Dark Alliance...The CIA,The Contra's and The Crack Cocaine Explosion
By Gary Webb
6
By Gary Webb
6
"They were doing their patriotic duty"
Unlike Carlos Cabezas, who walked into an existing
cocaine sales operation and began dealing dope the next
day, Danilo Blandón was forced to make his own way,
finding his own buyers in a city he really didn't know. If he
had been in San Francisco, it would have been a different
story. Menses's drug network there was well established
and, according to Blandón, flourishing. After distributing
900 kilos—nearly one ton—in 1981, Blandón said, Menses's business in San Francisco "got bigger and
bigger, because all the family was working at that time with
him, in the drug business."
By contrast, Menses's network in Los Angeles was of more recent origin and had been dealt a serious blow in
late 1981 with the arrest and subsequent flight of his West
Covina dealer, Julio Bermúdez, who had been moving
about twenty kilos a month before he was arrested.
While Blandón struggled to establish a customer base,
he made himself useful to the Menses organization in
other ways. He became "like a secretary for Mr. Menses,
because he already saw that I could do a lot for him. He
started telling me, 'Go out and collect some money to
somebody else in L.A.' and I started doing it, and he started
getting trust, trusting in me."
Blandón said he would not only pick up money from
customers in L.A. but deliver it as well, taking cash from
Menses to pay his cocaine suppliers in Los Angeles, men
Blandón described as Colombians. He also began
keeping the books for the L.A. drug operation, describing
himself as Menses's "administrator."
"I wasn't working with him in San Francisco. He was
working alone," Blandón said. "I keeping the books from
L.A."
"You were keeping his books in L.A.?" Blandón was
asked.
"Yes."
"So he was up in San Francisco, and you're down here in
L.A.?"
"Yes."
"So you were running his Los Angeles operation, isn't
that correct?"
"Yes," Blandón said.
"But remember, we were running
just a—whatever we were running in L.A. goes—the profit
is—was going to the Contra revolution. I don't know from
San Francisco."
The relationship between Blandón and Menses quickly
transcended the cocaine business. Meneses opened up a
restaurant on Hoover Street in East Los Angeles, which
Blandón helped oversee, called the Chicalina. Blandón
described the establishment somewhat curiously to a
federal grand jury, calling it a "marketing" operation. "That
was not my restaurant. That was Menses's restaurant," he
said, but he admitted that he'd told others he was one of the
owners.
Another of Blandón's jobs involved looking after the
welfare of Menses's wife and children. Menses had sent
them from San Francisco to L.A. after he started yet
another affair. In 1982, Blandón said, Menses "was in
love" with a woman in South San Francisco named Blanca
Margarita Castano, a Nicaraguan who would later become
his fifth wife.
Blanca was a cousin of a top Sandinista official, Bayardo
Arce Castano, one of the Nicaraguan government's nine commandantes and one of the most hard-line radicals
among them. Blanca's apartment near the Cow Palace, an
old auditorium made famous by Jefferson Airplane, was
used to store cocaine. "I went one time to pick it up right
there," Blandón said.
A frequent houseguest of Menses during this period
was John Lacome, a San Franciscan who was friendly with
Norwin's nephews, Jaime and Jairo. Lacome said he lived
at Menses's home for long periods during the early 1980s,
and told of cocaine-fueled parties that went on for days. Menses appeared totally unafraid of being arrested;
"There was a woman he was selling to, and this woman
would drive by his house, honk, and he'd come walking out
to the street with two kilos in his hands, in broad daylight,
and give them to her," Lacome said.
Menses was fond of expensive leisure suits, wore a
fairly obvious toupee, and took pains to surround himself
with women, as did his nephews. A former girlfriend of
Jaime Menses, Gloria Lopez, said the nephews all drove
flashy new cars, which they would trade in as soon as they
tired of them. That was how she first noticed Jaime, she
said. She was tending bar in the Mission District, and he
would drive up in a different new car every couple weeks.
Lopez, who later had a child with Jaime Menses, said
Jaime started off driving trucks for his uncle Norwin right out
of high school. Initially the loads were military uniforms; then
he graduated to moving a more lucrative product—and
started earning a substantially bigger paycheck.
"You give a kid like that out of high school all that money,
and what do you think is going to happen?" Lopez asked. "I
can't say that I blame Jaime for what he did. Then. I blame
him for a lot of things that happened later though."
Jaime's father, Jaime Sr., was also pressed into service
for the cause, hauling money to Central America for brother
Norwin. "Jaime Sr., I respected him very much," Rafael
Cornejo said. "He really wasn't too much involved with
drugs. He had a brake factory in Nicaragua before the
revolution, called FRICA. He was a very decent man.
During, I can't remember which year, he was incarcerated
in the U.S., 1984–85. . .. He'd been stopped at the border
with $70,000 or something. He was taking the money down
to Nicaragua. Once I told him, 'Look, Jaime, let me do that
for you.' But he said, no, he could do just fine." Jaime
Menses Sr. was murdered in 1990 in the offices of his money-changing business—FRECERSA—in San Jose,
Costa Rica.
Such were the hazards of being a Menses. So it was
not surprising that when Maritza Menses and her children
arrived in L.A. in 1982, someone would be assigned to
watch over them and help them along. Norwin gave Danilo
the job.
In August 1982 Blandón and Maritza Menses set up a
business together in Los Angeles, a company they named
JDM Artwork Inc. The name was an acronym made up of
the first initials of the incorporators' first names: Josefa
Maria Pelligatti, a friend of the Menses; Danilo
Blandón; and Maritza Menses.
The company did silk screen printing, and Blandón said
it was started by Meneses to provide an income for his
relocated family. But there may have been other motives
behind Menses's investment in the silk-screening
business. The company quickly became part of the
Contras' support network in Los Angeles. ARDE
commander Eden Pastora said he visited the firm during a
trip he made to L.A. in 1982, and it printed up T-shirts with
his likeness on them. Former Pastora aide Carol Prado
claimed that a Los Angeles printing company connected to
Blandón was used to launder money from drug sales for the
Contras.
Another former associate of Blandón, a Puerto Rican man convicted of counterfeiting U.S. currency, believed that
the company also dabbled in funny money, printing up fake
twenty-dollar bills that provided operating cash for the FDN.
The former associate produced Polaroid photographs that
showed him at work in an office with FDN banners and
slogans on the wall, and a picture of Blandón in the same
office, smiling, his arms thrown over the shoulders of other
laughing Hispanic men. A blue-and-white FDN flag was
clearly visible on the wall.
The associate's claims of counterfeiting could not be
independently corroborated, but according to CIA cables
filed in federal court, the CIA had information by 1984 that
Norwin Menses was involved in counterfeiting—both
American dollars and Costa Rican colones. In a 1986
interview, Menses said he allowed FDN members to use
his wife's Los Angeles T-shirt factory as a meeting place.
As the Contra support organizations in San Francisco
and L.A. grew more active, Menses role with the FDN
became much more public. Former FDN director Edgar
Chamorro told the San Francisco Examiner in 1986 that
he and FDN director Frank Arana flew to San Francisco in
October 1982 to select local leaders for the FDN support
committee there. Menses attended the organizational meeting, standing quietly in the back of the auto body shop
where the meeting was held. Menses "appeared like a
fund-raiser, an organizer," Chamorro told the paper. The
next day, Chamorro said, Menses helped set up a similar meeting in Los Angeles, providing refreshments
beforehand and throwing a party afterward.
"He was one of the main contacts in L.A.," Chamorro told
Examiner reporter Seth Rosenfeld. "He was in charge of
the organization of the L.A. meeting, the reception. He
drove us to the place. He gave us the schedule for that day.
He knew people, he was recommending names" (for
leadership positions in the L.A. organization).
Renato Pena Cabrera, the FDN's San Francisco
representative, told federal investigators in 1997 that he
was present "on many occasions" when Menses
telephoned FDN commander Enrique Bermúdez in
Honduras. "Meneses told Pena of Bermúdez's requests for
such things as gun silencers (which Meneses obtained in
Los Angeles), cross bows, and other military equipment for
the Contras." Menses sometimes personally delivered the
supplies to the Contras, Pena said; other times he had
contacts in Miami and Los Angeles forward them to friendly
Honduran authorities.
"Meneses would bring [back] military information,
bulletins, and communiques from Bermúdez that Pena
would put into newsletters and give to the press and Contra
sympathizers," a summary of Pena's interview states.
In a recent interview with the CIA, Meneses said that
"between 1983 and 1984, his primary role with the
California sympathizers was to help recruit personnel for
the movement. Meneses says he was asked by Bermúdez
to attempt to recruit Nicaraguans in exile and others who
were supporters of the Contra movement." The drug lord
told the agency's internal investigators that "he was not
directed to recruit people with any specific skills, such as
pilots or doctors, but was simply told to seek out anyone
who wanted to join with the FDN. Meneses states that he
was a member of an FDN fund-raising committee, but was
not the committee's head." He did not raise much cash but
was "involved in 1985 in attempting to obtain material
support, medical and general supplies" for the Contras.
When asked by the author in 1996 where he got the money to pay for these war materials, Meneses gave a
slight smile. "There was money available for these
purchases," he said.
Meneses associate Rafael Cornejo said he attended
some of the parties Meneses hosted for the FDN at his
homes in the San Francisco area.
"You can say what you want about that man, but his heart
and soul was into the movement, and that was his priority more than anything else," said Cornejo, whose father had
been a sergeant in Somoza's National Guard. "It's kind of
hard to be kicked out of your own country and that's what
his passion was. He was straight-up pro-Somocista."
Blandón complained that Meneses was so tightfisted
with the cash he was raising for the Contras that he was making little or no money selling cocaine. "I didn't make any money, you know. It was only for the people in the mountains, you know, for the Contra Revolution," Blandón
said. Meneses allowed him to keep enough "just to pay the
rent and to pay the food for my daughter. . .just to pay my
expenses." Among the Nicaraguan exile community, it was
strongly suspected that Meneses was dealing cocaine for
the Contras. And it was not un-admired. Somoza's former
secretary, Juan C. Wong, one of the first Nicaraguan exiles
to begin recruiting ex-Guardia men to join the Contras, said
he visited Meneses in San Francisco in 1983. "It's true, it
was widely spread around that he was involved with drugs,"
said Wong, a University of San Francisco grad who knew
the Meneses family from before the revolution. "And I don't
doubt that they wanted to raise money for the FDN. That's
only natural. They were doing their patriotic duty."
Bradley Brunon, Blandón's lawyer, said Blandón was one
of several former Somoza supporters dealing cocaine in
L.A. in the early 1980s. He met Blandón while defending a middle-class Nicaraguan exile accused of drug trafficking.
"People were being arrested who had high government
connections, or high military connections, in the Somoza
regime, who didn't have any particular lifestyle consistent
with being cocaine dealers, didn't have a background
consistent with that, but they were highly politicized
individuals," Brunon said. "And the only politics I was aware
that they were involved with was this attempt to fund the
Contra revolutionary insurgency."
Brunon said it was his understanding that "the Contras,
and I don't even know if they were known as that then. . .had
no above-the-line funding. Everything was sub rosa and
one of the ways they were trying to raise money was
importing cocaine. That was information that I didn't
specifically receive from Blandón, but that I had surmised
based on a series of events that were happening."
Blandón was fairly close-mouthed about his role with the
Contras, according to Brunon. "I don't know the formal
particulars of it other than there was this kind of
atmosphere of CIA and clandestine activities and so forth
that surrounded him when I met him," Brunon said of his
longtime client. "He never was specific. I mean, I believed
he was involved with the Contras. I don't think there's any
doubt about that. Beyond that, I never got into the
particulars with him, because I didn't have a need to know
at that point."
An air of mystery also surrounded another associate of
Blandón, an odd, cherubic, balding man in his mid-thirties
Blandón picked up as a partner shortly after going to work
for Meneses. The man would remain at Blandón's side for
seven years, though mostly in the shadows. Considering
his work history and the activities he was involved with at
the time, his appearance in the Nicaraguan's cocaine
trafficking entourage is both strange and worrisome. He
would give Blandón's drug ring a whole new sideline—
weapons and sophisticated electronics equipment—and a
whole new smell, the unmistakable aroma of the U.S.
intelligence community.
Brad Brunon met him in 1986, when he showed up
unannounced at the lawyer's office and began asking very
detailed questions about Blandón's background. "It was just
like the hair on the back of your neck goes up. What does
this guy want? What's he doing here? Is he investigating
Blandón?" Brunon said. "I never knew what his true role
was. I mean, he covertly insinuated that he was CIA. At
least, if not a sworn member, whatever the hell they do to
get to become employees—some sort of operative."
Brunon "really didn't have much communication with the guy
because he scared me."
His name was Ronald Jay Lister, a southern California
native who began working as a cocaine dealer and money
hauler for Blandón in late 1981 or early 1982, just as the
CIA was taking over the funding and operations of the
newly formed FDN. The CIA has publicly denied any
relationship with the man.
Before launching his life of crime as Danilo Blandón's
faithful sidekick, Ronald Lister had been a police officer of
one sort or another for nearly fifteen years. He'd started out
as a military policeman for the U.S. Army and U.S. Army
Reserve, stationed in Orange County with the 414th Military
Police company. His service records show he had a
degree in political science and was trained in processing
prisoners of war captured during the Vietnam conflict. He
regularly received excellent fitness reports. While an army
reservist, Lister hired on as an officer with the police
department of Maywood, a small suburb of Los Angeles
that once employed a handful of uniformed patrolmen. He
was also a reserve deputy for the L.A. County Sheriff's
Office at the same time.
Lister was called to active duty in the army for a few months in 1969, and later, when his enlistment ended, he
volunteered for the U.S. Coast Guard, serving as a reserve
port security officer at Terminal Island, in San Pedro,
California. In late 1973 he found a home with the Laguna
Beach Police Department, which patrols a posh Orange
County suburb south of Los Angeles. There, among the rich
and famous, he rose through the ranks to become a
detective in the burglary division.
Lieutenant Danielle Adams said Lister was a veteran by
the time she arrived in burglary; her recollection of him was
that he was "always very successful, very tenacious and got
the job done."
His former chief, Neil Purcell, who was on the hiring
board that gave Lister his job, remembers him differently.
"You hear lots of things about Ron Lister," Purcell said.
"The man, in my opinion, is a lying, conniving, manipulative
person who likes to play with people's minds. He's very
evasive and loves living on the edge. He's the biggest
bullshitter that has ever been placed on this earth."
Toward the end of Lister's twelve-year stint with the
police department, he was traveling in some pretty fast
company. "When he worked here, that silly son of a gun
was in with—what do they call themselves?—the Royal
Highnesses from Iran!" Purcell recalled with a hoot.
"Sporting Rolex watches for himself and his wife. Getting
wined and dined by these people until finally they [the
Iranians] were asked to leave this country. Anything. He
threw out names and organizations. He's a very bright guy.
As far as intelligence, he's very, very smart." It was the one
point upon which Adams and Purcell agreed.
"Don't ever underestimate him," Adams warned. "He's
very, very bright and very tenacious."
Both Adams and Purcell said Lister became involved in
private security work on the side toward the end of 1979.
He quit the Laguna Beach police department in May 1980
to pursue that vocation full-time. "He was in the alarm
business, is what he originally started off as," Adams
recalled. "And he had some muckety-mucks from the Arab
countries, so he says, in his alarm business and this was
getting pretty elaborate, and that's when he left the police
department. I know there was a lot of involvement and a lot
of travel while he was still here."
A few weeks before he resigned, corporate records
show, Lister incorporated a company called Pyramid
International Security Consultants Inc., based in Newport
Beach. What Pyramid was doing between 1980 and 1981
is not known, but Lister stated that this was around the time
he first met Blandón, "through a Beverly Hills business
connection." He said Blandón introduced him to Norwin Meneses, and that he "provided physical security for both men," who "always paid him in cash."
Soon after Lister paired up with Blandón and Meneses,
his security company began doing business overseas.
Blandón told Justice Department interviewers that he and
Meneses "entered into an informal partnership [with Lister]
for the purpose of selling weapons abroad," specifically in
El Salvador. Blandón said the plan was for Lister, Blandón,
and Meneses "to get their share of the profits in weapons,
which they would then give to the Contras."
Blandón's attorney, Brad Brunon, described Lister as
"one of these guys who would boast about having bugging
capabilities, would boast about having wiretap capabilities,
you could get any information any time, one of those. . .Ican-uplink-to-the-satellite sort of guy."
Christopher W. Moore, a former reserve Laguna Beach
police officer who met Lister in 1979, said Lister hired him
as an office manager in 1982 while Moore was working his
way through law school. "I think I was actually an officer in
Pyramid International. Ron put my name down as treasurer
or director or something because he needed to have some
directors for the incorporation papers." Moore confirmed
that Lister had extensive business dealings in Central
America, specifically in El Salvador. Lister explained his
travels there to Moore as involving gun running and "helping
the Contras, supposedly on behalf of the U.S. government.
I remember the longest conversations with him, 'I'm
protected. You're working for the government. Don't worry
about anything. I'm protected, I'm protected.' I don't know if
that was true or not, but I do know that we stopped worrying
about domestic security jobs and started concentrating on
foreign ones."
During the early 1980s, when Lister began doing
business there, El Salvador was wracked by a vicious civil
war and murderous political repression. A tenacious
revolutionary guerrilla group, the FMLN, had been running
circles around the country's corrupt and inefficient military.
The rebels' fight was being assisted by the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua, who have admitted supplying them with tons of
Eastern Bloc arms and ammunition.
The Reagan administration was far more concerned
about what was happening in El Salvador than they were
about Nicaragua, which Reagan's advisers considered
already "lost" to the Communists. One of Reagan's top
foreign policy objectives in 1981 and 1982 was to keep
what had happened in Nicaragua from spreading to El
Salvador, and the administration pushed hard for increased military and economic support for the beleaguered
Salvadoran government, particularly after a January 1982
rebel attack on the main military airport in El Salvador
demolished dozens of aircraft.
"Indeed, what came to be known years later as the
'Reagan Doctrine' may have been born in El Salvador in
1982," former Reagan State Department official Robert
Kagan wrote in 1996. Halting Sandinista arms shipments
to El Salvador was the official reason CIA director William
Casey gave to Congress when he informed lawmakers of
Reagan's decision in late 1981 to turn the CIA loose in
Nicaragua. The Contras were being trained to police the
borders to make sure no Sandinista arms got out to the
FMLN, Casey claimed.
Like many of the things the CIA said about the Contras,
that explanation was a lie, a smoke screen to hide the
agency's true agenda, which was to run a full-scale covert
war against the Sandinistas. The Reagan administration
found its Salvadoran aid program a tough sell in Congress
because of the horrendous human rights abuses then
occurring in the country. Frustrated by its inability to crush
the FMLN guerrillas in the field despite an overwhelming
firepower advantage, elements of the Salvadoran
government were striking back at the rebels by murdering
thousands of their supporters with death squads—right wing, quasi-military posses that would snatch suspected
rebel sympathizers off the streets and leave their mutilated
bodies on the outskirts of town a few days later. At the
height of this campaign, residents of the capital city of San
Salvador would wake up to find forty new bodies every
morning.
The Salvadoran government officially denied any
connection with the death squads, but the denials rang
hollow in Washington, even among Reagan's stalwarts.
"Under the guise of anti-Communism, the death squads
terrorized the entire country—murdering nuns, teachers,
labor organizers, political opponents and thousands of
other civilians," Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North wrote in his
1991 memoirs, Under Fire.
North wrote that it was clear most of the death squad
activity was the responsibility of the ultra right ARENA party
and its leader, former Salvadoran army major Roberto
D'Aubuisson. D'Aubuisson was reportedly running one of
the death squads linked to the assassination of San
Salvador's Archbishop Oscar Romero—allegedly by hit men from the FDN predecessor, the Legion of
September 15.
The official whose men were committing some of the
worst abuses was a $90,000-a-year CIA asset, Colonel
Nicholas Carranza, head of the government's feared
Treasury Police. According to one account, CIA director
Casey met personally with Carranza in the summer of 1983
and told him to "knock it off," or the CIA would kick him off
the payroll.
In phone conversations with Lister, Christopher Moore
learned that his boss was "supposedly doing security
consulting for the government of El Salvador." In June of
1982 Lister asked Moore to fly down and "babysit" a
government contract for a few days while Lister returned to
the United States to take care of some unspecified
business.
Moore agreed, and was off on what he would call the
strangest trip of his life.
Accompanying him on the eleven-day excursion, Moore
said, was a man who introduced himself as the Salvadoran
consul in Los Angeles. Since Moore spoke little Spanish,
the man served as Moore's guide and interpreter. "They
flew me down to this airbase that the French were building,
and I had to take pictures of it," Moore said; it was his
impression that Pyramid was bidding on a contract to
provide security for the base. When he returned to El
Salvador's capital, San Salvador, he settled into the
downtown Ramada Inn. Then he and the Salvadoran consul
attended a series of meetings with none other than Major
Roberto D'Aubuisson. "That was probably the highlight of my life at that point," chuckled Moore, now an attorney in
Los Angeles. "There I was, a reserve police officer who'd
only been in the country for a couple days, and I was sitting
in this office in downtown San Salvador across the desk
from the man who ran the death squads. He had a gun lying
on the top of his desk and had these filing cabinets pushed
up against the windows of the office so nobody could shoot
through them."
At another meeting, Moore and D'Aubuisson were joined
by Ray Prendes, the newly elected head of the Salvadoran
Assembly and a powerful figure in the ruling Christian
Democratic party. Prendes was on friendly terms with
D'Aubuisson, Moore said, and both appeared to have
some role in the award of the security contract Lister was
seeking.
Lister, in an interview with police, "said that Moore was a
good kid who had gone down to El Salvador to take
pictures of poorly planned and constructed security work at
a port on the southwest tip of El Salvador."
Moore was unsure if Lister's company ever got the
security contract for the airbase, but he thought not. He left
Lister's employ in 1983, soon after his boss began dealing
in heavy weapons. "Ron was an arms dealer and was
buying these semiautomatics, the ones the bad guys use,
called MAC-10s. He also had semiautomatic Uzis, and he
had gotten involved in selling something called RAW, which
was a rifle-fired hand grenade. He was into a lot of things."
Moore wasn't exaggerating. Between 1983 and 1986,
the FBI opened up five separate investigations of Lister, all
of which dealt with allegations of trafficking in illegal
weapons and high-tech devices with foreign governments.
In September 1983, Lister's and Blandón's company,
Pyramid International, came under FBI scrutiny for
Neutrality Act violations, which allegedly involved "the sale
of weapons to El Salvador and the loan of money from
Saudi Arabia to the Salvadoran government. Lister was
also alleged to be attempting to sell arms to several other
countries." Considering the fact that the Saudi government
was heavily involved in financing covert operations for the
Reagan Administration during the 1980s, it is perhaps not
surprising that "no further information was ever developed"
by the FBI. The Justice Department offered no explanation
for why that probe was abandoned.
Lister admits his company was dealing guns in El
Salvador. He told Justice Department investigators that
Blandón and Meneses "were the ones that opened the
doors down there. . they had many connections in El
Salvador. . .from their drug trafficking business." Lister sold
Blandón numerous machine pistols, which Blandón told him
he was sending to the Contras. "Anything that I gave him
was for the purpose of the Contras," Lister insisted.
An FBI informant told Justice Department inspectors that
Norwin Meneses had spoken of obtaining night vision
scopes from Lister in 1982, which the drug lord planned to
sell to the Salvadoran government. Meneses intended to
"use the proceeds from the night scopes to aid the
Contras," the informant reported, but said the deal fell
through.
In October 1982, Pyramid International made a security
proposal to Salvadoran defense minister General Jose
Guillermo Garcia, a man linked by one human rights
organization to death squad activities and the slaughter of
hundreds of peasants at a village called El Mozote in
December 1981.
Pyramid's proposal, which L.A. police found in a 1986
drug raid, was written in Spanish and had "Confidential"
stamped all over the front of it. It was entitled "Technical
Proposal for an Urgent Project to Implement an Integral
Security System for the Defence Ministry and the Major
General of the Armed Forces of the Republic of El
Salvador." The thick report described Pyramid as a unique
consulting firm "dedicated to the maintenance of freedom,
independence and free enterprise." The company only
served clients "with a similar political orientation."
That political orientation was spelled out in no uncertain
terms: Pyramid International Security Consultants would
"assist the new government in its goal to combat the
tyrannical forces of the left side, promoted and assisted by
the current governments of Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet
Union."
Lister's company outlined a variety of services it would
provide for the sum of $189,911: bodyguard and armed
escort services for Salvadoran public officials, including the
president and top political and military leaders; protecting
sensitive installations from sabotage and terrorism; and
installing sophisticated electronic technology, including
radio sensors and explosives detectors, at key military and
industrial installations. Lister later explained the document
as "a proposal to the current government in El Salvador to
implement programs to assist them in different types of
security operations, counter-measures type operations,
dealing with the types of problems they had. . .. We did a
whole study down there."
But one of Lister's associates at the time, a San Diego
arms manufacturer, said Pyramid's security proposal was
actually just a cover for another operation, a covert one
directed by the CIA. The company's real mission in El
Salvador, he said, was to set up a weapons manufacturing
facility to supply guns to the Contras in neighboring
Honduras. In a series of interviews with investigative
reporter Nick Schou of the L.A. Weekly in 1996 and 1997,
arms maker Timothy LaFrance described Pyramid
International as "a private vendor that the CIA used to do
things [the agency] couldn't do." LaFrance, whose
handiwork is so highly regarded that he has created
custom-made weapons for Rambo films and episodes of
Miami Vice, said he accompanied Lister to El Salvador at
least twice, becoming involved as a weapons specialist
and helping to set up facilities to make pistols for the
Contras.
Among the series of nameless biographies attached to
Pyramid's proposal to the Salvadoran government, one
employee is identified a "specialist in the design and manufacture of unique weapons." Lister's former office manager, Chris Moore, confirmed that "one of his [Lister's]
friends, and I can't recall the name, was an arms maker in
San Diego. He had a custom gun shop down there."
LaFrance, who makes and modifies exotic automatic
weapons for the military and law enforcement agencies in
his San Diego manufacturing facility, was convinced
Lister's consulting company had friends in high places. When he applied in Pyramid's name for a State
Department permit to take high-powered weapons out of
the United States, for example, LaFrance said, "It came
back approved in two days. Usually it takes three months. We went down to Central America with two giant boxes full
of machine guns and ammunition."
LaFrance told Schou that their cover story for the trip was
that they were there "to provide security, armor-proofing for
vehicles, limos and homes. My end was the weapons [and]
how to make a three-car stop if you're shot at." But the real
purpose, LaFrance said, was to "set up an operation in El
Salvador that would allow us to get around U.S. laws and
supply the Contras with guns. It's much easier to build the
weapons down there and that's eventually what we did."
Pyramid's security proposal discusses the company's
unique ability "to design and manufacture special
equipment—at the point—and in any part of the world, in
the majority of cases saving their foreign clients important
sums in currency."
According to LaFrance, the Pyramid team moved into a mass-transit center run by the military in downtown San
Salvador. "That's where we made the weapons. You could
have 50 guys working in a machine shop and nobody would
know it," he said. After the finished guns were transported
to a Salvadoran military airstrip in Morazon province, they
were airlifted to Contra camps in Honduras. "We made
almost all of our drops by helicopter, buzzing the treetops,"
LaFrance said.
While LaFrance's story is by its nature difficult to
corroborate, some independent documentation suggests
he was definitely the man to see in the early 1980s if one
needed to build a weapons plant. In May 1983 LaFrance
was solicited by the tiny Cabazon Indian tribe in southern
California to build an arms factory on their desolate,
tumbleweed-strewn Riverside County reservation. "We
need the know-how from an organization engaged in the manufacturing of armaments of various types, all consisting
of technology not currently found on the marketplace," the
Cabazons' letter to LaFrance Specialties stated. Another
letter spelled out precisely what the Cabazons were looking
to build: "A 9-mm machine pistol, an assault rifle with laser
sighting, a long-distance sniper rifle, a portable rocket
system, a night-vision scope, and a battlefield
communications system 'that cannot be detected by current
technology.'"
According to the San Francisco Chronicle, the
Cabazons were working on "a series of international military and security projects that seem to be lifted from the
pages of a spy novel." The tribal administrator was a man
who claimed to have long experience working for the CIA,
helping out on the agency's Chilean destabilization
program in the 1970s. He had paired the tribe up with
Wackenhut International Inc., a security firm the Chronicle
described as being "led by former officials of the CIA, the
FBI, National Security Agency, Defense Department and
federal law enforcement."
Wackenhut was very active in El Salvador during the
Contra war, providing employees to protect the U.S.
embassy and other installations, and doing "things you
wouldn't want your mother to know about," one Wackenhut
employee told Spy magazine in 1992. Apparently the firm
was using the Cabazon reservation's tax-exempt status and
its freedom from federal oversight to gain a competitive
advantage in soliciting federal weapons projects.
Freelance investigative reporter Danny Casolaro was
looking into the Cabazon/Wackenhut projects as part of a
larger conspiracy investigation at the time he was found
dead in a West Virginia motel room in 1991, allegedly a
suicide victim. He had told friends he was convinced that
"spies, arms merchants and others were using the
reservation as a low-profile site on which to develop
weapons for Third World armies, including the Nicaraguan
Contras." The Chronicle stated that Contra leader Eden
Pastora had visited a firing range near the reservation for a
weapons demonstration in 1981, a claim Pastora has both
confirmed and denied on separate occasions.
In early 1994 the U.S. Justice Department announced
that it was opening "a nationwide investigation" into
Casolaro's suspicious death—a probe ordered by then associate attorney general Webb Hubbell. Not long
afterward Hubbell pleaded guilty to crimes he'd committed
while an Arkansas lawyer and resigned from the Justice
Department. What resulted from the Casolaro investigation,
or even whether it ever went forward, has not been made
public.
Hubbell's interest in the journalist's death may have been more than passing curiosity. Hubbell had his own
connections to a company that was making weapons parts
for the Contras.
Tim LaFrance's story about setting up an arms factory
with Ronald Lister in El Salvador bears striking similarities
to one told by Terry Reed, a former air force intelligence
officer and FBI informant who became involved with the
CIA's Contra project in the mid-1980s. Reed, a pilot and machine tool expert, said he was initially recruited to train
would-be Contra pilots at a clandestine airstrip near Nella,
Arkansas. Later, he claims, he was asked to help the CIA
set up secret weapons parts facilities in Arkansas and,
later, in Mexico.
In his memoirs, Compromised, Reed wrote that he
scouted locations and provided the corporate shell for CIA
agents working with the Contras to set up and run a
sophisticated machine-tool shop in Mexico in 1985–86, in
order to keep a supply of untraceable weapons parts
flowing to the Contras during a time when Congress had
cut off the rebels' CIA assistance. He claims CIA
operatives were shipping cocaine through the machine-tool
company he'd helped the agency set up in Guadalajara, Mexico. One of the companies Reed worked with in
Arkansas was a small manufacturer of parking meters
called Park On Meter Inc., located in the town of
Russellville. Reed claimed that the company was secretly manufacturing parts for M-16 rifles as a subcontractor on a
CIA weapons project to supply the Contras.
The Washington Post sent a reporter to Arkansas in
1994 to "investigate" Reed's story. While the resultant
article was a snide and ham-handed attempt to portray
Reed as a crackpot conspiracy theorist, it nonetheless
confirmed many of the basic elements of his story. "Some
of the key relationships described in the book did exist in
some form," the Post grudgingly admitted. "The Iver
Johnson arms company near Little Rock, which the book
portrays as being at the center of the gun-manufacturing
effort, did ship a load of weapons to Nicaragua through a
Mexican distributor, according to former plant engineer J.
A. Matejko. But Matejko, described in the book as part of
the CIA plan, says the rifles were M-1s, not M-16's."
Moreover, the Post found, the parking meter company
Reed named "did make some gun parts for Iver Johnson,
another relationship characterized in the book as part of the
CIA weapons scheme." But, the Post scoffed, the parts
were "firing pins, not M-16 bolts as the book contends."
Park On Meter's former secretary and corporate lawyer
was Webb Hubbell, who also happens to be the brother-inlaw of the company's owner. Hubbell admitted to a Time magazine reporter that POM was also making rocket
launchers.
Another similarity between the weapons operations
described by Reed and LaFrance is that they both involved
admitted drug traffickers who appeared to be working for
the U.S. government. A central figure in all of Reed's
dealings with the CIA, he wrote, was a CIA and DEA
contract agent named Adler Berriman Seal. A former
airline pilot, Seal moved in 1982 from Baton Rouge to a
tiny airfield in isolated Mena, Arkansas, Intermountain
Regional Airport, and began running drugs and weapons.
In the early 1980s, Barry Seal was one of the biggest
cocaine and marijuana importers in the southern United
States, flying loads in directly for the Medellín cartel and airdropping them with pinpoint precision across Louisiana,
Arkansas, and other southern states.
"Seal detailed his cocaine-smuggling activities in '81, '82
and '83. What he testified to was that he was involved in 50
trips during those three years," IRS spokesman Henry
Holms told the Baton Rouge State Times in 1986,
explaining a $29 million lien that the IRS filed against Seal
for back taxes. A letter that year from Louisiana's attorney
general to U.S. Attorney General Ed Meese said Seal
"smuggled between $3 billion and $5 billion worth of drugs
into the U.S."
Seal's farm in Baton Rouge, according to a 1983 U.S.
Customs report, was allegedly used as a drop site for
cocaine and marijuana flown into the country aboard a DC4 aircraft, N90201. That same plane subsequently turned
up flying supplies for the Contras in 1985 through an air
cargo company the FDN hired called Hondu Carib Cargo
Inc. The operator of Hondu Carib, records show, was FDN
leader Adolfo Calero's brother, Mario Calero.
Hondu Carib's owner was pilot Frank Moss, identified in
a 1989 Senate report as having "been investigated,
although never indicted, for narcotics offenses by ten
different law enforcement agencies." The report said Moss
flew FDN supply missions for both Hondu Carib and a
Honduran air freight company called SETCO, which was
owned by Honduras's biggest drug trafficker, Juan Matta
Ballesteros.
One DC-4 Moss used to ferry Contra supplies was
seized by the DEA in March 1987 on a suspected drug run
off Florida's coast. Aboard the plane was marijuana
residue and Moss' notes which, according to a CIA cable,
contained "the names of two CIA officers and their
telephone numbers." Also found was the phone number of
Robert Owen, Oliver North's courier in Central America. (In
1985, records show, Owen reported to Oliver North that a
DC-6 owned by Mario Calero "which is being used for runs
out of New Orleans is probably being used for drug runs
into U.S.")
During the time he was dealing with Terry Reed, Seal
was also working for the DEA as a top-level informant; in
1984 he participated in a joint CIA-DEA sting operation in
an attempt to snare Sandinista government officials in drug
smuggling. Congressional records show North was being
regularly briefed by the CIA on Seal's sting operation, was
supplied with some of the evidence it produced, and
allegedly leaked the information to the press shortly before
a critical vote on Contra aid was coming up in Congress.
North maintains that his only involvement in the Seal sting
against the Sandinistas was as an observer, but a
statement he gave to the FBI in June 1986 suggests that
his relationship with the trafficker was considerably more
complex than that.
On February 17, 1986, Seal was murdered in New
Orleans by Colombian hit men. Four months later, in June,
North called the FBI and claimed that there was an "active measures program" being directed against him by the
Sandinistas. People were following him, he fretted,
directing death threats and smears against him. "North
expressed further concern that he may be targeted for
elimination by organized crime due to his alleged
involvement in drug running," a Washington-based FBI
agent wrote. North pointed to "the murder on Feb. 17, 1986
of a DEA agent, Steele [sic], on the date prior to Steele's
testifying against the Sandinistas for drug involvement."
Seal's "personal records showed him to be a contract
CIA operative both before and during his years of drug running in Mena in the 1980s," historian Roger Morris, a
former NSC staffer, wrote in a 1996 book, Partners in
Power, about Bill and Hillary Clinton.
The same Senate subcommittee that looked into the
Contras' connections with Hondu Carib in 1988 also poked
around at Mena and concluded that "associates of Seal
who operated aircraft service businesses at the Mena,
Arkansas, airport were also the targets of grand jury probes
into narcotics trafficking. Despite the availability of
evidence sufficient for an indictment on money laundering
charges, and over the strong protests of State and federal
law enforcement officials, the cases were dropped. The
apparent reason was that the prosecution might have
revealed national security information."
Clinton's critics have charged that it was impossible for
the governor of Arkansas to have been unaware of Seal's
activities at Mena. Indeed, Reed and former Arkansas
state troopers L. D. Brown and Larry Patterson, both of
whom have been critical of Clinton, insist he knew quite a
bit about it—including the fact that cocaine was involved.
Patterson, a member of Governor Clinton's security detail,
testified that he and other troopers were aware "that there
was large quantities of drugs being flown into the Mena
airport, large quantities of money, large quantities of guns,
that there was an ongoing operation training foreign people
in that area. That it was a CIA operation."
A mechanic at Mena airport, John Bender, swore in a
deposition that he saw Clinton there three times in 1985.
Ex-trooper Brown said that when he confronted Clinton
about the cocaine flights Seal was involved in, Governor
Clinton replied, "That's Lasater's deal," referring to his
close friend and campaign contributor, Little Rock bond
broker Danny Ray Lasater. In 1986 Lasater was indicted by
a federal grand jury in Little Rock on drug charges, and
Clinton's brother Roger, a cocaine addict, was named as
an unindicted co-conspirator. Lasater pleaded guilty to drug
trafficking; he received a thirty-month prison sentence but
served only six months in prison. Clinton pardoned him in
1990.
Clinton's supporters have maintained that Lasater was
no drug dealer, simply a high-flying businessman who got a
little too caught up in the fast life. But that's not the way the
FBI described it in a 1988 report citing the bureau's
successful battles against major drug trafficking
organizations. According to the FBI's description of its
investigation, Lasater was part of a huge drug ring. "In
December 1986, the Little Rock, Arkansas office of the FBI
concluded a four-year Organized Crime Drug Enforcement
Task Force investigation involving the cocaine trafficking
activities of a prominent Little Rock businessman who
operated several banking investment firms and brokerages
in Arkansas and Florida," the FBI report stated. "The
investigation revealed that this businessman was the main
supplier of cocaine to the investment banking and bond
community in the Little Rock area, which has the largest
bond community in the United States outside of New York
City. This task force investigation resulted in the conviction
of this businessman and 24 codefendants to jail sentences
ranging from four months to 10 years, as well as the seizure
of cocaine, marijuana, an automobile, an airplane and
$77,000."
Typically, investigations conducted by federal Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) units
target top-level criminal organizations, not businessmen
who take a few toots every now and then. Researchers
familiar with the Lasater investigation say that the FBI's
description of its Little Rock investigation goes far beyond
anything that has ever been publicly released about the
Lasater probe.
Roger Morris's book, in fact, describes an investigation
that was shut down prematurely and ended only with
Lasater's arrest, not that of twenty-four others. But Morris
also suggested that there was much more to the case than met the eye: "Whatever the limits or extent of Lasater's
cocaine trafficking or the nature of his other dealings, most
believed that beyond him the larger corruption in Little Rock
and elsewhere pointed unmistakably to organized crime,
not to mention the vast crimes of Mena—none of which
would be pursued."
Morris wrote that "in sworn testimony, a former staff member of the Arkansas State Police Intelligence Unit
would describe 'a shredding party' in which she was
ordered to purge the state's Mena files of nearly a thousand
documents, including those referring specifically to Iran/Contra conspirator Oliver North and Seal associate Terry
Reed." Reed claims that North, who was the National
Security Council official overseeing the Contra project at
the time, was his CIA contact for both the pilot-training
program and the machine-tool company front.
A Clinton spokesman called the reports of Clinton's
alleged knowledge of the Mena operations "the darkest
backwater of the right wing conspiracy industry." North, who
certainly knew about Barry Seal, has denied knowing
anything about Terry Reed or what was going on at Mena.
But something was certainly happening at that little airport,
and it was far from routine. While denying that the CIA was
involved in any illegal activities at Mena during the time
Seal's drug-smuggling operation was based there, the
CIA's Inspector General's Office confirmed in 1996 that the
CIA ran a "joint training operation with another federal
agency at Mena Intermountain Airport." The IG report, which
has never been publicly released, reportedly claims the
exercise lasted only two weeks, but conveniently omits the
year this occurred. The CIA also used the Mena airport for
"routine aviation related services" on CIA-owned planes,
according to a declassified summary of the report.
Coincidentally, it was Seal's drug-hauling airplane, a
Fairchild C-123K called The Fat Lady, that a Sandinista
soldier blew out of the skies over Nicaragua in 1986 with a
SAM-7 missile, breaking open the Iran-Contra scandal. The
plane had been based at Mena before Seal sold it and it
began flying weapons-hauling missions for Oliver North and
the FDN.
Morris wrote that Seal also worked for the Pentagon's
spy service, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), "where
coded records reportedly showed him on the payroll
beginning in 1982." Tim LaFrance told L.A. journalist Nick
Schou that the DIA was also involved in Ronald Lister's
weapons manufacturing plant in El Salvador, and that the meetings Lister and his associates had with death squad
commander D'Aubuisson "happened because the DIA
wanted them to happen." Records found in Ronald Lister's
house in the 1986 raid disclosed connections between
Lister and "a DIA subcontractor."
Another man involved in Lister's Salvadoran weapons
operation, LaFrance said, was Richard E. Wilker, a former
Laguna Beach resident whom LaFrance described as an
ex-CIA agent. Wilker appears as the "technical director" on
Pyramid International's proposal of the security project to
the Salvadoran government. The biography section of the
proposal boasts that the company had "technicians with the
Central Intelligence Agency in physical security for 20
years."
"I met Lister through Wilker," LaFrance said. "Wilker had
heard about my stuff from the Agency. He said he had a
friend who wanted to talk about a deal. I called to check and
Langley said he [Wilker] was still working for the Agency.
So I started doing business with Lister and Wilker." Lister
was not officially a CIA employee, according to LaFrance;
"He wasn't getting a paycheck from them. He may have
said he did but his connection was. . .with Wilker. Very few
people ever work directly for the Agency."
Former CIA officer John Vandewerker, who once
employed Wilker as a salesman, said he knew Lister and
Wilker were involved in some business activity in El
Salvador. "It was kind of touchy. . .as far as getting out of
the country and all that kind of stuff." He did not elaborate.
(Coincidentally, Vandewerker's name was found in the
notebooks of investigative reporter Danny Casolaro after
his death, in connection with the goings-on at the Cabazon
reservation.)
Pyramid was eventually tossed out of El Salvador at the
urging of the U.S. Army, which took over the weapons plant
that he and Pyramid had started, LaFrance said.
Lister dismisses any suggestion that he was "knowingly"
working for the CIA. In an interview with police in 1996, he
claimed "that if he were affiliated with an organization like
the CIA, he wouldn't talk about it." He confirmed, the
detectives wrote, that he had been a "security consultant
and had dealings and offices down in El Salvador. Lister
said he had a 'Munitions Control Permit' at that time and
was involved in legal arms sales." The detectives noted that
"Lister did display some knowledge of the U.S. intelligence
community during our interview."
Danilo Blandón met Lister very early through the FDN organization in Los Angeles and began an association with
him that would last until the late 1980s. Lister and a partner
named Bill Downing, Blandón said, "went to the meeting
that we have in the Contra revolution, the meeting that we
have every week and they, they offer us, they show us, you
know, they show us a demonstration for the weapons,
okay? They show the machine guns and the weapons. They
have the, the license to sell them."
Lister never sold guns to the Contras, according to
Blandón. That was true, but not entirely accurate, Norwin Meneses said during a 1996 interview: "We, in fact, did make arrangements to sell arms to the Contras, but the
FDN couldn't collect sufficient funds in order to finalize the
deal." Meneses, Blandón, and Lister then "traveled to
Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador to make
arrangements with local governments" for the donation of
arms, Meneses said.
"Lister and Blandón then continued their mission in South
America without me. . .. I know Danilo says that the
weapons he got came through Ronnie Lister, but that isn't
true. If I told you where we got them, governments would
fall," Meneses said mysteriously. "I'm not going to do it
while I'm in this place." He motioned to the walls of the
Nicaraguan prison where he was interviewed and made a
pistol with his thumb and forefinger, which he pointed at his
head.
Meneses's own involvement in Contra gun running was
confirmed in 1996 by the New York Times, which quoted
an unnamed Clinton administration official as saying that
Meneses had "contacts with the Contras in Honduras in
1982 or 1983 and 1984, and that he was believed then to
have had some involvement in arms smuggling as well as
money laundering and drugs." The Times also quoted two
other unnamed government officials as saying, "Intelligence
reports showed that Mr. Meneses was thought to have sent
some weapons for the Contras on at least one occasion.
But the size and nature of the shipment are unclear."
"There is a mention of weapons with him but not an
indication whether it was a standard or large pipeline," the
Times quoted "one official" as saying. The Times article
provided no further details on this stunning revelation.
The Los Angeles Times, in a 1996 profile that portrayed
Lister as a loudmouth who told tall tales, confirmed Meneses statements that Lister was involved in weapons
transactions with him. Quoting an unidentified "former
business associate" of Lister, the paper wrote that Lister
"led a sales team on a futile mission to civil war-racked
[sic] El Salvador in the summer of 1982 to market surplus
American arms, military equipment and used school buses
to the Salvadoran military. . .. The trip was financed, the
associate said, with an investment of at least $20,000 from
Norwin Meneses."
The trip was a failure, according to the Times, because
Lister tried to arrange the deal through an unnamed leader
of an unnamed political party. Afterward Lister tried to get
involved in the cocaine business with Meneses, but the
drug kingpin allegedly turned him down, supposedly
because Meneses regarded Lister as "a loose cannon."
The story did not explain how or where Lister would have
picked up enough "surplus" American arms to approach
the Salvadoran military about making a weapons deal.
When defense attorneys tried in 1996 to quiz Blandón
about Lister's alleged relationship with the CIA, a federal
prosecutor immediately objected, and the jury was ordered
out of the courtroom. During a whispered conversation with
the judge, the prosecutor said that while it was true that
"Lister made a claim. . .that he was an employee of the
CIA," the government believed it was false, made only to
"impress [his] illegal business partners," and was an
attempt "to deter prosecution."
Nevertheless the prosecutor asked the judge to halt that
line of inquiry because it was "muddying the waters." The
judge decided that since Blandón had denied that Lister
worked for the government, there was no need for any more
questions like that. An internal CIA investigation in 1997
declared that Lister had no relationship with the agency.
Chris Moore, who regarded Lister's claims of CIA
connections with some skepticism, said Lister told him he
had a "big CIA contact" at an Orange County company.
"I can't remember his name, but Ron was always was
running off to meetings with him supposedly," Moore said.
"Ron said the guy was the former Deputy Director of
Operations or something, real high up there. All I know is
that this supposed contact of his was working at the Fluor
Corporation [an international construction management
company based in Orange County] because I had to call
Ron out there a couple times." In an interview with the
Justice Department, Blandón "recalled hearing Lister say
that he was involved with the CIA and that he knew
someone high up in the CIA who was getting him some
licenses so he could sell weapons to Iran." Blandón said he
"never believed Lister because he lied too much." Years
later, however, evidence would surface suggesting that
Lister's claims of having a big CIA contact weren't as wild eyed as Blandón and Moore seemed to think.
In many ways, the relationship between Lister—the ex-cop weapons dealer—and Blandón—the MBA-toting
cocaine broker—was symbiotic
Lister when he first met Blandón, "knew nothing about
narcotics and could not tell you coke from flour. I had never
seen the shit." But after Lister returned from his Central
American travels, his former San Diego attorney said, he
appeared to be an expert in the cocaine business. "When
he came back, he seemed to know a lot about what was
going on in Colombia with drug trafficking. I thought it was
interesting because in the mid-1980s, no one knew very much about these cartels. But he knew quite a bit. And he
knew names and dates, places, et cetera.
"I can remember one incident in particular. In the papers
at the time all of a sudden there were these stories about
the Medellín cartel, and Ron just snorted and said, 'What
the hell is with the news media? There are all these stories
about the Medellín cartel and nothing about the Cali cartel.'
Ron said the Cali cartel is where all the power is
concentrated, that's where the power structure is, and no
one is even bothering them. They're getting ready to
expand their market to Europe. They're buying cargo ships
and airplanes.' Well, I'd never heard of the Cali cartel at that
point. Subsequent events certainly proved him right."
The attorney surmised that Lister could have gained "this
information from the CIA, or through his work with them. He
knew some pretty damned good details and professed to
being through the area. Now, I have traveled extensively
through Central America, and the only thing I can tell you is,
his information about the area was true. I know he'd been
there." Lister told CIA inspectors that he had been to
Colombia with Blandón and observed Blandón negotiating
drug deals with the Colombians.
As 1982 drew to a close, Blandón's cocaine trafficking
business in Los Angeles exploded. Almost overnight, it
appears, he went from receiving little one, or two-kilo
packages that could be tucked inside a lunch box to getting multimillion-dollar loads that wouldn't fit on a wheelbarrow.
"I'd go over to D's [Blandón's] house, take my Mercedes
over there, put three U-Haul boxes which will cover about
100 keys, about 33 per box plus one you'd squeeze in, in
the trunk, go over to south L.A.," Lister told police. "It was
the slickest deal you've ever seen."
There were two interrelated reasons for this huge
expansion of Blandón's cocaine trafficking. One is that Dr.
Raul Jeri's much-ridiculed "epidemic" of cocaine smoking
had finally arrived in Los Angeles. And the other was a
street-smart ghetto teenager who would come to be known
as Freeway Rick.
7
"Something happened to Ivan"
The man who would be king of the L.A. crack market saw
his first rock of cocaine around Christmastime in 1979 and
didn't believe it was a drug. Ricky Donnell Ross knew what
drugs looked like. He was nineteen. He'd seen drugs
before. But this sure didn't look like cocaine to him. It was a
little whitish chunk of something that could have been bird
shit, for all he knew. And you were supposed to put it in a
pipe and smoke it? Right.
Ross had seen people on TV using cocaine before, and
they never smoked any shit that looked like this. When they
used it, they cut it up on a mirror with a razor blade and
tooted it up with a hundred-dollar bill.
"It was glamorous. It was, you know, you was in the 'in'
crowd if you was into cocaine, if you was using. You know,
whatever. It was in," Ross said. "It was what the movie stars
were doing."
Ross's skepticism seems hard to believe now, with crack
dealers more plentiful than policemen in urban
communities. But in 1979 it was understandable. At that
point, hardly anyone had seen rock cocaine. The friend who
gave Rick what he called "a fifty-dollar rock" knew about
smokable cocaine only because he was traveling in the fast
lane. He was on the San Jose State University football
team. He went to a lot of high-class parties. He knew what
was happening.
"He's like, 'Man, I'm onto something new,'" Ross would
later tell the Los Angeles Times in 1994. According to the
Times, "Ross ventured out and showed off his acquisition
to an old pimp, who fired it right up and ordered $100 more."
The problem was, Ross didn't have any more. He didn't
know how to make it or where to get it. And it's doubtful he
could have found more even if he had the money, which he
didn't.
If he'd searched hard enough in the right neighborhoods, maybe in Malibu or Hollywood, Ricky Ross might have
been able to come up with something close—freebase
cocaine. Freebase was becoming popular in the upper
echelons of the drug underground in the late 1970s. It was
not crack, however. Making freebase was more
complicated and dangerous, requiring exotic and highly
flammable solvents. It was also different in content.
Freebase resulted from mixing cocaine powder with
ether. When the ether evaporated, it took the adulterants
and cutting agents with it, leaving behind smokable crystals
of pure cocaine base. For the process to work, however, it
required a very high-quality cocaine; the cocaine powder
that most people snorted wouldn't do because it was so
heavily cut. Adding ether to a mishmash of mannitol,
lidocaine, or milk sugar caused some "cocaine" to
evaporate entirely.
Freebasing was what comedian Richard Pryor had been
doing when he set himself on fire on June 9, 1980, and ran
screaming from his bedroom in Northridge, outside L.A.—a
ball of blazing polyester leaping across neatly kept lawns.
"His polyester shirt had melted onto his arms and chest and
he suffered third-degree burns from the waist up," Time magazine reported. "The Los Angeles police say Pryor told
them that the accident occurred while he was 'free-basing'
cocaine."
Pryor would later say freebasing was only tangentially
related to his fearful scorching. The fire happened because
he accidentally ignited some 151-proof rum while in a daze
from a seventy-two-hour freebasing binge. If he'd been
smoking freebase, in fact, he might never have burned
himself at all; Pryor said he started drinking the rum
because he'd run out of cocaine.
The distinction didn't matter much to the news media.
The fact that Pryor—a major celebrity—had an accident
while in the clutches of some weird, exotic new drug habit
made it big news. "When Cocaine Can Kill," Newsweek
trumpeted. "A dangerous drug craze" is how People
Weekly put it. The Los Angeles Times discovered to its
alarm that in the mostly black NBA, freebase use was
spreading among pro basketball players.
As one cocaine expert wrote in 1982, the coverage of
Pryor's accident was "reminiscent of the pre-Harrison Act
yellow journalism [and] told the story of how cocaine was
becoming the modern version of the Black cocaine menace of the early 1900s." The Harrison Act of 1914,
which outlawed recreational cocaine use in the United
States, resulted from a wild—and bogus—newspaper
campaign mounted by southern sheriffs who linked coke crazed black studs to the rapes of white women.
For a variety of reasons, including the bad press from
Pryor's misfortune, freebasing was largely a passing fad,
never really taking hold except among a few rich, hard-core
drug users. "The relatively high cost and difficulty of
producing cocaine free-base made it less accessible to most cocaine users," drug researcher Steven Belenko
wrote in 1993. "An estimated 10% of cocaine users in the
late 1970s also used free-base cocaine. But the need for
large quantities of relatively pure cocaine and volatile
chemicals to produce free-base limited its appeal to the
broader group of cocaine users."
Unlike Richard Pryor's neighborhood, the neighborhood
where Ricky Ross lived rarely saw cocaine in any form. As
hard as the drug was to find in white, middle-class
communities, it was ten times as scarce in South Central
L.A., where the Ross family had lived since the early 1960s.
People in the projects didn't have that kind of money, and if
every once in a while they did, they sure as hell didn't go out
and spend it all on white powder that barely got you high.
According to a Rand Institute study of street prices paid
by DEA agents and informants, an ounce of cocaine
powder in L.A. was selling for $4,844 in 1979. Other
sources place it at roughly $2,500 an ounce, suggesting
that DEA agents weren't the savviest shoppers around. In
any event, a tiny bit cost about half the average annual
income of a South Central resident. Little wonder that marijuana and angel dust—a dangerous chemical known in
the projects as "Sherm" or "water"—were the drugs of
choice where Ricky Ross lived. They were far less
expensive. That was why Thomas C. "Tootie" Reese, the
alleged king of cocaine in black L.A. at the time, lamented
that he never sold as much coke as the cops and the press
claimed.
"When you mentioned drugs, whether it was heroin or
coke, you heard Tootie's name," said former LAPD
narcotic detective Steven Polak. "He was the kingpin,
especially in the fifties and sixties. Everybody was working
Tootie Reese. Tootie Reese was probably one of the first
blacks who really did big dope." But the man himself had a
different story for the L.A. Times, which interviewed him a
few months after his arrest in December 1983 for selling
two kilos of cocaine to undercover officers.
"I ain't never been big," Tootie told the Times. Some
evidence gathered during the investigation of Reese
backed up his assertion that his cocaine-dealing prowess
had been greatly overrated. During a taped conversation
with undercover agents, Reese told them that "most of his
customers purchase only five ounces or 10 ounces and that
he had only five kilo-size customers." That admission was made at a time when a much bigger dealer in South
Central—Danilo Blandón—was moving dozens of kilos a month through just one customer. Reese was mostly a
heroin and marijuana dealer. By the early 1980s, when
cocaine started seeping into the inner cities in noticeable
amounts, Reese was a dinosaur.
"These new kids, once the eighties hit and these gangs
hooked up with this dope, he was nothing anymore," ex-detective Polak said. "He was just an old grandpa who'd
lost his teeth and wasn't worth anything anymore." A 1989
L.A. Times Magazine piece wrote him off in similar terms:
"The amounts of cocaine he allegedly dealt were
infinitesimal contrasted with the tonnage now sold monthly
by his successors in the black community."
Reese's first major successor would be Ricky Ross,
though that was not readily apparent in late 1979. Looking
at him then, one would not have imagined the slender,
slightly pop-eyed teenager to be a successor to anything
but a hard row to hoe. A sometime thief, sometime student,
he was clinging to a tattered dream of becoming a
professional tennis player. Though too small for football or
basketball, Ross had quick reflexes. When he was in middle school, about eleven or twelve, two family friends,
Dr. Mal Bouquet and Richard Williams, encouraged him to
take up tennis.
Ross's own father, Sonny, an oil tank cleaner by trade,
had left home while Ross was still a small child in Tyler,
Texas, in 1963. The rest of Ross's life would be spent in a
sometimes tragic quest to find someone to replace him.
Bouquet and Williams became Ross's first father figures.
"They picked me up, took me to tennis tournaments. They
took care of my racquets and tennis shoes, stuff like that,"
Ross said. "They fed me. You know, we'd leave a
tournament, we'd go to McDonald's, something like that."
Ross said the tournaments and tennis practices kept him
out of the 74 Hoover Crips, his neighborhood gang. He was
friends with many of them, he said, but was never a gang member himself. Federal prison records appear to back up
that claim. "There exists no information to substantiate your membership in the Los Angeles based 'Crips' street gang,"
stated a 1993 letter to Ross from the Federal Correctional
Institution in Phoenix. "All information in your file has been
deleted which reflected gang participation or membership."
"He does not have the culture of a gang member when
you talk to him," said L.A. Times reporter Jesse Katz, who
spent months interviewing Ross in 1994 for a major series
on the L.A. crack market. "He doesn't have the attitude and
the—I mean, he was a capitalist."
It wasn't because Ross had anything against gangs
necessarily. Most of the 74 Hoovers were homies he'd
grown up with, gone to school with. He would put them to
use in the future. But for now, he just didn't have time for
gang-banging. "Once I started playing tennis, we'd start
practicing as soon as school was out, so we'd get off the
tennis court probably around 6:00 or 7:00 when it was time
to go in the house."
It was hard to get away with anything there. His mother,
Annie, a heavyset woman with bottle-thick glasses, a janitor
in downtown office buildings, was strict. She was always
checking up on him and his older brother David, snooping
in their rooms to make sure they weren't getting into trouble. When she was at work, her younger sister Luetha Wilson
watched the boys.
By the time Ross enrolled in Dorsey High School, his
tennis skills were well honed. "I made All-League my first
year. My second year, I made All-City second team and my
senior year, I made All-City first team," Ross said. But he
didn't fare as well in tournaments. "I'd win a few rounds. I
never got ranked."
Still, Ross played well enough to retain a spot on the
Dorsey High tennis team. Playing tennis for a major
university was his immediate goal in life. There were about
five players on his high school team that the coaches were
grooming for college scholarships, and he was proud to
consider himself one of them.
Ross had a bit of a problem, though. By his senior year
at Dorsey, he still couldn't read or write. "My teachers just
passed me, gave me C's and let me go through," Ross
shrugged. It hardly seemed to matter, he said, because you
didn't need it to play tennis. And in truth, it hadn't mattered.
It hadn't kept him off the courts. It hadn't kept him behind in
school. It only mattered when he started practicing with the
Long Beach State University tennis team.
Ross had played in a tournament in Griffith Park, "and I
had beat the number three or four guy from Long Beach
State and a [Long Beach] coach asked me what school I
was going to, when I was graduating from high school.
Basically, he asked me, you know, what was I doing and
how is my tennis going and stuff like that." The coach
invited him over to the university for practice, and Ross
worked out with the Long Beach State team a couple of
times. "Then he found out about my grades and that I
couldn't read or write," Ross said. To Ross's shock, that
was the end of the university's interest. "I thought it basically
would be the same as it had been all the time," Ross
complained. "That they would just keep passing me
through."
Disillusioned, he dropped out of Dorsey soon afterward,
saying that it seemed pointless if he couldn't get into
college. "I didn't graduate. I made it to the 12th grade and I
was a few credits from being able to graduate." Ross said
he was "kinda like in no man's land, almost, I would say. . .. My life was like at a standstill." On July 7, 1978, he was
arrested by the LAPD for burglary and disorderly conduct.
The charges would be dismissed—Ross said it was a
case of mistaken identity—but the incident was an
indication of the path he was on.
Ricky's other passion in life was automobiles, so he
channeled his efforts in that direction. Since childhood, his mother said, "Ricky was taking things apart and putting
them back together." Every summer she took the boys
back to her brother's house in Overton, Texas, where Ricky
and David would work on the brother's farm. Ricky began
tooling around on tractors at an early age and developed
driving skills quickly.
"When Ricky was about four years old he tried to drive my brother's car," Annie Ross said. "By the time he was
eleven or twelve, he was driving by himself. You know, out
in the country, where nobody minded. When he got older,
he'd bring these cars home, work on them all the time, fix
them up, and sell them. He always kept himself real busy."
In 1979, as Ross prepared to leave tennis behind, he
prevailed upon someone he'd met through the sport, Mr.
Fisher, a young auto upholstery teacher at the Venice Skills
Center, to give him a shot at a new career. Fisher, a
sometime tennis partner, got Ross into an open slot at the
skills center.
"It's like a trade school where people that don't have
nothing going can go and get them a trade, and they pay
them," Ross said. "They pay them something really for
going, you know, like help you with your expenses and stuff
like that for going to the school." It was a nice favor, and
Ross began attending auto repair classes. Then tennis
came calling again.
Pete Brown, a coach at L.A. Trade Tech Junior College,
asked Ross if he'd like to come to the technical school,
learn a trade, and play tennis for him. Jubilantly, Ross quit
the skills center and went running to Trade Tech. He had made a college team after all. "He was a very good player,"
recalled Brown. "I'd say he was probably my number-three
guy on the team at the time." Ross recalled that he "played
number one and number two at different times of the
season. You know, like sometimes one guy would beat me
and sometimes I would beat him. So we would go back and
forth."
By then Ross had drifted away from his two childhood
tennis mentors, Bouquet and Williams. Ross was
embarrassed by his failure to get a scholarship, and he
sensed that Williams wasn't eager to have him around
anymore, since it was clear he wasn't going to make a major university team.
Ross began spending more time with Mr. Fisher, the
upholstery teacher, and the two played tennis together
frequently. Ross soon adopted Fisher as a father figure.
"Me and him, we would go play, you know, what we called
hitting. I would hit with him, because they like to hit with
people that's better than them, and in return he would buy me tennis shoes, racquets, help me get—like if I couldn't
get a racquet strung, I could call him and say that, you know,
'I need my racquet strung' and he would pay for it."
Fisher, Ross said, "was considered an uppity black guy.
He was single. He stayed in the Baldwin Hills area, which is
a nicer part of Los Angeles. He had a brand-new Cadillac,
you know, nice jewelry, school teacher." Ross said he
would "go by his house from time to time" after getting off
school at Trade Tech, where the illiterate Ross, ironically,
was studying bookbinding.
As the two became closer, Fisher let his guard down. In
1981, shortly before he left Trade Tech, Ross found out why
Mr. Fisher was able to afford jewelry and brand-new
Cadillacs on a trade school teacher's salary. "We had a
conversation one day. I found out that he was dealing and
also using narcotics. I'm not exactly sure how the
conversation came up but we started talking about it and he
started explaining to me what it was all about."
Ross said he was glad the topic arose. At this point in
his life, he was looking for any way to make a buck, and it
really didn't matter if it was legal or not. He'd crossed that
threshold already. "Actually, when he explained it to me, I
wanted to know more about it, so I started asking him more
questions," Ross said. "He showed me some. It was about
as big as a match head and he said, 'Well, this right here is
worth $50 and you can sell this and it just keeps getting
better and better,' is basically what he said."
Ross mulled it over. Selling cocaine certainly seemed a
lot better and a lot less risky than stealing and stripping
cars, which is what he'd been doing to put himself through
Trade Tech. He discussed it with his running partner, Ollie
Newell, known as "Big Loc" because some people thought
he acted crazy. Newell, who'd just gotten out of jail and
needed money, agreed that selling dope looked like a lot
less work for a lot more money.
But Ross had one reservation: all the dope dealers he
knew eventually got fucked up on their own product. Nothing
was more pathetic than seeing a burned-out old dealer
begging nickels and dimes from his former clients. That
wasn't the way Ricky Ross envisioned his life ending.
"Ollie was kinda like the one that kinda like coerced me
into getting into the business," Ross said. "You know, he's
like, 'Come on, man, you can do it, you don't mess around
with nothing, you don't smoke, you don't drink, you're clean,
you can handle it.'"
Ross made up his mind. They went back to see Mr.
Fisher and announced that they were ready to try it out.
Ross said Fisher gave them "a fifty-dollar piece" and "we
went to a neighborhood and tried to sell it."
It was not an encouraging start. "We got beat out of it," Ross said. "We gave it to somebody and they said they was going to pay us later and it didn't happen." Ross said he had to go slinking back to Fisher to tell him about the "sale," but he assured the teacher that "the guy was going to pay me the money, and he said, 'Okay, don't worry about it.'"
Chastened, Ross and Newell regrouped for another try. They scoped out the parking lot at Bret Harte Junior High, their alma mater, and stole a car from a faculty member. Selling the fancy wheels brought them $250, and a week or so after their first debacle, they went strutting back to Fisher's house with their hard-earned cash.
"We bought what's called an 8-track of cocaine from him. It's three grams of cocaine. At that time, it probably was about a gram of cocaine and about two grams of cut." Taking the 8-track for $250, they cut it again and sold it off in bits and pieces. "We could take it to our neighborhood where we stayed at and it would sell for [a total of] five, six hundred dollars. . .. I think the first time we might have made about $600 off it. . .an awful lot of money."
Instead of spending the profits, Ross said, they went back to Fisher's house and ordered more cocaine. "Sold it, made more money," Ross said. "I didn't really know the game. It was like we were just stumbling through, you know what I'm saying? Picking up as we go."
Ross said the amount of cash he was able to bring in scared him.
"I was selling, and Ollie was standing back, you know, and watching me, you know, make sure didn't nobody try to rob me or nothing like that," Ross said. "So I would make like three hundred dollars, I would take it home and put it up, because I didn't want to be standing out there with a whole lot of dope and a whole lot of money. Because the police raided the spot all the time, you know. They might be raided every 15 or 20 minutes. It was a PCP street. They was selling PCP there. But they wouldn't pay no attention to me unless I had a lot of money on me."
Ross said the cops mostly just smelled dealers' hands, looking for the telltale stench of PCP. "They would just smell my hands, pat me and let me go. But if I had a wad of money, it would draw attention, so we never wanted to get over two or three hundred dollars."
Acquaintances who were dealing PCP—"slanging Sherm" or "selling water," as it was called—made fun of him for selling coke because there was a much bigger market for angel dust. "All the guys selling PCP used to tell us, 'Ya'll can make more money, ya'll should sell PCP.' And I was like, 'No, that's all right, I don't want to mess with PCP. That's too hard.' And cocaine was more, like, flyer, more like the uppity people, you know, wasn't nobody going crazy, you know? When they smoked the PCP they would go crazy and stuff and I would think, 'I ain't gonna be involved with that.' Cocaine is like, mellow, and it was cool. So I didn't mind doing it."
Still slightly unsure of the future of the cocaine business, Ross kept his hand in the auto business as well. He was still stealing cars and fencing them or stripping them down in his body shop and parting them out. On March 19, 1982, he was arrested by the LAPD for grand theft auto. The police found a Mercedes Benz in his garage with parts that didn't match. Ross dipped into his cash reserves and hired a Beverly Hills lawyer named Alan Fenster, a former prosecutor and film studio lawyer who had little trouble getting the auto theft charge tossed out of court.
"There was no evidence Ricky had any knowledge about that car," said Fenster, whose performance in that felony case would lead him to many years of lucrative employment with Ross. Fenster, who'd been defending drug dealers and drug users since the early 1970s, said it was "my recollection that when I met Rick, he was already dealing drugs. Ricky was introduced to me by another client I had, who was a dealer, and I recall that he told me Ross was someone who was into some serious dealing then."
Early 1982 was an exceptionally good time to be in the cocaine business. It was like getting in on the ground floor of Amway. "At first we was just going to do it until we made $5,000," Ross said. "We made that so fast we said, 'No, we'll quit when we make $20,000.' Then we was going to quit when we saved enough to buy a house. . ."
Though it would not become apparent for some time, the cocaine industry was then undergoing dramatic changes that would boost the fortunes of dealers everywhere. The drug was finally beginning to filter down from the penthouses into the real world, opening up a whole new audience for its seductive charms.
The most basic reason was supply and demand. In some cities, Miami in particular, supply was beginning to outstrip demand, thanks largely to the efforts of Carlos Lehder and his pals in Medellín, Colombia, who had revolutionized the import/export part of the business. By early 1982, the Medellín cartel had gotten its act together and—using special airplanes, radar avoidance techniques, and specially designed speedboats—began bringing in unheard-of amounts of cocaine, mostly through the Bahamas.
Ten days before Rick Ross's auto theft arrest in March 1982, Customs agents in Miami searched an airplane, owned by a tiny Colombian air cargo company, that had flown in from Medellín. By the time agents arrived, workers were busy unloading dozens of boxes labeled "jeans." But when an inspector stuck a screwdriver into one of them, he didn't hit denim. White powder came pouring out of the hole.
When the Customs men had finished weighing the cocaine, the scales topped out at 3,906 pounds, nearly four times the size of the previous U.S. cocaine seizure record. It was, authors Guy Gugliotta and Jeff Leen wrote in Kings of Cocaine, the DEA's "first look at the shadow of the beast."
As more loads like that got through, the wholesale price of cocaine in the U.S. began dropping. But it never dropped dramatically enough to make it popular in low income neighborhoods. According to the 1994 Rand Institute study, between 1979 and 1982 ounce prices in L.A. fell from the stratospheric to the merely exorbitant: $4,844 vs. $4,011. Gram prices fell slightly during the same period, from $321 to $259. Kilo prices dropped more significantly, from around $75,000 to around $60,000. Major importers and top-level dealers began seeing big price breaks. But if the Rand study's figures are accurate, for the average Joe who bought by the gram, cocaine was still extremely expensive.
And that was okay with Ricky Ross and Ollie Newell. At those prices, they didn't need a lot of customers. By the end of 1981, they were finally starting to make some real money. The number of users in the neighborhoods wasn't growing that much, but they were stealing customers away from other dealers. "We just had a price," Ross said. "Nobody in the neighborhood could touch us."
It was not an encouraging start. "We got beat out of it," Ross said. "We gave it to somebody and they said they was going to pay us later and it didn't happen." Ross said he had to go slinking back to Fisher to tell him about the "sale," but he assured the teacher that "the guy was going to pay me the money, and he said, 'Okay, don't worry about it.'"
Chastened, Ross and Newell regrouped for another try. They scoped out the parking lot at Bret Harte Junior High, their alma mater, and stole a car from a faculty member. Selling the fancy wheels brought them $250, and a week or so after their first debacle, they went strutting back to Fisher's house with their hard-earned cash.
"We bought what's called an 8-track of cocaine from him. It's three grams of cocaine. At that time, it probably was about a gram of cocaine and about two grams of cut." Taking the 8-track for $250, they cut it again and sold it off in bits and pieces. "We could take it to our neighborhood where we stayed at and it would sell for [a total of] five, six hundred dollars. . .. I think the first time we might have made about $600 off it. . .an awful lot of money."
Instead of spending the profits, Ross said, they went back to Fisher's house and ordered more cocaine. "Sold it, made more money," Ross said. "I didn't really know the game. It was like we were just stumbling through, you know what I'm saying? Picking up as we go."
Ross said the amount of cash he was able to bring in scared him.
"I was selling, and Ollie was standing back, you know, and watching me, you know, make sure didn't nobody try to rob me or nothing like that," Ross said. "So I would make like three hundred dollars, I would take it home and put it up, because I didn't want to be standing out there with a whole lot of dope and a whole lot of money. Because the police raided the spot all the time, you know. They might be raided every 15 or 20 minutes. It was a PCP street. They was selling PCP there. But they wouldn't pay no attention to me unless I had a lot of money on me."
Ross said the cops mostly just smelled dealers' hands, looking for the telltale stench of PCP. "They would just smell my hands, pat me and let me go. But if I had a wad of money, it would draw attention, so we never wanted to get over two or three hundred dollars."
Acquaintances who were dealing PCP—"slanging Sherm" or "selling water," as it was called—made fun of him for selling coke because there was a much bigger market for angel dust. "All the guys selling PCP used to tell us, 'Ya'll can make more money, ya'll should sell PCP.' And I was like, 'No, that's all right, I don't want to mess with PCP. That's too hard.' And cocaine was more, like, flyer, more like the uppity people, you know, wasn't nobody going crazy, you know? When they smoked the PCP they would go crazy and stuff and I would think, 'I ain't gonna be involved with that.' Cocaine is like, mellow, and it was cool. So I didn't mind doing it."
Still slightly unsure of the future of the cocaine business, Ross kept his hand in the auto business as well. He was still stealing cars and fencing them or stripping them down in his body shop and parting them out. On March 19, 1982, he was arrested by the LAPD for grand theft auto. The police found a Mercedes Benz in his garage with parts that didn't match. Ross dipped into his cash reserves and hired a Beverly Hills lawyer named Alan Fenster, a former prosecutor and film studio lawyer who had little trouble getting the auto theft charge tossed out of court.
"There was no evidence Ricky had any knowledge about that car," said Fenster, whose performance in that felony case would lead him to many years of lucrative employment with Ross. Fenster, who'd been defending drug dealers and drug users since the early 1970s, said it was "my recollection that when I met Rick, he was already dealing drugs. Ricky was introduced to me by another client I had, who was a dealer, and I recall that he told me Ross was someone who was into some serious dealing then."
Early 1982 was an exceptionally good time to be in the cocaine business. It was like getting in on the ground floor of Amway. "At first we was just going to do it until we made $5,000," Ross said. "We made that so fast we said, 'No, we'll quit when we make $20,000.' Then we was going to quit when we saved enough to buy a house. . ."
Though it would not become apparent for some time, the cocaine industry was then undergoing dramatic changes that would boost the fortunes of dealers everywhere. The drug was finally beginning to filter down from the penthouses into the real world, opening up a whole new audience for its seductive charms.
The most basic reason was supply and demand. In some cities, Miami in particular, supply was beginning to outstrip demand, thanks largely to the efforts of Carlos Lehder and his pals in Medellín, Colombia, who had revolutionized the import/export part of the business. By early 1982, the Medellín cartel had gotten its act together and—using special airplanes, radar avoidance techniques, and specially designed speedboats—began bringing in unheard-of amounts of cocaine, mostly through the Bahamas.
Ten days before Rick Ross's auto theft arrest in March 1982, Customs agents in Miami searched an airplane, owned by a tiny Colombian air cargo company, that had flown in from Medellín. By the time agents arrived, workers were busy unloading dozens of boxes labeled "jeans." But when an inspector stuck a screwdriver into one of them, he didn't hit denim. White powder came pouring out of the hole.
When the Customs men had finished weighing the cocaine, the scales topped out at 3,906 pounds, nearly four times the size of the previous U.S. cocaine seizure record. It was, authors Guy Gugliotta and Jeff Leen wrote in Kings of Cocaine, the DEA's "first look at the shadow of the beast."
As more loads like that got through, the wholesale price of cocaine in the U.S. began dropping. But it never dropped dramatically enough to make it popular in low income neighborhoods. According to the 1994 Rand Institute study, between 1979 and 1982 ounce prices in L.A. fell from the stratospheric to the merely exorbitant: $4,844 vs. $4,011. Gram prices fell slightly during the same period, from $321 to $259. Kilo prices dropped more significantly, from around $75,000 to around $60,000. Major importers and top-level dealers began seeing big price breaks. But if the Rand study's figures are accurate, for the average Joe who bought by the gram, cocaine was still extremely expensive.
And that was okay with Ricky Ross and Ollie Newell. At those prices, they didn't need a lot of customers. By the end of 1981, they were finally starting to make some real money. The number of users in the neighborhoods wasn't growing that much, but they were stealing customers away from other dealers. "We just had a price," Ross said. "Nobody in the neighborhood could touch us."
The cocaine they were getting from Fisher was slightly
cheaper than what others were paying, and when Ross
asked him why, Fisher told him he "had a really good
connection." Since Ross could charge less, it wasn't too
hard to find customers willing to pay $125 a gram instead
of the $150 or $200 they'd been paying. Any chance to
save a buck—especially after being gouged all these years —made for very happy and loyal clients. "People would
come from everywhere, man. They would come from
Pomona, Pasadena, Riverside, Long Beach. It wasn't just
like an L.A. thing."
Ross also exercised some of the same type of discipline that had kept him out on the tennis courts, swinging the racquet and running, hour after hour, day after day. "I mean, listen, when you got in the dope business, everybody wanted to get high. Nobody wanted to sell dope," Ross said disgustedly. "It was like. . .even Ollie! Ollie was, was, was straight and always wanted to get high, get high, get high. So. . .I finally got in it, I said, 'Well, man, you're using up all the profit!' This was in the early stages, and he said, 'Well, I ain't gonna do no more.' But everybody else wanted to get high. [It was] the whole motto, you know, in our neighborhood—because we never left our neighborhood; we was like confined to South Central L.A.—everybody was just getting high. Let's party, man."
Ross was not the party-hearty type, not when it came to business. He considered himself first and foremost to be a professional cocaine trafficker. It was his job to move dope, and he did it with his usual intensity. "You know how some people feel that God put them down here to be a preacher? I felt that he had put me down to be the cocaine man," Ross told the L.A. Times in 1994. And like a missionary for a new religion, Ross began creating cocaine dealers.
"Eventually, all the guys that was selling PCP started seeing everybody coming [to me] with their hundred dollars, and they were selling like ten dollars worth, five dollars worth, you know, sticks. They knew every time somebody came to me, it was a hundred dollars. So I didn't have to see that many people, maybe, fifteen people a day, you know, I make fifteen hundred dollars and they started seeing to that and knowing how much money I was making.
"So then they started saying, 'Well, I'm gonna sell some water and you know I'm going to buy two hundred dollars worth from Rick and start, you know, investing it in cocaine and start doing it myself. So the next thing I know, all these guys were coming to me saying, 'Man, I want to get an eight-track.'"
But Ross's source, Mr. Fisher, was getting antsy about all the cocaine Ross and Newell were ordering. An occasional gram here and there was fine, he told Ross, but he was a schoolteacher, not Super Fly. The only reason he did a little dealing out the side was to pay for his own supply. Rick and Ollie were making a business out of it, and if they wanted to do that it was their business, but he didn't want anything to do with it.
"I think he was getting tired of us calling him up all the time and having him get us some more," Ross said. "Mr. Fisher was working so he told me to go ahead and deal directly with Ivan and we met at Mr. Fisher's house and I got the stuff."
"Ivan," a handsome, smiling Latino, had been supplying Mr. Fisher with cocaine for about a year. Ross had seen him around Fisher's house before, but they'd never been introduced.
During their first meeting, Ivan brought along another Hispanic—Henry—but Ricky wasn't clear what part Henry played, other than that he was Ivan's brother-in-law. Maybe he was his partner. Or maybe he'd just come along for the ride.
In halting English, Ivan told them that he would be happy to be their supplier from now on. If they wanted any more product, they should call him directly, instead of bothering Mr. Fisher. He slipped Ross a folded paper with a phone number on it. On the way out, Ivan told Ross that he would get them a better price than Mr. Fisher had. "We moved up fast," Ross said. "We went from moving grams to moving ounces." And Ivan proved true to his word. "After I started dealing directly with Ivan, it got better. We could take. . .the same thing we was buying from Mr. Fisher for $200 and turn it into $900, because we found out Mr. Fisher had been taking some of the money. He might have been making like $50, $75 off each one [8-track]. So we started making more money."
With more cash flow, Ross was able to order larger amounts of cocaine from Ivan and get a better price, a volume purchase break. And then he could cut his street prices even further. "He kept incrementally expanding his quantity, and every time he could do that, he was bringing the price down just a little bit more, and then what he would gain from volume, he would put right back into the operation," Times reporter Katz said. "It was just classic economics. And he saw all this in a way I guess others didn't, or weren't as disciplined as him to act on."
Some of this discipline was not entirely of Ross's choosing. One reason he and Newell began reinvesting their profits so faithfully was because they didn't dare spend the money on anything else. "My momma was strict, right? Both our mothers, me and Ollie's mother, was strict, right? So we couldn't show the money! We had like. . .we had $1,000 and we didn't even buy new tennis shoes! Because my mother woulda knew: 'Where'd you get them shoes from?'
"So we, like, hid our money. We was hiding our money from our mothers!" Ross laughed, shaking his head at the idea of two badass cocaine dealers so afraid of their mommas they couldn't spend their loot. "So even if we buy clothes, we'd hide them in the garage and put them on after we'd leave so she wouldn't find out."
But the nature of his business made it difficult to hide forever. Eventually Annie Ross figured out what was going on.
"When she found out I was selling dope, she had a fit. Threw me out of the house," Ross said. "I never rented no apartment or nothing like that. I had some money but I didn't know how to rent an apartment. I was living in her garage. I fixed it up like a little house. She was like, 'Boy, something going on. I don't know what you're doing but you ain't doing something right. You got all these people coming around here. Tell them people to stop coming round my house,'" Ross said.
He "really didn't do business there," he said, but when a customer wanted something, someone had to come by and let him know. "And she was like, 'There's too many people coming over here, I know something is wrong.' One day she just said, 'Get your stuff and leave. Don't come back over here. And Ollie, don't you come back either.' Because you know Ollie is like her godson. So she threw us out. But I had a little bit of money then and I moved in with one of my cousins and started paying her to let me stay there.
"But that's basically how we got started." After eight months with their new supplier, just as their business really began expanding, "something happened to Ivan," Ross said. He'd disappeared. Ross and Newell panicked. Their only supplier had dropped off the face of the earth. Where were they going to get their cocaine now? From afar, Danilo Blandón watched events unfold. It was time for him to make his move.
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a million hits is not enough
217s
Ross also exercised some of the same type of discipline that had kept him out on the tennis courts, swinging the racquet and running, hour after hour, day after day. "I mean, listen, when you got in the dope business, everybody wanted to get high. Nobody wanted to sell dope," Ross said disgustedly. "It was like. . .even Ollie! Ollie was, was, was straight and always wanted to get high, get high, get high. So. . .I finally got in it, I said, 'Well, man, you're using up all the profit!' This was in the early stages, and he said, 'Well, I ain't gonna do no more.' But everybody else wanted to get high. [It was] the whole motto, you know, in our neighborhood—because we never left our neighborhood; we was like confined to South Central L.A.—everybody was just getting high. Let's party, man."
Ross was not the party-hearty type, not when it came to business. He considered himself first and foremost to be a professional cocaine trafficker. It was his job to move dope, and he did it with his usual intensity. "You know how some people feel that God put them down here to be a preacher? I felt that he had put me down to be the cocaine man," Ross told the L.A. Times in 1994. And like a missionary for a new religion, Ross began creating cocaine dealers.
"Eventually, all the guys that was selling PCP started seeing everybody coming [to me] with their hundred dollars, and they were selling like ten dollars worth, five dollars worth, you know, sticks. They knew every time somebody came to me, it was a hundred dollars. So I didn't have to see that many people, maybe, fifteen people a day, you know, I make fifteen hundred dollars and they started seeing to that and knowing how much money I was making.
"So then they started saying, 'Well, I'm gonna sell some water and you know I'm going to buy two hundred dollars worth from Rick and start, you know, investing it in cocaine and start doing it myself. So the next thing I know, all these guys were coming to me saying, 'Man, I want to get an eight-track.'"
But Ross's source, Mr. Fisher, was getting antsy about all the cocaine Ross and Newell were ordering. An occasional gram here and there was fine, he told Ross, but he was a schoolteacher, not Super Fly. The only reason he did a little dealing out the side was to pay for his own supply. Rick and Ollie were making a business out of it, and if they wanted to do that it was their business, but he didn't want anything to do with it.
"I think he was getting tired of us calling him up all the time and having him get us some more," Ross said. "Mr. Fisher was working so he told me to go ahead and deal directly with Ivan and we met at Mr. Fisher's house and I got the stuff."
"Ivan," a handsome, smiling Latino, had been supplying Mr. Fisher with cocaine for about a year. Ross had seen him around Fisher's house before, but they'd never been introduced.
During their first meeting, Ivan brought along another Hispanic—Henry—but Ricky wasn't clear what part Henry played, other than that he was Ivan's brother-in-law. Maybe he was his partner. Or maybe he'd just come along for the ride.
In halting English, Ivan told them that he would be happy to be their supplier from now on. If they wanted any more product, they should call him directly, instead of bothering Mr. Fisher. He slipped Ross a folded paper with a phone number on it. On the way out, Ivan told Ross that he would get them a better price than Mr. Fisher had. "We moved up fast," Ross said. "We went from moving grams to moving ounces." And Ivan proved true to his word. "After I started dealing directly with Ivan, it got better. We could take. . .the same thing we was buying from Mr. Fisher for $200 and turn it into $900, because we found out Mr. Fisher had been taking some of the money. He might have been making like $50, $75 off each one [8-track]. So we started making more money."
With more cash flow, Ross was able to order larger amounts of cocaine from Ivan and get a better price, a volume purchase break. And then he could cut his street prices even further. "He kept incrementally expanding his quantity, and every time he could do that, he was bringing the price down just a little bit more, and then what he would gain from volume, he would put right back into the operation," Times reporter Katz said. "It was just classic economics. And he saw all this in a way I guess others didn't, or weren't as disciplined as him to act on."
Some of this discipline was not entirely of Ross's choosing. One reason he and Newell began reinvesting their profits so faithfully was because they didn't dare spend the money on anything else. "My momma was strict, right? Both our mothers, me and Ollie's mother, was strict, right? So we couldn't show the money! We had like. . .we had $1,000 and we didn't even buy new tennis shoes! Because my mother woulda knew: 'Where'd you get them shoes from?'
"So we, like, hid our money. We was hiding our money from our mothers!" Ross laughed, shaking his head at the idea of two badass cocaine dealers so afraid of their mommas they couldn't spend their loot. "So even if we buy clothes, we'd hide them in the garage and put them on after we'd leave so she wouldn't find out."
But the nature of his business made it difficult to hide forever. Eventually Annie Ross figured out what was going on.
"When she found out I was selling dope, she had a fit. Threw me out of the house," Ross said. "I never rented no apartment or nothing like that. I had some money but I didn't know how to rent an apartment. I was living in her garage. I fixed it up like a little house. She was like, 'Boy, something going on. I don't know what you're doing but you ain't doing something right. You got all these people coming around here. Tell them people to stop coming round my house,'" Ross said.
He "really didn't do business there," he said, but when a customer wanted something, someone had to come by and let him know. "And she was like, 'There's too many people coming over here, I know something is wrong.' One day she just said, 'Get your stuff and leave. Don't come back over here. And Ollie, don't you come back either.' Because you know Ollie is like her godson. So she threw us out. But I had a little bit of money then and I moved in with one of my cousins and started paying her to let me stay there.
"But that's basically how we got started." After eight months with their new supplier, just as their business really began expanding, "something happened to Ivan," Ross said. He'd disappeared. Ross and Newell panicked. Their only supplier had dropped off the face of the earth. Where were they going to get their cocaine now? From afar, Danilo Blandón watched events unfold. It was time for him to make his move.
next
a million hits is not enough
217s
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