Back Door to War
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy
1933-1941
by
CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL
II
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy
1933-1941
by
CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL
II
The Far East in Ferment
a. A Triple Offensive Is
Launched against ]apan
WHILE the Roosevelt Administration was putting its diplomatic house
in order with reference to Nazi Germany, the situation in the Far East
constantly threatened to get out of hand. The heritage of the Stimson
policy was an unfortunate one. But the policy of pressure upon Japan
antedated Stimson some two decades. Dollar diplomacy under Taft
challenged Japan's position in Manchuria, and under Woodrow Wilson a three-pronged offensive was launched against Nippon. The first
phase of this offensive began when Japan presented to China in January 1915 the famous Twenty-One Demands. In connection with these
demands the American Minister at Peking, Paul Reinsch, sent to the
Department of State a series of dispatches so critical in tone that they
helped to create in American minds a fixation of Japanese wickedness
that made eventual war a probability.1
This probability was increased
when Secretary Bryan (May 11, 1915) sent to Tokyo a nonrecognition
note that was later exhumed from the old files of State Department
correspondence by Secretary Stimson and fashioned into a hand grenade
that shattered all hope of peaceful relations between Japan and the
United States.
In 1917, when America intervened in World War I, the single-track
mind of President Wilson was directed towards Europe. Japan suddenly became our little brown brother in a crusade against the sinister
designs of the Central Powers. She was to be courted instead of criticized and her help to the Allies could be paid in terms of a new understanding of Japan's special position in North China. Britain, France,
and Russia had already in the early months of 1917 signed secret treaties with Japan which pledged their support of her claims to the retention of the German rights in Shantung and the German islands north
of the equator.2
When America entered the war Balfour paid a visit to
Washington and informed both President Wilson and Secretary Lansing of the terms of the secret treaties.3
As Professor Griswold sagely
remarked: "It is hard to escape the conclusion that those treaties relating to Shantung were among Balfour's revelations."4
As a matter
of fact, Lansing, in his Diary, frankly admits that he knew the terms
of the secret treaty between Britain and Japan: "The problem of the
final disposition of Germany's colonial possessions should be considered as unsettled. .. . In the case of the Pacific islands I learned last
summer that Japan and Great Britain have a secret agreement by which
Japan shall retain after the war the German territories north of the
equator."5
On November 2, 1917, Lansing and Viscount Ishii signed the well known Lansing-Ishii Agreement which specifically stated that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and consequently, the Government of the United States recognizes that Japan
has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." With reference to this agreement, Professor
Griswold makes the following comment:
Established diplomatic usage has endowed the phrase "special interests" with
political as well as economic connotations The situation in world politics
at the time the agreement was being negotiated was such as to suggest that
Lansing realized the political character of his concession and concealed it.
. . . The fact is, Lansing knew of the existence of the secret treaties, with
which his phrase was pale in comparison and which rendered fantastic the
expectations implicit in the rest of the agreement.... Given Lansing's knowledge of the Allied commitments to Japan, even the phrase "special interests"
implied at least tentative recognition of them.6
When one keeps these facts in mind, it is evident that the policy of
the President at Paris was a most dubious one. During the sessions of
the Peace Conference he led a determined assault upon the Japanese
position in Shantung in the face of his acquiescence in the secret treaty
that bound Britain to support the Japanese claims to economic domination of that province. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement had formally
recorded this acquiescence. Wilson's action, therefore, and his subsequent denial of any knowledge of the secret treaties must have convinced Japanese statesmen that he was implementing the maxims of
Machiavelli.
Another aspect of the President's offensive against Japan had to do
with Allied intervention in Siberia in 1918. During the spring of that
year the Allied governments kept urging the United States to consent
to a proposal to have Japan send an expeditionary force into Siberia as
"a mandatory of the Powers." On March 19, Lansing opposed this intervention rn a strong memorandum: "In view of the almost certain
hostility of the Russian people to Japanese occupation of Siberia and
the pro-German sentiment which would result .. . it would seem unwise and inexpedient to support the request for Japanese intervention."7
On April 10, Lansing states in another memorandum that "I
am entirely responsible for the present policy which is opposed to intervention by the Japanese in a mandatory capacity."8
Two months later
Lansing continues to remark: "It would be a grave error for Japan to
send an expedition alone. I feel that it ought not to be permitted if it
can be prevented."9
It was soon apparent, however, that it would be necessary to send
some type of expeditionary force into Siberia to co-operate with Czechoslovak troops who were making their way to Vladivostok. Inasmuch as
Japan was close to that port it was obvious that she should be asked to
contribute a considerable number of troops. On July 6 an important
conference was held at the White House with the President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, General
March, and Admiral Benson in attendance. After a detailed discussion
of the situation in the Far East it was decided that a "military force"
should be assembled at Vladivostok composed of "approximately 7,000
Americans and 7,000 Japanese to guard the line of communication of
the Czecho-Slovaks proceeding toward Irkutsk."10
On the same day Colonel House had a conversation with Viscount
Ishii with regard to the Siberian situation. At the close of this conference House wrote a letter to President Wilson in which he made the
following comment: "It has been my opinion for a long time that unless
Japan was treated with more consideration regarding the right of her
citizens to expand in nearby Asiatic undeveloped countries, she would
have to be reckoned with—and rightly so."11
As a result of numerous conferences dealing with the Far East it was finally decided to send General William S. Graves with a small army
(9,014 officers and men) to Siberia to co-operate with an Allied expeditionary force. The duties assigned to this force were to assist the
Czechs, help steady genuine Russian efforts at self-government and self defense, and to guard Allied military stores. The force under Graves
stayed in Siberia from August 1918 until April 1920. Its sole achievement was to save the maritime provinces of Siberia for the ruthless rule
of Red Russia.12
The third thrust of the Wilson offensive against Japan took the form
of financial pressure. During the Taft Administration certain American
banks were high-pressured into participating in the Chinese Hukuang
Railways loan. This action meant American membership in a fourpower banking consortium. The status of this participation was carefully defined in the agreements of November 10, 1910, and May 20,
1911.13
In 1912 (June 18-20) Japan and Russia joined this banking
group making it a six-power consortium. But American bankers were
"disgruntled" that they were "not yet in a position to make any profit
out of their endeavors." They made it clear to the Wilson Administration in the early days of March 1913 that they would not be satisfied
with the "mere approval" of the Department of State. As a necessary
condition "to their staying in the business with China they must be
asked to do so by the American Government."14
Instead of extending
this invitation, President Wilson favored American abstention from
the consortium on the ground that concerted banking pressure "might
conceivably go to the length in some unhappy contingency of forcible
interference in the financial, and even the political affairs of the great
oriental State [China]."15
The outbreak of the World War eliminated Germany and Russia
from the consortium, and Britain and France were so heavily burdened
by the costs of war that they were unable to extend any loans to China.
Japan quickly moved into this financial vacuum and loaned to China
more than 320,000,000 yen.16
The political implications of these
loans were so evident that the British and French governments intimated to the Department of State that it would be advisable for the United States to re-enter the consortium.17
Secretary Lansing countered
with an important suggestion. In a letter to President Wilson he outlined the financial straits of China and then remarked that, "in view
of the present circumstances and of the situation in China," it was
probably wise to organize a new four-power banking consortium.18
On
the following day the President approved this suggestion with the proviso that care should be taken to prevent the possibility of any "unconscionable arrangements" like some of the ones that had been contemplated under the terms of the former consortium.19
On June 22, Secretary Lansing invited the representatives of important banking groups to discuss with him the formation of a new consortium. They promptly accepted this invitation and on October 8 the
Department of State formally outlined to the governments of Britain,
France, and Japan a detailed proposal for a new consortium.20
On
March 17,1919,21
the British Government accepted the American proposal, but France and Japan delayed favorable action. The Japanese
press was opposed to the new consortium on the ground that it would
mean the loss by Japan of the "fruits she had amassed" in the past few
years.22
The Japanese Government entertained similar fears and Mr.
Odagiri, the Japanese financial representative at Paris, was instructed
to inform Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, chief American financial representative, that "all rights and options held by Japan in the regions of
Manchuria and Mongolia, where Japan has special interests, should be
excluded from the arrangement."23
Lamont immediately informed Odagiri that any attempt to exclude
Manchuria and Mongolia from the scope of the new consortium would
be "inadmissible."24
He also wrote to J. P. Morgan and Company and
expressed the opinion that there was no hope that Japan would recede
from her position unless "the United States and Great Britain will assume a very rigorous position in the matter."25
From Peking the
American Minister warned that the Japanese were playing their "usual
game" of deceit. Probably "you are being assured that they are favorable to the consortium and will join it in due course. Meanwhile influence is exerted to stir up the Chinese against it."26
In order to exert pressure upon the Japanese Government the Department of State toyed with the idea of a three-power consortium, but
Britain and France were opposed to such a move.27
Undue pressure
upon Japan might propel her into an alliance with Germany.28
In an endeavor to explain their desire to exclude Manchuria and
Mongolia from the scope of this proposed consortium, the Japanese
Government pointed out that those regions were of vital interest from
the viewpoint of national defense. Recent developments in Russia were a matter of "grave concern." The situation in Siberia might take a sudden turn that would threaten "the safety of Japan," and ultimately all
eastern Asia might become the victim of the "sinister activities of extremist forces."29
Secretary Lansing could understand this Japanese fear of the onward
tide of bolshevism. With reference to Japan's desire to station adequate
forces in Siberia for the purpose of checking that tide he made the following comment in his diary:
My belief is that they [the Japanese] will send reinforcements to Siberia and
attempt to strengthen Seminoff's force of White Russians. I cannot see
how the Japanese Government can adopt any other policy in view of the very
real peril to Japan if the Bolsheviks should gain a foothold in Manchuria and
cooperate with the Korean revolutionists. Certainly in the circumstances we
ought not to raise any objection to Japan sending a sufficient force to check
the Bolshevik advance, for the spread of Bolshevism in the Far East would
be a dreadful menace to civilization.30
During the very months while the consortium negotiations were going on, Lansing made another illuminating entry in his diary:
I have little patience with these people who are forever on the verge of
hysterics about the deep and wicked schemes of Japan. They imagine some of the most preposterous things and report them as facts. I would be inclined
to think that some of these enemies of Japan were mentally unbalanced but
for their sanity on all other subjects. Unfortunately, they are listened to by
many Americans whose reason ought to warn them against believing such
tales without better evidence.31
Ambassador Morris, in Tokyo, joined with Secretary Lansing in
lending a sympathetic ear to Japanese representations concerning their
need to build strong bastions of defense in North China. He believed
that the "strong, fundamental, tenacious purpose" of the Japanese Government was to assure protection of their lines of communication with
sources of raw materials and foodstuffs. America should give "consideration" to the Japanese viewpoint: "Unless we do so the likelihood of
solving the existing problems is scant."32
Financiers talk more abruptly than diplomats. Mr. Lamont thought
that it would be
poor policy to give the Japanese Government any further leeway in this matter.
In my judgment they ought to be down on their knees in gratitude to the
American, British and French groups for inviting the Japanese group to become a partner and for being so patient in the matter. My associates and I
are agreed that the best thing is to bring them up with a round turn and if
they do not like it, let them go their way.33
The Department of State swung round to the viewpoint of Mr. Lamont and the British Foreign Office did the same. In the face of this
pressure the Japanese Government made some concessions and the new
consortium agreement was finally signed on October 15, 1920.34
The
number of exceptions that Japan insisted upon were significant and
this fact made the Chinese Government lukewarm in its attitude towards the consortium. In January 1921 the Chinese Foreign Office was
notified of the new consortium agreement but no answer to this notification was ever sent from Peiping. In his Preliminary Report on the New
Consortium for China, Mr. Lamont spoke in his usual blunt fashion:
If ... the leading Powers, under whose approval the New Consortium has
been organized, should make to the present Peking Government, to the
Southern Government and to all factions in China including the Tuchuns,
strong diplomatic representations stating that all this nonsense of an opera
bouffe warfare must be dropped and the Government must get down to
business, I am inclined to believe that the result would be surprising in its
effectiveness.35
But the four powers represented in the new consortium were not
inclined to accept the forthright advice of Mr. Lamont. They were content to remain on the sidelines while rival factions in China feverishly
undermined the national structure. If Mr. Lamont's bold words had
been implemented by some form of effective intervention there may
have been some chance for Chinese salvation, but the consortium Powers merely waited for opportunities that never came. Shunned by the
rapidly changing governments in China, the consortium accomplished
nothing. Nationalist China rejected with hot contempt any thought of
surrendering the slightest portion of her sovereignty to international
bankers. Moreover, a powerful communist leaven was busily working
in China, and the most powerful leader in turbulent Canton was Sun
Yat-sen who had a strong leftist inclination. The Kremlin lost no time
in exploiting this inclination.
b. Sun Yat-sen Gives the
Chinese Revolution a Red Tinge
When the Washington Conference (1921-22) refused to accept the
program presented by the Chinese delegation, a feeling of deep resentment became manifest in many parts of China. The political division
between the north and the south did not mean that Canton and Peking
had different viewpoints relative to the demands that should be pressed
upon the powers. There was a common denominator of hostility towards America and Europe that could be used by skillful statesmen to
solve the problem of Chinese disunity. Moscow quickly perceived this
fact and sent able agents to exploit the situation for Russian benefit. In
August 1922, Adolf Joffe was dispatched to China with instructions
to cultivate intimate relations with the intellectuals and to thunder
against the "capitalistic Powers" and the "imperialistic nations." He
pledged Russian assistance whenever China thought that the moment
had arrived to get rid of "foreign imperialism."36 Joffe met Sun Yatsen in Shanghai in January 1923 and soon had the credulous Chinaman in his control.37
It was a part of the Soviet technique to blame China's
woes upon the wickedness of Western imperialism. Sun Yat-sen quickly
learned this lesson and on July 22, 1923, during an interview with
Fletcher S. Brockman, he vehemently denounced the ways of the
West.38
Joffe's propaganda was seconded by another astute communist agent,
Mikhail Borodin, who arrived in Canton in October 1923. His keen
intellect compensated for his unprepossessing personal appearance, and
his career as a communist agitator in Scotland and as a teacher in a commercial college in Chicago had given him an insight into Western
habitudes of thought. In China he was intent upon increasing the authority of Sun Yat-sen by converting the unwieldy Kuomintang into
an effective and centralized political machine. Party membership would
be a restricted privilege and party discipline would be rigidly enforced.
The real reins of authority would be in the hands of the Central Executive Committee which would organize and control the national government.
The creed of Sun Yat-sen and his circle of followers was given
inflammatory expression in the "Declaration of the First National
Congress" issued in January 1924. It read like a real Muscovite memorandum. Armed plundering and shameless exploitation by foreign
imperialistic nations had reduced China to a semicolonial status. The
main instruments of subjection had been the unequal treaties, foreign
control of the customs, the practice of extraterritoriality, and the division of China into spheres of influence. All these special privileges
would have to be abandoned and the unequal treaties abrogated.39
With the aid of Russian rubles and Russian military instructors Sun
Yat-sen established the Whampoa Military Academy for the training
of officers to lead his projected army. As a first step in this direction
he created "Labor bands" that crushed in a ruthless manner the merchant volunteer organizations in Canton. From Russia he learned that
proletarian reforms move faster when they ride on the wings of bullets.
His debt to his Soviet masters he freely acknowledged in the fulsome
phraseology of ardent converts to communism: "Russia believes in
benevolence and righteousness, not in force and utilitarianism. She is an exponent of justice and does not believe in the principle that a minority should oppress a majority."40
This flamboyant expression of faith in Moscow did not prevent Soviet agents from having relations with Peking. Their activities in the
North led to the treaty of May 31, 1924, in which Russia renounced
the special rights and privileges enjoyed in China by the Czarist Government, including Russia's share of the Boxer indemnity and the right
of extraterritoriality.41
But this treaty of May 1924 with Peking was merely an empty gesture. While representatives of Moscow were negotiating a treaty with
Peking, other agents were grooming Sun Yat-sen for an invasion of the
North. Borodin was feverishly pushing plans for a unification of China
through the armed forces of the Kuomintang. Red Russia and Red
China would soon be able to face the Western powers and compel compliance with their demands. This close association between Borodin
and Kuomintang leaders was clearly indicated in Sun Yat-sen's "Message to Soviet Russia," written shortly before Sun's death:
"I leave
behind me a Party which, as I always hoped, will be bound up with
you [Soviet Russia] in the historic work of the final liberations of
China and other exploited countries from the yoke of imperialism. . . .
Therefore I charge the Kuomintang to continue the work of the revolutionary nationalist movement so that China ... shall become free. With
this object I have instructed the Party to be in constant contact with
you."42
After the death of Sun Yat-sen on March 12, 1925, the influence of
Borodin increased to a point where he largely directed the course of
the revolutionary movement in South China. In September 1925 he
inspired a coup which placed Chiang Kai-shek in command of the
Kuomintang military forces. In 1923, Chiang had been sent to Moscow
to study bolshevist ideology and revolutionary techniques. He had returned to China as a protege of Sun Yat-sen and later was a close associate of Borodin. This meant that in 1925 he was both antiforeign
and anti-Christian. During 1926-27 as the Kuomintang armed forces
moved northward, this anti-Christian inclination became more manifest in Nationalist attacks upon Christian institutions and converts.
Missionaries were denounced as "imperialists" while their converts
were cursed as the "running dogs of the imperialists."43
This language
of vituperation was the specialty of Eugene Ch'en, the Soviet-Kuomintang Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose active tongue never tired of
flaying foreigners.
The tinder of resentment at foreign privileges in China was ignited
into flames by the communist-incited Shanghai Incident, May 30, 1925.
This was precipitated by student agitators who entered the International
Settlement to file a protest against the alleged harsh treatment of Chinese employees in Japanese mills. When the mob got out of hand it was
fired upon by Sikh and Chinese constables under the orders of the police
inspector at the Louza Station. The small number of casualties indicated
the restraint of the police, but communist elements magnified the incident into major proportions.
The background of the incident was sketched by the American consul at Nanking in a dispatch to Secretary Kellogg:
A few weeks prior to the incident of May 30th an American college professor, who had just completed a tour in Russia, delivered a series of lectures
in Nanking upon Bolshevism in which he pictured Communism in the most
roseate hues and virtually stated that while the system has as yet not been
perfected, it gives evidence of being the most ideal from an economic and
social standpoint that has yet been evolved by the human race. .. . As he was
introduced under American missionary auspices and gave many lectures to,
and had conferences with, numerous Chinese, his pronouncements had a very
unfortunate effect.
In his final pronouncement on the causes of the May 30th incident,
Consul Davis remarks: "The present movement is believed to have
been directly and deliberately caused by Soviet Russia fanning into
flame the smoldering embers of antiforeign feeling in China, which,
but for their nefarious activity, would in all probability have gradually
tended to become more and more quiescent."44
In London the financial circles were alarmed at this outbreak of violence and Sir Charles Addis, who was the head of the British group of
the Chinese consortium, thought that "immediate concerted action by
the Powers" was "imperative."45
Mr. Lamont was not so positive in
writing a prescription for the occasion. He assured the representative
of the Morgan interests in London that he had been maintaining "fairly close contact with Washington" but he had made no "specific suggestions, for while we agree that the situation is grave, we do not feel
competent to indicate a way out."46
c. Senator Borah Attacks
Foreign Imperialism in China
Close students of Far Eastern affairs were just as hesitant as Mr. Lamont
in writing and recommending broad prescriptions that would fit every
contingency in China. Thomas F. Millard, who had served for a while
as an adviser to the Chinese Foreign Office, was fearful that the Chinese
radicals were pushing things too fast. In a letter to W. W. Yen he outlined his viewpoint:
I arrived in China in December and at once began to study the situation. I
had hoped before leaving America that the reorganization at Peking which
followed the coup d'etat of last autumn would provide a chance for something constructive to be done; but after I was out here a while I perceived
that was not the case.... Now it appears that political tendencies in China are
toward something like an estrangement with America, whereby all that was
accomplished at Washington will be lost, and perhaps the American Government will be forced by circumstances to alter its China policy in some particulars. .. . I am somewhat puzzled as to what China's intellectual men are
thinking of—where do you think you are going ? .. . I find that many Chinese
intelligentsia seem to have gone over to the idea of abrogating the special
position (extraterritorial) treaties by ultimatum, hoping to "get away" with
it as Turkey did. .. . I ask you men who ought to be able to see a little ahead
to ponder the situation. If you repudiate of course you need not be concerned
about your credit, for that will absolutely vanish with such action. But if you
intend to try to stay inside the ring of responsible governments you require
considerable financial help from abroad. Where can that be obtained now ?
Only in one place—America.47
Mr. Millard then wrote to Senator Borah and advised him against
supporting the idea of abolishing at once extraterritorial rights in
China. He felt that China was
now
unprepared for this change, and it is almost certain that a sudden transition will add to the existing confusion. .. . It is doubtful now if the radical
elements here will be willing to stop short of complete and immediate abrogation: they are smart enough to know that just now they have the Powers
by the short hair.... The present diplomatic body at Peking is almost pitiable
in its bewilderment and fatuity.48
Borah wrote back that he was merely in favor of "relinquishing extraterritorial rights in China as soon as practicable. .. . I realized,
and realize now, that this cannot be accomplished outright and over
night."49
But Borah was fundamentally opposed to foreign imperialism
in China and he embraced every opportunity to denounce it. When the
Hankow Chamber of Commerce cabled to the Department of State that
the Moscow Third International was "admittedly concentrating in the
East with a view to creating chaos," he vehemently expressed the opinion that the trouble in China stemmed from Western imperialism: "The
American Chamber of Commerce in China is a part of the imperialistic
combine which would oppress and exploit the Chinese people."50
On August 21, Secretary Kellogg wrote to Senator Borah and reviewed the background of the May 30th incident in a competent and
comprehensive manner. In conclusion he observed: "The shooting was,
of course, a very unfortunate affair. It is impossible for me to say at
this distance exactly where the responsibility lies. It was not, of course,
entirely on the police authorities as, undoubtedly, the mob was bent
on mischief."51
Borah sharply dissented from this view: "From the
facts which have been presented to me, I feel the shooting cannot in
any sense be justified. It seems to me that this whole affair was treated
at first with regret and disregard, and finally with brutality."52
While Senator Borah kept closing his eyes to the activities of Soviet
agents and continued to belabor the wicked nations of the West for the
sins of imperialism, the Shanghai Municipal Council issued a manifesto
which stated that the riot of May 30 had been inspired by students and
other "disaffected persons" who had made inflammatory speeches. At
the trial held in Shanghai the prosecution charged that the students
who had started "all this trouble all came from a Bolshevik University
—the Shanghai University of Seymour Road."53
Ferdinand L. Mayer,
the charge at the American Legation in Peking, also emphasized the
dangers of Soviet intrigues. He was confident that the situation in China
was being "exploited in every manner possible" by "the Soviets."54
On
one point all American observers were in agreement—the antiforeign movement was rapidly spreading in China and it carried implications
of grave danger to the vested interests of the Western powers.
d. Causes of the Antiforeign
Movement in China
Minister MacMurray, after a survey of the situation in China, came to
the conclusion that much of the unrest in China was produced by an
"inferiority complex" that afflicted large numbers of the intellectuals.
They are aware of the "failure they are making in the organization of
their national life and morbidly conscious of the poor showing that they
have made in the eyes of foreign nations."55
Senator Borah thought that this "inferiority complex" came from
the fact that the Western powers had imposed "unequal treaties" upon
China with special reference to extraterritoriality and tariff autonomy.
This situation should be rapidly remedied by sweeping concessions to
China. In a letter to the editor of the Baltimore Sun, August 11, 1925,
he outlined his position with vigor:
Extraterritoriality is contrary to the spirit of the age and in conflict with the
principles of sovereignty. . . . What is proposed and what is to be seriously
urged is that the foreign powers shall in good faith ... aid in bringing about
a condition wherein extraterritoriality may be abolished. These steps should
be taken at once and unmistakably. . . .
Foreign interests in China are exploiting human life ... beyond the power
of human language to portray. There is no place where the blood of helpless
children is coined into dollars and cents as in China.56
In a letter to the Foreign Minister of the Nationalist Government,
Borah expressed the opinion that the "situation in China is not due to
temporary causes but to the nationalistic feeling upon the part of China
that she is entitled to equal treatment among the nations."57
In order
to pave the way for the best expression of this nationalistic feeling,
Senator Borah thought that the American Government should adopt
an independent policy and no longer be a member of the concert of
powers:
In my opinion the objects and aims and standards of the United States on
the one hand and Great Britain and Japan upon the other are so different
and diverse that it is utterly impossible to move in accord with them and at
the same time protect our own interests and do justice to China. On the other hand, by a bold, independent course, based upon sound principles of justice
and fair dealing, the United States can mold public opinion to such an extent
as to force a reasonable policy in the Far East.58
It is difficult to estimate the influence of Borah upon the Chinese intellectuals who were making a strong fight for tariff autonomy and the
abolition of extraterritoriality. There is no doubt that many of them
read his statements with deep interest and took courage from his sharp
denunciation of the "unequal treaties." Chungting T. Wang, of the Directorate-General of Sino-Russian Negotiations, wrote to assure Borah
that the "voice of a great statesman of a great country, advocating international justice and humane principles cannot but be a tremendous encouragement in our fight to recover our lost rights."59
In a similar vein
Harry Hussey, prominent architect in Peking, sent a very appreciative
letter to Borah: "Your remarks did more than anything else to restrain
the Chinese when things looked very dangerous here in China. Until
you spoke the Chinese were desperate. . . . Your speech showed them
that they had a friend in America and this fact was so used by the conservative element that they were able to control the others."60
e. The Kuomintang Demands
Tariff Autonomy
The Shanghai Incident was merely the first of a series of antiforeign riots that broke out in China in the summer of 1925. Along with this violence the Kuomintang leaders organized a boycott against British goods which lasted from June 1925 to October 1926.61 The Governor of Hong Kong believed that a great deal of the unrest directed against the British was caused by "Bolshevik intrigue."62 It was certainly true that the left-wing element of the Kuomintang was especially active in the South at this time, and the conservatives in the party began to grow apprehensive with regard to the future in China.
In order to provide a popular basis for their drive to secure control over China, the Kuomintang leaders adopted a program whose chief items were a demand for tariff autonomy and the abolition of extraterritoriality. In 1928 the American Government concluded an agreement with China whereby tariff autonomy would go into operation on January 1, 1929. With reference to the abolition of extraterritoriality the record was one of failure and this fact added volume and violence to Chinese denunciations of Western imperialism.
f. American Missionaries Help to
Mold United States Policy
In 1925 there were nearly five thousand American Protestant missionaries living in China. The annual expenditures of American mission societies in that country was approximately $10,000,000 and the lowest estimate of mission property holdings was $43,000,000.63 It was evident that this important group of very vocal Americans had a definite influence upon the policy of the Department of State. During the Coolidge Administration, missionary opinion was strongly pro-Chinese, and numerous memorials were sent to Washington for the purpose of molding official viewpoints. The religious press was also active in this pro-Chinese campaign.
On August 20, 1925, the Christian Century deprecated the alleged fact that the Far Eastern policy of the Department of State was largely controlled by a "little coterie of professional experts." It was hoped that the Coolidge Administration would finally reject the counsel of this small band of biased experts and adopt the pro-Chinese policy of Senator Borah.64 In September the same magazine came out strongly in favor of the abolition of extraterritoriality which was the "fruit of western imperialism" and which could be maintained only by armed force.65 Rev. J. L. Stuart, president of Yenching University, gave this viewpoint immediate support.66 Soon the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and most of the large mission boards were ardently advocating action to end the ancient practice of extraterritoriality.67
This pro-Chinese missionary opinion evoked sharp criticism in some quarters. In June 1926, George Bronson Rea, the editor of the Far Eastern Review, expressed the opinion that missionary influence in America was so strong that the "selection of our Minister to Peking is determined by qualifications that meet the endorsement of missionary Boards." He was certain that these boards exerted at Washington an "influence that no President, statesman, or politician would dare to antagonize. The successful development of their plans can be attained only by maintaining a sympathetic atmosphere in America towards China, for should popular opinion . . . become hostile, it would automatically shut off the stream of voluntary contributions upon whose continuous and increasing flow depends the very existence of the movement." This missionary influence had not only been a decided detriment to American trade but it was really responsible for the antiforeign unrest that was spreading throughout China: "Every close student of Chinese affairs traces the present outburst of anti-foreign sentiment to the emotional hysteria set in movement by overzealous missionary and educational uplifters."68
Rodney Gilbert, a well-known American newspaperman in China, shared Mr. Rea's viewpoint. A change in the missionary attitude from one of friendship to one of a more critical character would quickly mean that the "tide of unspeakable drool which has been going home for a year about China's rights and aspirations" would be "abruptly stemmed in both America and England."69
g. Evolution of U.S. Policy
towards Nationalist China
As political, economic, and social conditions in China grew progressively worse after 1925, it became more difficult for pro-Chinese missionary opinion to have an important influence upon the policy of the Department of State. The political factor was particularly disturbing in the Chinese equation. When the Special Tariff Conference met in Peking on October 25, 1925, the regime of President Tuan Ch'i-jui was distinctly shaky. The Peking Government was largely controlled by Chang Tso-lin and Marshal Feng Yii-hsiang. Chang was master of Manchuria while Feng was dominant in Northwest China. But other war lords soon challenged their position when it became evident that any favorable decisions of the Special Tariff Conference would mean increased revenues for the Peking Government. Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang promptly protested against the negotiations between the powers and the "illegal" Peking Government. Chang Tso-lin was compelled to retreat to Mukden and, despite the provisions of the Boxer Protocol, communications between Peking and the sea were severed by the troops of the contesting war lords. The military situation in China, however, remained remarkably fluid. In March 1926, Chang Tso-lin joined forces with his recent bitter foe Wu P'ei-fu and soon their armies were in occupation of Peking. The President, Tuan Ch'ijui, promptly retired from office and for several months there was no semblance of a central government in China. Faced with this political uncertainty, on July 3, 1926, the Special Tariff Conference adjourned and the powers were warned by contending factions against any attempt to resume discussions.70
The minatory message from the Foreign Minister of the Canton Government was an acrid attack upon the "phantom government in Peking," which he described as the creation of "a brace of medieval militarists and a bunch of Mandarin statesboys and statescoolies."71 Two weeks later he turned his guns upon American policy because it had failed to recognize the fact that the situation in China was "revolutionary" and not "evolutionary." Remedies in China would have to be drastic. The old "unequal treaties" would have to be abrogated and new agreements negotiated which would be "consistent with the real independence and sovereignty of China."72
In reply to these blasts from the excitable and impudent Ch'en, the American Minister in Peking sent to the Department of State a long note which carefully reviewed the situation in China. Since 1918 there had been at Peking "no regime asserting an even plausible claim to being a legitimately constituted government." Nevertheless the powers had found it advantageous hitherto to grant "at least de facto recognition to each group succeeding to control of the capital and offering to carry out the obligations of the Government of China." It had obviously been worth while to deal with a "central government which we clearly understood to be a fiction," so long as it continued to be a "conservative force" which safeguarded legitimate foreign interests. But the situation in China had recently disintegrated to the point where the powers could not expect "that a conservative or even friendly influence will characterize any new regime." The Central Administration in Peking was nothing more than a "pawn used in a fantastic game being played among military rivals having no loyalties and no principles." It would be idle, therefore, to expect anything from a Special Tariff Conference. The decisions of such a conference could not be carried out by a "central administration which is and for years must be a political nonentity."
It should also be kept in mind that the Red shadow of Russia was encroaching upon North China. Marshal Feng Yii-hsiang, "freshly schooled in Moscow in revolutionary methods," might at any time return to Peking, and his first move would be to have all existing treaties with the United States and other "capitalistic Powers" canceled by "a declaration he would cause to be made." It would probably be wise for the American Government frankly to "discard the fiction that a central government exists in Peking."73
Secretary Kellogg was not inclined to accept MacMurray's suggestions that the Department of State should abandon any hope of results from a Special Tariff Conference. Moreover, he believed that it would be a mistake to issue a "public notification to China that she has no government." Such action would "bring the hostility of the Chinese people upon us and give to other nations an opportunity to lay the blame upon us for the failure of the Conference and furnish them . . . with a sought-for excuse for abandoning the Conference. . . . The action you suggest, I feel certain, would fail to be understood in the United States and would meet quite likely with disfavor."74
h. The Kuomintang Armies
Employ Red Advisers
While Secretary Kellogg and Minister MacMurray were exchanging notes with reference to American policy in China, the rapid advance of Kuomintang armies promised a profound change in the political picture in the Far East. By October 1926 the important cities of Hankow, Hanyang, and Wuchang had been captured, and in December preparations were pushed for a drive against Shanghai.
It was significant that the plan of campaign of the Kuomintang military forces had been prepared by the Bolshevik General Bliicher (called General Ga-Lin by the Chinese) and his staff. In each of the ten corps of the armies "one or more Russians held strategic positions for military or propaganda purposes." The advance of the soldiers was preceded by "plain-clothes propagandists who preached to peasants and townsmen the principles of Dr. Sun and Lenin; scattered vast quantities of placards, pamphlets, and handbills; organized the people, willing and unwilling, into peasants' and workers' unions; and set up soviet local governments."75
This Red complexion of the Kuomintang's northward thrust seemed to give the British Government little real concern. As early as February 1926 the Foreign Office appeared to be "gravitating in the direction of the early recognition of the Canton Government." MacMurray thought that this inclination was due primarily to commercial considerations. By placating the Red regime at Canton the "strike and boycott" against British goods would be "terminated."76 In September, when the British Foreign Office raised this question of recognition, Secretary Kellogg replied that the American Government was ready to enter "into relations and negotiate with any Government representing China which appears to be capable of fulfilling the obligations which it may undertake." It had no intention, however, of initiating negotiations with "individual provinces or groups of provinces."77
But Secretary Kellogg was opposed to any collective intervention to compel adherence to existing treaties. He would go no further than a formal protest to the Canton Government.80 Even this protest would have to be lukewarm because the British Government, continuing its appeasement of the Red Nationalist administration at Canton, favored the acceptance of the Kuomintang decision to collect surtaxes. Downing Street proposed that the notes from the powers should merely insist upon guarantees against any increase in the rates of taxation. This was going too far for even the pacific Department of State, which refused to adopt the British suggestion. On November 3 the American consul general at Canton was instructed to file a protest against the legality of the new surtaxes. The other Western powers promptly followed suit.81 This bold action by Canton was followed by a similar move on the part of the Peking Government, which in October 1926 informed both Belgium and Japan of its determination to demand a revision of existing treaties with those powers. On November 6, Peking announced that the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865 was abrogated.82 [The PTB, make it hard to find the text of this treaty,Wikipedia treats it as if it did not exist.hmmm DC]
To MacMurray in Peking it was evident that this procedure would be invoked against existing treaties with the United States unless in the "meantime our intention not to tolerate such treatment of our rights has been made very clear."83 MacMurray then developed the thesis that in China there were two' rival schools of thought with reference to a revision of the "unequal treaties"—one evolutionary, the other strongly revolutionary. The first school adhered to the belief that treaty revision should be carried out through joint action by China and the Western powers, and its members also thought that China should prove to the world that it was capable of bearing the responsibilities of a sovereign nation. This had been the theory upon which the Washington Conference had acted and it was the "inspiration of the Special Conference on the Tariff and of the Commission on Extraterritoriality." But the failure of China to use her "opportunities effectively," combined with the reluctance of the powers to implement the Washington treaties, had opened the way "for the Soviet's disruptive influences" with the revolutionary school of thought. China had already taken a significant step along the Russian road to repudiation of treaty obligations. Before she took another step down this dubious path it would be expedient for the United States to speak "some friendly words of warning."84
Secretary Kellogg was not disposed to direct any real threat either to Canton or Peking, with the result that the matter of surtaxes was not settled by conferences between representatives of the two governments in China and the ministers of the Western powers. The Peking Government then showed its contempt for Western thought by dismissing Sir Francis Aglen from the office of inspector-general of Customs. This action spurred MacMurray to send a cablegram to Secretary Kellogg in which he stressed the dangerous implications that lay behind this dismissal. It should be apparent that further weak protests against treaty violations would be "fruitless; and foreign commerce will henceforth have no safeguards against the arbitrary exactions of the local authorities."85
This dark prospect was not deeply disturbing to Secretary Kellogg. The Department of State had already realized the "increasing difficulty of obtaining complete recognition of the rights of United States nationals in China." Moreover, it was not possible to employ the "military and naval forces of the United States to enforce the rights guaranteed under existing treaties." The only policy for America to follow with regard to China was one of "patience and watchfulness."86
j. Britain Challenges American
Leadership in China
The Canton and Peking governments wanted more from Washington than mere patience and watchfulness. They desired effective mediation between the powers and China in the direction of large concessions relative to tariff autonomy and the abolition of extraterritoriality. The British Foreign Office perceived the direction of political winds in China and decided to engage in an experiment in diplomatic kite flying. On December 24, 1926, the British Ambassador in Washington handed to Secretary Kellogg a copy of a telegram that had been sent to the British Minister in Peking. This telegram contained a statement of principles that the British Foreign Office thought should in the future guide the policy of the Western powers in China. The first item emphasized the importance of abandoning the idea "that the economic and political development of China can be only secured under foreign tutelage and [the powers] should declare their readiness to recognize her right to the enjoyment of tariff autonomy as soon as she herself has settled and promulgated a new national tariff." After this deep bow to the irresponsible elements that then made up China, the memorandum went on to say that the powers should "expressly disclaim any intention of forcing foreign control upon an unwilling China." A final injunction was to the effect that the powers should also "modify their traditional attitude of rigid insistence on the strict letter of treaty rights."87
The Department of State was painfully surprised at this British attempt to steal the "American thunder" with regard to China,88 and it was fearful of American criticism of the failure of the Secretary to outline and follow an effective policy. MacMurray, in Peking, was caustic in his comments on the British memorandum. While it might be advisable for the powers to adopt towards China a less "querulous and petty attitude," yet the broad formula proposed by the British with regard to "condoning disregard of their obligations by the Chinese in all matters which the Powers may not unanimously consider vital, is .. . an invitation to the Chinese to carry the principle of repudiation to what ever may prove to be the limit of tolerance on the part of the Powers." But the mere fact that such radical concessions had been proposed by the nation which was still predominant in the trade of China would compel the United States to adopt a similar attitude.89
In this estimate of the situation MacMurray was soon proved to be entirely correct, for Secretary Kellogg immediately fell in line with British action. Peking was informed that the British recommendations had "formed part of the United States Government's policy for a long time." The Department of State was ready to embrace the first opportunity to "negotiate with a Government representing China for the purpose of revising the existing American treaties in the directions of relinquishing the extraterritorial privileges of Americans in China and of granting China the right to establish her own tariff rates on products of American origin."90
MacMurray begged Secretary Kellogg not to move so fast in the matter of granting important concessions to irresponsible political groups in China. Such a policy would "gain us no consideration or respect on the part of the [Chinese]. . . . Indeed it would give them courage to deprive us and other foreigners of all special privileges and ordinary rights as well."91 Kellogg rejected this wise counsel and formulated American policy in strict conformity with Chinese desires as expressed to him in daily conferences with Dr. Alfred Sze, the Chinese Minister in Washington. On January 27, 1927, he finally announced that the American Government was fully prepared to "continue the negotiations on the entire subject of the tariff and extraterritoriality" and to begin these negotiations "on behalf of the United States alone."92 Discussions were expected to be with the representatives of both the Canton and Peking governments. It was not long, however, before the success of the northern thrust of the Nationalist armies made it unnecessary to consider the desires of Peking.
k. Congress Supports a
Policy of Treaty Revision
The pro-Chinese policy of Secretary Kellogg received strong support in congressional circles. The Porter Resolution of January 1927 requested the President forthwith to enter into negotiations with the "duly accredited agents of the Republic of China" with a view to concluding treaties that would establish relations between the two countries upon an "equal and reciprocal basis." Members of both political parties favored this resolution. Mr. Connally, of Texas, expressed the opinion that the unrest in China went back "as far as the Opium War in 1842. . .. From that day until this .. . the Powers of the world have imposed their will on China."93 Mr. Carroll L. Beedy, of Maine, was equally sympathetic towards China: "I want my country to do her utmost to free China from the curse of unequal treaties and foreign misrule."94 On February 21, 1927, the resolution passed the House of Representatives by the overwhelming vote of 262 ayes to 43 nays.95 It was then sent to the Senate where it languished in a pigeonhole in the office of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
While the Porter Resolution was being debated in the House of Representatives, American press opinion in many quarters was vehemently in support of its adoption. The Baltimore Sun was especially active in pressing for immediate and favorable consideration of the resolution. The people of China had been "bullied and outraged" in every possible manner by the Western powers. The long day of oppression was now over and China would at last secure her just position among the nations of the world.96 The Washington Post thought that the only honorable course for America to follow was to "befriend the Chinese nation and deal with it as an equal."97 The New York World,98 the Louisville Courier-Journal,"99 and the Kansas City Star,100 echoed these sentiments of friendship. But the Chicago Tribune challenged these pro-Chinese attacks upon the "unequal treaties." The outcry against "foreign exploitation" of the Chinese was "largely a matter of domestic politics and a dangerous device." The Porter Resolution indicated either an "abysmal ignorance of the notorious facts of Chinese conditions" or it was a "play of cheap politics to conciliate a sentimentalism in this country which has no respect for the facts."101
The Chicago Tribune was particularly concerned over the Red tinge of the Canton Government. The Cantonese had the "closest relations with Moscow," and Americans should realize that Sun Yat-sen in his last years had been closely associated with communist agents.102 The New York Times was equally critical of Canton. Foreign domination in China was a myth except "in so far as the Cantonese are under the influence of Soviet Russia."103
l. The Nanking Incident
and Its Repercussions
As the armies of the Canton Government under Chiang Kai-shek moved northward in the spring of 1927, the antiforeign spirit that had been developing for some years broke through all barriers of restraint. On March 24, 1927, at Nanking, a major incident occurred. As some of the Nationalist soldiers passed by the American Legation, John K. Davis, the American Consul, addressed them. They replied by cursing him in the "most savage manner," and a petty officer shouted: "You are all alike.... You Americans have drunk our blood for years and become rich. We are busy now killing Fengtien soldiers but we will soon begin killing all foreigners in Nanking regardless of what country they are from."104
This threat was soon carried out. Dr. John E. Williams, the vice president of the University of Nanking, was "wantonly" shot through the head and instantly killed. Seven American missionaries arrived at the consulate with grim stories of unprovoked attacks. Consul Davis decided to lead the Americans at the consulate to the Standard Oil property known as Socony Hill where some measure of protection could be given by gunboats in the river. Shortly after they arrived at their destination, a band of Nationalist soldiers arrived and were appeased with some difficulty. Other bands opened fire upon the refugees on Socony Hill who would soon have been killed if the gunboats had not been able to protect them with a "curtain of shells." The following morning the entire group was able to board vessels waiting in the rivei and was taken to safety.
The number of foreigners killed during the Nanking Incident was six: one American, three Englishmen, one Italian, and one French priest. Ten mission buildings were burned and the residences of the missionaries were looted. The American, British, and Japanese consulates were ruined.
The American Consul at Nanking reported to the Department of State that the soldiers responsible for the attacks were "regular Kuomintang troops who were operating under orders." Minister MacMurray was "absolutely convinced" that this "campaign of terrorism and insult to foreigners was not only officially countenanced by and directed but even prearranged" by the Canton Government.105
From Tokyo came word that the outrages at Nanking were merely an item in an extended radical program designed to ruin Chiang Kai shek. The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to Ambassador MacVeagh the belief that it would be inexpedient for the powers to take "oppressive measures" against Chiang because such action would play into the hands of the "radicals among the Cantonese."106 The British Foreign Office agreed with this Japanese viewpoint. Support should be given to Chiang in the hope that he would be able to form a "nucleus of a moderate element directed against the extremist faction of the Nationalist Government." Demands for redress should first be presented to Eugene Ch'en, the leftist Minister of Foreign Relations of the Canton Government. This moVe would necessitate previous consultations among the representatives of the powers with reference to the application of sanctions against Canton.107
When the shadow of sanctions fell across the desk of Secretary Kellogg, he was instantly alarmed at the possibility of a real storm in the Far East. His first reaction was to instruct MacMurray that the Department of State was not in favor of applying "drastic sanctions to the Nationalists."108 He would go only so far as to present to Ch'en identic notes of protest from the American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese governments concerning the outrages committed in Nanking. These notes were finally presented simultaneously on April 11 by the consuls of the five powers at Hankow. In the event that the "Nationalist Authorities" failed to "comply promptly" with these terms, the powers would find themselves compelled to take "such measures" as they considered "appropriate."109
When the powers agreed that the replies of Eugene Ch'en were not "satisfactory," the question of sanctions once more came to the front. Secretary Kellogg recoiled before such a suggestion and anxiously sought some alternative. The Japanese Foreign Office supplied one by asserting a belief that the time was ripe for promoting a split between Chiang Kai-shek and the belligerent Eugene Ch'en. Kellogg quickly grasped this diplomatic lifesaver and announced that the best policy to follow would be to let "Eugene Ch'en's note remain unanswered and await developments." No action should be taken that would embarrass Chiang.110
MacMurray hoped that these fears of the Department of State would not lead to any break in the collective policy of applying pressure upon the Canton Government. If America withdrew from the concert of powers, the inevitable result would be a new Anglo-Japanese alliance which would dominate the situation in the Far East.111 Kellogg replied that he had not decided to "withdraw entirely" from co-operation with the powers in the matter of dealing with the Nationalist Government. The Department of State would still honor the commitments made at the Washington Conference concerning extraterritoriality and the revision of the Chinese tariff, but it would also insist upon a policy of "moderate action" in China. The time had passed when foreign countries could "take over Chinese territory or maintain by force special spheres of influence in trade."112
When the representatives of the powers in Peking prepared a memorandum which still voiced acceptance of the "principle of sanctions" in connection with the proposed policy to be followed in China, Secretary Kellogg lectured them upon the folly of considering the employment of force to compel the Canton Government to agree upon reparations. America was opposed to "drastic action" and would not even go as far as joining with the powers in the presentation of another identic note to Eugene Ch'en.113
In the face of this American policy of inaction the plans of the powers for vigorous action against the Nationalist Government quickly collapsed. This was the signal for Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 to break with the communist elements in the Kuomintang and to lay plans for the establishment of a more conservative government that would be more favorably regarded by the Western powers.
m. Secretary Kellogg Is Indifferent
to Red Menace in China
Until April 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek rejected the leadership of Mikhail Borodin and other communist leaders, the Nationalist Party in China had been following a line laid down by Moscow. This was apparent to seasoned observers in the Far East, but President Coolidge and the Department of State appeared indifferent to the communist menace. The President himself continued to sound the note of friendship towards China no matter what complexion the leading faction assumed. On April 25, 1927, at a dinner of the United Press Association, he insisted that his Administration did not "wish to pursue any course of aggression against the Chinese people." Ultimately the turmoil in China would "quiet down and some form of authority will emerge which will no doubt be prepared to make adequate settlement for any wrongs we have suffered."114
This "Pollyanna" attitude was distinctly distasteful to American businessmen in Chinese treaty ports. In April 1927, the American Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai issued a statement that called attention to the union of Chinese nationalism and Russian communism:
Militarism, brigandage and Bolshevism have destroyed all semblance of law and order throughout the greater part of China. . . . We believe that immediate concerted action by the Powers to restore a condition of security for foreign lives and property in all treaty ports . . . will have a far-reaching influence throughout China to the ultimate benefit of the Chinese people.115
Rodney Gilbert agreed with the views of the American Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai and lamented the fact that the Coolidge Administration had abandoned the policy of collective pressure upon China. Writing from Peking he remarked: "This whole community, official as well as commercial, is disgusted and discouraged beyond expression."116
In October 1927, George Bronson Rea, in a speech before the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, presented the specter of bolshevism stalking through large parts of China: "If we admit that Soviet Russia has a right to intervene in the internal affairs of China and use the Chinese armies .. . to carry forward its warfare against the interests of other Powers, then the Powers .. . have the same right to intervene in the internal affairs of China for the protection of their interests."117
The American Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai was confident that the Chinese Nationalist movement had been "Soviet-managed and engineered."118 The same opinion was expressed by the North China Herald in its special supplement entitled China in Chaos: "Whoever calls for negotiations [between the Powers and China] calls forward self-appointed representatives who are the notorious wreckers and looters of this wretched land, while immediately behind them stand the Bolshevist agitators."119
Because of Chiang's bolshevist background, the North China Herald was deeply suspicious of his break (April 1927) with the Communists :
Those foreigners who see in the revolt against Soviet dictation or in the ruthless suppression of Communist labor groups, evidence of a sincere change of heart... are blind to the fundamental motives behind these changes. Neither in the forwarding of the Bolshevist program nor in the revolt against it have we ever been able to see anything but cold, calculating hypocrisy.120
But these charges of hypocrisy against Chiang Kai-shek received little support in the United States. The Coolidge Administration was determined to believe the best of him and in the spring of 1928 it was ready to recognize his government. On March 30, 1928, by an exchange of notes, the Nanking Incident was settled. The next step would be formal recognition. MacMurray warned the Department of State against such a move: "As to the probability of establishment by the Nationalists of a responsible government, in the sense of having a serious capability of fulfilling its responsibilities, domestic and international, it is my opinion that this is extremely problematical, nor do I expect it within any predictable future."121
Secretary Kellogg seldom paid any attention to the advice of Minister MacMurray. In this case he merely moved ahead and on July 25, 1928, he concluded a treaty with the government of Chiang Kai-shek in which definite provision was made for Chinese tariff autonomy.122 When MacMurray requested instructions concerning the status of Chiang's Government, Secretary Kellogg promptly informed him that the "signing of the treaty of July 25 with representatives of the Nationalist Government constitutes technically recognition of that Government and ratification by the Senate is not necessary to give effect to the recognition."123
The bitter struggle to achieve Chinese unification and to secure the recognition of the Nationalist Government by the Western powers had won apparent success. But the Red leaven that Chiang himself had planted deep in the heart of the Chinese political loaf never ceased its work of fermentation. In the end it would destroy not only Chiang but all China.
next
Continued Friction with Japan Points towards Inevitable War
Tariff Autonomy
The Shanghai Incident was merely the first of a series of antiforeign riots that broke out in China in the summer of 1925. Along with this violence the Kuomintang leaders organized a boycott against British goods which lasted from June 1925 to October 1926.61 The Governor of Hong Kong believed that a great deal of the unrest directed against the British was caused by "Bolshevik intrigue."62 It was certainly true that the left-wing element of the Kuomintang was especially active in the South at this time, and the conservatives in the party began to grow apprehensive with regard to the future in China.
In order to provide a popular basis for their drive to secure control over China, the Kuomintang leaders adopted a program whose chief items were a demand for tariff autonomy and the abolition of extraterritoriality. In 1928 the American Government concluded an agreement with China whereby tariff autonomy would go into operation on January 1, 1929. With reference to the abolition of extraterritoriality the record was one of failure and this fact added volume and violence to Chinese denunciations of Western imperialism.
f. American Missionaries Help to
Mold United States Policy
In 1925 there were nearly five thousand American Protestant missionaries living in China. The annual expenditures of American mission societies in that country was approximately $10,000,000 and the lowest estimate of mission property holdings was $43,000,000.63 It was evident that this important group of very vocal Americans had a definite influence upon the policy of the Department of State. During the Coolidge Administration, missionary opinion was strongly pro-Chinese, and numerous memorials were sent to Washington for the purpose of molding official viewpoints. The religious press was also active in this pro-Chinese campaign.
On August 20, 1925, the Christian Century deprecated the alleged fact that the Far Eastern policy of the Department of State was largely controlled by a "little coterie of professional experts." It was hoped that the Coolidge Administration would finally reject the counsel of this small band of biased experts and adopt the pro-Chinese policy of Senator Borah.64 In September the same magazine came out strongly in favor of the abolition of extraterritoriality which was the "fruit of western imperialism" and which could be maintained only by armed force.65 Rev. J. L. Stuart, president of Yenching University, gave this viewpoint immediate support.66 Soon the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America and most of the large mission boards were ardently advocating action to end the ancient practice of extraterritoriality.67
This pro-Chinese missionary opinion evoked sharp criticism in some quarters. In June 1926, George Bronson Rea, the editor of the Far Eastern Review, expressed the opinion that missionary influence in America was so strong that the "selection of our Minister to Peking is determined by qualifications that meet the endorsement of missionary Boards." He was certain that these boards exerted at Washington an "influence that no President, statesman, or politician would dare to antagonize. The successful development of their plans can be attained only by maintaining a sympathetic atmosphere in America towards China, for should popular opinion . . . become hostile, it would automatically shut off the stream of voluntary contributions upon whose continuous and increasing flow depends the very existence of the movement." This missionary influence had not only been a decided detriment to American trade but it was really responsible for the antiforeign unrest that was spreading throughout China: "Every close student of Chinese affairs traces the present outburst of anti-foreign sentiment to the emotional hysteria set in movement by overzealous missionary and educational uplifters."68
Rodney Gilbert, a well-known American newspaperman in China, shared Mr. Rea's viewpoint. A change in the missionary attitude from one of friendship to one of a more critical character would quickly mean that the "tide of unspeakable drool which has been going home for a year about China's rights and aspirations" would be "abruptly stemmed in both America and England."69
g. Evolution of U.S. Policy
towards Nationalist China
As political, economic, and social conditions in China grew progressively worse after 1925, it became more difficult for pro-Chinese missionary opinion to have an important influence upon the policy of the Department of State. The political factor was particularly disturbing in the Chinese equation. When the Special Tariff Conference met in Peking on October 25, 1925, the regime of President Tuan Ch'i-jui was distinctly shaky. The Peking Government was largely controlled by Chang Tso-lin and Marshal Feng Yii-hsiang. Chang was master of Manchuria while Feng was dominant in Northwest China. But other war lords soon challenged their position when it became evident that any favorable decisions of the Special Tariff Conference would mean increased revenues for the Peking Government. Wu P'ei-fu and Sun Ch'uan-fang promptly protested against the negotiations between the powers and the "illegal" Peking Government. Chang Tso-lin was compelled to retreat to Mukden and, despite the provisions of the Boxer Protocol, communications between Peking and the sea were severed by the troops of the contesting war lords. The military situation in China, however, remained remarkably fluid. In March 1926, Chang Tso-lin joined forces with his recent bitter foe Wu P'ei-fu and soon their armies were in occupation of Peking. The President, Tuan Ch'ijui, promptly retired from office and for several months there was no semblance of a central government in China. Faced with this political uncertainty, on July 3, 1926, the Special Tariff Conference adjourned and the powers were warned by contending factions against any attempt to resume discussions.70
The minatory message from the Foreign Minister of the Canton Government was an acrid attack upon the "phantom government in Peking," which he described as the creation of "a brace of medieval militarists and a bunch of Mandarin statesboys and statescoolies."71 Two weeks later he turned his guns upon American policy because it had failed to recognize the fact that the situation in China was "revolutionary" and not "evolutionary." Remedies in China would have to be drastic. The old "unequal treaties" would have to be abrogated and new agreements negotiated which would be "consistent with the real independence and sovereignty of China."72
In reply to these blasts from the excitable and impudent Ch'en, the American Minister in Peking sent to the Department of State a long note which carefully reviewed the situation in China. Since 1918 there had been at Peking "no regime asserting an even plausible claim to being a legitimately constituted government." Nevertheless the powers had found it advantageous hitherto to grant "at least de facto recognition to each group succeeding to control of the capital and offering to carry out the obligations of the Government of China." It had obviously been worth while to deal with a "central government which we clearly understood to be a fiction," so long as it continued to be a "conservative force" which safeguarded legitimate foreign interests. But the situation in China had recently disintegrated to the point where the powers could not expect "that a conservative or even friendly influence will characterize any new regime." The Central Administration in Peking was nothing more than a "pawn used in a fantastic game being played among military rivals having no loyalties and no principles." It would be idle, therefore, to expect anything from a Special Tariff Conference. The decisions of such a conference could not be carried out by a "central administration which is and for years must be a political nonentity."
It should also be kept in mind that the Red shadow of Russia was encroaching upon North China. Marshal Feng Yii-hsiang, "freshly schooled in Moscow in revolutionary methods," might at any time return to Peking, and his first move would be to have all existing treaties with the United States and other "capitalistic Powers" canceled by "a declaration he would cause to be made." It would probably be wise for the American Government frankly to "discard the fiction that a central government exists in Peking."73
Secretary Kellogg was not inclined to accept MacMurray's suggestions that the Department of State should abandon any hope of results from a Special Tariff Conference. Moreover, he believed that it would be a mistake to issue a "public notification to China that she has no government." Such action would "bring the hostility of the Chinese people upon us and give to other nations an opportunity to lay the blame upon us for the failure of the Conference and furnish them . . . with a sought-for excuse for abandoning the Conference. . . . The action you suggest, I feel certain, would fail to be understood in the United States and would meet quite likely with disfavor."74
h. The Kuomintang Armies
Employ Red Advisers
While Secretary Kellogg and Minister MacMurray were exchanging notes with reference to American policy in China, the rapid advance of Kuomintang armies promised a profound change in the political picture in the Far East. By October 1926 the important cities of Hankow, Hanyang, and Wuchang had been captured, and in December preparations were pushed for a drive against Shanghai.
It was significant that the plan of campaign of the Kuomintang military forces had been prepared by the Bolshevik General Bliicher (called General Ga-Lin by the Chinese) and his staff. In each of the ten corps of the armies "one or more Russians held strategic positions for military or propaganda purposes." The advance of the soldiers was preceded by "plain-clothes propagandists who preached to peasants and townsmen the principles of Dr. Sun and Lenin; scattered vast quantities of placards, pamphlets, and handbills; organized the people, willing and unwilling, into peasants' and workers' unions; and set up soviet local governments."75
This Red complexion of the Kuomintang's northward thrust seemed to give the British Government little real concern. As early as February 1926 the Foreign Office appeared to be "gravitating in the direction of the early recognition of the Canton Government." MacMurray thought that this inclination was due primarily to commercial considerations. By placating the Red regime at Canton the "strike and boycott" against British goods would be "terminated."76 In September, when the British Foreign Office raised this question of recognition, Secretary Kellogg replied that the American Government was ready to enter "into relations and negotiate with any Government representing China which appears to be capable of fulfilling the obligations which it may undertake." It had no intention, however, of initiating negotiations with "individual provinces or groups of provinces."77
i. Peking and Canton Demand
Revision of Existing Treaties
In the summer of 1926 the Canton Government was ready to take far-reaching action against the so-called "unequal treaties" with the Western powers. In September 1926 it was learned that the first move in
this direction would be the levying of surtaxes on foreign goods imported into South China. MacMurray thought that such a measure
should produce concerted and "resolute action" by the powers against
this "method of indirect repudiation of treaties."78
The American
charge at Peking was in agreement with MacMurray. Perhaps a "naval
blockade or some feasible measure of force" might bring the Canton
Government to its senses.79 But Secretary Kellogg was opposed to any collective intervention to compel adherence to existing treaties. He would go no further than a formal protest to the Canton Government.80 Even this protest would have to be lukewarm because the British Government, continuing its appeasement of the Red Nationalist administration at Canton, favored the acceptance of the Kuomintang decision to collect surtaxes. Downing Street proposed that the notes from the powers should merely insist upon guarantees against any increase in the rates of taxation. This was going too far for even the pacific Department of State, which refused to adopt the British suggestion. On November 3 the American consul general at Canton was instructed to file a protest against the legality of the new surtaxes. The other Western powers promptly followed suit.81 This bold action by Canton was followed by a similar move on the part of the Peking Government, which in October 1926 informed both Belgium and Japan of its determination to demand a revision of existing treaties with those powers. On November 6, Peking announced that the Sino-Belgian Treaty of 1865 was abrogated.82 [The PTB, make it hard to find the text of this treaty,Wikipedia treats it as if it did not exist.hmmm DC]
To MacMurray in Peking it was evident that this procedure would be invoked against existing treaties with the United States unless in the "meantime our intention not to tolerate such treatment of our rights has been made very clear."83 MacMurray then developed the thesis that in China there were two' rival schools of thought with reference to a revision of the "unequal treaties"—one evolutionary, the other strongly revolutionary. The first school adhered to the belief that treaty revision should be carried out through joint action by China and the Western powers, and its members also thought that China should prove to the world that it was capable of bearing the responsibilities of a sovereign nation. This had been the theory upon which the Washington Conference had acted and it was the "inspiration of the Special Conference on the Tariff and of the Commission on Extraterritoriality." But the failure of China to use her "opportunities effectively," combined with the reluctance of the powers to implement the Washington treaties, had opened the way "for the Soviet's disruptive influences" with the revolutionary school of thought. China had already taken a significant step along the Russian road to repudiation of treaty obligations. Before she took another step down this dubious path it would be expedient for the United States to speak "some friendly words of warning."84
Secretary Kellogg was not disposed to direct any real threat either to Canton or Peking, with the result that the matter of surtaxes was not settled by conferences between representatives of the two governments in China and the ministers of the Western powers. The Peking Government then showed its contempt for Western thought by dismissing Sir Francis Aglen from the office of inspector-general of Customs. This action spurred MacMurray to send a cablegram to Secretary Kellogg in which he stressed the dangerous implications that lay behind this dismissal. It should be apparent that further weak protests against treaty violations would be "fruitless; and foreign commerce will henceforth have no safeguards against the arbitrary exactions of the local authorities."85
This dark prospect was not deeply disturbing to Secretary Kellogg. The Department of State had already realized the "increasing difficulty of obtaining complete recognition of the rights of United States nationals in China." Moreover, it was not possible to employ the "military and naval forces of the United States to enforce the rights guaranteed under existing treaties." The only policy for America to follow with regard to China was one of "patience and watchfulness."86
j. Britain Challenges American
Leadership in China
The Canton and Peking governments wanted more from Washington than mere patience and watchfulness. They desired effective mediation between the powers and China in the direction of large concessions relative to tariff autonomy and the abolition of extraterritoriality. The British Foreign Office perceived the direction of political winds in China and decided to engage in an experiment in diplomatic kite flying. On December 24, 1926, the British Ambassador in Washington handed to Secretary Kellogg a copy of a telegram that had been sent to the British Minister in Peking. This telegram contained a statement of principles that the British Foreign Office thought should in the future guide the policy of the Western powers in China. The first item emphasized the importance of abandoning the idea "that the economic and political development of China can be only secured under foreign tutelage and [the powers] should declare their readiness to recognize her right to the enjoyment of tariff autonomy as soon as she herself has settled and promulgated a new national tariff." After this deep bow to the irresponsible elements that then made up China, the memorandum went on to say that the powers should "expressly disclaim any intention of forcing foreign control upon an unwilling China." A final injunction was to the effect that the powers should also "modify their traditional attitude of rigid insistence on the strict letter of treaty rights."87
The Department of State was painfully surprised at this British attempt to steal the "American thunder" with regard to China,88 and it was fearful of American criticism of the failure of the Secretary to outline and follow an effective policy. MacMurray, in Peking, was caustic in his comments on the British memorandum. While it might be advisable for the powers to adopt towards China a less "querulous and petty attitude," yet the broad formula proposed by the British with regard to "condoning disregard of their obligations by the Chinese in all matters which the Powers may not unanimously consider vital, is .. . an invitation to the Chinese to carry the principle of repudiation to what ever may prove to be the limit of tolerance on the part of the Powers." But the mere fact that such radical concessions had been proposed by the nation which was still predominant in the trade of China would compel the United States to adopt a similar attitude.89
In this estimate of the situation MacMurray was soon proved to be entirely correct, for Secretary Kellogg immediately fell in line with British action. Peking was informed that the British recommendations had "formed part of the United States Government's policy for a long time." The Department of State was ready to embrace the first opportunity to "negotiate with a Government representing China for the purpose of revising the existing American treaties in the directions of relinquishing the extraterritorial privileges of Americans in China and of granting China the right to establish her own tariff rates on products of American origin."90
MacMurray begged Secretary Kellogg not to move so fast in the matter of granting important concessions to irresponsible political groups in China. Such a policy would "gain us no consideration or respect on the part of the [Chinese]. . . . Indeed it would give them courage to deprive us and other foreigners of all special privileges and ordinary rights as well."91 Kellogg rejected this wise counsel and formulated American policy in strict conformity with Chinese desires as expressed to him in daily conferences with Dr. Alfred Sze, the Chinese Minister in Washington. On January 27, 1927, he finally announced that the American Government was fully prepared to "continue the negotiations on the entire subject of the tariff and extraterritoriality" and to begin these negotiations "on behalf of the United States alone."92 Discussions were expected to be with the representatives of both the Canton and Peking governments. It was not long, however, before the success of the northern thrust of the Nationalist armies made it unnecessary to consider the desires of Peking.
k. Congress Supports a
Policy of Treaty Revision
The pro-Chinese policy of Secretary Kellogg received strong support in congressional circles. The Porter Resolution of January 1927 requested the President forthwith to enter into negotiations with the "duly accredited agents of the Republic of China" with a view to concluding treaties that would establish relations between the two countries upon an "equal and reciprocal basis." Members of both political parties favored this resolution. Mr. Connally, of Texas, expressed the opinion that the unrest in China went back "as far as the Opium War in 1842. . .. From that day until this .. . the Powers of the world have imposed their will on China."93 Mr. Carroll L. Beedy, of Maine, was equally sympathetic towards China: "I want my country to do her utmost to free China from the curse of unequal treaties and foreign misrule."94 On February 21, 1927, the resolution passed the House of Representatives by the overwhelming vote of 262 ayes to 43 nays.95 It was then sent to the Senate where it languished in a pigeonhole in the office of the Committee on Foreign Relations.
While the Porter Resolution was being debated in the House of Representatives, American press opinion in many quarters was vehemently in support of its adoption. The Baltimore Sun was especially active in pressing for immediate and favorable consideration of the resolution. The people of China had been "bullied and outraged" in every possible manner by the Western powers. The long day of oppression was now over and China would at last secure her just position among the nations of the world.96 The Washington Post thought that the only honorable course for America to follow was to "befriend the Chinese nation and deal with it as an equal."97 The New York World,98 the Louisville Courier-Journal,"99 and the Kansas City Star,100 echoed these sentiments of friendship. But the Chicago Tribune challenged these pro-Chinese attacks upon the "unequal treaties." The outcry against "foreign exploitation" of the Chinese was "largely a matter of domestic politics and a dangerous device." The Porter Resolution indicated either an "abysmal ignorance of the notorious facts of Chinese conditions" or it was a "play of cheap politics to conciliate a sentimentalism in this country which has no respect for the facts."101
The Chicago Tribune was particularly concerned over the Red tinge of the Canton Government. The Cantonese had the "closest relations with Moscow," and Americans should realize that Sun Yat-sen in his last years had been closely associated with communist agents.102 The New York Times was equally critical of Canton. Foreign domination in China was a myth except "in so far as the Cantonese are under the influence of Soviet Russia."103
l. The Nanking Incident
and Its Repercussions
As the armies of the Canton Government under Chiang Kai-shek moved northward in the spring of 1927, the antiforeign spirit that had been developing for some years broke through all barriers of restraint. On March 24, 1927, at Nanking, a major incident occurred. As some of the Nationalist soldiers passed by the American Legation, John K. Davis, the American Consul, addressed them. They replied by cursing him in the "most savage manner," and a petty officer shouted: "You are all alike.... You Americans have drunk our blood for years and become rich. We are busy now killing Fengtien soldiers but we will soon begin killing all foreigners in Nanking regardless of what country they are from."104
This threat was soon carried out. Dr. John E. Williams, the vice president of the University of Nanking, was "wantonly" shot through the head and instantly killed. Seven American missionaries arrived at the consulate with grim stories of unprovoked attacks. Consul Davis decided to lead the Americans at the consulate to the Standard Oil property known as Socony Hill where some measure of protection could be given by gunboats in the river. Shortly after they arrived at their destination, a band of Nationalist soldiers arrived and were appeased with some difficulty. Other bands opened fire upon the refugees on Socony Hill who would soon have been killed if the gunboats had not been able to protect them with a "curtain of shells." The following morning the entire group was able to board vessels waiting in the rivei and was taken to safety.
The number of foreigners killed during the Nanking Incident was six: one American, three Englishmen, one Italian, and one French priest. Ten mission buildings were burned and the residences of the missionaries were looted. The American, British, and Japanese consulates were ruined.
The American Consul at Nanking reported to the Department of State that the soldiers responsible for the attacks were "regular Kuomintang troops who were operating under orders." Minister MacMurray was "absolutely convinced" that this "campaign of terrorism and insult to foreigners was not only officially countenanced by and directed but even prearranged" by the Canton Government.105
From Tokyo came word that the outrages at Nanking were merely an item in an extended radical program designed to ruin Chiang Kai shek. The Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed to Ambassador MacVeagh the belief that it would be inexpedient for the powers to take "oppressive measures" against Chiang because such action would play into the hands of the "radicals among the Cantonese."106 The British Foreign Office agreed with this Japanese viewpoint. Support should be given to Chiang in the hope that he would be able to form a "nucleus of a moderate element directed against the extremist faction of the Nationalist Government." Demands for redress should first be presented to Eugene Ch'en, the leftist Minister of Foreign Relations of the Canton Government. This moVe would necessitate previous consultations among the representatives of the powers with reference to the application of sanctions against Canton.107
When the shadow of sanctions fell across the desk of Secretary Kellogg, he was instantly alarmed at the possibility of a real storm in the Far East. His first reaction was to instruct MacMurray that the Department of State was not in favor of applying "drastic sanctions to the Nationalists."108 He would go only so far as to present to Ch'en identic notes of protest from the American, British, French, Italian, and Japanese governments concerning the outrages committed in Nanking. These notes were finally presented simultaneously on April 11 by the consuls of the five powers at Hankow. In the event that the "Nationalist Authorities" failed to "comply promptly" with these terms, the powers would find themselves compelled to take "such measures" as they considered "appropriate."109
When the powers agreed that the replies of Eugene Ch'en were not "satisfactory," the question of sanctions once more came to the front. Secretary Kellogg recoiled before such a suggestion and anxiously sought some alternative. The Japanese Foreign Office supplied one by asserting a belief that the time was ripe for promoting a split between Chiang Kai-shek and the belligerent Eugene Ch'en. Kellogg quickly grasped this diplomatic lifesaver and announced that the best policy to follow would be to let "Eugene Ch'en's note remain unanswered and await developments." No action should be taken that would embarrass Chiang.110
MacMurray hoped that these fears of the Department of State would not lead to any break in the collective policy of applying pressure upon the Canton Government. If America withdrew from the concert of powers, the inevitable result would be a new Anglo-Japanese alliance which would dominate the situation in the Far East.111 Kellogg replied that he had not decided to "withdraw entirely" from co-operation with the powers in the matter of dealing with the Nationalist Government. The Department of State would still honor the commitments made at the Washington Conference concerning extraterritoriality and the revision of the Chinese tariff, but it would also insist upon a policy of "moderate action" in China. The time had passed when foreign countries could "take over Chinese territory or maintain by force special spheres of influence in trade."112
When the representatives of the powers in Peking prepared a memorandum which still voiced acceptance of the "principle of sanctions" in connection with the proposed policy to be followed in China, Secretary Kellogg lectured them upon the folly of considering the employment of force to compel the Canton Government to agree upon reparations. America was opposed to "drastic action" and would not even go as far as joining with the powers in the presentation of another identic note to Eugene Ch'en.113
In the face of this American policy of inaction the plans of the powers for vigorous action against the Nationalist Government quickly collapsed. This was the signal for Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 to break with the communist elements in the Kuomintang and to lay plans for the establishment of a more conservative government that would be more favorably regarded by the Western powers.
m. Secretary Kellogg Is Indifferent
to Red Menace in China
Until April 1927 when Chiang Kai-shek rejected the leadership of Mikhail Borodin and other communist leaders, the Nationalist Party in China had been following a line laid down by Moscow. This was apparent to seasoned observers in the Far East, but President Coolidge and the Department of State appeared indifferent to the communist menace. The President himself continued to sound the note of friendship towards China no matter what complexion the leading faction assumed. On April 25, 1927, at a dinner of the United Press Association, he insisted that his Administration did not "wish to pursue any course of aggression against the Chinese people." Ultimately the turmoil in China would "quiet down and some form of authority will emerge which will no doubt be prepared to make adequate settlement for any wrongs we have suffered."114
This "Pollyanna" attitude was distinctly distasteful to American businessmen in Chinese treaty ports. In April 1927, the American Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai issued a statement that called attention to the union of Chinese nationalism and Russian communism:
Militarism, brigandage and Bolshevism have destroyed all semblance of law and order throughout the greater part of China. . . . We believe that immediate concerted action by the Powers to restore a condition of security for foreign lives and property in all treaty ports . . . will have a far-reaching influence throughout China to the ultimate benefit of the Chinese people.115
Rodney Gilbert agreed with the views of the American Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai and lamented the fact that the Coolidge Administration had abandoned the policy of collective pressure upon China. Writing from Peking he remarked: "This whole community, official as well as commercial, is disgusted and discouraged beyond expression."116
In October 1927, George Bronson Rea, in a speech before the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, presented the specter of bolshevism stalking through large parts of China: "If we admit that Soviet Russia has a right to intervene in the internal affairs of China and use the Chinese armies .. . to carry forward its warfare against the interests of other Powers, then the Powers .. . have the same right to intervene in the internal affairs of China for the protection of their interests."117
The American Chamber of Commerce at Shanghai was confident that the Chinese Nationalist movement had been "Soviet-managed and engineered."118 The same opinion was expressed by the North China Herald in its special supplement entitled China in Chaos: "Whoever calls for negotiations [between the Powers and China] calls forward self-appointed representatives who are the notorious wreckers and looters of this wretched land, while immediately behind them stand the Bolshevist agitators."119
Because of Chiang's bolshevist background, the North China Herald was deeply suspicious of his break (April 1927) with the Communists :
Those foreigners who see in the revolt against Soviet dictation or in the ruthless suppression of Communist labor groups, evidence of a sincere change of heart... are blind to the fundamental motives behind these changes. Neither in the forwarding of the Bolshevist program nor in the revolt against it have we ever been able to see anything but cold, calculating hypocrisy.120
But these charges of hypocrisy against Chiang Kai-shek received little support in the United States. The Coolidge Administration was determined to believe the best of him and in the spring of 1928 it was ready to recognize his government. On March 30, 1928, by an exchange of notes, the Nanking Incident was settled. The next step would be formal recognition. MacMurray warned the Department of State against such a move: "As to the probability of establishment by the Nationalists of a responsible government, in the sense of having a serious capability of fulfilling its responsibilities, domestic and international, it is my opinion that this is extremely problematical, nor do I expect it within any predictable future."121
Secretary Kellogg seldom paid any attention to the advice of Minister MacMurray. In this case he merely moved ahead and on July 25, 1928, he concluded a treaty with the government of Chiang Kai-shek in which definite provision was made for Chinese tariff autonomy.122 When MacMurray requested instructions concerning the status of Chiang's Government, Secretary Kellogg promptly informed him that the "signing of the treaty of July 25 with representatives of the Nationalist Government constitutes technically recognition of that Government and ratification by the Senate is not necessary to give effect to the recognition."123
The bitter struggle to achieve Chinese unification and to secure the recognition of the Nationalist Government by the Western powers had won apparent success. But the Red leaven that Chiang himself had planted deep in the heart of the Chinese political loaf never ceased its work of fermentation. In the end it would destroy not only Chiang but all China.
next
Continued Friction with Japan Points towards Inevitable War
Notes
1 Paul W. Reinsch, An American Diplomat in China (New York, 1922), chap. 12 ; Thomas E. La Fargue, China and the World War (Stanford, 1937), chap. 3.
2 F. Seymour Cocks, The Secret Treaties and Understandings (London, 1918), pp. 84-88; J. V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China (New York, 1921), II, 1168-69.
3 Blanche E. Dugdale, Arthur James Balfour (New York, 1936), II, 145-46. See also, Balfour to President Wilson, January 31, 1918, File 2, Box 135. Wilson Papers, Library of Congress; and Secretary Lansing to President Wilson, November 18, 1918, File 2, Box 156. Ibid.
4 A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern Policy of the United States (New York, 1938), p. 219.
5 Lansing Diary, January 10, 1918. Lansing Papers, Library of Congress.
6 Griswold, op. cit., pp. 218-19.
7 Lansing, op. cit. Memorandum by Secretary Lansing, March 18, 1918.
8 Ibid., April 10, 1918.
9 Ibid., June 12, 1918.
10 Lansing, op. cit. Memorandum of a conference at the White House, July 6, 1918.
11 Colonel House to President Wilson, July 6, 1918. House Papers, Yale University Library.
12 General William S. Graves, America's Siberian Adventure (New York, 1931); Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East (New York, 1949), pp. 47-141; John A. White, The Siberian Intervention (Princeton, 1950), pp. 270-74.
13 Frederick V. Field, American Participation in the China Consortiums (Chicago, 1931 ), PP- 14-66; John G. Reid, The Manchu Abdication and the Powers, 1908-1912 (Berkeley, 1935), PP- 36-241, 258-99.
14 MacMurray, op. cit., p. 1024; Griswold, op. cit., pp. 172-73.
15 Foreign Relations, 1913, pp. 170-71.
16 Ibid., 1918, pp.
17 Ibid., 1917, pp. 144-45; 154-55. British Embassy to Secretary Lansing, October 3, 1917; Ambassador Jusserand to Secretary Lansing, November 19, 1917.
18 Secretary Lansing to President Wilson, June 20, 1918. 893.51/2512, MS, Department of State.
19 President Wilson to Secretary Lansing, June 21, 1918. 893.51/2513, MS, Department of State.
20 Secretary Lansing to Ambassador Jusserand, October 8, 1918. 893.51/20426, MS, Department of State.
21 British Foreign Office to the American Embassy, London, March 17, 1919. The Consortium, The Official Text of the Four-Power Agreement for a Loan to China and Relevant Documents (Washington, 1921), No. 5, p. 15.
22 Ambassador Morris to Secretary Lansing, Tokyo, May 28, 1919. 893.51/2241, MS, Department of State.
23 J. W. Davis to Acting Secretary Polk, London, June 18, 1919. 893.51/2268, MS, Department of State.
24 J. P. Morgan and Company to Dept. of State, June 25, 1919. 893.51/2282, MS, Department of State.
25 T. W. Lamont to J. P. Morgan and Company. 893.51/2268, MS, Department of State.
26 Reinsch to Secretary Lansing, Peking, June 26, 1919. 893.51/2284, MS, Department of State.
27 Ambassador Wallace to Breckinridge Long, Paris, July 13, 1919. 893.51/2308, MS, Department of State.
28 Ambassador Wallace to Secretary Lansing, Paris, September 16, 1919. 893.51/ 2425, MS, Department of State.
29 Japanese Embassy to the Department of State, March 2, 1920. 893.51/2695, MS, Department of State.
30 Lansing, op. cit., November 30, 1918.
31 Ibid., July 31, 1919.
32 Ambassador Morris to Acting Secretary Polk, March 11, 1920. 893.51/2707, MS, Department of State.
33 Ambassador Morris to Secretary Colby, Tokyo, April 8, 1920, with enclosures. 893.51/2765, MS, Department of State.
34 In a letter to Nakaji Kajiwara, president of the Yokohama Specie Bank, May 11, 1920, Mr. Lamont listed the terms agreed upon: "(1) that the South Manchuria Railway and its present branches, together with mines which are subsidiary to the railway, do not come within the scope of the Consortium; (2) that the projected Tao Nan Fu-Jehol Railway and the projected railway connecting a point on the Tao Nan Fu-Jehol Railway with a seaport are to be included within the terms of the Consortium,"
35 Pp. 14-15.
36 Lyon Sharman, Sun Yat-sen: His Life and its Meaning (New York, 1934), P247; M. T. Z. Tyau, China Awakened (New York, 1922), chap. 9.
37 Secretary Lansing had little regard for Sun Yat-sen. In a letter to President Wilson, November 25, 1918, he remarked: "I would not go further than this in regard to this man [Sun Yat-sen] as there are some very ugly stories about him in regard to his acceptance of bribes and his readiness to serve the highest bidder. I believe that the evidence on this subject .. . is of a very conclusive sort." Wilson op. cit., File 2, Box i57-
38 New York Times, July 22-23, 1923.
39 T. C. Woo, The Kuomintang and the Future of the Chinese Revolution (London, 1928), Appendix C.
40 Harley F. MacNair, China in Revolution (Chicago, 1931), p. 77.
41 Harriet L. Moore, Soviet Far Eastern Policy, ig3i-ip4S (Princeton, 1945), pp. 156-64.
42 Sharman, op. cit., pp. 308-9. The close connection between Sun Yat-sen and the Communists was indicated in a dispatch from Consul John K. Davis, United States consul at Nanking to Secretary Kellogg, July 6, 1925: "There is little doubt that but for Sun's illness and death he and Feng Yu-hsiang would have shortly sprung a coup in the capital with Soviet assistance, and once in power instead of asking for treaty revision would have simply announced that all of the so-called 'unequal treaties' had been abolished." 893.00/6465, MS, Department of State.
43 McNair, op. cit., pp. 100—107.
44 Consul John K. Davis to Secretary Kellogg, Nanking, July 6, 1925. 893.00/ 6465, MS, Department of State.
45 E. C. Grenfell to T. W. Lamont, London, June 25, 1925. 893.00/6364, MS, Department of State.
46 T. W. Lamont to E. C. Grenfell, June 26, 1925. 893.00/6364, MS, Department of State.
47 Thomas F. Millard to W. W. Yen, Shanghai, June 11, 1925. Borah MS, Library of Congress.
48 Thomas F. Millard to Senator Borah, Shanghai. June 18, 1925. Ibid.
49 Senator Borah to Thomas F. Millard, Boise, Idaho, July 20, 1925. Ibid.
50 New York Times, June 16, 1925.
51 Secretary Kellogg to Senator Borah, August 21, 1925, Strictly Confidential. Borah, op. cit.
52 Senator Borah to Secretary Kellogg, Boise, Idaho, August 26, 1925. Ibid. In a letter to Bishop William F. McDowell, August 18, 1925, Borah makes the following critical comment: "I think the course of conduct of the Western nations in China [is] indefensible." Ibid.
53 Dorothy Borg, American Policy and ihs Chinese Revolution. 1925-1928 (New York, 1947), PP- 24-25.
54 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, June 19, 1925. Foreign Relations, 1925, I, 667.
55 Minister MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, July 28, 1925. Ibid., pp. 799-802.
56 Borah, op. cit.
57 Senator Borah to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Canton Government, September 26, 1925. Ibid,
58 Senator Borah to Thomas F. Millard, September 15, 1925. Ibid.
59 Ibid. Chungting T. Wang to Senator Borah, Peking, September 28, 1925.
60 Harry Hussey to Senator Borah, Peking, June 23, 1925. Ibid.
61 C. F. Remer and William B. Palmer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts with Special Reference to their Economic Effectiveness (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 95-102.
62 China Year Book, 1926-27, p. 982.
63 China Year Book, 1928, p. 4; Julean Arnold, "The Missionaries' Opportunity in China," Chinese Recorder, October 1925, p. 639; C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York, 1933), p. 308.
64 Pp. 1041-43.
65 Ibid., September 10, 1925, p. 114.
66 American Relations with China: A Report of the Conference Held at the Johns Hopkins University, September 17-20, 1925 (Baltimore, 1925), p. 39.
67 Borg, op. cit., pp. 76-82.
72 Eugene Ch'en to the American Consul General Jenkins, Canton, July 28, 1926. Ibid., pp. 851-53.
73 Minister MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, August 14, 1926. Ibid., pp. 671-80. ?
74 Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, August 24, 1926. Ibid., p. 682.
75 McNair, op. cit., pp. 108—9.
76 Borg, op. cit., p. 120.
77 The Department of State to the British Embassy, October 5, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, 855.
78 Minister MacMurray to Ferdinand L. Mayer, September 30, 1926. Ibid., p. 868.
79 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, October 3, 1926. Ibid., p. 869.
80 Secretary Kellogg to Mayer, October 5, 1926. Ibid., p. 871.
81 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, November 3, 1926. Ibid., pp. 896-97.
82 China Year Book, 1928, p. 782.
83 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, November 12, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, 996-97-
84 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, November 16, 1926. Ibid., pp. 897-99.
85 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, February 7, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1027, II, 379-81. 72
58 Senator Borah to Thomas F. Millard, September 15, 1925. Ibid.
59 Ibid. Chungting T. Wang to Senator Borah, Peking, September 28, 1925.
60 Harry Hussey to Senator Borah, Peking, June 23, 1925. Ibid.
61 C. F. Remer and William B. Palmer, A Study of Chinese Boycotts with Special Reference to their Economic Effectiveness (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 95-102.
62 China Year Book, 1926-27, p. 982.
63 China Year Book, 1928, p. 4; Julean Arnold, "The Missionaries' Opportunity in China," Chinese Recorder, October 1925, p. 639; C. F. Remer, Foreign Investments in China (New York, 1933), p. 308.
64 Pp. 1041-43.
65 Ibid., September 10, 1925, p. 114.
66 American Relations with China: A Report of the Conference Held at the Johns Hopkins University, September 17-20, 1925 (Baltimore, 1925), p. 39.
67 Borg, op. cit., pp. 76-82.
68 Far Eastern Review, June 1926, pp. 242-43.
69 North China Herald, July 10, 1926.
70 Robert T. Pollard, China's Foreign Relations, igiy-1931 (New York, 1933), pp. 275-79.
71 Eugene Ch'en to the American Consul General Jenkins, Canton, July 14, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1Q26, I, 845. 72 Eugene Ch'en to the American Consul General Jenkins, Canton, July 28, 1926. Ibid., pp. 851-53.
73 Minister MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, August 14, 1926. Ibid., pp. 671-80. ?
74 Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, August 24, 1926. Ibid., p. 682.
75 McNair, op. cit., pp. 108—9.
76 Borg, op. cit., p. 120.
77 The Department of State to the British Embassy, October 5, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, 855.
78 Minister MacMurray to Ferdinand L. Mayer, September 30, 1926. Ibid., p. 868.
79 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, October 3, 1926. Ibid., p. 869.
80 Secretary Kellogg to Mayer, October 5, 1926. Ibid., p. 871.
81 Ferdinand L. Mayer to Secretary Kellogg, November 3, 1926. Ibid., pp. 896-97.
82 China Year Book, 1928, p. 782.
83 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, November 12, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, 996-97-
84 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, November 16, 1926. Ibid., pp. 897-99.
85 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, February 7, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1027, II, 379-81. 72
86 Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, February 15, 1927. Ibid., pp. 382-83.
87 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador in China, December 2, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, 923-29.
88 London limes, January 5, 1927.
89 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, December 22, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, 919-21.
90 Secretary Kellogg to Minister MacMurray, December 23, 1926. Ibid., p. 922.
91 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, December 28, 1926. Ibid., p. 929.
92 Secretary Kellogg to the American charge in China (Mayer), January 25, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1927, II, 350-53.
93 Congressional Record, January 26, 1927, LXVIII, pt. II, 2324.
94 Ibid., LXVIII, pt. II, 4388.
95 Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. Ill, 4389.
96 January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
97 January 9, 1927.
98 January 25, 1927.
99 March 17, 1927.
100 January 21, 26, 1927.
101 January 23, 28, 30; February 3, 5, 9, 1927.
102 March 22, 1927.
87 British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador in China, December 2, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, 923-29.
88 London limes, January 5, 1927.
89 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, December 22, 1926. Foreign Relations, 1926, I, 919-21.
90 Secretary Kellogg to Minister MacMurray, December 23, 1926. Ibid., p. 922.
91 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, December 28, 1926. Ibid., p. 929.
92 Secretary Kellogg to the American charge in China (Mayer), January 25, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1927, II, 350-53.
93 Congressional Record, January 26, 1927, LXVIII, pt. II, 2324.
94 Ibid., LXVIII, pt. II, 4388.
95 Ibid., February 21, 1927, LXVIII, pt. Ill, 4389.
96 January 8-10, 23-24, 29, 1927.
97 January 9, 1927.
98 January 25, 1927.
99 March 17, 1927.
100 January 21, 26, 1927.
101 January 23, 28, 30; February 3, 5, 9, 1927.
102 March 22, 1927.
103 January 25, 1927.
104 Consul John K. Davis to Secretary Kellogg, Nanking, March 28, 1927. Foreign Relations, 1927, II, 151-63.
105 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 151.
106 Ambassador MacVeagh to Secretary Kellogg, Tokyo, March 28, 1927. Ibid., p. 164.
107 British Ambassador (Howard) to Secretary Kellogg, April 5, 1927. Ibid., pp. 179-81.
108 Memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 6, 1927. Ibid., pp. 182-83.
109 Consul General at Hankow (Lockhart) to Eugene Ch'en, April n , 1927. Ibid., pp. 189-90. These demands included the following items: (1) adequate punishment of commanders of the troops responsible for the murders, personal injuries, and indignities and the material damage done as also of all persons found to be implicated; (2) apology in writing by the Commander in Chief of the Nationalist Army including an express written undertaking to refrain from all forms of violence and agitation against foreign lives and property; (3) complete reparation for the personal injuries and material damage done.
110 Memorandum by the Secretary of State, April 20, 1927. Ibid., 204-5.
111 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, April 23, 1927. Ibid., pp. 209—10.
112 Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, April 25, 1927. Ibid., pp. 210-11.
113 Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, April 28, 1927. Ibid., pp. 215-16.
114 United States Daily, April 26, 1927.
115 North China Herald, April 30. 1927.
116 Borg, op. cit., p. 344.
117 Ibid., p. 351.
118 Bulletin of the American Chamber of Commerce of Shanghai, August, 1927.
119 China in Chaos, p. 2.
120 June 18, 1927.
121 MacMurray to Secretary Kellogg, Peking, June 20, 1928. Foreign Relations, 1Q28, II, 184-85.
122 Ibid., pp. 475-77-
123 Secretary Kellogg to MacMurray, August 10, 1928. Ibid., pp. 192-93.
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