The CIA as Organized Crime: How Illegal Operations Corrupt
America and the World
By Douglas Valentine
Chapter 7
America and the World
By Douglas Valentine
Chapter 7
VIETNAM REPLAY ON
AFGHAN
DEFECTORS
After eight years of waging a “dirty war” against the Taliban (whom Obama
had described a month earlier as a “cancer” that must be irradiated out of
existence), the US government and its NATO allies tried a different tack in 2010.
For the first time they acknowledged that the “insurgent” enemy was, according
to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, part of the “fabric” of Afghan society.
1 Having acknowledged the humanity of Muslims in Afghanistan, the plan was now to entice low- and mid-level Taliban to switch sides. High-level Taliban and anyone connected to al Qaeda (now manifest as ISIS), however, maintained their exalted status on Obama’s hit list.
In January 2010, US and NATO officials started offering bribes drawn from a multi-million-dollar program “Peace and Reintegration Trust Fund” to get Taliban fighters to betray their leaders and become, as General Stanley McChrystal said, “part of solution in Afghanistan.” 2
In the US, the peace plan horrified some women’s rights advocates, but appealed to elements of the public who were already weary of endless war. Taliban leaders condemned the buyout strategy as a “trick” and warned that offers of reconciliation were futile unless all foreign troops left Afghanistan. 3
As ever, there was a darker CIA side to the “reconciliation” plan.
The Method in Their Madness
Historically, defector programs are an essential ingredient of brutal US pacification efforts. The Chieu Hoi “Open Arms” program in Vietnam was touted by military strategists as having produced positive results by offering “clemency to insurgents.” The statistics they offered up proved the case.
But, as with every CIA covert action, the “Open Arms” program relied on
deceptive advertising and media complicity to make the “pacification” of the
Vietnamese countryside appear humane. In fact, “amnesty” and “open arms”
programs have nothing to do with reconciliation. Rather, they serve as another
component of covert CIA intelligence and counterinsurgency operations.
Former CIA Director William Colby told me that the CIA’s RD teams in Vietnam (like PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, discussed in the previous chapter) relied on defectors whose job was to “go around the countryside and indicate to the people that they used to be Vietcong and that the government has received them and taken them in, and that the Chieu Hoi program does exist as a way of VC currently on the other side to rally.”
Defectors “contact people like the families of known VC,” Colby said, “and provide them with transportation to defector and refugee centers.”
Master spy Colby, who perished mysteriously in a boating accident in 1996, would have agreed that information management is the key to political warfare in general and to defector programs in particular. Defector programs are ultimately aimed not at the enemy, but at the American public which, when it hears words like “clemency” and “amnesty,” starts to see the war in a kinder, gentler light.
After the information managers concoct an appealing slogan, additional public approval is garnered by composing and planting articles in foreign and domestic newspapers. The stories portray CIA operations as good deeds designed to bring about peace and prosperity, while fostering freedom and democracy.
Despite the warm and fuzzy language, defector programs are a horrific aspect of dirty war. The CIA launches a covert action like the Taliban defector program only if it has the “intelligence potential” to produce information on an enemy’s political, military and economic infrastructure, which in turn leads to air strikes and midnight death squad operations. Like Dinh Tuong An said in his “Truth about Phoenix” articles, they are meant to prolong a war forever, or until total victory is achieved. [18 years later,sounds right DC]
In 2009, the CIA launched its defector program as a way of recruiting low and mid-level Taliban who had the best “intelligence potential” on the senior level Taliban officials it desires most to eliminate.
Not only does defection sap the enemy’s fighting strength and morale, and lead to capture, interrogation and assassination of enemy leaders, genuine defectors provide accurate and timely intelligence on enemy unit strengths and locations. As a condition for “amnesty” they are required to prove their commitment by serving as guides and trackers for other pacification programs, like Counter Terror hit teams. Many are returned to their villages with a CT team to locate hidden enemy arms or food caches. Some are sent on “One Way” missions and bombed along with the targets they locate.
After being profiled and interrogated by security officers, some defectors are turned into double agents. Defectors who return to their former positions inside opposition military or political organizations are provided with a “secure” means of contacting their CIA case officer’s Principal Agent, to whom they feed information leading to the arrest or ambush of enemy cadres and secret agents. Some function for years as penetration agents and provide the greatest prize of all, “strategic” information on the enemy’s plans.
Defector programs also provide CIA “talent scouts” with cover for recruiting criminals into CT and RD “political action” teams. Burglars, arsonists, forgers and smugglers have unique skills and no compunctions about committing havoc. In Vietnam, the entire 52nd Ranger Battalion of the South Vietnamese Army was recruited from Saigon prisons.
Military operations, like President Obama’s “surge” in 2010, provide security for CIA officers to conduct covert operations through instruments like the PRTs, which is the real reason the Taliban defector buyout program was launched concurrently with the surge. 4
As I predicted in my 2010 article for Consortium News, the multi-million dollar program defector program was doomed from the start. Indeed, after all the hoopla associated with its debut, it fizzled out after six months. The Times attributed the failure to the fact that the Pashtuns realized it was a trick, while their ethnic rivals within the CIA’s parallel government feared losing whatever gains they’d made if the Taliban were incorporated. 5
The program was revived in 2014 by President Ashraf Ghani and aimed at “high-level” reconciliation through a High Peace Council (a moniker only Madison Avenue ad men could devise). Provincial Peace Councils were installed in 33 provinces. However, disarmament was a precondition, and disarmament meant surrender.
Statistics supplied by the United Nations Development Program showed stunning success: “10,404 former combatants have so far renounced violence and joined the peace and reintegration program. Of these, 10,286 received financial assistance to reintegrate into their communities.” 6
Other statistics are less encouraging. There were over 11,000 civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2015, marking a steady increase since Obama’s surge in 2010. As a stranger could see at a glance, mounting civilian deaths indicate anything but a desire on America’s part for reconciliation in Afghanistan.
Frank Scotton: A Case Study in Psyops
In Vietnam, officers within the “political and psychological warfare” branch of the CIA’s Special Operations Division managed low-level defector programs. In doing so, they worked with US Information Service (USIS) officers like Frank Scotton. The USIS was the overseas branch of the erstwhile US Information Agency, and specialized in the symbolic transformation of grim realities, like CIA-sanctioned drug trafficking, into happy myths that promoted the mythological American Way.
In their effort to convert the world into one big Chamber of Commerce, the CIA and USIS employed all manner of media from TV, radio and satellites to armed propaganda teams, wanted posters and selective terror. 7
As noted in the previous chapter, Scotton played a pioneering role in US political and psychological operations in Vietnam. After graduating from American University’s College of International Relations in 1961, he received a graduate assistantship to the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii. CIA officer Lucien Conein told me that Scotton was recruited into the CIA while there, although Scotton insisted that he wasn’t.
Scotton did, however, acknowledge the CIA-sponsored East-West Center’s espionage function. “It was a cover for a training program in which Southeast Asians were brought to Hawaii and trained to go back to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to create agent nets,” he said.
Scotton told Associate Professor of History Jeff Woods about his early days in Vietnam. Here’s how Woods described what psywar expert Scotton did.
He went into the countryside alone, with a .45, a grease gun, and a bag of money. Scotton started in the central highlands arranging meetings with local officials and learning what he could about the Vietcong’s people’s war. He also met the wild group of multinational other warriors trying to pacify the highlands. In an abandoned shack near Anh Khe, he found Englishmen Dick Noone, Norman Hurbold, and a group of Malayans. Noone was especially interesting. His brother Pat had been an anthropologist in Malaya and the originator of Senoi Dream Theory, which held that the tribesmen’s collective dream world could be shaped to influence group solidarity. Dick Noone had worked in Malaya shaping the dreams of the once peaceful Orang Asli aborigines, organizing them into the Senoi Praaq, a police unit noted for its ruthless slaughter of captured Communist guerillas. Noone convinced Scotton that his biggest problem in persuading the rural Vietnamese and Montagnards to brave the jungle and kill the VC was that he had not done it himself. The American immediately took the advice to heart: “Whoever dared the vacuum, could control the vacuum”…8
Determined to earn the respect of the people he intended to recruit, the novice disappeared into the jungle, alone. He slept by day and laid ambush by night. Unsure who was VC and who was not, he let several armed, black pajama-clad Vietnamese pass by without confrontation. After a few days of this, he encountered Nai Luett, a CIA-trained special forces operative who was hunting VC in the area. Luett told Scotton in no uncertain terms that any ethnic Vietnamese he encountered on the trails in the highlands at night were VC. He then handed Scotton a World War I bayonet and told him that if he carried it, the local Montagnards would recognize it as the sign of a VC killer and an ally. Luett then disappeared back into the jungle. By the end of his first week in the vacuum, Scotton had killed more than a half dozen VC guerrillas. 9
Woods is describing Jason, the grotesque character wearing a goalie’s mask in the popular slasher movies. When I speak of psycho CIA officers, think of Scotton. Who gave him the legal authority to go off on his own and kill all these people? Can CIA-USIS officers do anything they want, from drug dealing to mass murder?
In any event, after proving his manhood the militant American Way, Scotton turned his attention to “energizing” the Vietnamese through the carefully scripted “political action” that advanced American policies at the expense of the aspirations of average Vietnamese.
In looking for people to mold into political cadres preaching the American line, Scotton turned to the CIA’s defector program, which resided under cover of the State Department’s Agency for International Development, and was named the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program. There Scotton found the raw material needed to prove the viability of his experimental political action program.
In Pleiku Province, he worked with Captain Nguyen Tuy (a graduate of Fort Bragg’s Special Warfare Center) who commanded the Fourth Special Operations Detachment, and Tuy’s case officer, US Special Forces Captain Howard Walters. As part of their pilot program designed to induce defectors, Scotton, Walters and Tuy set up an ambush in VC territory and waited until dark. When they spotted a VC unit, Scotton yelled in Vietnamese through a bullhorn, “You are being misled! You are being lied to! We promise you an education!”
Full of purpose and allegory, he shot a flare into the night sky and hollered, “Walk toward the light!”
To his surprise, two men defected, convincing him and his CIA bosses that “a determined GVN unit could contest the VC in terms of combat and propaganda.”
Back in camp, Scotton told the defectors to divest themselves of untruths. “We said that certainly the US perpetrated war crimes, but so did the VC. We acknowledged that theirs was the stronger force, but that didn’t mean that everything they did was honorable and good and just,” Scotton said.
Scotton called his method the “motivational indoctrination” program.
Going National
In 1965, Tom Donohue, the chief of the CIA’s Covert Action branch in Saigon, recognized the value of intelligence obtained through defectors, and in 1965 he authorized the establishment of Chieu Hoi programs, based on Scotton’s motivational indoctrination method, in each of South Vietnam’s 44 provinces. In typical CIA style, there was nothing in writing, and nothing went through the central government.
CIA officers managed the Chieu Hoi program in the provinces, where the process worked as follows: upon arriving at the Chieu Hoi center, the defector was interviewed and, if he had information on the VCI, sent to the local Province Interrogation Center; if he had tactical military information, he was sent to military interrogators.
If a defector had the potential to serve in one of the RD Cadre programs, the CIA put him on a plane and sent him to its indoctrination center in Vung Tau, where he was plied with special attention and wowed with eye-popping gadgets. The training was rigorous but the defectors were treated well; they received medical care for infections, and the food was full of protein.
Next came political indoctrination, lasting from 40-60 days, depending on the individual, in which previously conscripted defectors preached the beauty of the American Way.
“They had a formal course,” said Jim Ward, the CIA officer in charge of Phoenix in the Delta (1967-1969). “They were shown movies and given lectures on democracy.”
Upon graduation, each defector was given an ID card, a meal, money, and a chance to gain redemption by killing former comrades.
The Chieu Hoi program was thought to be so promising that in June 1967, Nelson Brickham incorporated it within the Phoenix program. Brickham appreciated Chieu Hoi as “one of the few areas where police and paramilitary advisors cooperated.” He also viewed the defector program as a means for the CIA to develop “unilateral penetrations unknown to the [South Vietnamese] police.”
By 1969 the defector program was a centerpiece of “pacification” and was managed by military psyops teams (like the one that penetrated NPR), replete with posters, banners, loudspeakers mounted on trucks, and leaflets falling from the skies.
For example, on 22 January 1970, 38,000 leaflets were dropped over three villages in Go Vap District. Addressed to specific VCI cadres identified by RD teams, they read: “Since you have joined the NLF, what have you done for your family or your village and hamlet? Or have you just broken up the happiness of many families and destroyed houses and land? Some people among you have been awakened; they have deserted the Communist ranks and were received by the GVN and the people with open arms and family affection.
“You should be ready for the end if you remain in the Communist ranks. You will be dealing with difficulties bigger from day to day and will suffer serious failure when the ARVN expand strongly. You had better return to your family where you will be guaranteed safety and helped to establish a new life.”
Defects in the Program
The military, CIA and USIS were so convinced by their own propaganda that they funded TV and radio shows, and produced movies with real actors to spread the word. And from the language of scripted Phoenix reports, one would think that the Chieu Hoi program was a rollicking success. All “rallied” VC (real and imagined) were included in Phoenix neutralization statistics and by 1970 more than 100,000 were said to have been processed through 51 Chieu Hoi centers.
Many so-called defectors, however, simply regurgitated the American line in order to win amnesty. They considered defector programs as a chance for R&R. They made a quick visit to their families, enjoyed a home-cooked meal, and then returned to the war for independence.
According to AID Public Safety advisor Douglas McCollum, who monitored the Chieu Hoi program in three provinces in Vietnam, “It was the biggest hole in the net. They’d come in; we’d hold them, feed them, clothe them, get them a mat. Then we’d release them and they’d wander around the city for a while, and then disappear.”
As American war managers knew full well, genuine defectors were pariahs in Vietnam’s village-based culture. They could never go home.
The same lesson applies in Afghanistan’s tribal culture. In the 15 years of occupation, American and NATO forces are solely responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. As a result, they have no popular support or connection to the people they wish to dominate; they can only reach the “people” through “media” like translated leaflets and bounty programs that offer rewards to traitors.
Nothing could be a clearer indication of just how detached America’s war managers are from the reality of life in Afghanistan’s villages. And while the CIA relies on leaflets and “motivational indoctrination” programs to sell itself, the Taliban go from person to person, speaking a common tongue, proving that technology is no substitute for human contact.
The tragedy is that America has no alternative to systematic brainwashing. And while brimming with the comic enthusiasm of an Amway convention or a Bible Belt religious revival, defector programs remain a serious business. Today, they are conducted secretly at high-security CIA bases in Afghanistan and Iraq and occasionally produce spectacular results.
For example, when the Bush regime was preparing the American public for the invasion of Iraq, the CIA recruited high-level defectors from the Iraqi army. Offers of Swiss bank accounts and positions of power in the liberated Iraq of the future were balanced with CIA-prepared scripts the defectors read to the US media. Two such defectors were channeled to New York Times reporter Chris Hedges, who dutifully wrote an article titled “Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism” on 8 November 2001. The horrifying though patently untrue idea that Iraq was training terrorists to attack America had the intended effect, and public support for the pending war grew. 10
In hopes of acquiring similar sources for domestic propaganda coups, all defector debriefing reports are sent to CIA stations for analysis and possible use against the American public, which alone can be fooled. It’s a risky business, as evidenced by the Jordanian defector who turned out to be a triple agent and blew up a handful of CIA officers at FOB Chapman. But it’s the only game in town.
The United States was defeated in Vietnam for just this reason. And though packaged as a new initiative, the latest Taliban defector buyout program simply heralds a replay of the Vietnam experience in Afghanistan – nothing new in the grim world of counterinsurgency.
Over the course of its 70-year reign of terror, the CIA has overthrown countless governments, started innumerable wars, costing millions of innocent lives, and otherwise subverted and sabotaged friends and foes alike. Despite all this murder and mayhem, it has only lost around 100 officers.
No one is supposed to kill CIA officers. No matter how many innocent women and children they destroy, CIA officers are the Protected Few. Why would the terrorists in Afghanistan suddenly deviate from the norm and throw the whole game into chaos?
Consider the Afghan war veteran, Micah Johnson, the black American, who killed five Dallas cops in July 2016. 1 Johnson was enraged because it doesn’t matter how many black men cops kill, they are never punished. It doesn’t matter that the cops have an accommodation with the criminal underworld, or that their bosses allow their gangster informants to move drugs into black communities. Cops are members of the Universal Brotherhood of Officers. They exist above the law. The end.
Granted, the Universal Brotherhood of Officers is hard for civilians to find, let alone comprehend. It exists in the twilight zone between imagination and in reality, in Bob Kerrey’s “fog of war”, in the realm of the insulated ruling class. It is why officers of opposing formal armies have more in common with one another than they have with their own enlisted men.
Officers are trained to think of enlisted men as cannon fodder. They know when they send a bunch of foot soldiers up a hill, some of them will die. That’s why they do not fraternize.
That’s why it’s illegal for a working class individual like me to speak the name of an active duty CIA officer. It’s also why civilians can’t know the names of CIA commandos who shoot pregnant women and dig the bullets out of their corpses. The laws only apply to the little people and the defenseless.
Only Grand Pooh-Bahs like Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who leaked the name of CIA officer Valerie Plame to syndicated columnist Robert Novak back in 2003, can get away it. 2 Not only was it a felony, it was a political crime of the highest order, given that Armitage leaked Plame’s name in retaliation for her husband, Joe Wilson, a career diplomat, having disproved the Bush’s regime’s Big Lie that Saddam Hussein had obtained enough “yellow cake” to build a nuclear bomb.
This class distinction is the basis of the sacred accommodation.
It’s why the Bush Family, despite its repeated denials, had the FBI round up the Saudi “royals” and fly them out the US the day after 9/11. If anyone was a case officer to the bombers, or knew about their plans, he was among those Protected Few.
CIA officers are at the pinnacle of the Brotherhood. Blessed with fake identities and bodyguards, they fly around in private planes, live in villas, and kill with state-of-the-art technology. They tell army generals what to do. They direct Congressional committees. They assassinate heads of state and innocent children equally, with impunity, with indifference.
In Afghanistan, CIA officers manage the drug trade from their hammocks in the shade. Opium production has soared since they purchased the government in 2001. 3 They watch in amusement as addiction rates soar among young people whose parents have been killed and whose minds have been damaged by 15 years of US aggression. They don’t care that the drugs reach America’s inner cities.
CIA officers have an accommodation with the protected Afghan warlords who convert opium into heroin and sell it to the Russian mob. It’s no different than cops working with the Mafia in America; it’s an accommodation with an enemy that ensures the political security of the ruling class.
The CIA is authorized to negotiate with the enemy, but only if the channels are secure and deniable. It happened during the Iran Contra scandal, when President Reagan won the love of the American people by promising never to negotiate with terrorists, while his two-faced administration sent CIA officers to Tehran to sell missiles to the Iranians and use the money to buy guns for the drug dealing Contras.
In Afghanistan the accommodation within the drug underworld provides the CIA with a secure channel to the Taliban leadership to negotiate on simple matters like prisoner exchanges.
The exchange of British journalist Peter Moore for an Iraqi “insurgent” in CIA custody was an example of how the accommodation worked in Iraq. Moore was held by a Shia group allegedly allied to Iran, and his freedom depended entirely on the CIA reaching an accommodation with leaders of the Iraqi resistance. The details of such prisoner exchanges are never revealed, but always lead to secret negotiations over larger issues of strategic importance to both sides.
The criminal/espionage underworld in Afghanistan provides the intellectual space for any eventual reconciliation. There are always preliminary negotiations for a ceasefire, and in every modern American conflict that’s the CIA’s job. For the CIA has the best intelligence on family relationships in any nation where the US is operating.
CIA officer John Mason directed the Phoenix program from 1969-1971. In a 19 August 1969 New York Times article, Terrence Smith quoted Mason as saying, “Sometimes family relationships are involved. We know very well that if one of our units picks up the district chief’s brother-in-law, he’s going to be released.”
Ed Brady, an army officer detailed to the CIA and assigned to the Phoenix Directorate in Saigon, explained how the accommodation worked in Vietnam.
Brady told me how he and his Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Tan, were lunching at a restaurant in Dalat. Casually, Tan nodded at a woman eating noodle soup and drinking coffee at the table near theirs. Colonel Tan whispered that the woman was the Viet Cong province chief’s wife. Brady, of course, wanted to grab her and use her for bait.
Colonel Tan said to Brady: “You don’t understand. You don’t live the way we live. You don’t have any family here. You’re going to go home when this operation is over. You don’t think like you’re going to live here forever. But I have a home and a family and kids that go to school. I have a wife that has to go to market, and you want me to kidnap his wife? You want me to set a trap for him and kill him when he comes in to see his wife? If we do that, what are they going to do to our wives?”
“The VC didn’t run targeted operations against [top GVN officials] either,” Brady explained. “There were set rules that you played by. If you conducted a military operation and chased them down fair and square in the jungle, that was okay. If they ambushed you on the way back from a military operation, that was fair. But to conduct these clandestine police operations and really get at the heart of things, that was kind of immoral to them. That was not cricket. And the Vietnamese were very, very leery of upsetting that.”
Obama’s dirty war in Afghanistan relies largely on immoral operations in which wives and children are used as bait to trap husbands – or are killed as a way of punishing men in the resistance. That is why CIA officers reign supreme; like Brady in Vietnam, they have no personal, religious, or social connection with the indigenous population. They are not bound by moral rules, and are free to slaughter with impunity.
The CIA plays the same role in Afghanistan that the Gestapo and SS Einsatzgruppen performed in France in World War Two – terrorizing the urban resistance and partisan bands in the countryside by targeting their friends and families. The CIA’s objective is to rip apart poor and working class families and, in the process, unravel the fabric of Afghan society, until the Afghan people accept American domination. They don’t care how long it takes, either. Afghanistan is a means to get at Russia, similar to how Nixon played the China Card in Vietnam.
And that is why CIA officers were killed in Afghanistan. The Taliban have no reason to negotiate a settlement. They know history, and that the racist elites in America will never accommodate them.
As I said in 2010, the CIA is utterly predictable. I said it would invoke the symbolic “100-1 Rule” made famous by the Gestapo, and go on a killing spree, killing 100 Afghanis for every CIA officer killed, until its lust for vengeance was satisfied.
2010 was indeed the deadliest year for civilians in Afghanistan since 2001. In 2013, the rate was still rising and included an “alarming increase in women and children casualties” which reflected “the changing dynamics of the conflict over the year…which was increasingly being waged in civilian communities and populated areas,” the United Nations said. 4
The statistics are skewed to blame civilian deaths on the Taliban, but even the US military acknowledges the steady increase. As of June 2016, “Afghans feel less secure than at any recent time, a new Pentagon report says, as Afghan battlefield deaths continue to escalate and civilian casualties hit a record high.” 5
“Perceptions of security remain near all-time lows,” the report said, adding that “Only 20 percent of Afghans surveyed in March called security good. That is a drop from 39 percent a year earlier. In the latest polling, 42 percent of Afghans said security is worse now than during the time of the Taliban, which ruled the country from 1996 to late 2001 when U.S. troops invaded to eliminate an al-Qaida sanctuary. The report called the 42 percent figure a historic high.”
The Afghan people hate the Americans more and more, year after year. And that makes the CIA happy, in so far as it spells protracted war and increased profits for its sponsors in the arms industry.
Afghan anger means more resistance. And more resistance provides a neat pretext for the eternal military occupation of a disposable nation strategically located near Russia and China.
The Taliban will never surrender and, for the CIA, that means victory in Afghanistan.
But it also means spiritual defeat for America, as it descends ever further into the black hole of self-deception, militarism, and covert operations.
next
THE CIA IN UKRAINE
Notes
Chapter 7
1 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Gates Says Taliban Must Take Legitimate Afghan Role”, International New York Times, 22 January 2010.
2 Kristen Chick, “General McChrystal: Taliban could be part of solution in Afghanistan”, Christian Science Monitor, 25 January 2010.
3 “No decision yet on offer of talks: Taliban”, The Jakarta Post, 30 January 2010.
4 See Douglas Valentine, “The Afghan ‘Dirty War’ Escalates”.
5 Rod Nordland, “Lacking Money and Leadership, Push for Taliban Defectors Stalls”, International New York Times, 6 September 2010.
6 . <http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/aprp
7 In 1999, when the world went seriously digital, the USIA was renamed the Broadcasting Board of Governors.
8 September 7, 2010 <https://www.atu.edu/research/ProfessionalDevelopmentGrants/09- 10/Woods_Final_Report.pdf>
9 Ibid.
10 Chris Hedges, “Defectors Cite Iraqi Training For Terrorism”, The New York Times, 8 November 2001.
Chapter 8
1 Manny Fernandez, Richard Perez-Pena and Jonah Engel Bromwich, “Five Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says”, July 8, 2016.
2 John King and Brian Todd, “Armitage admits leaking Plame’s identity”, CNN, 8 September 2006.
3 “Afghan Opium Production 40 Times Higher Since US-NATO Invasion”, teleSUR, 31 August 2016: see <https://www.mintpressnews.com/afghan-opium-production-40-times-higher-sinceus-natoinvasion/219974/>
4 Jessica Donati, “Afghan civilian deaths up in 2013 as war intensifies: U.N.”, Reuters, 8 February 2014.
5 Robert Burns, “Pentagon report says Afghans feel less secure”, Associated Press, 17 June 2016.
Former CIA Director William Colby told me that the CIA’s RD teams in Vietnam (like PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, discussed in the previous chapter) relied on defectors whose job was to “go around the countryside and indicate to the people that they used to be Vietcong and that the government has received them and taken them in, and that the Chieu Hoi program does exist as a way of VC currently on the other side to rally.”
Defectors “contact people like the families of known VC,” Colby said, “and provide them with transportation to defector and refugee centers.”
Master spy Colby, who perished mysteriously in a boating accident in 1996, would have agreed that information management is the key to political warfare in general and to defector programs in particular. Defector programs are ultimately aimed not at the enemy, but at the American public which, when it hears words like “clemency” and “amnesty,” starts to see the war in a kinder, gentler light.
After the information managers concoct an appealing slogan, additional public approval is garnered by composing and planting articles in foreign and domestic newspapers. The stories portray CIA operations as good deeds designed to bring about peace and prosperity, while fostering freedom and democracy.
Despite the warm and fuzzy language, defector programs are a horrific aspect of dirty war. The CIA launches a covert action like the Taliban defector program only if it has the “intelligence potential” to produce information on an enemy’s political, military and economic infrastructure, which in turn leads to air strikes and midnight death squad operations. Like Dinh Tuong An said in his “Truth about Phoenix” articles, they are meant to prolong a war forever, or until total victory is achieved. [18 years later,sounds right DC]
In 2009, the CIA launched its defector program as a way of recruiting low and mid-level Taliban who had the best “intelligence potential” on the senior level Taliban officials it desires most to eliminate.
Not only does defection sap the enemy’s fighting strength and morale, and lead to capture, interrogation and assassination of enemy leaders, genuine defectors provide accurate and timely intelligence on enemy unit strengths and locations. As a condition for “amnesty” they are required to prove their commitment by serving as guides and trackers for other pacification programs, like Counter Terror hit teams. Many are returned to their villages with a CT team to locate hidden enemy arms or food caches. Some are sent on “One Way” missions and bombed along with the targets they locate.
After being profiled and interrogated by security officers, some defectors are turned into double agents. Defectors who return to their former positions inside opposition military or political organizations are provided with a “secure” means of contacting their CIA case officer’s Principal Agent, to whom they feed information leading to the arrest or ambush of enemy cadres and secret agents. Some function for years as penetration agents and provide the greatest prize of all, “strategic” information on the enemy’s plans.
Defector programs also provide CIA “talent scouts” with cover for recruiting criminals into CT and RD “political action” teams. Burglars, arsonists, forgers and smugglers have unique skills and no compunctions about committing havoc. In Vietnam, the entire 52nd Ranger Battalion of the South Vietnamese Army was recruited from Saigon prisons.
Military operations, like President Obama’s “surge” in 2010, provide security for CIA officers to conduct covert operations through instruments like the PRTs, which is the real reason the Taliban defector buyout program was launched concurrently with the surge. 4
As I predicted in my 2010 article for Consortium News, the multi-million dollar program defector program was doomed from the start. Indeed, after all the hoopla associated with its debut, it fizzled out after six months. The Times attributed the failure to the fact that the Pashtuns realized it was a trick, while their ethnic rivals within the CIA’s parallel government feared losing whatever gains they’d made if the Taliban were incorporated. 5
The program was revived in 2014 by President Ashraf Ghani and aimed at “high-level” reconciliation through a High Peace Council (a moniker only Madison Avenue ad men could devise). Provincial Peace Councils were installed in 33 provinces. However, disarmament was a precondition, and disarmament meant surrender.
Statistics supplied by the United Nations Development Program showed stunning success: “10,404 former combatants have so far renounced violence and joined the peace and reintegration program. Of these, 10,286 received financial assistance to reintegrate into their communities.” 6
Other statistics are less encouraging. There were over 11,000 civilian casualties in Afghanistan in 2015, marking a steady increase since Obama’s surge in 2010. As a stranger could see at a glance, mounting civilian deaths indicate anything but a desire on America’s part for reconciliation in Afghanistan.
Frank Scotton: A Case Study in Psyops
In Vietnam, officers within the “political and psychological warfare” branch of the CIA’s Special Operations Division managed low-level defector programs. In doing so, they worked with US Information Service (USIS) officers like Frank Scotton. The USIS was the overseas branch of the erstwhile US Information Agency, and specialized in the symbolic transformation of grim realities, like CIA-sanctioned drug trafficking, into happy myths that promoted the mythological American Way.
In their effort to convert the world into one big Chamber of Commerce, the CIA and USIS employed all manner of media from TV, radio and satellites to armed propaganda teams, wanted posters and selective terror. 7
As noted in the previous chapter, Scotton played a pioneering role in US political and psychological operations in Vietnam. After graduating from American University’s College of International Relations in 1961, he received a graduate assistantship to the East-West Center at the University of Hawaii. CIA officer Lucien Conein told me that Scotton was recruited into the CIA while there, although Scotton insisted that he wasn’t.
Scotton did, however, acknowledge the CIA-sponsored East-West Center’s espionage function. “It was a cover for a training program in which Southeast Asians were brought to Hawaii and trained to go back to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos to create agent nets,” he said.
Scotton told Associate Professor of History Jeff Woods about his early days in Vietnam. Here’s how Woods described what psywar expert Scotton did.
He went into the countryside alone, with a .45, a grease gun, and a bag of money. Scotton started in the central highlands arranging meetings with local officials and learning what he could about the Vietcong’s people’s war. He also met the wild group of multinational other warriors trying to pacify the highlands. In an abandoned shack near Anh Khe, he found Englishmen Dick Noone, Norman Hurbold, and a group of Malayans. Noone was especially interesting. His brother Pat had been an anthropologist in Malaya and the originator of Senoi Dream Theory, which held that the tribesmen’s collective dream world could be shaped to influence group solidarity. Dick Noone had worked in Malaya shaping the dreams of the once peaceful Orang Asli aborigines, organizing them into the Senoi Praaq, a police unit noted for its ruthless slaughter of captured Communist guerillas. Noone convinced Scotton that his biggest problem in persuading the rural Vietnamese and Montagnards to brave the jungle and kill the VC was that he had not done it himself. The American immediately took the advice to heart: “Whoever dared the vacuum, could control the vacuum”…8
Determined to earn the respect of the people he intended to recruit, the novice disappeared into the jungle, alone. He slept by day and laid ambush by night. Unsure who was VC and who was not, he let several armed, black pajama-clad Vietnamese pass by without confrontation. After a few days of this, he encountered Nai Luett, a CIA-trained special forces operative who was hunting VC in the area. Luett told Scotton in no uncertain terms that any ethnic Vietnamese he encountered on the trails in the highlands at night were VC. He then handed Scotton a World War I bayonet and told him that if he carried it, the local Montagnards would recognize it as the sign of a VC killer and an ally. Luett then disappeared back into the jungle. By the end of his first week in the vacuum, Scotton had killed more than a half dozen VC guerrillas. 9
Woods is describing Jason, the grotesque character wearing a goalie’s mask in the popular slasher movies. When I speak of psycho CIA officers, think of Scotton. Who gave him the legal authority to go off on his own and kill all these people? Can CIA-USIS officers do anything they want, from drug dealing to mass murder?
In any event, after proving his manhood the militant American Way, Scotton turned his attention to “energizing” the Vietnamese through the carefully scripted “political action” that advanced American policies at the expense of the aspirations of average Vietnamese.
In looking for people to mold into political cadres preaching the American line, Scotton turned to the CIA’s defector program, which resided under cover of the State Department’s Agency for International Development, and was named the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) program. There Scotton found the raw material needed to prove the viability of his experimental political action program.
In Pleiku Province, he worked with Captain Nguyen Tuy (a graduate of Fort Bragg’s Special Warfare Center) who commanded the Fourth Special Operations Detachment, and Tuy’s case officer, US Special Forces Captain Howard Walters. As part of their pilot program designed to induce defectors, Scotton, Walters and Tuy set up an ambush in VC territory and waited until dark. When they spotted a VC unit, Scotton yelled in Vietnamese through a bullhorn, “You are being misled! You are being lied to! We promise you an education!”
Full of purpose and allegory, he shot a flare into the night sky and hollered, “Walk toward the light!”
To his surprise, two men defected, convincing him and his CIA bosses that “a determined GVN unit could contest the VC in terms of combat and propaganda.”
Back in camp, Scotton told the defectors to divest themselves of untruths. “We said that certainly the US perpetrated war crimes, but so did the VC. We acknowledged that theirs was the stronger force, but that didn’t mean that everything they did was honorable and good and just,” Scotton said.
Scotton called his method the “motivational indoctrination” program.
Going National
In 1965, Tom Donohue, the chief of the CIA’s Covert Action branch in Saigon, recognized the value of intelligence obtained through defectors, and in 1965 he authorized the establishment of Chieu Hoi programs, based on Scotton’s motivational indoctrination method, in each of South Vietnam’s 44 provinces. In typical CIA style, there was nothing in writing, and nothing went through the central government.
CIA officers managed the Chieu Hoi program in the provinces, where the process worked as follows: upon arriving at the Chieu Hoi center, the defector was interviewed and, if he had information on the VCI, sent to the local Province Interrogation Center; if he had tactical military information, he was sent to military interrogators.
If a defector had the potential to serve in one of the RD Cadre programs, the CIA put him on a plane and sent him to its indoctrination center in Vung Tau, where he was plied with special attention and wowed with eye-popping gadgets. The training was rigorous but the defectors were treated well; they received medical care for infections, and the food was full of protein.
Next came political indoctrination, lasting from 40-60 days, depending on the individual, in which previously conscripted defectors preached the beauty of the American Way.
“They had a formal course,” said Jim Ward, the CIA officer in charge of Phoenix in the Delta (1967-1969). “They were shown movies and given lectures on democracy.”
Upon graduation, each defector was given an ID card, a meal, money, and a chance to gain redemption by killing former comrades.
The Chieu Hoi program was thought to be so promising that in June 1967, Nelson Brickham incorporated it within the Phoenix program. Brickham appreciated Chieu Hoi as “one of the few areas where police and paramilitary advisors cooperated.” He also viewed the defector program as a means for the CIA to develop “unilateral penetrations unknown to the [South Vietnamese] police.”
By 1969 the defector program was a centerpiece of “pacification” and was managed by military psyops teams (like the one that penetrated NPR), replete with posters, banners, loudspeakers mounted on trucks, and leaflets falling from the skies.
For example, on 22 January 1970, 38,000 leaflets were dropped over three villages in Go Vap District. Addressed to specific VCI cadres identified by RD teams, they read: “Since you have joined the NLF, what have you done for your family or your village and hamlet? Or have you just broken up the happiness of many families and destroyed houses and land? Some people among you have been awakened; they have deserted the Communist ranks and were received by the GVN and the people with open arms and family affection.
“You should be ready for the end if you remain in the Communist ranks. You will be dealing with difficulties bigger from day to day and will suffer serious failure when the ARVN expand strongly. You had better return to your family where you will be guaranteed safety and helped to establish a new life.”
Defects in the Program
The military, CIA and USIS were so convinced by their own propaganda that they funded TV and radio shows, and produced movies with real actors to spread the word. And from the language of scripted Phoenix reports, one would think that the Chieu Hoi program was a rollicking success. All “rallied” VC (real and imagined) were included in Phoenix neutralization statistics and by 1970 more than 100,000 were said to have been processed through 51 Chieu Hoi centers.
Many so-called defectors, however, simply regurgitated the American line in order to win amnesty. They considered defector programs as a chance for R&R. They made a quick visit to their families, enjoyed a home-cooked meal, and then returned to the war for independence.
According to AID Public Safety advisor Douglas McCollum, who monitored the Chieu Hoi program in three provinces in Vietnam, “It was the biggest hole in the net. They’d come in; we’d hold them, feed them, clothe them, get them a mat. Then we’d release them and they’d wander around the city for a while, and then disappear.”
As American war managers knew full well, genuine defectors were pariahs in Vietnam’s village-based culture. They could never go home.
The same lesson applies in Afghanistan’s tribal culture. In the 15 years of occupation, American and NATO forces are solely responsible for the deaths of thousands of innocent civilians. As a result, they have no popular support or connection to the people they wish to dominate; they can only reach the “people” through “media” like translated leaflets and bounty programs that offer rewards to traitors.
Nothing could be a clearer indication of just how detached America’s war managers are from the reality of life in Afghanistan’s villages. And while the CIA relies on leaflets and “motivational indoctrination” programs to sell itself, the Taliban go from person to person, speaking a common tongue, proving that technology is no substitute for human contact.
The tragedy is that America has no alternative to systematic brainwashing. And while brimming with the comic enthusiasm of an Amway convention or a Bible Belt religious revival, defector programs remain a serious business. Today, they are conducted secretly at high-security CIA bases in Afghanistan and Iraq and occasionally produce spectacular results.
For example, when the Bush regime was preparing the American public for the invasion of Iraq, the CIA recruited high-level defectors from the Iraqi army. Offers of Swiss bank accounts and positions of power in the liberated Iraq of the future were balanced with CIA-prepared scripts the defectors read to the US media. Two such defectors were channeled to New York Times reporter Chris Hedges, who dutifully wrote an article titled “Defectors Cite Iraqi Training for Terrorism” on 8 November 2001. The horrifying though patently untrue idea that Iraq was training terrorists to attack America had the intended effect, and public support for the pending war grew. 10
In hopes of acquiring similar sources for domestic propaganda coups, all defector debriefing reports are sent to CIA stations for analysis and possible use against the American public, which alone can be fooled. It’s a risky business, as evidenced by the Jordanian defector who turned out to be a triple agent and blew up a handful of CIA officers at FOB Chapman. But it’s the only game in town.
The United States was defeated in Vietnam for just this reason. And though packaged as a new initiative, the latest Taliban defector buyout program simply heralds a replay of the Vietnam experience in Afghanistan – nothing new in the grim world of counterinsurgency.
Chapter 8
DISRUPTING THE
ACCOMMODATION:
CIA KILLINGS
SPELL VICTORY IN
AFGHANISTAN
AND
DEFEAT IN AMERICA
Why, everyone wondered, did a suicide bomber target the CIA, knowing that
the most violent gang on earth was going to start dropping bombs and slitting
throats until its lust for revenge was satisfied? Over the course of its 70-year reign of terror, the CIA has overthrown countless governments, started innumerable wars, costing millions of innocent lives, and otherwise subverted and sabotaged friends and foes alike. Despite all this murder and mayhem, it has only lost around 100 officers.
No one is supposed to kill CIA officers. No matter how many innocent women and children they destroy, CIA officers are the Protected Few. Why would the terrorists in Afghanistan suddenly deviate from the norm and throw the whole game into chaos?
Consider the Afghan war veteran, Micah Johnson, the black American, who killed five Dallas cops in July 2016. 1 Johnson was enraged because it doesn’t matter how many black men cops kill, they are never punished. It doesn’t matter that the cops have an accommodation with the criminal underworld, or that their bosses allow their gangster informants to move drugs into black communities. Cops are members of the Universal Brotherhood of Officers. They exist above the law. The end.
Granted, the Universal Brotherhood of Officers is hard for civilians to find, let alone comprehend. It exists in the twilight zone between imagination and in reality, in Bob Kerrey’s “fog of war”, in the realm of the insulated ruling class. It is why officers of opposing formal armies have more in common with one another than they have with their own enlisted men.
Officers are trained to think of enlisted men as cannon fodder. They know when they send a bunch of foot soldiers up a hill, some of them will die. That’s why they do not fraternize.
That’s why it’s illegal for a working class individual like me to speak the name of an active duty CIA officer. It’s also why civilians can’t know the names of CIA commandos who shoot pregnant women and dig the bullets out of their corpses. The laws only apply to the little people and the defenseless.
Only Grand Pooh-Bahs like Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who leaked the name of CIA officer Valerie Plame to syndicated columnist Robert Novak back in 2003, can get away it. 2 Not only was it a felony, it was a political crime of the highest order, given that Armitage leaked Plame’s name in retaliation for her husband, Joe Wilson, a career diplomat, having disproved the Bush’s regime’s Big Lie that Saddam Hussein had obtained enough “yellow cake” to build a nuclear bomb.
This class distinction is the basis of the sacred accommodation.
It’s why the Bush Family, despite its repeated denials, had the FBI round up the Saudi “royals” and fly them out the US the day after 9/11. If anyone was a case officer to the bombers, or knew about their plans, he was among those Protected Few.
CIA officers are at the pinnacle of the Brotherhood. Blessed with fake identities and bodyguards, they fly around in private planes, live in villas, and kill with state-of-the-art technology. They tell army generals what to do. They direct Congressional committees. They assassinate heads of state and innocent children equally, with impunity, with indifference.
In Afghanistan, CIA officers manage the drug trade from their hammocks in the shade. Opium production has soared since they purchased the government in 2001. 3 They watch in amusement as addiction rates soar among young people whose parents have been killed and whose minds have been damaged by 15 years of US aggression. They don’t care that the drugs reach America’s inner cities.
CIA officers have an accommodation with the protected Afghan warlords who convert opium into heroin and sell it to the Russian mob. It’s no different than cops working with the Mafia in America; it’s an accommodation with an enemy that ensures the political security of the ruling class.
The CIA is authorized to negotiate with the enemy, but only if the channels are secure and deniable. It happened during the Iran Contra scandal, when President Reagan won the love of the American people by promising never to negotiate with terrorists, while his two-faced administration sent CIA officers to Tehran to sell missiles to the Iranians and use the money to buy guns for the drug dealing Contras.
In Afghanistan the accommodation within the drug underworld provides the CIA with a secure channel to the Taliban leadership to negotiate on simple matters like prisoner exchanges.
The exchange of British journalist Peter Moore for an Iraqi “insurgent” in CIA custody was an example of how the accommodation worked in Iraq. Moore was held by a Shia group allegedly allied to Iran, and his freedom depended entirely on the CIA reaching an accommodation with leaders of the Iraqi resistance. The details of such prisoner exchanges are never revealed, but always lead to secret negotiations over larger issues of strategic importance to both sides.
The criminal/espionage underworld in Afghanistan provides the intellectual space for any eventual reconciliation. There are always preliminary negotiations for a ceasefire, and in every modern American conflict that’s the CIA’s job. For the CIA has the best intelligence on family relationships in any nation where the US is operating.
CIA officer John Mason directed the Phoenix program from 1969-1971. In a 19 August 1969 New York Times article, Terrence Smith quoted Mason as saying, “Sometimes family relationships are involved. We know very well that if one of our units picks up the district chief’s brother-in-law, he’s going to be released.”
Ed Brady, an army officer detailed to the CIA and assigned to the Phoenix Directorate in Saigon, explained how the accommodation worked in Vietnam.
Brady told me how he and his Vietnamese counterpart, Colonel Tan, were lunching at a restaurant in Dalat. Casually, Tan nodded at a woman eating noodle soup and drinking coffee at the table near theirs. Colonel Tan whispered that the woman was the Viet Cong province chief’s wife. Brady, of course, wanted to grab her and use her for bait.
Colonel Tan said to Brady: “You don’t understand. You don’t live the way we live. You don’t have any family here. You’re going to go home when this operation is over. You don’t think like you’re going to live here forever. But I have a home and a family and kids that go to school. I have a wife that has to go to market, and you want me to kidnap his wife? You want me to set a trap for him and kill him when he comes in to see his wife? If we do that, what are they going to do to our wives?”
“The VC didn’t run targeted operations against [top GVN officials] either,” Brady explained. “There were set rules that you played by. If you conducted a military operation and chased them down fair and square in the jungle, that was okay. If they ambushed you on the way back from a military operation, that was fair. But to conduct these clandestine police operations and really get at the heart of things, that was kind of immoral to them. That was not cricket. And the Vietnamese were very, very leery of upsetting that.”
Obama’s dirty war in Afghanistan relies largely on immoral operations in which wives and children are used as bait to trap husbands – or are killed as a way of punishing men in the resistance. That is why CIA officers reign supreme; like Brady in Vietnam, they have no personal, religious, or social connection with the indigenous population. They are not bound by moral rules, and are free to slaughter with impunity.
The CIA plays the same role in Afghanistan that the Gestapo and SS Einsatzgruppen performed in France in World War Two – terrorizing the urban resistance and partisan bands in the countryside by targeting their friends and families. The CIA’s objective is to rip apart poor and working class families and, in the process, unravel the fabric of Afghan society, until the Afghan people accept American domination. They don’t care how long it takes, either. Afghanistan is a means to get at Russia, similar to how Nixon played the China Card in Vietnam.
And that is why CIA officers were killed in Afghanistan. The Taliban have no reason to negotiate a settlement. They know history, and that the racist elites in America will never accommodate them.
As I said in 2010, the CIA is utterly predictable. I said it would invoke the symbolic “100-1 Rule” made famous by the Gestapo, and go on a killing spree, killing 100 Afghanis for every CIA officer killed, until its lust for vengeance was satisfied.
2010 was indeed the deadliest year for civilians in Afghanistan since 2001. In 2013, the rate was still rising and included an “alarming increase in women and children casualties” which reflected “the changing dynamics of the conflict over the year…which was increasingly being waged in civilian communities and populated areas,” the United Nations said. 4
The statistics are skewed to blame civilian deaths on the Taliban, but even the US military acknowledges the steady increase. As of June 2016, “Afghans feel less secure than at any recent time, a new Pentagon report says, as Afghan battlefield deaths continue to escalate and civilian casualties hit a record high.” 5
“Perceptions of security remain near all-time lows,” the report said, adding that “Only 20 percent of Afghans surveyed in March called security good. That is a drop from 39 percent a year earlier. In the latest polling, 42 percent of Afghans said security is worse now than during the time of the Taliban, which ruled the country from 1996 to late 2001 when U.S. troops invaded to eliminate an al-Qaida sanctuary. The report called the 42 percent figure a historic high.”
The Afghan people hate the Americans more and more, year after year. And that makes the CIA happy, in so far as it spells protracted war and increased profits for its sponsors in the arms industry.
Afghan anger means more resistance. And more resistance provides a neat pretext for the eternal military occupation of a disposable nation strategically located near Russia and China.
The Taliban will never surrender and, for the CIA, that means victory in Afghanistan.
But it also means spiritual defeat for America, as it descends ever further into the black hole of self-deception, militarism, and covert operations.
next
THE CIA IN UKRAINE
Notes
Chapter 7
1 Elisabeth Bumiller, “Gates Says Taliban Must Take Legitimate Afghan Role”, International New York Times, 22 January 2010.
2 Kristen Chick, “General McChrystal: Taliban could be part of solution in Afghanistan”, Christian Science Monitor, 25 January 2010.
3 “No decision yet on offer of talks: Taliban”, The Jakarta Post, 30 January 2010.
4 See Douglas Valentine, “The Afghan ‘Dirty War’ Escalates”.
5 Rod Nordland, “Lacking Money and Leadership, Push for Taliban Defectors Stalls”, International New York Times, 6 September 2010.
6 . <http://www.af.undp.org/content/afghanistan/en/home/operations/projects/crisis_prevention_and_recovery/aprp
9 Ibid.
1 comment:
Re: https://exploringrealhistory.blogspot.com/2019/09/part-4-cia-as-organized-crimevietnam.html
It is too bad this writing cannot be made mandatory for all to read. Furthermore, wish it were only the ‘cia’ that plays-this-role, whether Vietnam, Afghanistan, elsewhere, or in America’s heartland… the masses are maneuvered into this compromise by no less than mass media, schools, colleges, advertising, publishers, Hollywood, courts, sports, & even the internet to be the sacrificial slaves of those who have been allowed and yes, welcomed to rule & be ‘our Representatives.’ This same game dates back further than the then elite conducting the Opium Wars. More recent it was Attorney General Eric Holder’s ‘fast & furious’ enriching both gang warfare working hand-in-hand with two-party government against all classes of Americans.
These psychological warfare programs are ongoing, and these chapters only give a small glimpse as to its extent!
If only the masses would come to realize this psycho program winning is only due to a direct proportion of people not accepting that the mass media programmers are only following a well-paid job/script, and none of this would continue if it wasn’t for this 100% believability portrayal of a fake/false reality.
The Programmers don’t even believe the shit they tell; they just do it to maintain their comfort style & continue The System---the [Wall Street & all of the bankrupted Roman] Empire!
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