PART 6:EXTREME PREJUDICE: THE TERRIFYING STORY OF THE PATRIOT ACT & THE COVER UPS OF 911 AND IRAQ

EXTREME PREJUDICE:

THE TERRIFYING STORY  OF 

THE PATRIOT ACT & THE 

COVER UPS OF 911 AND IRAQ

BY SUSAN LINDAUER

CHAPTER 12: 

THE BATTLE FOR PEACE 

“Those who profess to favor freedom and yet depreciate agitation, are people who want crops without ploughing the ground; they want rain without thunder and lightening; they want the ocean without the roar of its many waters. The struggle may be a moral one, or it may be a physical one, or it may be both. But it must be a struggle. Power concedes nothing without a demand. It never did. And it never will.” 

–Frederick Douglass 

I was furious, and I was not alone. 

Americans were awake after 9/11. And now, in record time, the forces of Democracy mobilized for one helluva fight to protect peace in the Middle East. 

At the first trumpeting for War on Capitol Hill, Americans of all political stripes, every ethnicity and socio-economic background, young and old, rallied together in opposition. People who had never participated in demonstrations before raised their voices against War with Iraq. 

Leaders in the anti-war movement—MOVE on, International ANSWER, and United for Peace and Justice unleashed the fury of the internet as a critical tool for mobilizing public opposition on a massive scale. Through rapid-fire email alerts and online petitions, they organized signature campaigns and ambitious phone blitzes to the White House and Congressional offices, identifying Congressional reps for activists and providing phone numbers and a 30 minute time block for every caller. With such aggressive behind the scenes’ organization, protests to Congress rolled throughout the days, and the anti-war movement swelled across the country at warp speed. Hundreds of thousands of letters arrived on Capitol Hill every week, running 10 to 1 against the War. Thanks to the internet, the strength of the anti-war movement rivaled the momentum achieved at the end of the Vietnam War. 

And so the blueprint for internet activism was born. 

If the leaders of the United States ever cared about democracy, this was a moment to be fiercely proud of our country and our people. 

Instead, on October 10 and 11, 2002 the U.S. Congress approved a Joint Resolution Authorizing War with Iraq by a vote of 77 to 23 in the Senate, and 296 to 133 in the House. 215 

Senator Robert Byrd of West Virginia has dubbed the Senators who opposed the War resolution “the Immortal 23.” 216 But of those, really just a handful of Congressional leaders actively took up the antiwar cause, and fought with urgency and passion to head off the disaster. 

The podium for peace was a lonely place. The most formidable leadership came from Senator Byrd himself, and Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, who worked tirelessly to interject a modicum of rational thinking into the debate. Senator Byrd took to the floor every day before the vote. After that fight was lost, he battled for peace right up to the invasion, and for disengagement from Iraq thereafter. 

Senator Kennedy entreated America’s leaders to think ahead to the consequences for America’s moral leadership in the world community: 

“We can deal with Iraq without resorting to this extreme. It is impossible to justify any double standard under international law. America cannot write its own rules for the modern world. To do so would be unilateralism run a muck. It would antagonize our closest allies whose support we need to fight terrorism, prevent global warming, (and) deal with many other dangers that affect all nations. It would deprive America of the moral legitimacy necessary to promote our values abroad. And it would give other nations, from Russia, to India, to Pakistan an excuse to violate fundamental principles of civilized international behavior.” 217 

Wiser words have rarely been spoken on Capitol Hill. 

A rising leader in the Democrat Party, Barak Obama did not get elected to the U.S. Senate until November, 2004, after the War started. However, he “got it,” too. In remarks declaring his anti-war philosophy in October, 2002, a week before the Senate vote, Obama demonstrated more foresight and courage than most of his fellow Democrats. 218 

“I suffer no illusions about Saddam Hussein. The Iraqi people would be better off without him, ” Obama said. “But I also know Saddam poses no imminent and direct threat to the United States, or to his neighbors; that the Iraqi economy is in shambles; that the Iraqi military is a fraction of its former strength. In concert with the international community, he can be contained until, in the way of all petty dictators, he falls away into the dustbin of history.” 

“I know that even a successful war against Iraq will require a US occupation of undetermined length, at undetermined cost, with undetermined consequences, ” Obama said. “I know that an invasion of Iraq without a clear rationale, and without strong international support will only fan the flames of the Middle East, and encourage the worst, rather than best impulses of the Arab world, and strengthen the recruitment arm of Al Qaeda.” 

“I am not opposed to all wars. I’m opposed to dumb wars,” Obama said. “You want a fight, President Bush? Let’s finish the fight with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda through effective, coordinated intelligence, and shutting down the financial networks that support terrorism, and a homeland security program that involves more than color-coded warnings.” 

I could not have said it better myself. 

Alas, in direct contrast to the overwhelming demands of the American people, as of October 2002, Obama, Byrd and Kennedy constituted the minority on Capitol Hill. 

Only 23 Senators and 133 House members— including just one Republican in the Senate, Lincoln Chafee of Rhode Island, and six Republicans in the House, had the courage and vision to oppose the War Authorization bill. Support from Democrats proved just as obstinate. Less than one third of the House opposed the War bill. 

In the days before the big vote, I was appalled by the irrational propaganda on Capitol Hill. The rhetoric was totally divorced from the reality that I was connected to as a primary intelligence source at the United Nations. It was real political theater. Members of Congress spoke of Iraq in language devoid of any understanding of the substantial developments over the previous two years. 

By that time, I had visited many Congressional staffers in different offices. 219 My meetings with Republicans and Democrats to explain the Peace Framework continued right up to the Invasion. Several told me they’d already received debriefings. As such, all that disinformation could not have been a mistake. It struck me that Congress was deliberately trying to eradicate the truth about opportunities for a peaceful resolution with Iraq, so they could sell a non-truth to Americans that required a military option. They wanted Americans to perceive War as the only way forward—And that was a lie. 

After the War authorization vote, there were some notable conversions to the peace camp. Senator Joseph Biden (D-Delaware), Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana) and Senator Chuck Hagel (R-Nebraska) emerged as outspoken advocates for using diplomacy and coalition building to its greatest possible good, before engaging in military confrontation. 

They played a critical role arguing that dialogue had already achieved results by securing the return of the weapons inspectors to Iraq. And they urged the White House to give weapons inspections a chance to succeed. Notably, all three served on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which received special debriefings on the success of back channel dialogue. 220 That gave me hope that the peace option would sway more leaders. 

On the House side, meanwhile, Rep. Ron Kind (Wisconsin) and Rep. Sherrod Brown (Ohio) led a coalition of 123 Congress members, urging the White House to give U.N. inspectors ample time to complete their jobs. Fully one-quarter of Congress signed a letter to President Bush supporting the U.N.’s process for verifying Iraq’s disarmament. All were Democrats. 221 

Unhappily, disinformation continued to be more plentiful than courage. 

Even the most rudimentary knowledge of the Middle East should have frightened Congress away from military conflict with Iraq. Yet despite all the debriefings by the intelligence community, and appeals to desist by foreign policy gurus and military experts alike, Congress failed to grasp the magnitude of consequences of its actions. Leaders on both sides of the aisle demonstrated the poorest conceptualization of issues framing the Middle East. They refused to hear the message pounding from all sides. 

Phrases like “quagmire, ” “dead end, ” “sand trap, ” all of it were a foreign language on Capitol Hill. Congress was caught up in the theatrics of their war propaganda. Their need for public attention and TV time swamped their better judgment. They did not want to hear any criticism or doubts. 

If members of Congress believed they could steamroll the American people, however, they were grossly mistaken. The American people roared back in opposition. 

On October 26, 2002, two weeks after Congress approved the War Resolution, the American people launched massive demonstrations in Washington and San Francisco, with bus-loads of protesters arriving from the heartland of Nebraska and Iowa, Ohio and New Hampshire, North Carolina and Florida. Internationally, on the same day, hundreds of thousands of demonstrators gathered in Rome, Berlin, Copenhagen, Tokyo and Mexico City to protest War with Iraq, as well. 222 

Globally, opposition to the Iraq War was the most powerful act of democracy the world has ever witnessed. 

In Washington DC, more than 200,000 Americans attended a three hour rally, followed by a march that circled the White House. The size of the crowds rivaled the largest peace demonstrations at the end of the Vietnam War. Shoulder to shoulder crowds marched for blocks at a time, singing and chanting anti-war slogans. When the front of the procession returned to Constitution Avenue at the starting point of the march, thousands of demonstrators were still heading out on the parade route, still shoulder to shoulder strong. 223 

Every activist who participated in the Anti-War Movement demonstrated heroic foresight that year. Every one of us should be proud that we battled so hard to preserve the peace. 

Democracy showed amazing strength across all economic lines and regional boundaries. Without a single classified intelligence debriefing, the American people and the world community saw with great clarity the nightmare that would be unleashed by this war. Together all of us aggressively pushed forward to voice our objections, with the full expectation that government leaders who champion democracy overseas would first have to respect those principles here at home. 

It’s a great irony, isn’t it? 

If our leaders had respected the will of the people, the triumph of the Anti-War movement would have done more to advance democracy in difficult regions of the world than all of the slogans and speechifying by the White House and State Department. We would have won the hearts and minds of the Middle East, Asia, on and on. Through War with Iraq, that possibility has been largely squandered. In my opinion, it’s lost forever. 

For myself as an Asset, it was not difficult to decide what I must do. I knew that I could not sit idly on the sidelines, while Congress stampeded the world into War. 

Throughout the fall and winter, I hooked into the burgeoning anti-war network, attending mass demonstrations in Washington and smaller protests by CodePink and local peace groups, like the D.C. Anti-War Network and Education for Peace in Iraq. Like others, I turned to the internet, which swelled and multiplied the ranks of the antiwar movement in record time. 

I got angrier every day. I experienced great surges of outrage every time White House officials or Congressional leaders swallowed the airwaves of CNN to reinvent Pre-War Intelligence with false reports on Iraq’s links to terrorism or hostility to the weapons inspections. The speakers were ignorant of the facts. They hardly qualified as “Middle East experts” at all. 

I was appalled by how recklessly think tanks and media pundits attacked peace. Our framework had been constructed so carefully, in order to advance all components of U.S. interests. Even the slightest amount of direct knowledge of the actual events would have smashed their rhetoric into tiny fragments for ridicule. Yet instead of questioning White House propaganda, media pundits fed the hysteria. War was sold like high fashion. These were the days of promos on CNN, Fox News and MSNBC like “Showdown with Saddam” and “Countdown to Iraq.” 

Fuming over the breadth of deception and fraud by Congress and the White House, I made a decision to break the cardinal rule of intelligence gathering. 

I would not swallow the truth for Capitol Hill. 

I would not stand down. 

I would not protect elected leaders from their responsibility to the people for their decision-making. 

I would not shield them with deniability. 

It was a decision that ultimately would cost me everything I had. But to this day I have never regretted what actions I took next. 

As an Asset, I had learned how to work a problem and create whatever tools I needed on my own—rapidly and out of nothing. Otherwise I could never have become so effective at what I do. 

The situation on Capitol Hill indicated a massive communications breakdown. The solution struck me as fairly simple. It required message confrontation at the broadest possible level, inclusive of every conceivable party to the debate. That would build a critical mass of audience and knowledge at a rapid and exponential degree. And it would preclude “deniability.” They couldn’t say they didn’t know the facts. They couldn’t pretend not to have been shown the mistakes in their assumptions. If they could be forced to confront truth at every turn, they would be more likely to accept it. 

It was an excellent strategy, if I say so myself. 

And so, on September 11, 2002, the first anniversary of the terrorist strike that I labored so hard to prevent, I launched a message system that I called “Citizens for Public Integrity, ” so named to condemn the political manipulations of 9/11 to inflame public support for War. 

To get the message across, I formed a blast fax and comprehensive email data base for all 435 members of the House of Representatives and 100 Senators. My targets encompassed Democrats and Republicans alike, guaranteeing that both parties would have equal access to message warnings, without partisan favoritism. 224 

The list included the personal emails for every Chief of Staff; every Legislative Director; every Press Secretary and Foreign Policy Assistant in the House and Senate. 225 

In short, the email data base covered every top legislative staffer on Capitol Hill, Democrat and Republican alike. 

It was a huge undertaking. I had to phone every office to get those names. Wire taps provided by my good friends at the FBI prove I really did so. Then I had to tabulate all those names into a massive data base to run the emails. 

In addition, I created a blast fax for every Congressional office—all 435 in the House and 100 in the Senate. I also created a blast fax for every Ambassador’s office at the United Nations, 185 in all. 226 

Once Citizens for Public Integrity was established, I used those fax and email data bases to launch a massive blitz exposing the dangers of War and Occupation. A series of 20 short papers proved incredibly prescient in forecasting the catastrophic consequence of Occupation for Iraq’s people, the Middle East and the financial future of America’s Middle Class. A number of noteworthy articles by foreign policy experts and activists got redistributed, as well. 

So much for the phony accusation that Assets stayed silent, while Congress raced off the cliff! I shouted from the rooftops —And I must say those rooftops were awfully crowded. All of us together hit the mark with a tragic degree of accuracy. 

For example, Citizens for Public Integrity researched the history of Iraq’s resistance to the British Occupation in the 1920's, and the heavy losses for British soldiers. I warned about their costly defeat as anti-British rebellions against puppet rulers spilled blood throughout the 1940's and 1950's, culminating in Iraq’s violent anti-Western, pro-Communist revolution of 1958. 227 

Citizens for Public Integrity and another antiwar group, Focus on Arab American Issues and Relations (F.A.A.I.R), jointly projected a 10 year cost of War and Occupation at $1.6 Trillion Dollars—compared to the $100 billion projected by pro-War Republicans on Capitol Hill. 228 In actuality, the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have cost $4 to $5 Trillion together— equaling one-third of the total Federal debt of $15 Trillion. 

Unhappily for Middle Class Americans, Citizens for Public Integrity correctly warned that the costs of War would overwhelm Washington’s ability to provide essential domestic government services at home. “The (initial) $100 billion price tag for the War risks forcing a tax increase on personal income and meager corporate profits, at a time when Americans are struggling to resist a backslide into a double-dip recession, and filing a record number of bankruptcies.” 229 

Like a modern day Cassandra, I warned that War in Iraq would push our financial institutions to the brink of collapse. 

Always I warned of penalties for opposing the Will of the People: “It is inconceivable that after September 11, Congress would take such rash, poorly evaluated actions to aggressively taunt terrorist retaliations against our country. Evidently some incumbents think they can distract Americans from the stock market and the dangers of a double-dip recession with all this talk about Iraq.” 230 

“Citizens for Public Integrity want to put Congress on notice. We will hunt Congressional representatives whose actions trigger terrorism, just like we hunted Al Qaeda. Only members of Congress won’t be able to hide like Osama bin Laden.” 

I was hardly passive, after all. In fact, I would argue that my efforts exemplify Asset work at its very best—when there’s a crisis and somebody goes in to reshape the construct of the problem, and create a vehicle for solution on a rapid basis. My actions make a mockery of claims that Assets demonstrated “gross incompetence” in the run up to War. 

Thanks to the FBI, which captured 28,000 phone calls, 8,000 emails and hundreds of faxes, all of my efforts to warn Congress away from this War are fully substantiated. 231 

Yes, I was one more voice in a humongous crowd. I’m fiercely proud of all of us. 

And yes, my anti-war perspective was probably a minority viewpoint inside the CIA. Nevertheless, my actions prove that thinking opponents of the War shrieked from the rooftops to pull Congress back from disaster. Our numbers might have been small, but we were extremely well organized and resourceful in communicating our message. We were anything but sheep-like or ambivalent towards the impending catastrophe. We saw the mistakes in political assumptions, and we urgently tried to introduce more accurate information to policymakers. That’s exactly what all of us should have done. 

Our leaders refused to listen to us—though they are supposed to act as the people’s representatives, and take instructions from the electorate. 

And yes, I faced a backlash from the pro-war camp. By example, I relied entirely on the internet and fax lines to distribute my anti-war messages to Congress and the United Nations in New York. My blast fax transmitted nonstop, 24 hours a day, for weeks on end, while I slept or headed off to work. Mysteriously, my phone lines would go down, cutting off my faxes. I would march to a pay phone in the freezing cold, only to be told that some unidentified technical glitch had interrupted my service, and a technician would have to be scheduled. It never happened before, and there was no explanation for why it happened now— except for my activism. A phone technician would come out, and trouble-shoot repairs. Low and behold, 10 days later the phone would cut off again. It happened repeatedly. 

That didn’t stop me. I would get everything ready. When the phone would come up, I would rush to get my papers out before the lines shut down again. 

So yes, it’s true that pro-war and anti-war factions fought each other. But that’s part of the intelligence game. It takes a lot more than that to discourage any of us. 

Any good Asset is supposed to know how to run a blockade. That’s the role we play. By this time, I had done the Lockerbie negotiations with Libya, and preliminary talks with Iraq’s Ambassador and senior diplomats to resume the weapons inspections. Any of that would be much more difficult than a tricky phone line. 

And yes, I believe Neoconservatives tried to sabotage my anti-war communications. Absolutely they played with my message distribution. 

Hey, I can take it. They would play rough and throw up obstacles. I would rebuff them. That’s how it’s done. That’s the game of Intelligence. That’s what makes Assets different. 

It’s not really a complaint. It is important, however, for Americans and the global community to understand what actions I took before the War, because my actions prove that complaints about prewar intelligence were false flags to distract angry voters. Washington scapegoated the Intelligence Community overall, because Congressional leaders lacked the integrity and courage of good leadership to take responsibility for their own decisions. At the end of the day, they’re the ones who did this. A good number of us desperately tried to stop them. 

On the other hand, let’s give credit where it’s due: Everybody on earth opposed this War. Way to go, people! 

As the months rolled on, the Anti-War community mounted an increasingly frenetic lobbying effort to stop the War. 

Tens of millions of activists took to the streets around the globe. 

Entire populations raised their voices to beseech America’s leaders not to do this terrible and stupid thing. A majority of Republican and Democrat voters favored giving U.N. weapons inspectors the opportunity to finish their jobs. 

Come January 19, 2003, anti-war forces in America trebled our numbers. The Washington Post acknowledged “more than 500,000 people” braved the frigid cold that January day, marching 40 deep in crowds that stretched two miles through the streets of Washington to protest a U.S. invasion of Iraq. 232 

The Anti-War movement struck ever more forcefully in February. On the weekend of February 14- 16, 2003, Anti-War demonstrators rallied in 60 countries and 700 cities on every continent, including the McMurdo Air Base in Antarctica. Over 12 million people participated worldwide, by conservative estimates. It was the largest coordinated demonstrations in the history of mankind. 233 

The most staggering crowds turned out in Italy and Spain, where right-wing governments backed the US- British invasion, despite polls showing 70% of their peoples opposed the War. 

At least 2 million Italians gathered for a massive protest in Rome. The historic center “between the Roman Coliseum and Piazza San Giovanni was packed for hours in a slow-moving carnival of banners, dancing and music.” 234 

In Germany, 500,000 protested in Berlin, while 100,000 marched in Brussels, the largest demonstration ever in the home of the European Parliament and NATO. 235 

In New York City, over 500,000 protesters packed the streets for 20 blocks as part of a rally at the United Nations Headquarters. Hit by freezing cold winds, New Yorkers refused to go home, despite New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg’s decision to ban the planned march. The people persevered. 236 

Spain outshone us all. Millions of anti-war protesters filled streets throughout the country: 1.5 million in Barcelona; 2 million in Madrid; 500,000 in Valencia; 250,000 in Seville; 100,000 in Los Palmas and 100,000 in Cadiz. 237 The European media declared that one of every eight (8) Spaniards protested that day against Prime Minister Jose Aznar’s stubborn support for War. A year later, Aznar would be thrown out of office by angry Spanish voters. 

That weekend marked a momentous celebration of non-violence and diplomacy throughout the world. 

The tragedy is that such a fantastic and extraordinary groundswell of global democracy did not sway America’s leaders to honor the will of the people. 

After all, the decision to go to war was undertaken in all of our names—against all of our wishes. And We, the People of the World, continue to pay the price for the horrible mistake on March 19, 2003— a day that should live in infamy forever— a day that global democracy was defeated by a small shadow group of tyrants in Washington DC. 

I was just one voice among millions, amidst a whole planet united for peace and justice. Who would guess that out of all those demonstrators, one in particular— Little Me— would pose such a grave threat to White House officials, who would become desperate to invent a series of false justifications for this debacle, after their gross mistake was recognized and attacked. 

Bottom line: the leaders who pushed our world into War with Iraq could not handle the responsibility of their decision-making. 

They were cowards. 

One of them happened to be my second cousin, Andrew Card, Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush. When the War started to go wrong— which was almost immediately—Andy and his Neo-Conservative friends looked for a scapegoat. 

They decided to pick on the Assets. 

In short, they decided to pick on me. 

Andy Card 

Andy Card. There’s a lot of speculation and gossip about who he is to me, most of it not very flattering or polite. Inquiring minds want to know, right? 

Well, Andy Card is my second cousin on my father’s side from Holbrook Massachusetts. 

He was the Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush, Jr. and former Deputy Chief of Staff and Secretary of Transportation to President George H. Bush, Sr, 238 otherwise known as “King George the First.” 

In short, Andy’s a professional hit man for the Republican Party. 

While I was growing up in Anchorage, Alaska, my mother owned a string of 10 weekly newspapers and four country music radio stations. Political lines get awfully blurry on the tundra. Alaska’s a small town almost three times the size of Texas. Everybody takes care of everybody else. They cut fire wood for their neighbors. They go hunting and fly-in fishing together. And when I was growing up, they all voted for Senator Ted Stevens, because he defended the gun laws and sent money home to Alaska’s villages. People in Alaska love their guns. And they love their federal dollars. They’re pretty sure both are manna from God, and they give thanks accordingly. Which (sort of) explains Sarah Palin. 

I first met Andy Card when I was a freshman at Smith College, one of the Seven Sister women’s colleges in Northampton, Massachusetts. Traveling home to Alaska for holidays was impossible. So for Thanksgiving and Spring Break, I would visit my 80 + year old Aunt Mimi, Miss Mildred Platt of Holbrook, Massachusetts. Think of Jessica Tandy, and you’ve nailed her. Aunt Mimi was the picture of Yankee independence, sharp as a tack and our family historian. She wanted to teach me everything possible about our family genealogy. She was a gem, a gracious lady who welcomed her “cousin from Alaska” into her home. 

On visits to Aunt Mimi’s grand old house in Holbrook I met my East Coast cousins, including Andy Card, his brother, Bradford and their sister, Sarah. Andy was much older than all of us. Sarah had graduated from Wheaton College. But Brad was a college freshman like me at St. Anselm’s College in Manchester, New Hampshire. For a couple of years, Brad road tripped to Northampton for weekend visits to Smith. He’d bring his friends to campus parties. He was outgoing and handsome, and I enjoyed our visits very much. 

So I want to be clear: Andy Card and I have known each other since the 1980's, though age separated us, and most of my time was spent with his younger brother. 

What’s more, Andy’s a good political player. Come election time, what with my mother’s growing media empire in the wilds of Alaska—and her ties to the good and honorable Senator Stevens—it just made sense that Andy Card would make a special nod to our family in Alaska. 

Perceptions to the contrary would be grossly inaccurate. 

After I warned about the 1993 World Trade Center attack, and started working as an Asset, I had to distance myself from Andy, who had national political aspirations after all. 

Our need for distance ended overnight when President-elect George Bush, Jr. named Andy to serve as White House Chief of Staff. At that point, my background was fully revealed, all cards on the table, when I approached him in December, 2000 about our back channel talks to resume the weapons inspections in Iraq. 

I expected Andy to be surprised. But I was at the top of my game. I had accomplished many good things involving Libya and Iraq, with special regards to anti-terrorism, through a decade of perseverance and creative strategizing. 

I expected a man like Andy Card to be proud of my actions. A man who brags to his friends about his outstanding devotion to my field of work should be fiercely proud that one of his own family has been on the cutting edge of it for a decade. 

When you do the work I have done, you don’t apologize for communicating with the Chief of Staff to the President of the United States of America. 

At the end of the conversation, you expect him to say thank you. 

Think about it. I was a primary source of raw intelligence on Iraq and Middle Eastern anti-terrorism overall. I enjoyed high level access to officials in Baghdad and Libya. It was extremely valuable for the White House Chief of Staff to have first-hand access to major new developments inside Iraq. Given my status as an Asset —and his— it was entirely appropriate for him to receive these debriefings. That was part of his job. 

No doubt that’s why Andy Card never suggested I should break off communications with Iraq — or that I should stop providing him with my insider’s analysis of breaking developments in Baghdad. 

All of which makes our end so galling.

CHAPTER 13: 

THE LAST DAYS 

To suffer woes, which hope thinks infinite; To forgive wrongs darker than death or night; To defy power, which seems omnipotent; To hope til hope creates from its own Wreck the Thing it Contemplates; Neither to change, nor falter, nor repent 

–Percy Shelley 

Diplomatic activity moved at whirlwind speeds inside the Iraqi Embassy once weapons inspections got underway. Always courteous diplomats clipped with brisk efficiency, hurrying to meetings, making the most of every opportunity to assure anxious observers of Baghdad’s compliance with the most rigorous standards for disarmament verification the world had ever seen. 

Most nations at the U.N. would have flunked the performance standards demanded of Iraq. They could never have passed their own tests. Ironically, Iraq’s performance excelled at the target so much that the United States and Britain were forced to raise the bar ever higher. But in all ways, the U.S. was outdone. Iraq’s diplomats craved an end to the misery of U.N. sanctions for their people. They saw the finish line, and they were determined to earn that suspension with fast-paced responses to any U.N. inquiry for data or performance reviews. They were tireless in chasing that goal. 

Iraq had been cosmopolitan and secular before sanctions, which meant that diplomats were highly acclimated towards the West— very different from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia or Iran, which despised all social progress. For all of those years, Iraqi diplomats always made a point of declaring their desire to renew old friendships with the West. Now they had a chance to prove it. They would not miss this opportunity. 

Nor did France, Russia or other Security Council members like Syria, which championed a non-military solution to the conflict, let Iraqi diplomats off easily. Quite the opposite, those countries sought to prove the worthiness of peace by demanding that Iraq jump through hoops of fire, as well. They were determined to show that conditions for peace would not be lax or ineffectual, as Washington and London argued. 

Over 800 inspections uncovered only a few rusted relics of old armaments. Meanwhile, Iraqis tolerated the most intrusive searches of factories, employees’ cars, purses and briefcases, and home visits to scientists. Every time the U.S. and Britain ramped up their propaganda machine, U.N. inspectors would come up empty-handed. The most aggressive weapons hunt in history risked shaming the United Nations, which had inflicted horrific suffering on the Iraqi people, in its self righteous pursuit of weapons owned by every nation on earth—except Iraq. 

By this time U.N. sanctions had killed 1.7 million Iraqis, including one million children. 239 That’s no exaggeration, unfortunately. The World Health Organization and UNICEF calculated that 500,000 Iraqi children died from sanctions by the end of 1996. 240 It was now 2003, and death had continued its relentless march through the valley of the Tigris and Euphrates. UNICEF estimated that 5,000 children under the age of 5 died every month from sanctions. 241 Iraqi health officials put that figure closer to 8,000 dead children and 3,000 adults— a total of 11,000 deaths every month. 242 On either end, the death toll was hideous. 

Now it appeared the children of Iraq had died for nothing. 

Remarkably, the lack of weapons uncovered during the inspections did nothing to dampen dire predictions about what Iraq might still be hiding. 

Journalists tracked the progress of weapons inspections amidst wild and inventive leaks from White House officials about secret weapons caches. Media “experts” fed the hype with speculation as to where Iraq might be hiding those pesky weapons that U.N. inspectors could not seem to find. But around the world, in neighborhoods and restaurants, in universities, corporate offices and family rooms, rational citizens everywhere prayed for weapons inspections to succeed. The whole world held its breath watching for signs that Iraq would crack under duress. 

Inside the Embassy, a different scene played out. Iraqi diplomats smiled with hope, serenity etched on their faces. Their acceptance of the demands on their country posed no burden for them. For the first time in thirteen years under sanctions, they could see a better future ahead, one of reconciliation, prosperity and welfare for their people. And so they worked tirelessly through days and nights to acquire documentation and prepare for meetings with various Embassy staffs in New York. They did not sleep so they could coordinate with Baghdad, which was already approaching night-time when the day was half done in New York. 

Perched on a sofa, drinking sweet Iraqi tea and watching the action in the embassy lobby, I remember saying a prayer for those diplomats—for all of us really. And yes, I asked God to stay with them. Perhaps that makes you uncomfortable, but if there was ever a time for prayer, it was in those last days. Iraq was not the problem, however. If the world could have looked down from a corner of the ceiling, there would have been no doubt of the sincerity of their actions. 

That change was not accidental. We had done so much advance work to prepare for this day. All of us had made a huge up-front investment to guarantee this success. With Saad Abdul Rahmon and Salih Mahmoud and Dr. Saeed Hasan, and Abdul Rahmon Mudhian, we had planned exhaustively how Iraqi officials would respond differently to every problem situation that tripped up previous inspections. 

Objectives had been carefully defined and communicated for 18 months in our talks. Previous problems got picked apart in painstaking detail. How would past failures get handled differently this time? What advance instructions would be necessary for building supervisors, so they could cooperate effectively? Who at the lower levels would require special hand holding, if approached? We worked methodically and intensively to make this a different experience. 

Watching the inspections unfold, I could see that our dialogue had achieved strong results. 

I felt deeply satisfied. I believed the world was starting to become persuaded. Most important of all, the brutality of U.N. sanctions might end for the Iraqi people. 

On December 21, 2002 I lunched with my senior diplomatic contact at the Malaysian Embassy, Mr. Rani Ismail Hadi Ali. 243 Rani Ali was an expert on U.N. sanctions policy who staffed Ambassador Hasmy Agam on the Security Council. On behalf of Ambassador Agam and Malaysia’s foreign ministry, Rani Ali provided vital and necessary technical guidance, regarding U.N. criteria for disarmament verification. 244 

To my greatest chagrin, Rani Ali was homeward bound to Kuala Lumpur, having finished his diplomatic tour at the United Nations. 

Equally disappointing, Ambassador Agam was also returning to Malaysia. His distinguished career in diplomacy had been rewarded by a much deserved invitation for Malaysia to head the Non-Aligned Movement (N.A.M.), with Ambassador Agam holding a top Secretarial post. Malaysia was scheduled to host a meeting of the N.A.M. in Kuala Lumpur in February. 

Rani Ali would be leaving New York in just days. At our final lunch, he offered some critical parting advice, 245 which I took seriously to heart. 

The most urgent question now, Rani Ali argued, was how to get the United States out of its corner, so that Washington could embrace the world position for peace and still come out declaring victory. The U.S. had to appear triumphant. 

In this phase, Rani Ali urged me to go back to Baghdad, and look for anything more that I could get for the United States to close that deal. 

I agreed wholeheartedly. On my walk up Third Avenue to the Iraqi Embassy on East 79 th Street, I thought about different possibilities. 

There was talk that Iraq had cancelled the LUKoil contract with Russia for development of the West Qurna Oil fields, containing 8 billion to 10 billion barrels of oil. 246 

With profound apologies to Russia, I recognized that if I could persuade Iraq to offer a major first-tier oil concession to the United States, it might push us over the top to lock in a peace agreement. What can I say? I had to examine every possible opportunity. Frankly I cringed to hear that Iraq had pulled LUKoil’s rights to develop that oil field. It hurt my efforts that Iraq should renege on its contractual commitments to Russia or any other country for post- sanctions reconstruction or oil development. It was important that U.S. corporations must be able to trust Iraqi promises, as part of lifting sanctions. If Baghdad would break its agreements with Russia or France, both outspoken opponents of sanctions policy, what would they do to the U.S., which had tormented them for 13 years? 

See the problem? Still, LUKoil gave me an edge. I wasted no time raising the possibility with Iraqi diplomats that afternoon on December 21, 2002. 

It’s important to clarify that I’m the one who decided to ask for the LUKoil contract. Rani Ali did not suggest that I take it. That was my own idea. 

Iraqi diplomats seized on my suggestion immediately. 

On January 8, 2003, I made a final appeal for peace to my dear second cousin, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card. 247 

Reminding him about my special contacts with Iraqi diplomats, I offered to secure the LUKoil contract for the United States. I made sure Andy understood the U.S. could definitely have the West Qurna field. However, if the White House did not want it, I hoped Baghdad could restore Russia’s contractual rights. 

The purpose of my letter was greater than the LUKoil contract, however. I made clear that I would use my back-channel access to get anything more the United States wanted from Baghdad, so the Bush Administration could be satisfied in accepting a nonmilitary solution to this (non) conflict. 248 

My letter on January 8, 2003 provided a devastating forecast of the dangers of invading and occupying Iraq. 249 

“My dearest cousin, this War with Iraq will hurt us, too. In six weeks or six months, it won’t matter. Because when it hits, it will hit so hard it will not matter that there was ever a delay. The Iraqi people hate Americans, no matter what they think of Saddam. When I was in Baghdad last March, more than one Imam swore to me their people would tear off the arms and legs of American soldiers, and decapitate them, and drag their bodies through the streets. They swore their women would fight, too.” 

“Once the U.S. bombing starts, the Iraqi exiles will have no credibility as leaders. None whatsoever. They will be hated as pawns of the United States, and my God, let me tell you, Arabs can hate. A U.S. victory will never be sweet for long.” 

“Above all, you must realize that if you go ahead with this invasion, Osama bin Laden will triumph, rising from his grave of seclusion. His network will be swollen with fresh recruits, and other charismatic individuals will seek to build on his model, multiplying those networks. And the United States will have delivered the death blow to itself. Using your own act of war, Osama and his cohorts will irrevocably divide the hearts and minds of the Arab Street from moderate governments in Islamic countries that have been holding back that tide. Power to the people, what we call “democracy, ” will secure the rise of the fundamentalists. And before the next Presidential election, Andy, it will become a disaster.” “You are in my prayers. Let me help you. Please.”

Warning Secretary Powell 

before his U.N. Speech 

Andy Card was not the only White House official whom I approached to outline opportunities for peace in January, 2003. 

By happy chance, Secretary of State Colin Powell lived next door to my CIA handler, Dr. Richard Fuisz in McLean, Virginia. 250 

For years I’d been told that soldiers appreciate peace more than ordinary people, because they understand what battle actually costs. They understand what it means to ask men to die, and to send men to kill. They understand the sacrifice for soldier families, and the price of destruction unleashed on the community by their weapons. As General Wesley Clark said, you don’t go to War unless there’s “absolutely, absolutely, absolutely no other way.” 251 

War should be a last resort when all other options fail. 

With that understanding, many of us in the anti-war community pinned our hopes on Secretary Powell. A retired four-star General and Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, from the outside it appeared that Secretary Powell had serious doubts about the necessity and consequences of a War with Iraq. We all hoped the wisdom of his extraordinary military experience might persuade civilians running the Pentagon to slow down and give peace a chance. 

Concerned that Secretary Powell might not have access to the full range of peace options before the War, I decided to approach Powell at his home on January 8, 2003—the same day that I delivered my 11th letter to Andy Card. In the package for Secretary Powell, I included several of my earlier progress reports to Andy Card on our talks to resume the weapons inspections, including Iraq’s response to the 9/11 attack, dated September 24, 2001— and the comprehensive peace framework dated December 2, 2001. 252 

I advised Secretary Powell that the peace framework continued to be viable and productive. 

On January 27, 2003, I returned a second time— just a few days prior to Secretary Powell’s infamous speech at the United Nations on February 5, 2003. In greater detail than before, I advised him that Iraq’s enthusiasm for the inspections was so strong during the preliminary talks from November 2000 to March 2002 that it was unlikely Iraq might be hiding Weapons of Mass Destruction. 253 

This message was not ambiguous. 

On January 27, 2003, I told Secretary Powell: 

“If what you claim is really what you want, this is a viable framework that would allow President Bush to declare a moral victory for his leadership. Working from a formidable position of power, having soldiers ready in the Gulf, the White House could achieve a victory without going to War.” 

“What I have to say next will be more aggravating, but I have an obligation to advise you.” 

“Given that Iraq has tried for two years to hold covert talks with the United States, with the promise of immediately resuming weapons inspections, there’s a very high probability that Iraq has no weapons of mass destruction. Forget what the Iraqi Opposition has told you. They’re famous liars, and most desperate to engage the United States in their protection. You can’t kill 1.7 million people and return home after a vicious bombing campaign to a great parade.” 

“No, Iraq emphasized for more than a year before Kofi Annan got involved, that Baghdad would jump at the chance to prove to the world they had no weapons. At any moment Iraq was ready for those inspections to begin, and that says to me that they felt always they had nothing to hide. They simply insisted that without U.S. support for the plan, it would have no benefits or meaning for resolving tensions. Current events have proved that they were right.” 

“Don’t deceive yourself, Mr. Secretary that War would have no costs. Believing your own rhetoric at this moment would be the most rash and incendiary mistake. Fighting street battles searching for Saddam would entail deadly risks for U.S. soldiers. No matter what Iraqis think of Saddam, the common people hate the U.S. for sanctions and bombings, and they would consider it traitorous to help you. Under these circumstances, the brutality necessary to win this war would be consumption for the entire Arab world. It would produce a disastrous period of occupation. The Iraqis have fought occupations before. They would strike back wherever possible.” 

“Outside Iraq, Islamist's would point to the failure of west-leaning leaderships to protect the Iraqi people. Fundamentalists would seize on that failure to force concessions for their strict cause. There would be a shift to the will of the people alright. No wonder Iran has been chuckling to itself. Iran and Osama— not the United States— would be the greatest victors in this war. The Arab Street would rush to their side.” (Yes, I called the rise of Iran, here and in other papers.) 

“Please let me help you. You can still achieve a greater victory, Mr. Secretary, and maintain the force of America’s moral authority in the world’s eye. The objectives of the Bush Administration can be achieved without igniting terrorist revenge and international boycotts. Or destroying political alliances in the War on Terrorism. Or forcing massive deficit spending that will prolong the U.S. recession and scare the hell out of Wall Street and the Middle Class. Or starting a Holy War— which this would become.” 

Well, OK jury. What do you think? 

Were those the words of a “foreign agent provocateur?” Does my analysis qualify as “treason?” 

Actually, I believe I offered a rational argument worthy of Secretary Powell’s consideration. As a long-time U.S. Asset covering the Iraqi Embassy at the United Nations, I had unique, primary access to special information that could benefit his decision making. It was appropriate that I should take action to make sure he was formally advised of it. A military commander entrusted with the welfare of hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers needs as much input to define his options as possible. In this situation, Washington could have demanded anything from Baghdad, and got it all, without engaging in battle. The U.S. could have demonstrated victory without the hell of War and Occupation— a sort of “unconditional surrender, ” without sacrificing U.S. soldiers or destroying the lives of Iraqi civilians. 

And so I think my action was legitimate, so long as my language demonstrated proper respect for Secretary Powell’s seniority and stature, which I certainly tried to do. 

Notably, in 2007, the Senate Intelligence Committee singled out the “outstanding quality” of intelligence reporting in January, 2003, calling it “one of the few bright spots” in Pre-War Intelligence. 254 The Senate Committee listed the specific warnings that I detailed in my January letters to Andy Card and Secretary Powell in its citation. 

Senator John Warner (R-Virginia) called it “chilling and prophetic.” 

As for Secretary Powell’s ability to identify me as an Asset, my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz was Secretary Powell’s next door neighbor—and a well recognized member of the intelligence community. My relationship with Dr. Fuisz was easily discovered. Either a quick background check or a simple google search on the internet would have turned up our link together on Lockerbie. My knowledge of Secretary Powell’s home address had to come from next door. It’s not rocket science. 

All of that makes it difficult to understand why Secretary Powell should have turned his copies of the Andy Card letters over to the FBI.—something he surely forgot when he gave his infamous interview to Barbara Walters in September, 2005. 255 

In that extraordinary sit-down exclusive that aired on “20/20” , Secretary Powell excoriated mid-level bureaucrats at the CIA—not the top dogs, but mid-level bureaucrats— for not warning him in late January 2003, before his notorious speech at the U.N.— that claims about Iraq’s weapons capacity were not realistic or substantiated. His Deputy, Richard Armitage likewise complained bitterly that no one had the courage or foresight to warn Secretary Powell off the bad intelligence that laid the foundation for his remarks at the United Nations. 

Nobody except me. 

And I got arrested for it. 

As they say, no good deed goes unpunished in Washington. 

But I was stupefied when I heard Colin Powell’s complaint to Barbara Walters. It was an appalling lie. There’s serious question as to whether General Powell violated his oath of military service to the detriment of the welfare of U.S. soldiers, when he made that false declaration. I think he should face a court martial to answer for it. By then, I was gagged by the indictment, and locked up tight on Carswell Air Force Base. I could say nothing, while the Good General whitewashed the blood and dirt off his reputation. 

Ah, but I’m getting ahead of myself. 

I was blessedly ignorant of the dark outlook for my future. I carried on my antiwar outreach to Capitol Hill and the United Nations in New York as passionately as ever. 

Syria and Malaysia

The World’s Best 

Hope for Peace 

The departures of Rani Ali and Ambassador Agam from the Malaysia Embassy did not handicap my efforts in New York, fortunately. Over the years I had cultivated widespread sources at the United Nations. With the storm of War darkening the horizon, I made every effort to use all of them. With the help of Rani Ali, I tracked down phone and fax numbers for every Ambassador’s office 256 in the U.N. General Assembly. 

By January, I was bombarding senior diplomats at the U.N. with appeals to support peace. FBI wire taps prove I lit up phone lines all over the Security Council and key embassies. 

I argued that the existing peace framework addressed all parts of the conflict, and thus rendered War with Iraq avoidable and unnecessary. 

What we needed was the technical language to ratify Baghdad’s offerings to the United States—257 just like we’d done with weapons inspections and the Lockerbie Trial. 

In January and February, 2003, I floated an idea that the United Nations should draft Ambassador Agam—who had 30 + years of senior diplomacy under his belt— to lead a “working group” into Baghdad. 

Recently, Syria had taken a non-permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. In a letter to Syria’s Ambassador Wehbe on February 3, 2003, I wrote: 258 

“Many more opportunities for diplomacy exist even now. I urge Syria and other peace-seeking nations on the Security Council to support the formation of a Working Group that could go to Baghdad, and build a framework as an alternative to War. After talks in Baghdad, the Working Group could present its findings to the United Nations for debate.” 

“This framework would create a parallel track to War preparations. Its purpose would be to define the Iraqi Government’s own commitments on a full range of social and political rights that have been stymied by Baghdad’s necessary preoccupation with grinding sanctions. With that understanding, the United Nations could better decide whether War is necessary at all.” 

In Washington style, I circulated the Wehbe letter all over the Security Council and General Assembly. 

I also suggested the “Working Group” should be charged with implementing the collection of democratic reforms proposed by senior Iraqi officials in Baghdad a year earlier. Iraq’s proposal included some highly creative suggestions, such as housing Iraqi exiles in expanded embassy compounds, and granting Iraqi exiles the rights to establish political parties, party headquarters and opposition newspapers. Returning exiles would have had the right to announce their candidacy for office, and actively campaign for election around the country. 

Each part of this framework would be ground-breaking. Above all, it could be guaranteed. The hardest part had been accomplished already. Baghdad had accepted the demands. All that was missing was a technical agreement to begin implementing the various components, which the “Working Group” could handle. 

To his great credit, Ambassador Agam declared months before that he would come out of retirement, if necessary, to lead comprehensive peace talks with Iraq. He was fully committed to the project, and totally capable of delivering it. 

At the February, 2003 meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement in Kuala Lumpur, Ambassador Agam and my old friend Dr. Saeed Hasan, now Iraq’s Deputy Foreign Minister, discussed the possibility. Traveling to Baghdad for talks would have been out of the question, because of loud whispers that War was imminent. 259 Nonetheless, talks could still be held in Geneva or Paris. 

The situation was not hopeless. War was not inevitable. There was not a lack of viable options. That’s flat wrong. 

It was only a question of who had the courage to pursue peace. Some of those answers are surprising. Malaysia’s special contribution to anti-war efforts, behind the scenes, deserves recognition, praise and appreciation from the international community. 

As it turns out, Malaysia was not the only farsighted leader on the world stage. 

On the evening of February 4, 2003, wire taps by my good friends at the FBI prove I contacted the Syrian embassy at the United Nations, and spoke directly with Syria’s Ambassador Wehbe. 260 

It helps to know that Ambassador Wehbe and I had been briefly introduced by Rani Ali at a Lebanese Tavern, popular among U.N. diplomats. On other occasions, he observed me lunching with diplomats from Libya and Iraq. That stood out, since Western contacts with either of those countries was highly unusual in those years. My role in talks for the Lockerbie Trial would have been known to Syria’s diplomats, as well. 

All of that helps explain why Ambassador Wehbe probably recognized who I was, during this phone call. 

Ambassador Wehbe: “The Ambassador is speaking.” 

Lindauer: (Laughs) “I did not expect you to answer your own phone.” 

Ambassador: “Indeed!” 

Lindauer: (Laughs) Ah, my name is Susan Lindauer… 

Ambassador: “Yes.” 

Lindauer: “And I ah, sent something to you by fax yesterday.” 

Ambassador: “Yes.” 

Lindauer: “It is pertaining to the Iraqi issue. This is ah, a peace framework.” 

Ambassador: “Right.” 

Lindauer: “I have been involved– I live in Washington.” 

Ambassador: “Yes.” 

Lindauer: “I have been a back door…” 

Ambassador: “Hmph hmph.” 

Lindauer: “between Iraq and the White House.” 

Ambassador: “Yeah.” 

Ambassador: “I know.” 

Lindauer: “Okay.” 

Ambassador: “I know.” 

Lindauer: “Okay, good. I have sent that to your, ah, consular.” 

Ambassador: “Did you ask for a meeting?” 

Lindauer: “I was going to be in New York and I was going to have some meetings with a couple of other embassies.” 

Ambassador: “Do you like to come ah, this evening?” 

Lindauer: “I am in Washington.” 

Ambassador: “Oh I thought you are here.” 

Lindauer: “I realize you are incredibly busy, but I would like to share this. Let me put it this way. I do ask you please. I know you’re very busy, but it is very important that you see what I have sent.” 

Ambassador: “Okay, I will ask for it.” 

Lindauer: “Thank you so much.” 

Ambassador: “I will ask for it, and I will see it.” 

Ambassador Wehbe showed a remarkable degree of civility and respect for the contributions of an ordinary woman from outside his own country. If my experience has taught me nothing else, it’s that a government willing to discuss ideas put forth by ordinary people—and listen — is doing some things right. One might argue that listening to common people marks the foundation of all genuine democracy. I find it intriguing, therefore, to compare Syria’s handling of the situation to Colin Powell’s reaction to the very same information. 

Syria’s Ambassador Wehbe did more than listen and read my proposal. To his tremendous credit, Ambassador Wehbe’s staff checked out the framework with Iraqi diplomats, and verified that the platform was accurately portrayed and entirely valid. 

Then Syria followed through, and took action to carry it forward. 

Kudos to Damascus! 

Several weeks after President Obama’s Inauguration, in February 2009, I confronted the Senate Intelligence Committee in Washington over the abuse that I suffered as an Asset, and the gross dishonesty of defaming Pre-War Intelligence, with such a strong peace framework on the table, ready for implementation. 

At that point, the CIA reluctantly acknowledged that Syria had approached them with an identical proposal in early 2003, in the 11th hour before the invasion. 261 

According to Joseph Farah, who publishes the G2 Bulletin, CIA sources have confirmed that Ambassador Wehbe and Syria’s senior diplomats approached the United States covertly, possibly through a third party, seeking to open a back channel to the Secretary of Defense, in order to implement the comprehensive framework, which Iraq had accepted enthusiastically. 262 

According to the G2 Bulletin, Iraq offered six unconditional terms to Defense Department policymakers. The terms were: 

• Full support of America’s Arab-Israeli peace process 
• Support for U.S. strategic interests in the region. 
• Priority to the United States for Iraqi oil 
• Elections within two years, under U.N. auspices. 
• Disarmament— direct U.S. involvement in disarming Iraq. The U.S. could send 5,000 troops into Iraqi to search for weapons of mass destruction. 
• Full cooperation in the war terror— including the hand over of Abdul Rahman Yasin, who was involved in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center. To this day, he is still at large. 

The CIA implied that it arrived too late to act upon. The G2 Bulletin reported that Republican leaders laughed in Syria’s face saying , “See you in Baghdad.” 

Why solve a problem when you can have a war instead? 

In which case, they acted like fools. 

And yet, like Malaysia, Syria deserves the most profound gratitude and praise from the international community, for the simple fact that its leadership had the courage to support peace to the very end. Syria and Malaysia handled this crisis extremely well. They could not have done better. 

Their diplomats had the wisdom and courage to recognize the frightening consequences of this stupid war. Instead of getting paralyzed—or relinquishing responsibility for crisis resolution to the West— their leaders used their position on the Security Council to support dialogue, offering themselves as intermediaries. 

That’s the U.N. at its best. 

As someone who watches trends in the Middle East, Syria’s proactive spirit greatly impressed me. Syria’s diplomats saw the possibility of common ground, and put the good of the world community before any possible differences with Baghdad. I admire that tremendously. It speaks to Syria’s leadership potential in other Middle East conflicts. 

Critically, when the CIA acknowledged all parts of Syria’s proposal, they acknowledged mine—since the two are almost 100% identical, and FBI wire taps prove that I shared it with Syria’s Embassy at the start of February, 2003. 263 

That is valuable for corroborating the legitimacy of the peace framework itself, and the success of my own role as a back channel. Clearly the peace option passed the vetting process with Baghdad, since Syria’s government required verification from Iraqi sources before submitting it to the Bush Administration. I was spot on. 

Unhappily, problem solving was not what Pro-War Republicans wanted. It was not in the best interests of Big Oil and the War Profiteers, the only winners of this catastrophic War. But a Great Peace was always possible. 

That’s critical for the world to know. Although this conflict appeared overwhelming and intractable, dialogue and diplomacy could have achieved results right to the very last days—thanks to the courageous leadership of nations like Malaysia and Syria. 

A substantial peace with Iraq could have achieved every objective demanded by United States and Britain as a justification for War. It would have been a prosperous peace, with oil and reconstruction contracts for the United States, Europe and Asia; weapons disarmament; cooperation with anti-terrorism efforts; even democratic reforms. Victory could have been declared without firing a missile, or killing a single Iraqi child. 

By corollary, every sacrifice to support this War effort has wasted our financial resources and the talent of future generations. And it never had to happen. 

For me, that’s a bitter disappointment. Yet it should give us hope for our future that we don’t have to go down this path again. 

Resolving conflict is always a question of leadership, courage and vision. No matter how hopeless and bleak a situation looks, there’s always a path towards conflict resolution. It might appear difficult. But it can be done. 

It’s always about dialogue, dialogue and more dialogue. When you go looking for allies, you will find them in the most unusual places. 

To Syria and Malaysia, many thanks!

next
GOODNIGHT, SAIGON…1179s

notes
Chapter 12
215. Congress votes on Iraq War Resolution. SourceWatch. 
216 Film Documentary, Body of War, directed by Ellen Spiro and Donahue, inter cuts the 2002 war debate with the postwar life of Tomas Young, a soldier who was paralyzed with a shattered spine within a week of arriving in Iraq. Captures his personal meeting with Sen. Robert Byrd— and his snubbing by Sen. Feinstein’s staff. 
217. Sen Kennedy Floor Speech, Debate on War Authorization. Oct, 10, 2002. 
218. Barak Obama Speech against Iraq War Authorization, Federal Plaza in Chicago, October 2, 2002. 
219. FBI Evidence. Wire taps of phone calls to Congressional offices from July, 2002 until March, 2003. 
220. FBI Evidence. Wire taps of phone calls to Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
221. Letter to President Bush, Rep. Ron Kind and Rep. Sherrod Brown. January, 2003. 
222. Anti War Protests Largest Since 60s. Washington Post. October 27, 2002 
223. Ibid. Washington Post. October 27, 2002. 
224. FBI Evidence. Citizens for Public Integrity. Blast fax and email data base listing of Congressional staffers in all House and Senate offices. U.S. vs. Lindauer. 
225. Ibid. FBI Evidence. Citizens for Public Integrity. Email Data base of Congressional staffers 
226. Ibid. FBI Evidence. Citizens for Public Integrity. Blast fax of Congressional offices and U.N. Ambassadors. U.S. vs. Lindauer 
227. FBI Evidence. Citizens for Public Integrity Papers. U.S. vs. Lindauer Sept. 2002 through March 2003. 
228. Ibid. FBI Evidence. Citizens for Public Integrity Papers. U.S. vs. Lindauer 
229. Ibid. FBI Evidence. Citizens for Public Integrity Papers. U.S. vs. Lindauer 
230. Ibid. FBI Evidence. Citizens for Public Integrity Papers. U.S. vs. Lindauer 
231. Ibid. FBI Evidence summary for Defense. U.S. vs. Lindauer 
232. “Huge Protests for Peace, ” San Francisco Chronicle. January 19, 2003 
233. GREEN LEFT WEEKLY: “Largest Coordinated anti-war protest in history.” Feb. 19, 2003 
234. Ibid. Green Left Weekly. Feb. 19, 2003 
235. Ibid. Green Left Weekly. Feb. 19, 2003 
236. Ibid. Green Left Weekly. Feb. 19, 2003 
237. Ibid. Green Left Weekly. Feb. 19, 2003 
238. Wikipedia. Biography of Andrew Card CHAPTER 13 and 14 
Chapter 13
239. Ibid. Statistics on UN sanctions deaths cross reference (i) the World Health Organization (ii) United Nations Children’s Fund (iii) Iraq Health Ministry. 
240. Ibid. (i) World Health Organization and (ii) United Nations Children’s Fund 
241. Ibid. United Nations Children’s Fund 
242. Ibid. Iraqi Health Ministry 
243. FBI Evidence. Email exchanged by Lindauer and Rani Ali in December, 2002. 
244. FBI Evidence. Email, phone correspondence from Rani Ali, Malaysian Embassy. 
245. Ibid. FBI Evidence. Correspondence with Rani Ali, Malaysian Embassy 
246. Russian Contracts in Iraq: Forgive or Forget, June 4, 2003, Daniel Kimmage 
247. Susan Lindauer Letter to Andy Card, White House Chief of Staff, January 8, 2003 
248. Letter to Andy Card, January 8, 2003 
249. Ibid. Andy Card Letter, January 8, 2003. 
250. FBI Evidence. Manila envelope with Colin Powell’s address (next door to Dr. Fuisz) 
251. Ibid. Keynote: Texas Democratic Party Convention General Clark. June 9, 2006. 
252. FBI Evidence. Correspondence to Secretary Colin Powell, manila envelope plus hand written notes on Andy Card letters dated Sept 24, 2001; Dec 2, 2001; and Jan 8, 2003 
253. FBI Evidence. Letter to Secretary Powell. January 27, 2003, manila envelope plus signature & handwritten notes 
254. U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee. Inquiry of Pre-War Intelligence from January, 2003. Released in May, 2007. 
255. Barbara Walters Interview with Secretary Colin Powell, ABC’s 20/20. September 8, 2005 
256. FBI Evidence. Correspondence with Rani Ali, Malaysian Embassy. 
257. Letter to U.N. Ambassador Wehbe of Syria. February 3, 2003. 
258. Ibid. Letter to U.N. Ambassador Wehbe of Syria. February 3, 2003. 
259. FBI Evidence. Email correspondence with Rani Ali, Malaysian Embassy, Feb 2003. 
260. FBI Evidence. Wire taps of phone conversation with Syria’s Ambassador Wehbe at the United Nations, February 4, 2003. 
261. “U.S. Rejected 2003 Iraqi Peace Offer: Saddam Hussein Proposed Elections, Disarmament, Help with War on Terror.” Joseph Farah, G2 Bulletin, March 10, 2009. WorldNet Daily. 
262. Ibid. “U.S. Rejected 2003 Iraqi Peace Offer:” G2 Bulletin, March 10, 2009. 
263. FBI Evidence. Wire tap. Fax transmission of Peace Framework to Syrian Embassy, Office of Ambassador Wehbe at the United Nations. February 3.