Back Door to War
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy
1933-1941
by
CHARLES CALLAN TANSILL
IX
America Anticipates the League in Exerting Economic Pressure upon Italy
a. Senator Nye Flusters Foreign Diplomats
As THE LEGIONS of Mussolini were preparing to march into Ethiopia, many Americans began to press for neutrality legislation that would insulate the Western Hemisphere against the possible outbreak of World War II. The crusade of 1917 had not made the world safe for democracy, and during the early years of the Roosevelt era a tide of disillusion swept over the United States that hid from the public eye the measuring rods that had been used by patriotic historians during the second Wilson Administration. The average American suddenly began to count the cost of the World War and was deeply disturbed to discover that the vast expenditures in human lives and national wealth entailed by that struggle had been in vain. American intervention had completely destroyed the old balance of power that had been carefully constructed by European statesmen, and at the close of the conflict the United States had retired from a position that might have brought stability to a new international edifice that trembled in the winds of uncertainty. When Hitler began to move with earthquake feet along the German frontiers, the continent of Europe had tremors that shook the White House in Washington. But President Roosevelt had no magic formula that would bring prompt reassurance to anxious millions across the Atlantic. He was looking for re-election in 1936 and he did not dare to flout the strong isolationist sentiment that was so evident in most American circles.
One of the isolationist leaders was Senator Nye who was certain that Americans could derive no benefits from sailing on stormy European waters. The great parade of 1917 had shown all too clearly that the paths of glory led but to the grave. The best way to prevent a repetition of that mad scramble with its dire results was to show the American people the sinister forces that had dragged them into conflict. The wiles of Wall Street should be made familiar to the man in the street so that he would shut his ears to the drums of war that beat a cadence of death for the poor and a rhythm of riches for the wealthy.
This viewpoint of Senator Nye received strong confirmation through a sensational article published in Fortune in March 1934, entitled "Arms and the Men." In a long succession of lurid pages the story was told of the shady deals and the devious methods of great munitions manufacturers of Europe in their efforts to incite wars that would make their profits reach dizzy heights.1 Nye had this article reprinted in the Congressional Record so that its full impact would be felt by susceptible members of Congress. There is little doubt that it helped to influence the action of the Senate in its approval on April 12 of the Nye resolution that provided for the appointment of a special Senate Committee to investigate the activities of munitions makers and dealers.2
Vice-President Garner appointed Nye to be the chairman of this committee, and Senator Pittman, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, acquiesced in the appointment. It was quite unusual in a Senate controlled by the Democratic Party for a Republican to be named to this important post. Secretary Hull deeply deprecated this action by the Democratic majority: "Had I dreamed that an isolationist Republican would be appointed I promptly would have opposed it... . The appointment of Nye was a fatal mistake because the committee . . . proceeded to enlarge the scope of its inquiry into an attempt to prove that the United States had been drawn into the First World War by American bankers and munitions makers."3
But despite his dislike for the appointment of Senator Nye, Secretary Hull promised to aid the committee in every possible way, and President Roosevelt urged the Senate (May 18, 1934) to provide ample funds for the use of committee members so that they would be able to execute their task with a thoroughness commensurate with the high importance of the questions at issue.4 The committee began its hearings on September 4, and it was not long before a sordid story began to unfold. There were some colorful chapters dealing with the malign activities of highly paid lobbyists who used their influence to secure lucrative contracts. Some of the testimony pointed to the fact that manufacturers of munitions ardently believed in a "one world" of business. There were intimate ties that bound these "merchants of death" into an international trust. Within this business circle many trade secrets freely circulated, patents were exchanged, and the volume of trade was diverted into certain favored channels.
It was also brought out that some American army and naval officers had been of great service to armament firms, and that the Army and Navy departments, in order to speed a "preparedness program," had given definite encouragement to the same corporations. This encouragement went so far as to permit manufacturers to copy designs of equipment that had been tested and perfected in government laboratories. Products made from these plans were freely sold to foreign governments.*5
Some of the revelations that shocked the American public came from the secret files of the Department of State. Secretary Hull had been most generous in making available for the use of the Nye Committee confidential documents whose contents were supposed to be kept hidden from the prying eyes of newspaper reporters. But the inevitable leaks soon occurred. The Argentine Government protested against certain allegations concerning an Argentine admiral; the Chinese Foreign Office denied that a large wheat loan had been diverted into the itching palms of munitions makers, and Lord Vansittart carefully combed his large vocabulary for words that would express the proper pitch of indignation over the insinuation that King George V had exerted pressure upon Poland in order to secure a contract for a well-known British firm.6 Taking his cue from the Foreign Office, the British Ambassador at Washington denounced the publication of the correspondence of the British Government with the House of Morgan during the years 1914- 17. The American public should remain ignorant of the close connections between American big business and Britain.
Secretary Hull was greatly embarrassed by this barrage of protests, and he endeavored to enlist the support of the President in his effort to keep the Nye Committee "within reasonable limits." Anglo-American relations should be carefully coddled lest some incident arise that might lead to seriously strained relations. But President Roosevelt was not interested in preserving the secrecy of the records of the House of Morgan. Although he agreed to meet the members of the Nye Committee in conference on March 19, he refrained from exerting the slightest pressure upon them.7 Historians will be eternally grateful to him for his silence on this occasion.
Thanks to this lack of Presidential pressure the Nye Committee unearthed a vast amount of data of great value to historians. These documents clearly showed the economic forces that helped to prepare the hostile climate of opinion against Germany that eventually led to American intervention in 1917. An important part of this evidence revealed the rich financial harvest gathered by some business firms as a result of the conflict.8 These surprising figures accelerated the movement to enact legislation that would insure American neutrality and would take the profits out of war.
b. The Offensive against American Neutrality
The movement to insure American neutrality soon encountered the bitter opposition of many American publicists and politicians who believed that the Kellogg Pact had abolished the old concept of neutrality. They expressed their opinions with vehemence and launched a spirited attack upon anyone who adhered to the belief that America could still stay out of Europe's never-ending cycle of wars. Their carefully planned offensive against the continuance of the American practice of neutrality began long before the findings of the Nye Committee deeply disturbed the American mind. It was a carry-over from the fight for the Treaty of Versailles. That treaty was partly American-made, and it had numerous supporters in the United States. Many readily recognized that it contained some glaring injustices, but they would not condemn the whole convention because of these imperfections. After the defeat of the treaty in the Senate, a group of prominent Americans dedicated all their efforts to bring the United States into a close concert with their former allies by means of some innocent-appearing pact whose broad implications could eventually be made to serve their purposes. The Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact was the answer to their prayers.
The British and French governments watched with great care and deep appreciation the work of these international-minded Americans. It was becoming increasingly difficult to preserve the spoils of the World War. If America could be bound to some general treaty for the renunciation of war her moral support would be assured in favor of the status quo. If some nation still crippled by the chains of Versailles attempted to break those bonds, or if some have-not power should by armed force endeavor to upset the political structure erected in 1919, she would be denounced as a treaty violator and a wicked foe of world peace. The Kellogg Pact was in the making long before 1928.
In order that this pact should be specially shaped to promote British and French imperial interests, the foreign offices of those two countries insisted upon certain reservations to the general terms of the treaty. The French Government made it very clear that the proposed peace pact should not affect the right of legitimate defense or the performance of the obligations outlined in the Covenant of the League of Nations. The same should be true with reference to the obligations contracted under the terms of the treaties of Locarno or under the provisions of treaties of alliance. Secretary Kellogg indicated his approval of these reservations in his speech before the American Society of International Law (April 28, 1928). On May 19 the British Government expressed its acceptance of the French reservations and then seized the opportunity to announce some of its own. There were certain regions of the world whose welfare and integrity constituted a "special and vital interest" for the safety of the Empire. Interference with these regions could not be "suffered." Their protection against attack was "to the British Empire a measure of self-defence." It should be clearly understood, therefore, that the British Government would not become a party to a new general peace treaty except upon the "distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect [self-defense of certain regions of the world.]"9
In commenting upon these British and French reservations, Professor Edwin Borchard trenchantly remarks: "Considering the breadth of these qualifications or interpretations, it would be difficult to conceive of any wars that nations have fought within the past century, or are likely to fight in the future, that cannot be accommodated under them. Far from being an outlawry of war, they constitute the most definite sanction of specific wars that has ever been promulgated."10
It was obvious that the British reservations were purposely ambiguous. British statesmen could still meet with armed force any "interference" in vast undefined "regions of the world" whose welfare and integrity the British Government regarded as "vital" to the interests of the Empire. By accepting this significant phraseology Secretary Kellogg underwrote a reservation which reduced the peace pact to a sorry gesture. His previous acceptance of the French reservations gave further overtones of war to a document that was supposed to be a paean of peace.11
This situation was given an additional martial twist by Secretary Kellogg's opinion that wars undertaken by nations in pursuance of their obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations, under the Locarno treaties, or under treaties of alliance were not outlawed by the Pact of Paris.12 After this broad statement it was only natural for European statesmen to argue that the American Government was now bound by League decisions concerning aggressor nations and could not oppose collective action decreed by Geneva.13 It is interesting to note that Senator Borah helped to mold this European viewpoint. In an interview with Kirby Page he boldly declared: "Another important result of such a treaty [the proposed Paris pact] would be to enlist the support of the United States in co-operative action against any nation which is guilty of a flagrant violation of this outlawry agreement. . . . It is quite inconceivable that this country would stand idly by in case of a grave breach of a multilateral treaty to which it is a party."14
It should be remembered that Borah, as chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, took an active part in the negotiations for this Pact of Paris. Before the pact was signed Secretary Kellogg wrote him a letter to thank him for his "co-operation and very great assistance."15 Borah replied by congratulating Kellogg "not only in securing the Treaty, but in securing it in the form in which it seems now it will undoubtedly be accepted. I look upon the Treaty as a great and distinct achievement in the cause of peace and I regard the manner and skill with which you have conducted the negotiations as an exhibition of the highest statesmanship."16
Kellogg now expressed his fears that there was "a significant movement against the treaty in this country and I think we should all bear this in mind."17 Borah should have been deeply interested in checking this movement because he was in many ways one of the authors of the pact that would soon be signed in Paris:
I think the people in Europe understand the great assistance you have been. Many of the suggestions as to its form came from you and your first open letter to the New York Times explaining the proposed treaty was of immense value.18
In the second week in August, Kellogg wrote to Borah with some anxiety about the "insinuations" in certain newspapers:
Just now representatives of certain papers ... are writing all the insinuations they can think of and Frank Simonds has joined the crowd. He says we have assumed moral obligations. I know of no moral obligations to apply sanctions or take affirmative military action in any case whatever might happen; in fact this is the only kind of treaty, as you have always said, that we can possibly sign. .. . It makes me discouraged when I see such insinuations.19
These insinuations had a good basis in fact and Borah's interview with Kirby Page [March 25, 1928] showed that the chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations firmly believed that "in the event of a grave violation" of the proposed peace pact the United States could "not stand idly by." It would not be long before the next Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, would vehemently assert this very viewpoint. Borah was incredibly naive in his whole attitude towards the proposed Kellogg-Briand treaty for the outlawry of war. He had been one of the outstanding opponents of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919-20 and had played a major part in encompassing its defeat in the Senate. Now he was throwing all his energies in pushing through the Senate a treaty that would "freeze" all the injustices of Versailles. The so-called chains of Versailles could be broken only by armed conflict; Borah was in the strange position of outlawing war and thus perpetuating those chains. The implications of the proposed pact seemed to escape him, even though some distinguished publicists endeavored to warn him. In December 1929, Professor Borchard wrote him a long letter which ended on the following admonition:
I cannot help but feel grateful that we did not succumb to the campaign for joining the League—a campaign now about to be renewed. . . . We should inevitably have become either a party to or an opponent of these transactions [European disputes then pending] and could not have done anything but drag ourselves into the meshes of European politics. If I correctly read the British White Paper, it is their idea that this result has been accomplished by our signature of the Kellogg Pact. It was always my belief that this was essentially their purpose in signing the Kellogg Pact.20
Senator Capper had already given an indication that he believed that the Kellogg Pact fundamentally changed our historic neutrality policy. In February 1929 he introduced a resolution which called for the prohibition of the shipment of "arms and munitions and implements or other articles for use in war" to any country which the President declared was a violator of the Kellogg Pact.21 Although this resolution was not adopted by the Senate it was strong evidence that some prominent Republicans and Democrats were ready to follow a bipartisan policy with reference to the outlawry of war.
There were numerous academic supporters of this bipartisan policy. Professor Clyde Eagleton was confident that the "Kellogg Pact will be respected only if we deliberately and strongly take sides against the violator of the Pact,"22 and Professor Charles G. Fenwick praised the pact because it indicated American concern with regard to its observance "by other States" and an intention to depart from our "traditional attitude of neutrality" should others be guilty of a breach of it.23
In order to implement this one-world concept of war and peace (with no middle ground of neutrality), certain publicists expressed the opinion that the provisions of the Kellogg Pact contained implications of international consultation. David Hunter Miller was sure of it. In the event of a threat of war, "inevitably the Government of the United States will be consulted, if not at Geneva, certainly by the Powers most influential at Geneva. . . . No Government of the United States could be indifferent to such an appeal [nor] could it refuse to use its influence in such case in co-operation with the League of Nations to preserve peace." Consultation among the signatories of the Pact of Paris was an obligation inherent in the terms of the Pact itself.24
Secretary Stimson shared this view of Mr. Miller, and on August 8, in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations, he gave it clear and emphatic expression.25 Neutrality, he believed, was an outworn American concept: international co-operation was the new slogan of the Department of State arid it would command popular support. The Roosevelt Administration was too cautious to go as far as Mr. Stimson, but Norman Davis, at Geneva (May 22, 1933), not only promised consultation but also co-operation with other powers to the extent of refraining from any action that would defeat collective effort to punish an aggressor State.26
John Bassett Moore, America's leading authority in the field of international law, listened to the words of Norman Davis with deep dismay. The commitment of the United States to any far-reaching consultative pact would "constitute the gravest danger to which the country has ever been exposed, a danger involving our very independence. .. . It would destroy the last vestige of the power to control our own destiny. . . . Of all conceivable devices the 'consultative pact' is the most pernicious."27
These words of warning from Judge Moore carried considerable weight in some Democratic circles, and they had a definite influence upon the Department of State in the Italo-Ethiopian crisis. But before the outbreak of that conflict the fight to preserve American neutrality was transferred to the halls of Congress.
c. The President Accepts a Congressional Program of Neutrality
It is a trite observation that politics often makes strange bedfellows. This was certainly true of the relations between Borah and Stimson. At times they were poles apart in their attitude towards the problem of world peace, but upon other occasions they stood shoulder-to-shoulder and gave each other strong support. In the summer of 1932, Borah agreed with Stimson that it would be wise statesmanship to cancel the war debts of the nations that had been associated with America during the World War.28
In the early days of 1933, Borah once more stood close to Stimson. On January 10, 1933, President Hoover sent to Congress a special message requesting authority to declare an embargo upon munitions of war. This request had particular reference to the war then raging between Bolivia and Paraguay. But the message also contained an enclosure from Secretary Stimson (January 6, 1933) in the form of a resolution that had wide implications.29 Borah was persuaded to introduce this resolution which passed the Senate on January 19 without discussion. On the following day Senator Bingham made a motion to reconsider the vote on the resolution and thereby erected a barrier that prevented final favorable action.30
Under the wide terms of this resolution, whenever the President discovered in any part of the world a threatening situation which would be aggravated by shipments of munitions of war to that quarter, he could, after securing some measure of international co-operation, issue a proclamation which would take the form of an arms embargo. This embargo would be put into force against "such country or countries as he [the President] may designate."
The tremendous powers thus placed within the discretion of the President were very apparent to the business interests of the United States. Officials from the Winchester Repeating Arms Company, and from similar corporations in different parts of the country, rushed to Washington and strongly argued against the proposed legislation. In response to this pressure the scope of the resolution was narrowed. The embargo would apply not to "any part of the world" but merely to "any American Country."31 But even in this emasculated form it failed to secure the approval of Congress.32
When Secretary Hull assumed office in March 1933 he quickly disclosed his irritation that Congress had failed to enact neutrality legislation that placed broad powers within the President's discretion. He and Stimson saw eye to eye in this regard. In April 1935, he frankly informed the President that he did not want the type of legislation "advocated by isolationists like Nye, which would bind the Executive hand and foot and inform any prospective aggressors . . . that they could declare war on their intended victim and we would then see to it that our citizens did not furnish arms to that victim."33
But Hull was not able to suppress the enthusiasm of Senators Nye and Clark who introduced several measures providing for the very neutrality policy that was scorned by the Department of State. The President and Secretary Hull asked Senator Pittman (chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations) to "kill" the proposed legislation by reporting adversely upon it, but he failed to act according to their desires. Norman Davis was then sent to see Pittman who agreed to "stifle" the Nye-Clark resolutions. After this promise of acquiescence by Pittman, Hull appeared before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and expressed his views. Subsequently he sent to the committee a draft of the legislation which he preferred. This, of course, contained a provision which left to the President's discretion the application of an arms embargo in time of war.34
The Department of State feared that the strong isolationist bloc in the Senate might be able to postpone the passage of the proposed legislation, so Hull on August 19 asked President Roosevelt to exert pressure upon Senator Pittman so that he would evince the proper fighting spirit against the obstructionists. But Pittman seemed singularly unresponsive to White House advice in this regard, and the resolution he reported from the Committee on Foreign Relations failed to give the President any discretion in the application of an arms embargo. When this resolution passed both houses of Congress and was sent to the President for his approval, Secretary Hull indicated several provisions that were distasteful to him. But the President waved aside these objections and approved the bill on August 31.
On September 24, the National Munitions Control Board held its first meeting, and now every manufacturer, exporter, and importer of arms, ammunition, and implements of war would have to register with the Department of State. The export of their products would be controlled by a license system. In time of war a mandatory embargo proclaimed by the President would put a stop to this trade with belligerent nations. There would be no opportunity for the use of Presidential discretion. It was also provided that the Chief Executive, by proclamation, could extend to American citizens a warning that if they took passage on belligerent ships they did so at their own risk. He could prohibit or restrict the entry of belligerent submarines into American waters and could bar the transport of men and munitions from American ports to belligerent vessels at sea.35
d. American Reaction to the Italo-Ethiopian War
The Neutrality Act had established a new policy of peace insurance which it was ardently hoped would keep America safe from the ravages of war. A test for this policy soon arose on October 3 when Mussolini's legions marched into Ethiopia. The usual proclamations of war were omitted. This led Secretary Hull to send telegrams to London, Paris, Rome, Geneva, and Addis Ababa requesting news of actual hostilities. Bingham, in London, replied that "His Majesty's Government do not consider a state of war to exist."36 A little puzzled by the cautious attitude of Britain, Hull sent another telegram of inquiry to London: "Is this attitude based upon legal considerations that relate to belligerent rights, or is it the result of practical considerations pending the Council meeting?"37
While Hull was waiting for a reply from Bingham, Stanley K. Hornbeck, chief of the Division of Far Eastern Affairs, proposed to Mr. Phillips that a message be sent to the British Foreign Office and to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to the effect that no request be made of the American Government to co-operate in the imposition of sanctions.38
Dr. Hornbeck's proposal was met with "smiles of disapproval" but he nevertheless continued to push it vigorously. He knew only too well that Europe would be eager for America to co-operate in any program of pressure upon Italy and he realized the dangers that would attend such action. While the Department of State was pondering the problems that would inevitably arise out of the war, word came from Paris that Laval and Eden had been holding important conferences concerning the course that should be followed. Laval had expressed the view that "it might be possible to get by with economic measures" of pressure upon Rome. Eden had countered with the statement that "if such measures should be taken they must be strong, firm and complete, and must commence all at once in order to be effective."39
As dispatches continued to pour into the Department of State from European capitals it was soon obvious that a state of actual warfare existed between Italy and Ethiopia. In view of this fact President Roosevelt sent to Secretary Hull a wireless message from the cruiser Houston that he believed a proclamation should be immediately issued recognizing this state of war.40 Hull agreed with this viewpoint even though some of his advisers like Hugh Wilson were of the opinion that America should await action by the League. On October 5 the formal proclamation was issued which placed an embargo upon the shipment of arms and munitions of war to belligerent nations. Along with this proclamation a statement was issued warning all American citizens that those "who voluntarily engage in transactions of any character with either of the belligerents do so at their own risk."41
This statement went beyond the letter of the Neutrality Act and was drafted by Secretary Hull in order to discourage "trading of all kinds with Italy." The President had agreed with Hull in this particular case, but he broke with him in connection with the issuance of a warning to American citizens to be careful about traveling on Italian ships. Hull thought this warning was not necessary, but the President insisted that it be issued. He feared that if "Americans continue to patronize Italian ships there may very easily occur some untoward episode."42
From Germany, Dodd reported that the Italo-Ethiopian War was being carefully studied by the Foreign Office. With reference to the possible imposition of sanctions, Dodd believed that inasmuch as Germany was no longer a member of the League and had no share in "Geneva decisions, it does not propose to be bound thereby." The German Government hoped "to maintain normal trade with Italy."43
In Paris there was a growing disinclination to take strong measures against Italy. Even the leftist press was supporting this viewpoint. The communist papers were exclaiming with emphasis: "We refuse to be dragged into a war through Signor Mussolini's folly." In the leading papers there was a marked tendency to "dissuade England from pressing for the adoption of sanctions."44
After a careful scrutiny of the French press the Italian Government reached the conclusion that "France had decided to support Italy without alienating England." The consequence was that "Italy will proceed uninterrupted into Ethiopia, in the meantime seeking some advantageous compromise Military sanctions seem certain to be discarded and such economic sanctions as may be adopted have the prospect of being so restricted as to be ineffective."45
Hugh Wilson, in Geneva, hoped that Secretary Hull would postpone any action with reference to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. The situation was decidedly "ticklish." The issuance of an American proclamation recognizing a state of war "might influence the decision of the Council and involve us in responsibility for the course of action which they adopt."46
Prentiss Gilbert, also in Geneva, presented the opposite viewpoint. He had talked with a British official who took the position that the sooner America acted "the better." League action "would not tend to clarify the situation but [would] probably render it more involved and that early action on our part would not only serve to cut through this atmosphere by a recognition of the realities of the situation, but . . . would also strengthen the British position."47
It was the British position that Secretary Hull regarded as being of prime importance. On October 5 he directed James C. Dunn to telephone to the Embassy in London and make certain inquiries about the attitude of the Foreign Office. He learned that the British Government believed that "sanctions might not be agreed to immediately at Geneva, but that eventually there would be sanctions." With reference to the existence of war between Italy and Ethiopia, no decision had as yet been made by the British Government.48
While the British Foreign Office was wrestling with the juridical problem of war, the British General Staff and the British Admiralty were engaging in important conversations with French military officials concerning possible operations in the event that France was attacked as a result of League measures. During these conversations the question of sanctions was given extended consideration, the view being expressed that "military measures might be evoked by conditions flowing out of the application of economic measures."49
These conversations were given added significance by the reply of the French Government to the British query as to French action in the event Britain was attacked by a third power "against whom sanctions were contemplated." French assistance was promised under the following three conditions:
1) The obligation of assistance must be reciprocal. It must bind Britain to help France in similar circumstances.
2) There must be a joint consultation on the proposed measures of precaution.
3) The obligations must apply whether the aggressor State is or is not a member of the League.50
e. The League Names Italy as an Aggressor Nation
During the period of Anglo-French military conversations concerning the wide ramifications of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, the League of Nations was grappling with the same thorny problem. Anthony Eden, at Geneva, had no thought of appeasement, and his inflexible attitude was strongly supported by many important groups in Britain.
The clergy of the Church of England was particularly insistent that the British Government stand behind the League. The Archbishop of York 51 and the Archbishop of Canterbury wrote letters that vehemently expressed the opinion that loyalty to the League was a moral obligation.52 Canon F. R. Barry, preaching in Westminster Abbey, struck a similar note and frankly faced the fact that League support in the crisis then disturbing Europe might have grave consequences for Britain.53 Just before the Assembly of the League declared Italy to be an aggressor state, Eden received a telegram from the Archbishop of York and a number of bishops, deans, and other representatives of the Church of England assuring him that he had their ardent support in "taking whatever action" might be "necessary to uphold the Covenant of the League."54
Many members of the Trades Union Congress were outspoken in their advocacy of loyalty to the League, and when the Labour Party Conference began its sessions on September 30 a demand was immediately voiced for the application of economic sanctions.55 British public opinion was apparently ready to support the League even at the cost of war.
In France there was a very different situation. As the shadow of resurgent Germany began to darken the northern frontiers of France, Laval grew increasingly reluctant to have any serious break with Mussolini. At first the rightist leagues like the Croix de Feu, the Camelots du Roi, and the Solidarite Franchise were the most outspoken groups in favor of friendly relations with Mussolini's Italy, but slowly the leftist elements moved in the same direction. In most circles there was no fervor for war. The general viewpoint reflected a profound pessimism about British idealism. It seemed to a large number of Frenchmen that the sudden British enthusiasm for the League masked a selfish concern for British imperial interests.
They regarded it as distinctly naive to allow their feelings to be engaged by the abrupt conversion of a nation which finds itself overcome by so lively an attachment to the League at a moment when the League can be of service to its national interests. Between the previous indulgence and the present severity of the English attitude towards violations of the Covenant, the French see a contrast which strikes them as singular. .. . Is it not exasperating to see England rallying to the Covenant at last after her long detachment has allowed our victory [in the World War] to fritter itself away and has permitted an expansion of German nationalism ?56
But French reluctance to press Mussolini in a vigorous fashion did not prevent the League of Nations from taking action to block Italian expansion in Ethiopia. On October 5 the Council of the League met at Geneva and appointed a Committee of Six which was to submit a report on the Italo-Ethiopian dispute not later than the afternoon of the 7th. On that date the Council reassembled and heard the report of this special committee. In conclusion the report made this ominous statement: "After an examination of the facts stated above, the Committee has come to the conclusion that the Italian Government has resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations." The Council accepted this report naming Italy as an aggressor nation, and it referred the matter to the meeting of the Assembly on October 9.57
There was little doubt that the Assembly would confirm the decision of the Council, and in Geneva the question of sanctions began to loom large. On October 8, Hugh Wilson had a long talk with M. Coulondre, the French Foreign Office expert on economics, who wanted to know if copper and petroleum could be included under the term "implements of war" and thus be affected by the American arms embargo. Wilson did not believe that these "strategic materials" would fall within the terminology of the neutrality law. Coulondre then remarked that embargoes and quotas could be made efficacious "only on condition that the United States would co-operate." Wilson felt that such co-operation "might be extremely difficult." After a brief consideration of this discouraging statement, Coulondre expressed the optimistic opinion that the French and British governments were moving towards a "real entente."58
In London, Sir Samuel Hoare discussed this entente with Ambassador Bingham and was a little dubious about French co-operation. He inclined towards the view that the "French Government would not go as far as actual military sanctions or a blockade, but he was confident that the French would support the British up to that point." Economic sanctions might turn the trick. If there could be arranged some effective collective action in refusing to accept Italian exports, the war would not last more than a few months.59
The possibility that the Italo-Ethiopian conflict might widen into a general European war was discounted by Mussolini who assured the editor of the Paris Soir of his desire to come to an understanding with Britain: "This disagreement which England has with us is indeed senseless and a conflict between the two countries would be unthinkable. Neither directly nor indirectly do we desire to injure any British interest."60
But these gestures of conciliation did not affect the attitude of the Assembly of the League of Nations which on October 11 approved the decision of the Council (October 7) to declare that Italy had resorted to war "in disregard of engagements under Article 12 of the Covenant." The Assembly also appointed a Co-ordination Committee to deal with the matter of possible sanctions against Italy.61
Ambassador Long reported that in Rome the press was "bitter over the action of the League." It expressed the opinion that "Italy has been condemned at Geneva under methods which no court in any civilized country would use in the prosecution of the most heinous crime."62 In view of this sharp Italian animosity towards Britain, Long thought that the Department of State should be prepared for a "possible sudden outbreak of hostilities." If a conflict actually took place, it would not be wise to discount the military strength of Italy. The "potentialities of the situation suggest the possibility of our having to deal on a friendly basis in the future with a more important Italy."63
f. Secretary Hull Insists upon an Independent Policy
The Department of State was fully aware of the implications of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. On October 9, Secretary Hull sent a telegram to Hugh Wilson in which he emphasized the fact that as far as the American Government was concerned it should be "increasingly clear" to the League that every possible step had been taken to "preserve the peace." An assurance was then given that the Department of State would not overlook "any measures that we may be able to take consistent with our policy." But the League should realize that the American Government was inclined to pursue its course "independently in the light of circumstances as they develop."64
Ambassador Wilson discussed this instruction with Anthony Eden who said that he "had been particularly careful not to take any steps which could embarrass the United States and that he had reached the conclusion before I spoke to him that it might be embarrassing to us to have an invitation issued." When Wilson took the matter up with Laval he received a prompt assurance that "if the matter of an invitation were raised," France would oppose "such a step."65 Eden then remarked that further pressure could be exerted upon Italy through collective action on the part of the signatories of the Pact of Paris. He could not see that "such a step would cut across the work at Geneva if done through diplomatic channels." In order to illustrate this statement he outlined the plan he had in mind for applying sanctions to Italy in such a way as to bring the war to an early close.
While Eden was thinking in terms of compulsion, Laval still hoped that it would be "possible to make an agreement which could be accepted by Italy." This hope was based upon confidential information to the effect that Mussolini was prepared to accept "something considerably less than he had formerly demanded."66
But from Rome word came that the position of Mussolini in Italy was stronger than ever. The feeling was widespread that "the present issue goes beyond any question of internal policies and involves the very existence of Italy. Mussolini counts among his supporters today persons who formerly would gladly have witnessed this downfall or perhaps even had contributed to that purpose."67
In Geneva the British continued to press for effective sanctions. This policy would be pursued until the elections. Consequently, "the weight of English pressure at Geneva on the Italo-Abyssinian crisis may be expected to increase rather than diminish until the general election is over."68
This British pressure found expression during a conversation between Sir Samuel Hoare and Ambassador Bingham. The Foreign Secretary was extremely anxious that Italy be made to feel the weight of international displeasure because of her aggressive action in Ethiopia. In this regard the signatories of the Kellogg Pact could play an important role. They could be summoned to action by the League, but this procedure might awaken resentment in the United States. A second alternative could take the form of a series of conversations "between the diplomatic representatives of the Pact signatories," but Hoare was silent as to the method of initiating these conversations. The third alternative was the "possibility of action initiated by the President of the United States."69
When these suggestions were conveyed to President Roosevelt he was somewhat confused as to procedure. He was enjoying a cruise at sea and he did not have on board his vessel a "complete copy" of the Kellogg Pact. He could not remember any "clause under which any positive action can be taken by signatories against a violating nation except possibly a pro forma protest."70
Hull immediately replied by wireless that there was no provision in the Pact of Paris which prescribed any method of invocation. But former secretaries of state [including Stimson] had "unofficially expressed the opinion that the Pact impliedly authorized and calls for consultation, and it is our view that consultation at the present stage .. . does not contemplate anything more than a concerted .. . appeal by all the signatories to the belligerent countries to abide by their legal and moral obligations by desisting from further hostilities."71
With the President's approval, Secretary Hull sent a long instruction to Ambassador Bingham indicating the attitude of the American Government. The Department of State was "favorably disposed in principle to the idea of calling attention to the obligations of all signatories to the Pact," and this had already been done with reference to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. With regard to any consultation between the signatories of the pact in relation to this dispute, such action should have been taken before the outbreak of hostilities. Therefore, the "opportune moment for collective invocation of the Pact. . . has gone by." In view of what the "United States has already done, dramatically and emphatically, I doubt whether it would be wise for a renewed initiative to come from this country."72
But this negative attitude towards any formal invocation of the Pact of Paris did not prevent the President and Secretary Hull from making strenuous efforts to exert economic pressure upon Italy even before sanctions were actually imposed by the members of the League. At a press conference on October 10, Secretary Hull was asked whether he would care to elaborate upon what "the President said about American interests trading with belligerents at their own risk." Hull replied that every person should be able to grasp the "implications" of the President's statement. While there was no legal prohibition against Americans engaging in ordinary commercial transactions with the belligerent nations, the President's warning about the risks attending these business relations would probably act to diminish the extent of them.73
This mild, indirect way of checking the flow of American goods to Italy did not satisfy the President's desire to help put a stop to the Italo-Ethiopian War. He suggested to Secretary Hull that it might be possible to put an end to all shipments of processed copper and steel by including those articles in the list of "arms, ammunition and implements of war." When Hull informed him that his advisers in the Department of State were of the opinion that the Neutrality Act did not "authorize such additions to the embargo list," he pressed for the publication of the names of all Americans who, even at their own risk, traveled on belligerent ships or traded with belligerents. Hull conferred with Secretary Roper on this point and then advised the President that such publication would be "unwise." It would be expedient to proceed slowly and avoid incurring the "criticism and the certain antagonism of traders and travellers."74
g. Britain Limits Italian Freedom of Speech
American interest in the imposition of sanctions against Italy was diverted for a short time by British action to limit Italian freedom of speech. On October 12 the Columbia Broadcasting System issued a press release relative to the refusal of the British postal authorities to relay, through the radio-telephonic circuit between London and New York, a speech made by Baron Aloisi at Geneva. Under Article 27 of the Telecommunication Convention of Madrid, any suspension of radio services could be put into effect only after "all the contracting governments" had been notified through the Bern Bureau of such intended action. The British Government had not taken the trouble to send this notification, and their failure to do so was branded by Francis C. de Wolf, of the Department of State, as "somewhat high handed." This incident was "further proof of the wisdom of establishing a separate telephonic circuit between New York and Paris."75
Dr. Irving Stewart, a member of the Communications Commission, took the matter more seriously than Mr. de Wolf. He regarded the British action as a direct breach of Article 26 of the Treaty of Madrid (1932). It might, therefore, be necessary for the Federal Communications Commission to write to Secretary Hull and request that the breach be "brought to the attention of the British authorities." This suggestion was shocking to certain officials in the Department of State who were busily berating Italy for violating treaties. Britain must never be put in the same class with Italy in this matter. Dr. Stewart was quickly informed that it would be preferable to keep all discussion of this question upon a "purely informal basis" because its wide ramifications "involved matters of delicate consequence." It was apparent to Dr. Stewart that Britain must not be judged by ordinary standards, so he promised to do "all he could" to keep the commission from sending any protest to the Department of State.76 The incident could be safely buried in the voluminous government files.
h. America Refuses to Follow a
Parallel Policy with Britain
While this burial was being safely accomplished by the members of the Federal Communications Commission, many of the experts in the Department of State were wrestling with the very live problem of sanctions against Italy. They were fully aware of the fact that the Covenant of the League imposed no obligations on the League as such in connection with the imposition of sanctions. The enforcement of such measures was the responsibility of the individual members of the League. The obligation of each member to apply sanctions became effective as soon as it had recognized through its vote that Italy "had gone to war in violation of the Covenant."77 All the members of the Council with the exception of Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Albania had approved the resolution declaring Italy an aggressor nation, thus indirectly making a declaration in favor of sanctions. In the Assembly on October 10, Italy had voted against the resolution of censure, while Austria and Hungary abstained from formal action. Thus the League was almost a unit in its approval of measures to curb Italian aggression.
In Europe the attitude of Germany was of prime importance. Word from Ambassador Dodd was reassuring: "Notwithstanding the suspicions of the French . . . which I gather are in a measure shared in the United States that Germany may shortly be expected to avail herself of the conjuncture to break loose, this country is really out of the picture for the present."78
News from France struck a note of muted optimism. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., had a conversation with Pierre Laval on October 15. The French Premier still nursed hopes of finding a solution for the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. France had no intention of "acquiescing in either military sanctions or blockade." He was especially anxious for his policy of conciliation to succeed because if matters were pushed to an extreme point and Mussolini fell there was "great danger that Communism might take over the regime in Italy and Europe could ill afford this blow."79
In October 1935 there was little danger of Mussolini's fall. The decision of the League to impose sanctions upon Italy had done more "to rally the nation around the Government . . . than any step yet taken toward a 'peaceful solution' of the dispute." Italy was now certain that Britain sought war in order to "cripple" Italian power "permanently."80 Mussolini, during a conversation with former Senator Allen, of Kansas, expressed the opinion that the British Government was trying to "provoke Italy into war."81 In Rome it was reported that a telegram had just been received from Dino Grandi recounting a discussion with Neville Chamberlain. Chamberlain had remarked that "it was no longer a question of war in Abyssinia; no longer a question of support from the League of Nations, but it has become a question of England's prestige."82
But Britain had no real intention of going to war to preserve her prestige. There was strong hope in London that economic sanctions would bring Italy to her knees. On October 15 the American press published a statement concerning the financial restrictions that the League was ready to impose upon Italy. All loans to or for the Italian Government, or to any person or corporation in Italian territory, were prohibited. Similar prohibitions would be applied to "all banking or other credits." This action was regarded by Herbert Feis, of the Department of State, as "very drastic."83
Although the British Government realized that a policy of economic sanctions might eventually lead to war with Italy, it instructed its delegation at Geneva°to push "hard and insistently" for its adoption.84 The Italian Foreign Office was fearful that this British pressure would have immediate effect upon American policy. On October 16 the Italian Ambassador had a conversation with Mr. Phillips and complained that the Federal Reserve Bank had recently circularized the more important banks in New York City asking for data concerning all credit and banking operations with Italian banks and commercial houses. He regarded this action as one of the many manifestations that the American Government was busily engaged in efforts to discourage trade with Italy. While he was certain that the League of Nations was "not dictating" to the United States, it seemed obvious that the Department of State was "very responsive to the situation developing in Geneva." When the ambassador finally remarked that he assumed that the British Government was in close touch with the United States "with regard to its program," Mr. Phillips hurriedly "denied this and told him definitely that we had not been approached by any Government with regard to League activities."85
This assurance by Mr. Phillips was distinctly disingenuous. On the very day that this assurance was given by Mr. Phillips, Anthony Eden had one of his usual confidential conversations with Ambassador Hugh Wilson. Once more the old question arose of consultations between countries which were not members of the League. Wilson expressed the opinion that any action or pronouncement by these non-member countries on the Italo-Ethiopian dispute should be issued as a result of diplomatic discussions rather than as a product of a formal conference. Eden replied by suggesting that France and the United States take the initiative in invoking the Kellogg Pact. He was quite "enthusiastic for this idea." He felt that it would be "enormously helpful... if Germany could be brought into the picture in some way."86
Secretary Hull was cool to this suggestion, and on October 17 he cabled to Prentiss Gilbert at Geneva that the American Government was "acting upon its own initiative and proceeding separately and independently of all other Governments or peace organizations."87
When Ambassador Wilson was shown a copy of this instruction he sought an early opportunity to discuss its contents with Anthony Eden. Eden was reassuring. Undoubtedly a communication from the League would be sent to the United States, but it would be in a form that "could not be embarrassing." With reference to the political situation in Europe, Eden remarked that the "whole relationship between France and England was progressively more unsatisfactory." He had received letters from France indicating that England was more unpopular than at any time since Fashoda. Certainly the public temper in Britain was rapidly mounting against France and their "shilly-shallying in carrying out collective action."88
The communication from the League to which Eden had referred took the form of some documents dealing with the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. American comment on these data was requested. On October 26, Secretary Hull sent his reply. Once more emphasis was placed upon the "independent policy" followed by the United States with reference to the war in Ethiopia. While the American Government looked with sympathetic interest upon the concerted efforts of other nations to preserve peace, it would not become a member of this concert. It would, however, be ready at all times to exercise "its moral influence in favor of peace throughout the world."89
I. Italy Hopes to Preserve American Friendship
In France some of the papers like Le Jour were frankly disappointed by the tenor of Secretary Hull's reply. M. Bailby expressed the view that "when America promises to exercise moral influence in favor of peace" it is apparent that she has "no desire to go further." This decision leaves "the door open to transportation of products through Germany and Austria, thus placing sanctions nations in a deplorably inferior position."90
Prime Minister Laval, however, informed Ambassador Straus that he was "very well pleased with the statement of the American position." He believed that peace could be preserved by granting to Italy "some form of control over that portion of Ethiopia south of the eighth meridian." He likewise felt that it would be necessary to grant a strip of territory in the North bordering on Eritrea. With regard to sanctions he inclined towards the view that they would be applied "almost immediately," and would be confined to "economic measures." He thought that it was exceedingly important to "sustain the administration of Mussolini in order to prevent the spread of communism."91
In Italy the reply of Secretary Hull to the League was considered a "full confirmation of the policy of neutrality voted by Congress." Italian opinion remained "friendly to America."92 The hopes of many Italians were given a lift by the remarks of a well-known American newspaper correspondent, Isaac G. Marcosson, who appeared to speak with authority relative to the impossibility of enforcing sanctions against Italy. It was Mr. Marcosson's conviction that the failure of Austria and Hungary to approve the policy of pressure presaged an early breakdown of that system. German exports would have an easy road to Italy, and Russia, despite promises to the contrary, would supply Mussolini with much-needed oil, pig iron, and manganese.93
But Italian optimism as to the ineffective nature of sanctions received a blow on October 30, when President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull issued statements which called attention to the fact that they had warned American citizens "against transactions of any character with either of the belligerent nations except at their own risk." The President then expressed the hope that American businessmen would not be attracted by the possibility of rich returns from wartime trade, and Mr. Hull sounded a warning against "temporary and risky war profits."94
This counsel of perfection was not received with favor in some important countries. The Japanese Ambassador in Rome informed Ambassador Long that his Government would "not support the sanctions policy" and would not "even answer the recent League communication on the subject."95 The Spanish Government was not at all certain what policy it would adopt,96 while the Polish Ambassador informed Mr. Phillips, the Acting Secretary of State, that his Government was opposed to an early enforcement of sanctions against Italy.97 The holes in the embargo dykes were constantly growing larger.
It was obvious to many American diplomats abroad that the British program for exerting pressure upon Italy was not meeting with the support that had been expected. The possibility of being drawn into a war had acted as a deterrent upon some nations; others were critical of the way British statesmen had handled the matter. Ambassador Long expressed the view that the Italian invasion of Ethiopia had been a violation of the Kellogg Pact, but she was not alone in this movement towards war. Britain's "naval threat against Italy was also a violation of the Covenant of the League and fairly good evidence that she was, and is, ready to disregard her renunciation of 'war as a national policy' taken under the Kellogg Pact."98
It was difficult for Ambassador Long to be sharply critical of Italian policy. In Rome he had been treated with such constant courtesy that he found it easy to supply excuses for violations of the Kellogg Pact. Since October 11 the Italian Government had been faced with the threat of sanctions. This economic warfare would start on November 18, and its impact upon the Italian way of life was dreaded throughout the peninsula. It was widely recognized that America, through her arms embargo, through restrictions upon banking credit, and by repeated warnings of the dangers of trade with belligerent nations, had taken steps that might seriously embarrass the Italian war effort. But the Italian Government had not permitted these adverse moves to produce an attitude of hostility towards the United States. While there was some "querulousness in their scrutiny of American policy, they are on the whole generous in their interpretations of it as it affects them and they very generally consider America in a very friendly way." The hope was still cherished that the Ethiopian war would not sacrifice "the friendship of America not only because of the selfish advantage it is to them in this fight but also because the thought is traditional with them." After this careful presentation of many of the factors in the Italo-Ethiopian equation, Ambassador Long closed with the following advice: "I strongly recommend the American Government be neutral and keep out of this war. .. . I recommend that we pursue a course of studied aloofness."99
J. The Department of State Exerts Pressure upon Italy
These recommendations of Ambassador Long were wasted words as far as President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull were concerned. The Anglo-American entente, whose existence had been vigorously denied by Mr. Phillips, was functioning in a most effective manner. The Department of State had been making an exhaustive study of economic sanctions and it had come to the conclusion that they could not function properly unless certain essential raw materials and key commodities were excluded from American exports to Italy. The embargo on "arms, ammunition and implements of war" was too restricted in scope to affect the Italian war effort in a major manner. Something new would have to be added to the American program.
In order to be of the greatest possible service to the League in this matter of sanctions against Italy, Secretary Hull issued on November 15a statement that was really a declaration of economic warfare upon Italy:
The American people are entitled to know that there are certain commodities such as oil, copper, trucks, tractors, scrap iron, and scrap steel which are essential war materials, although not actually "arms, ammunition, or implements of war," and that according to recent Government trade reports a considerably increased amount of these is being exported for war purposes. This class of trade is directly contrary to the policy of this Government as announced in official statements of the President and Secretary of State, as it is also contrary to the general spirit of the recent neutrality act.100
It was the purpose of Secretary Hull to place America in the van of a crusade against aggressor nations. Neither he nor the President had the authority to join with other nations in military sanctions that would stop the march of Italian armies into Ethiopia, but they could invoke the "spirit" of the Neutrality Act in an effort to sabotage any rapid advance of Mussolini's war machine. They had moved several steps ahead of the League in this matter. Secretary Hull's statement of November 15 was three days prior to the date when the League sanctions went into effect. Moreover, the list of commodities and raw materials on this non-export list was more extensive than the one subsequently issued by the League members. The American schedule included the important item of petroleum. The League never went that far and the statements issued by it never struck the note of righteousness so strongly sounded by Secretary Hull. To strident supporters of the League this note of righteousness seemed like a summons to peace; to realistic students of international relations it was a clarion call to arms whose overtones kept vibrating along State Department corridors until they were magnified into a chorus of war by the tragedy of Pearl Harbor.
X
Mussolini Makes a Mockery out of Collective Security
A. Secretary Hull Defends American Policy
SECRETARY HULL'S press statement of November 15 convinced Mussolini that the United States should really be classed with the nations that favored economic sanctions against Italy. When Ambassador Long reported this shift in sentiment to the Department of State, Hull glibly explained that America was following an "independent policy" based upon the "spirit and intent" of the recent neutrality legislation.1 On November 22 he used the same explanation during a long conversation with the Italian Ambassador. He assured Signor Rosso that one of the main reasons for the broad suggestions in the statement of November 15 was the obvious fact that the American people were "almost wildly against war and are at all hazards in favor of keeping out of the present war." Contact with belligerent nations might spread the infection of armed conflict, so the Roosevelt Administration had come to the conclusion that it was expedient to isolate America from such contacts as much as possible. "Heavy pressure" had been exerted upon the Department of State to include in its embargo list a "number of prime and essential war materials" out of which implements of war might be made. The Administration had finally decided to make some favorable response to this pressure.
Mr. Hull then directed the attention of Ambassador Rosso to the very considerable sacrifice the World War had entailed upon America. He also alluded to the large loans the Wilson Administration had extended to Italy during that conflict and to the fact that these loans had later been reduced to a "nominal sum." Many Americans were now asking why the Italian Government was embarking upon a costly adventure in imperialism instead of liquidating these overdue financial obligations. As for Mr. Hull himself, he felt constrained to express his great surprise that "the Italian Government would make a complaint against this Government, in all the circumstances, in the severe language it does."2 The position of the United States was very clear: "It opposed abnormal shipments for war purposes of strictly war materials."
These explanations of Secretary Hull were far from satisfactory to the Italian Government. The League of Nations had named November 18 as the day on which economic sanctions would go into effect, and Mussolini had many fears concerning the impact of these restrictions upon the Italian way of life. The sanctions were divided into four categories: (1) an arms embargo upon ammunition and implements of war; (2) an embargo upon Italian exports; (3) a ban upon exports to Italy; (4) a financial boycott against Italy. The financial boycott, though very stringent, did not seriously affect Italy. The embargo upon Italian exports caused a sharp decline in trade with France and Britain, but the United States bought as much in March 1936 as in January 1935, and Germany, Austria, and Hungary came to the rescue of Mussolini. Although the gold reserves of the Bank of Italy shrank rapidly between November 1935 and March 1936, there was a balance sufficient to provide necessary purchases for a short war.3 The ban on exports to Italy was not as drastic and as extensive as some statesmen had wished. Coal, oil, and copper were not prohibited. For the three month period, October through December 1935, the American proportion of Italy's oil purchases rose to 17.8 per cent. Copper exports from the United States showed a similar increase, rising from $1,329,000 (November 1934-March 1935) to $2,201,000 (November 1935- March 1936). Despite the ardent admonitions of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull, American business interests would not embargo exports that brought large profits.4
In November 1935 the Italian Government had no assurance that sanctions would fail to cripple its war effort. There was still a strong sentiment in Geneva to place oil on the embargo list, and there was also a possibility that Secretary Hull might be able to induce American oil companies to cease their exports. Ambassador Long believed that if the League banned the export of petroleum to Italy, Mussolini would "choose to fight rather than submit."5
Laval also feared this possibility and was decidedly "lukewarm toward the enforcement of sanctions." At a reception in Paris, Mme Laval informed the wife of the Italian Ambassador "in no uncertain terms how utterly opposed she was to the creation of any antagonism between France and Italy." Persons "high in Government" felt that she was "echoing her husband's point of view."6
In the face of this threat of war from Mussolini, Britain quickly turned to the United States for advice. On December 5 the British Ambassador in Washington asked Secretary Hull if there was any possibility that the American Government would take "effective action" to prevent increased oil shipments to Italy in the event the League imposed an oil embargo or that the British Government embarked upon an independent course along the same line.7 Hull's reply was quite cautious. While the Department of State was definitely opposed to the shipment "in abnormal quantities" of war materials to the belligerent nations, "those interested must use their own judgment" in attempting to forecast "the probable attitude and action of Congress" towards these abnormal exportations.
This Delphic answer did not satisfy Sir Ronald Lindsay who returned to the Department of State on December 7 to repeat his inquiry. Hull was somewhat annoyed by this persistence. During the course of his conversation with Sir Ronald he asked if the League were waiting for American assurances before taking any action. Before the Ambassador could reply, Hull indicated that the Department of State had "gone as far" as it could. It did not have any "legal authority to impose an oil embargo." If the League was ready to take steps to put oil on its embargo list it would have to do so without reference to American action.8
Sir Ronald was taken aback by the tone and content of Hull's remarks and finally murmured that he was not "disposed to make any further inquiry." He could clearly see that the Department of State at that moment was not interested in any adventure in Anglo-American parallel policies.
B. The Hoare-Laval Agreement
Without Secretary Hull to stiffen his backbone, John Bull was a very pliant person. At times he could lend an ear to counsel of high principle, but upon other occasions had no difficulty in hearing the soft accents of intrigue. At Geneva the British Foreign Office had a mouthpiece in Anthony Eden who talked as impeccably as he dressed. In Paris the British had an expert, Mr. Maurice Peterson, who whispered in such low terms of realism that Pierre Laval regarded him as a kindred soul and assigned M. de Saint-Quentin to be his boon companion. During the early weeks of October when Eden talked of holding firm against Italian aggression, Peterson and Saint-Quentin were busily engaged upon a project that would frankly recognize the claims of Mussolini to a large portion of Ethiopia. These activities became so well known that the London Daily Herald published a plan of appeasement which was supposed to represent the viewpoint of this interesting pair. It provided for Italian domination over the empire of Haile Selassie.9
This plan was placed in diplomatic moth balls until after the General Elections in Britain. When Mr. Baldwin had been safely returned to office (November 14), Mr. Peterson resumed his work with Saint Quentin. On December 4, Laval had an important conference with the Italian Ambassador, and on the following day the New York Times published the outline of a project for peace in Ethiopia.10 Apparently, it was difficult for the plans of Laval to remain secret.
On December 7, Sir Samuel Hoare journeyed to Paris for a talk with Laval, during the course of which he expressed the view that unless some platform of peace were soon placed beneath the tottering structure of Ethiopia it would fall under the hammer blows of Marshal Badoglio. Laval quickly concurred in the gloomy predictions of the British Foreign Secretary. Ethiopia suddenly became the "sick man of Africa" and a major operation was necessary to save its existence. This operation was completed on December 8, and the chief surgeons were Hoare and Laval.
Laval's major concern in December 1935 was the danger of a rapprochement between Italy and Germany. This had to be prevented even though Mussolini's terms were high. It would be far better to place a large number of backward Ethiopians under Italian administration than to push Mussolini into Hitler's arms and thus prepare the way for World War II. Under Emperor Haile Selassie conditions in Ethiopia were distinctly primitive and the lot of the average native was poverty and personal danger. There was a strong possibility that his way of life would be improved under Italian rule.
The viewpoint of Laval has been given understanding expression by Winston Churchill in his latest study of the background of World War II:
The French, therefore, felt very strongly that they should not be drawn into permanent estrangement from Italy because of all the strong feeling which had suddenly surged up in England against Mussolini. . . . Two divisions of troops were all we could send at the outset to France if she were invaded by Germany. One can certainly understand Monsieur Laval's point of view at this time.11
Fear of Germany was a constant factor in the European equation of Laval, and after Hoare had been in Paris for a few hours he began to share this same apprehension. He finally gave his blessing to the labors of Saint-Quentin and Maurice Peterson, and the joint product soon became known as the Hoare-Laval Agreement for the settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Under its terms Ethiopia would cede to Italy some 60,000 square miles of territory and receive in return a slice of Eritrea with an outlet to the sea. The southern half of Ethiopia, approximating 160,000 square miles, would be reserved as a sphere of influence where Italy would enjoy certain economic privileges. Along with these advantages there would also go a definite amount of political control which would be equivalent to Italian domination.12 Sir Samuel was in full flight before Mussolini.13
Hoare's retreat was both moral and physical. After the publication of the Hoare-Laval Agreement the British Foreign Secretary paid a hurried visit to Switzerland for a much-needed rest. Pictures were circulated showing him skating with great zest, but bad luck followed him. While executing a difficult figure on the ice he fell and broke his nose. The fall of man is an old story but to Hoare it seemed to take on new meaning. He should return at once to England and explain to Parliament why he had become a party to a plan for appeasing Mussolini. Prime Minister Baldwin agreed with this decision and for a while intended to fight alongside of Hoare under his well-known banner of "men not measures." But aroused British public opinion compelled him quickly to lower that banner and frankly confess in Parliament that the Hoare-Laval proposals were "absolutely and completely dead." There would be no attempt "to resurrect them."14
Baldwin's decision to abandon the Hoare-Laval Agreement was made after a storm of protest broke loose in the British press. The London Star called the agreement a travesty which was "horrifying men with a sense of justice"; the Yorkshire Post regarded it as a breach of "international morality"; the Liverpool Daily Post looked upon its terms as "shocking"; while the Manchester Guardian remarked that it was "incredible that the Government has accepted a plan so utterly remote from any it has ever given the country cause to think it would so much as tolerate."15 The London Daily Herald, a leftist Labour organ, was particularly vehement in its denunciation of the agreement which it called a "breach of faith—a conspiracy to enter into a conspiracy with the aggressor in order to defeat the League."16 The News Chronicle (Liberal) scored the arrangement as an "outrageous betrayal of the Covenant,"17while the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post printed a similar lament.18 Harold Laski rushed into print with an acrid estimate of Sir Samuel Hoare: "He is simply the average Tory mind in power instead of out of power. .. . Sir Samuel acted in the crisis exactly as the old Tory mind approves. . . . He thinks in terms of power."19
On December 16 the secret corollary to the Hoare-Laval Agreement was published. This article would really prevent the Ethiopian Government from building a railroad from the port of Assab into the interior of the country. The London Times regarded this corollary as something at "variance with even the most cynical interpretation of the civilizing mission" of Italy.20
The chains of newspapers belonging to Lords Beaverbrook and Rothermere were generally in favor of the Hoare-Laval Agreement, but the majority of the British press was so sharp in its criticism that Hoare was compelled to resign and Anthony Eden was appointed as the new Foreign Minister. Baldwin thus made a bow in the direction of public opinion, but there was no conviction in the gesture. In June 1936, Hoare was brought back into the Cabinet as the First Lord of the Admiralty. It was impressively stated that his unusual talents as an administrator could not be overlooked. Apparently his colleagues thought that his talents, and not high moral principles, were the main requisite for a statesman.
In Italy this bitter British reaction to the Hoare-Laval Agreement was attributed to the "working of antifascism, masonry and communism upon the misguided masses." These forces did not exist in Germany and this fact prepared the way for an understanding with that country. The Italian press candidly admitted that German statesmen had "no love for Italy," but it was felt that Hitler respected the Fascist State as a "stronghold against Communism, and as an indispensable element for the safety of Europe. .. . In a certain sense the fates of the two countries and regimes are considered to be linked, for both have the same powerful foreign and international enemies and both are working toward similar national ends."21
With reference to British policy the feeling in Italy grew increasingly hostile. Even the temperate and optimistic L'Osservatore Romano expressed the opinion that the situation had become "extremely dangerous."22 Sanctions had not impeded the Italian war effort, and in Rome there was "plenty of coal and plenty of food." The Italian people were "ready for any emergency" and strongly disposed to "take any steps which their leader might decide for them."23
C. President Roosevelt Chides Italy
The existence of this martial spirit in Italy was viewed by President Roosevelt with deep misgivings. In an address to Congress, January 3, 1936, he referred directly to Italy and to other have-not nations. These nations had failed to demonstrate the "patience necessary to attain reasonable and legitimate objectives by peaceful negotiation or by an appeal to the finer instincts of world justice." He then contrasted these impetuous, grasping nations with peaceful and moral America.24
This homily on American virtues infuriated many Italian editors who indicated the many years that Mussolini had waited in vain for justice in the matter of a fair distribution of colonial territory:
It is easy for rich nations (like the United States who, through past ways of expansion and conquest in which natives were exterminated, has everything she needs and who to protect her high standard of living has barred immigration and imports to the detriment of poor nations) to condemn autocracies. . . . As to the beauties of democratic regimes . . . how about Roosevelt himself, who has .. . so thoroughly failed to uproot crime as to force America's national hero [Lindbergh] to seek safety for his child on this side of the Atlantic.25
This sharp tone of criticism with reference to America was soon toned down as the Italian press began to reflect increasing optimism concerning the efficiency of the war machine. The American naval attache in Rome reported that the Italian fleet was in a "very high state of efficiency" with a "high morale amongst the men and a calm and unexcited attitude on the part of the officers."26 Colonel William J. Donovan, returning from a trip to Eritrea, stated that the "service of supplies was excellent, that morale was high, that health and sanitation were splendid, efficiency first rate, and that the military positions now occupied were secure and could be easily held."27 In Rome there was a growing feeling that the African adventure would have a happy ending because Italian military strength had risen to such a point that Britain would not dare to intervene. This optimism was confirmed by glowing reports of success in the fierce engagements in the Tembyen, January 19 to January 23, 1936.
The message from President Roosevelt to Congress on January 3 was delivered in the evening over a nationwide radio network. After dealing specifically with international relations he turned to the matter of new neutrality legislation. This proposed new legislation would not only retain the mandatory embargo on the export of arms, munitions, and implements of war to belligerents but it would also empower the President to extend the embargo to the export, in excess of "normal commerce," of other articles or materials used "in the conduct of war" when he believed that such action would "preserve the neutrality of the United States" or if he thought that the war would be prolonged if such an embargo were not put into force. The list of materials subject to these restrictions was left to the discretion of the President.28
These wide powers conferred upon the President by the proposed Pittman-McReynolds Bill were regarded by some eminent publicists as dangerous to American liberties. Judge John Bassett Moore declared that it was unwise to "give this unlimited power to any man. . . . The bestowal of such power would constitute the worst form of dictatorship ever set up."29
A large number of Italian-American organizations reinforced these objections of Judge Moore's to any enlargement of the President's embargo power. Letters and telegrams began to pour into the offices of influential members of Congress. The League for American Neutrality sponsored a meeting in Faneuil Hall in Boston. Governor Curley, in a speech with strong political overtones, praised Mussolini as a lover of peace and a savior of Christianity. Other speakers were equally lyric in their praise of the Duce.30
As the attack on the proposed new neutrality legislation gained strength, Mr. Generoso Pope, publisher of the well-known newspaper, // Progresso, rushed to Washington for an interview with President Roosevelt. The Chief Executive was most reassuring: "Gene, America honestly wishes to remain neutral; and I want you to tell the Italians . . . that our neutrality will in no way imply discrimination at the expense of Italy and in favor of any other nation." When Mr. Pope asked if the existing neutrality legislation could not be re-enacted, the President replied: "Perhaps this could be a good solution." Mr. Pope then pressed the same question upon Secretary Hull who "assured him that he had no personal objection to the idea if Congress should decide to accept it."31
Whether as a result of this pressure or not, Congress rejected the section of the Neutrality Bill that enlarged the President's embargo powers. It did forbid the granting of loans and credits to belligerents
and it made mandatory the existing discretionary power of the President to extend the arms embargo to additional states when they became involved in war. It also exempted from the operation of the law any American republic at war with a non-American state and not "co-operating with a non-American State or States in such war."32
It is apparent, therefore, that the Italian-American pressure group made strenuous efforts to defeat any neutrality legislation that would seriously affect Mussolini's "African Adventure," and it is the opinion of an able student of the situation in 1936 that this group "noticeably influenced the course of American neutrality."33
D. Josef Beck Loses Confidence in the League
Italian victories in the spring of 1936 strengthened the efforts of Italian-Americans to prevent any amendments to neutrality legislation that would confer additional powers upon the President. They also indicated to European statesmen that Italian conquest of Ethiopia was inevitable. It was now realized with deep regret that it had been a mistake to abandon the Hoare-Laval Agreement which might have saved for Emperor Haile Selassie a considerable portion of his empire. In London the American charge reported that it was "increasingly realized by those responsible for British foreign policy that whereas the methods employed by Hoare were faulty, the general aim of his policy was substantially right." The former British Foreign Secretary had recognized the fact that Germany would greatly profit by any break in the Stresa front. His concessions to Italy were based upon the belief that Europe could not afford to alienate Mussolini. Eden was beginning to realize the truth of some of Hoare's assertions, and his zeal for sanctions was fast disappearing.34
At Geneva, Hugh Wilson saw the shadow of Germany begin to darken the minds of many delegates to the League of Nations. He was struck with the "fact that nearly everyone with whom I have spoken has treated the problem of Germany with greater gravity than that of Abyssinia. . . . Massigli says that the French are much concerned lest Germany in the near future denounce the servitudes on the Rhineland."35
It was not difficult for French statesmen to see that Hitler would take advantage of any coolness between Britain and Italy, and Massagli clearly forecast the German movement in the Rhineland. Britain's pressure upon Poland in the matter of sanctions had distressed Colonel Beck in Warsaw who let Laval know that he had "lost confidence in the League of Nations as an instrument for promoting peace."36 Anthony Eden's insistence upon a firm policy with reference to Italy soon brought many chickens of hatred to roost in the muted halls of the League of Nations.
E. Implications of the Maffey Report
The Italian chickens were offered a comfortable roost on the well known "Maffey Report" which was published in part in the Giornale d'italia. This confidential British document, dated June 18, 1935, was regarded by the Italian press as a justification of the Italian program in Ethiopia. Sir John Maffey, British Permanent Under Secretary for Colonies, was appointed chairman of a special committee to examine into the more important aspects of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Eden admitted that the report of this special committee concluded with a statement that "there was no important British interest in Abyssinia with the exception of Lake Tana, the waters of the Blue Nile, and certain tribal grazing rights." During the early months of 1935, British ministers acted as if they agreed with the findings of this Maffey Report, and "what is more, seemed to care little about their obligations toward the League of Nations in relation to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. . . . It is little wonder, then, if Mussolini concluded that the British Lion was peacefully and purposely dozing."
But this slumber was rudely interrupted by the announcement on June 27, 1935, of the results of the "Peace Ballot" which since November 1934 had been conducted by some private organizations under the auspices of the League of Nations Union. Approximately eleven and a half million persons in Great Britain and North Ireland recorded their opinions on five questions. On the question as to the advisability of using "military measures" to stop aggression, 74 per cent of the vote cast was in favor "of military sanctions."
This large affirmative vote deeply disturbed the Baldwin Government which had just refused to consider sanctions against German rearmament. The policy of the Foreign Office had been governed by expediency rather than principle, and it was difficult for it suddenly to "stand forth convincingly as the White Knight of collective security."37 When the attempt was made in connection with Italian expansion in Ethiopia, Mussolini felt that he had been double-crossed and he refused to be impressed with British recitations of certain formulas of peace.
In order to justify his suspicions of British policy he had pertinent paragraphs of the Maffey Report published in the Italian press. They contained sharp criticism relating to "Ethiopia's unworthiness of belonging to the League, her ill-will toward Italy and her menace to all neighboring colonies." The Italian Government had in "due time informed the British Government of the situation in Ethiopia," and had expressed a desire for co-operation. Why was co-operation denied and why did the British Foreign Office fail to "go into the fact that, as the Maffey Report showed, Abyssinia was a violator of League principles and obligations?"
After reading the excerpts from the Maffey Report as published in the Giornale d'italia, most Italians believed that British action in the Ethiopian dispute was based upon a "dislike of Fascism; determination to destroy the Franco-Italian alliance; a desire to maintain absolute hegemony in the Mediterranean; and Eden's personal ambition and, at a later stage, the bitter enmity toward Mussolini." Italians were "bewildered by what they regard as the criminal, and also suicidal, policy of England."38
From England, Sir Leo Chiozza Money, former Parliamentary Secretary to the British Ministry of Shipping, wrote a brief letter to President Roosevelt and inclosed many documents that placed Italian penetration of Ethiopia in a favorable light. It was evident to him that the Italians in Ethiopia were "cultivating, teaching and healing, founding hospitals and dispensaries, sinking wells, freeing slaves . . . and in the words of Major Fiske (an American, by the way), doing in 100 days more than had been done in 1,000 years."39
In Rome, Ambassador Long realized the significance of the Italo-Ethiopian impasse with regard to European alignments. The Italian Government had made it clear that a "continuance of the present policy of the League under British direction and French backing will make Italy revise her whole foreign policy." The heavy concentration of the British fleet in the Mediterranean was deeply resented by Mussolini who had been giving careful attention to the suggestion that an ultimatum be sent to London demanding a reduction in the number of British warships in those waters.40
The possibility of such a step was strengthened by the electrifying news of a series of brilliant victories gained by Italian armies in Ethiopia. On February 15, Marshal Badoglio won a decisive battle at Amba Aradam, where the forces of Ras Mulugeta were crushed so completely that it amounted to a national disaster. On February 27, Italian forces drove the Ethiopian troops from their strongly fortified positions in the Tembyen, and on April 12 the Italian flag was hoisted on the northern shore of Lake Tana. Emperor Haile Selassie realized the shattering effect of these defeats, and in a desperate attempt to stem the Italian tide he attacked the First Italian Army Corps near Lake Ashangi on March 31. After five days of bitter struggle the Emperor's troops fled in wild disorder down the road to Dessie, and the eventual Italian conquest of Ethiopia was assured.41
F. Britain Wishes Oil to Be on List of Sanctions
The Italian victories in February 1936 seemed to spur the British Government into a final attempt to tighten economic restrictions upon Italy and to impose the long-threatened oil sanction. On March 2, Signor Bova Scoppa, the head of the Italian delegation at Geneva, informed the French Foreign Secretary (Flandin) that Mussolini would seriously resent the imposition of the oil sanction. When Flandin informed Eden of this fact, the British Foreign Secretary stated that he had been instructed by the Cabinet to push this very measure. Flandin opposed this move so vigorously that Eden talked with Prime Minister Baldwin over the telephone and secured a postponement of action upon oil.42 On the following day (March 3) the Committee of Thirteen adopted a resolution which called upon both belligerents to open negotiations for the "definite restoration of peace." It was expected that the Italian and Ethiopian governments would have their replies ready for the meeting of the committee on March 10.
Mussolini was not disposed to pay much attention to this request of the Committee of Thirteen. He would make peace upon his own terms when Italian armies had crushed Ethiopian resistance. France could read this military writing upon the wall of Ethiopia and it spelled a policy of nonintervention. Flandin was determined to conciliate rather than irritate Mussolini, and his attitude was praised by Virginio Gayda (March 3) . 43 On that same day the Duce, in an address to his Cabinet, commended the American Government for its refusal to heed "League solicitations" with reference to the imposition of a sanction upon the export of oil to Italy.44
In Rome the feeling against an oil sanction had been very strong and Mussolini had several times intimated that he would regard such action as almost the equivalent of a declaration of war. He was, therefore, deeply grateful to Flandin for his pressure upon Eden. But this gratitude to France was soon partially diverted to Hitler when the Nazi leader moved his troops into the Rhineland (March 7) and thus liquidated the Locarno Pact. Once more Germany rocked the foundations of the European state system and made France labor desperately in an attempt to maintain the Stresa front. Mussolini must now be courted rather than chided.
G. Mussolini Makes a Peaceful Gesture
In March the Italian Foreign Office saw at a glance that a profound change had suddenly taken place in the European scene. With victory in Ethiopia now assured, Italy could make some slight gesture of peace. On March 8, Mussolini informed the Committee of Thirteen that he accepted in principle their plea for a restoration of peace. But negotiations for a cessation of Italo-Ethiopian hostilities must be based upon a recognition of the alleged fact that Ethiopia was the "aggressor nation." Moreover, in any peace program acceptable to Italy there should be an assurance that "security and treaty rights" would be guaranteed, and it should be made clear that "the military situation" must be the basis for negotiation.45
Engert, in Addis Ababa, ridiculed these terms of peace and vehemently denied the reports of Italian military successes. In recent important engagements the Italian plan for encircling the Ethiopian Army had failed and the Italian "forces, especially the Alpinis, suffered heavy losses." The morale of the Ethiopian soldiers was "excellent and has not been affected by Italian lies." Mussolini's legions were in a "precarious situation and their lines of communication are at the mercy of Ethiopian patrols who take the fullest advantage of it. .. . Ethiopia is determined to eject the invader from her territory."46
Mussolini knew the situation in Ethiopia far better than the American Minister in Addis Ababa, and he counted upon the fact that time was on his side. In Rome he evinced a co-operative disposition and let it be understood that he was in favor of a settlement of the Rhineland difficulty "with such a show of strength against Germany that it would make the Reich realize the seriousness of any further infractions" of the Treaty of Versailles.47
This apparent conciliatory disposition had some effect upon the Committee of Thirteen which reassembled on March 23 in London. After considering the answers of Italy and Ethiopia to its plea for the restoration of peace, the committee requested its chairman to "take such steps as may be called for" in order to "bring the two parties together .. . and to bring about a prompt cessation of hostilities." On this same day Mussolini made a bitter attack upon sanctions.48 The path to peace was still blocked by barriers that only an Italian victory could remove.
This victory would not be long delayed. Italian armies were on the road to complete military success in Ethiopia, and the fleet was ready to give a good account of itself. Captain L. N. McNair, the naval attache at Rome, was much impressed "with the physical preparations in the form of equipment and with the moral and spiritual preparations of the men and officers of the Italian Navy." Within the last six months the situation in the eastern Mediterranean had changed distinctly in the direction of Italy's advantage.49
H. Britain Becomes More Friendly with Hitler
Britain was not happy to see this increase in Italian military strength, and was inclined to court Germany as one means of balancing the new political equation in the Mediterranean. There was a "distinct pro-German attitude among English people including high army circles."50 Reliance upon some measure of German support relieved the British Government of the necessity of conciliating Italy, and in Paris it was believed that "relations between Italy and Great Britain are so tense as to be the really grave danger point on the European horizon today."51 From Berlin, Dodd reported on the possibility of a rapprochement between Germany and Britain. Several well-informed and experienced observers were of the opinion that "the British may have to choose shortly between following French advice and make up with the Italians . . . or pursuing the obvious alternative of virtually allying herself with Germany."52 If Hitler were smart he could, according to Ambassador Dodd, drive an excellent bargain.
British statesmen were well acquainted with the old dictum that he who sups with the Devil must use a long spoon. They feared that Hitler would ask a high price for any diplomatic support he might give to the British position at Geneva, and Neville Chamberlain insisted that "no demand for the transfer of British colonies to Germany would be entertained for a moment."53 As a friendly gesture towards Germany, however, the British Cabinet would be willing to "remove the 'guilt clauses' from the Treaty [of Versailles] if Germany gives up claims for mandates." Britain would not "permit Germany to be put again in the 'dock.' " An effort should also be made to "grant France necessary security while at the same time Germany must be granted full equality." But no matter what diplomatic deals the situation in Europe demanded it should always be kept in mind that Italy should never be permitted to dominate Ethiopia.54
The items in the British Cabinet memorandum which Prentiss Gilbert disclosed to Secretary Hull were given additional confirmation by Ambassador Bingham. It was now very evident that the British Foreign Office was greatly disappointed that the Hoare-Laval Agreement had been defeated. During a conversation with Bingham the British Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs frankly admitted that he was "more than ever convinced that the Hoare-Laval proposals would have been a great advantage primarily to Abyssinia and indeed to the whole world and he thought that in the end public opinion would come around to this belief."55
I. The League Attempts to End the Italo-Ethiopian War
British belief in the advantages of the Hoare-Laval Agreement was induced by Italian military successes in March and April 1936. On April 15, Baron Aloisi appeared in Geneva and proposed to the chairman of the Committee of Thirteen that peace negotiations be opened on the basis of "the actual situation as it presents itself after six months of military operations." The Ethiopian delegation to the League promptly opposed this proposal and instead suggested the imposition of more rigorous sanctions. Anthony Eden listened with favor to these drastic suggestions, and when the Council met on the afternoon of April 20 he indicated the willingness of the British Government to exert more pressure upon Italy through the enactment of "any further economic and financial sanctions that may be considered necessary .. . for the fulfilment of the obligations which we all of us bear in this dispute."
Monsieur Paul-Boncour completely disagreed with the Eden viewpoint. France was determined to adhere to a policy of conciliation. The Italian Government had signified its desire to support the existing political structure in Europe. This attitude should be encouraged and not flouted. The Russian delegate (Potemkin) denounced the tendency in the League to treat aggressors with "tolerance or even indulgence," and Madariaga referred to the difficulty of conciliating a nation which the League had condemned as a violator of the Covenant. At the close of the session on April 20 the Council finally adopted a harmless resolution which renewed the appeal of the Committee of Thirteen to the two belligerents for a "prompt cessation of hostilities and restoration of peace in the framework of the League of Nations."56
This action of the Council was an obvious defeat for Eden. As Hugh Wilson reported from Geneva, "the current has changed. Where previously the general desire was to increase the severity of sanctions under British lead and against French restraint, now the ebb has set in and the British realize that they must maneuver carefully if existing sanctions are not to be swept away." The British Government had been gambling "on a time factor. If before the rains in Abyssinia set in towards the end of May, Abyssinia's resistance is fully crushed, it will mean a disastrous defeat to British policy." At the close of the session of the Council, Wilson encountered Eden who wryly remarked: "It is slipping badly. We have done our best but I fear it [the collective effort against Italy] is going to crumble."57
J. Britain Continues to Court Hitler
Despite the apparent disintegration of the League front against Italy, Eden still worked feverishly to keep it intact. In doing so he once more looked towards Berlin for assistance. In Paris, Straus learned that there were "certain personalities in Great Britain" who were "taking the dangerous course of encouraging Hitler" to stage an "early Nazi coup in Austria." They were playing this reckless role in order to "show Mussolini the error of his ways."58 In Berlin these British friendly gestures were welcomed and the Foreign Office deprecated the collapse of collective security at Geneva because it "greatly affected British prestige." The recent Anglo-German conversations in London "were entirely satisfactory, the German officials . . . having found the British as helpful as their treaty commitments could possibly permit. . . . Reference was made to the disadvantage to the British of being tied to the French apron strings. This it was felt worked against British Empire interests, League interests, and the attempt with which England and Germany are both so concerned to bring about better general European relations and conditions. There were clear implications in my conversations with the Foreign Office yesterday of its feeling that sooner or later the British would come to realize the community of Anglo-German interests vis-a-vis Italian imperialism."59
While British statesmen were making "friendly gestures to Hitler,"60 Italian armies were battering on the gates of Addis Ababa. On May 2 the Emperor and his family hurriedly left the capital, and three days later the Italian advance guard entered the city without any opposition. Mussolini at once issued a proclamation announcing to the "Italian people and to the World that peace is re-established."61
The capture of Addis Ababa and the flight of the Emperor was an unmistakable indication to the world that the Italian adventure in Ethiopia had been successful. British policy had received a severe defeat and this fact was emphasized in the British press. Britain had backed down before the threats of Mussolini, and according to the London Daily Herald "the League might as well be shut up for any roaring bully could shut it up by threatening war if it grimaced at him."62 The London Daily Mail believed it was time for a reversal of the Eden policy: "The right course for Great Britain is to clean the slate and give notice as soon as possible that she will have nothing more to do with sanctions or with the penal clauses of the Covenant. Friendship with Italy is of vital importance both to her and to ourselves."63
It was significant to note that the Opposition in Great Britain still clamored for the continuance of sanctions. Its attitude was sharply assailed by the Morning Post: "The war is over; the Italian armies are in occupation of Ethiopia, but our Socialists say that the sanctions must be continued. . . . They have been clamouring for the closing of the Suez Canal to Italian transport, and yesterday Mr. Eden told them plainly that such a measure would inevitably lead to war with Italy. . . . The Opposition, having done their best to disarm this country, appear to be willing to face that risk and it is a remarkable fact that exactly those people who worked hardest for disarmament are now working hardest to embroil us in war."64 [same crap they did here in America in 2020, defund law enforcement,then incite riots in our cities DC]
In France the Opposition played the same sinister game. The leftist press called for "revenge on Italy and the prevention of the exploitation of her conquest by the preservation and strict continued application of League principles. . . . Certain organs of the extreme Left press rise in indignation and press for a showdown at once in a crisis which the Geneva Powers had hoped to postpone."65
British and French statesmen refused to be pushed into conflict with Italy by the loud clamor of the belligerent Opposition. Some of them were beginning to believe that it was high time for a radical change in the direction of British foreign policy. Lord Lothian was one of the prominent spokesmen of this new viewpoint. He expressed the opinion that it was expedient to eliminate from the Covenant of the League of Nations every obligation "to go to war all over the world which neither we nor the Dominions are willing .. . to live up to." The League should be an instrument for international conciliation and not "an international war office." Moreover, a new attitude should be adopted towards Britain's foes in the World War. It should be evident that a "strong Germany will be the best security for peace and stability. There will certainly be no stability in Europe or Africa so long as we connive at attempting to maintain that system of encirclement and inequality against Germany which has been the root of European unrest for fifteen years, and the main cause of the rise of the Hitler regime Once the system of universal collective security goes, the next best basis is that of a regional balance, and once Germany has her rightful place in Europe and is a member of a revised League alongside of Russia, Italy and France, it may be possible .. . to secure that twenty-five years of certain peace of which Herr Hitler talks."66
K. America Refuses to Adopt a Realistic Policy
It was hardly likely that a period of peace would bless Europe if the principle of nonrecognition were still adhered to by the major powers. It was some time before British statesmen recognized this fact. On May 9, 1936, the King of Italy signed a decree which proclaimed that the former Empire of Ethiopia had been conquered by Italian armies and was therefore under the "full and entire sovereignty of the Kingdom of Italy." Emperor Haile Selassie replied to this proclamation with a telegram to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations (May 10) requesting the formal adoption of the nonrecognition principle with reference to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute.67Faced with this challenge, the Council (May 12) adroitly postponed the question of nonrecognition until its next meeting on June 15. By that time the war in Ethiopia would have reached its final stage and a realistic decision could be reached.
On that same day (May 12), the British Ambassador in Rome informed Mussolini that his Government would "not recognize" the Italian regime in Ethiopia. It was fully realized in London that the Duce would deeply resent this step and the British Cabinet felt that the situation was "extremely grave."68
British action on May 12 was needlessly provocative. The Foreign Office under Eden's guidance was holding fast to a policy that was decidedly unrealistic. But Mussolini with victory in his grasp was content to overlook this verbal challenge. The legions of Marshal Badoglio had proved far more potent than the economic sanctions of the League of Nations. Italy had scored a major political and diplomatic success, and the frowns of Anthony Eden would eventually change into the tight smile of acquiescence.
In America, however, there was determined opposition to the adoption of a realistic policy concerning Ethiopia. Secretary Hull gave little heed to the fact that in Europe the political weight of Italy was badly needed to balance the scales against the fast-increasing pressure of Hitler. Hull had a golden opportunity to help maintain the Stresa front by a slight nod of encouragement to Mussolini. Instead he adhered to the old Stimson formula of nonrecognition with a tenacity that was strengthened by a glow of righteousness. He would rather be right than save the world by a touch of realism.
On May 12, the Italian Ambassador paid a visit to the Department of State for the purpose of explaining to Secretary Hull the civilizing mission of Italy in Ethiopia. Hull regarded this explanation as "somewhat rambling" and .was not favorably impressed with its content.69 The ambassador was disturbed by the Secretary's lack of friendly response, so he stopped at the office of Mr. Phillips, the Under Secretary of State, and hesitantly remarked that the annexation of Ethiopia was "by far the best solution of the problem; that he felt in due course Geneva would recognize the facts as they existed." When he inquired "what position the United States would take in the circumstances," Phillips hastily informed him that the American Government had "not yet decided what course" it would pursue.70 The words of Mr. Phillips were quite indecisive but his manner was friendly so Ambassador Rosso left the Department of State with a slight feeling of hope in his heart.
L. Eden Recommends that Sanctions Be Lifted
With victory assured in Ethiopia, Italian statesmen made strenuous efforts to show how conciliatory they could be towards countries that had looked askance at the Duce's program in Africa..In Addis Ababa, Marshal Badoglio was exceeding cordial to Mr. Engert. He referred in the friendliest terms to his visit to the United States when he had had the good fortune to meet President Roosevelt, then serving as the Assistant Secretary of the Navy. He also spoke of his "dear friend General Pershing."71
Mussolini was in similar good form. In an interview published in the Intransigeant on May 24 he tried to quiet British apprehensions by stating that he was "asking nothing of England. I am ready to give her all possible assurances."72 In London, Dino Grandi stressed Mussolini's desire for a "better understanding with Great Britain and reiterated the assurance that Italy had no designs against British interests."73
On May 28, Mussolini granted an interview to Gordon Lennox, the London Daily Mail correspondent in Rome. He was profuse in his protestations that "the interests of Great Britain in so far as the waters of Lake Tana are concerned will be strictly respected." When he was questioned about Anglo-Italian relations he replied that not only was a rapprochement between those two countries desirable but was really "necessary." He then stated that he would do everything in his power "to bring it about."74
But these assurances had no effect upon ardent advocates of sanctions like Sir Alfred Zimmern, Professor Gilbert Murray, and Lord Hugh Cecil. They did, however, carry conviction to Neville Chamberlain, Chancellor of the Exchequer. In a speech before the 1900 Club (June 10) he condemned the continuance of sanctions as the "very midsummer of madness." British leaders should open their eyes "to realities." The policy of sanctions had been "tried out and it has failed to prevent war, failed to stop war, failed to save the victim of aggression." Such a policy should be abandoned.75
It was evident that the British Cabinet was preparing to reverse its attitude towards Italy, and this fact was made even more clear by the "reinclusion" of Sir Samuel Hoare as the First Lord of the Admiralty. On June 18, Anthony Eden announced in Parliament that he would recommend at Geneva that the sanctions in force against Italy should be lifted. The Morning Post warmly approved this statement: "The policy of sanctions against Italy had become an affront to common sense and a menace to the peace of Europe."76 The Daily Mail expressed the same viewpoint: "The Daily Mail has from the first maintained that the sanctions policy was stupid and disastrous."77 But the News Chronicle criticized the action of the Government as "grovelling submission,"78 while the Daily Herald called the change in front a "complete and unconditional surrender."79
Australia and Canada followed the lead of London, and other members of the League scrambled on the British bandwagon. On July 4 the League Assembly voted to end sanctions. Some months later the question of nonrecognition was raised in Parliament (December 16) and Eden announced that the British Government still adhered to that principle.80 Therefore, it was not "the intention of His Majesty's Government to accord de jure recognition to the annexation of Abyssinia." In making this announcement he was careful to conceal the fact that the Cabinet had already decided to extend de facto recognition to Italian control over Ethiopia. This decision was soon revealed in a lawsuit before the Chancery Division of the Supreme Court of Judicature,81 and later it was reluctantly wrung from the British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs during a debate in the House of Commons (March 17 , I938).82
On April 16, 1938, an Anglo-Italian agreement was signed in Rome which amounted to a full recognition of Italian sovereignty over Ethiopia.83 The stage was all prepared for League action. On May 10, Lord Halifax stated to the members of the Council that the Anglo-Italian agreement dealt solely with affairs between the two nations. The verity of this remark was challenged by Litvinov, and an explosive discussion was precipitated by an appeal from Emperor Haile Selassie against any recognition of Italian conquests in Ethiopia. But most of the members of the Council supported the British viewpoint, the Polish delegate going so far as to denounce the nonrecognition principle as a "source of conflict." Although no vote was taken at this session of the Council, it was obvious that a majority of the members were ready to abandon the principle for which Mr. Stimson had fought with vigor and tenacity.84
According to Professor Malbone W. Graham, who discussed the situation with Mr. Munters, president of the League Council, it was frankly admitted in Geneva that the decision to abandon the doctrine of nonrecognition was adopted under pressure from Lord Halifax.85 Impressed with this British example of appeasement, several members of the League granted recognition to Italian rule in Ethiopia by issuing letters of credence accrediting their envoys to "His Majesty the King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia."86
Everything was now prepared for a complete repudiation of Eden's assurance that it was not the intention of His Majesty's Government to "accord de jure recognition of the annexation of Abyssinia." On November 2, 1938, Prime Minister Chamberlain introduced in the House of Commons a motion to the effect that "this House welcomes the intention" to bring the Anglo-Italian Agreement (April 16,1938) "into force." After a brisk debate the House approved the motion by an overwhelming vote and the House of Lords did likewise.87 Anthony Eden had to swallow his brave words of December 16, 1936, and there is no evidence that he gagged too violently over this task.
m. The Principle of Nonrecognition Is Invoked by the United States
In the United States the action of the British Government was followed with keen interest if not with approval. After Mussolini's proclamation announcing the annexation of Ethiopia, Ambassador Long made a cordial statement that warmed the heart of the Duce and caused the Italian Government and press to be "outspoken in protestations of friendship for the United States."88 On June 16, Count Ciano, recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, assured Secretary Hull that he would use "every endeavor to further the existing friendly relations between our two countries."89 Four days later, President Roosevelt issued a proclamation declaring that a state of war no longer existed between Italy and Ethiopia and therefore the arms embargo was no longer in force.90
But the Department of State had no intention of recognizing the annexation of Ethiopia by Italy. When Breckinridge Long retired as ambassador to Italy and his successor, William Phillips, was sent to Rome in August 1936, his letter of credence was addressed merely to "the King of Italy." In October, Mussolini sent to the United States a new ambassador, Signor Fulvio Suvich. His letter of credence employed two titles: "King of Italy—Emperor of Ethiopia." But President Roosevelt was careful to receive him only as the ambassador from the "King of Italy."91
The British Government was far more realistic. On January 14,1938, the Prime Minister informed President Roosevelt that he was prepared, "if possible with the authority of the League of Nations, to recognize de jure the Italian conquest of Abyssinia (by which Signor Mussolini sets great store), and to take other action if he found that the Italian Government on their side were ready to give evidence of their desire to contribute to the restoration of confidence and friendly relations."92 The President promptly replied that he was "concerned" over this statement of Prime Minister Chamberlain. At a moment "when respect for treaty obligations would seem to be of such vital importance in international relations,... and at the time when our two Governments have been giving consideration to measures in support of international law and order in the Far East,... I cannot help but feel... that a surrender by His Majesty's Government of the principle of nonrecognition . . . would have a serious effect upon public opinion in this country."93
But the British Government paid little attention to this plea of President Roosevelt's. On April 16, 1938, it concluded with Italy an agreement which specifically recognized the Italian annexation of Ethiopia. The nonrecognition policy had been buried deep in the grave of expediency. But the RooseVelt Administration adhered to the Stimson doctrine. On April 19, with special reference to the Anglo-Italian Agreement, President Roosevelt remarked that "this Government has seen the conclusion of an agreement with sympathetic interest because it is proof of the value of peaceful negotiations," but with his tongue in his cheek he added the proviso that he was not making any attempt to "pass upon the political features" of such an accord.94 A few weeks later, Secretary Hull made it clear that the principles governing the conduct of American foreign relations had not undergone any change.95 As a proof of this statement, President Roosevelt sent a birthday telegram of congratulation to Victor Emmanuel III (November 11, 1938) who was addressed merely as the "King of Italy."96
But this consistency was really the hobgoblin of small minds. The Roosevelt Administration was stubbornly clinging to a formula that made for war rather than peace. It served no useful purpose. As a distinguished authority in the field of international law aptly remarks: "It seems safe to conclude that the policy of non-recognition as practiced today is of slight value either as a sanction or as evidence that the rule that conquest confers valid title has been superseded. . . . Conceived of as a solution of the centuries-old problem of the cause and cure of war, it appears somewhat fatuous."97
As one reviews the whole story of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, it is evident that the policy of Britain was worse than "fatuous." Fatuity does not necessarily lead to war, but the persistently hostile attitude of the British Foreign Office towards Italian acquisition of Ethiopia pointed definitely in that direction. When Mussolini moved his legions into a country that was hopelessly backward and in dire need of intelligent direction under some highly civilized state, the British Government pretended to be deeply disturbed as a matter of principle.98 The compromise policy of Sir Samuel Hoare in December 1935 proved that previous protestations of principle were a mere sham.99 The French Government was never fooled by the pious platitudes of Eden, and Mussolini regarded them as an insult to his intelligence. British insistence upon sanctions completely destroyed the Stresa front. This fundamental change in political relationships in Europe may be laid directly at the door of Eden who posed as a Lancelot lost in a modern world of intrigue. His unfortunate role, and that of the Baldwin Government, is clearly described by Winston Churchill:
His Majesty's Government had imprudently advanced to champion a great world cause. They had led fifty nations forward with much brave language. . . . Their policy had for a long time been designed to give satisfaction to powerful elements of opinion at home rather than to seek the realities of the European situation. By estranging Italy they had upset the whole balance of Europe and gained nothing for Abyssinia.100
With the collapse of the Stresa front the way was wide open for the creation and extension of the Rome-Berlin Axis. Hitler was glad to smile when Eden frowned, and Mussolini quickly learned to prefer the friendly atmosphere of Berlin to the chilly fogs of London. These fogs of misunderstanding hid from most British eyes the stark fact that World War II was just around the corner. Thanks to Eden, and others of his ilk, that corner would soon have to be turned.
next
Ambassador Dodd Finds Berlin an Unpleasant Spot for a Wilsonian Democrat
chapter 9
1 IX, (March 1934), 52-57, 113-26.
2 Congressional Record, 73 Cong., 2 sess., 2192, 4323, 6688, 7154.
3 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 398.
4 Ibid., p. 400.
5 Hearings Before the Special Senate Committee on the Investigation of the Munitions Industry, 73 Cong., 2 sess., pts. 1-17. See also, William T. Stone, "The Munitions Industry," Foreign Policy Association Reports, No. 20, 1935; H. C. Engelbrecht, One Hell of a Business (New York, 1934).
6 Hull, op. cit., p. 380.
7 Ibid., pp. 400-402. 214
8 According to statistics presented in the Report of the Federal Trade Commission on War-Time Profits and Costs of the Steel Industry, June 25, 1924, p. 29, the profits of some corporations were fantastically high:
firm year profits
Firm Bethlehem Steel Corporation 1917 43%
Jones and Laughlin Steel Company 1917 47%
Colt's Patent Fire Arms Company 1917 64%
Savage Arms Corporation 1917 65%
In Richard Lewisohn's The Profits of War (New York, 1937), pp. 153-54, the following statement is made: "The Kennecott Company, one of the Guggenheim group, made a profit in 1917 amounting to 70% of the capital invested. . . . The corresponding profits of the Utah Copper Company . . . were 200%. . . . But even this was surpassed Dy the Calumet and Hecla Copper Mining Company who won the palm with 800% in 1917." See also the Washington Evening Star, December 14, 1935.
9 With reference to the effect of these reservations upon the Kellogg Pact see Edwin Borchard, "The Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War," American Journal of International Law, XXIII (1929), 116-20; Philip M. Brown, "The Interpretation of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War," ibid., pp. 374-79.
10 Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), pp. 292-93.
11 George Wickersham, "The Pact of Paris: A Gesture or a Pledge?," Foreign Affairs, VII (1929), 356 ff.
12 The General Pact for the Renunciation of War, pp. 37, 67.
13 Frank H. Simonds, "America's Second Peace Adventure," American Review of Reviews, LXXVIII (1928), 267; Oscar T. Crosby, "The Paris Pact," Advocate of Peace, XC (1928), 693.
14 New York Times, March 25, 1928. Some months later, Senator Borah expressed a very different viewpoint. In a speech in the Senate, January 3, 1929, he now stated: "If a nation violates the treaty [Pact of Paris] are we under any obligation, express or implied, to apply coercive or punitive measures? I answer emphatically, NO!" Congressional Record, 70 Cong., 2 sess., LXX, January 3, 1929, 1065.
15 Secretary Kellogg to Senator Borah, July 16, 1928. Personal and Confidential, Borah Papers, Library of Congress.
16 Senator Borah to Secretary Kellogg, July 22, 1928. Ibid.
17 Secretary Kellogg to Senator Borah, July 26, 1928. Ibid.
18 Secretary Kellogg to Senator Borah, July 27, 1928. Ibid.
19 Secretary Kellogg to Senator Borah, August 10, 1928. Ibid.
20 Edwin M. Borchard to Senator Borah, December 27, 1929. Ibid.
21 Congressional Record, 70 Cong., 2 sess., February 11, 1929, p. 3198.
22 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1925, p. 133.
23 "The Implication of Consultation in the Pact of Paris," American Journal of International Law, XXVI (1932), 787-89.
24 David Hunter Miller, The Peace Pact of Paris (New York, 1928), pp. 130-31.
25 Henry L. Stimson, "The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development," Department of State, Publication No. 357 (Washington, 1932), pp. 11-12.
26 Department of State, Press Release, May 22, 1933.
27 "An Appeal to Reason," Foreign Affairs, XI (1933), 571-73.
28 Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in War and Peace (New York, 1948)^.214 . -
29 Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 2 sess., January 10, 1933, pp. 1448, 1546.
30 Congressional Record, 72 Cong., 2 sess., pp. 2134-35.
31 New York Times, February 16, 1933.
32 Judge John Bassett Moore protested vigorously against the passage of any resolution which placed such great powers within the discretion of the President: "The pending resolution is .. . opposed to the settled policy and the highest interests of the United States and also to the provisions of our Federal Constitution. If adopted it would enable the President (1) to make international engagements of the most far reaching kind at his will, without the advice and consent of the Senate, and (2) to carry us into war without the prerequisite constitutional declaration of war by Congress." House Report No. 22, 73 Cong., 1 sess., pt. 2, pp. 5-9.
33 Hull, op. cit., p. 406.
34 Ibid., pp. 410-11.
35 Borchard and Lage, op. cit., p. 315.
36 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, October 4, 1935. 765.84/1556, MS, Department of State.
37 Secretary Hull to Ambassador Bingham, October 4, 1935. 765.84/1556, MS, Department of State.
38 Stanley K. Hornbeck to Mr. Phillips, October 4, 1935. 765.84/1960, MS, Department of State.
39 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, October 4, 1935. 765.84/1557, MS, Department of State.
40 President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, October 4, 1935. 765.84/1574, MS, Department of State.
41 Department of State, Press Release, October 5, 1935, pp. 251-55.
42 Hull, op. cit., pp. 430-31.
43 Ambassador Dodd to Secretary Hull, Berlin, October 5, 1935. 765.84/1587, MS, Department of State.
44 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, October 5, 1935. 765.84/1591, MS, Department of State.
45 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 5, 1935. 765.84/1607, MS, Department of State.
46 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 5, 1935. 765.84/1583, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.
47 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 5, 1935. 765-84/1595, MS, Department of State.
48 Memorandum by James C. Dunn, October 5, 1935. 765.84/1583V2, MS, Department of State.
49 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 6, 1935. 765.84/1681, MS, Department of State.
50 London Times, October 8, 1935.
51 Ibid., August 20, 1935.
52 Ibid., August 28, 1935.
53 Ibid., August 26, 1935.
54 Ibid., October 10, 1935.
55 Survey of International Affairs, 1935, pp. 61-63.
56 P. Vaucher and P. H. Siriex, UOpinion Britannique, la Societe des Nations et la Guerre halo-Ethiopienne (Paris, 1936), pp. 8, 23, 91.
57 League of Nations Official Journal, November 1935, p. 1223.
58 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 8, 1935. 765.84/1680, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.
59 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, October 8, 1935. 765-84/ 1666, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.
60 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 8, 1935. 765.84/1653, MS, Department of State.
61 League of Nations Official Journal, League Assembly, pp. 255-67.
62 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 9, 1935. 765.84/1695, MS, Department of State.
63 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 9, 1935. 765.84/1711, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.
64 Secretary Hull to Ambassador Wilson, October 9, 1935. 765.84/1686, MS, Department of State.
65 Ambassador Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 10, 1935. 765.84/1722, MS, Department of State.
66 Ambassador Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 10, 1935. 765.84/ 1729, MS, Department of State.
67 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 10, 1935. 765.84/2074, MS, Department of State.
68 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, October 10-11, 1935. 765.84/ 1721, 1740, MS, Department of State,
69 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, October 11, 1935. 765.84/ 1752, Confidential for the Secretary, MS, Department of State.
70 President Roosevelt to Secretary Hull, October 13, 1935. 765.84/1784, MS, Department of State.
71 Secretary Hull to President Roosevelt, October 13, 1935. 765.84/1784, MS, Department of State.
72 Secretary Hull to Ambassador Bingham, October 14, 1935. 765.84/1752, MS, Department of State.
73 Department of State, Press Release, October 12, 1935, pp. 303-4.
74 Hull, op. cit., pp. 432-33.
75 Memorandum of Francis Colt de Wolf on the "Censorship by British of Baron Aloisi's Speech," October 12, 1935. 765.84/2026, MS, Department of State.
76 Memorandum concerning conversation with Dr. Irving Stewart, October 15, !935- 765.84/2028, MS, Department of State.
77 Memorandum dealing with the League mechanism concerning sanctions, October I 5, J935- 765.84/2002, MS, Department of State.
78 Ambassador Dodd to Secretary Hull, Berlin, October 14, 1935. 765.84/1819, MS, Department of State.
79 Memorandum of a conversation between Pierre Laval and Mr. Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, October 15, 1935. 765.84/2065, MS, Department of State.
80 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 17, 1935. 765.84/2241, MS, Department of State.
81 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 16, 1935. 765.84/1888, MS, Department of State.
82 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 16, 1935. 765.84/1870, MS. Department of State.
83 Memorandum by Herbert Feis on the League of Nations financial sanctions against Italy, October 16, 1935. 765.84/2027, MS, Department of State.
84 Ambassador Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 15, 1935. 765.84/1849, MS, Department of State.
85 Memorandum of a conversation between Mr. Phillips and the Italian Ambassador, October 16, 1935. 765.84/2176, MS, Department of State.
86 Ambassador Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 17, 1935. 765.84/1916, MS, Department of State.
87 Secretary Hull to Prentiss Gilbert, October 17, 1935. 765.84/1847, MS, Department of State.
88 Ambassador Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, October 18, 1935. 765.84/1952, MS, Department of State.
89 Statement of Secretary Hull, October 26, 1935, Department of State, Press Release, November 2, 1935, pp. 336-37.
90 Ambassador Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, October 28, 1935. 765.84/2167, MS, Department of State.
91 Ambassador Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, October 29, 1935. 765.84/2181, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.
92 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 29, 1935. 765.84/2195, MS, Department of State.
93 New York Herald-Tribune, (Paris edition), October 18, 1935.
94 Department of State, Press Release, November 2, 1935, pp. 338-39.
95 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 29, 1935. 765.84/2192, MS, Department of State.
96 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, October 30, 1935. 765.84/2205, MS, Department of State.
97 Acting Secretary Phillips to American Embassy at Warsaw, November 2, 1935. 765.84/1866, MS, Department of State.
98 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, November 12, 1935. 765.84/2507, MS, Department of State.
99 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, November 12, 1935. 765.84/2507, MS, Department of State.
100 Department of State, Press Release, November 16, 1935, p. 382.
CHAPTER 10
1 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 436.
2 Memorandum by the Secretary of State regarding a conversation with the Italian Ambassador (Rosso), November 22, 1935. 765.84/2747, MS, Department of State. On the previous day (November 21), the Marquis Alberto Rossi Longhi, counselor of the Italian Embassy, had a long talk with Mr. Joseph C. Green, chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions Control. He complained that "certain features of our neutrality policy were unfair to Italy and seemed to indicate a hostile attitude on our part toward his country." Mr. Green gave Signor Longhi the stereotyped reply that the "primary purpose of our neutrality policy was to keep, the United States from becoming involved in war and that the measures we had taken to accomplish that end had been taken independently and on our own initiative and were made applicable to both belligerents equally." Green to Secretary Hull, November 21, 1935. 71100111 Armament Control/492, MS, Department of State.
3 By December 12, 1935, fifty-three nations had agreed to an arms embargo directed against Italy; fifty-two had accepted the suggestion of a credit boycott; fifty had come around to the view that Italian imports should be prohibited; fifty-one believed that certain exports to Italy should be embargoed; and forty-six had adopted the draft of a plan to assist those nations that had been adversely affected by the sanctions program. Only four states had refused to take action under Article 16 of the Covenant-Albania, Austria, Hungary, and Paraguay. See Dwight E. Lee, Ten Years (Boston, 1942), p. 150.
4 M. J. Bonn, "How Sanctions Failed," Foreign Affairs, XV (1937), 350-61.
5 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, November 25, 1935. 765.84/2742, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.
6 Ambassador Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, November 25, 1935. 765.84/2740, MS, Department of State.
7 Many British newspapers were loudly calling for an oil sanction. Professor Gilbert Murray wrote to the Daily Mail, December 2, 1935, and categorically stated that "Mussolini has got to be defeated. If you can do it by cutting off his supplies of oil, then do it quickly and universally. It will stop the war." The Daily Telegraph, December 2, 1935, was certain that oil sanctions would "paralyze the grandiose overseas expedition on which Mussolini has staked the present prestige of Italy."
8 Hull, op. cit., p. 442. In the diary of Neville Chamberlain there are some comments of interest concerning sanctions: "November 29, 1935. The U.S.A. has already gone a good deal further than usual. . . . We ought to give the lead ourselves rather than let the question go by default. .. . If we backed out now because of Mussolini's threats we should leave the Americans in the air." Keith Feiling, The Life of Neville Chamberlain (New York, 1946), p. 272.
9 London Daily Herald, October 30, 1935.
10 The New York Times, December 5, 1935.
11 Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm (Cambridge, 1948), pp. 181-83.
12 British White Paper, Cmd. 5044 (1935); Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, CCCVII, December 19, 1935, 2004 ff. There were varying estimates of the exact amount of territory that Italy would receive from Ethiopia. The Manchester Guardian, December 12, 1935, in its editorial, "The Peace Proposals," indicated its belief that under the Hoare-Laval Agreement, Italy would receive 150,000 out of Ethiopia's total square mileage of 350,000. This would be ten times as much as the proposal made by the Committee of Five in September.
13 The British Foreign Office went so far as to instruct the British Minister at Addis Ababa, Sir Sidney Barton, to use his "utmost influence to induce the Emperor to give careful and favorable consideration to these proposals, and on no account lightly to reject them. . . . He will give further proof of his statesmanship by realizing the advantages of the opportunity of negotiations which they afford." London News Chronicle, December 16, 1935.
14 Survey of International Affairs, 1935, II, 314-20.
15 Quoted in the London Times, December 12, 1935.
16 December 11, 1935.
17 December 11, 1935.
18 London Daily Herald, December 20, 1935.
19 December 14,1935.
20 December 16, 1935.
21 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, December 18, 1935. 765.84/3357, MS, Department of State.
22 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, December 31, 1935. 765.84/3485, MS, Department of State.
23 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, January 3, 1936. 765.84/3481, MS, Department of State.
24 Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931-1941 (Washington, 1943), p. 306.
25 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, January 16, 1936. 765.84/3380, MS, Department of State, with enclosures.
26 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, January 17, 1936. 765-84/3463, MS, Department of State.
27 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, January 16, 1936. 765-84/3354. MS, Department of State.
28 Edwin Borchard and William P. Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, 1937), pp. 325-29-
29 Pending "Neutrality" Proposals: Their False Conceptions and Misunderstandings (New York, 1936), pp. 6-7.
30 // Progresso, January 28, 1936.
31 John Norman, "Influence of Pro-Fascist Propaganda on American Neutrality, 1935—1936," Essays in History and International Relations in Honor of George Hubbard Blakeslee, ed. D. E. Lee and G. E. McReynolds (Worcester, 1949), pp. 207-8.
32 The United States in World Affairs, 1936, pp. 142-43.
33 Norman, op. cit., p. 213.
34 Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, January 18, 1936. 765.84/3470, MS, Department of State.
35 Ambassador Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, January 23, 1936. 765.84/3521, MS, Department of State.
36 Report of Lieutenant L. N. Miller, assistant naval attache in Paris, January 14- 23, 1936. 765.84/3879, MS, Department of State.
37 Lee, op. cit., pp. 135-38.
38 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, February 27, 1936. 765.84/3915, MS, Department of State.
39 Sir Leo Chiozza Money to President Roosevelt, March 3, 1936. 765.84/3939, MS, Department of State.
40 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, February 27, 1936. 765.84/3911, MS, Department of State. See also Virginio Gayda, "Mediterranean and International Agreements," Giornale d'italia, February 26, 1936.
41 Survey of International Affairs, 1935, II, 350-409.
42 See the remarks of Mme Tabouis. L'Oeuvre, March 3, 1936.
43 Giornale d'ltalia, March 3, 1936.
44 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, March 4, 1936. 765.84/3944, MS, Department of State.
45 Secretary Hull to Engert (Addis Ababa), March 9, 1936. 765.84/3889, MS, Department of State.
46 Engert to Secretary Hull, Addis Ababa, March 17, 1936. 7<55-84/3935, MS, Department of State.
47 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, March 12, 1936. 740.0011 Mutual Guarantee/418 (Locarno), MS, Department of State.
48 Survey of International Affairs, 1935, II, 342.
49 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, April 3, 1936. 765.84/4104, MS, Department of State.
50 Anthony J. Biddle to Secretary Hull, Oslo, April 6, 1936. 765.84/4042, MS, Department of State.
51 Warrington Dawson to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 7, 1936. 765.84/4124, MS, Department of State.
52 Ambassador Dodd to Secretary Hull, Berlin, April 9, 1936. 765.84/4066, MS, Department of State.
53 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, April 7, 1936. 765.84/4045, MS, Department of State.
54 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, April 15, 1936. 765.84/4159, MS, Department of State.
55 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, April 15, 1936. 765.84/4115, MS, Department of State.
56 Survey of International Affairs, 1935, II. 347-55.
57 Ambassador Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, April 20, 1936. 765.84/4151, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.
58 Ambassador Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, April 21, 1936. 765.84/4158, MS, Department of State.
59 Mr. Mayer to Secretary Hull, Berlin, April 22, 1936. 765.84/4176, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.
60 Anthony J. Biddle to Secretary Hull, Oslo, May 2, 1936. 765.84/4228, MS, Department of State.
61 New York Times, May 6, 1936.
62 May 7, 1936.
63 May 7, 1936.
64 May 7, 1936.
65 Ambassador Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, May 11, 1936. 765.84/4365, MS, Department of State.
66 London Times, May 5, 1936.
67 League of Nations Official Journal, 1936, p. 660.
68 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, May 12, 1936. 765.84/4388, MS, Department of State.
69 Memorandum of a conversation between Secretary Hull and the Italian Ambassador, Signor Rosso, May 12, 1936. 765.84/4397, MS, Department of State.
70 Memorandum of a conversation between the Under Secretary of State, Mr. William Phillips, and the Italian Ambassador, Signor Rosso, May 12, 1936. 765.84/4413, MS, Department of State.
71 Engert to Secretary Hull, Addis Ababa, May 14, 1936. 765.84/4421, MS, Department of State.
72 Ambassador Straus to Secretary Hull, Paris, May 25, 1936. 765-84/4490, MS, Department of State.
73 Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, May 29, 1936. 765.84/4532, MS, Department of State.
74 London Daily Mail, May 29, 1936. See also, Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, May 29, 1936. 765.84/4544, MS, Department of State.
75 London Times, June 11, 1936; Feiling, op. cit., p. 296. 76 June 19, 1936.
77 June 19, 1936.
78 June 19, 1936.
79 June 19, 1936.
80 Parliamentary Debates, 318 House of Commons, 2432.
81 Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory (Princeton, 1947), p. 137.
82 Parliamentary Debates, 333 House of Commons, March 17, 1936, 617.
83 Documents on International Affairs, 1938, I, 141.
84 League of Nations Official Journal, 1938, pp. 339-55.
85 Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, May 13-15, 1940, p. 95-
86 On January 5, 1938, the Italian Government issued a statement which indicated that seventeen states, most of them League members, had granted de jure recognition, and eleven of them, including Great Britain and France, had granted de facto recognition of the annexation of Ethiopia.
87 Parliamentary Debates, 340 House of Commons, 331; Parliamentary Debates, no House of Lords, 1678.
88 Kirk to Secretary Hull, Rome, May n , 1936. 765.84/4362, MS, Department of State.
89 Signor Rosso to Secretary Hull, June 16, 1936. 711.65/73, MS, Department of State.
90 Hull, op. cit., p. 471.
91 Ibid., 470-71.
92 Prime Minister Chamberlain to President Roosevelt, January 14, 1938. 740.00/ 264a, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.
93 President Roosevelt to Prime Minister Chamberlain, January 17, 1938. 740.00/ 264b, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.
94 Department of State, Press Release, April 19, 1938.
95 Ibid., May 12, 1938.
96 Ibid., November 11, 1938.
97 Herbert Briggs, "Non-Recognition of Title by Conquest," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law (May 13-15, 1940), p. 81.
98 It had long been recognized by students of African problems that slavery existed on a large scale in Ethiopia. Major E. W. Poison Newman, in an article in the Contemporary Review, CXLVIII (December 1935), entitled "Slavery in Abyssinia," p. 650, makes the following comment: "Slavery is the basis of the Abyssinian economic system. . . . The abolition of slavery in Abyssinia involves a complete social and economic reformation, and can only be carried out by external pressure and the exercise of European administration." As Winston Churchill aptly remarked: "The character of the Ethiopian government and the conditions prevailing in that wild land of tyranny, slavery and tribal war were not consonant with membership of the League." Op. cit., p. 166.
99 One of the important forces that controlled British attitude towards Mussolini's advance into Ethiopia was the grave fear that he might divert the waters of the Blue Nile "into the arid plains of an extended Eritrea" and thereby affect the water supply of the Nile when it reached Egypt. He could convert Eritrea into a rich cotton growing country, but this diversion of waters might severely injure Egypt. Sir John Harris, "Italy and Abyssinia," Contemporary Review, CXLVIII
100 Churchill, op. cit., p. 187.
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