Back Door to War
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy
1933-1941
by
CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL
VI
Moscow Molds the Political
Pattern
in the Far East
A.
Secretary Hull Overlooks
a Diplomatic Opportunity
WHEN SECRETARY HULL rejected in June 1934 the proffer of a Japanese olive branch, he clearly indicated his strong disinclination to have
it cultivated in the friendly soil of American good will so that it would
bear the rich fruit of a permanent accord. But despite this lack of response from the Department of State, the Japanese Government still
strove for an intimate understanding with the United States. Hirota
remained as Foreign Secretary in the Okada Cabinet which took office
on July 8, and Saionji, Makino, and other moderates were "clearly in
the saddle." An eminent Japanese liberal expressed to Ambassador
Grew the opinion that "if the United States had had the privilege
of choosing the Cabinet in its own interest, it could not have done
better."1
These favorable factors were entirely overlooked by Secretary Hull
who at times liked to flavor the ointment of diplomacy with a dash of
strong vinegar. This Hull formula finally grew so distasteful to Prime
Minister Okada that he decided it was useless to continue to make
friendly gestures in the direction of the United States. He might just
as well surrender to the demands of a powerful pressure group in Japan
that kept clamoring for naval parity with the United States and Great
Britain.
B.
]apan Denounces the
Washington Naval Treaty
The Washington Naval Treaty of February 6, 1922, had never been
popular with Japanese militarists who deeply resented the ratio of inferiority that had been imposed upon their naval establishment. Moreover, they realized that parity with the United States and Great Britain
would greatly reduce the likelihood of armed intervention by either of
these powers to block Japanese expansion in North China.
For a decade after the Washington Conference the situation in China
had been a big question mark to the statesmen of the great powers.
For a while it had appeared that Chiang Kai-shek might be able to bring some measure of peace to a country that had been in chaos since
the last days of the empire. But the whirlwind of nationalism had been
too strong for the successor of Sun Yat-sen to harness, and Americans
at Nanking in 1927 and Russians along the Chinese Eastern Railway
in 1929 had felt, its destructive force. In 1931, Japan had decided to
convert Manchuria into a glorified cyclone cellar that would be safe
against any adverse wind from China or even from the steppes of
Siberia. Stimson, however, was unduly suspicious of Japanese weather
maps and he sharply protested against the precautions taken by the
watchful men of Nippon. Japanese statesmen not only resented his
repeated protests but regarded American naval maneuvers in Hawaiian
waters as a covert threat to their position in the Far East. If naval
parity were attained it might act as a gag upon American secretaries
of state who talked of peace while walking down the road to war.
It is interesting to note that while Stimson was engaged in his favorite pastime of sending irritating notes to Japan, American naval construction was permitted to fall far below the limits permitted by the
Washington Naval Treaty. On March 4, 1933, the American Navy
was approximately at 65 per cent of treaty strength, while the navy
of Japan had mounted to 95 per cent of treaty limits. If Japan, by denouncing the Washington Naval Treaty, could eliminate all limitations
upon its naval armament, and if the United States continued its policy
of indifference to naval construction, it would not be long before actual
parity could be reached. In that event the Stimson policy would no
longer be invoked by American statesmen.
But President Roosevelt defeated these hopes of Japanese navalists
by allocating in June 1933 the large sum of $238,000,000 from the
National Industrial Recovery Act appropriations for the construction
of new warships. This action confronted Japanese admirals with a
formidable dilemma: they now had the "unenviable task of deciding
whether to abrogate the treaties next year [1934] and start a hopeless competition with far wealthier nations for naval supremacy, or else
accept a continuance of the present ratios and face an outraged public."2
The naval leaders in Japan felt that they could not "lose face" by continuing to accept the existing ratios. Their pressure upon Hirota grew
so strong that on September 17, 1934, he informed Ambassador Grew
that Japan had definitely decided "to give notice before December 31,
1934, to terminate the Washington Naval Treaty."3
When preliminary conversations began in London in October 1934 relative to the renewal of the Naval Treaty of 1930, the Japanese delegates promptly introduced their demand for parity. Their arguments
were based upon the grounds of "prestige and manifest destiny." Manifest destiny had been a favorite American watchword during many
decades of the nineteenth century, but Secretary Hull felt outraged
when Japanese statesmen began to apply it to their expansion in Manchuria. He was certain that the real reason for Japanese parity demands
was the desire to "obtain overwhelming supremacy in the Orient" and
thus secure "preferential rights and privileges."4
He did not share the
"deep concern" of the British Foreign Office to arrive at some solution
satisfactory to Japan, and he was cool to the suggestion of a tripartite
nonaggression treaty to cover the situation in the Far East. It would be
best for the American delegation at Geneva to give no encouragement
to the Japanese to "expect any concessions or to expect the conclusion
of a new treaty in substitution for the Washington Treaty."5
Norman Davis discovered that the British were not in favor of the
stand-and-deliver attitude of Secretary Hull. They were anxious to continue the "talks with the Japanese" even though there was no solution
in sight. Hull reluctantly responded to this British pressure and agreed
that the "conversations should not be broken off right away," but he
instructed Davis to "refrain from doing anything which would diminish the embarrassment of the Japanese as the time of the denunciation
approaches." Hull had developed an ardent dislike for the Japanese
and was now conducting relations with them in a thoroughly feudist
manner.6
In the face of this uncompromising attitude there was nothing left
for the Japanese Foreign Office to do but inform Hull on December 29,
1934, of its decision to denounce the Washington Naval Treaty of
February 6, 1922. The limitations imposed by that treaty would expire
on the last day of December 1936. There was still a small chance that
conversations at Geneva could lead to some path of accommodation and
cause the Japanese Cabinet to reconsider its decision. British statesmen
favored further attempts to discover some common denominator of
agreement in the matter of naval ratios, but Hull believed that lessons
of diplomacy to the Japanese should be taught to the tune of verbal
spankings rather than by words of encouragement.7
It is to be regretted
that President Roosevelt felt the same way.
In this regard his viewpoint differed fundamentally from that of his cousin, Theodore Roosevelt. In the winter of 1910, after a mature consideration of all the factors in the Far Eastern situation, Theodore
Roosevelt gave President Taft some sound, realistic advice relative to
the Japanese advance into Manchuria:
Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country and at the same
time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese,
on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our
interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a
menace, in however slight a degree, to their interests.8
C.
Japan Promotes Autonomy
Movement in North China
It had been very clear to Theodore Roosevelt during his administration
as President that Japan regarded Manchuria as a bulwark of defense
and as the keystone in the economic structure of the empire. Japan
could not retire from her position in that province and any attempt to
force her withdrawal would lead to open warfare. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt and Secretary Hull by adopting the Stimson formula of
nonrecognition had opened a Pandora's box of troubles in the Far East.
When they applied the formula to Japan and remained silent concerning Russia's absorption of Outer Mongolia, they emptied every evil in
the box and led them to stalk along the Manchurian frontier stirring
up discontent.
Chaos and communism are close companions and as Japan looked
over the unsettled condition of affairs in North China, it was apparent
that Russian agents were busily at work in fomenting discord. They
would turn the peasants against the tottering regime of Chiang Kaishek, and when the fires of revolution had destroyed the weak fabric
of the Nationalist Government, communist armies under Mao Tse-tung
or Chu Teh would quickly extinguish them under a heavy iron curtain.
The formula was simple and very effective. If Japan remained inactive
in North China, it would not be long before Manchuria and Korea
would be closely besieged by great masses of fanatical Reds. Japan must
either extend her frontiers in China or see her troops pushed into the
sea.
Under the terms of the Tangku Truce, May 31,1933, Chinese troops
had been withdrawn from Northeast Hopeh Province which was converted into a "demilitarized zone" under the nominal control of China.
Order in this area had been insufficiently maintained by organizations "under the control of Chinese" officials who were "not unsympathetic
to the Japanese."9
As conditions continued unsettled the Japanese decided to restore order by force and to extend the area under her control.
In May 1935, Japanese armies moved into the demilitarized zone of
Hopeh and some weeks later compelled Chinese officials to consent
to a new truce. Under the terms of the Ho-Umedzu Agreement, July 6, 1935 (signed by General Umedzu, commander of the Japanese Army
in North China and by General Ho Ying-chin, Chinese Minister of
War), Chinese troops would be withdrawn from Hopeh Province and
this would be followed by the "dissolution and suppression of certain
Chinese organizations to which the Japanese objected." Another important item provided for the prohibition "of all anti-foreign and anti-Japanese activities in China generally."10
This important agreement was one expression of the policy stressed
by Hirota in the late summer of 1935. After having removed one possibility of friction with Soviet Russia by the purchase of the Chinese
Eastern Railway (March 23), Hirota concentrated his attention upon
North China. In October he announced three basic principles of accommodation with China: (1) recognition of Manchukuo; (2) suppression of anti-Japanese activities; (3) collaboration in an anti-Communistic program. When the Nanking Government refused to give
serious consideration to these proposals, Japan announced on November 24 the existence of a strong independence movement that aimed
at the autonomy of the five northern provinces of Chahar, Hopeh,
Shansi, Shantung, and Suiyuan. The consolidation of these five provinces into an autonomous unit was not accomplished, but the Japanese
did organize the "East Hopeh Anti-Communistic Autonomous Government."
This was placed under the control of a Chinese named Yin
Ju-keng who was sympathetic with Japanese aspirations. Next, the
Hopeh-Chahar Political Council was established "under the nominal
control of the Chinese Government." The Japanese puppet in this case
was General Sung Che-yuan. Finally, the Japanese erected in "Chahar
Province north of the Great Wall (about nine-tenths of the Province)
an 'independent' Mongolian regime under the nominal leadership of
the Mongolian prince Teh Wang."11
These political moves were apparently merely a prelude to the establishment of a real autonomous
government in the five northern provinces.
D.
America and Britain Protest
against Japanese Policy
Britain viewed with evident alarm this sudden expansion of Japanese
influence in North China. James L. Garvin, noted British political
analyst, called attention to the fact that something "significant and sinister" had taken place in the Far East,12
while Sir Samuel Hoare, speaking for the Foreign Office, lamented that events had taken place "which,
whatever the truth of the matter may be, lend color to the belief that
Japanese influence is being exerted to shape Chinese internal political
developments and administrative arrangements."13
Secretary Hull went far beyond the cautious language of the British
Foreign Secretary. On December 5 he issued a press release which indicated the attitude of the Department of State:
There is going on in and with regard to North China a political struggle
which is unusual in character and which may have far-reaching effects. . . .
Unusual developments in any part of China are rightfully and necessarily
of concern not alone to the Government and people of China but to all of
the many powers which have interests in China. . . . Political disturbances
and pressures give rise to uncertainty and misgiving. . . . They make difficult
the enjoyment of treaty rights and the fulfillment of treaty obligations. ... In
international relations there must be .. . faith in principles and pledges.14
E.
American Purchases of
Silver Adversely Affect China
While Secretary Hull was talking on this high plane with reference to
help for China, the actions of United States Treasury officials under
the Silver Purchase Act of 1934 were helping to undermine Chinese
opposition to Japanese expansion in North China. American purchases
of silver caused a large flow of that metal from China to the United
States, thus leading to a serious depletion of bank reserves and a consequent decline in commodity prices. The Chinese Government countered with a tax on silver exports, but large quantities were smuggled
out of the country and foreign trade was soon demoralized.15
After
vainly waiting for an expected loan, China was finally compelled to
issue on November 3 a decree nationalizing silver. All holders of that metal were ordered to exchange it for legal-tender notes issued by three
government banks.
America's silver policy had caused serious economic distress in large
areas in China, had weakened her resistance to Japanese encroachments,
and had made many of her "responsible business leaders to feel that
their economic interests would perhaps be safer if entrusted to Japanese
control than they would be if they were left to be played upon by the
hocus-pocus of fourteen American Senators."16
Instead of increasing
American exports to China, the Silver Purchase Act led to a sharp drop
in this current of trade.17
Secretary Hull admits that the operations of the Treasury Department led to a "disastrous flight of silver from China to the United
States," and he laments the fact that it was not until May 1936 that
any real relief was afforded by Secretary Morgenthau.18
During these
months of financial dislocation in China, Japan moved forward to a
more secure control over large portions of North China. [Sure he lamented, he is either covering for Treasury, or the two agency's had different agenda's for China.See The Silver Stealers in my tags DC]
F.
Japan Again Asks for Naval Parity
Under the provisions of the London Naval Treaty of 1930 arrangements were outlined for a conference to meet in 1935 for the purpose
of drafting a convention that would settle all questions relating to naval
limitations. When this convention met in London, December 9, 1935,
the Japanese delegates presented their usual plea for parity. This
stressed the importance of establishing a "common upper limit" by
reducing the existing ration of 5-5-3 to one of 3-3-3. This could be
accomplished by destroying a large number of American and British
warships.19
Admiral Nagano defended the Japanese position by asserting that
the common upper limit desired did not "envisage giving Japan any
opportunity for aggression; on the contrary, Japan wanted to make
aggression by any power impossible." Under the 5-5-3 ratio the American Navy, concentrated in Oriental waters, could "threaten Japanese
security." Norman Davis replied that he did not think that the Japanese proposals were "very fair." After discussing the reasons for the
establishment of the 5-5-3 ratio he then remarked that it was essential
to find some modus vivendi which would "avoid both the common upper limit and the ratio." Admiral Standley thought that a satisfactory temporary arrangement might be effected by taking the existing naval
establishments with certain qualitative limitations and add a preamble
stating that "an adequate navy was the sovereign right of everybody."
This suggestion was accepted by the Japanese delegates for further consideration.20
During the course of his remarks Norman Davis had expressed his
gratification at the "improvement in Japanese-American relations in
the past three years." He paid tribute to the Japanese people and to
their urge for progress which the United States admired but which it
desired to see "exercised in a peaceful manner." Mr. Phillips also adverted to the "rapidly growing friendship" between the United States
and Japan and spoke of his fears that "parity would certainly set us back
and breed suspicion."21
But the Japanese delegates continued to insist upon parity and refused to discuss the new building programs presented by France, Great
Britain, and Italy. On January 15, 1936, when the other powers rejected the parity request, Japan formally withdrew from the conference.22
Collective security in the Pacific was crumbling even before
Mussolini's legions in Africa proved that it was hopelessly out of date.
G.
President Roosevelt Delivers
a Lecture to Wicked Dictators
As the system of collective security was rapidly breaking down in Africa
and in China, it occurred to President Roosevelt that he might check
this disintegration by some words of warning to dictators in Germany,
Italy, and Japan. In 1936 the Nazi regime in Germany was distasteful
to multitudes of Americans and Mussolini's march into Ethiopia had
given deep offense to a large and influential group of publicists and
professors who believed that the frontiers of America had gradually
been extended into every continent on the globe. The Japanese movement into North China had been particularly disturbing to these ardent
one-worlders who conveniently forgot that Russia had really taken over
Outer Mongolia and was rapidly infiltrating Sinkiang. The Department
of State in 1935 had protested to Russia against communist propaganda
in the United States, but it had evinced no interest in the advance of the
Red tide over the plains of North China. Russia, with its vast reservoir
of strength in limitless Siberia, was a far more serious threat to China than the armies of Japan that had to fight a desperate battle to be able
to cling to the fringes of the continent of China. But President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull kept looking at the problems of eastern Asia
through the myopic eyes of Henry L. Stimson who had bedeviled the
situation in 1931-32 and who still muddled the minds of high officials
who held the reins of authority.
On January 3, 1936, the President delivered an address to Congress
in which he sounded a sharp challenge to wicked dictators who were
engaged in aggressions that might lead to World War II. After congratulating his Administration upon the adoption of a "good neighbor
policy," he belabored other national leaders who had failed to "demonstrate that patience necessary to attain reasonable and legitimate objectives by peaceful negotiation or by an appeal to the finer instincts of
world justice." Fully aware that the injustices of Versailles could never
be rectified through any agency of the League of Nations, the President
must have pressed his tongue hard in his cheek when he uttered such
sonorous nonsense. But he relished his role as lecturer to errant nations,
and he hurried on to further words of castigation: "They [Germany,
Italy, and Japan] have . . . impatiently reverted to the old belief in the
law of the sword, or to the fantastic conception that they, and they alone,
are chosen to fulfill a mission. .. . I recognize that these words which I
have chosen with deliberation will not prove popular in any nation that
chooses to fit this shoe to its foot."23
In distant Tokyo, Ambassador Grew regarded these minatory words
of the President as an exercise in "courageous statesmanship." He
realized that this pointed admonition would not stop the "Japanese
push into China," but he hoped that it might retard its progress.24
He
was not honest enough to admit that it was another step in the direction
of war with Japan.
Japanese reaction to the President's address was given significant expression in a speech made by Hirota who deprecated the fact that American statesmen constantly talked as though they had a mandate from
God: "It is to be regretted that there are abroad statesmen of repute
who seemed determined to impose upon others their private convictions as to how the world should be ordered, and who are apt to denounce those who oppose their dictates as if they were disturbers of
peace."25 [The man was totally correct, but it was not yet apparent that a foreign entity already had it's claws into the United States,and it was this foreign entity that had illusions of grandeur with regard to a mandate from God. Simply put the United States was already being used for Zionist designs DC]
In New York, Ambassador Saito, speaking before the Japan Society, endeavored to justify Japanese policy in China by comparing it with the
American Monroe Doctrine.26
This statement aroused the ready ire of
Senator Pittman who vehemently denied the validity of such a comparison. "We are seeking to preserve the republics of Latin America, not to
destroy them."27 [might not be looking to destroy, but definitely applying puppet strings DC]
Although Ambassador Grew recognized that the much-quoted utterance of Pittman was "utterly jingoistic," he did not regret it because
he believed that "its net result will be helpful." The Japanese Government should be made to realize that there has always been a limit to
American patience. Indeed, if they looked into the history of the United
States, they would discover that "the American people are among the
most inflammable in the world." Some little incident in the Far East
might easily ignite the tinder of American resentment and thus produce
a long and devastating war. Grew overlooked the fact that utterances
like those of Senator Pittman greatly helped to prepare in Japanese
minds a pile of ardent dislike that could be enkindled into flames of
conflict by sparks of caustic criticism on the part of American officials.28 [Now that is a damn lie about the American people, the United States government had already declared it's own people enemies, and sold them and their heir's into perpetual chattel slavery to the Crown and Vatican! The American people have been nothing but cannon fodder for 87 years in a few more days as I write this on 3/2/20 DC]
H.
Chinese Nationalism Makes a
Common Cause with Communism
While jingoists in the United States were denouncing Japanese policy in China, the Japanese Cabinet was doing its best to maintain friendly relations with the United States. In the first week in March 1936,
Hirota was commanded by the Emperor to assume the post of Prime
Minister. This selection pleased Grew who looked upon Hirota as a
"strong and safe" man. In response to a series of questions from Grew,
the new Prime Minister repeated the items in his policy towards China
which he had announced during the preceding October: (i) Chinese
recognition of Manchukuo; (2) suppression of anti-Japanese activities;
(3) collaboration in an anti-communistic program. In its execution of
this policy Japan would not "interfere with foreign rights and interests
including the principle of the Open Door." In conclusion, Hirota again
emphasized his warm desire to make "good relations" with the United
States the most important item in his program of peace.29
This same note of friendly feeling for the United States was echoed
by Mr. Yoshida, the Japanese Ambassador to Britain who was visiting
Washington. At the conclusion of his friendly remarks he expressed
the hope that the American people would soon recognize the need of
the "immense and rapidly growing population of Japan" for more territory.30
This land hunger could best be satisfied by a large slice of
North China.
Secretary Hull reduced Yoshida's fervor of expression by coolly remarking that the American people were getting the impression that
Japan "sought absolute economic domination, first of eastern Asia, and
then of other portions as she might see fit." This would eventually
mean "political as well as military domination," and that the upshot of
"the entire movement would be to exclude countries like the United
States from trading with all of those portions of China thus brought
under the domination .. . of Japan." Hull then discoursed at length
upon the beneficent aspects of his reciprocal trade program which aimed
at breaking down tariff barriers and thus making it possible for "some
20 billions of dollars of international trade by degrees to be restored." If the Japanese Government would abandon its selfish policy of imperialism in North China and follow American tutelage in the matter of reciprocal trade, it would soon be vastly benefited by the strong
new currents of rich commerce.31
Japanese statesmen were well acquainted with all the items in the
Hull program of reciprocal trade, and they had weighed with care most
of the arguments in favor of unrestricted trade. But their problem in
North China was primarily one of defense against Russia. The importance of Manchuria as a source of raw materials and as a market for
Japanese manufactures was obvious. Less obvious was the importance of
that province as a bulwark that would stem the Red tide that had already
covered the entire province of Outer Mongolia. The Soviet Army in
the Far East during the years 1936-38 increased to an imposing force
of more than 300,000 seasoned troops.32
Not only could this army use
Mongolia as a springboard for offensive action, but after 1935, Red
forces could recruit further strength in the province of Sinkiang. According to Alexander Barmine, who was in charge of the supply of
Soviet arms to military forces in that province, it was evident that all
vestiges of Chinese control had vanished. In 1935, Sinkiang had become "a Soviet colony in all but name."33
It is significant that the American Government never addressed a note to Soviet Russia protesting against the absorption of these provinces. American concern relative to the preservation of Chinese territorial integrity had its sole expression in acrid notes to Japan. Faith in
Russia's good intentions was an important item in the Far Eastern
policy of the Roosevelt Administration. [That is because Roosevelt was a Communist,and had been from day 1 of his first term, the problem with that truth though is that it blows their 'official history' out of the water. Protest all you want, call me anything you like, I have his actions, both domestic and foreign as proof, all the deniers have is what they sold you as history DC]
Officials in the Department of State not only overlooked the rapid
extension of Russian power through control over Outer Mongolia
and Sinkiang, but they deliberately closed their eyes to the implications
that lay behind the establishment of the Communist Army in the province of Shensi. After the communist debacle in 1927, Mao Tse-tung
and Chu Teh retreated to convenient rural areas in Kiangsi and Kwantung provinces and carefully recruited new strength. In August 1931
a mandate was received from Moscow instructing Chinese Communists
to create a full-fledged Soviet government: "In the shortest possible period, a central Soviet government must be formed in the most secure
region." In accordance with this directive the First Congress of Chinese
Soviets assembled in Juichin, Kiangsi, in November 1931 and promulgated a constitution along Russian lines. Before closing its sessions this
Congress elected a permanent Central Executive Committee which immediately chose a Cabinet that included such loyal communist leaders
as Mao Tse-tung, Chu Teh, and Chou En-lai. This Cabinet was empowered to rule by decrees which were to have the force of law. The program formulated by the Congress had a definite communist inclination:
the confiscation of the estates of landlords and the nationalization of all
industries belonging to foreigners.34 [Meanwhile his Zionist masters had FDR stick his thumb up his ass,sit on it,and rotat. DC]
By September 1932 the Communist Party in China proudly reported
to the Comintern that it had organized a Red Army of twenty-six corps
and fifteen local divisions. It had also introduced a "well-armed GPU
detachment" in order to suppress any "counter revolutionary movements." In the following year the Chinese delegate, Wang Ming, stated
that the Red military forces had grown to an army of 350,000 trained
troops with an irregular force approximating 600,000. This military
establishment had under its domination a total population of nearly
sixty million people.35
But the Red Army in China felt insecure in the provinces of Kiangsi
and Kwantung, so in October 1934 it began the Long March that finally took it into Kansu and Shensi.36
In northern Shensi a new Soviet
area was rapidly organized in 1935. For Russia the new location for
the Chinese Communist Army was of great importance. Bordering on Inner Mongolia, it would provide a bulwark against the projected
Japanese advance in that region. Close to the territory of Soviet Russia,
it could draw from that area much-needed supplies for warlike operations. As an instrument of Russian policy it was admirably located and
was ready to strike upon orders from Moscow.
The Kremlin, however, was too canny to use the Chinese Red Army
as an offensive force at that time. It would be better strategy to arrange
a truce with the Nationalist armies of Chiang Kai-shek and then preach
a crusade against the Japanese invaders. When they were turned back
the truce could be conveniently broken and the armed forces of Chiang
Kai-shek, war-weary and shattered, could be crushed. All China would
then be inundated by the Red tide.
It would, therefore, be smart politics for the Chinese Communists
to arrange a hurried understanding with the Nationalist Government
and use Chiang Kai-shek as an unwitting tool to further their ends.
The first move in this game of wits was to implement a motto forged by
Mao Tse-tung: "All parties and classes unite to fight the Japanese and
the traitors. . . . We are against civil war."37
Other communist leaders
echoed this clarion call of Mao Tse-tung, and when Chiang Kai-shek
was taken prisoner at Sian in December 1936 by Chang Hsueh-liang,
Moscow quickly intervened and secured his release.38
For the time being
he was an important Soviet asset that had to be carefully exploited.
When his usefulness was over he could be shot as a "fascist-militarist."
I.
Japan Draws Closer to Germany
In the face of this growing accord between Chiang Kai-shek and the
communist leaders in China, Japan concluded the well-known anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936. This was a consultative convention which bound the contracting parties to "keep each other informed concerning the activities of the Communistic International."39
There was also a secret "additional agreement" which provided that
in the event "one of the High Contracting Parties" should "become the
object of an unprovoked attack or threat of attack by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics," the other contracting party would "take no measures which would tend to ease the situation" of Soviet Russia. This
secret treaty also made provision for consultations between the contracting parties to safeguard "common interests."40
In a statement explaining the purpose of the anti-Comintern Agreement, the Japanese Foreign Office indicated the extent of communist
propaganda and the efforts of communist agents to promote world-wide
revolution in order to establish Red control over every part of the globe.
Attention was called to the devious means by which the Russian Government had acquired a dominant influence in the Chinese provinces of
Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. In order to meet this growing threat to
Japanese security, it had been found necessary to enter into the anti-Comintern Pact with Germany. But this step was merely a preliminary
move in the direction of attempting to prove to other powers the importance of becoming parties to a general anti-Comintern pact.41
During a conversation with the American charge d'affaires, Mr.
Dickover, Horinouchi, the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs,
gave an assurance that "no secret military . . . arrangement of any kind
was included in the agreement."42 - The Russian Government, however,
was confident that some kind of a military alliance had been arranged
between Germany and Japan, and the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo informed Ambassador Grew, "with considerable heat," that this alliance
was also directed against the rich British and Dutch colonial empires
in the Far East. There was no real foundation for this statement, and
Ambassador Grew himself discounted such talk.
J.
Japan Seeks an
Accommodation with China
Ambassador Grew was not disturbed by the ominous assurances of the
Russian Ambassador that Japan and Germany had signed an agreement
which aimed at eventual absorption of some of the choice British and
Dutch possessions in the East Indies. He was happy that on New Year's
Day 1937 there were no "current controversies of prime importance"
between Japan and the United States.43
A few weeks later Grew had
a "long and intimate" conversation with Amau, the spokesman of the
Foreign Office. The burden of their talk was the satisfactory state of
Japanese-American relations.44
But Grew was afraid that the situation
was too good to last. In Japan one felt a "little like living on a volcano,
never knowing when an explosion is going to occur."45
Grew believed that Prime Minister Hirota was largely responsible
for this improvement in Japanese-American relations. He had made strenuous efforts to curb hostile comments in the Japanese press, and
Amau had struggled valiantly to have the Japanese public see America
in a more friendly light. But the most important factor in this uncertain
equation of good relations was the status of North China. Faced with a
rapidly growing communist menace, Japan had attempted to extend her
influence in some areas of North China, and this had led to increased
friction with the government of Chiang Kai-shek. The situation could
easily develop into armed conflict unless some formula of accommodation could be found. For many months successive Japanese ministries
endeavored to find this formula.
In the summer of 1936, Hirota made special efforts to conciliate
China at a time when Chinese mobs were maltreating Japanese nationals. At Chengtu, on August 24, two Japanese newspaper reporters were
murdered and two other Japanese nationals were "dragged from their
hotel and brutally beaten."46
It seemed evident to the Japanese Foreign
Office that this mob action was the result of the "anti-Japanese agitation instigated by the Kuomintang and tolerated by the National Government." The Chengtu Incident was soon followed by many other unfortunate occurrences of a similar nature. On September 17 at Swatow
a hand grenade was thrown into a restaurant owned by a Japanese; at
Hankow on September 18 a Manchukuo official "was molested on a
train by a mob and some of his valuables were taken away." On the same
day at the same place a Japanese consular policeman was killed by some
Chinese while he was "patrolling the border of the Japanese concession
at Hankow." A few days later (September 23) at Shanghai one Japanese bluejacket was killed and two were wounded by Chinese gunmen.
As a result of these unprovoked attacks upon Japanese nationals, the
Japanese Foreign Minister issued a statement (September 28) that negotiations with China "could not be left to drift." China was "now at
the cross-roads where it must decide whether or not to shake hands with
Japan."47
The Chinese Government responded to this statement by asking
Secretary Hull to request Japan "to be moderate and conciliatory toward
China,"48
and the British Government instructed its ambassador in
Tokyo to present a similar request to Foreign Minister Arita.49
The Foreign Office endeavored to quiet the situation by announcing on October 2 the decision to send Mr. Kuwashima, director of the East Asiatic
Bureau, to China for conferences with Ambassador Kawagoe. In explaining this step the Foreign Office spokesman remarked that it was
important for Japan to convey to Chiang Kai-shek its "real intentions."50
According to the Chinese ambassadors to France and Great Britain
the real intentions of the Japanese Foreign Office were divulged in a
series of "demands" or "requests" which were far-reaching in their
scope. The Japanese Government attached special importance to the
"demands" dealing with action against communism and with the
autonomy movement in five northern provinces.51 [I find absolutely no fault with Japan's stance given who was driving the unrest in China DC]
On October 1 the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the
British Ambassador that "Japan was determined to make North China
safe for Manchukuo."52
Two days later the Foreign Office advised the
American Embassy in Tokyo that the "only demand upon which they
will insist is the suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda and agitation
because of the danger of further incidents."53
But this agitation against
the Japanese grew in intensity, fanned doubtless by Communists who
wished to exclude any thought of compromise between Chiang Kai-shek
and the Japanese Government. On October 30, David Berger wrote to
Secretary Hull to impart stray bits of information he had gleaned from
a "local Chinese official of the Nanking Ministry of Finance." According to this official, in Nanking there was "now a desire to bring about
what might be called a Soviet orientation in Chinese foreign affairs."54 [And FDR's masters made sure he kept his thumb up his ass DC]
A Soviet orientation in Chinese foreign affairs meant a widening
breach between China and Japan. On December 3, Mr. Suma, first secretary of the Japanese Embassy in Nanking, confided to Ambassador
Johnson that during the last month he had noticed a "distinct change
for the worse in the attitude of the Chinese toward the Japanese, and even the soldiers and officers of General Chiang's own troops were now
urging a more anti-Japanese attitude."55
This belligerent attitude on the part of the Chinese gave deep concern
to the British Foreign Office. Anthony Eden called on the Chinese Ambassador in London and requested him to "urge his Government not to
overplay its hand." If Nanking proved "completely recalcitrant to all
overtures, the result will tend to solidify and unify Japanese public
opinion in favor of stronger measures." In Tokyo the Chinese Ambassador talked to Grew in such a boastful manner that he gave the impression that "China is at present 'feeling its oats' and is very likely to
overplay its hand in resisting Japanese overtures."56
K.
Chiang Kai-shek Welcomes
Communist Help against Japan
One of the main elements in producing this Chinese boastfulness was
the union of the Nationalists and the Communists. This union contributed additional military strength to the Chinese position but the initiative would lie with the communist forces. They would fight only on
their own terms and only for communist objectives. This fact was clearly
perceived in Japan where the advancing Red tide was viewed with increasing alarm. According to Ambassador Grew the idea was taking
root that the government required "but one principle in dealing with
China: to oppose any movement in China which is definitely Communist and to assist any movement in China which is definitely antiCommunist. Increasingly, policy toward China appears as simply part
of the larger question of the Russian and Communist menace."57 [Your statement Ambassador Grew begs the question, if you could see the growing Russian and Communist menace, how come your boss did not? Bear in mind now reader these events are happening a full Three years before the Zionist's gave Hitler the green light to move East into Poland DC]
This viewpoint was understood by Mr. Hornbeck who prepared
many memoranda for the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. On January
16 he discussed the situation in Shensi Province and then remarked:
"There is serious danger that the rebellious troops at Sian (and Kansu
provincial troops) may join forces with the large Communist armies
occupying nearby regions and create a formidable Communist front in
Northwest China. Such a development would jeopardize internal peace
in China and disturb Sino-Japanese relations."58
There was little doubt that the Nationalists and the Communists had
reached some satisfactory understanding about objectives and procedures. Although Chiang Kai-shek had demanded that the Communists
meet his rigorous conditions for joint operations, there were "reliable
indications" that a "reconciliation was proceeding along lines privately
agreed upon."59
This fact gave Japanese statesmen further fears of the
communist menace.
L.
Japan Tries to Conciliate China
The Japanese Diet had not been satisfied with the efforts of the Hirota
Ministry to find some solution for the impasse in Japanese-Chinese relations. On January 23, 1937, the Hirota Government went out of office,
and on February 2 General Hayashi assumed the duties of Prime Minister. In the Diet, Hayashi immediately gave assurances of a pacific
policy towards China: "I have no faith in a pugnacious foreign policy."
In elaborating his viewpoint he further remarked: "It is greatly to be
regretted if China makes the mistake of thinking Japan is wedded to a
policy of aggression."
There were indications that the Hayashi Ministry would not press
the far-reaching "demands" of the preceding administration. New negotiations with China would stress only two points: (1) the reduction
of the Chinese tariff, and (2) the establishment of an air service between China and Japan. This program of conciliation had the support
of the Japanese press which insisted that the government had "no wish
to infringe on the territorial integrity of China as an independent
State. Thus the contrast between the present tone of the press and its
former tone is patent."60
When Mr. Grew went to talk with the new Japanese Foreign Minister (Naotake Sato) who took office on March 3, he was informed that a
special effort would be made to bring about a "marked improvement" in
Sino-Japanese relations. As far as America was concerned, Grew knew
Sato "fairly well" and believed that relations "will be of the best."61
One of the first expressions of this Japanese conciliatory policy towards China was the dispatch of an economic mission under the chairmanship of Kenji Kodama, former president of the Yokohama Specie Bank. Kodama was reputed to be an authority on Chinese affairs and
also was popular in China. This Japanese mission spent two days in
Nanking (March 16-17) and was received by Chiang Kai-shek who
gave assurances that he desired "the friendly help and advice of Japan."
Chiang further stated that Chinese industrialists would "unquestionably" accept the advice of Japanese industrial experts and would "follow their footsteps so that China's culture and economy may rise on the
same plane with Japan for the stability of oriental peace and welfare."62
But these friendly words had little meaning when the Japanese endeavored to have them translated into favorable action. On March 24,
Ambassador Johnson reported that the Japanese economic mission had
accomplished nothing because the "Chinese appear to have insisted that
a readjustment of the political relations of the two countries is necessary before any concrete program of 'economic cooperation' can be
agreed upon."
63
In April, Ambassador Johnson was frankly pessimistic
about an improvement in Japanese-Chinese relations. The Chinese attitude towards Japan had distinctly "stiffened" in recent months, and
the Foreign Office would insist upon a fundamental change in the Japanese political position in North China before conducting negotiations
of an economic character.64
The Nationalist Government in China knew that Japan was in no
position to abrogate the Tangku Truce of May 31, 1933, or to abolish
the Hopeh-Chahar Political Council of 1935. These measures had been
taken as a means of defense against the rapidly increasing influence of
Soviet Russia in North China. To Japan it was significant that the Nationalist Government was not at all worried about Russian control of
the provinces of Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang. Why should Chinese
nationalism bitterly oppose any Japanese expansion in North China
while regarding with apparent indifference Russian imperialism in the
same area? If Chiang Kai-shek had fallen under the domination of
Russia, it would be highly dangerous for Japan to make any concessions
to him.
But Prime Minister Hayashi still hoped for some satisfactory arrangement with China and he believed that economic adjustments
might be the prelude to a political understanding. This friendly attitude, however, failed as bait for Chinese good will. As Ambassador
Grew reported from Tokyo: "China's attitude has stiffened as a result of Japan's conciliatory gestures."65
These gestures did not cease when
China refused to reciprocate. On May 10, Foreign Minister Sato assured foreign newspaper correspondents in Tokyo that Japan "does not
demand exclusive rights, and believes that it can live peacefully side by
side [with China] in the economic world."66
Ambassador Grew noted in May that the Japanese "conciliatory program met with setbacks during May and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the chief proponent of the policy, found it necessary to issue statements showing a firmer stand on the part of Japan.. . . There was a recurrence of anti-Japanese agitation in North China and there occurred
several incidents which were said to have caused serious concern to the
Japanese authorities."67
These difficulties were magnified by General
Sung Che-yuan's non-co-operative attitude with reference to East Hopeh. In the early autumn of 1936 he had promised "the Japanese economic co-operation but has delayed signing a number of Japanese-prepared agreements for such co-operation. The Japanese desire certain
preliminary economic developments such as railway construction, iron
mining and cotton growing in order to pave the way for Japanese industrial establishments." Chiang Kai-shek himself desired "to maintain
the status quo in North China" and not challenge the Japanese position
there, but the opposition of his "subordinates" was making his position
"difficult"68
In the last week in May 1937 the Hayashi Ministry went out of office
with its program of economic adjustments with China unfulfilled. On
June 4, Prince Konoye assumed the duties of Prime Minister and Hirota
once more became Foreign Minister. During a conversation with Ambassador Grew on June 7, Hirota stated that his former three points of
accommodation with China "were too abstract for present circumstances, and that he therefore proposed to find concrete solutions of the
various problems outstanding between Japan and China."69
Mr. Grew
thought that China was in "the fortunate position of being able to refuse the granting of economic concessions which Japan urgently needs
but for the attainment of which Japan is apparently not desirous of using armed forces."70
M.
Soviet Russia Promotes a
War between China and Japan
It is apparent from the diplomatic correspondence that came to the Department of State from Nanking and Tokyo that in the summer of 1937
many Chinese officials were spoiling for a fight between Japan and
China. In June 1937, Mr. Andrews, second secretary of the American
Embassy in Tokyo, had a conversation with Dr. Mar who held a similar
position in the Chinese Embassy. After Ambassador Grew read a report
of this conversation he noted that Dr. Mar's attitude was "one of truculence and undue optimism, thus reflecting the enhanced sense of security
that has been developed in a section of Chinese officialdom as a consequence of the development of the past year."71
China, and not Japan,
was ready for the outbreak of hostilities.
In China the Japanese Ambassador kept speaking in a conciliatory
vein which stressed the idea that "the time would come when there
would be 'understandings' between China and Japan." As a result of
these pacific words Mr. Gauss, the American Consul-General at Shanghai, reported that in informed quarters it was believed that "the Japanese are unlikely to display a strong attitude or to take any aggressive
measures in North China while the question of an Anglo-Japanese understanding is being explored."72
It is evident that many foreign observers in June-July 1937 regarded
an outbreak of war between China and Japan as quite improbable. The
Konoye Ministry seemed intent upon carrying out the pacific policy of
the preceding administrations. It was with distinct surprise, therefore,
that the governments of the major powers heard that armed hostilities
had taken place near Peiping. On the night of July 7, in the vicinity of
the famous Marco Polo bridge, some Japanese troops became involved
in a sharp fight with some units of the Chinese Twenty-ninth Army.73
A
new drama that would end on a curtain line announcing Russian domination of the Far East, had opened with an ominous fanfare. The whole
world became an interested audience with few of the spectators realizing that the progress of the play was pointed towards a Russian conclusion. Chinese, Japanese, and Americans would move across the Far
Eastern stage in intricate patterns that finally proclaimed a definite Muscovite motif. The Moscow theater never staged a more effective puppet
show.[Now what he says next to start the next chapter makes me question his courage and character, he for a moment puts the bulls eye where it belongs, but he quickly gets back on the reservation, and talks about the Japan Empire expansion to cover his slip up about Russian puppet show. DC]
VII
Mussolini Looks upon Ethiopia
with Acquisitive Eyes
WHILE JAPAN was moving ahead in Manchuria in a sustained drive
to expand the limits of the Japanese Empire, Mussolini was scrutinizing most carefully the map of Africa in order to plan a drive that would
give imperial frontiers to Italy. These Italian dreams of empire did not
begin with Mussolini. They began in the latter decades of the nineteenth
century and they could be realized only if some of the great powers
supported Italian aspirations.
A.
Britain Recognizes Italian
Aspirations in Northeast Africa
Italian colonial aspirations found their first expression in the activities
of the missionary Sapeto who landed at Massaua in 1838. After a careful examination of the territory near the straits that separate the Red Sea
from the Gulf of Aden, he acquired for the Rubbatino Company of
Italy a concession on the Bay of Assab (November 15, 1869). In March
1882 this commercial company agreed to sell its rights to the Italian
Government, and when this contract was approved by Parliament on
July 5, 1882, Italy formally adopted a policy of colonial expansion in
Africa.1
After the British Government recognized (1882) Italian sovereignty
over Assab, the Italian Foreign Office elevated its gaze to other African
horizons and in February 1885 the port of Massaua was occupied. Using this port as a wedge for further penetration, the Italian sphere of influence grew rapidly in size until in May 1889, under the terms of the
Treaty of Ucciali, a nominal protectorate over Abyssinia was established. The legal basis for this protectorate was Article 17 of the treaty,
but the Amharic text of that document differed from the Italian version and did not specifically place Abyssinian foreign affairs under the
control of Italy. Inasmuch as the Amharic text was the only one that was
actually signed, the Emperor Menelik's vigorous assertions of independence had a firm legal basis.2
The British Government supported Italian claims. On March 24 and
April 15, 1891, an Anglo-Italian arrangement was concluded which
recognized Italian control over a large portion of Northeast Africa.3
But the French Government was strongly opposed to the Italian advance in Abyssinia, so they prompted Menelik to protest against the
Italian interpretation of the Treaty of Uccialli and to assert his claims
to territory as far as Khartoum. This aggressive attitude led the British
to conclude another agreement with Italy (May 5, 1894) which placed
the Province of Harar under Italian control. This action was in direct
defiance of the Anglo-French Treaty of 1888 which related to this same
territory.4
B.
Italy Deserts the Triple Alliance
British recognition of Italian aspirations to control large portions of
Ethiopia was followed by French and Russian efforts to preserve the independence of that empire. Munitions of war from France began to
pour into Ethiopia and Menelik was emboldened in February 1893 to
denounce the Treaty of Uccialli. In 1894, Italian troops advanced into
Tigre, and for a time were highly successful. But this aggression was
merely a prologue to the crushing defeat at Adowa (March 1, 1896).
In the Treaty of Addis Ababa, Italy recognized the independence of
Ethiopia. Nevertheless, Italian hopes for eventual control over that vast
region were still nursed by ambitious statesmen in Rome. These hopes
could be realized only if France and Britain regarded them with friendly eyes. In Paris, Delcasse made some diplomatic gestures that resulted
in the secret Franco-Italian convention of December 1900. As far as
France was concerned, Tripoli was earmarked as a future Italian colony.5
Two years later (November 1, 1902) this political flirtation assumed a more serious character when Italy promised to be neutral in
the event that France was involved in a war she did not provoke.6
In the spring of 1906, during the sessions of the Algeciras Conference, this Franco-Italian entente paid good dividends to both France
and Britain. They responded by concluding with Italy (December 13,
1906) a tripartite arrangement which apparently recognized the independence of Ethiopia. But behind a bold facade of diplomatic doubletalk, French and British statesmen gave a friendly nod towards the old
Italo-British accord of 1891 with its implications of Italian control over Ethiopia. When Russia followed their example by concluding with
Italy the Racconigi bargain of October 1909, the road to Tripoli was
open.7
Strengthened by this series of diplomatic deals, Italy provoked
war with Turkey in 1911, and in October of the following year she concluded this conflict by securing the cession of Libya.8
By balancing the Triple Entente against the Triple Alliance, Italy
had been able to gain her diplomatic objectives. But her intervention in
the World War failed to bring any rich spoils of victory. In 1919, at
Versailles, Allied statesmen unwittingly prepared the way for the subsequent development of fascism in Italy. When Orlando and Sonnino
temporarily left the Peace Conference in high dudgeon because of
President Wilson's appeal to the Italian people, "the British and French
arranged to divide up Germany's African colonies, leaving the Italians
completely out in the cold. Italy later accepted these arrangements with
the understanding that she would receive compensations elsewhere, but
these were never satisfactorily forthcoming. Here we find one basis for
Italy's enduring bitterness over the final settlement, for the rape of
Ethiopia in 1935, and for Mussolini's 'stab in the back' of 1940."9
C.
Britain Moves to
Conciliate Mussolini
In November 1919 the Italian Government made a strong effort to extract from Britain some territorial compensations in Africa that would
help to sweeten the bitter draught forced upon Italy during the Paris
Peace Conference. In the proposed arrangement Britain would receive
a concession to construct a barrage on Lake Tana even though that body
of water would be within the Italian sphere of influence in Ethiopia.
Britain would also have the right to build a motor road from that lake
to the Sudan. For her part of the bargain Italy would be given a right to
build and operate a railway connecting Eritrea and Somaliland. This
line would run to the west of Addis Ababa. Italy would also have the
exclusive right to the economic exploitation of western Ethiopia.
The British Government rejected this Italian proposal because it was
opposed to any sort of Italian control over the headwaters of the Nile.10
But in 1925 the British Foreign Office experienced a change of heart
and notes were exchanged between Sir Ronald Graham, the British Ambassador in Rome, and Mussolini (December 14, 20, 1925) in
which the Italian proposals of 1919 were accepted. This meant British
support of an Italian railway from Eritrea across Ethiopia to Somaliland, and British recognition of Italy's exclusive right to exploit the resources of western Ethiopia. Apparently, the British Government regarded the Anglo-Italian protocols of 1891 as still in force.11
The French Government immediately entered a protest against this
Anglo-Italian accord. Britain and Italy then hurriedly addressed notes
to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations which contained ample assurances of their innocent intentions towards Ethiopia. But it was
obvious that the exchange "of Anglo-Italian notes of 1925 ... remained
in force also after the explanations furnished by the two Governments
to Abyssinia, . . . and that the exclusive economic rights which Italy
claimed in regard to Abyssinia before 1923 . . . were fully confirmed
first by Great Britain and subsequently by France."12
Encouraged by this British support, Mussolini went ahead and concluded with Ethiopia a pact of friendship (August 2, 1928) and an
additional convention which provided for the construction of a motor
road from the port of Assab to Dessie. But work on this road was
halted when it reached the boundary of Ethiopia. The Italian Government soon discovered that the "1928 Treaty remained .. . an absolutely
dead letter except for the clause regarding conciliation and arbitration.
. . . The non-fulfillment by Abyssinia of her economic engagements
towards Italy has been one of the strongest grievances of the Italian
Government against Abyssinia."13
D.
Italy's Alleged Need
for Colonial Outlets
Italian interest in Ethiopia was based upon the alleged need for colonies
that would serve first of all as outlets for the overcrowded conditions in
the Italian peninsula. In 1913 more than 700,000 Italians had left their
native land to seek homes abroad, and the average annual emigration
approximated half a million. The remittances which these emigrants sent home had constituted an important item in the Italian balance of
international payments. But this large emigration with its golden flood
of remittances had been checked by restrictive legislation enacted by
the United States and many other countries. With these ordinary outlets
no longer available for her surplus population, Italy became vitally interested in acquiring colonies that would not only welcome immigrants
but would also produce essential raw materials needed for home manufacture. Ethiopia, with its large population, could be developed into an
important market for Italian goods.
E.
The Walwal Incident Points
in the Direction of War
One factor that constantly disturbed the delicate Ethiopian equation
was the aggressive attitude shown at times by the tribesmen of Emperor
Haile Selassie in their relations with Italian nationals along the frontiers
of Eritrea and Somaliland. Even after her entry into the League of Nations in 1923, Ethiopia had "remained a bad neighbour for all the bordering countries and for Italy in particular.... That the Italian colonies
had suffered from the incursions of Abyssinian bands cannot be
doubted."14
In the event that Italy were involved in a war in Europe,
these restive bands could be a real menace to the Italian colonial empire.
This danger was emphasized by Mussolini on May 14, 1935, when he
stated that he did not wish Ethiopia to be a "pistol that would be eternally pointed against us, and which in the case of European trouble
would render our position in East Africa untenable."
From the viewpoint of Italian imperialists the case against Ethiopia
was strong enough to justify war, and the profits that would accrue
from such a conflict were carefully weighed. It would require only a
spark to ignite the tinder that had been accumulating since 1896, and
that tiny bit of fire was generated in the friction caused by the Walwal
Incident in December 1934.
This incident had its origin in a dispute about the ownership of the
wells at Walwal. It is worthy of note that the "Italians had for some
years been in possession of Walwal which they had fortified without
any protest from Ethiopia."15
Although the Emperor claimed that Walwal was within the boundary of Ethiopia, it was evident that Italian
forces had occupied that strategic spot for at least five years.16
Hostilities at Walwal could have led to an immediate outbreak of
actual war, but there were several barriers along the road to conflict. As far as Italy was concerned these barriers were formidable: (1) the obligations imposed upon her by the League Covenant; (2) the obligations contained in the Pact of Paris; (3) the pledges freely given in the
Three-Power Treaty of 1906; (4) the procedures outlined in the Italo-Ethiopian Arbitration Treaty of 1928. But Mussolini was not deeply
concerned over these paper blockades. Since 1933 he had contemplated
eventual war with Ethiopia and had been making preparations for it.17
For the time being, however, he would make a bow in the direction of a
pacific settlement of the dispute. While he was making ready for conflict, he would find some plausible excuse for it.
The Emperor Haile Selassie was eager to upset Mussolini's plans in
this regard, so he promptly offered arbitration in accordance with the
terms of the treaty of 1928. When the Italian Foreign Office rejected
this offer and demanded immediate reparation, Ethiopia directed the
attention of the League of Nations to the implications of the Walwal
Incident (December 14). On December 16, Italy supplied the League
with her version of the incident. Some three weeks later (January 3,
1935) Ethiopia made a formal appeal to the League and invoked the
application of Article 11 of the Covenant.18
At the next meeting of the
Council (January 11) some action would have to be taken on the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.
In order to anticipate League action, and in an effort to secure Italy's
support in eventual pressure upon Germany, Pierre Laval made a visit
to Rome and arrived at an accord with Mussolini. In agreement with
the terms of this treaty of January 7, 1935, Italy made some concessions
with reference to Tunis. In return she received 2,500 shares in the Djibouti Railroad, a considerable strip of territory to add to Italian Libya,
a similar increase of territory to be joined to Eritrea, and a final gift of
the island of Dumeira in the Red Sea. For these favors Mussolini agreed
to consult with France in the event of any threat to the status quo in
Europe.
But the published terms of this agreement told only half the story. It
is evident that a secret understanding was reached between Mussolini
and Laval on January 7, 1935. When Mussolini was asked by Ward
Price if he had been given a free hand in Ethiopia by his accord with
Laval, he gave the ambiguous answer: "It is correct that all disputes between ourselves and France were settled by the agreement of 7 January."19
The comments of General de Bono were not so Delphic: "The conversations with M. Laval led us to hope that, so far as France was
concerned, no obstacles would be placed in our path in any eventual action we should take against Abyssinia."20
The implications of the
Franco-Italian treaty were abundantly clear: "In return for Italian cooperation in Europe, Laval was willing to sacrifice anything, even the
League of Nations itself, as events proved. Mussolini understood this
to be the case and was prepared to exploit all of its possibilities."21
When the Council of the League of Nations met on January 11, Mussolini was ready with certain tactics of delay. He adopted a conciliatory tone with reference to difficulties with Ethiopia and appeared to be ready to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928. During the next two months there was a good deal of diplomatic sparring with no real action towards a settlement of the dispute. On March 17, Ethiopia submitted an appeal to the League of Nations requesting a full investigation of the situation under the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant. But the League was gravely disturbed about other matters. On March 16, Germany had abrogated the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which limited her armed forces. This defiant step led to the conference at Stresa where Britain, France, and Italy sought some formula to preserve the peace of Europe. There was no time for any protracted discussion of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. But as the weeks passed and no progress was made in connection with the arbitration of the Walwal Incident, the Council of the League was compelled to adopt two resolutions (May 25). One called upon the two powers in dispute to name the Conciliation Council of four arbitrators (according to the provisions of the treaty of 1928) and to arrive at some settlement by August 25. The other resolution provided for a meeting of the Council in the event that the arbitral proceedings failed to arrive at an acceptable result.22
As many statesmen had anticipated, the attempt to arbitrate the Walwal Incident ended in a dismal failure on July 9 when the counsel for Ethiopia referred to Walwal as situated within Ethiopian territory. As soon as this statement was made, the Italian representative left the meeting in evident anger and the dispute took on a more serious aspect. For several weeks the Italian Government had been rushing military supplies to Africa in preparation for eventual hostilities. An early outbreak of war was indicated by Mussolini in an address at Cagliari to the Black Shirts leaving for Africa (June 8): "We have old and new accounts to settle; we will settle them. We shall take no account of what may be said beyond our frontiers, because we ourselves, we alone and exclusively, are the judges of our interests and the guarantors of our future."23
Stimson arrived in Rome on July 8, and on the following day he had a conference with Mussolini in the Venezia Palace. There was the predicted "friendly exchange of ideas." When Stimson emphasized the importance of pushing a program of disarmament, Mussolini indicated his ardent agreement with this viewpoint and stated "emphatically that everybody knew where Italy stood: she was for disarmament and peace."25
After a pleasant week end at Nettuno with Grandi, including a somewhat terrifying speedboat trip with Mussolini, Stimson returned to Rome for further conversations with Italian leaders. Grandi made it clear that Italy feared and opposed "French hegemony" in Europe. She stood for a "balance of power," side by side "with Great Britain."
Mussolini showed to Stimson and his wife "his attractive side" and they grew to like him "very much."26 Grandi made an equally good impression upon them, and when Stimson was about to leave Rome, he issued a very friendly statement to the press (July 14) : "We shall bear away with us a memory of the kindness expressed to us not only by the Italian Government but by her people everywhere which has convinced us of the essential sympathy which exists between the people of Italy and America. This common understanding augurs well for the future relations of the two countries."27
In order to confirm these cordial relations, in November 1931, Dino Grandi decided to pay a brief visit to the United States. On the eve of his sailing for New York, the London Times published a penetrating survey of Italo-American relations. It pointed out that Grandi had made an "excellent personal impression" when he went to Washington after the close of the World War as a member of the Italian delegation which had been sent to settle the problem of war debts. In 1931 it was fortunate for Grandi that there were "no outstanding disputes between Italy and the United States." Recent restrictions on Italian immigration into the United States might have caused some unfriendly feeling, but Mussolini had prevented this by indicating his opposition to the old system whereby Italy was losing each year a large part of her population. In order to keep Italians home he had launched new projects "for more intensive and scientific farming and land reclamation plans." On the whole, therefore, there was quite a "satisfactory background for that political cooperation which Signor Mussolini, especially since last January 1, is anxious to promote between the two countries."28
Dino Grandi informed American press correspondents that he was going to the United States as an "Ambassador of my country, but also as an Italian to interpret to the great American people the sentiments of deep and unchanging friendship of all Italians."29 He landed in New York on November 16 and was met by Under Secretary of State William R. Castle. On the train ride to Washington, Grandi expressed his viewpoints freely to Castle. With regard to France he remarked that her statesmen wished "absolute security" but that was a goal most difficult to attain. Disarmament was a question with so many complexities that he felt it wise to visit Washington to discover how far the American Government wanted "to go at the next Geneva Conference." Italy would go "as far" as America in that regard.[Even then we can see through dealings in both these chapters with Japan and Italy, that when it came to disarmament, the United States was going to have to lead the disarmament. It bothers me greatly that this author calls it the American government, because it was not then, and it is not now. It is, and was the United States Government, and it DID NOT, and DOES NOT represent the American people period.It is a Foreign Corporation operating on OUR soil! DC]
Castle informed Grandi that Secretary Stimson felt that "there is little hope of any success in disarmament unless first the political questions of Europe can be settled, beginning with the Polish Corridor." Grandi agreed with this viewpoint but feared that they could not be settled "now without war." Italy took a revisionist attitude towards the peace treaties of 1919, but any important revisions would have to be postponed for some years. He had informed Chancellor Brining of this fact and had suggested that he enter into a formal engagement with France to that effect, but Briining said that any such arrangement would mean his speedy fall from office. He (Brining) would make an effort, however, to stop "the talk about these hoped-for revisions."
Grandi was inclined to "agree with the French that perhaps it might be just as well to have the Nazis in for a time as they would not dare . .. seriously to change the German foreign policy, and if the rest of Germany saw that even they would have to appeal for outside help, the people might settle down and try to make the best of things."30 [He missed just a tad in that stap at being a prophet DC]
Grandi had a three-hour conference with President Hoover soon after he reached Washington, and they discussed many details concerning reparations and disarmament. The cordial spirit in which these conversations were conducted made a great impression in Italy. Virginio Gayda was certain that this friendly atmosphere was "another proof that Italian and American foreign policy happily coincide on the general matters now at issue." Much satisfaction was felt at the "unlimited scope of the Washington conversations, and the Secretary's phrase, 'the sky is the limit,' is echoed through the Italian press."31
When Grandi sailed for Italy on November 27 he could find "no words to express" the "deep impressions and dear remembrances" he took back with him.32 A brief Italo-American understanding had been established, and during the sessions of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva during the spring of 1932, Grandi played his role according to schedule. But France blocked the agreement so desperately needed and thus prepared the way for the fall of the Brining Ministry and the eventual elevation of Hitler to the office of Chancellor.33
The failure of the Disarmament Conference to settle the pressing problems before it was deeply discouraging to Secretary Stimson, but he had no fault to find with the attitude of Italy. During the last days of Stimson's term of office as Secretary of State, Signor Augusto Rosso, the Italian Ambassador, went to the Department of State to convey farewell greetings. After the usual salutations, Stimson "thanked the Ambassador and said that, in the case of Italy" his satisfaction at the good relations between the two countries was "accompanied by the personal pleasure he had received in his personal contacts not only with Signor Mussolini but with those gentlemen who represented him."34 Apparently, Stimson never felt any delicacy in meeting and conversing with the Italian dictator, and when he left office on March 4, 1933, American relations with Italy were of a most cordial character. Under the Roosevelt Administration they soon underwent a complete change.
The Italian Ambassador regarded this story as a serious reflection upon the record of Italy during the World War and he asked the Acting Secretary of State for an explanation.35 All that Mr. Phillips could do was to send a lame reply that General Johnson "may not have been accurately quoted." In any event, Mr. Phillips was certain that the ebullient General had not intended to offend the Italian Government or "the Italian people."36 [of course he did, my dad of the same generation used to use the same offensive term along with one other when talking about Italian people, I got up the courage one day to ask him why, and his excuse was,'they call us micks'. I just gave the old 10 year old response of Oh, and went outside to hit rocks with an old baseball bat into the woods. It is difficult to admit your dad was a racist, but far easier to not grow up like him as far as people skills.However I draw the line when another culture seeks my destruction. DC]
These ill-considered remarks of General Johnson had little effect upon the course of Italo-American relations, but the incident reflected a definite change in the climate of opinion in Washington after the inauguration of President Roosevelt. During the Administration of President Hoover there had been no important officials prone to shoot from the lip. After March 4, 1933, something new and crude had been added to the picture in Washington.
While some statesmen indulged in speculation about the degree of responsibility which rested upon Mussolini's shoulders for the Nazi purge of June 30, every official in Europe realized that the meeting of June 14-15 signalized the beginnings of an accord that carried a grave threat to the peace of the Continent. In the United States there were many misgivings concerning this new relationship, and they helped to undermine the Italo-American understanding so painstakingly erected by Stimson. American dislike of Hitler had been rapidly increasing since he assumed the office of Chancellor, and it reached a high point after the party purge. Any friendly gestures of Mussolini in the direction of the German dictator would be certain to arouse deep dissatisfaction in many American circles. It would not be long before Mussolini and Hitler were regarded as two peas in the same black pod. The Italo-Ethiopian dispute prepared the way for this change in American opinion.
Eden was particularly disappointed in the attitude of Benes. He had discovered that the Czechoslovakian statesman was "concerned only with the Austrian question, was unwilling to bring pressure upon Italy or to do anything which would run the slightest risk of upsetting the Continental alignment."
Eden's attitude towards Hitler and Germany was significant. While he was imbued with a "profound skepticism" of the program outlined in Hitler's recent speech, he was determined to go ahead and "explore fully" the possibilities for peace. He was anxious to have Germany reenter the League, and in his conversation with Hitler he had given assurances that "the British were willing to have the Treaty of Versailles separated from the Covenant if the German so desired." This comment, said Mr. Wilson, was so radical that it should be kept "extremely confidential."
From close observation of the scene in Geneva, Ambassador Wilson had come to the conclusion that Laval and Eden were an "excellent team." He had the impression that Laval was "developing into the type of Foreign Minister that Briand was, with perhaps a greater sense of political realism and a more practical method of achieving and applying his policies. Both he and Eden are on the up-grade politically [and] they have a decided esteem for each other."38
This generous attitude should have appealed to the Italian Government but it was soon obvious that the Walwal Incident was given scant consideration by Mussolini. He had larger objectives in mind. These were partially disclosed during a conversation between Ambassador Long and Signor Suvich, the Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Italian diplomat freely confided his hope that the "League of Nations, through its powers of arbitration, should see fit to offer Italy a mandate for Abyssinia. This would be the best thing for Abyssinia which was an undeveloped and lawless country. . . . Italy could not afford to withdraw her soldiers from there; as a matter of fact it was necessary to send more soldiers to protect Italian colonists" from the raids of armed Ethiopians.40
These raids from Ethiopia into adjacent Italian colonial territory were the subject of some trenchant editorials by Virginio Gayda in the Giornale d'Italia, June 18-20. The Italian public was informed that they could not be permitted to continue indefinitely. Apparently, war or a mandate over Ethiopia were the only alternatives.41
Mussolini immediately rejected the proposals of Eden. In any settlement of the dispute with Ethiopia he would insist upon the annexation of all "those parts of Abyssinia which did nqt form part of Abyssinia proper." In addition he wished to "control Abyssinia." If he had to go to war to attain his objectives he would endeavor "to wipe the name of Abyssinia from the map."42
The reaction of Eden to these frank statements is not clearly revealed. In Rome, Italian officials attempted to establish the fiction that Eden's visit had been in the nature of a "conciliatory 'pat on the back' intended to assuage any ill-feeling that might have been caused by England's independent negotiations of naval agreements with Germany. ... The Mussolini-Eden exchange of views is generally believed to have proved satisfactory on both sides."43
The American charge at Geneva hurriedly telegraphed that he had learned from authoritative sources that Mussolini had decided to "establish a protectorate over Abyssinia," and Eden had been informed of that indention. He had also heard a Russian official remark that "while his Government had originally felt Mussolini was 'playing poker' they had now changed their ideas and believed he 'meant business.' "44
The Italian press had criticized Eden's proposals as inadequate, while French press opinion was hostile because Zeila would be in competition with the port of Djibouti and this would violate the tripartite treaty of 1906. In Rome, Virginio Gayda complained that Eden's concessions "neither corresponded to the avowed purposes of the British Government nor answered Italy's requirements for security and economic expansion."45
Kirk, the American charge in Rome, discussed the situation with Chambrun, the French Ambassador, who confided that before "leaving for his recent trip to Paris he had been authorized by Mussolini to state to the French Government that he [the Duce] was definitely in favor of a peaceful solution of the conflict with Abyssinia if Italy's prestige and interests could be safeguarded." It was Chambrun's belief that some "gesture was essential to vindicate the honor and prestige of Italy and this could be effected by the cession of Adowa which would enable Mussolini to advertise the triumph of his regime over the defeat of the previous government."46
This instruction was given to the press on July 6 and it gave birth to many rumors concerning American policy in Ethiopia. Secretary Hull was making his viewpoint very clear to the major powers in Europe but he was not doing it in the spectacular manner of Secretary Stimson, Some students of international law thought he was being too cautious in his handling of the matter. Professor Quincy Wright hurriedly wrote to Hull and expressed the opinion that "a failure on our part to do anything would be such a severe blow to the cause of peace and respect for the Pact of Paris that I hope you will find it possible to accept an invitation to consult, if offered, by the League of Nations."48 [If the nations of Europe had truly sought peace, they would never have signed Versailles at the expense of Germany DC]
Under pressure of enthusiasts like Professor Wright, Secretary Hull requested the Italian Ambassador to call at the Department of State. When Signor Rosso arrived he was informed that the American Government was "deeply interested in the preservation of peace in all parts of the world." For this reason Mr. Hull felt "impelled to impress upon the Italian Ambassador our increasing concern over the situation arising out of Italy's dispute with Ethiopia and our earnest hope that a means may be found to arrive at a peaceful . . . solution of the problem."49
On the following afternoon both the British and French ambassadors paid formal visits to the Department of State and received statements similar to the one given to Ambassador Rosso. Mr. Phillips, during a long conversation with the British Ambassador, drew attention to an article in the Boston Evening Transcript which stated that "it is nearly the unanimous conclusion of London opinion that the Briand-Kellogg Pact is dead owing to the brusque refusal of the American Government to invoke that pact." It was important, Mr. Phillips emphasized, for the British Government to realize that "this impression is entirely contrary to the sense of our note to the Emperor."50
In order to make the viewpoint of the Department of State entirely clear in this regard, Secretary Hull issued on July 12 a statement to the effect that "the Pact of Paris is no less binding now than when it was entered into by the 63 nations that are parties to it The United States and the other nations are interested in the maintenance of the Pact and the sanctity of international commitments assumed thereby."51
Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of War, was delighted with this press statement of July 12. He had long been of the opinion that it would be "highly desirable to have our country notify the League of Nations that the United States would cooperate with it in any measures it found desirable to take, short of war, to enforce its covenants among its own members." It was apparent to him that caution would never save the day for world peace. He was persuaded that "if the world is to be saved, it must be by daring."52
From Rome indirect news came from Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn that Mussolini had informed him that there was still a possibility of peace, but this peace must be on his terms. He was really planning a "colonial enterprise on a large scale rather than a campaign of conquest." This colonial enterprise might involve some "military operations" to satisfy Italy's "prestige and enable her to weaken the power of the Negus," but after these ends had been accomplished the "process of colonial enterprise will be gradually carried out."55
The Japanese Government, apparently impressed with the beneficent aspects of Italian "colonial enterprise," immediately announced an attitude of neutrality with reference to the situation in Ethiopia. The Italian press acclaimed this "unequivocal" declaration as a gesture of friendship towards Italy, and it was widely interpreted as an indication of a new political alignment.56
Further news from Rome came in the form of a series of answers that Mussolini gave to some questions that had been formulated by Mrs. William B. Meloney, of the New York Herald-Tribune. In his answers Mussolini stated that "good will on the Italian side has been met by Abyssinia with stubborn obstruction. The treacherous attack on Walwal... has been nothing but the latest proof of a spirit of persistent hostility which has lasted for half a century." It was obvious that the frontiers of the Italian colonial empire would have to be defended. Italy, moreover, had now arrived at a clear realization of the "mission of civilization that she has to accomplish in Abyssinia, not only on her own behalf but also on that of the whole western world."57
Some nations in the Western world were a little suspicious that Mussolini was unduly anxious to bear the White Man's burden in Ethiopia. In order to meet their objections, the Duce gave an interview to one of the correspondents of the Echo de Paris (July 16) in which he crisply remarked that he "was seeking for Italy in Abyssinia what British and French colonizers had sought for their countries." Then as a sop to French and British statesmen, he gave the assurance that he would "continue to consider Austrian independence as the dominating factor in his foreign policy."58 Germany was not disturbed by this thrust at Nazi ambitions, and von Bulow, in Berlin, informed Dodd that he thought that pressure upon Italy "for the application of the Kellogg Pact might do harm." Hitler's Government was careful to take no step that would cause friction with Italy.59
Emperor Haile Selassie was delighted with this Presidential expression of a hope for peace, but diplomatic circles at Addis Ababa were of the opinion that the government of the United States had "adopted a very cautious attitude, calculated to avoid at all cost any action or positive intervention in the Italo-Ethiopian controversy."61 This viewpoint nettled Secretary Hull who instructed our ambassadors in London and Paris to send "all information possible to enable our Government to determine whether any further action by it.. . as a signatory of the Pact of Paris would . . . have a beneficial rather than a disadvantageous effect."62
When the American charge at Paris responded with a statement that both the French and British governments were of the opinion that some positive action by the United States would be of real assistance in halting the aggressive plans of Mussolini, a conference was held at the White House. The President suggested an immediate message to Mussolini, so on August 18, Hull instructed Mr. Kirk, the American charge at Rome, to convey to the Duce the earnest hope of the American Chief Executive that "the controversy between Italy and Ethiopia will be resolved without resort to armed conflict."63
When Mr. Kirk delivered this message the following day, Mussolini assured him that he appreciated the "character of the message and its expression of friendliness," but he had already mobilized one million men for conflict with Ethiopia which was now inevitable. Regardless of League action, Italy would proceed with her plans. If the opposition of other countries developed to the point of actual intervention, Italy would "take steps accordingly."64
In the face of this Italian defiance, France and Britain worked feverishly to find some solution short of war. At Paris, during August 15-18, tripartite negotiations had been carried on with reference to the Ethiopian situation, and proposals had been made to Mussolini which reduced the sovereignty of Ethiopia to a shadow. But the Duce wanted the whole Abyssinian apple, core and all. After he had rejected the patchwork prepared by Eden and Laval, Ramsay MacDonald startled Europe by a statement that the situation was the "most serious we have had to face since 1914."65
The verity of MacDonald's statement was not questioned in most European circles, and it was obvious that Britain was the chief disturbing factor in the explosive international situation. The Italians were "unalterably convinced" that Britain was actuated "only by selfish interests," and that her "professed anxiety for the League is pure hypocrisy."66 Virginio Gayda, in the Giornale d'Italia, ran a series of articles accusing Britain of bad faith with reference to the terms of the tripartite treaty of 1906,67 and the Italian press was filled with similar charges.
The British Foreign Office promptly intervened and instructed its Minister at Addis Ababa to "inform the Emperor that His Majesty's Government, for its part, advise him to withhold the concession."69
From London, Mr. Atherton, the American charge, reported that the Foreign Office considered Mr. Rickett an "unstable adventurer," and it summed up the "reports of such a deal at such a moment as 'truly deplorable.' "70 This view was confirmed by Mr. Marriner, at Paris, who reported to Secretary Hull that the "general feeling here in press and semi-official circles is that the reported Abyssinian oil and mineral concession, even though British official participation has been disavowed, will nevertheless weaken Britain's position at Geneva, correspondingly strengthen the Italian thesis, and probably put sanctions out of the question."71
Secretary Hull was just as concerned over the news of the Ethiopian concession to the Standard Oil Company as was Anthony Eden. On September 3, two of the officials of that company visited the Department of State and had a long conversation with Wallace Murray, chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. Mr. Murray frankly told them that the concession was a "matter of grave embarrassment" not only to the American Government but to other governments which "are making strenuous and sincere efforts for the preservation of world peace which is seriously threatened by the Italo-Ethiopian dispute." After commenting upon the delicate position of the British Government in the pending difficulties, he emphasized the fact that "this Government, no less than the British Government, desires to divest itself of any suspicion of selfish interest when world peace is at stake." After he had insisted to the Standard Oil officials that only "immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the concession would meet the needs of the situation," they finally agreed to accept his advice. Secretary Hull added some words of wisdom about the ethical aspects of foreign policy, and the representatives of one of America's largest corporations left the Department of State with a better understanding of the crosscurrents that affect the conduct of American foreign affairs. Their departure from Washington was speeded by some weighty words from the White House to the effect that "dollar diplomacy" was no "longer recognized by the American Government."72
But this high-sounding declaration was somewhat bewildering to Emperor Haile Selassie who had started the diplomatic fireworks by hurriedly granting the concession. He had not responded to any pressure from wicked Wall Street. Indeed, he had pressed his favors upon American big business with the ardent hope that such action might add strength to American interest in Ethiopia. Secretary Hull had a difficult time explaining the advantages of righteousness over riches in the new code of diplomacy, but the Emperor finally saw the light and regarded with fresh hope the proceedings of the League. These hopes were doomed to early disappointment.73 [It was a smart move on his part, given the situation he was in, but Zionist interests were in control in Washington, and they bigger plans in mind, and as noted in the last footnote, yes America was neutral, but only until the Zionists said you are no longer neutral,and that is the sad truth that ends these two chapters. DC]
Next
Britain and France Fear to Provoke War over the Issue of Ethiopia 210s
When the Council of the League of Nations met on January 11, Mussolini was ready with certain tactics of delay. He adopted a conciliatory tone with reference to difficulties with Ethiopia and appeared to be ready to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928. During the next two months there was a good deal of diplomatic sparring with no real action towards a settlement of the dispute. On March 17, Ethiopia submitted an appeal to the League of Nations requesting a full investigation of the situation under the terms of Article 15 of the Covenant. But the League was gravely disturbed about other matters. On March 16, Germany had abrogated the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles which limited her armed forces. This defiant step led to the conference at Stresa where Britain, France, and Italy sought some formula to preserve the peace of Europe. There was no time for any protracted discussion of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. But as the weeks passed and no progress was made in connection with the arbitration of the Walwal Incident, the Council of the League was compelled to adopt two resolutions (May 25). One called upon the two powers in dispute to name the Conciliation Council of four arbitrators (according to the provisions of the treaty of 1928) and to arrive at some settlement by August 25. The other resolution provided for a meeting of the Council in the event that the arbitral proceedings failed to arrive at an acceptable result.22
As many statesmen had anticipated, the attempt to arbitrate the Walwal Incident ended in a dismal failure on July 9 when the counsel for Ethiopia referred to Walwal as situated within Ethiopian territory. As soon as this statement was made, the Italian representative left the meeting in evident anger and the dispute took on a more serious aspect. For several weeks the Italian Government had been rushing military supplies to Africa in preparation for eventual hostilities. An early outbreak of war was indicated by Mussolini in an address at Cagliari to the Black Shirts leaving for Africa (June 8): "We have old and new accounts to settle; we will settle them. We shall take no account of what may be said beyond our frontiers, because we ourselves, we alone and exclusively, are the judges of our interests and the guarantors of our future."23
F.
Secretary Stimson Enjoys
Friendly Relations with Mussolini
The progress of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute was followed with great
interest by President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. In Rome the American attitude towards this African adventure was studied with equal interest, and it was soon evident that the Italian Government was extremely anxious to preserve the friendly relations that had been so carefully
established by Secretary Stimson during the Hoover Administration. In
July 1931, Stimson paid a visit to Rome for talks with Mussolini and
Dino Grandi concerning disarmament. On July 3, Grandi, the Italian
Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a statement to the Associated Press
with reference to this visit: "I met Mr. Stimson in London during the
Naval Conference and our relations were always most cordial. . . .
There is no prearranged program of conversations. There will be a
friendly exchange of ideas. Italy has never been very favorable to the
idea that the world is divided into geographical sectors... . Europe cannot get along without America."24 Stimson arrived in Rome on July 8, and on the following day he had a conference with Mussolini in the Venezia Palace. There was the predicted "friendly exchange of ideas." When Stimson emphasized the importance of pushing a program of disarmament, Mussolini indicated his ardent agreement with this viewpoint and stated "emphatically that everybody knew where Italy stood: she was for disarmament and peace."25
After a pleasant week end at Nettuno with Grandi, including a somewhat terrifying speedboat trip with Mussolini, Stimson returned to Rome for further conversations with Italian leaders. Grandi made it clear that Italy feared and opposed "French hegemony" in Europe. She stood for a "balance of power," side by side "with Great Britain."
Mussolini showed to Stimson and his wife "his attractive side" and they grew to like him "very much."26 Grandi made an equally good impression upon them, and when Stimson was about to leave Rome, he issued a very friendly statement to the press (July 14) : "We shall bear away with us a memory of the kindness expressed to us not only by the Italian Government but by her people everywhere which has convinced us of the essential sympathy which exists between the people of Italy and America. This common understanding augurs well for the future relations of the two countries."27
In order to confirm these cordial relations, in November 1931, Dino Grandi decided to pay a brief visit to the United States. On the eve of his sailing for New York, the London Times published a penetrating survey of Italo-American relations. It pointed out that Grandi had made an "excellent personal impression" when he went to Washington after the close of the World War as a member of the Italian delegation which had been sent to settle the problem of war debts. In 1931 it was fortunate for Grandi that there were "no outstanding disputes between Italy and the United States." Recent restrictions on Italian immigration into the United States might have caused some unfriendly feeling, but Mussolini had prevented this by indicating his opposition to the old system whereby Italy was losing each year a large part of her population. In order to keep Italians home he had launched new projects "for more intensive and scientific farming and land reclamation plans." On the whole, therefore, there was quite a "satisfactory background for that political cooperation which Signor Mussolini, especially since last January 1, is anxious to promote between the two countries."28
Dino Grandi informed American press correspondents that he was going to the United States as an "Ambassador of my country, but also as an Italian to interpret to the great American people the sentiments of deep and unchanging friendship of all Italians."29 He landed in New York on November 16 and was met by Under Secretary of State William R. Castle. On the train ride to Washington, Grandi expressed his viewpoints freely to Castle. With regard to France he remarked that her statesmen wished "absolute security" but that was a goal most difficult to attain. Disarmament was a question with so many complexities that he felt it wise to visit Washington to discover how far the American Government wanted "to go at the next Geneva Conference." Italy would go "as far" as America in that regard.[Even then we can see through dealings in both these chapters with Japan and Italy, that when it came to disarmament, the United States was going to have to lead the disarmament. It bothers me greatly that this author calls it the American government, because it was not then, and it is not now. It is, and was the United States Government, and it DID NOT, and DOES NOT represent the American people period.It is a Foreign Corporation operating on OUR soil! DC]
Castle informed Grandi that Secretary Stimson felt that "there is little hope of any success in disarmament unless first the political questions of Europe can be settled, beginning with the Polish Corridor." Grandi agreed with this viewpoint but feared that they could not be settled "now without war." Italy took a revisionist attitude towards the peace treaties of 1919, but any important revisions would have to be postponed for some years. He had informed Chancellor Brining of this fact and had suggested that he enter into a formal engagement with France to that effect, but Briining said that any such arrangement would mean his speedy fall from office. He (Brining) would make an effort, however, to stop "the talk about these hoped-for revisions."
Grandi was inclined to "agree with the French that perhaps it might be just as well to have the Nazis in for a time as they would not dare . .. seriously to change the German foreign policy, and if the rest of Germany saw that even they would have to appeal for outside help, the people might settle down and try to make the best of things."30 [He missed just a tad in that stap at being a prophet DC]
Grandi had a three-hour conference with President Hoover soon after he reached Washington, and they discussed many details concerning reparations and disarmament. The cordial spirit in which these conversations were conducted made a great impression in Italy. Virginio Gayda was certain that this friendly atmosphere was "another proof that Italian and American foreign policy happily coincide on the general matters now at issue." Much satisfaction was felt at the "unlimited scope of the Washington conversations, and the Secretary's phrase, 'the sky is the limit,' is echoed through the Italian press."31
When Grandi sailed for Italy on November 27 he could find "no words to express" the "deep impressions and dear remembrances" he took back with him.32 A brief Italo-American understanding had been established, and during the sessions of the Disarmament Conference in Geneva during the spring of 1932, Grandi played his role according to schedule. But France blocked the agreement so desperately needed and thus prepared the way for the fall of the Brining Ministry and the eventual elevation of Hitler to the office of Chancellor.33
The failure of the Disarmament Conference to settle the pressing problems before it was deeply discouraging to Secretary Stimson, but he had no fault to find with the attitude of Italy. During the last days of Stimson's term of office as Secretary of State, Signor Augusto Rosso, the Italian Ambassador, went to the Department of State to convey farewell greetings. After the usual salutations, Stimson "thanked the Ambassador and said that, in the case of Italy" his satisfaction at the good relations between the two countries was "accompanied by the personal pleasure he had received in his personal contacts not only with Signor Mussolini but with those gentlemen who represented him."34 Apparently, Stimson never felt any delicacy in meeting and conversing with the Italian dictator, and when he left office on March 4, 1933, American relations with Italy were of a most cordial character. Under the Roosevelt Administration they soon underwent a complete change.
G.
General Johnson Creates Tension
in Italian-American Relations
The Italo-American accord erected by Secretary Stimson quickly dissolved under the warmth of Secretary Hull's idealistic fervor. The first
hint of difficulty came when the irrepressible General Hugh S. Johnson
delivered a typical speech before the National Association of Manufacturers (December 7, 1933). During the course of his colorful remarks,
Johnson told with great zest of an Italian official who approached Alexander Legge (who had charge of Allied purchasing during the World
War) with the usual request in mind. Before he could express it, Legge
burst out with vehemence: "Good morning, Sunny Italy! When are
those wops of yours going to stop running and start fighting?" The official was nonplussed for a moment and then excitedly murmured:
"You wait—zey play treek." The Italian Ambassador regarded this story as a serious reflection upon the record of Italy during the World War and he asked the Acting Secretary of State for an explanation.35 All that Mr. Phillips could do was to send a lame reply that General Johnson "may not have been accurately quoted." In any event, Mr. Phillips was certain that the ebullient General had not intended to offend the Italian Government or "the Italian people."36 [of course he did, my dad of the same generation used to use the same offensive term along with one other when talking about Italian people, I got up the courage one day to ask him why, and his excuse was,'they call us micks'. I just gave the old 10 year old response of Oh, and went outside to hit rocks with an old baseball bat into the woods. It is difficult to admit your dad was a racist, but far easier to not grow up like him as far as people skills.However I draw the line when another culture seeks my destruction. DC]
These ill-considered remarks of General Johnson had little effect upon the course of Italo-American relations, but the incident reflected a definite change in the climate of opinion in Washington after the inauguration of President Roosevelt. During the Administration of President Hoover there had been no important officials prone to shoot from the lip. After March 4, 1933, something new and crude had been added to the picture in Washington.
H.
Beginnings of the
Rome-Berlin Axis
In Rome, in the early years of the Roosevelt reign, there were some innovations in the diplomatic picture that matched the changes in Washington. On June 14-15, 1934, there was an important conference between Hitler and Mussolini at Venice. Many observers believed that
these conversations had a definite connection with the bloody purge of
the Nazi Party two weeks later. The American Ambassador was inclined
to the view that "Mussolini had no doubt advised Hitler that it would
be necessary to take drastic steps to maintain his authority."37
It is quite
probable that the Duce did advise the adoption of stern measures to enforce party discipline, but it is not likely that he counseled the bloody
procedure followed by Hitler. Liquidation can be effected without adverse publicity and without the sanguinary excesses committed by the
Nazi leaders. [They were eliminated because they knew who was pulling Hitlers strings, as well as knowing some of Hitlers personal dirt. As far as that purge goes in Germany, it was nothing compared to the Lenin-Stalin purges in Russia from 1917 on DC]While some statesmen indulged in speculation about the degree of responsibility which rested upon Mussolini's shoulders for the Nazi purge of June 30, every official in Europe realized that the meeting of June 14-15 signalized the beginnings of an accord that carried a grave threat to the peace of the Continent. In the United States there were many misgivings concerning this new relationship, and they helped to undermine the Italo-American understanding so painstakingly erected by Stimson. American dislike of Hitler had been rapidly increasing since he assumed the office of Chancellor, and it reached a high point after the party purge. Any friendly gestures of Mussolini in the direction of the German dictator would be certain to arouse deep dissatisfaction in many American circles. It would not be long before Mussolini and Hitler were regarded as two peas in the same black pod. The Italo-Ethiopian dispute prepared the way for this change in American opinion.
I.
Anthony Eden Whispers a Few
Confidences to Hugh Wilson
On May 25 the Council of the League of Nations had adopted two resolutions which it had hoped would provide a formula for the settlement
of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. But Anthony Eden had serious doubts
about arriving at an early solution of this problem. During the course
of a dinner he had with Ambassador Hugh Wilson at Geneva, he and
Lord Cranborne (Eden's Parliamentary assistant) became quite voluble. Eden was in a difficult position. British public opinion was in favor of a stern attitude towards Italy, but Eden was fearful that vigorous
action might endanger the stability of the Stresa accord. Moreover, Eden
had to deal with Pierre Laval who could not "understand Eden's insistence in the Abyssinian matter and seemed willing to adopt a formula
face-saving for the League and leaving Italy a free hand." Eden was particularly disappointed in the attitude of Benes. He had discovered that the Czechoslovakian statesman was "concerned only with the Austrian question, was unwilling to bring pressure upon Italy or to do anything which would run the slightest risk of upsetting the Continental alignment."
Eden's attitude towards Hitler and Germany was significant. While he was imbued with a "profound skepticism" of the program outlined in Hitler's recent speech, he was determined to go ahead and "explore fully" the possibilities for peace. He was anxious to have Germany reenter the League, and in his conversation with Hitler he had given assurances that "the British were willing to have the Treaty of Versailles separated from the Covenant if the German so desired." This comment, said Mr. Wilson, was so radical that it should be kept "extremely confidential."
From close observation of the scene in Geneva, Ambassador Wilson had come to the conclusion that Laval and Eden were an "excellent team." He had the impression that Laval was "developing into the type of Foreign Minister that Briand was, with perhaps a greater sense of political realism and a more practical method of achieving and applying his policies. Both he and Eden are on the up-grade politically [and] they have a decided esteem for each other."38
J.
The Walwal Arbitration
Encounters a Delay
In Geneva it was evident to Prentiss B. Gilbert that the arbitration of the
Walwal Incident would encounter a lengthy delay. The Ethiopian Government had named its representatives on the arbitral board, but these
selections had not impressed Mr. Gilbert very favorably. M. de la Pradelle did not enjoy "the best of reputations," while Pitman Potter had
little ability to handle "matters having to do with actual foreign affairs
in the practical realm." To Gilbert he appeared as the "sort of man
who believes in Santa Claus."39 This generous attitude should have appealed to the Italian Government but it was soon obvious that the Walwal Incident was given scant consideration by Mussolini. He had larger objectives in mind. These were partially disclosed during a conversation between Ambassador Long and Signor Suvich, the Italian Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The Italian diplomat freely confided his hope that the "League of Nations, through its powers of arbitration, should see fit to offer Italy a mandate for Abyssinia. This would be the best thing for Abyssinia which was an undeveloped and lawless country. . . . Italy could not afford to withdraw her soldiers from there; as a matter of fact it was necessary to send more soldiers to protect Italian colonists" from the raids of armed Ethiopians.40
These raids from Ethiopia into adjacent Italian colonial territory were the subject of some trenchant editorials by Virginio Gayda in the Giornale d'Italia, June 18-20. The Italian public was informed that they could not be permitted to continue indefinitely. Apparently, war or a mandate over Ethiopia were the only alternatives.41
K.
Mussolini Rejects a
Proposal of Anthony Eden
Anthony Eden did not agree with Virginio Gayda that war or an
Italian mandate over Ethiopia were the only alternatives in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. A mandate over Ethiopia would offer entirely too
much incentive to Mussolini to push his far-reaching plans for colonial
expansion. Perhaps the Duce would be satisfied with merely a big bite
out of the Ethiopian apple. With this idea in mind, Eden had a momentous interview with the Italian dictator in Rome. Under the terms
of his proposal, Britain would offer Ethiopia an outlet to the sea at
Zeila, in British Somaliland, together with a narrow strip of land that
would connect that port with Ethiopian territory. Ethiopia would then
cede to Italy a part of the Ogaden and would also grant certain economic
concessions to Italian nationals. Mussolini immediately rejected the proposals of Eden. In any settlement of the dispute with Ethiopia he would insist upon the annexation of all "those parts of Abyssinia which did nqt form part of Abyssinia proper." In addition he wished to "control Abyssinia." If he had to go to war to attain his objectives he would endeavor "to wipe the name of Abyssinia from the map."42
The reaction of Eden to these frank statements is not clearly revealed. In Rome, Italian officials attempted to establish the fiction that Eden's visit had been in the nature of a "conciliatory 'pat on the back' intended to assuage any ill-feeling that might have been caused by England's independent negotiations of naval agreements with Germany. ... The Mussolini-Eden exchange of views is generally believed to have proved satisfactory on both sides."43
The American charge at Geneva hurriedly telegraphed that he had learned from authoritative sources that Mussolini had decided to "establish a protectorate over Abyssinia," and Eden had been informed of that indention. He had also heard a Russian official remark that "while his Government had originally felt Mussolini was 'playing poker' they had now changed their ideas and believed he 'meant business.' "44
The Italian press had criticized Eden's proposals as inadequate, while French press opinion was hostile because Zeila would be in competition with the port of Djibouti and this would violate the tripartite treaty of 1906. In Rome, Virginio Gayda complained that Eden's concessions "neither corresponded to the avowed purposes of the British Government nor answered Italy's requirements for security and economic expansion."45
Kirk, the American charge in Rome, discussed the situation with Chambrun, the French Ambassador, who confided that before "leaving for his recent trip to Paris he had been authorized by Mussolini to state to the French Government that he [the Duce] was definitely in favor of a peaceful solution of the conflict with Abyssinia if Italy's prestige and interests could be safeguarded." It was Chambrun's belief that some "gesture was essential to vindicate the honor and prestige of Italy and this could be effected by the cession of Adowa which would enable Mussolini to advertise the triumph of his regime over the defeat of the previous government."46
L.
The Emperor of Ethiopia
Seeks American Intervention
While the principal European powers were anxiously seeking some solution of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, Emperor Haile Selassie handed to
the American charge at Addis Ababa a note which requested the American Government to invoke the Pact of Paris as a means of arresting the
Italian advance into Ethiopia. Secretary Hull answered this request in a
note that was cool and cautious: "My Government hopes that the ...
arbitral agency dealing with this controversy may be able to arrive at a
decision satisfactory to both of the Governments immediately concerned. .. . My Government would be loath to believe that either of the
Powers [Italy and Ethiopia] would resort to other than pacific means
as a method of dealing with this controversy."47 This instruction was given to the press on July 6 and it gave birth to many rumors concerning American policy in Ethiopia. Secretary Hull was making his viewpoint very clear to the major powers in Europe but he was not doing it in the spectacular manner of Secretary Stimson, Some students of international law thought he was being too cautious in his handling of the matter. Professor Quincy Wright hurriedly wrote to Hull and expressed the opinion that "a failure on our part to do anything would be such a severe blow to the cause of peace and respect for the Pact of Paris that I hope you will find it possible to accept an invitation to consult, if offered, by the League of Nations."48 [If the nations of Europe had truly sought peace, they would never have signed Versailles at the expense of Germany DC]
Under pressure of enthusiasts like Professor Wright, Secretary Hull requested the Italian Ambassador to call at the Department of State. When Signor Rosso arrived he was informed that the American Government was "deeply interested in the preservation of peace in all parts of the world." For this reason Mr. Hull felt "impelled to impress upon the Italian Ambassador our increasing concern over the situation arising out of Italy's dispute with Ethiopia and our earnest hope that a means may be found to arrive at a peaceful . . . solution of the problem."49
On the following afternoon both the British and French ambassadors paid formal visits to the Department of State and received statements similar to the one given to Ambassador Rosso. Mr. Phillips, during a long conversation with the British Ambassador, drew attention to an article in the Boston Evening Transcript which stated that "it is nearly the unanimous conclusion of London opinion that the Briand-Kellogg Pact is dead owing to the brusque refusal of the American Government to invoke that pact." It was important, Mr. Phillips emphasized, for the British Government to realize that "this impression is entirely contrary to the sense of our note to the Emperor."50
In order to make the viewpoint of the Department of State entirely clear in this regard, Secretary Hull issued on July 12 a statement to the effect that "the Pact of Paris is no less binding now than when it was entered into by the 63 nations that are parties to it The United States and the other nations are interested in the maintenance of the Pact and the sanctity of international commitments assumed thereby."51
Newton D. Baker, former Secretary of War, was delighted with this press statement of July 12. He had long been of the opinion that it would be "highly desirable to have our country notify the League of Nations that the United States would cooperate with it in any measures it found desirable to take, short of war, to enforce its covenants among its own members." It was apparent to him that caution would never save the day for world peace. He was persuaded that "if the world is to be saved, it must be by daring."52
M.
Italy Is Anxious to Assume the
White Man's Burden in Africa
It was soon apparent to Secretary Hull that a policy of "daring" might
involve the United States in war. Mussolini was determined to enjoy
his adventure in Africa no matter how high the cost might run. From
London the word came that there was little hope of preserving the
peace of Europe. Of course Britain would continue her "efforts to prevent war," but there was small chance that these would be successful.53
In Paris, Straus saw Laval who gave assurances that he was "anxious to
avoid war" between Italy and Ethiopia. This anxiety led him to propose
a formula whereby Italy would be given a mandate over Ethiopia. Under its terms the Italian Government would receive not only territorial
concessions and economic advantages but would also be given some
form of "administrative control" over Ethiopia. If these concessions
were not made at once, Mussolini would move towards war. When
asked what effect these belligerent moves of Mussolini would have
upon Europe, Laval bluntly replied: "That is Mussolini's business—
not mine."54 From Rome indirect news came from Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn that Mussolini had informed him that there was still a possibility of peace, but this peace must be on his terms. He was really planning a "colonial enterprise on a large scale rather than a campaign of conquest." This colonial enterprise might involve some "military operations" to satisfy Italy's "prestige and enable her to weaken the power of the Negus," but after these ends had been accomplished the "process of colonial enterprise will be gradually carried out."55
The Japanese Government, apparently impressed with the beneficent aspects of Italian "colonial enterprise," immediately announced an attitude of neutrality with reference to the situation in Ethiopia. The Italian press acclaimed this "unequivocal" declaration as a gesture of friendship towards Italy, and it was widely interpreted as an indication of a new political alignment.56
Further news from Rome came in the form of a series of answers that Mussolini gave to some questions that had been formulated by Mrs. William B. Meloney, of the New York Herald-Tribune. In his answers Mussolini stated that "good will on the Italian side has been met by Abyssinia with stubborn obstruction. The treacherous attack on Walwal... has been nothing but the latest proof of a spirit of persistent hostility which has lasted for half a century." It was obvious that the frontiers of the Italian colonial empire would have to be defended. Italy, moreover, had now arrived at a clear realization of the "mission of civilization that she has to accomplish in Abyssinia, not only on her own behalf but also on that of the whole western world."57
Some nations in the Western world were a little suspicious that Mussolini was unduly anxious to bear the White Man's burden in Ethiopia. In order to meet their objections, the Duce gave an interview to one of the correspondents of the Echo de Paris (July 16) in which he crisply remarked that he "was seeking for Italy in Abyssinia what British and French colonizers had sought for their countries." Then as a sop to French and British statesmen, he gave the assurance that he would "continue to consider Austrian independence as the dominating factor in his foreign policy."58 Germany was not disturbed by this thrust at Nazi ambitions, and von Bulow, in Berlin, informed Dodd that he thought that pressure upon Italy "for the application of the Kellogg Pact might do harm." Hitler's Government was careful to take no step that would cause friction with Italy.59
N.
President Roosevelt Urges
Mussolini to Accept Arbitration
The League of Nations, like France and Germany, was distinctly cautious in its handling of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Although the council adopted a resolution which provided for a general examination of the
Ethiopian situation at the meeting scheduled for September 4, it also
adopted another resolution which sharply limited the scope of the Walwal arbitration. In order to give some strength to this action of the
League, President Roosevelt made a public statement on August 1 in
which he voiced the hope "of the people and the Government of the
United States that an amicable solution will be found [for the settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian controversy] and that peace will be maintained."60 Emperor Haile Selassie was delighted with this Presidential expression of a hope for peace, but diplomatic circles at Addis Ababa were of the opinion that the government of the United States had "adopted a very cautious attitude, calculated to avoid at all cost any action or positive intervention in the Italo-Ethiopian controversy."61 This viewpoint nettled Secretary Hull who instructed our ambassadors in London and Paris to send "all information possible to enable our Government to determine whether any further action by it.. . as a signatory of the Pact of Paris would . . . have a beneficial rather than a disadvantageous effect."62
When the American charge at Paris responded with a statement that both the French and British governments were of the opinion that some positive action by the United States would be of real assistance in halting the aggressive plans of Mussolini, a conference was held at the White House. The President suggested an immediate message to Mussolini, so on August 18, Hull instructed Mr. Kirk, the American charge at Rome, to convey to the Duce the earnest hope of the American Chief Executive that "the controversy between Italy and Ethiopia will be resolved without resort to armed conflict."63
When Mr. Kirk delivered this message the following day, Mussolini assured him that he appreciated the "character of the message and its expression of friendliness," but he had already mobilized one million men for conflict with Ethiopia which was now inevitable. Regardless of League action, Italy would proceed with her plans. If the opposition of other countries developed to the point of actual intervention, Italy would "take steps accordingly."64
In the face of this Italian defiance, France and Britain worked feverishly to find some solution short of war. At Paris, during August 15-18, tripartite negotiations had been carried on with reference to the Ethiopian situation, and proposals had been made to Mussolini which reduced the sovereignty of Ethiopia to a shadow. But the Duce wanted the whole Abyssinian apple, core and all. After he had rejected the patchwork prepared by Eden and Laval, Ramsay MacDonald startled Europe by a statement that the situation was the "most serious we have had to face since 1914."65
The verity of MacDonald's statement was not questioned in most European circles, and it was obvious that Britain was the chief disturbing factor in the explosive international situation. The Italians were "unalterably convinced" that Britain was actuated "only by selfish interests," and that her "professed anxiety for the League is pure hypocrisy."66 Virginio Gayda, in the Giornale d'Italia, ran a series of articles accusing Britain of bad faith with reference to the terms of the tripartite treaty of 1906,67 and the Italian press was filled with similar charges.
O.
The White House
Denounces Dollar Diplomacy
The situation was suddenly made more complicated when news came
from Addis Ababa (August 31, 1935) that the Emperor had granted to
a subsidiary of the Standard Oil Company (The African Exploration
and Development Company) a concession for the exploitation of oil
and mineral resources in a large part of his empire. This concession had
been secured by a British subject, Francis Rickett, and there were many
rumors that British capital would soon be invested in it. Although the
officials of several companies of the Standard Oil group disclaimed all
knowledge of this concession, the Emperor flatly stated that it had been
granted to that company.68 [Huh, so that's what they called it before..In Name of National Security. The thing that really pissed off Washington in this instance is twofold...1. England beat them to the punch, and 2. An American Corporation was involved DC]The British Foreign Office promptly intervened and instructed its Minister at Addis Ababa to "inform the Emperor that His Majesty's Government, for its part, advise him to withhold the concession."69
From London, Mr. Atherton, the American charge, reported that the Foreign Office considered Mr. Rickett an "unstable adventurer," and it summed up the "reports of such a deal at such a moment as 'truly deplorable.' "70 This view was confirmed by Mr. Marriner, at Paris, who reported to Secretary Hull that the "general feeling here in press and semi-official circles is that the reported Abyssinian oil and mineral concession, even though British official participation has been disavowed, will nevertheless weaken Britain's position at Geneva, correspondingly strengthen the Italian thesis, and probably put sanctions out of the question."71
Secretary Hull was just as concerned over the news of the Ethiopian concession to the Standard Oil Company as was Anthony Eden. On September 3, two of the officials of that company visited the Department of State and had a long conversation with Wallace Murray, chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs. Mr. Murray frankly told them that the concession was a "matter of grave embarrassment" not only to the American Government but to other governments which "are making strenuous and sincere efforts for the preservation of world peace which is seriously threatened by the Italo-Ethiopian dispute." After commenting upon the delicate position of the British Government in the pending difficulties, he emphasized the fact that "this Government, no less than the British Government, desires to divest itself of any suspicion of selfish interest when world peace is at stake." After he had insisted to the Standard Oil officials that only "immediate and unconditional withdrawal from the concession would meet the needs of the situation," they finally agreed to accept his advice. Secretary Hull added some words of wisdom about the ethical aspects of foreign policy, and the representatives of one of America's largest corporations left the Department of State with a better understanding of the crosscurrents that affect the conduct of American foreign affairs. Their departure from Washington was speeded by some weighty words from the White House to the effect that "dollar diplomacy" was no "longer recognized by the American Government."72
But this high-sounding declaration was somewhat bewildering to Emperor Haile Selassie who had started the diplomatic fireworks by hurriedly granting the concession. He had not responded to any pressure from wicked Wall Street. Indeed, he had pressed his favors upon American big business with the ardent hope that such action might add strength to American interest in Ethiopia. Secretary Hull had a difficult time explaining the advantages of righteousness over riches in the new code of diplomacy, but the Emperor finally saw the light and regarded with fresh hope the proceedings of the League. These hopes were doomed to early disappointment.73 [It was a smart move on his part, given the situation he was in, but Zionist interests were in control in Washington, and they bigger plans in mind, and as noted in the last footnote, yes America was neutral, but only until the Zionists said you are no longer neutral,and that is the sad truth that ends these two chapters. DC]
Next
Britain and France Fear to Provoke War over the Issue of Ethiopia 210s
FOOTNOTES
Chapter 6
1 Grew Diary, July 6, 1934; Ten Years in Japan (New York, 1944), pp. 139-40.
2 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, September 15, 1933. Japan: 1931-1941, I, 249-50.
3 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, September 18, 1934. Ibid., pp. 253-54.
4 Secretary Hull to Norman Davis (at Geneva), November 13, 1934. Ibid., pp. 259-60.
5 Secretary Hull to Norman Davis, November 22, 1934. Ibid., pp. 262-63.
6 Secretary Hull to Norman Davis, November 26, 1934. Ibid., pp. 266-67.
7 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 290-91.
8 Theodore Roosevelt to President Taft, December 22, 1910. Knox Papers, Library of Congress.
9 Memorandum written by Stanley K. Hornbeck of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 15, 1937. 793.94/9195, MS, Department of State.
10 Memorandum by Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, July 15, 1937. 793.94/9194, MS, Department of State.
11 Ibid. In this memorandum Dr. Hornbeck makes the following comments: "Although the Chinese state that no such agreement [Ho-Umedzu Agreement] exists, our Embassy at Peiping states that 'circumstantial evidence inclines one to believe in the genuineness of the documents' comprising the agreement. Whether or not the Chinese actually accepted the Japanese demands, "subsequent actions of the Chinese authorities have not run counter to the Japanese desires.' "
12 New York Times, December 1, 1935.
13 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, December 5, 1935, CCCVII, 336.
14 Department of State, Press Releases, December 5, 1935. Japan, 1931-1941, I, 240-41.
15 Parliamentary Debates, loc. cit. Statement of Sir Samuel Hoare.
16 The United States in World Affairs, 1936, p. 78.
17 Exports from the United States to China in 1934 amounted to $68,667,000. In 1935 they dropped to $38,156,000.
18 Hull, op. cit., p. 446.
19 New York Times, December 10, 1935.
20 Memorandum of conversation between the American and the Japanese delegations at the London Naval Conference, December 17, 1935. Japan, 1931-1941, I, 285-89.
21 Ibid., pp. 288-89.
22 The chairman of the Japanese delegation (Nagano) to the chairman of the conference (Monsell), London. January 15, 1936. Ibid., p. 297.
23 Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 19J1-1941 (Washington, 1943), pp. 304-7.
24 Grew Diary, January 5, 1936; Ten Years in Japan (New York, 1944), pp. 162-63.
25 Ibid., January 21, 1936, p. 164.
26 The United States in World Affairs, 1936, p. 66.
27 Congressional Record, LXXX, 1703.
28 Grew Diary, February 11, 1936; Ten Years in Japan, pp. 164-65.
29 Ibid., March 13, 1936; ibid., pp. 179-81.
30 Memorandum of Secretary Hull after a conversation with Ambassador Yoshida, June 12, 1936. Japan, IQ3I-IQ4I, I, 241-44.
31 Ibid., I, 241-44.
32 General Lushkov, who escaped from Russia to Japan in June 1938, estimated the Red Army in the Far East at 400,000 infantry. Japanese estimates were somewhat lower. New York Times, July 3-14, 1938. See N. Hidaka, Manchukuo-Soviet Border Issues (Sinkiang, 1938), p. 260.
33 Alexander Barmine, One Who Survived (New York, 1945), PP- 231-32. On January 1, 1936, Russian agents signed an agreement which established a very close political bond between Russia and Sinkiang. See also, Martin R. Norins, Gateway to Asia: Sinkiang (New York, 1944).
34 David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East (New Haven, 1948), pp. 108-9.
35 Ibid., pp. 111-12.
36 Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China (New York, 1939), pp. 189-218.
37 Dallin, op. cit., p. 131.
38 Ibid., pp. 67-70.
39 The text of the treaty is given in United States and JapaN, 1931-1941, II, 153- 55
40 Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, I (Washington, 1949), 734.
41 Statement of the Japanese Foreign Office, November 25, 1936. Japan, 1931-1941, II, 155-57.
42 Grew Diary, December 3, 1936; Ten Years in Japan, p. 191.
43 Ibid., January 1, 1937; ibid., p. 192.
44 Ibid., February 12, 1937; ibid., pp. 205-6.
45 Ibid., March 19, 1937; ibid., p. 207.
46 R. Y. Jarvis to Secretary Hull, Hankow, September 8, 1936. 893.00 P.R./Hankow/112, MS, Department of State.
47 E. R. Dickover to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, October 1, 1936. 793.94/8272, MS, Department of State.
48 Memorandum prepared by Maxwell M. Hamilton, Division of Far Eastern Affairs, October 2, 1936. 793.94/8260, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.
49 Memorandum prepared by Mr. Hamilton recounting a conversation with Andre de Laboulaye, the French Ambassador, October 2, 1936. 793.94/8266, MS, Department of State.
50 E. R. Dickover to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, November 25, 1936. 894.00 P.R./107, MS, Department of State.
51 These so-called Japanese "demands" were listed as follows: (1) autonomy of the five northern provinces; (2) economic co-operation with the whole of China; (3) joint measures for defense against communism; (4) appointment of Japanese advisers to the Chinese Government; (5) establishment of air communications between Japan and China; (6) a preferential tariff agreement; (7) the complete suppression of anti-Japanese propaganda in China. See memorandum by Maxwell M. Hamilton, of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, October 3, 1936. 793.94/8234, MS, Department of State.
52 Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Mallet, British charge d'affaires at Washington, and Mr. Hornbeck, October 6, 1936. 793.94/8254, MS, Department of State.
53 E. R. Dickover to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, October 3, 1936. 793.94/8218, MS, Department of State.
54 David Berger to Secretary Hull, October 30, 1936. 793.94/8451, MS, Department of State
55 Interview between Ambassador Johnson and Mr. Suma, Nanking, December 3, J 936. 793.94/8481, MS, Department of State.
56 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, December 14, 1936. 793.94/8437, MS, Department of State.
57 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, December 31, 1936. 793.94/8501, MS, Department of State.
58 Memorandum prepared by Stanley K. Hornbeck, January 16, 1937. 793.94/8505, MS, Department of State.
59 Ambassador Johnson to Secretary Hull, Nanking, February 23, 1937. 893.00/ 14016, MS, Department of State.
60 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, February 25, 1937. 793.94/8546, MS, Department of State.
61 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, March 5, 1937. 894.00/706, MS, Department of State.
62 Ambassador Johnson to Secretary Hull, Nanking, March 18, 1937. 793-94/8543, MS, Department of State.
63 Ambassador Johnson to Secretary Hull, Nanking, March 24, 1937. 793.94/8554, MS, Department of State.
64 Ambassador Johnson to Secretary Hull, Nanking, April 12, 1937. 893.00 P.R./ 135, MS, Department of State.
65 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, April 30, 1937. 793.94/8632, MS, Department of State.
66 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, May 10, 1937. 793.94/8643, MS, Department of State.
67 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, report on political conditions in Japan for May 1937. 894.00 P.R./114, MS, Department of State.
68 Ambassador Johnson to Secretary Hull, Peiping, June 17, 1937. 793.94/8721, MS, Department of State.
69 Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, June 24, 1937. 793.94/8725, MS, Department of State.
70 Ibid.
71 ibid.
72 C. E. Gauss to Secretary Hull, Shanghai, June 30, 1937. 793.94/8992, MS, Department of State.
73 Walter H. Mallory, "Japan Attacks, China Resists," Foreign Affairs, XVI (October 1937), 129-33; T. A. Bisson, "Origins of Sino-Japanese Hostilities," Foreign Policy Reports, XIII (March i, 1938), 291-300,
Chapter 7
1 Maxwell H. H. Macartney and Paul Cremona, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1Q14-1Q37 (New York, 1938), p. 276; Charles F. Rey, The Real Abyssinia (Philadelphia, 1935), p. 139.
2 William L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism (New York, 1935), I, 109, 272; Elizabeth P. McCallum, "Rivalries in Ethiopia," World Affairs Pamphlets, No. 12 (World Peace Foundation, Boston, 1935), p. 28.
3 Augustus B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (London, 1901), chap. 9.
4 Leonard Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa (New York, 1920), pp. 211 ff.
5 A. F. Pribram, The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary (Cambridge, 1920), II, 227, 240-45.
6 Livre-Jaune: Les Accords Franc o-ltali ens de 1900-1902 (Paris, 1920), pp. 7-9.
7 Sidney B. Fay, Origins of the World War (New York, 1929), I, 406-11.
8 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 279.
9 Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace (New York, 1944), p. 266. Luigi Villari, in his Expansion of Italy (London, 1930), p. 41, discusses the Allied division of the spoils of war and points out how Great Britain received some 989,000 square miles or territory, France about 253,000 square miles, while Italy was awarded a small tract amounting to a mere 23,737 square miles.
10 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., pp. 289-90.
11 Robert G. Woolbert, "Italy in Abyssinia," Foreign Affairs, XIII (1935), 499- 508.
12 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 293. With reference to the Italo-British understanding of 1925, Gaetano Salvemini remarks: "It can surely not have escaped the notice of the Foreign Office that Abyssinia would be reluctant to consent to the construction of such a railway [joining Eritrea and Italian Somaliland], which would therefore lead to military occupation and some sort of political control. The 1925 agreement could only mean that the Foreign Office was giving Mussolini a free hand in a large portion of Abyssinia." "Mussolini, the Foreign Office and Abyssinia," Contemporary Review, CXLVIII (September 1935), 271.
13 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., pp. 294-95; MacCallum, op. cit., pp. 39-40-
14 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 285.
15 E. W. Poison Newman, Italy's Conquest of Abyssinia (London, 1937), p. 17.
16 Publications of the League of Nations, Official Document C. 40, M. 22, 1035, Vll.
17 General Emilo de Bono, Anno XIII (London, 1937), pp. 1-17, 55-89.
18 According to Article n any war or threat of war was a "matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations."
19 London Daily Mail, August 24, 1935.
20 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., pp. 299-300.
21 C. Grove Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman, The Origins and Background of the Second World War (New York, 1943), pp. 378-79.
22 Survey of International Affairs, 1935, pp. 143-65.
23 ibid., p. 159.
24 Statement to the press made by Dino Grandi, July 3, 1931. 033.1140 Stimson, Henry L./137, MS, Department of State.
25 Memorandum of a conversation with Signor Benito Mussolini, head of the Italian Government, at Rome, Thursday, July 9, 1931. 033.1140 Stimson, Henry L./ 141, MS, Department of State.
26 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in War and Peace (New York, 1948), pp. 268-69
27 John W. Garrett to the Secretary of State, Rome, July 16, 1931. 033.1140 Stimson, Henry L./137, MS, Department of State.
28 London Times, November 5, 1931.
29 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Stimson, November 10, 1931, enclosure No. 2. 033.6511 Grandi, Dino/87, MS, Department of State.
30 Memorandum of a conversation between Signor Grandi and William R. Castle, November 16, 1931. 033.6511 Grandi, Dino/99, MS, Department of State.
31 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Stimson, November 19, 24, 1931. 033.6511 Grandi, Dino/85-86, MS, Department of State.
32 Dino Grandi to Secretary Stimson, November 27, 1931. 033.6511 Grandi, Dino/88, MS, Department of State.
33 See ante, p. 34-35.
34 Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Stimson and the Italian Ambassador, Signor Augusto Rosso, February 23, 1933. 711.65/42, MS, Department of State.
35 Augusto Rosso to William Phillips, Acting Secretary of State, December 8, 1933. 711.65/44, MS, Department of State.
36 William Phillips to Signor Augusto Rosso, December 12, 1933. 711.65/44, MS, Department of State.
37 Breckinridge Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 5, 1934. 862.00/3308, MS, Department of State.
38 Ambassador Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, May 29, 1935. 862.20/ 1058, MS, Department of State.
39 Prentiss B. Gilbert to Wallace Murray, June 1, 1935. 765.84/501, MS, Department of State. It is interesting to note that Professor Pitman B. Potter has written a monograph on the Wai Wai Arbitration (Washington, 1938), which reviews the evidence in the case and presents the more important documents. It is significant that the arbitral commission dodged the essential point at issue in the dispute: in whose territory was Walwal located in December 1934?
40 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, June 10, 1935. 765.84/528, MS, Department of State.
41 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, June 20, 1935. 765.84/434, MS, Department of State.
42 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 303.
43 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, June 28, 1935. 765.84/479, MS, Department of State.
44 Mayer to Secretary Hull, Geneva, June 29, 1935. 765.84/419, MS, Department of State.
45 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 2, 1935. 765.84/429, MS, Department of State.
46 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 2, 1935. 765.84/427, MS, Department of State.
47 Secretary Hull to American charge at Addis Ababa, July 5, 1935. 765.84/432, MS, Department of State.
48 Quincy Wright to Secretary Hull, July 8, 1935. 765.84/469, MS, Department of State.
49 Statement of Secretary Hull to the Italian Ambassador, July 10, 1935. 765.84/ 479A, MS, Department of State.
50 Memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Phillips and the British Ambassador, July 11, 1935. 765.84/611, MS, Department of State.
51 Department of State, Press Release, July 13, 1935, pp. 53-54.
52 Newton D. Baker to Secretary Hull, July 12, 1935. 765.84/626, MS, Department of State.
53 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, July 16, 1935. 765.84/541, MS, Department of State.
54 Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, July 13, 1935. Urgent and Confidential, 765.84/ 524, MS, Department of State.
55 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 17, 1935. Confidential file, 765.84/556, MS, Department of State.
56 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 18, 1935. Confidential file, 765.84/567, MS, Department of State.
57 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 18, 1935. Strictly Confidential, 765.84/568, MS, Department of State.
58 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 23, 1935. 765.84/602, MS, Department of State.
59 Ambassador Dodd to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 18, 1935. 826.00/3539, MS, Department of State.
60 Department of State, Press Release, August 10, 1935, p. 119.
61 C. Van H. Engert to Secretary Hull, Addis Ababa, August 9, 1935. 765.84/ 1075, MS, Department of State.
62 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 421.
63 Secretary Hull to Alexander Kirk, August 18, 1935; Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), p. 266.
64 Hull, op. cit., p. 422.
65 The United States in World Affairs, 1934-35, ed. W. H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs (New York, 1935), p. 245.
66 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, August 23, 1935. 765.84/1032, MS, Department of State.
67 See particularly the issues of August 16-17, 1935. 68 New York Times, August 31, September 1, 1935. 69 London Times, September 1, 1935
70 Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, August 31, 1935. 884.6363 African Exploitation and Development Corporation/2, MS, Department of State.
71 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, September 3, 1935. 765.84/1005, MS, Department of State.
72 New York Times, September 5, 1935.
73 Hull, op. cit., pp. 423-25. It is interesting to note that the news of the oil concession to the Standard Oil Company did not excite any bitterness in the Italian press against the United States. In a dispatch to Secretary Hull, September 4, 1935, Breckinridge Long, the American Ambassador at Rome, remarked as follows: "As to the American angle of the affair, I may state that even at the outset there was no evidence of resentment against the United States, the participation of American capital being considered a blind for British interests. . . . The subsequent statements issued by the Secretary of State and the action of the Standard Oil in renouncing the concession have made a most favorable impression here. .. . It is felt that the American Government has given further and substantial proof of an impeccable attitude of neutrality." 765.84/1216, MS, Department of State.
20 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., pp. 299-300.
21 C. Grove Haines and Ross J. S. Hoffman, The Origins and Background of the Second World War (New York, 1943), pp. 378-79.
22 Survey of International Affairs, 1935, pp. 143-65.
23 ibid., p. 159.
24 Statement to the press made by Dino Grandi, July 3, 1931. 033.1140 Stimson, Henry L./137, MS, Department of State.
25 Memorandum of a conversation with Signor Benito Mussolini, head of the Italian Government, at Rome, Thursday, July 9, 1931. 033.1140 Stimson, Henry L./ 141, MS, Department of State.
26 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in War and Peace (New York, 1948), pp. 268-69
27 John W. Garrett to the Secretary of State, Rome, July 16, 1931. 033.1140 Stimson, Henry L./137, MS, Department of State.
28 London Times, November 5, 1931.
29 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Stimson, November 10, 1931, enclosure No. 2. 033.6511 Grandi, Dino/87, MS, Department of State.
30 Memorandum of a conversation between Signor Grandi and William R. Castle, November 16, 1931. 033.6511 Grandi, Dino/99, MS, Department of State.
31 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Stimson, November 19, 24, 1931. 033.6511 Grandi, Dino/85-86, MS, Department of State.
32 Dino Grandi to Secretary Stimson, November 27, 1931. 033.6511 Grandi, Dino/88, MS, Department of State.
33 See ante, p. 34-35.
34 Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Stimson and the Italian Ambassador, Signor Augusto Rosso, February 23, 1933. 711.65/42, MS, Department of State.
35 Augusto Rosso to William Phillips, Acting Secretary of State, December 8, 1933. 711.65/44, MS, Department of State.
36 William Phillips to Signor Augusto Rosso, December 12, 1933. 711.65/44, MS, Department of State.
37 Breckinridge Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 5, 1934. 862.00/3308, MS, Department of State.
38 Ambassador Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, May 29, 1935. 862.20/ 1058, MS, Department of State.
39 Prentiss B. Gilbert to Wallace Murray, June 1, 1935. 765.84/501, MS, Department of State. It is interesting to note that Professor Pitman B. Potter has written a monograph on the Wai Wai Arbitration (Washington, 1938), which reviews the evidence in the case and presents the more important documents. It is significant that the arbitral commission dodged the essential point at issue in the dispute: in whose territory was Walwal located in December 1934?
40 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, June 10, 1935. 765.84/528, MS, Department of State.
41 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, June 20, 1935. 765.84/434, MS, Department of State.
42 Macartney and Cremona, op. cit., p. 303.
43 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, June 28, 1935. 765.84/479, MS, Department of State.
44 Mayer to Secretary Hull, Geneva, June 29, 1935. 765.84/419, MS, Department of State.
45 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 2, 1935. 765.84/429, MS, Department of State.
46 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 2, 1935. 765.84/427, MS, Department of State.
47 Secretary Hull to American charge at Addis Ababa, July 5, 1935. 765.84/432, MS, Department of State.
48 Quincy Wright to Secretary Hull, July 8, 1935. 765.84/469, MS, Department of State.
49 Statement of Secretary Hull to the Italian Ambassador, July 10, 1935. 765.84/ 479A, MS, Department of State.
50 Memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Phillips and the British Ambassador, July 11, 1935. 765.84/611, MS, Department of State.
51 Department of State, Press Release, July 13, 1935, pp. 53-54.
52 Newton D. Baker to Secretary Hull, July 12, 1935. 765.84/626, MS, Department of State.
53 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, July 16, 1935. 765.84/541, MS, Department of State.
54 Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, July 13, 1935. Urgent and Confidential, 765.84/ 524, MS, Department of State.
55 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 17, 1935. Confidential file, 765.84/556, MS, Department of State.
56 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 18, 1935. Confidential file, 765.84/567, MS, Department of State.
57 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 18, 1935. Strictly Confidential, 765.84/568, MS, Department of State.
58 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, July 23, 1935. 765.84/602, MS, Department of State.
59 Ambassador Dodd to Secretary Hull, Berlin, July 18, 1935. 826.00/3539, MS, Department of State.
60 Department of State, Press Release, August 10, 1935, p. 119.
61 C. Van H. Engert to Secretary Hull, Addis Ababa, August 9, 1935. 765.84/ 1075, MS, Department of State.
62 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 421.
63 Secretary Hull to Alexander Kirk, August 18, 1935; Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), p. 266.
64 Hull, op. cit., p. 422.
65 The United States in World Affairs, 1934-35, ed. W. H. Shepardson and William O. Scroggs (New York, 1935), p. 245.
66 Alexander Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, August 23, 1935. 765.84/1032, MS, Department of State.
67 See particularly the issues of August 16-17, 1935. 68 New York Times, August 31, September 1, 1935. 69 London Times, September 1, 1935
70 Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, August 31, 1935. 884.6363 African Exploitation and Development Corporation/2, MS, Department of State.
71 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, September 3, 1935. 765.84/1005, MS, Department of State.
72 New York Times, September 5, 1935.
73 Hull, op. cit., pp. 423-25. It is interesting to note that the news of the oil concession to the Standard Oil Company did not excite any bitterness in the Italian press against the United States. In a dispatch to Secretary Hull, September 4, 1935, Breckinridge Long, the American Ambassador at Rome, remarked as follows: "As to the American angle of the affair, I may state that even at the outset there was no evidence of resentment against the United States, the participation of American capital being considered a blind for British interests. . . . The subsequent statements issued by the Secretary of State and the action of the Standard Oil in renouncing the concession have made a most favorable impression here. .. . It is felt that the American Government has given further and substantial proof of an impeccable attitude of neutrality." 765.84/1216, MS, Department of State.
1 comment:
The Washington Naval Treaty was a huge benefit for Japan and Great Britain. The US Congress authorized the construction of a two fleet Navy each capable of defeating Japan or Great Britain.
The Japanese could never hope to gain parity and Great Britain was broke after WWI.
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