Hailes 

Part of the testimony and prepared statement by Special Agent Herbert Hailes appeared in the House report: 

It is an “old-boy management network” Lageman‘s style of management was autocratic, Machiavellian, and dictatorial, resulting in general office chaos, disruption of major investigations, and set into motion a neverending feeling of fear, confusion, frustration, and burnout. He personally took the severest disciplinary action available on any agent who was not a sycophant. Intimidation, threats, and micro-management ultimately affected every phrase of investigative work in the district. A case in point was Lageman’s posture on national priority investigations. He said that “perception is above all what matters!...it does not matter whether we make arrests or seizures... what matters is the perception Region and headquarters has of what we tell them.” 

The Commissioner wants to portray the Service as a benevolent and well controlled organization operating according to law, and directive, and doing nothing wrong; when the record declares resoundingly otherwise. Those of us who protest the serious mismanagement and misconduct spend more time and energy fighting the retaliation and the relentless petty harassment than fight the “war on drugs.” 

Agents are constantly bogged down in the strife and political power plays with inept and unscrupulous managers. I firmly believe that people in this agency who are a part of the twisted system will attempt the removal of myself and my colleagues. It will be cleverly tried through some fabricated issue and ostensibly “for the good of the service,” while the renegade managers wave good-by with their “sweetheart” deals. 

 SAC John H. Juhasz

Special Agent in Charge (SAC) John Juhasz testified and submitted a prepared statement. Juhasz had been selected to head a task force to conduct investigations into misconduct and corruption by state and federal officials in Arizona that was given the code name “Firestorm.” He testified that the FBI refused to become a part of the task force. Rather strange, since that is one of the key areas of their responsibilities. The House report included a copy of a letter Drugging America—A Trojan Horse 192 that Juhasz sent to Customs Commissioner Carol Hallett, which said in part: 

I am writing to inform you of the continuing tragedy of Customs and other law enforcement corruption in Arizona.....corruption of Customs employees....trying to deal with the drug related corruption of law enforcement officers on the Arizona-Mexico border.... the Customs Office of Enforcement (OE) is out of control. 

Despite the glaring mismanagement that was rampant in [Thomas McDermott’s] office, he was promoted to Headquarters last year....I found out that the DEA was deliberately withholding valuable intelligence from my office concerning corrupt border inspectors, and I suspected that Javier Dibene, the SAC of the Justice Department Office of the Inspector General for Arizona (OIG, formerly Immigration OPR), was deliberately quashing corruption investigations of immigration inspectors and Border Patrol Officers on the border. 

There was a major cover-up [by the FBI and U.S. attorney] This was at least partly due to a strong “good old boy” network and due in another large part to the fear of what such a well orchestrated investigation would inevitably uncover. 

Loads of Cocaine Passed 

by Arizona Customs Inspectors 

The House report described audiotapes transcribing the conversations between two rival drug dealers describing in detail the corruption of Customs and INS border inspectors. Part of the House report addressed this matter: 

The tapes contained the unequivocal identification and implication of Customs border inspectors by name in corruption that involved the deliberate “passing” of large (600 pound) and numerous periodic (alleged to be weekly) loads of cocaine by the inspectors, and the involvement of their family members in the importation of cocaine. The report showed the cover-up of the tapes and their implications by local FBI Supervisor Joe Reyes. 

Also covering up for the tapes was Customs SAC Javier Dibene, who then destroyed what he thought was the only copies. These decisions were made despite the fact that the tapes contained the obvious, straight forward naming of the inspectors...The Customs inspectors referred to by name in the tapes had been under investigation for over one year....Dibene asserted that if the inspectors were involved in corruption, he could understand (condone) their activity because they came from poor, humble beginnings and needed to provide for their families. 

Javier Dibene’ s actions concerning the audiotapes serves to confirm...that he was actively suppressing corruption investigations. Equally as puzzling is the internal storm of controversy in DEA that followed the delivery of the tapes by S/A Vasquez. 

ASAC Gerald Murphy of the DEA in Tucson refused to allow our IA agents to meet with or even speak to S/A Vasquez to arrange further debriefing of their confidential informant. In fact, ASAC Murphy reprimanded Vasquez for giving Customs IA the tapes and informed all of his agents that they were not to generate any reports addressing law enforcement corruption, and no information concerning such corruption was to go out of his office without his prior approval. 

What this really meant, since ASAC Murphy refused to pass along corruption intelligence, was that no allegations of corruption would be turned over to the proper agencies for investigation. Thus, the drug dealers could continue to smuggle large (tons) quantities of drugs into Arizona from Mexico through corrupt border inspectors without fear of being investigated. 

The entire matter was ignored and the DEA and the FBI continued to disregard our requests for cooperation....began discovering the extent of the efforts taken by Javier Dibene to cover up corruption and quash investigations. This was quickly realized to be potentially a major embarrassment to the DOJ OIG. [Office of Inspector General.] 

It is now apparent that in order to avoid large scale embarrassment to these agencies, the Task Force and Juhasz had to be stopped....nearly daily allegations of corruption made by DEA informants to the Special Agents....Critical records, reports, and intelligence data have disappeared from Dibene’s office and the DEA’ Nogales, Arizona office.... as the FBI, DOJ OIG, and DEA embarrassed at being caught covering up drug related law enforcement corruption in Arizona. 

Who can exert so much political pressure in Washington, D.C? It is undisputed that a large portion of the drugs reaching our streets and injuring and killing our youth are allowed to enter the country through unscrupulous and corrupt law enforcement officials....Law enforcement officers on the Arizona-Mexico border, at all levels, have been corrupted. It does not matter whether this is due to bribes, sexual favors, real or threatened blackmail, or just plain fear of standing up and being counted. 

Further Evidence of Government 

Drug Shipments into the U.S. 

On Page 1206 of the House report are the following statements: 
• In July 1990, FBI and Customs Albuquerque executed a controlled delivery of 1,646 kilograms of cocaine from Colombia to New Mexico. 

• Unknown to the FBI, the Customs SAC had arranged for media coverage of the arrests and seizures. (This publicity sabotaged obtaining evidence against a major drug shipper.) 

 [Customs Furnished the Plane, 

the Pilot, and the Drugs] 

• At the news conference, Customs led the media to believe that the delivery of cocaine into the State of New Mexico was planned and executed by the drug traffickers, when, in fact, Customs had supplied a pilot, an aircraft, a vessel, and took delivery from the Colombians. (Similar to other examples in these pages.) 

The House report described how all, or almost all, of the Customs employees in the Yuma, Arizona office were guilty of embezzlement. 

Routine CIA Drug Shipments 

Through Los Angeles Airport 

Twenty-year veteran Customs agent Frank C. Newman submitted a report dated August 14, 1990, to the House committee (pgs 971-979) revealing CIA drug shipments through Los Angeles International Airport. This was dynamite testimony, and further corroborated the years of information provided to me by my many CIA and other inside sources that flew the drugs, arranged for the shipments, or discovered the practice. Portions of Newman’s testimony and report were entered in part into the report: 

I have been a Customs Inspector at Los Angeles International Airport for thirteen years. I have seen a number of questionable events related to narcotics laws over the years. The most shocking event occurred about a month ago. I found out by accident that agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration were escorting a large shipping container loaded with cocaine into the country. I called our Internal Affairs people within minutes. Approx two weeks later another shipping container loaded with cocaine arrived. 

 [Controlled Drug Smuggling By CIA] 

I have seen “controlled deliveries” before, but these most recent incidents make the ones that I have worked on before look minuscule. Someone at your level should be asking, “How can we justify importing large loads of cocaine in hopes of stamping out cocaine in the U.S.? At what levels of government are these deliveries authorized? Do members of Congress such as yourself know about these controlled deliveries, especially such large loads? Are these loads coming into just Los Angeles, or other major cities in the United States as well?” 

With such large loads coming in, how much has been allowed to get to the street? What would the citizens of the U.S. say if they found out about such large loads? It seems reprehensible that officers of the Border Patrol and Customs Inspectors can risk their lives, and get killed, on the Mexican border looking for this stuff, and we then find that our own officers in another unit are bringing large loads of cocaine by us on a routine basis. 

Bombshell Disclosures: 

No Response 

Although CIA and other government insiders had testified for years about CIA drug smuggling into the United States, this testimony from a Customs agent, put into a congressional report, should have caused major repercussions. Instead, nothing was reported by the media, Congress, the Department of Justice, and virtually every other government and non-government check and balance. Newman‘s prepared statement, which also appeared in the House report, stated in part: 

On 7-5-90 I was working baggage at terminal Two at LAX. A man who identified himself as the security chief for Pan American Airlines approached me and gave me information as follows: A shipping container with 32 boxes of diplomatic material weighting 804 kgms (net) was being escorted into the country by three U.S. drug enforcement agents. I made a photocopy of his information, thanked him and went directly to SCI Dan Vigna. I asked if he knew anything about a load of dope coming into the country and he replied, “Yes, there is a shipment of coke coming.” I informed him that I was going to call Internal Affairs and did so immediately. After all the crosses and double-crosses associated with narcotics, it is always best to cover oneself by calling Internal Affairs, and I did this. 

Several years ago, Customs inspectors in the Carolinas were ordered by agents of the CIA to clear a shipload of goods from Poland as part of the Iran-Contra affair with no questions asked. 

A few years later, even though these inspectors had acted in good faith, the Commissioner of Customs, William von Raab, wanted their heads on a platter. It had proven politically embarrassing to him when the Iran-Contra investigators found out that the shipment of goods on the freighter were really illegal guns and ammo. A situation like this also occurred in New Orleans. The inspectors were made into scapegoats. 

Implying Routine Shipments of 

Cocaine by CIA-DEA-Customs 

Newman made reference to ten large shipping containers of fish that had arrived from South America on Air Canada under suspicious circumstances that he wanted to inspect. His supervisor ordered him not to inspect it. Newman described the incident to the House Committee: 

A Customs House broker told me that he had heard about a large load of cocaine being brought in one month earlier. He then described exactly the date, the airline, the commodity, and the country of origin. I immediately contacted Internal Affairs. The agent told me that both DEA and Customs agents had told him that they hadn’t brought any loads of cocaine into the country on that day. I was left with two theories: corrupt members of Customs management arranged the load and set me up to sign it off; or DEA or Customs agents arranged the load and wanted to keep it quiet, so they lied to the Internal Affairs agent. I have asked myself a number of times, How many other inspectors have also been set up to sign off loads? 

Newman described another incident of drugs arriving on a Pan Am flight: 

I had found out about a load of cocaine arriving on Pan Am Flight 416. I was certain that a “dirty” load had arrived. Agents from both Internal Affairs and Office of Investigations had both denied knowledge of a load of cocaine, but voiced a willingness to check it out. Approximately 2 hour later another agent from Office of Investigations called to demand where I had received the information about the load of cocaine [apparently trying to silence the informant]. 

CIA Cocaine Load into Los Angeles 

Was Normal and Proper 

Two weeks after the prior shipment of cocaine, Newman heard of another large cocaine shipment. He contacted Customs Airport Director Eileen Colon, who assured Newman that “She had double checked and could assure me that all of these large controlled deliveries of cocaine were proper. She also stated that I would still receive a letter of reprimand.” The reprimand was for Newman calling Internal Affairs when he heard about the prior cocaine shipment, which Colon called a technical error. 

Further Proof of Government 

Drug Smuggling 

What these statements were admitting was that large shipments of cocaine were regularly being shipped into the United States by government personnel and agencies. This information supported the years and years of similar statements made to me by my government undercover sources. In a March 27, 1992, letter to Representative Doug Barnard, Newman wrote: 

Smuggling, corruption, and graft are, and have been an integral component of border culture and society for the last two hundred years. Individuals growing up in the border environment are going to be loyal to their families first, friends second, and their employer, the United States of America, third. Presently, huge numbers of Texas law enforcement officers who grew up on the border are involved in varying degrees in smuggling activity. The list includes sheriffs, deputies, city, state and federal law officers. The Texas border is rapidly becoming a “little Colombia,” with no end in sight. 

Dynamite Discoveries Followed 

by Letters of Reprimand 

Despite uncovering these criminal and even subversive activities by government personnel, Customs supervisors made no attempt to address the serious matters. Instead, they placed a letter of reprimand in Newman’s file alleging that he made a technical violation by reporting the major criminal offenses to Customs Internal Affairs: bypassing the SAC who would have covered up the matters. In effect, the major drug traffickers went scot-free, but the agent reporting the crimes was reprimanded. 

Protecting Informant 

from DEA Agent 

Newman described the incident where one of his informants told him about a shipment of jewelry that was arriving which was shown as a $200,000 value when in fact it was a $600,000 value. His investigation caught the deception and the shipment was seized. Several days later, DEA agent Darnelle Garcia asked Newman the name of his informant. Newman refused to provide this information, fearing for the informant’s life. Newman wrote: 

This was so preposterous that I told him that I didn’t give out the names of my informants. A few days later another inspector told me that Garcia’s informant had owned part of the large shipment of jewelry that I had seized. I can only presume that my informant would have been badly beaten or killed if I would have given out his name. For the record, Darnelle Garcia is presently awaiting trial in federal court in Los Angeles for acts of corruption on the job. 

Perilous Position of Customs 

Contract Agents or Informants 

Under these conditions, it is obvious that any contract agent carrying out undercover assignments for U.S. Customs would be easily disavowed if the authorized operation became a political liability. 

Operation Polar Cap 

Newman described how Customs covered up for what would become the largest money laundering operation ever busted by the government involving jewelry stores in the Los Angeles area. 

Brinks Money Laundering 

Operation in Los Angeles 

In reporting a large money-laundering operation in Los Angeles at Brinks, Newman wrote: 

In 1985, I found that Brinks, the armored car company, was importing gold bullion and coins for sale by their company. People were bringing paper sacks full of cash and trading it for gold shot and coins. 

Newman checked with Gary Cunitz, their cargo coordinator, asking him if he ever had the feeling that Brinks had been laundering drug money by selling gold? Cunitz replied, “Yes, and that’s why we stopped selling gold.” After Brinks stopped the practice, a Brinks vice president “quit” the company and set up a separate operation selling gold. 

Newman filed a report on this money laundering operation. Instead of filing charges, Customs supervisors merely required Brinks to file government forms known as CF 4790. Newman was furious; it was a huge money laundering scheme that had gone on for years and the company’s crimes were ignored. 

Felony Retaliation Against 

Government Agents 

The House report devoted considerable space to government retaliation against agents who reported corruption by management personnel, including drug trafficking offenses, or who discovered government-protected drug smuggling operations. Appendix 9 in the report, for instance, was titled: “Material Concerning Continuing Retaliation By Customs Officials Against Whistleblowers In San Antonio and Chicago.” This retaliation violated numerous federal criminal statutes, including Title 18 USC Section 1505 relating to obstructing proceedings before government departments, agencies and committees, and Title 18 USC Sections 1512 and 1513 which pertain to threatening witnesses. The congressional committee did nothing about these criminal acts that undermined the responsibility and the functions of that government agency. 

Smoking Hallucinogenic Substance? 

Despite all the internal reports of corruption and cover-ups in the Customs Service, Customs Commissioner Carol Hallett, wrote in a February 15, 1992, letter to FBI Director William Sessions : “In the past several years, as a direct result of the FBI and Customs working together [i.e., cover-ups of internal corruption], notable accomplishments have been achieved in the area of dismantling large drug trafficking organizations.” 

The smoke and mirrors went both ways. Sessions, in a February 26, 1991, reply, wrote: “The importance of the January 22nd meeting was to reaffirm the long-standing spirit of cooperation between the FBI and the United States Customs Service (USCS) and strengthen the lines of communication between our agencies. Your assistance and positive support in resolving these issues is indicative of the spirit of cooperation that has been the benchmark of FBI and USCS relations. I look forward to a continuation of that tradition.” 

These letters appear to be written by people on another planet, or surely, under the spell of some strong hallucinogenic substance. No matter, the public takes it all in as gospel, and that is what counts! 

Duplicity of Congressional 

Obstruction of Justice 

For over 30 years I have encountered and documented congressional obstruction of justice. Many deep-cover insiders, FBI agents, and others have provided prima facie proof of the corruption to members of Congress—who then covered up. These were major criminal acts that made possible great harm upon the United States and many of its people. The 1553-page report, one of many revealing reports, received the same cover-up by members of Congress and most of the media. None of the committee members, or any other congressional committee members who knew about the findings in that report, made any effort to bring about the cessation of the drug smuggling into the United States by federal employees and agencies. This type of cover-up violated many federal criminal statutes for which an ordinary person would end up in prison.

Customs Service Drug Smuggling 

Report: Disappearance 

A May 3, 1993 Associated Press (AP) story described an explosive eight volume file prepared in December 1990 that disappeared from a final Washington report in 1991. The missing files described “Customs Service drug smuggling” and reported a pattern of drug trafficking by Customs inspectors. This report was sent to Washington and then removed from government files. Most newspapers refused to print the AP story, but I found it in the Oakland Tribune. 

Mexico’s Cartels Buying U.S. Cops? 

The title on a U.S. News & World Report article (March 8, 1999) was “The Corrupting Allure of dirty drug money.” with the subtitle, “Are Mexico’s cartels buying U.S. cops?” The article described INS inspector Rafael Landa, with a salary of $35,000 a year, having $300,000 cash stored in his Nogales, Arizona home. It was believed that two Mexican drug gangs paid Landa and two other INS inspectors almost a million dollars for allowing over 4000 pounds of cocaine to cross the border. That quantity of cocaine had a street value of over $1.5 billion. 

Customs Agents Taking 

Kickbacks from Informants 

A July 24, 1998 article in the San Francisco Daily Journal, referring to U.S. Customs Service agents, said: “A number of incidents brought strong criticism to the Justice Department, among them the government’s failure to disclose that a U.S. Customs agent took a $4,000 kickback from an informant in a major drug-smuggling trial.” Former Customs Agent Frank Gervacio received a $4,000 kickback in a drug case from government informant Michael Woods in a major international marijuana case. The kickback tainted a major drug case involving a former member of the Thai parliament, Thanong Sirprechapong, in which over 90,000 pounds of marijuana were smuggled into the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. The attorney for the Thai defendant moved to have the case dismissed on the basis of the misconduct between the informant and the U.S. Customs agent. The kickback resulted in criminal charges filed against the Customs agent in U.S. District Court, San Francisco (U.S. v. Gervacio, CR97-0275MHJP N.D. Cal). 

Federal Judge’s 

Suspicious Leniency 

Despite the seriousness of the matter, the position of trust which the government agent occupies, and the fact that a multi-year investigation of a major drug operation was legally undermined, U.S. District Judge Marilyn Patel sentenced Gervacio on March 1, 1999, to only 100 hours of community service and ordered him to pay a fine in the amount of the kickback (March 1, 1999). Not much more than a person receives for a traffic offense. In the third editions of Unfriendly Skies and Defrauding America, I describe in detail the corruption by this federal judge that covered up for major high-level crimes against the public. 

There can be several reasons why a government agent receives a kickback from a government informant. The government agent and an informant may have engaged in a conspiracy to set up an innocent person, which results in the informant receiving compensation based upon the recommendation of the government agent, and the government agent builds up a favorable record for job actions. The informant than kicks back part of the government compensation to the agent. 

Another reason could be that the informant is alerted to a major drug ring  by the government agent and given insider information that the informant can then claim in a notice of criminal activities made to the government agency. After being paid for “his” tip, the informant kicks back part of the government money to the government agent who provided him the initial information. 

“A national disgrace!” 

Tucson FBI Resident Agent in Charge, Steve McCraw, described the bribing of U.S. agents along the border as “a national disgrace.” Drug Enforcement Administration Chief Thomas Constantine estimated that drug cartels pay over $1 million every week in bribes to government agents. 

A February 1999 Treasury Department report stated that the Customs Service had repeatedly failed to fight internal corruption, and continues to be affected by a “long history of strife and infighting” involving its two internal investigative units. 

How Corrupt Government Agents 

Increase Their Income 

There are many ways for government agents responsible for drug-related matters to increase their income. For instance: 

• Notify drug traffickers when the inspector will be on duty at a border check point so that the trafficker can be waved through without an inspection. 
• Pass along knowledge of an arrest warrant about to be served. 
• Pass along knowledge existing in one of the government databases. 
• Make a bogus inspection of a drug-laden vehicle and allow it to pass without inspection. 
• Destroy evidence in the files pertaining to a targeted drug trafficker. 
• Refuse to initiate investigations, or close down investigations, when the evidence of such crime exists. 
• Transfer or reprimand agents who develop evidence sufficient to indict. 
• Order agents not to conduct an investigation of a particular person or company known to be involved in drug trafficking. 
• Federal agents or U.S. Attorney refusing to act on evidence of criminal activities when related to high-level government officials. 
• Federal agents or U.S. attorneys falsely stating the evidence is not sufficient to convict so as to protect government-related activities. 
• Federal agents or U.S. attorney filing sham criminal charges against government agent who reports crimes being protected by higher officials. 
• Government supervisors filing unfavorable reports about an inspector, or transferring him or her into an assignment away from the scene of the corrupt activities. 
• Charge investigator with technical violations and take disciplinary action against him or her, when the investigator is reporting politically sensitive or government-protected corruption. 

Instructed to Commit Fraud and 

Perjury by DOJ and Customs 

Mark Conrad was a veteran in the Customs Service, who was resident agent in charge (RAC) in Customs Internal Affairs at Houston, responsible for a nine-state area. He retired from U.S. Customs Service in December 1998. He was very vocal in articulating the misconduct he had seen over the years. He provided me with information about corruption in Customs and the Department of Justice. In one letter he said: 

I can give you explicit details of my being asked to lie in Federal Court in Ft. Lauderdale; to ignore blatantly false representations to a Federal judge in San Diego, to lie in an internal investigation, etc. I can provide you with actual documents that prove the government altered computer records (Internal Affairs reports) to reflect what management wanted—not what the facts were and I can provide you with specific sources and outside independent government agents that can confirm what I say. 

Customs Admits Internal Corruption 

“U.S. Customs Admits Its Own Drug Corruption,” was the title to a New York Times article (February 17, 1999) as it referred to an Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) report which stated in part: 

The officials said the number of (internal corruption) cases might be higher because the corruption often required little involvement by an officer whose only overt activity was to turn away when a car carrying drugs pulled up at an inspection lane. Such cases are extremely difficult to detect, given the volume of cross-border traffic. 

One of the most serious issues to emerge in the report was the animosity between the agency’s internal affairs unit and the Office of Investigations, which conducts criminal inquiries into violations of Customs laws. The report found what it called a “long history of strife and infighting” between the two units, an animosity based on investigations agents’ belief that agents assigned to internal affairs “are incompetent, overzealous and spend too much time investigating matters that are unrelated to corruption.” 

Two Internal Affairs agents interviewed in the course of the review said the hostility had “a debilitating effect on their ability to perform their jobs diligently” and “diminished the importance of their work.” 

Some agents cited instances in which investigations agents interfered with or compromised investigations. The report did not cite specifics but said that two Federal prosecutors had considered excluding Customs agents from corruption cases because of the conflict that the report said had reached “critical proportions.” 

Prosecuting America’s Men 

and Women While Protecting 

Corrupt Government Personnel 

The corrupt culture that permeates U.S. Customs protects the major drug traffickers who pay bribes. To offset those drug traffickers that are allowed to pass through Customs, some agents pick on those who aren’t in a position to pay for protection: the average Joe or Jane passing through Customs. Agents receive extra money for catching people smuggling small quantities of drugs, and this extra compensation leads to harassing abuses against many people who have not committed any smuggling offenses.

Personal Outrages Resulting 

from Personal Searches 

The PBS television show, Frontline, titled “Snitch,” which aired on April 29, 1999, documented the cases of people, including women, who were subjected to body cavity searches, who were detained for hours at a time, made to take laxatives while detained and endured people watching them defecate, looking for ingested drugs. This can happen to you, your wife, your mother, and you must accept it. This is all a part of the deteriorating constitutional rights that formerly existed but are now lost, a condition younger people don’t recognize. 

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