Part 4: Back Door to War..Stimson Produces a Pattern of War...Hull Spurns a Japanese Olive Branch

Back Door to War 
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 
1933-1941
by 
CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL
IV 

Secretary Stimson 

Produces a Pattern of War 

A. American Press Opinion 

of the Stimson Doctrine 

WHEN SECRETARY STIMSON boldly announced on January 7, 1932, his nonrecognition policy, he felt confident that he could rely upon a large section of the American press for support. The old tradition of isolation had been slowly and steadily undermined by ardent one-worlders who were desperately anxious for America to bear a larger share of the burdens that the World War had thrust upon the weakened back of Europe. The New York press had led the assaults of these journalistic saboteurs with the Times as the leader of the offensive. Stimson had carefully watched this conflict and had come to the conclusion that the old American order had collapsed. His nonrecognition note would serve as a stirring call to all internationalists to build a new political edifice whose ample dimensions would require enormous supplies of American materials and whose maintenance would impose a staggering load upon the American taxpayer. 

The New York Times was quick to answer the summons of Mr. Stimson. It candidly admitted that in former years "frank communication by Mr. Stimson would have been regarded as indelicate and undiplomatic."1 In the new international era that had just been ushered in, the Stimson note was a cordial invitation for concerted action against the wickedness that had raised its ugly head in Manchuria. The Richmond Times-Dispatch gave expression to this sentiment and was certain that the doctrine of non-recognition would make Japan a "pariah nation."2 The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette echoed this viewpoint 3 with the Los Angeles Times humming the same blithe melody.4 The Indianapolis News stressed the "timeliness" of the Stimson note,5 while the Boston Daily Globe burst into ecstasy that Stimson had given voice to the sentiment that "every friend of peace throughout the world has been awaiting."6 

The Cleveland Plain Dealer was outspoken in its praise of the policy expressed by Secretary Stimson,7 while the Chicago Daily News 8 and the Kansas City Star 9 added their voices to this chorus of approval. But the Chicago Tribune could not approve the manner in which the Secretary of State had moved in concert with the League of Nations, and it feared that we had given "Japan a grievance which could have been avoided."10 The Philadelphia Record and the Washington Post also recorded apprehensions concerning any intimate association with the League.11 

In the South the Atlanta Constitution threw out a hint of warning. "The United States is treading on dangerous ground in becoming involved in the Manchurian situation to the extent of joining other nations in notes of warning to Japan which are tantamount to threats. It is none of our business until some of our rights have been infringed upon."12 

The Hearst press was quick to point out the dangers of the knight errantry of Mr. Stimson: "The Asiatic treasure house need not agitate us or the State Department. Japan is only doing in Manchuria what the United States did when it took Texas away from Mexico."13 The New York Daily News was equally critical: "When Frank B. Kellogg was Secretary of State he used to be known as Meddlesome Mattie. In justice to Mr. Kellogg it must now be admitted that never in his palmiest days did he equal Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson as a giver of advice."14 

Some periodicals representing the so-called "liberal elements" in the East were sharply critical of the Stimson note. The New Republic thought that the doctrine of non-recognition would be as "effective as saying to a man who has burned down his neighbor's house: 'I refuse to take cognizance of the conflagration and shall continue to send letters to the old address.' " The implication of war was clearly recognized. "If Mr. Hoover and Secretary Stimson persist in this course and Japan does not yield, we are likely to be faced with the bald choice of fighting or suffering a thumping diplomatic defeat."15 

The Communist Party organ, the Daily Worker, was certain that the Stimson policy had the ultimate aim of crushing the communist movement in China. On February 22 the Daily Worker published a manifesto addressed to the American working class: "Workers! War in the Far East means a war against the toiling masses of the world! It means the danger of a world war in the interests of the profiteers! Hands off China! Defend the Soviet Union!"16 

When the crisis in the Far East became more acute with the Japanese attack upon Shanghai (January 28), American press opinion reached a higher pitch of excitement. College professors who are so often invincible in peace and invisible in war, rushed to the linotype front and began firing verbal barrages at the Japanese Government. At Harvard this professorial pugnacity was especially apparent. President Lowell and twenty members of his faculty organized a sniping party which raked the Japanese position from every angle. Lowell was especially anxious to have the League of Nations impose economic sanctions upon the wayward men of Nippon, and he nursed the hope that the American Government would support this action with enthusiasm and efficiency.17 From Princeton came a demand that President Hoover take appropriate action "regardless of material cost or political position."18 Cornell and Johns Hopkins universities added to this babble for a boycott,19 and then President Lowell and Newton D. Baker sponsored a giant petition of college presidents and professors in which a strident note was sounded in favor of collective economic pressure upon Japan.20 

It was not long before the Committee on the Far Eastern Crisis took an active part in this pastime of heckling Japan. Their main contribution was a petition with some ten thousand signatures, and Professor Tyler Dennett became their spokesman in a statement that contained a dire warning that unless the Japanese march into Manchuria was effectively checked, civilization itself would be dragged back "toward the Dark Ages."21 

In the South the Louisville Courier-Journal and the Raleigh News and Observer were strongly in support of these petitions for economic sanctions.22 In other sections of the country the Boston Herald, the Milwaukee Journal, and the Cleveland Plain Dealer stressed the same viewpoint.23 The Scripps-Howard chain of newspapers expressed "hearty agreement" with the spirit of these petitions but issued a warning that the Department of State should secure definite assurances of Anglo-French co-operation before taking any positive steps towards the application of economic pressure upon Japan.24 

It was soon evident, however, that these voices in favor of economic sanctions were lost in the chorus of disapproval that swelled throughout the land. The New York Sun denounced sanctions as an "invitation to war."25 The Herald-Tribune compared the proposed boycott to poison gas which could be aimed in the direction of the enemy but which might be blown back in the faces of its sponsors.26 Walter Lippmann, writing in the Herald-Tribune, feared that further pressure upon Japan might lead to war: "The idea of war should be renounced clearly and decisively, even to the point of evacuating American citizens from the theater of war if that is deemed necessary."27 

The New York Daily News was vehement in its denunciation of the petitions in favor of sanctions: "We hope that the American people will insist that their government... pay no attention to this foolish and provocative petition of Mr. Baker and the assorted college presidents."28 The New York Evening Post struck a similar note: "There seems to us something wrong in the fact that a handful of doctrinaire citizens can thus go about framing diplomatic proposals that may get the rest of the United States into war."29 

In Philadelphia the Evening Bulletin entered a spirited protest against the boycott;30 the Record expressed the view that there had never been a more "thoughtless and dangerous movement" in the long record of American history;31 while the Public Ledger pointed out that an effective boycott would be a prelude to war against Japan.32 The Boston Evening Transcript was fearful that President Lowell would have the United States assume the role of policeman "of the universe,"33 and the Washington Post emphasized the perils of such a role: "The proposed commitment would involve the United States in foreign entanglements that might cost the lives of an untold number of American sons."34 

The Frank E. Gannett chain of newspapers in upstate New York was sharply hostile to the idea of economic sanctions,35 with the Hearst press warmly supporting the same viewpoint.36 In the Middle West the Chicago Tribune feathered some sharp shafts for American pacifists who were "running amuck." The "Ph.D.'s and the Pacifists" were getting America into a most dangerous position.37 The Detroit Free Press regarded the boycott movement as "futile, criminal and dangerous,"38 while the Cincinnati Enquirer thought that the "United States should attend strictly to her proper business."39 In the Far West the Spokane Spokesman Review had an editorial with the descriptive title: "Are They Itching for Another War?"40 The San Francisco Examiner matched this editorial with a flashy one of its own: "Baker's Japanese Boycott a Sure Way to War."41 

The "liberal press" was openly hostile to the imposition of economic sanctions against Japan. The Nation believed that a boycott was "too explosive a device to be trifled with,"42 and it carried in its columns an able article by Professor Edwin M. Borchard who expressed the firm conviction that "there is no peace in such a program.43 The New Republic had nothing but sharp criticism for anything approaching a boycott. America could not "co-operate with the League in an effort to discipline Japan without going to war."44 

The business press had no hesitation in joining this outcry against economic pressure upon Japan. The Commercial and Financial Chronicle thought that the demand in certain quarters for economic sanctions was one that should be "both reprobated and deplored."45 Bradstreet's denounced the "loose talk" about a boycott,46 while other business periodicals like the Journal of Commerce and Commerce and Finance echoed these critical remarks.47 

This barrage of criticism made little impression upon Secretary Stimson who continued his policy of baiting Japan. He persuaded the President to send the fleet to the Pacific during the winter months of 1931-32 where it engaged in elaborate maneuvers between California and the Hawaiian Islands. This show of strength apparently nerved the Assembly of the League of Nations on March 11, 1932, to adopt a cautious nonrecognition resolution.48 But this belated action had slight influence upon Japan's policy in Manchuria. Although the Japanese Government had signed on May 5 an agreement that led to the withdrawal of her armed forces from Shanghai, no effort was made to move out of Manchuria. The Stimson doctrine had not only failed to stem the Japanese tide in North China but it was producing an anti-American sentiment that would make the maintenance of good relations a difficult task. To Japanese statesmen it seemed apparent that the situation in the Far East presaged an inevitable conflict between capitalism and communism, and they could not understand why the Department of State insisted upon following a policy which might preclude Japanese assistance in this struggle. In this regard the words of Admiral Toyoda had special significance. In a letter to Ambassador Forbes he commented on the serious condition of affairs in China and then expressed the opinion that the Pacific area would witness some of the more important clashes between capitalism and communism. The nature of this conflict would exclude any idea of compromise: 

We, or our near posterity, will have to decide between Sino-Russian communism or the Anglo-Saxon capitalism. If China should fall under the rule of communism, and if Japan keep up her present policy, which she certainly will, the chance is she will be forced to play the role of Iki and Tsushima as the advance posts of the Anglo-Saxon capitalism.49 

B. Stimson Helps to Push 
Japan out of the League 
Stimson always closed his eyes to any evidence of the real conflict of interests in the Far East, and he completely ignored the wise words of Admiral Toyoda. He was bent upon castigating Japan for her defensive moves in Manchuria which in his eyes were merely part of a program of expansion. On April 4 he had a long talk with the Japanese Ambassador (Debuchi) in which he sharply criticized the manner in which Japan had extended her frontiers in Manchuria. His main purpose in holding this conversation was to "take a pretty stiff position" with Debuchi, so "that he could not report to his government that I had shown any signs of yielding to the steps that they were taking or the arguments they were putting up."50 Some weeks later (June 10) Debuchi had to listen to another long lecture on the misdeeds of his government in North China. The Foreign Office was evidently laying plans to extend recognition to the puppet government of Manchukuo, and as a preliminary step in this direction it had given orders for the assumption of control over the Chinese Maritime Customs Service within that area. This step was viewed by Secretary Stimson with "great concern."51 

As one means of coping with the Japanese advance in North China, Stimson sent Joseph C. Grew to Tokyo as the American Ambassador. When Grew arrived in Japan in June 1932, the press was friendly and the Emperor was as agreeable as Mr. Grew's deafness permitted him to be. But the shadows of the Manchurian adventure fell across the threshold of the American Embassy and Grew soon realized that they would probably deepen and lengthen despite all his efforts to banish them with the bright light of some new Japanese-American understanding. 

The main barrier across the road to friendly relations was the Stimson doctrine itself. The Japanese Government was determined to recognize Manchukuo in defiance of adverse opinion in the United States and in Europe. Secure control over North China appeared to Japanese statesmen, regardless of party affiliations, as a national necessity. As a source of essential raw materials and as a market for manufactured goods, Manchuria had special importance for Japan. Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson had been willing to regard certain portions of North China as a Japanese sphere of influence, and the language of the Root-Takahira and the Lansing-Ishii agreements was so vaguely fertile that Japanese aspirations had enjoyed a rapid growth. Theodore Roosevelt, after boldly plucking the Panama pear, could not turn a deaf ear to Japanese pleas for a bite of Manchurian melon. And Woodrow Wilson, deep in his preparations for a crusade against wicked Germany, could not look too closely into Japanese motives in Manchuria. Encouraged by these friendly gestures of American Presidents, Japanese armies moved into many parts of North China. When Stimson suddenly flashed a red light of warning against any further advance, the Japanese Government made no real effort to obey the signal. Their Manchurian machine had gained too much momentum to be stopped by an American traffic cop who merely blew a tin whistle of nonrecognition. 

The efforts of European statesmen were just as futile as those of Secretary Stimson. The Lytton Commission, appointed under the terms of the League resolution of December 10, 1931, reached Tokyo on February 29, 1932, for a series of conferences with Japanese statesmen and with representatives of various Japanese organizations. From April 20 to June 4 the commission took testimony in Manchuria, and then returned to Tokyo for a brief sojourn. It finally moved to Peiping to complete the task of drafting a formal report. 

While the commission was in Tokyo, Major General Frank R. McCoy talked freely to Ambassador Grew. He assured the ambassador that the commission was of the opinion that Japan's action in Manchuria was based on two false premises: the argument of self-defense and the argument of self-determination. The commission was also convinced that the erection of a puppet state like Manchukuo "would result in a festering sore which will inevitably lead to future wars." Although Mr. Grew shared these viewpoints, he warned Secretary Stimson that  I any protest from the United States concerning Japanese recognition of Manchukuo would play right into the hands of the military clique in Tokyo. Silence would pay good diplomatic dividends.52 

But the task of silencing Stimson was as difficult as stopping the rush of waters over Niagara Falls. He was so full of righteous indignation that he had to deliver a new blast against Japan on August 8 in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations (New York City). As Grew had anticipated, the reaction in Japan to this latest Stimson attack was widespread and bitter. Its violence caused Grew to warn Stimson that "we should have our eyes open to all possible future contingencies."53 The policy of constantly pricking Japan might eventually lead to a dangerous outburst. 

On September 3, Grew sent another telegram of warning. The Japanese Government firmly intended to see "the Manchuria venture through." The Japanese public was convinced that the "whole course of action in Manchuria is one of supreme and vital national interest," and it was determined to meet, if necessary with arms, "all opposition."54 After sending this telegram to the Department of State, Grew confided to his Diary that Japanese resentment was really focused upon only one American—Secretary Stimson. Everyone he met in Japan was "thoroughly friendly" and his personal relations with Japanese officials were of "the best." But Stimson had enraged all Japan with his policy of constant hostile pressure.55 It was not hard for a diplomat to see the inevitable result of these tactics. 

In some circles in Japan the hope was expressed that a change in the Administration in Washington would bring a change in Far Eastern policy. But Stimson still had some six months to serve as Secretary of State, and there was the ominous possibility that during the period he would so firmly fix the pattern of policy that a new Secretary would be unable to alter it. Of one thing everyone in Japan could be certain— Stimson would not recede from the stand he had taken, no matter what the result. America might not be pushed to the point of actual conflict with Japan, but the road to war would be wide open and an invitation to hostilities would be ready for the anxious consideration of the President-elect. 

In order to make sure that this invitation would be no empty affair, Stimson had consented to have Major General Frank R. McCoy serve as a member of the Lytton Commission of Enquiry. If this commission denounced Japanese aggression in North China in acidulous terms, General McCoy would bear a portion of the responsibility for such an indictment. 

On October 1, 1932, the report of the Lytton Commission was published in Geneva. It made some interesting admissions. The rapid growth of the Communist Party was briefly described and the inability of Chiang Kai-shek to suppress it was clearly indicated.56 But nothing was said about Soviet infiltration of Sinkiang and the absorption of Outer Mongolia. Japan was to be the culprit in China, not Russia. In order to prove this point the report expressed in very positive terms the belief that Japan made use of the Mukden Incident of September 18 to carry out a far-reaching plan of expansion in North China. It was admitted that Japan had "special interests" in Manchuria but these interests did not justify the erection of a semi-independent state like Manchukuo which would be under Japanese control. The report therefore recommended that Manchuria should enjoy "a large measure of autonomy" consistent "with the sovereignty and administrative integrity of China."57 

The report mentioned the fact that the Japanese had erected the new state of Manchukuo on March 9, 1932, and had installed Henry Pu-yi, the boy Emperor of China, as the regent. It did not indicate who was to dethrone the regent or who was to assume the grave responsibility of pushing the large Japanese Army out of Manchukuo and thus permit Manchuria to resume its former status. Indirectly, this assertion of continued Chinese sovereignty over the Three Provinces was an endorsement of the Stimson nonrecognition principle. The commission conveniently closed its eyes to the fact of Japanese control over Manchukuo and assumed that the farce of nonrecognition would bring Japan to heel. It was a little shocked when Japan formally recognized Manchukuo on September 15, and Secretary Stimson felt outraged at this defiance of his doctrine. 

Two months later (November 19) Matsuoka, the head of the Japanese delegation at Geneva, whispered some warning words to Hugh Wilson and Norman Davis. The hostility of the Japanese public towards the United States was "dangerous." There was a growing belief that several attempts had been made by the American Government to "check Japanese development in Manchuria and to get control of the railway situation in that area." The large body of influential Japanese opinion that heretofore had been friendly was "rapidly diminishing." The Japanese people had been very patient, but a point had been reached where this quality was no longer a virtue and the repressed irritation against America might break through all bonds with "suddenness and violence."58 

Matsuoka had spent many years in the United States as a student and was known among the Japanese as "thinking and conducting himself like an American."59 His words of warning would have had some influence upon the average Secretary of State, but Stimson refused to heed them. He carelessly boasted to Hugh Wilson that he was acquainted with the "personality and methods" of Matsuoka and had anticipated that he would assume the airs of a "clever advocate."60 If Stimson had been blest with a more perceptive mind, he would have realized that Matsuoka was not indulging in idle threats. His words were freighted with wisdom, but Stimson still clung to the idea that he could beat the Japanese Foreign Minister into submission with the club of nonrecognition. It gave him small concern if the Foreign Minister squirmed under this punishment and if the Japanese press grew violent in its denunciations of his policy. The Japanese would have to take their medicine no matter how bitter it tasted. 

To some American publicists the Stimson policy seemed distinctly ill-advised. Raymond L. Buell was sharply critical of the attitude of the Hoover Administration towards Japan. If the United States "in its righteousness attempts to deny Japan the opportunity of obtaining necessary resources by a policy of force, will it lower its tariffs so that Japan may solve its population problems by means of industrialization?" Mr. Buell thought that the government of the United States should take steps to call a tariff "parley" that would consider some adjustment of existing high rates, and as a concession to Japanese opinion it should cease the elaborate naval maneuvers in Pacific waters.61 

These suggestions of Mr. Buell failed to awaken any favorable response in the Department of State.62 Stimson was opposed to any cessation of pressure upon Japan. Fortunately, this unfriendly attitude did not evoke in Japan a correspondingly hostile feeling. Quite the opposite! Japan was anxious to be conciliatory. On December 29 the Japanese Ambassador informed Mr. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, that "all the bankers, and merchants and industrialists" were intent upon "cordial and friendly relations with the United States." No one in Japan "would dare to think that war with the United States is possible." In conclusion the ambassador remarked that the "new rapprochement between Russia and China causes the Japanese to look more than ever to the United States for friendship and cordial relations."63 

In the meantime the League of Nations was giving extended consideration to the implications of the Lytton Report. On December 6 the League Assembly referred the report to a Committee of Nineteen. The representatives of several small nations on this committee were profoundly provoked with Japan because of her military operations in Manchuria. They made up for their military weakness in cascades of strong words of criticism. Stimson's quick ear caught these caustic accents and he repeated them to the Japanese Ambassador. On January 5, 1933, he talked with Debuchi, and after reviewing Japanese disregard of certain treaty obligations, he acidly observed that really there was "no other course" for Japan to follow but "to get out of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact."64 

After reading this stiff lecture to the Japanese Ambassador, Stimson found time to visit Hyde Park on January 9 where he found President elect Roosevelt in a very receptive mood. He had no trouble in convincing Roosevelt that the Stimson doctrine should be one of the pillars of the foreign policy of the new Administration. Three days later he informed Ambassador Debuchi that the President-elect would adhere to the Stimson policy.65 On January 16 this news was sent to our diplomatic representatives abroad, and on the following day Roosevelt, at a press conference at Hyde Park, insisted that America must stand behind the principle of the "sanctity of treaties."66 Party lines in America had disappeared when it came to imposing discipline upon Japan. 

On the day following this important announcement, the Japanese Ambassador had a conversation with Under Secretary of State William R. Castle. After the usual exchange of courtesies, Debuchi ventured the statement that he had planned to discuss "the irritation to Japanese feelings over the fact that our [the American] fleet remained in the Hawaiian Islands." Castle had caught the accent of no compromise with Japan so he coldly remarked that "the disposition of the American fleet was a matter solely for the decision of the American Government." Debuchi quickly conceded this fact and then amicably added that his main desire in this matter was to secure a "diminution of anti-American feeling in Japan" and that the presence of the American fleet in Hawaiian waters "kept this feeling going." Castle "ignored this remark" and then fired another verbal broadside at the retreating ambassador: "I told him it seemed to me that the Japanese were doing everything in their power to stir up anti-Japanese feeling in this country."67 

It is evident that the prevailing mood in the Department of State was one of thinly veiled hostility towards Japan, and this fact is given additional illustration in a memorandum prepared by Mr. Hornbeck. After alluding to the friction between the United States and Japan, Hornbeck then discusses certain suggestions relative to improving this ominous condition of affairs. It had been suggested "that a meeting should be arranged, preferably at some point between the continental United States and Japan, such as Honolulu, between some prominent American statesman and a prominent Japanese, for example, the Secretary of State and the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs." These two statesmen could discuss "fully and frankly the relations between the two countries and effect some arrangement which would tend to assure the maintenance of peace." 

This suggestion, which inevitably reminds one of the suggestion made by Prince Konoye in the summer of 1941, was rejected by Mr. Hornbeck because it "would in all probability be abortive" and therefore would do more harm than good. But Secretary Stimson was momentarily intrigued with the idea of this suggested meeting. On the Hornbeck memorandum he made the following endorsement, January 28, 1933: "This is a very useful analysis and I agree with most of it. The only point that I am inclined to disagree with is what I consider its rather ultra-conservatism in the latter portion. I am turning over in my own mind the possibility of a gesture to either immigration or a meeting."68 

Even if Secretary Stimson had been sincere in his desire to make some gesture of conciliation towards Japan, it was apparent that time was against him. In a few weeks the Roosevelt Administration would take office and it would be most unusual for an outgoing Secretary of State to take a major diplomatic step which might not be in complete agreement with the policy already outlined by his successor in office after March 4, 1933. At any rate Stimson did nothing to conciliate Japanese statesmen who were now determined to take some radical action at Geneva. The Roosevelt statement at Hyde Park on January 17 in favor of the "sanctity of treaties" failed to make much of an impression upon them. They knew that the British and French empires had been built by the blood, sweat, and tears of millions of persons in conquered countries. Why all this sudden show of international virtue? As Matsuoka sagely remarked: "The Western Powers taught the Japanese the game of poker but after acquiring most of the chips they pronounced the game immoral and took up contract bridge."69 It was obvious to most Japanese statesmen that the conscience of the Western powers barked only at strangers. 

C. Matsuoka Marches Out of 
the League At Geneva, 
Matsuoka was not inclined to listen to lectures in the League Assembly on public morals, and Ambassador Grew on February 23, 1933, informed Secretary Stimson that the Japanese Cabinet was in entire agreement with the viewpoint of their chief delegate. They regarded their position in Manchuria as an essential link in the "life line" of the Japanese Empire. They were determined to fight rather than yield to League pressure.70 In the face of this resolute Japanese attitude, the League went ahead and on February 24 it formally approved by an overwhelming vote the report of the Committee of Nineteen which had implemented the Lytton Report.71 

This critical action on the part of the Assembly of the League of Nations provoked an immediate response from Matsuoka. After gravely stating that his government had "reached the limit of its endeavors to cooperate with the League," he marched stiffly from the hall of the Assembly. The rest of the Japanese delegation with the exception of Frederick Moore followed Matsuoka. Moore remained for a brief period in his seat while members of the Assembly and the spellbound spectators waited to see what he would do. Growing tired of the strain of being the sole representative of Japan in the Assembly, he slowly walked from the room, realizing all the while that a grave crisis had been reached in world affairs.72 

Hugh Wilson, representing the United States, was also in the Assembly as Matsuoka walked out. Like Frederick Moore he also realized that a crisis had been reached in world politics, and this crisis he knew had been precipitated by Stimson's nonrecognition policy. In his memoirs, Wilson tells the story of that fateful march of Matsuoka: 

The final session of the Assembly remains indelibly printed on my mind. .. . Matsuoka's speech on that day in the Assembly was delivered with a passionate conviction far removed from his usual businesslike manner. He pointed out the danger of pillorying a great nation. He warned that the Assembly was driving Japan from its friendship with the West toward an inevitable development of a self-sustaining, uniquely Eastern position. . . . For the first time the gravest doubts arose as to the wisdom of the course which the Assembly and my country were pursuing. I began to have a conception of the rancor and resentment that public condemnation could bring upon a proud and powerful people, and I began to question, and still do question whether such treatment is wise.... Condemnation creates a community of the damned who are forced outside the pale, who have nothing to lose by the violation of all laws of order and international good faith. . . . Not only did such doubts regarding arraignment arise in me, but for the first time I began to question the non-recognition policy. More and more as I thought it over I became conscious that we had entered a dead-end street.73 

Professor Borchard, of Yale, agreed completely with Hugh Wilson. To him, and to Phoebe Morrison, the doctrine of nonrecognition amounted to a rather churlish refusal to face unpleasant facts, giving to political judgments a fictitious legal justification. International law makes no place for a doctrine so destitute of constructive value. . . . The doctrine of non-recognition would seem to make no constructive contributions to a disordered world, but on the contrary embodies potentialities for further disequilibrium.74 

To President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt, however, Stimson looked like some modern Lancelot engaged in a desperate combat with the forces of evil and the doctrine of nonrecognition was a most potent spear. Roosevelt regarded himself as a twentieth-century King Arthur, and his Round Table was crowded with knights who were ready to sally forth and impose a New Deal upon a credulous American public. It was not long before Irvin S. Cobb began to whisper ominously about a Double Deal, but there were few ears that cared to listen to such evil accents. 

This New Deal was supposed to have a domestic emphasis, and some of the Roosevelt knights were fearful of far-flung adventures along the distant Far Eastern horizon. Rexford G. Tugwell was not a typical knight because he had in his heart both reproach and fear. He violently reproached his associates for not warning Roosevelt about the obvious dangers of the Stimson doctrine, and he greatly feared that war lurked behind every line of the nonrecognition policy.75 

Raymond Moley was another Roosevelt favorite who warned his chief against any acceptance of the Stimson doctrine. But the President elect speedily silenced Moley with the remark: "I have always had the deepest sympathy for the Chinese. How could you expect me not to go along with Stimson on Japan?"76 

When one reads the colorful columns of Westbrook Pegler's "Fair Enough" and ponders the repeated assertions that the wealth of the Delano family was partly gained from dubious smuggling operations along the coasts of China, it would seem all too true that Roosevelt's roots went very deep into the dark soil of the Orient. The Delano money had helped to furnish him with luxurious living, and it had provided him with the social and financial background that was so helpful to a Presidential aspirant. It is possible that he did feel some spark of gratitude towards the Chinese who had been exploited for his benefit. Of one thing we may be certain: he started his first term as President with a definite suspicion of Japan's policy in North China. This fact was given clear expression during a Cabinet meeting held on March 7, 1933, when the possibility of American involvement in war in the Far East was definitely envisaged.77 The new Administration was already taking its first steps down the road to war with the Stimson banner of nonrecognition flying high. 

D. President Roosevelt Regards 
with a Friendly Eye the 
Principle of Collective Security 
In the development of a detailed critique of the nonrecognition doctrine of Secretary Stimson, it is essential that emphasis be placed upon the dangerous implications that he wished to read into the pious phraseology of the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact. The general principle of nonrecognition may be traced back, as far as the Department of State is concerned, to numerous diplomatic notes which expressed an ideal Pan American policy. It received its classic formulation in the well-known note that Secretary Bryan sent to Japan on May 11, 1915, which gave warning that the American Government would not recognize any agreement or understanding between China and Japan which impaired the treaty rights of the United States, or which adversely affected the political or territorial integrity of China or the international policy of the Open Door.78 The Pact of Paris, and the important treaty (January 5, 1929) which provided for an inter-American court of arbitration, had specifically outlawed war and had given definite support to the nonrecognition policy. They were followed by the Stimson note of January 7, 1932, with respect to the Far East, and by the Declaration of August 3,1932, in which the United States and eighteen other republics in the New World announced that they would not recognize the validity of territorial acquisitions which might be obtained through conquest.79 The Hoover Administration was prepared to give substance to these declarations by terminating the imperialistic programs of previous administrations with reference to Latin America. After the withdrawal of American armed forces from Latin America, it was merely a short step to the Roosevelt acceptance in 1936 of the doctrine of absolute nonintervention in Latin-American affairs. 

But the nonrecognition principle announced by Secretary Bryan in 1915 had no implication of war, and in 1928 there were few persons who believed that the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact could be used as an instrument to propel nations into war. It took the belligerent eyes of Secretary Stimson to see a martial meaning in the pacific phrases of the Pact of Paris, and it took his aggressive mind to twist the inoffensive statement of Secretary Bryan (May n , 1915) into a clarion call to arms. 

It was apparent to seasoned diplomats that the manner in which Stimson endeavored to apply the nonrecognition formula was so provocative that war and not peace would be the result of his efforts. The world was not ready to purchase future peace at the price of immediate war. In Tokyo, Ambassador Grew became increasingly dubious with regard to the frenzied actions of Stimson to stop the Japanese advance into Manchuria. It seemed to him that the "peace machinery which the world has been trying... to erect these last fourteen years" was basically "unsound." How could statesmen really expect to halt the tides of national ambition by the paper dykes of peace treaties like the Pact of Paris? Could such a pact have stopped the movement that pushed America into conflict with Spain in 1898? Moral sanctions would have little effect upon nations that had completed their blueprints for plunder. And if moral ostracism were "ineffective," how could America "implement the Kellogg Pact?" Certainly not by the force of arms which would be "contrary to the very principle for which the Kellogg Pact stands." Neither the severance of diplomatic relations nor the imposition of economic boycotts would check nations that were moving down the broad highway to war. The future peace of the world could be preserved only by removing the causes of conflict and not by trying to restrict its scope or to soften its impact.80 

At the same time that Ambassador Grew was recording in his diary these sapient observations, he was writing a dispatch to Secretary Stimson in a very different vein. Japan was essentially a wicked nation with no real understanding of moral obligations. This being so it "would seem that the world was hardly justified in taking for granted that Japan would observe the letter and spirit of international agreements." This "callous disregard of the pledged word" was the "growth of centuries" and could be traced to the fact that in Japan "there was nothing to correspond to the rules of abstract justice contained in the old Roman law." As a result of this lack of knowledge of Roman law the "Japanese naturally do not look upon contracts and agreements as do Occidental peoples."81 

While Mr. Grew was writing this critical commentary upon the "unmoral" Japanese, his counselor of Embassy, Mr. Neville, was writing an equally caustic memorandum upon the faithless Chinese. It was apparent to him that the Chinese Government had failed to carry out many of the engagements undertaken at the Washington Conference of 1921-22. Moreover, the menace of Red Russia was growing more formidable every day: 

In this atmosphere of distrust and suspicion, aggravated by the world-wide economic collapse and internal problems of industrial and social discontent, the Japanese looked about them. In addition to the normal difficulties in China, the Japanese were subjected to an intense boycott; the situation in Manchuria appeared worse than ever as the Chinese had used borrowed money to operate railways to the detriment of the Japanese line; their various agreements with the Chinese remained unimplemented and in the background was Soviet Russia, apparently once more a Power. The Washington undertakings were unfulfilled, and the Conference called to supplement the Naval Treaty had ignored the actual conditions that Japan had to face. So in 1931 Japan acted alone. . . . The British had acted alone in Shanghai and the British and Americans had acted together at Nanking in 1927. . . . After the Japanese action in September, 1931, the Chinese appealed to the League of Nations, alleging aggression on the part of Japan and asking redress under the Covenant. . . . The Chinese are in no position to bring up any of the Washington settlements. They have defaulted on their obligations thereunder and do not come into court with clean hands.82 

Secretary Stimson would not have agreed with this indictment of the government of China, and the Division of Far Eastern Affairs continued to needle Japan. On his way home from the debacle at Geneva, Matsuoka passed through the United States and hoped to have a conference with President Roosevelt. When this news came to the Department of State, Mr. Hornbeck immediately wrote a memorandum indicating that it "would be undesirable to have the new President grant Mr. Matsuoka an interview." If he [Matsuoka] were "to speak with the President it would be only natural for the public to assume that Matsuoka had endeavored to convince the President of the justice of the Japanese case."83 For some reason that is not clear, Mr. Hornbeck believed that the American public should not be placed under the strain of having to follow the arguments of Matsuoka. There was a chance that they might be too cogent and thus defeat the repressive policy of the Department of State. As a result of Mr. Hornbeck's advice, Matsuoka did not have an opportunity to present in private the case of Japan relative to Manchukuo. 

While the Department of State was striving to check any conciliatory gestures in the direction of Japan, the student body of Meiji University, in Tokyo, was extending to the President-elect their "heartfelt congratulations" upon his election: "The fact that our Japanese public rejoiced over your victory, we believe is a clear evidence of the great significance we are placing upon your Administration. . . . We hope that you will reweigh the Manchurian troubles and try and comprehend that the cause is not so simple as one might think."84 

The Japanese press also expressed an ardent desire that the Roosevelt Administration would take an understanding view of the Manchurian situation and thereby lay the basis for "a restoration of friendly relations between the two nations." Matsuoka himself was quite optimistic with reference to Japanese-American relations. He thought that all talk of war between the two countries was "ridiculous." If Japan went to war in the near future, it would be with Soviet Russia, and Matsuoka expressed the view that in that event "he would not be surprised to see the United States on Japan's side." 

There was no doubt that Japan had no wish for a war with the United States. Matsuoka was correct in his belief that the logical opponent for Japan in her next war would be Russia, but logic was not the basis for the foreign policy of the Roosevelt Administration. The wish that was closest to Stalin's heart was to involve Japan and the United States in a war that would remove the Japanese barrier that prevented the Red tide from overflowing the wide plains of China. The way that wish was gratified is the story of the succeeding chapters on Japanese-American relations. 

V

Secretary Hull Spurns a 

Japanese Olive Branch 

A. America Makes a Friendly 
Bow to League of Nations 
JAPANESE gestures of friendship toward the United States did not evoke any similar action on the part of the United States. It was soon apparent that the Roosevelt Administration was prepared for limited co-operation with the League of Nations that had just censured Japanese conduct in North China. Secretary Hull had no hesitation in accepting an invitation from the League to appoint a representative to participate in the deliberations of the Advisory Committee which would deal with questions concerning the Far East. Hugh Wilson, at Geneva, helped the committee to formulate certain recommendations for the application of the nonrecognition policy to Manchukuo. Secretary Hull gave his approval to these recommendations with a few exceptions. In this indirect manner the Department of State indicated its acceptance of the Stimson policy. It was careful not to emphasize this acceptance with a loud fanfare of explosive notes that had been characteristic of the Stimson practice in 1931-32. 

In connection with the problem of disarmament, President Roosevelt showed a definite inclination to work with the League he had so publicly scorned in 1932. During his press conference on May 10, 1933, he candidly admitted that his Administration was ready "to take its part in consultative pacts" which would help to insure "the safety of threatened Nations against war." He regarded this move as a "very considerable advance" over the policy of Secretary Stimson. The State Department was now prepared to move forward to the point of "making its obligations quite definite and authoritative."1 

This revealing Presidential declaration was followed by a statement of Norman Davis, chairman of the American delegation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, to the effect that the United States was ready not only to make a "substantive reduction of armaments" but was also willing to consult with other states in case of a real threat to world peace. If the League, as a result of these consultations, should decide to invoke economic sanctions against an aggressor nation, the American Government would refrain from "any action tending to defeat such collective effort."2 

B. Japan Earmarks Jehol 
as a Part of Manchukuo 
While the Roosevelt Administration was indicating a co-operative attitude towards the League of Nations, Japanese troops began to move into Jehol. This movement had been anticipated by a Japanese attack upon Shanhaiguan which appeared "designed to shut out from Jehol the Chinese forces recently sent North." From the viewpoint of the British Foreign Office the province of Jehol was "covered by the original proclamation of the Manchukuo state, to which the Governor of the Province was a party." For this reason Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, was not sure whether the formal incorporation of Jehol into Manchukuo would be regarded "by the League as more than part and parcel of their [the Japanese] action in converting Manchuria into anew state."3 

It was apparent to Sir John Simon and to Secretary Hull that there was no real central government in China. The Lytton Commission could talk in general terms about this government and could condemn Japan for the erection of Manchukuo, but it was evident to realistic observers that Japan was the only stabilizing force in North China. With China in chaos it had been necessary for Japan to protect her interests against the menacing Red tide of communism and against the outrageous demands of competing Chinese war lords. In Peiping, Ambassador Johnson saw the situation in a clear perspective and informed Secretary Hull that China had "no real national army capable either of making effective the Government's writ throughout the country or of effective resistance under unified control against a modern power despite the fact that over two million men are under arms. They are the tools of rival militarists who have repeatedly plunged the nation into civil war and whose most solemn pledges to support the National Government are usually worthless."4 

When these Chinese militarists, whose armies had brought devastation to large areas in China, moved into Jehol, the Japanese Government decided to expel them. According to Matsuoka there were more than 100,000 Chinese troops stationed in this territory claimed by Manchukuo. If they did not consent to immediate withdrawal, they would have to be ejected by force.5 

In the Department of State, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs prepared a special memorandum on the "Possibility of Chinese-Japanese Hostilities in Tientsin-Peiping Area." After discussing the activities of Chinese troops along the frontiers of Manchuria, the memorandum remarks: "The Japanese not unnaturally declare that China's activities in that connection are provocative and, if continued, must be met by Japanese military operations in China proper." In answer to the question about what America should do in this situation, the memorandum continued: "It is believed that there is no initiative which the American Government might advisedly take in this connection. The foreign power which has the most at stake in that area is Great Britain."6 

While British and French interests were seriously affected by the Japanese advance into North China, it seemed very difficult to secure agreement on the bases of a joint policy. Europe continually turned to the United States for leadership in this Far Eastern crisis, but the Roosevelt Administration refused to crawl far out on a diplomatic limb in the manner that was so characteristic of Secretary Stimson. On April 22 the French Foreign Office indicated to Mr. Marriner, the American charge d'affaires in Paris, that it would be advisable for the United States, England, and France to "confer with a view of determining what should be done" with reference to the Japanese advance in North China. It was "vital" that the three powers should "act together."7 

Secretary Hull was not ready to subscribe to a joint policy in the Far East and he was definitely opposed to taking the initiative in this regard. In view of "Great Britain's membership in the League and extensive interests in North China, leadership in any action of the powers in capacity of a go-between should advisedly be left to the British."8 This decision of Secretary Hull was strongly supported by Mr. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. In a penetrating memorandum dealing with the crisis in China he showed that chaos continued to prevail in large areas in that unfortunate country. "China's leaders, both political and military," had not yet "given evidence of having arrived at any position of unity or solidarity among themselves." A "five-fold revolution" was in progress throughout the land and this had prevented the officials from showing any "sign of firmness in terms of singleness of purpose and centralization of authority and responsibility on their own part." In the face of this official incapacity it was not worth while to attempt mediation.9 

The European powers with extensive interests in the Far East were not discouraged by the negative attitude of Secretary Hull relative to co-operation. They kept pressing for some international action to stop the Japanese armies from moving ahead in Manchuria, but the Department of State remained noncommittal. In another memorandum Mr. Hornbeck again denned the policy of the Roosevelt Administration: 

The material interests most menaced by the Japanese advance in the area now under attention are British interests. Next, French. The initiative toward concerted action, if to be taken by any of the major powers without reference to the League of Nations, might best be taken by the British Government. Next best, by either the French or the Italians. . . . We have repeatedly stated that initiative should come from them rather than from us.... From time to time since September 18, 1931, we have . . . taken the initiative toward inducing action. . . . Very seldom have we had favorable responses from the other major powers concerned.10 

It was obvious that European and Chinese attempts to draw the United States into some form of concerted action against Japan were futile. Having failed even to elicit from the Secretary of State a note denouncing Japanese aggression in North China, the Chinese Government decided to sign the well-known Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933. At the time the truce was signed, Japanese troops were in secure control of Jehol Province and occupied most of Northeast Hopeh. Under the terms of the agreement 
(1) Chinese troops were to withdraw from Northeast Hopeh Province. The boundary of this area, subsequently referred to as the "demilitarized zone," extended roughly in a northwest-southeast direction some miles "northeast of the railway connecting Peiping and Tientsin." 
(2) The Japanese Army was to have the right to conduct inspections to ascertain whether the Chinese Government was fulfilling this stipulation. 
(3) The Japanese Army was to withdraw to the Great Wall and Chinese police organizations were to undertake the maintenance of order in the "demilitarized zone."11 

The result of the Tangku Truce was the extension of Japanese control, not only over Jehol, but also over Northeast Hopeh Province. While nominally the "policing" of this part of Hopeh Province was entrusted to Chinese forces, it was realized that Japanese authority in that area would be paramount. This arrangement was merely a prelude to the creation in the autumn of 1935, under Japanese direction, of the East Hopeh Anti-Communistic Autonomous Government which will be discussed in another section. 

C. Secretary Hull Rejects Idea 
of Japanese Goodwill Mission 
The fact that Secretary Hull did not issue a statement condemning the Tangku Truce was interpreted by some Japanese statesmen as an indication that the Roosevelt Administration would not continue the hostile attitude toward Japan so often assumed by Secretary Stimson. As early as May 2, Ambassador Grew had a friendly conversation with Matsuoka who "observed that in his opinion the development of good relations between the United States and Japan should be the cornerstone of Japanese policy."12 In the following month there were indications that the Japanese public shared the feelings of the Foreign Office. When Admiral Montgomery M. Taylor, in command of the United States Asiatic Fleet, paid a visit to Japan, he was greeted with unusual cordiality by everyone. This warm welcome was regarded by the American Embassy as strong evidence of the "marked improvement in the Japanese attitude toward the United States." Japan was turning from Britain to America: "For many years the Japanese have apparently considered the British their best friends in the family of nations. Many of them now have . . . decided that a conflict of commercial interests will always prevent a continuance of their friendship and they are consequently looking to the United States to take the place of their former Allies."13 

In its earnest desire to improve relations with the United States the Japanese Foreign Office as early as December 1932 had been considering the dispatch of a good-will mission to the United States, and in September 1933 when Ambassador Grew had a formal conversation with Hirota, he found the Foreign Minister in a most friendly mood. Hirota had just succeeded the undemonstrative Uchida, and he made a special effort to convince Grew that the polar star of his policy would be the establishment of cordial relations with the United States. Grew was certain that these assurances were sincere. He discovered it was a pleasure to meet a Foreign Secretary with whom he could "really talk things out."14 

The opportunity for a frank discussion of affairs came a few days later when Grew called at the residence of the Foreign Minister. Hirota immediately intimated that he was contemplating the dispatch of a good-will mission to the United States as an evidence of his desire to "develop closer relations between the United States and Japan." Grew at once discouraged such a step. He believed that informal visits by distinguished Japanese statesmen like Prince Tokugawa would accomplish far more than the proposed good-will mission.15 Secretary Hull agreed with this opinion and he suggested that the best way for Japan to win American friendship was through the removal of any possibility of discrimination against American interests in Manchukuo.16 

D. Friction in Far East Points 
to Eventual Russo-Japanese War 
One of the reasons for this Japanese approach to the United States was the belief that war between Japan and Russia was almost inevitable. By 1933, Outer Mongolia was so completely dominated by Russia that it could be used as a base for further Russian infiltration of North China. The Russian menace to Japanese interests in Inner Mongolia and Manchukuo was assuming clearer outlines each day. In order to meet it with assurance, it would be expedient for Japan to cultivate friendly relations with the United States. The American Government should be able to perceive the dangers of expanding communism and present with Japan a common front against the great enemy of capitalism. 

The desire immediate to the heart of Joseph Stalin was some means of preventing any close attachment between the United States and Japan. Such a union could erect an effective barrier against the Red tide that had already rolled into Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. The fate of China would be decided by the attitude of the United States, and Russia knew that a friendly nod from the United States would weight the scales in her favor. 

In the early part of March 1933, Ambassador Grew received from "a reliable Soviet source" an outline of Soviet-Japanese relations. The Embassy's "informant" assured Mr. Grew that Japan was pushing preparations for "a war with the Soviets, with the United States, or with both." As a bulwark against this threatened war the "Soviet Union badly needs the resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States. It is able, but cannot agree, to repay the old Russian debts owing to American citizens, because to repay one set of debts would make it necessary to repay all." The Russian Government was willing, however, to give economic favors in "return for the cancellation of the old debts."17 

Four months later the Russian Government made another approach to the United States. M. Bogomolov, the Soviet Ambassador to China, expressed to Ambassador Johnson the opinion that the "absence of friendly relations between Soviet Russia and the United States" made the position of Russia in the Far East "very weak." He then confidentially added that this same absence of friendly relations "was also a factor of weakness in the position of the United States in the Far East." The intimation was very clear: America should resume diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia lest the Japanese Government, in the event of war, would be able to persuade the American public that the armies of Japan were "fighting, not Soviet Russia, but the Soviet regime."18 

In October 1933, Ambassador Grew sent to the Department of State a careful estimate of the situation in the Far East and came to the conclusion that it was "not unlikely" that Japan was determined "to remove the Russian obstruction from the path of her ambitions at an advantageous moment." This moment might occur in 1935. One of the main reasons for this clash between Japan and Russia was the Japanese fear of communism. "Communistic thought" was regarded in Japan with the utmost aversion and drastic measures were being taken "to stamp it out of the country. Japan considers herself as the bulwark against the spread of communism southward and eastward. Given sufficient provocation, the Japanese could readily be aroused to enter Siberia with the intention of completely destroying a regime which it fears and detests."19 

This fear of communism, which so strongly colored the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, was not felt by the Roosevelt Administration which decided to court rather than repel the advances from the Russian Foreign Office. Despite the Russian absorption of Outer Mongolia and the infiltration of Sinkiang, the Department of State refused to regard Japan as a bulwark against any further Russian movement into North China. Instead, it decided to recognize Soviet Russia and thus give the cause of communism in China a tremendous boost. On November 16, 1933, recognition was formally extended to Soviet Russia with all its wide implications of a joint policy against Japan. The Roosevelt Administration had made it clear that it had turned its back upon a Japanese bid for a rapprochement based upon a common hostility towards communism. Apparently, in the Far East, Japan, rather than Russia, was the nation to be disciplined. [pure insanity by FDR,or in truth he was a communist, the whole damn war was bullshit to the American,because at the end of their blood orgy,WE paid to rebuilt everything, everywhere! DC]

E. Japanese Gestures of Friendship 
are Rebuffed by the U.S. 
The President's decision to favor Russia rather than Japan in the Far East was in defiance of the opinions of some American diplomats in that area. Mr. Edwin L. Neville, counselor of the American Embassy in Tokyo, wrote a long memorandum in October 1933 which gave a realistic summary of the situation in China. It was apparent that the: 

establishment of the present regime in Manchuria is to place the Japanese and Russians face to face over a long frontier. They need no longer consider any Chinese political interest in that region.... So long as the Soviet Government was not a military power the Japanese felt that their national interests in Manchuria were not seriously menaced. When, however, Soviet military prowess was added to the problems which the Japanese had to confront on the mainland, they came to the conclusion that Chinese political complications, at least, should be eliminated in that region. .. . So far as the United States is concerned, there seems no probability that the American people would be willing to engage in any new ventures in this part of the world. . .. In the light of Russian activities in Outer Mongolia and the behavior of Soviet agents in intramural China, it is open to question whether a Russian military victory . . . would be of any value in preserving or restoring the political and administrative integrity of China.20 

Mr. Neville saw clearly the menace of the Russian advance in North China and indicated the fallacy of any belief that a Russian military victory over the Japanese would restore the political and administrative integrity of China. But Ambassador Grew closed his eyes to the implications that lay behind the Roosevelt Administration's policy of extending recognition to Soviet Russia. In his diary he made the following comments which illustrate his narrow vision: "The President has played his cards well: he said not a word about Manchuria but started building up the fleet and recognized Soviet Russia; as a result he gets an entirely new and more friendly orientation of Japanese policy toward the United States."21 

It is quite surprising that Mr. Grew could seriously confide to his diary on November 30 that the Roosevelt recognition of Russia had compelled the Japanese Government to adopt an "entirely new and more friendly orientation" in its policy towards the United States. Since March 1933 the Japanese Government had gone out of its way to conciliate America and to win the approval of the Department of State. It is something of a shock, therefore, to find Ambassador Grew refusing to read the abundant evidence that revealed this Japanese good will and to strike a note of unfairness that was soon sounded with more emphasis by Secretary Hull. 

But Hirota was so profuse in his friendly gestures that Grew had to admit that the Foreign Minister was "genuinely doing his best to improve Japan's relations with foreign countries all along the line." In the face of this amicable attitude it would be inexpedient for Secretary Hull to issue any new note with reference to the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition. America would "sacrifice no principle by silently" maintaining its position.22 

As the weeks went by, Grew became more and more impressed with the pacific dispositions of Japan's leaders. The Emperor was a man of "mild and peaceful character." Prince Saionji, Count Makino, and many members of the Genro were profoundly imbued with the "horrors of war." The Prime Minister was "more peaceful than bellicose," while Hirota was doing all he could to improve Japan's relations with other countries. At a recent dinner at the Tokyo Club, Baron Hayashi, one of the Emperor's favorites, had voiced with impressive earnestness the desire of the Japanese Government to avoid war: "We want peace."23 

As an important gesture along this line, Hirota sent a new ambassador to the United States. Hiroshi Saito, who began his duties as ambassador on February 13, 1934, had made an intensive study of American history and was certain that he "knew the American people." His previous experience in consulates on the Pacific Coast and as secretary of the Embassy in Washington had given him an intimate acquaintance with American habitudes of thought. According to Frederick Moore, "no American career diplomatist was his equal."24 

Saito's first task in Washington was to endeavor to persuade Secretary Hull to negotiate a new treaty with Japan. In the course of these negotiations some formula might be found that would eliminate the causes of future friction between the two countries. At least these conversations would afford an opportunity frankly to discuss all questions at issue. They might lead to a Japanese-American understanding of tremendous importance to the preservation of peace in the Orient. Japan was gravely concerned about Russian objectives in North China. Using this Japanese apprehension as a convenient diplomatic tool, Hull would have a chance to shape the situation in the general direction of American desires. Such a procedure would call for diplomatic skill of a high order. It seems probable that Secretary Hull regarded the task as too difficult for him to handle because he flatly refused to open negotiations looking towards a new treaty with Japan25 that might have led to a friendly accord. 

Hull finally consented to an exchange of diplomatic notes which contained the usual aspirations. Hirota tried to show an amicable spirit by referring to the fact that for eighty years Japan and the United States had "always maintained a relationship of friendliness and cordiality." After alluding to the increasingly important trade relations, he expressed the conviction that "all issues pending between the two nations will be settled in a satisfactory manner." It was the sincere desire of the Japanese Government that a "most peaceful and friendly relation will be firmly established between her and her great neighbor across the Pacific, the United States." 

The reply of Secretary Hull was cordial on the surface, but behind each paragraph lurked the shadow of the Stimson doctrine.26 If he had encouraged lengthy diplomatic conversations in preparation for a formal treaty with Japan, he might have found some answer to the questions that found a thunderous expression in the attack upon Pearl Harbor. His note to Hirota was couched in friendly phraseology, but it dodged the issue of Japanese expansion in North China. Hull knew that this issue was like a small cancer deep in the delicate tissue of Japanese-American relations. It could be removed by the radical procedure of war or it could be checked by the X rays of a friendly understanding. He chose to let it grow until war was the only remedy, and his responsibility for that result is obvious to any student who carefully examines the diplomatic correspondence. 

F. Japan Proclaims a Monroe 
Doctrine for the Far East 
The most important question that disturbed the course of Japanese-American relations was the one dealing with the status of Manchukuo. When the Japanese Foreign Office received word from Saito that Secretary Hull would not discuss in detail the outstanding issues pending between the two countries, Hirota reluctantly realized that it was in vain to hope for any understanding that would remove all causes of friction. He still persisted, however, in making friendly gestures in the direction of the United States. One of the most significant of these was his decision to pay a warm tribute to the memory of Townsend Harris, the first American Consul to Japan. On April 22, Grew was taken on a Japanese destroyer to the port of Shimoda where long lines of school children greeted him with loud shouts of "banzai." There were many speeches that stressed the long tradition of cordial relations between Japan and the United States, and the ceremony impressed Grew as a very "moving one."27 [A blind person can see that Japan did not want war with America DC]

But this glow of friendly relations was soon extinguished by the reaction produced by a statement issued by Mr. Amau, the chief of the Bureau of Information and Intelligence of the Japanese Foreign Office. On April 17, 1934, Amau issued to the Japanese press a statement of the foreign policy, formulated by the Foreign Office with reference to China. Its terse phraseology sounded like a challenge to all the powers that had large interests in China. After a declaration that Japan had "special responsibilities in East Asia," the statement went on to say that in order to fulfill those responsibilities it might be necessary at times for Japanese armed forces to act on their own initiative and not to seek the co-operation of other nations. It was only natural, therefore, for Japan to "oppose any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan." Loans for political purposes or shipments of munitions of war would be regarded with suspicion.28 

Ambassador Grew immediately sent a telegram to Secretary Hull relative to the Amau statement, and Maxwell M. Hamilton, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, hurriedly prepared a memorandum on the situation. In the event that the Japanese Government sent to the Department of State a copy of the Amau statement, the acknowledgment of the receipt of that document should be "very brief and should indicate merely that we purpose to continue in our traditional and consistent course of conducting foreign relations in accordance with the developing principles of international law and the treaties to which the United States is a party."29 

On April 20, Ambassador Grew sent to Secretary Hull a dispatch dealing with the issuance of the Japanese Monroe Doctrine for the Far East and he inclosed a copy of the unofficial statement issued by the Japanese Foreign Office on April 17.30 An interpretation of this statement was made by Ambassador Saito in an interview with Constantine Brown on April 21. The Japanese Government would consider extending loans or selling aircraft to China as "an unfriendly act." The Western nations did not have the "remotest idea" of how "to deal with the Chinese. . . . The Japanese Government . . . has decided to prevent the furtherance of the present trouble by the loans which Western nations are giving the various Chinese leaders to further their own ambitions."31 

These Japanese statements of policy in the Far East rang like an alarm along the quiet corridors of the Department of State, and Under Secretary of State Phillips requested the Japanese Ambassador to pay a formal call and present some explanation of the action by the Foreign Office. Mr. Saito was disturbingly vague in his answers to the questions of Mr. Phillips. He doubted whether the statement made by Mr. Amau had been made in "any precise form" and therefore it was difficult to give any adequate explanation of it. Phillips complained that Mr. Saito was not of "much help" in this situation, and the interview ended on a distinctly unsatisfactory note.32 

From April 21 to April 24 some British newspapers expressed opinions that were strongly pro-Japanese. The London Daily Mail emphatically stated that it was difficult to see "why Japan's preponderance of interest in China should be disputed,"33 and the London Morning Post acidly observed that "the interventions both in Shanghai and in Manchuria, whatever may be thought of the methods employed, were invited by China, if not forced upon Japan through the anarchy and misrule which threatened every foreign interest."34 

Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Secretary, had been far more cautious than the British press in expressing his opinion. His public statement appeared to Mr. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, as "somewhat ambiguous," and the British Ambassador, during a conversation with Mr. Hornbeck, admitted that the Foreign Secretary when under verbal fire was "very cagey" in his language. When the ambassador (Sir Ronald Lindsay) made an inquiry concerning American policy, Mr. Hornbeck replied that "we feel that action by the various governments concerned on parallel lines and with the appearance of a common front would have obvious advantages but that we did not intend to assume or be placed in a position of leadership in initiating proposals for joint or concurrent action."35 

While the Department of State was seeking some formula that would fit the situation in the Far East, Ambassador Grew had an interview with Hirota who tried to quiet any suspicions by giving explicit assurances that there "was no intention on the part of Japan to claim a privileged position in derogation of the rights and responsibilities to which the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty are entitled." The Foreign Office was endeavoring faithfully to "follow the policy of the Emperor," and was anxious to "achieve with all countries, and especially with the United States, relations of friendliness."36 

Mr. Grew was not deeply impressed with these friendly words, and he confided to his diary the opinion that the Amau statement "accurately expresses the policy which Japan would like to pursue."37 Mr. Hornbeck agreed with this viewpoint,38 but he prepared a memorandum in which he advised the Secretary of State to follow a policy of caution: "In the light of what has happened up to the present, I personally favor making no reply to the Japanese statement. .. . It appears that no other government is prepared to take a strong position against the Japanese statement. . . . American interests in China are not, in my opinion, any more important than, if as important as, the interests of Great Britain, Russia and possibly France. I do not think that the United States should 'stick out its neck' and become the spearhead in opposition to Japan."39 

Secretary Hull paid little attention to this warning memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck. On April 28 he sent to Tokyo an aide-memoire which clearly outlined the viewpoint of those persons in the Department of State who favored exerting constant pressure upon Japan. He referred to the treaties which defined America's rights in China and then bluntly stated that the treaties themselves could be modified or terminated only by "processes prescribed or recognized or agreed upon by the parties to them."40 

This aide-memoire reached Tokyo on July 29. Although it was Sunday and was also the Emperor's birthday, Grew sent a hurried note to Hirota and requested an immediate audience. The Foreign Minister at once acceded to this request, and after slowly reading the Hull statement, he remarked that Amau's ill-chosen words had caused "great misunderstanding." His manner was "perfectly friendly," and he betrayed no sign of displeasure because the statement of the spokesman of the Foreign Office had been so directly challenged.41 

It is evident that Hirota was still trying desperately to court American good will in the face of the growing Russian menace to Japanese dominance in Manchuria. Japan was deeply concerned over the communist threat to one of the main life lines of her empire, and she had directed the implications of the Amau statement at Russia and not at the United States. The establishment of bolshevik control over Russia in 1917 had been viewed by Japan with anxious eyes, and her invasion of Siberia had been prompted by the necessity of stemming the communist tide. As the Bolsheviks strengthened their hold upon Russia, Japanese fears deepened. These fears had been readily recognized in the report of the Lytton Commission: 

As the Soviet Government and the Third International had adopted a policy opposed to all imperialist powers which maintained relations with China on the basis of existing treaties, it seemed probable that they would support China in the struggle for the recovery of sovereign rights. This development revived all the old anxieties and suspicions of Japan toward her Russian neighbor.42 

These suspicions were confirmed when Russia and China signed a treaty on December 12, 1932, which restored diplomatic relations between the two nations. This agreement, it was feared, might be the signal for joint Russian and Chinese pressure upon the Japanese position in North China. Uchida, the Japanese Foreign Minister, recognized this possibility. In a speech in the Diet he ominously remarked: "Should the Red movement in the Yangtze Valley and South China, which have long suffered from the activities of Communists and the depredations of Communist armies, gain in strength as a result of the Sino-Russian rapprochement, that would be a serious menace to peace in the Orient against which Japan must certainly be on guard."43 

The establishment of the Japanese-controlled state of Manchukuo was one of the means devised in Tokyo to meet this Russian threat. In order to improve her position in Manchuria, Japan raised Henry Pu-yi from Regent to Emperor and formally crowned him at Hsinking on March 1, 1934.44 This was an obvious bid for international recognition of the government of Manchukuo. The London Times responded with a statement that some countries with large business interests in the Far East would soon find it necessary "to reconcile their trading activities in Manchuria with the policy of recognition."45 The New York Journal of Commerce expressed hearty agreement with this viewpoint and praised the government of Manchukuo as the "most stable and efficient that any portion of China has enjoyed for a long time past."46 Mr. T. J. League, who had spent many years in China, wrote to Mr. Hornbeck to advise him of the exact status of Manchukuo: 

Manchuria has never at any time been part of the "Chinese body-politic." It stands now as it has done, as a unit distinct and entirely separate from China. . . . I should like to suggest to you the wisdom of discrediting entirely the Russian propaganda against Japan, which is, and has been for some time past, virulent.... Recognition of Manchukuo would alleviate most of this and put the whole situation in an entirely different and more favorable atmosphere. Personally, I believe that Japan is sincere in her presentations and purposes.47 

While the great powers hesitated about granting recognition to the state of Manchukuo, Russia was rapidly strengthening her position in the Far East. First she adopted special measures to encourage migration to the maritime provinces of Siberia. Next, collective farmers were granted exemptions from agricultural taxes; wages for workers were raised to inviting new levels, while prices paid by the government for the products of the fisheries were increased in a significant manner 48 

Japan regarded these Russian moves with sharp suspicion and she redoubled her efforts to purchase the Chinese Eastern Railway. When the Soviet Government fixed the price at 160,000,000 yen, Hirota spurned that sum and offered only 120,000,000 yen. In August 1934 the negotiations completely broke down and left relations between the two countries seriously strained.49 Lieutenant-Colonel Seiichi Aoki, in a popular Japanese magazine, published an article which indicated the imminence of war.50 Stalin answered this challenge with a defiant declaration: "We do not fear threats and are ready to give blow for blow."51 

In anticipation of actual warfare in the near future, Japan completed in 1933 some 1,060 miles of new railway in North China and then pushed some new military highways to the borders of Manchukuo.52 In November 1934 the Japanese Cabinet approved the largest military budget on record. Russia met this action by increasing her army appropriation from 1,573,000,000 rubles in 1933 to 1,795,000,000 rubles in 1934.53 

It was widely recognized that President Roosevelt's recognition of Russia had added considerable strength to the Muscovite position in the Far East, thereby increasing Japan's difficulties in her endeavor to dominate Manchuria. It was apparent to Japan that Russia had long range plans to communize China and thus eventually to control a large portion of eastern Asia. The very nature of international communism made it impossible to have stable relations with Russia, so Japan again turned to the United States in May 1934 in the hope of erecting a common front against the foes of capitalism. Knowing that the Roosevelt recognition of Russia would make inexpedient any reference to the dangers of communism, the Japanese Ambassador addressed to Secretary Hull a note which explored the bases upon which a Japanese-American understanding could be built. Emphasis was placed upon the importance of adopting a policy which would prevent China from relying upon her ancient stratagem of playing off America against Japan. 

It was important to have some joint "governmental action" that would dissipate the "suspicion and fear between the United States and Japan." This could take the form of a joint declaration which would stress a desire to "promote trade to the mutual advantage of the two countries and to make secure the principle of equal opportunity of commerce in the Pacific regions." The declaration could also include a pledge binding each nation to "respect the territorial possessions and the rights and interests of the other," and it would "restate their determination that the two countries should ever maintain a relationship of peace and amity."54 

G. The State Department Frowns 
upon an Understanding with ]apan 
It was obvious that Ambassador Saito was angling for some joint statement of policy like the Root-Takahira or the Lansing-Ishii agreements of 1908 and 1917, but Hull did not regard Japanese friendship as worth-while bait. He had already rejected formal negotiations looking towards a treaty between the two nations, and he now refused to be drawn into an executive agreement that would announce American acceptance of Japan's special position in North China. Such an agreement would have changed the history of our Pacific relations and would have eliminated the tragedy of Pearl Harbor. But once more the barrier of the Stimson doctrine held the two nations apart and prevented an accommodation that would have pointed towards peace.55 

Rebuffed for a second time by Secretary Hull, Japan now turned to Germany. In the summer of 1934 a Japanese naval squadron paid a good-will visit to German waters, and this gesture was followed by the dispatch of Japanese military and naval experts to Germany. Trade agreements were the next item in this catalogue of friendship.56 As the courtesy list lengthened and commercial advantages became manifest, Poland took an active interest in this Japanese-German rapprochement. Trade possibilities with Manchukuo led many statesmen in Europe to ponder whether it was worth while to adhere to the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition. 

There were other economic factors that disturbed the equation of international friendship. In 1933, Japanese textiles began to flood the markets in which British goods had long held a dominant place. This was particularly true with reference to the markets in India, Egypt, and East Africa. In 1934 the situation was so serious that a conference was held in London between British and Japanese manufacturers for the purpose of allocating the textile trade of the two countries. No agreement could be reached and this impasse led Mr. Walter Runciman, president of the British Board of Trade, to issue a statement that seemed equivalent to a declaration of economic warfare upon Japan.57 Trade wars are often the prelude to armed conflict. 

The United States experienced this Japanese commercial invasion in 1934 when imports of cotton cloth from Japan rose from 1,116,000 square yards in 1933, to 7,287,000 square yards in 1934. In the first three months of 1935 these imports reached the startling figure of 12,771,000 square yards, and the owners of the New England cotton mills saw bankruptcy just around the corner of another year. But the general picture of American commercial relations with Japan was distinctly reassuring. Japan's total exports to the United States in 1934 were considerably less than in the previous year, while American exports to Japan rose from $143,000,000 in 1933 to $210,000,000 in 1934. This rapidly increasing trade with Japan was partly explained by the fact that Japanese mills were consuming a large portion of the American cotton crop. The percentage of the crop that went to Japan rose from 15 per cent in 1929 to 30 per cent in 1934. While many countries were reducing their imports of American cotton, Japan was constantly increasing her purchases of this important raw product, thus adding another link in the economic chain that bound the two countries together. In comparison with this fast-growing trade, the Open Door in China was like the entrance to the cupboard of Old Mother Hubbard.58 

H. Closing the Open 
Door in Manchuria? 
With Japanese markets expanding each year and with Japanese mills consuming American cotton in a constantly increasing volume, it seemed as though the economic basis for a Japanese-American accord had been firmly established. But Secretary Hull could not keep his eyes from the Manchurian scene where, it was widely alleged, the Open Door was being slowly closed by Japanese pressure. Japan regarded Manchukuo as her first line of defense against Russian aggression. This aggression would not come in the immediate future, but the communist currents in China would gradually be merged into a mighty stream that would surge against all Japanese outposts in Manchukuo in a tide that would be difficult to stem. If these bastions of defense were not carefully prepared to meet these rapidly rising waters, they would be engulfed and the creative work of several decades would be destroyed. 

This pressing problem of national defense was the one that gave Japanese statesmen their greatest concern, and it was the real reason why the Japanese Foreign Office announced in April 1934 its Monroe Doctrine for eastern Asia. Hirota knew that the American Monroe Doctrine had always rested upon the broad basis of national defense. He also knew that the primary reason behind Theodore Roosevelt's predatory policy in Panama was this same factor of defense. Even as late as 1912 the American Government had invoked the Monroe Doctrine as a deterrent against the acquisition, by a Japanese corporation, of a large tract of land in the vicinity of Magdalena Bay. This bay was in Mexican territory, but if it were controlled by a Japanese corporation, it might be used as a naval base for future operations against the United States. Under pressure from the Department of State the Japanese corporation abandoned its project, and the Senate of the United States, as a warning to other Japanese corporations, passed a resolution opposing the transfer of strategic areas in the Americas to non-American corporations which might be acting as agents for a foreign power.59 

The Japanese Government in 1912 had readily recognized the fact that the American Government could not permit any part of the Mexican borderlands to pass under the partial control of foreign corporations. Considerations of national defense were of paramount importance to every American statesman, and this factor had outweighed any regard for the feelings of Mexican politicians who might resent Yankee dictation with reference to business dealings with the nationals of other countries. In April 1934, Japan merely took a leaf from the book of American national defense and announced indirect control over the petroleum resources of Manchukuo. China would not like this action and neither would other countries that had hoped to exploit the riches of North China, but for Japan this control took on the aspect of a national imperative. 

The first item in this program of control was the issuance by the government of Manchukuo of a charter to the Manchuria Petroleum Company (February 21, 1932). This charter provided that the new company would have a monopoly control over the sale and distribution of petroleum in Manchukuo. The capital stock of the company was owned entirely by the government of Manchukuo and by Japanese interests. There was no possibility that any foreign oil company could share in the management or the profits of the Manchuria Petroleum Company. 

This secure control over the oil business in Manchukuo might adversely affect the oil companies of foreign nations by depriving them of the retail trade which they had developed over a long period of years. 

In 1932 about 55 per cent of the oil imported into Manchuria was handled by the American Standard Vacuum Oil Company and by the Texas Oil Company. British, Russian, and Dutch interests controlled 35 per cent of the remaining oil imports with Japan having only 10 per cent for her share.60 

It is apparent that the Japanese Government was determined to adjust this balance of business so that it would incline in favor of her nationals. Oil is an essential commodity in modern warfare. It was only common sense for the government of Manchukuo to insist upon control over the oil resources within its borders. 

Although the restrictive policy of the government of Manchukuo was criticized as being inconsistent with the Open-Door policy, it was soon obvious that American petroleum interests would not be seriously injured. American exports of petroleum to Manchukuo increased from $782,000 in 1936 to $3,436,000 in the following year. In 1938 these exports continued to increase, but the Department of State explained this favorable factor by asserting that Manchukuo was building up reserves for war purposes. This may have been true in 1938, but it was not true in the early thirties. 

In 1932, American exports to Manchuria were valued at only $1,186,000. After the erection of Manchukuo into a Japanese dependency, American trade rose to $2,691,000 in 1933, and in 1935 reached the respectable figure of $4,188,000. 

If the Open Door was slowly being closed in Manchukuo, there still remained a crack wide enough to permit a growing American trade.61 

But the Department of State was not satisfied with these favorable trade statistics. Secretary Hull sent a series of strong protests to Japan with reference to the monopoly given to the Manchuria Petroleum Company,62 and American public opinion was aroused over the preferences given to Japanese nationals in their business enterprises within Manchukuo. Since 1899 many Americans had tickled their fancies with warm visions of a great export trade to China's teeming millions.63 

Although this trade never developed, they continued to cherish their illusions and they overlooked the far larger trade opportunities with Japan. The friction between the United States and Japan over Japanese commercial policies in Manchukuo was entirely needless. Secretary Hull was determined to press for the continuance of a trade principle (Open Door), even when its partial abrogation meant an increased volume of American trade. He seemed to be unaware of the ominous fact that his notes were creating a backlog of ill will that might later burst into the flames of war.

next
Moscow Molds the Political Pattern in the Far East 

notes
Chapter IV

1 January 9, 1932.

2 January 12, 1932.

3 February 18, 1932.

4 January 9, 1932.

5 January 9, 1932.  

6 January 8, 1932.  

7 January 9, 1932.  

8 January 9, 1932. 

9 January 8, 9, 1932. 

10 January 9, 1932.

11 January 9, 1932. 

12 January 9, 1932.

13 The San Francisco Examiner, January 10, 1932. 

14 January 8, 1932. 

15 January 27, 1932.  

16 January 9, February 20-23, 

17 Christian Science Monitor, February 18, 1932. 

18 New York Times, February 4, 1932. 

19 Ibid., February 28, 1932. 

20 New York Times, February 22, 1932. 

21 Ibid., February 26, 1932. 

22 February 21, 24, 1932. 

23 February 18, 20, 21, 1932. 

24 New York World-Telegram, February 22, 1932. 
25 February 23, 1932. 
26 March 19, 1932. 
27 February 26, 1932. 
28 February 21, 1932. 
29 February 22, 1932. 
30 February 23, 1932. 
31 February 27, 1932. 
32 February 24, 1932. 
33 February 18, 1932. 
34 February 24, 1932. 
35 Rochester Democrat and Chronicle, February 26, 1932. 
36 Washington Times, March 7. 1932. 
37 March 9, 1932.  
38 February 21, 1932.
39 February 21, 1932.
40 February 23, 1932.
41 February 25, 1932.
42 March 9, 1932.  
43 March 9, 1932. 
44 February 10, March 9, 1932.  
45 February 27, 1932.  
46 March 5, 1932.  
47 February 24, March 9, 1932. 
48 Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory (Princeton, 1947), pp. 62-66.
49 Admiral Tejiro Toyoda to Ambassador William Cameron Forbes, Tokyo, March 3, 1932. 793-94/4877, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 

50 Memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 4, 1932. 793.94/4968, MS, Department of State. 

51 Memorandum by the Secretary of State, June 10, 1932. 693.002 Manchuria/77, MS, Department of State.

52 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, July 16, 1932. Foreign Relations: Japan, 1931-1941, I, 93-95. On June 21, 1932, Viscount Ishii had made a speech before the America-Japan Society of Tokyo in which he gave assurances that Japan would leave "no stone unturned in order to remove all possible causes of friction with her great neighbor." Shanghai Evening Post and Mercury, June 21, 1932. 

53 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, August 13, 1932. Japan: 1931- 1941, I, 100. 

54 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, September 3, 1932. Ibid., p. 102. 

55 Joseph C. Grew, Ten Years in Japan (New York, 1944), p. 40. 

56 Lytton Report (Washington, 1932), pp. 20-23. 

57 Ibid., p. 130. 

58 Secretary Stimson to Ambassador Grew, Washington, November 21, 1932. Japan and the United States: 1931-1941, I, 104-5. 

59 Frederick Moore, With Japan's Leaders (New York, 1942), pp. 130-31, 

60 Secretary Stimson to Hugh Wilson, November 21, 1932. Japan and the United States, 1931-1941, I, 105. 

61 New York Herald-Tribune, November 20, 1932. 

62 Memorandum of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, November 25, 1932. F/G 711.94/751, MS, Department of State. The memorandum expressed the opinion that a revision of tariff duties in favor of Japanese products would have the unfortunate effect of assisting "the Japanese military to retain their power longer." 

63 Conversation between Mr. Hornbeck and the Japanese Ambassador, December 29, 1932. F/HS 711.94/758, MS, Department of State. 

64 Conversation between Secretary Stimson and Ambassador Debuchi, January 5, 1933- 793-94/57O9, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 

65 Conversation between Secretary Stimson and Ambassador Debuchi, January 12, J 933- Japan and the United States, 1931—1941, I, 108-9. 

66 New York Times, January 18, 1933. Stimson had already assured the British Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, that the President-elect was committed to the Stimson doctrine. Sir John replied, January 14, that the British Government would adhere to the same doctrine. Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 89.  

67 Conversation between William R. Castle and the Japanese Ambassador, January 18, 1933. 793.94/6063, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 

68 Endorsement of Secretary Stimson upon the Hornbeck memorandum, January 28, 1933- 793-94/6o63, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. I 16 

69 Moore, op. cit., pp. 38-39. 

70 Japan and the United States: 1931-1941, I, 110-12. On February 7, 1933, with his tongue in his cheek, Stimson instructed Hugh Wilson, United States Minister at Geneva, to make it clear that he was not in any way attempting "to guide or to influence or prejudice the League in its deliberations." Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 153. 

71 Russell M. Cooper, American Consultation in World Affairs, pp. 268-69

72 Moore, op. cit., p. 133. 

73 Hugh R. Wilson, Diplomat Between Wars (New York, 1941), pp. 279-81. 

74 Edwin M. Borchard and Phoebe Morrison, Legal Problems in the Far Eastern Conflict (New York, 1941), pp. 157-78.

75 Rexford G. Tugwell, The Stricken Land (New York, 1947), p. 177. 

76 Raymond Moley, After Seven Years (New York, 1939), pp. 94-95. 

77 James Farley MSS, in the possession of Walter Trohan. 

78 Secretary Bryan to Ambassador Guthrie (Tokyo), May 11, 1915. Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 146. 

79 Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the United States (New York, I943). Cf. chaps. 12, 13, 16. 

80 Grew Diary, February 23, 1933; Ten Years in Japan, pp. 78-80. 

81 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Stimson, February 21, 1933, 793.94/6026. MS, Department of State. 

82 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Stimson, Tokyo, February 24, 1933, with inclosure by Mr. Neville, counselor of the Embassy. 793.94/6031, MS, Department of State. 

83 Memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, February 28, 1933. 811.4611 Japan/24, MS, Department of State. On March 31, 1933, Matsuoka had a brief interview with Secretary Hull. He was "very affable" and "urged that Japan be given time in which to make herself better understood." With reference to this conversation, Mr. Hull remarks: "I was courteous but virtually silent while he was offering these parting remarks." Foreign Relations, 1933, p. 264.

84 Memorial from the editorial staff of the Sundai Shimpo, student publication of Meiji University, Tokyo, Japan, to President Roosevelt, February 22, 1933. 711.94/ 792, MS, Department of State.

Chapter V
1 The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, ed. Samuel I. Rosenman (New York, 1938), II, 169 ff. 
2 Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), pp. 186-91. 
3 Sir John Simon to Ambassador Mellon, London, January 13, 1933. Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 88-90. 

4 Ambassador Johnson to Secretary Hull, Peiping, February 13, 1933. Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 171-72.
5 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, February 13, 1933. Ibid., pp. 174-75. 
6 Memorandum prepared by the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, March 16, 1933. 793-94/6o65, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 
7 Mr. Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 22, 1933. Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 286. 
8 Secretary Hull to Ambassador Johnson (China), Washington, April 25, 1933. Ibid., p. 290.  
9 Memorandum by Mr. Hornbeck, chief, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, April 26, 1933. Ibid., pp. 293-94. 
10 Memorandum by Mr. S. K. Hornbeck, May 16, 1933. Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 327-28. 

11 Memorandum by Mr. S. K. Hornbeck, July 15, 1937. 793.94/9195, MS, Department of State. In a concluding paragraph of this memorandum Mr. Hornbeck remarks: "The Japanese Army has from time to time put forth claims that there were certain secret agreements embodied in or supplemental to the Tangku Truce, such as provision for through postal, railway and airway communications between North China and Manchuria. Although the Chinese have denied the existence of any secret agreements, actually postal, railway and airway communications have been opened between Manchuria and North China."
12 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, May 8, 1933. Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 307. 
13 Monthly report of the American Embassy in Tokyo, June, 1933. 894.00 P.R./67, MS, Department of State. 
14 Grew Diary, September 18, 1933; Ten Years in Japan (New York, 1944), pp. 99-100. 
15 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, October 3, 1933. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 123-24. 
16 Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, October 6, 1933. Ibid., pp. 125-26.
17 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, March 9, 1933. Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 228-30. 
18 Memorandum by the United States Minister to China (Johnson), Peiping, July 20, 1933. Foreign Relations, 1933, III, 377-78. 
19 Ambassador Grew to the Under Secretary of State (Phillips), Tokyo, October 6, 1933. Ibid., pp. 421-24.
20 Memorandum written by Mr. Edwin L. Neville on the situation in the Far East, Tokyo, October 6, 1933. 793.94/6495, MS, Department of State. 
21 Grew Diary, November 30, 1933; Ten Years in Japan, p. 108. 
22 Ibid., January 23, 1934; ibid., pp. 115-16. 
23 Ibid., February 8, 1934; ibid., pp. 117-19. 

24 Frederick Moore, With Japan's Leaders (New York, 1942), pp. 70-77. 
25 Ibid., pp. 85-86. 
26 Hirota's note was handed to Secretary Hull on Feb. 21, 1934; Hull's note was handed to the Japanese Ambassador on March 3, 1934. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 127-29 
27 Grew Diary, April 22, 1934; Ten Years in Japan, pp. 125-27. 
28 Ibid., April 28, 1933; ibid., pp. 128-33.
 29 Memorandum prepared by the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, April 20, 1934. 793-94/67OO, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 
30 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, April 20, 1934. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 223-25. 
31 Washington Evening Star, April 22, 1934. 
32 Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Phillips), April 24, 1934. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 225-26. 
33 April 21, 1934. 
34 London Morning Post, April 24, 1934.
35 Memorandum of a conversation between the British Ambassador, Sir Ronald Lindsay, and Mr. Hornbeck, April 24, 1934. 793.94/6617, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 
36 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, April 25, 1934. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 227-28. 
37 Grew Diary, April 28, 1934; Ten Years in Japan, p. 130. 
38 Memorandum prepared by Mr. Hornbeck and addressed to Mr. Phillips, April 2 5> J934- 793-94/6669, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 39 Memorandum prepared by Mr. Hornbeck on Amau statement, April 25, 1934. 793.94/6700, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 
40 Secretary Hull to Ambassador Grew, April 28, 1934. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 231- 32. 
41 Grew Diary, April 29, 1934; Ten Years in Japan, pp. i33~34- 
42 Lytton Report, League of Nations, Geneva, October 1, 1932, pp. 36-37. 

43 Contemporary Japan, published by the Foreign Affairs Association of Japan, Tokyo, March, 1933, I, No. 4, pp. 766-67. 

44 The United States in World Affairs, 1934-35, ed. W. H. Shepardson and W. O. Scroggs (New York, 1935), pp. 152-53. Henry Pu-yi was appointed regent of Manchukuo on March 9, 1932. He was born in 1906 and was designated by the Empress Dowager of China as the successor to the throne under the title, Emperor Hsuan Tung. After the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty in 1912 he remained for a while in Peking, but in 1924 he went to live in the Japanese concession at Tientsin. During the years from his abdication to his appointment as regent of Manchukuo he assumed the name of Henry Pu-yi. 

45 May 4, 1934. 

46 March 5, 1934. 

47 T. J. League to Mr. Hornbeck, March 23, 1934. 793.94/6572, MS, Department of State. 

48 Economic Review of the Soviet Union, January, 1934, p. 23. 

49 Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, iQ3i-ig45 (Princeton, 1945), p. 37. 

50 Tyler Dennett, "America and Japanese Aims," Current History, XXXIX (March, 1934), 767. 

51 New York Times, January 28, February 4, 1934. 

52 H. J. Timperley, "Japan in Manchuria," Foreign Affairs, XII (January, 1934), 295-305. 

53 League of Nations, Armaments Year Book, 1934, pp. 441, 725. 

54 Ambassador Saito to Secretary Hull, May 16, 1934. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 232-33. 
55 Mr. Phillips, the Acting Secretary of State, to Ambassador Grew, June 18, 1934- Japan: 1931-1941, I, 237-39. 
56 Moore, op. cit., pp. 38-39.

57 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, May 7, 1934, CCLXXXIX, 718. 

58 Shepardson and Scroggs, op. cit., pp. 174-78. 

59 Thomas A. Bailey, "The Lodge Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," Political Science Quarterly, XLVIII (1933), ff 

60 Shepardson and Scroggs, op. cit., pp. 156-59. 

61 Department of State, Press Releases, April 6, 1939; Japan: 1931-1941, I, 155- 56. Ralph Townsend, The High Cost of Hate (San Francisco, 1939), pp. 24-25, gives the following table based upon official figures: 

Total U. S. sales in Manchukuo by years: 

1931 $2,176,000 

1932 1,186,000 

1933 2,691,000 

1934 3,398,000 

1935 4,188.000 

1936 3,542,000 

1937 16,061,000 

62 Japan: 1931-1941, I, 130-57. 

63 It had long been apparent to realistic diplomats that the trade between the United States and China would never be large. As Dr. Jacob Schurman remarked to Mr. Hamilton of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs: "China has never been a great market for American goods and there is little reason to suppose that she ever will be." 793-94/6686, MS, Department of State.

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