Friday, May 1, 2020

Part 6: Back Door to War...Britain and France Fear to Provoke War over the Issue of Ethiopia

Back Door to War 
The Roosevelt Foreign Policy 

Britain and France Fear to Provoke War over the Issue of Ethiopia 
A. France Vainly Seeks 
Promises of Aid from Britain 
ON SEPTEMBER 2, in preparation for the meeting of the Council of the League, Anthony Eden and Pierre Laval had a long conversation with reference to the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Eden endeavored to impress upon Laval "in the strongest terms the British point of view, stating how it was backed throughout by British public opinion, by the Church, by the peace and League societies, and by the Labor and Liberal parties." He then remarked that "unless Mussolini altered his projects the question of sanctions would necessarily arise and that these might mean war." If this emergency arose Britain was "prepared to do its part." After this ambiguous statement, Eden expressed the opinion that "if Britain was willing to go so far at this time as to take its share and run the risks incident to sanctions, France must feel that this would be, if not a guarantee, at least a sure precedent for the future in case difficulties should arise with respect to German aggression." Laval replied that he had not as yet decided whether to ask Britain for "specific assurances as to further action in other cases should the affair be pushed to the extremity of sanctions against Italy."1 

Two days later, Hugh Wilson had luncheon with Eden at Geneva. Eden informed him that a number of the representatives of the "small states" had assured him that they were in favor of "the application of the Covenant" in the matter of the Italo-Ethiopian controversy. When he had endeavored to elicit from them a definite assurance of support, however, they had evaded his efforts. He then referred to the apparent desire of French statesmen to make diplomatic "bargains." In Paris, Laval had asked him what Britain would do in case of trouble in Austria. Eden had merely replied that the "building up of collective action would certainly be a precedent for British future action." When Laval pressed for a more specific statement, Eden countered with the observation: "I am unable to give you an official answer." 

Eden then confidentially informed Wilson that, with reference to the Laval-Mussolini conversation on January 7, Laval had told him that "he had given Mussolini a free hand as far as France was concerned only in regard to economic measures. On the other hand, Mussolini had told Eden immediately thereafter that the French 'had agreed to accord him complete liberty of action in Ethiopia.'

At the conclusion of this lunch, Eden "spoke in tones of the deepest appreciation" of the action of Secretary Hull "in having the Socony Vacuum Company withdraw from the concession." This had "cleared the air enormously and made him 'happier than anything in this dreary situation.' " 2 

B. The Walwal Arbitral 
Commission Dodges the Issue 
Before the Council of the League opened its sessions on September 4, a report came from the arbitral commission that had been appointed to assess the blame for the outbreak of hostilities at Walwal. On September 3, this commission rendered a unanimous decision which declared that neither Italy nor Ethiopia was responsible for the incident.3 On the following day the Italian Ambassador had a brief talk with Wallace Murray, in the Department of State, and remarked that the wording of the arbitral decision apparently "excluded altogether Italian responsibility" for the "Walwal incident," while at the same time it indicated that "proof of Ethiopian responsibility is lacking." This phraseology was quite "satisfactory to Italy."4 

C. Laval Wishes to 
Conciliate Mussolini 
The day after the arbitral commission had rendered its decision on the Walwal Incident, Baron Aloisi laid before the League a lengthy indictment against the empire of Haile Selassie which included some items dealing with slavery, cannibalism, and ritualistic murder. The representative from Ethiopia repelled with vehemence these charges,5 and the League thereupon appointed a committee of five to "examine as a whole Italo-Ethiopian relations with a view to seeking a peaceful solution."6 

While this committee was making its study, the Council continued its consideration of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute and conversations were anxiously held between Laval and Anthony Eden. During one of these talks Eden remarked that if "Mussolini were allowed to 'get away' with what he was doing, Hitler would be the next." Laval then evinced his readiness to support British contentions if Eden would give him adequate guarantees against possible German aggression. The statement that the British Government was "prepared to fulfill their share of responsibilities as a member of the League" did not go far enough to satisfy France. 

From the British viewpoint the situation in Geneva was far from reassuring, and Lord Vansittart made it clear that "while Britain will be ready to apply sanctions with adequate support on the part of other Powers, she could not undertake to apply them alone. To satisfy British public opinion they might propose sanctions, but should they not be supported he foresaw a possible British abandonment of the League."7 

This British talk of sanctions was very distasteful to Laval. At a meeting of the committee appointed by the Council to study the Italo-Ethiopian controversy he remarked that he was convinced that the only manner in which Italy could be handled without risk of grave European complications was to permit Italy to have at least one victory in Abyssinia. At that time, and not until then .. . did he feel that France could join in taking extreme measures. . . . He believed that Italy would then accept an offer based on those which he together with the British had made at Paris. Eden tacitly acquiesced in this point of view.

To Ambassador Wilson this Laval formula seemed likely to be accepted at Geneva. After hostilities were commenced by Mussolini, a compromise would be "worked up between England, France and Italy at the expense of Abyssinia." Of course there was a possibility that a strong front might be maintained against Italy. If sanctions "are adopted and are efficiently enforced by the States of Europe then the results in Europe and indeed in the world may be incalculable. A belief may be acquired in stability; a sense of solidarity and a sense of safety may arise which would go a long way not only to solving political problems but also economic ones."9 

In Rome the British Ambassador greatly doubted if sanctions would be applied against Italy in the event of war against Ethiopia. He inclined to the viewpoint, current in diplomatic circles, that Italy might move ahead to victory and then be ready for joint Franco-British mediation.10 

In Ciano's address to the American people on September 7, there was no intimation that Italy was counting upon a short war with probable mediation by major European powers. He stressed the wide prevalence of slavery in Ethiopia and the desire on the part of Italy to remedy this sad situation. To this humanitarian ideal was joined the belief that Italy had a mission to open the vast resources of Ethiopia for the benefit of the whole world. This would be a titanic task that could not be accomplished in a short time.11 

But despite Ciano's speech with its high-sounding objectives, Premier Laval still clung to his belief that before peace talks could have any real foundation it would be necessary "that some military operation . . . take place in Abyssinia in order to satisfy Mussolini who was beginning to feel that the world had turned against him, not with reference to the merits of the case in Abyssinia but as opponents of Fascist party policies."12 

To Breckinridge Long, in Rome, it was obvious that these military operations would soon take place in Ethiopia. Italy had more than 200,000 troops south of the Suez Canal. To withdraw them would be equivalent to a disastrous defeat. Every indication pointed to a "well-calculated, well-prepared, cold, hard and cruel prosecution of their preconceived plans using the instrumentality of an army and navy almost fanatic in its devotion to .. . one man.... I am led to the firm belief that no compromise is possible except on Mussolini's terms. . . .The settled friendship between Italy and England is gone, not to reappear for generations."13 

This rift between Italy and Britain was very apparent on September 11 when Sir Samuel Hoare, British Foreign Secretary, addressed the Assembly of the League of Nations. He made it very clear that in the emergency then facing the League with reference to difficulties between Italy and Ethiopia, the British Government would support League action with "unwavering fidelity." In conformity with "its precise, explicit obligations the League stands, and my country stands with it, for collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety and particularly for steady, collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression."14 

D. Secretary Hull Rejects 
the Role of Mediator 
The day before Hoare threw this challenge in the face of Mussolini, the American Minister at Addis Abada was asked by Emperor Haile Selassie if the United States would be willing "to mediate between Italy and Ethiopia, provided of course Italy accepts such mediation."15 Hull promptly replied that American mediation was not "practicable, coming as it does at a moment when the appropriate agencies of the League of Nations .. . are occupied in an endeavor to arrive at a solution under pertinent provisions of the Covenant."16 The following day, in order to assuage Ethiopian sensibilities, Hull issued a press statement setting forth the attitude of the American Government towards unprovoked war. It sounded a note which soon became very familiar to millions of Americans: "A threat of hostilities anywhere cannot but be a threat to the interests, political, economic, legal and social of all nations."17 

E. Britain and France Seek 
to Solve the Ethiopian Problem 
Secretary Hull's press statement of September 13 had many broad implications that must have greatly pleased some ardent one-worlders, but the British Foreign Office was anxious for the Department of State to be more specific in its declarations of policy. Hoare had arrived at the point where he believed that Britain would have to take some action because the "potentialities of the Italian adventure in Africa are a threat to the Empire." Pressure upon Italy could take the form of "graduated economic sanctions," which would be applied only if several important nations within the League would agree upon common action. In his conversations with Hoare, Laval had remarked that "if something cannot be given to Italy, there is no use offering her anything." He was willing to go so far as to acquiesce in "Italy's occupation of Abyssinia." Hoare's reply was that any acquiescence in "Italy's occupation of Abyssinia was to acquiesce in a war." He could not accept "any such suggestion." When Laval then pressed Hoare for some formal "British commitments in Europe," the British Foreign Secretary vaguely answered that his country would not enter into "any engagements on the Continent beyond the general conception of League action."18 

Hoare's noncommittal answer placed Laval on the spot. He realized that he "must do nothing in any way to throw cold water on the British attitude toward the League," but at the same time he had "to preach a measure of prudence and sound a warning against plunging too deeply into trouble before it is demonstrated to be inevitable." It was Hugh Wilson's belief that the "British and French are slowly coming together."19 

This viewpoint seemed confirmed by information that reached the ears of Ambassador Long in Rome. He had learned from some "French diplomatic sources" that Mussolini had been "plainly told that some solution must be found by negotiation, and found before any feat of arms take place." French diplomats favored an arrangement whereby Italy, France, and Britain would "agree upon Italy's legitimate aspirations in Abyssinia and submit their proposal to the Negus." If Haile Selassie "refused, the Italians might then use force." According to the latest news from Geneva, however, Hoare would probably reject this proposal. 

In the event that Britain and France continued to remain indifferent to Italian interests in Ethiopia, there was a definite possibility that an Italo-German rapprochement might develop. While most persons in Rome admitted that Italy preferred "the friendship of France for military, historical, racial, religious and psychological considerations," it was also felt that if Laval turned his back upon Italy, there was a strong possibility that Mussolini would "seek Allies elsewhere."20 

F. Ambassador Long Favors Giving 
Mussolini a Slice of Ethiopia 
The dangerous situation that was developing in Europe relative to the Italo-Ethiopian impasse, prompted Ambassador Long to suggest a possible solution of the difficulty. His plan was based upon the belief that Italy would have to be given some "additions to her territory in Africa" as a bribe to keep her from going to war. Moreover, it seemed apparent that Germany should be made an active partner in a new European concert.21 

This judicious plan of settlement proposed by Ambassador Long fell upon the very deaf ears of Secretary Hull who does not even mention it in his Memoirs. In an effort to exert pressure upon the Department of State for action with respect to his proposal, Ambassador Long sent a lengthy dispatch which emphasized the growing antagonism between Italy and Britain. The former friendly relations had completely disappeared, and it was impossible to "conceive today that Italy and England will in the next few years proceed to a friendly co-operation in any degree consistent with that which characterized their relations for the past decades." It was necessary, therefore, for some bold action to be taken at once by the United States. If the plan presented to Secretary Hull were not soon adopted, a long line of serious "incidents" would soon follow. Mussolini would not be satisfied with the conquest of Ethiopia. After he occupied Addis Ababa he would elevate his gaze to other territories in Africa and in Asia Minor. Europe would have to be stabilized at once through mutual nonaggression pacts of real force or a series of wars would ensue. The world was approaching a period of expansion and explosion, and some safety valve of mutual trust and good will was the only alternative to disaster.22 

G. Laval Makes a Bow towards Britain 
While Ambassador Long was feverishly seeking some solution of the Italo-Ethiopian controversy, Premier Laval made an important address before the Assembly of the League of Nations during which he made a deep bow in the direction of Britain. With respect to certain obligations of France he was very precise: 

France is faithful to the League Covenant. She cannot fail in her obligations. . . . The adhesion without reservation which we have brought to the League has been enthusiastic and the result of considered opinion. . . . From the protocol in 1924 to the conference for the limitation of armaments, France's representatives have supported with the same fervor the doctrine of collective security. This doctrine remains and will remain the doctrine of France. The Covenant endures as our international law. 

Let all realize that there exists no discord between France and Britain in their effective seeking for a pacific solution of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. Our obligations are inscribed in the Covenant. France will not evade those obligations.23 

Anthony Eden was greatly pleased with Laval's address. On the evening of September 13 he had dinner with Hugh Wilson and talked quite frankly. He pointed out that things are shaping up in the direction for which Great Britain is working; that the French are coming around to the British way of thinking. . . . Eden and Cranborne were quite patently profoundly troubled at the extraordinary seriousness of the situation. . . . Discussing sanctions briefly Eden observed that perhaps the simplest form they could take at the outset at least would be that which would not interfere with sea-borne traffic and so not involve fleet action or questions of American war vessels Regarding the United States Eden said that his Government had determined during this stage not to make any overtures to us regarding questions of neutrality etc.; that the British did not want either to act prematurely or to act in a manner which might embarrass the American Government and therefore would defer the discussion with our Government until a definite program for the inspection of the American Government had been worked out and hoped for a "benevolent" attitude on our part.24 

Eden's satisfaction with Laval's speech was shared by other members of the British Government and by a large section of the British press. The comment in the London Times was typical: 

Unless Signor Mussolini has lost all sense of proportion, the firm words of M. Laval, whose eagerness to reach an agreement with him has been so obviously profound and sincere, should answer at once the Italian dictator that far more is to be gained for his country by timely collaboration with Great Britain and France than by an insensate policy which they can have no choice but to oppose.25 

In Paris, Laval's address received wide support and the press expressed the view that the Premier had "turned a difficult corner, advanced the cause of peace and increased France's prestige."26 

H. Britain Wishes the U.S. to 
Accept Important Responsibilities 
In London the Foreign Office seemed especially anxious to ascertain the American attitude towards the imposition of sanctions upon Italy. During a conversation with Mr. Atherton (the American charge) at the Foreign Office, Sir Samuel Hoare made many comments upon the current of recent events and indicated a certain degree of distrust of Laval. He had found the French Premier a loose talker and while there was nothing written between Mussolini and Laval, he did not doubt for a moment that Laval had left very decided impressions with the Italians as to French policy. . . . However, Sir Samuel stated that the French had made this trip up with the British. France had definitely taken the side of the Covenant. 

. . . At the time of consulting League Powers after an act of aggression, non-League Powers would also have to be consulted, and while the Foreign Secretary "made no requests" in the present instance, he said that he was keeping me informed since the attitude of the American Government . . . would be asked. Sir Samuel reiterated that the imposition of sanctions would be a gradual one along the lines of the 1921 resolutions. The first question to be posed was whether League members and non-League members would refrain from selling arms and munitions and implements of war to Italy, and secondly,.. . whether they would also agree to cease purchasing from Italy. 

After making these statements concerning League policy, Sir Samuel then shifted to possible action under the terms of the Pact of Paris. An early appeal "to all the signatories of the Paris Pact . . . must be envisaged as another decisive method of concentrating world opinion . . . against Italian aggression."27 

Before the receipt of this telegram from London, Secretary Hull had held several conferences with his advisers in the Department of State and had expressed the view that the American Government should clearly define its position relative to trade with Italy before the League took any action regarding sanctions. In this way it would be apparent that the decision was independent of any course prescribed by the League.28 

I. Anthony Eden Expresses 
Suspicions of Russia 
While the Department of State was considering what course to take with reference to sanctions against Italy, Hugh Wilson sent an interesting and revealing record of his conversations with M. Massigli, the French representative at Geneva, and with Anthony Eden. On September 12, Wilson had luncheon with Massigli. He informed Wilson in strict confidence that the matter of sanctions against Italy went "very much against the grain with Laval, but he had recognized its inevitability and the fact that the course of events might well cause the French to carry on with England in this direction." In the event sanctions were applied, they must be "swift and efficacious." It would be difficult to realize this ideal if the United States would not join this concert. Wilson immediately informed Massigli that he had "no idea of what the temper of the United States would be when the time came and whether such action would be politically feasible." 

Massigli then remarked that he greatly feared that France and Britain were dealing with a "mad man." No argument and no threat seemed to have any effect upon Mussolini. When Chambrun, in Rome, had pointed out to the Duce the danger of conflict with the British if he persisted in his course, he replied that "he was ready and willing, if they so desired, to measure strength with them and was convinced that he could beat them in the Mediterranean: 'Je m'en fous des Anglais.' " 

On the following day (September 13), Wilson lunched with Eden. Eden was profoundly troubled and felt that "it will be too late to stop hostilities." Regarding Russia, he said that "Litvinov was acting pretty 'naughty.' His general impression . . . was that he felt that the recent Soviet interference in support of the League in the Council and general expressions of a strong attitude by Russia were really prompted not so much by love of mankind as in the hope that the embroilment of the situation would eventually bring the enfeeblement of the capitalist States and offer an advantageous terrain for Communistic success."29 

There was good reason for Mr. Eden's troubled state of mind and for his belief in the inevitability of hostilities. In Rome on September 17, Ambassador Long had an important conference with Mussolini and soon discovered that he was "definitely and irrevocably determined to proceed in Abyssinia with what he insists upon calling a colonial enterprise." The Duce assured Long that he wished to localize the conflict and keep it confined to Ethiopia. He had no desire to see it spread to Europe. But in the event that anybody interferes with him he is prepared and that he has an army of a million men in Italy and that he has a competent fleet and an air force with a certain superiority and that he will brook no interference. He is much exercised . . . about sanctions and mentioned specifically the action of France in Morocco, the Chaco affair, Germany's violations of the Treaty of Versailles, the British action four years ago in Iraq and Japan's activities in Manchukuo and China, in none of which cases were sanctions involved. He then said with anger: "It is only for me and on account of Italy when we wish to rectify wrong and have a legitimate expansion that sanctions are sanctions." 

He was frank in his admissions that he was rapidly moving down the road to war, and he had no hesitation in declaring that he expected to conquer and hold a large portion of Ethiopia. His air of candor was refreshing and his general attitude made a deep impression upon Ambassador Long: 

One cannot talk with Mussolini . . . without being fully conscious of the bold determination and the irrevocable nature of the decisions he has already taken. He is calm, his voice modulated, his manner gracious and his friendly attitude toward the United States unmistakable.30 

J.Ambassador Long 
Advises against Sanctions 
Ambassador Long was so deeply concerned over the wide ramifications of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute that he cabled to Secretary Hull (September 18) and expressed the hope that "if sanctions are invoked at Geneva ... the American Government will not associate itself with them. There would be many unfortunate grave repercussions at home and unnecessary complications here." Long was strongly of the belief that America should beware of European entanglements and should act "without reference to the program of any other government or groups of governments."31 

These telegrams from Ambassador Long caused Mr. Phillips, the Acting Secretary of State, to have a long conversation with Wallace Murray, the chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, with reference to the matter of sanctions against Italy. Mr. Murray pointed out that upon three recent occasions (August 20, 28, and September 16) Sir Samuel Hoare had discussed with the American charge at London the "question of sanctions and the possibility of either a conference of the signatories to the Kellogg Pact or of consultation of the [or between the] signatories to the Kellogg Pact." Mr. Murray was of the opinion that the Department of State should adopt an attitude of "great reserve" regarding any suggestions of conferences or consultations.32 

While Mr. Phillips was pondering the problems connected with sanctions against Italy, he received a telegram from Geneva which indicated that Mussolini had approached France with specific proposals for an alliance against Germany. This overture had spurred the French Foreign Office to ask Britain for definite promises of aid in the event of war. These sought-for promises included an "undertaking that British land forces be sent to the Continent in the event of a German move, the undertaking to comprehend specific arrangements respecting the number, character and disposition of such forces." Also, a "bilateral air pact." Until this "or something similar be granted the French will not consider sanctions against Italy."33 

The Italian press soon got wind of these French proposals for an alliance with Britain and the whole matter was dismissed as of little importance. Doubt was expressed "as to the effective commitments which England will or can make on the Continent and as to the possibility of the French being satisfied with generic assurances." Britain had in the past demonstrated "the uncertain value of her contribution to security on the Continent." Without Italy there "could be no collective security."34 

K. Secretary Hull Defines the 
Position of the United States 
Under the impact of these telegrams Secretary Hull decided that it was important to give a clear formulation of American foreign policy. On September 20 he instructed Ambassador Long that the plan outlined in the telegram from Rome on September 12 was not acceptable to the Department of State. The American attitude towards world peace had received cogent expression in statements already given to the press by the Secretary of State, who would deeply regret "any occurrences which would indicate that we had lost confidence in the agencies which are striving to reach a satisfactory solution of the present dispute."35 

After rejecting Ambassador Long's solution of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, Secretary Hull instructed Mr. Atherton, in London, that the American Government would "not join in the imposition of sanctions upon any nation involved in the pending controversy between Italy and Ethiopia." With regard to League action it was impossible for the United States to "arrive at any conclusion with regard thereto before it was placed in full possession of the reasons and bases upon which such collective action by the League was founded and a complete description of the specific measures to be put into effect."36 

L. The Committee' of Five 
Makes a Futile Suggestion 
In order to dispel all doubts concerning the proper settlement of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute the League Committee of Five submitted (September 18) to both powers a proposal for careful consideration. It was in substance a League protectorate over Ethiopia, the Emperor being assisted by four advisers appointed by the Council. In this plan there was express recognition of Italy's "special interest in the economic development of Ethiopia.

In order to secure some information about what was going on during the meetings of the Committee of Five, Hugh Wilson had a conversation with Mr. Beck of Poland. He deprecated any strong action against Italy. Sanctions might drive her out of the League, and without Italy the League might disintegrate. Beck then gave Wilson a detailed description of the international situation, including a colorful vignette of Hitler: 

In international affairs Hitler is simple, but it is the simplicity of common sense. He had stated, for instance, to Beck: "There is not a single question between Poland and Germany which is worth a war," and he had specifically included the Corridor in this statement. Hitler had also told Beck that by reading his German history and the history of Europe for two hundred years he had found the same mistake repeated ad nauseam: the conquest of territory of alien races in every case left a bitter enemy on the flank. . . . "But," I said, "you are sketching the portrait of a very intelligent man." Beck then threw up his hands and said that never as long as he lived would he understand "what the Devil" Hitler was trying to do in Germany. . . . However, when it came to foreign affairs Beck stated emphatically that no one should make the mistake of underrating Hitler: Hitler was a thoughtful, simpleminded, direct man, full of common sense when it came to the question of foreign relations. Beck described Hitler somewhat as Sir John Simon had done: simple, honest, hard-working, with no thought of self or of luxury.37 

It was apparent that Mr. Wilson elicited from Mr. Beck a great deal of comment about Hitler and very little information concerning the work of the Committee of Five. When the plan of the committee was made public Signor Rosso (the Italian Ambassador) had a conversation with Mr. Phillips about it. He soon made it clear that the Foreign Office believed that it did not go "nearly far enough" in meeting Italian aspirations in Ethiopia. There was little hope for its acceptance.38 

M. The Department of State Ponders 
the Problem of Sanctions 
In the face of probable Italian rejection of the proposal of the Committee of Five, the Department of State hurriedly made a study of the implications of any policy of sanctions. Once more Wallace Murray submitted a report on the political aspects of conferences and consultations. It seemed to him that the Department of State should adopt an attitude of "great reserve" if it "should be asked to call or to attend a conference as a signatory of the Pact of Paris." Inasmuch as the European powers were more directly affected by the Italo-Ethiopian situation, it was obvious that it was "up to them rather than to the United States to call a conference if one is required." In the event a conference were called by some European power to consider the question of sanctions, the Department of State should bear in mind the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations concerning the ratification of the Pact of Paris: "The Committee further understands that the treaty does not provide sanctions, express or implied. Should any signatory to the treaty . .. violate the terms of the same, there is no obligation or commitment, express or implied, upon the part of any of the other signers of the treaty to engage in punitive or coercive measures against the nation violating the treaty." 

If the American Government decided to adopt a policy of refraining from any purchases of goods from Italy, it could make this effective by the following procedures: (1) private organizations could inaugurate a campaign to boycott Italian goods; (2) the government could request individuals to cease making any purchases from Italy; (3) if Italy attempted to discriminate against American trade it would be possible to deny her the most-favored-nation treatment in the same manner that Germany had been treated; and (4) consideration could be given to employing as a more drastic measure the provisions of Article 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930.39 

A long report was also prepared by the Office of the Economic Adviser in the Department of State. With reference to the impact of sanctions upon Italy, this report indicated that certain imports occupied a key place in the Italian economic structure. These included machines and apparatus and parts (Germany the principal source) ; mineral oils (Romania the principal source); coal and coke (Germany the principal source); copper (United States and Chile the principal sources); cotton (60% from the United States); and nitrates (Chile the only source). 

The conclusions that were drawn from these figures were that "as long as Italy is able to pay,for its imports, economic sanctions could only be decisively effected if (a) they were virtually universal among the principal suppliers of the strategic materials. .. . In the case of the most important strategic materials, Italy has probably been accumulating stocks in anticipation of unusual needs."40 

After an extended consideration of these reports from his Department of State advisers, Secretary Hull instructed the American representative in London to inform the Foreign Office that the American Government "would not join in the imposition of sanctions upon any nation involved in the pending controversy between Italy and Ethiopia." With reference to collective action under the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations, it would "of course be obviously impossible" for the United States to join such a concert without first being "placed in full possession of the reasons" for such a measure.41 

N. Italy Rejects the Proposal 
of the Committee of Five 
While Secretary Hull was informing the British Foreign Office that the American Government would not become a member of any concert to impose sanctions upon Italy, Mussolini was speeding his preparations for war in Ethiopia. For a brief time Ambassador Long thought that the concentration of the British fleet in the Mediterranean was causing the Italian press to adopt a "modified tone" in its comments upon British policy,42 but when he talked with the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Signor Suvich), he learned that the proposal of the Committee of Five would not "be acceptable." Long then ventured the remark that he believed he could detect a "tone of conciliation" in Italian utterances within the past twenty-four hours, but Suvich merely "gave a doubtful shrug of the shoulders and replied that he was not conscious of it."43 

It was apparent that in Paris the press had not detected any note of conciliation in Italian utterances, and tension was rapidly rising. It was said that Chambrun had spoken plainly to Mussolini, and "Pertinax," in L'Echo de Paris, intimated that Laval had informed the Duce that "any feeling that France would not go as far along the road as Britain with Article 16 was incorrect."44 

But these French assurances did not completely dissolve British suspicions. On September 20, Sumner Welles and Ambassador Bingham had a conversation with Lord Vansittart,45 who emphasized the strong insistence of British public opinion upon "implementing the obligations of the Covenant." This insistence worried Bingham who feared that some "Maine incident" might lead to seriously strained relations between Britain and Italy. It was evident that Vansittart had similar worries and they were given further extension by the uncertainty in British minds as "to the extent the French consider themselves committed to implement the Covenant and incidentally the British thesis there in under."46 

British uneasiness was given additional development on September 21 when the Italian Government announced its rejection of the proposals of the Committee of Five. On the island of Malta preparations were hastily made for possible conflict with Italy, and the situation was viewed "with extreme gravity."47 At Geneva the British representatives at the sessions of the League of Nations described the tone of the Italian note of rejection as "extremely brusque," but they admitted that it was cleverly phrased and contained "some elements which .. . are embarrassing."48 Anthony Eden was particularly disturbed by the possible effects of the Italian reply to the Committee of Five, and he confided to Hugh Wilson that "the affair is just as bad as it could be."49 

On September 23, Emperor Haile Selassie endeavored to place a barrier along the Italian road to war by accepting the proposals of the Committee of Five. This action appeared to have an immediate effect upon the Italian Government. On the following day the Italian press contained "no attacks on England" and the recent bellicose tone was greatly modified.50 At Geneva the atmosphere suddenly became clearer. A member of the British delegation informed Prentiss Gilbert that Laval had "definitely informed the British .. . that France would adopt any position which the British might take in Geneva and that he [Laval] had also informed Rome." This information probably soon went the rounds in diplomatic circles because Prentiss Gilbert reported that the "whole outward situation here during the day has been that the British and French have agreed on a common policy." As a result of these rumors and confidences "an almost dramatic change has apparently occurred in the inner circles of the three Powers chiefly concerned." Counsels of moderation were now heard and attention was focused on the "disastrous results to finance and trade" which a European war would inevitably cause.51 As a gesture of conciliation, the British Ambassador in Rome called upon Mussolini and informed him that "Sir Samuel Hoare wanted him to understand that England's entire conduct was not a manifestation of hostility toward Italy or an aggression of any kind but simply an expression of England's attachment to the principles of the League of Nations."52 

But this British shadowboxing did not greatly impress Mussolini. Ambassador Long believed that it was "impossible to see a success in continued negotiations." He was met "at the end of every hypothesis with the as yet unaltered conclusion that he [Mussolini] will fight his way out and fall if necessary that way rather than by an ignominious surrender to the Power he provoked."53 

O. Mussolini Offers a 
Formula of Peace 
Although Mussolini was bent upon war with Ethiopia he was wise enough to make some gestures in the direction of peace. As a countermeasure to the proposals of the Committee of Five he submitted a new plan which included three major items: (i) the right to acquire territory, "to the west of Addis Ababa," which would establish a connection between the Italian colonies of Eritrea and Somaliland; (2) a stipulation that the proposal to Ethiopia of an outlet to the sea should be arranged to run through Italian rather than through British or French territory; (3) the adoption of a policy that would provide for the disarmament and demobilization of a large part of the Ethiopian Army. The remaining armed forces of Ethiopia should be under the command of Italian officers. 

While the Committee of Five were considering these proposals of Mussolini, the situation in Geneva remained tense. The matter of sanctions gave members of the League deep concern. The Swiss representative (G. Motta) pointed out to Hugh Wilson that he considered economic sanctions as "peculiarly dangerous for Switzerland as he feared their consequences. In the event of sanctions would the Powers protect Switzerland against Italy?" In his opinion it would be "impossible that their application would not be followed by bitterness and hatred from which the mutual relations of the two countries would suffer for a generation."54 

But Motta's apprehensions were relieved for a brief period by the sudden appearance of a more friendly note in Anglo-Italian relations. In Geneva it seemed apparent that Mussolini had adopted a more reasonable attitude.55 In Rome the press emphasized the "amicable relations existing between Italy and England,"56 while in London the tension was "relieved for the moment."57 

P. Britain Bids for American Support 
Even in Addis Ababa there were expressions of hope that conflict could be avoided. The Emperor apparently believed that Britain would insist upon a "fair deal" for Ethiopia. Moreover, he had not lost faith in the League of Nations. He informed the American Minister that he had placed the fate of his country in "the hands of the collective conscience of the world and is ready to make any sacrifice that can be reasonably expected of him."58 

The extent of his sacrifice would depend upon the strength of collective pressure that Britain would be able to muster against Italy. In order to ascertain the exact degree of this strength, the British Foreign Office decided to make inquiries about attitude of the United States concerning joint action. On September 25, Sir Samuel Hoare had an important conference with Ambassador Bingham during the course of which he frankly asked Bingham if Secretary Hull had given any consideration to the "possibility of consultation among the signatories of the Kellogg Pact." Bingham cautiously replied that he had "no information on this subject." Hoare then hastily assured the ambassador that he had no intention of urging "any course of action upon the United States Government," but he hoped it might be possible for it to take steps that "would tend to limit the war between Italy and Abyssinia in scope and time." Bingham expressed the view that he did not "think it probable" that the Department of State would favor joint action with the members of the League in imposing sanctions upon Italy if war broke out. He knew, however, that Secretary Hull was interested in "reducing the scope and time of the war," and would give consideration to methods of doing so "in the event of unanimous collective action by other Powers." Sir Samuel Hoare listened attentively to this none-too-encouraging statement of the attitude of the Department of State and then remarked that after the outbreak of hostilities the policy of the British Government would be to "invoke economic pressure .. . as far as possible short of actual sanctions." He expressed the ardent hope that the United States would "aid this effort as far as they might deem it proper to do so."59 

The reply of Secretary Hull to these remarks of Hoare was an indirect assurance of partial support. The American Government "would not decline an invitation to consult through diplomatic channels with a view to the invocation of the Pact [of Paris], but we are of the opinion that consultation .. . might appear to encroach upon the explicit functions of the Covenant of the League . . . and it would therefore appear undesirable." Hull then hastened to indicate how America could be of assistance if the present Italo-Ethiopian crisis deepened into war. Italy, like other European countries, had defaulted upon its large loan from the United States and therefore (under the Johnson Act) could not be granted further loans or credits from American sources. Moreover, no credits would be granted by the Export-Import Bank to finance the export of commodities to Italy. Private institutions in the United States would quickly adopt a policy of "restricting credits to Italian borrowers," and finally, the recent neutrality resolution approved by Congress would require an embargo upon the export of arms, munitions, and implements of war to Italy if she became a belligerent.60 

It was quite apparent to Hoare and to other members of the British Government that the United States, in an indirect fashion, could exert tremendous economic pressure upon Italy without having to go to the length of actual sanctions. This obvious fact must have given them solace at a time when they badly needed it. Great Britain was having a mild case of "war jitters." Prentiss Gilbert cabled from Geneva that the British Government would soon "inquire" if the American Government had any objection to "an increase in the British naval building program which they plan to present to Parliament." Aroused British public opinion had caused a delay in the acceptance of the "projected agreement with France which presumably involved British Continental commitments." A widespread "distrust of the French in the present situation and a dissatisfaction at the present situation through them with Rome has impelled the British to re-open direct relations with Rome." 

The British Ambassador in Rome had been instructed to call on Mussolini and complain that his program with regard to Ethiopia was too expansive. If he would be more conciliatory and would be willing "to work out an agreement" with the British Government an effort would be made to "find out how much can be obtained from Addis Ababa." In the meantime, the Duce had disturbed the British official mind by indicating that the question of Ethiopia had not been raised during the conference at Stresa even though the British had summoned their African expert for consultation. Therefore, Mussolini had construed the "British attitude at that period as a tacit consent to his undertaking." Some British officials admitted to Gilbert that they found "this assertion of Mussolini to be unanswerable."61 

Q. Mussolini Moves in 
the Direction of War 230S
To most European observers it was obvious in the last week in September that Mussolini was making his final preparations for war. On September 26 he had a conversation with Jules Sauerwein of he Matin and informed him that operations would begin in about ten days. He anticipated the imposition of economic sanctions but did not expect them to be "sufficiently effective to interfere with his operations."62 

In a long dispatch to Secretary Hull, Ambassador Long carefully canvassed the situation in Rome and came to the conclusion that there was "no evidence that the Italians are considering modifying their African program. While it is true that the presence of the British fleet in the Mediterranean has caused in some quarters a feeling of uneasiness, . . . there is as yet no proof that the country as a whole is not prepared to back up the Government's determination to defy all threats rather than submit to a diplomatic defeat which would be fatal to Italian national prestige."63 

At Geneva the general attitude seemed to grow more resolute against any Italian advance into Ethiopia. It was believed that after the Italian troops had gained a "bloodless victory" over Ethiopian forces, an effort would be made by the League to "declare Italy the aggressor and to apply sanctions." At that moment a peace offensive could be launched which would have an excellent chance to be successful. The final peace settlement could give the Italians "such territorial concessions and economic privileges as could be gradually developed into an attractive position although not then or ever a control over Abyssinia which would threaten British Empire interests in Abyssinian independence."64 

These speculations of Ambassador Wilson gave too little heed to the real objectives of Mussolini. Nothing less than complete control over Ethiopia would satisfy the Duce. On September 28 a statement was issued in Rome which clearly indicated the Italian viewpoint. The proposals of the Committee of Five had failed to make provision for "Italy's needs for expansion and security." All persons of "good faith throughout the world have recognized the justice of Italy's rejection of the suggestions of the Committee." The Duce was determined that his own program would be carried out and was ready to face the consequences. Emperor Haile Selassie had recently completed the mobilization of his armed forces with the "declared intention to attack the frontiers of the Italian colonies." Italy would meet force with force.65 

R. Secretary Hull Offers 
"Moral Support" to Ethiopia 
Apparently the Emperor was more ready to meet peace with peace, and in order to implement this pacific program he once more turned to Mr. Engert, the American Minister at Addis Ababa. Engert made a prompt appeal to Secretary Hull to "go on record by expressing to the Italian Ambassador your disappointment that his country should deliberately turn its back on the whole post-war structure for the maintenance of peace."66 Hull's reply to this plea for support was a flat refusal to take a bold stand in this Ethiopian imbroglio. All that America was willing to do at this time was to promise the Emperor its "moral support." He should be buoyed up by the assurance that the Department of State would "continue this support by any action which we can properly take in the light of our limitations as occasions arise."67 

S. Britain Engages in a Bit 
of Diplomatic Double Talk 
While Secretary Hull was trying to satisfy the hungry Emperor with scattered crumbs of morality, Sir Samuel Hoare was endeavoring to placate Laval with a similar slim diet. On September 10 the French Government had addressed a note to Sir Robert Vansittart inquiring just what they might expect from Britain in the event of a "violation of the Covenant of the League of Nations and a resort to force" by some European State "whether or not that State might be a member of the League of Nations." The reply of the British Foreign Office was made public on September 29. It was couched in general terms that were far from satisfactory to France. Hoare made specific reference to the assurances he had voiced in his address before the Assembly of the League of Nations on September 11. He then re-emphasized his statement that the "League stands, and this country stands with it, for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety, and particularly for steady collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression."68 

The British press was in substantial agreement that Hoare's reply was the "only possible one which any British Government could have made." Most papers were of the opinion that "no British Government can commit itself to specific action in an undefined hypothetical future case."69 The French press, with the exception of radical papers like the Socialist Republique and Leon Blum's Populaire, expressed deep disappointment with the vague promises of the Hoare note. Nothing short of "a hard and fast guarantee in writing of all the clauses of the Versailles Treaty" would satisfy them.70 

News came from Rome that the French naval attache had stated "definitely" that Laval would "not agree to military sanctions." The German Ambassador in the same city expressed the opinion that Germany would "not join any sanctions against Italy."71 In Paris the prevailing attitude indicated a "solidifying French public opinion decidedly set against applications of measures of any kind against Italy."72 By October 3 even the leftist groups in France were opposed to sanctions. Marcel Deat, leader of the Neo-Socialist group, openly declared that his followers would not favor any "proposals for the application of sanctions which might come before the Chamber." Leon Blum's vigorous utterances against Italy had been gradually reduced to weak whispers about "peaceful sanctions." Apparently, there would be no real concert of powers to block the march of Mussolini's legions into Ethiopia.73 

On October 2, Italian bombing planes began to drop bombs on northern Ethiopian villages, and on the following day the signal was given for a general advance of Italian armed forces into Ethiopia. As the Italian troops crossed the Ethiopian border they broke out into a gay marching tune whose words indicated their supreme confidence: "With the whiskers of the Emperor we will make a little brush to polish up the shoes of Benito Mussolini." This song was a clear indication that the Italian Army had no doubt that Mussolini had given the British Government a brisk brush-off.74 

IX America Anticipates the League in Exerting Economic Pressure upon Italy a. Senator Nye Flusters Foreign Diplomats As THE LEGIONS of Mussolini were preparing to march into Ethiopia, many Americans began to press for neutrality legislation that would insulate the Western Hemisphere against the possible outbreak of World War II. The crusade of 1917 had not made the world safe for democracy, and during the early years of the Roosevelt era a tide of disillusion swept over the United States that hid from the public eye the measuring rods that had been used by patriotic historians during the second Wilson Administration. The average American suddenly began to count the cost of the World War and was deeply disturbed to discover that the vast expenditures in human lives and national wealth entailed by that struggle had been in vain. American intervention had completely destroyed the old balance of power that had been carefully constructed by European statesmen, and at the close of the conflict the United States had retired from a position that might have brought stability to a new international edifice that trembled in the winds of uncertainty. When Hitler began to move with earthquake feet along the German frontiers, the continent of Europe had tremors that shook the White House in Washington. But President Roosevelt had no magic formula that would bring prompt reassurance to anxious millions across the Atlantic. He was looking for re-election in 1936 and he did not dare to flout the strong isolationist sentiment that was so evident in most American circles. One of the isolationist leaders was Senator Nye who was certain that Americans could derive no benefits from sailing on stormy European waters. The great parade of 1917 had shown all too clearly that the paths of glory led but to the grave. The best way to prevent a repetition of that mad scramble with its dire results was to show the American people the sinister forces that had dragged them into conflict. The wiles of Wall Street should be made familiar to the man in the street so that he would shut his ears to the drums of war that beat a cadence of death for the poor and a rhythm of riches for the wealthy. This viewpoint of Senator Nye received strong confirmation through a sensational article published in Fortune in March 1934, entitled 212 BACK DOOR TO WAR "Arms and the Men." In a long succession of lurid pages the story was told of the shady deals and the devious methods of great munitions manufacturers of Europe in their efforts to incite wars that would make their profits reach dizzy heights.1 Nye had this article reprinted in the Congressional Record so that its full impact would be felt by susceptible members of Congress. There is little doubt that it helped to influence the action of the Senate in its approval on April 12 of the Nye resolution that provided for the appointment of a special Senate Committee to investigate the activities of munitions makers and dealers.2 Vice-President Garner appointed Nye to be the chairman of this committee, and Senator Pittman, chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, acquiesced in the appointment. It was quite unusual in a Senate controlled by the Democratic Party for a Republican to be named to this important post. Secretary Hull deeply deprecated this action by the Democratic majority: "Had I dreamed that an isolationist Republican would be appointed I promptly would have opposed it... . The appointment of Nye was a fatal mistake because the committee . . . proceeded to enlarge the scope of its inquiry into an attempt to prove that the United States had been drawn into the First World War by American bankers and munitions makers."3 But despite his dislike for the appointment of Senator Nye, Secretary Hull promised to aid the committee in every possible way, and President Roosevelt urged the Senate (May 18, 1934) to provide ample funds for the use of committee members so that they would be able to execute their task with a thoroughness commensurate with the high importance of the questions at issue.4 The committee began its hearings on September 4, and it was not long before a sordid story began to unfold. There were some colorful chapters dealing with the malign activities of highly paid lobbyists who used their influence to secure lucrative contracts. Some of the testimony pointed to the fact that manufacturers of munitions ardently believed in a "one world" of business. There were intimate ties that bound these "merchants of death" into an international trust. Within this business circle many trade secrets freely circulated, patents were exchanged, and the volume of trade was diverted into certain favored channels. It was also brought out that some American army and naval officers had been of great service to armament firms, and that the Army and Navy departments, in order to speed a "preparedness program," had given definite encouragement to the same corporations. This encourage1 I X, (March 1934), 52-57, 113-26. 2 Congressional Record, 73 Cong., 2 sess., 2192, 4323, 6688, 7154. 3 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 398. 4 Ibid., p. 400 

Chapter 8
1 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, September 3, 1935. 765.84/1013, MS, Department of State. 
2 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 4, 1935. 765.84/1036, MS, Department of State. 
3 Pitman B. Potter, The Wai Wai Arbitration (New York, 1935). 
4 Wallace Murray to Judge Walton B. Moore, September 4, 1935. 765.84/1255, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 
5 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 4, 1935. 765.84/1039, MS, Department of State. 
6 Breckinridge Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 4, 1935. 765.84/1026, MS, Department of State.
7 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 5, 1935. 765.84/1045, MS, Department of State. 
8 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 7, 1935. 765.84/1067, MS, Department of State. 
9 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 7, 1935. 765.84/1068, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.
10 Breckinridge Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 7, 1935. 765.84/1069, MS, Department of State. 
11 Breckinridge Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 7, 1935. 765.84/1072, MS, Department of State. 
12 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, September 9, 1935. 765.84/1084, MS, Department of State. 
13 Breckinridge Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 10, 1935. 765.84/1101, MS, Department of State. 
14 Address of Sir Samuel Hoare to the League of Nations Assembly, September n , 1935 ; International Conciliation, November 1935, pp. 508-18. 
15 Cornelius Engert to Secretary Hull, Addis Ababa, September 10, 1935. 755.84/ 1094, MS, Department of State. 
16 Secretary Hull to Engert, September 12, 1915. 765.84/1094, MS, Department of State. 
17 Department of State, Press Release, September 14, 1935, pp. 194-96. This statement was prepared in the Department of State on September 12 and was released to the press on the following morning. It was not sent to Ambassador Long on September 12 or 13. On the 13th it was evidently cabled by the Italian Ambassador at Washington to the Foreign Office. On the afternoon of September 13 the Italian Under Secretary of State (Suvich) paid a visit to the American Embassy in order to discuss some of its implications. On that day (September 13) the Italian press had "long accounts" of the Hull statement. For some strange reason Secretary Hull had not cabled his statement to Ambassador Long. Therefore, when Suvich made his call at the Embassy, Long could not discuss the Hull press statement with him. 
This oversight on the part of the Department of State caused Long great embarrassment, and he poured forth to "dear Cordell" his injured feelings: "It is not only a question of my personal and official embarrassment at being confronted by another Government with a matter supposed to be within my information, but it is also the fact that it reflects upon your representatives abroad, and it leads to the broad assumption that they are not in the confidence of their Government. .. . I do trust that in the future particular efforts will be made to advise the Embassies at the seat of trouble of any statements made by the Department concerning the Governments to which they are accredited. . . . Anyhow, please don't do it any more to me." Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 16, 1935. 765.84/1648, Confidential file, MS, Department of State.
18 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 12, 1935. 765.84/1133, MS, Department of State. 
19 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 12, 1935. 765.84/1140, MS, Department of State. 
20 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 12, 1935. 765.84/1338, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 
21 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, September 12, 1935. 765.84/1134, MS, Department of State. Ambassador Long summarized his plan as follows:  "1 . Italy, by agreement with England and France, to receive territorial adjustments to include all the lowlands of Abyssinia and some of the uplands as far as Addis Ababa and east of Mia for some miles and south to the British border. The Italian maps of original Abyssinia and its recently conquered dependencies as submitted to the League by Italy as part of her memorial would indicate the extent of territory to be acquired by Italy. 
"2. Ethiopia to have a new capital in the confines of old Abyssinia and to be guaranteed as to its territorial integrity and sovereignty by Italy, France and England.  
"3. Germany (a) to be brought into the discussions and a tentative agreement arrived at to cede back to Germany certain of its former African colonies on condition that Germany recognize and join as guarantor with the other three Powers the independence of Austria; (b) Germany's assumption of arms on land, sea and in air to be confirmed by the other three Powers; (c) Germany, Italy, France and England agree to attend in sixty days a conference for the reduction of land and air forces in Europe. 
"4. The four Powers to subscribe to mutually operative non-aggression pacts and invoke the Locarno Treaty for the air and land, and subsequently open both agreements for the adherence of all European Governments. 
"5. The four Powers to open simultaneously with the Arms Reduction Conference, another conference for lowering tariff barriers and obstacles to trade and for monetary stabilization, and open that agreement for signature by all European Governments." 
22 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 13, 1935. 765.84/1341, MS, Department of State. 
23 Premier Laval's address before the Assembly of the League of Nations, September 13, 1935; International Conciliation, November 1935, pp. 521-   
24 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 13, 1935. 765.84/1139, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 
25 Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, September 14, 1935. 765.84/1159, MS, Department of State. 
26 Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, September 14, 1935. 765.84/1153, MS, Department of State. 
27 Atherton to Secretary Hull, London, September 16, 1935. 765.84/1197, Strictly Confidential for the Secretary, MS, Department of State. 

28 Cordell Hull, Memoirs (New York, 1948), I, 426. 
29 Memoranda of conversations between Hugh Wilson and M. Massigli, September 12, and Anthony Eden, September 13, 1935, Geneva. 765.84/1429, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 

30 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 17, 1935. 765.84/1205, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 
31 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 18, 1935. 765.84/1219, MS, Department of State. 
32 Wallace Murray to Mr. Phillips, September 18, 1935, inclosing a memorandum dealing with the question of consultation under the terms of the Kellogg Pact. 765.84/ 1329, MS, Department of State. 
33 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 19, 1935. 765.84/1261, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State.
34 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 12, 1935. 765.84/1503, MS, Department of State. 
35 Secretary Hull to Ambassador Long, September 20, 1935. 765.84/1265, MS, Department of State. 
36 Hull, op, cit., p. 436.
37 Memorandum of a conversation between Hugh Wilson and Mr. Beck, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, Geneva, September 20, 1935. 765.84/1495, MS, Department of State. 
38 Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Phillips and Signor Rosso, the Italian Ambassador, September 20, 1935. 765.84/1410, MS, Department of State 
39 Memorandum prepared by Wallace Murray, chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, for the Secretary of State, September 20, 1935. 765.84/1281, MS, Department of State. 
40 Memorandum prepared by the Office of the Economic Adviser, Department of State, September 20, 1935. 765.84/1706, MS, Department of State. 
41 Secretary Hull to the American Embassy in London, September 20, 1935. 765.84/ 1197, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 
42 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 21, 1935. 765.84/1287, MS, Department of State. 
43 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 21, 1935. 765.84/1288, MS, Department of State. 
44 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, September 21, 1935. 765.84/1289, MS, Department of State. 
45 The British Acting Secretary for Foreign Affairs. 
46 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, September 21, 1935. 765.84/ 1291, Confidential for the Secretary, MS, Department of State. 
47 Mr. George to Secretary Hull, Malta, September 22, 1935. 765.84/1306, MS, Department of State. 
48 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 23, 1935. 765.84/1335, MS, Department of State. 
49 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 23, 1935. 765.84/1314, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 
50 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 24, 1935. 765.84/1326, MS, Department of State.
51 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 24, 1935. 765.84/1336, MS, Department of State. 
52 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 24, 1935. 765.84/1344, MS, Department of State. 
53 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 24, 1935. 765.84/1342, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 
54 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 25, 1935. 765.84/1380, Very confidential, MS, Department of State. 
55 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 25, 1935. 765.84/1378, MS, Department of State. 
56 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 25, 1935. 765.84/1377, MS, Department of State. 
57 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, September 25, 1935. 765.84/ 1374, MS, Department of State. 
58 Cornelius Engert to Secretary Hull, Addis Ababa, September 26, 1935. 765.84/ 1403, Confidential file, MS, Department of State. 
59 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, September 25, 1935. 765.84/ 1381, For the Secretary, MS, Department of State. 
60 Secretary Hull to Ambassador Bingham, September 27, 1935. 765.84/1381, MS, Department of State. 
61 Prentiss Gilbert to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 26, 1935. 765.84/1384, MS, Department of State. 
62 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 27, 1935. 765.84/1408, MS, Department of State. 

63 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 27, 1935. 765.84/1700, MS, Department of State. 
64 Hugh Wilson to Secretary Hull, Geneva, September 27, 1935. 765.84/1445, Strictly Confidential, MS, Department of State. 
65 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 28, 1935. 765.84/1452, MS, Department of State. 
66 Cornelius Engert to Secretary Hull, Addis Ababa, September 29, 1935. 765-84/ 1460, MS, Department of State. 

67 Secretary Hull to Cornelius Engert, October 1, 1935. 765.84/1460, MS, Department of State. 
68 London Times, September 30, 1935. 
69 Ambassador Bingham to Secretary Hull, London, September 30, 1935. 765.84/ 1459, MS, Department of State. 
70 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, September 30, 1935. 765.84/1456, MS, Department of State. 
71 Ambassador Long to Secretary Hull, Rome, September 29, October 1, 1935. 765.84/1453, 765.84/1488, MS, Department of State. 
72 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, October 2, 1935. 765.84/1498, MS? Department of State. 
73 Theodore Marriner to Secretary Hull, Paris, October 3, 1935. 765.84/1515, MS, Department of State. 
74 On October 3, Prentiss Gilbert informed Secretary Hull that a member of the Council of the League had inquired if the American Government would care to participate in any flights over Ethiopia by "impartial observers." Reference was made to American participation in the work of the Lytton Commission. Secretary Hull immediately replied that the American Government continued to "watch sympathetically the efforts of the League to find a peaceful solution of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute," but it did not wish to become an "active participant in its administrative activities." Secretary Hull to Prentiss Gilbert, October 4, 1935. 765.84/1529, MS, Department of State. 


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