PART 4: EXTREME PREJUDICE: THE TERRIFYING STORY OF THE PATRIOT ACT & THE COVER UPS OF 911 AND IRAQ

EXTREME PREJUDICE:

THE TERRIFYING STORY  OF 

THE PATRIOT ACT & THE 

COVER UPS OF 911 AND IRAQ

BY SUSAN LINDAUER

CHAPTER 8: 

IRAQ’S COOPERATION WITH 

9/11 INVESTIGATION 

Everyone wanted to help after 9/11. Very few people actually could. I was one of those. There’s nothing grandiose about it. The U.S. required a rapid turn around of high value, actionable intelligence from all possible Arab sources, in order to launch a muscular response to Al Qaeda. Iraq and Libya were both known to possess a significantly higher quality of tracking intelligence on terrorist cells in the Middle East. As such, my special access to those embassies and my history securing their cooperation with other anti-terrorism projects , carried premium value in any serious investigation. 

To put that in context, by September 11, 2001, Paul Hoven and I had worked together for eight years, going back to the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. Dr. Fuisz and I had worked together from September, 1994 onward. I established contact with the Libya House in May, 1995 and the Iraqi Embassy in August, 1996. Our work encompassed significant parts of the Middle East, including Egypt,Syria/Hezbollah, Yemen and Malaysia. However, primarily we focused our energies on Libya and Iraq, leveraging my anti-war and anti-sanctions activism to build relationships with diplomats on all matters involving counter-terrorism. 

This was a well-oiled machine. Virtually no one else enjoyed such close proximity to either Iraq or Libya’s embassies. Both countries had been isolated at the United Nations for years, though Libya’s relations in Europe and Africa had started to thaw following the Lockerbie Trial. 

As for Baghdad, former CIA Director, George Tenet, bemoaned that he could “count on one hand the number of agents working inside Iraq.” 146 The simple fact was that Saddam tortured and killed them as quickly as he uncovered their duplicity. Saddam executed them as traitors. 

Globally, there were just 5,000 Assets, making us a fairly elite group. 147 

That put me in a prized position in New York. Only three U.S. Assets covered the Iraqi Embassy— And my two comrades got drafted by the FBI after 9/11. Raed Al-Anbuke and Wisam Al-Anbuke were sons of an Iraqi diplomat, brothers who desired to remain in the U.S. after their visas expired. In exchange for validating their green cards and work visas, 148 the brothers videotaped and photographed guests at Embassy parties. 149 I know that because, as co-defendant, I received copies of their legal discovery and saw the paltry evidence against them. The Anbuke brothers were very young, in their mid-20's, and worked at a dry cleaners and a video rental store in Manhattan. 150 By contrast, I had graduated from Smith College and the London School of Economics. I had worked as a Congressional Press Secretary and Capitol Hill journalist in Washington DC. Throughout the 1990's, anti-terrorism was my specialty. Most unusually our back channel was not covert, in that I operated with the full knowledge of Arab diplomats and Ambassadors, who understood my motivation as a desire to help end UN sanctions. This was an open and direct line. 

In short, if the U.S. government was serious about acquiring Iraq’s cooperation with the 9/11 investigation, they required my help. There was nobody else who could do it.

Under the circumstances, it would have been irresponsible— and possibly criminal— if I had refused. During my nightmarish federal indictment, I frequently pondered the irony of that point. Refusing to help might have got tagged as “obstruction of justice.” Many times I pictured that “alternative” court session — how Judge Mukasey might have lectured the Court on my stunning failure to provide for the community’s welfare. He might have denied my bail, or handed down a heavy sentence to teach everyone a lesson of the obligations we all bear to our society. 

I would have deserved it. 

After all, pressure to secure Iraq’s cooperation was intense after 9/11. The Pro-War camp hurled outrageous accusations about Saddam’s support for Al Qaeda. On November 28, 2001, Presidential hopeful, Senator John McCain declared— “There was a meeting between Iraqi Intelligence and Mohammed Atta [chief conspirator of the 9/11 attack] in Prague.” 151 

Two weeks later on December 9, 2001, Vice President Richard Cheney said on “Meet the Press, ” “It’s been pretty well confirmed that he [Atta] did go to Prague, and he did meet with a senior official of Iraqi Intelligence Service.” 152 

Republicans in Congress jumped fast on that bogus bandwagon, trumpets blaring I suffered no suspicions. From where I sat, Congressional leaders had zero comprehension of Saddam’s philosophy for holding onto power, or his deep paranoia of all Islamic fundamentalists, terrorists or not. He tracked those individuals mercilessly. What’s more I had full confidence that Baghdad would have supplied me with any fragment of intelligence on the 9/11 conspiracy, as I had demanded for months, if they had come across it. Providing that intelligence would have brought Baghdad closer to Washington and Europe. I had underscored that advantage many times over the summer of 2001. Helping us preempt the attack would have emphasized Iraq’s secular commitment and moderation. Baghdad understood that. They simply had nothing to give us. 

In truth, throughout the summer of 2001, Iraqi officials raced full steam to topple the U.N. sanctions, actively wooing trade missions from Europe, Asia and the Persian Gulf to rebuild bridges and overcome that isolation barrier. My back channel focused on the critical importance of resuming U.N. weapons inspections to verify disarmament But tantalizing side conversations promised the U.S. a bonanza of economic reconstruction contracts in various economic sectors. 153 Trying to win over Washington, Baghdad dangled priority contracts in telecommunications, transportation, hospital equipment and pharmaceuticals, in addition to the oil sector. Whatever the CIA asked for, the U.S. could have. Diplomats swore a thousand times that it would be mine. 154 

After 11 years of hellacious misery, the end of sanctions loomed closer every day. Iraqi officials would have done nothing to jeopardize that progress. It was their greatest hope for the future.

In short, there was zero chance that Iraq had any incentive to participate in the 9/11 conspiracy, or withhold information about it. They would have lost everything at exactly the moment they were poised to triumph over all their obstacles. 

September 11 was Baghdad’s tragedy, too. 

I was never fooled by Republican rhetoric to the contrary. Yet even those of us who correctly recognized that Iraq had nothing to do with 9/11 should have been enthusiastic to receive Iraq’s cooperation with the War on Terrorism. 155 Baghdad had some of the best tracking intelligence on the workings of terrorist networks anywhere— Saddam’s secular government loathed and reviled Islamic fundamentalists. In his paranoia, he presumed that sooner or later they would become “enemies of state.” So Iraqi Intelligence monitored them constantly, and tracked them all over the Middle East. They would often appeal to his government for sanctuary, anticipating his hatred of the United States. If so, they failed to understand that Saddam desperately hoped to reconcile with America. Getting access to that superior trove of intelligence would have made a phenomenal impact on U.S. goals— and Saddam understood that. 

The U.S. would have difficulty achieving results without that input. 

On the other hand, you can see the problem for Republican leaders. 

Finally, after 9/11, President Bush had a chance to hurdle international antipathy towards U.S military aggression against Iraq. Right up to that moment, world opinion had turned against Washington. Current U.S. policy against Iraq was doomed. Baghdad was poised on the cusp of rehabilitation. Cooperation with anti-terrorism would have been one more factor to justify that end. It didn’t take Saddam very long to figure that out.

Where would that leave the White House? Back at square one without an excuse to launch their war. 

But I did not understand that yet. 

With the world discombobulated by 9/11, the White House seized its advantage and rushed to rev up its propaganda machine, with Vice President Cheney and Senator John McCain as its mouthpiece. In a calculated push to link Iraq to Al Qaeda, the White House launched one of the most blatant and audacious deceptions in the War on Terrorism. 

Not for the first time, my credentials posed a serious problem for NeoCons at the White House. Our team had monitored Iraq’s enormously poor enthusiasm for various jihadi groups since 1996— including Iraq’s rejection of overtures from Bin Laden in 1998, immediately after his infamous jihad fatwa against the west. 156 

In the early spring of 1998, before the U.S. Embassy bombings in Dares Salaam and Nairobi, Kenya, I played a first-hand role in assessing whether Bin Laden would find sanctuary or financial support from Libya or Iraq. 157 In one of the very first investigations of what I call “Pre-Al Qaeda” structure and support, I approached both embassies, and expressed sympathy and appreciation for Bin Laden’s cause. 

Their reaction was stark. Libyan diplomats declared me ‘persona non grata’ at their Embassy in New York, and commanded that I must go away and never return. They would not meet with me again. 

As for Baghdad’s reaction, Iraqi diplomats voiced great alarm. They quizzed me extensively as to what Islamic cleric had set up shop in Washington, who could possibly preach support for Bin Laden’s cause. They urged me to explore Islam through a different mosque, and expressed dismay that my understanding had suddenly become so dark. Iraqi diplomats argued that Bin Laden does not follow true Islamic beliefs. They warned that in my quest to understand their religion, I had come across unholy teachings. They urged me to abandon any new friends preaching these terrible things. They were horrified. 

They pushed very hard to identify who my new radical friends were. They wanted names and nationalities. Like I said, Saddam tracked these people all over the world. 

All of this was reported to Dr. Fuisz, who delightedly instructed me to return to the United Nations and apologize to Libya and Iraq. He told me to say that I had made a great mistake in my enthusiasm, and that I recanted my support for Osama Bin Laden. 

Diplomats from both embassies expressed profound relief. 

Our project was important because it established one of the earliest benchmarks for the response that would greet Osama in Middle East nations alienated from the United States. Would his compatriots find sanctuary and welcome in Libya or Iraq? Absolutely not. Baghdad and Tripoli were onto Osama’s game years before Al Qaeda hit our radar. They saw him as a serious threat. They demanded that I stay away from his followers— or stay away from them. 

My career as an Asset was itself a history of Iraq’s opposition to radical Islamic terrorism. 

And so within days of the 9/11 attack, I headed for New York to meet with Libyan and Iraqi diplomats. Both Dr. Fuisz and Hoven urged me to act as rapidly as possible to secure the highest levels of cooperation from both countries. I performed at their demand. 

Paul Hoven would later tell the FBI that he spoke with me 40-50 times after 9/11. 158 That speaks for itself. 

Dr. Fuisz was typically smooth, quoting John F. Kennedy: “Ask not what your country can do for you, ask you what you can do for your country. You don’t ask for anything right now.” 

It must be understood that I had to do the fieldwork before Dr. Fuisz and Hoven could report back to the Intelligence Community, as my handlers. 

At the end of the day, I was the one in direct contact with Iraqi officials. These were my diplomatic sources. My team would succeed or fail—and the policy would succeed or fail— based on the aggressiveness of my outreach. 

After 9/11 nobody was playing. The CIA damn well wanted everything turned over immediately. People like Dr. Fuisz and Hoven took this investigation very seriously. They pushed me to the limit. The attack required it. 

For that matter, I had Libya, too. That was easy. In my conversations with Libya’s Ambassador, Issa Babaa, he quickly reminded me that Libya was the first nation in the world to warn Interpol about Osama bin Laden in 1995. (Egypt issued the first warrant for his arrest in 1996.) Given that long-standing animosity between Gadhafi and Bin Laden, it was easily confirmed that Libya would have no present day linkages to Al Qaeda that could be exploited for intelligence purposes. On the other hand, Libya was praised in media reports for voicing sympathy for the 9/11 victims, including Tripoli’s recognition that over 90 nations lost their fellow country-men that day. The tragedy struck world-wide. 

I communicated those messages from Libya’s Ambassador to Dr. Fuisz. When the media praised Libya’s cooperation, I reasonably concluded my messages had made it up the intelligence chain, and that the success of my efforts was recognized and appreciated. 

With regards to Libya, I think it was appreciated. 159 A few weeks later, the New York Times lauded Libya’s contribution with the headline: “Three New Allies Help CIA in its Fight against Terror.” “Since Sept 11, CIA officials have opened lines with intelligence officials from several nations that Washington has accused of supporting terrorism.” 

Importantly, those meetings at the Libya House occurred on the same days —the same trips to New York—as my meetings at Iraq’s Embassy. I visited one after the other. 

It is with a mixture of pride, amusement and disgust, therefore, that I recall one count of my federal indictment: “On or about September 19, 2001, Susan Lindauer a/k/a “SYMBOL Susan, ” met with an officer of the Iraq Intelligence Service in Manhattan.” 160 

The date was actually September 18. The feds got the wrong day. And I certainly hoped my diplomat friend, Salih Mahmoud, had ties to Iraqi Intelligence. It would make my success much easier to achieve. That was the whole point of the trip, after all. 

It must be underscored that the Justice Department never disputed that my work occurred. On the contrary, the federal prosecutor, Edward O’Callaghan, argued that I should serve 10 to 25 years in prison because it did occur. He simply argued that my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz, was interested in Libya and only Libya—Not Iraq. 

That’s right! According to the Justice Department, the CIA did not care about Iraq’s relationship to Al Qaeda after 9/11. They did not want to know anything about it. 

I am not making that up. 

The alleged evidence supporting these accusations are what I call “hinky.” And that’s putting it politely. 

According to the FBI, an Iraqi diplomat named Salih Mahmoud (whom I fully acknowledge working with) treated me to lunch on three afternoons in Manhattan. 161 

On September 8, 2001,the Iraqi diplomat allegedly bought us both lunch for $33.50. My half of that was apparently $16.75 with tax and tip. 

On September 13, he bought the two of us lunch for $27.57 at 2:17 pm, according to a time-stamped receipt. My half of that bill would have come to $13.78. 

And on September 22, he allegedly bought us lunch for $31.85—My half was $15.92. 

The grand total of this misadventure totaled $92.92 By deduction, my half share for three lunches in the most expensive city in the world totaled $46.46. I found that somewhat insulting, though most amusing. All receipts were date and time stamped. So the feds couldn’t fudge the meetings, which helped my defense enormously. 

Curiously, none of those lunches took place on September 19, 2001—the date cited in my indictment. Yet this was the evidence used to justify criminal charges against me. 

I mean, come on didn’t the FBI have anything better to do? The Justice Department wanted to put me on trial for eating a cheeseburger?! 

Ah, but was it American Cheese! Was it a patriotic cheeseburger? Or was it the “French” fries, which irked the Justice Department? That’s what a jury had to decide. 

Remember now, a defendant is innocent until proven guilty—even under the Patriot Act. 

Here’s the punch line, which I could not wait to share with a jury: The FBI had the wrong Susan. The diplomat in question, Salih Mahmoud, had a girlfriend named Susan, who worked at the United Nations. We joked about her all the time, that he had “another Susan, since he couldn’t have me.” She was the “other woman.” Or maybe I was the “other woman.” Whatever—we were two different American women. 

Apparently the FBI didn’t figure that out in its investigation. That’s what happens when the Intelligence Community cannibalizes its Assets! Nobody knows what the hell’s going on. It’s pandemonium! 

I used to giggle deliriously, anticipating my pleasure as I exposed my “rival” to a jury. Given the gravity of the charge— eating a cheese burger with a friendly Iraqi diplomat, you can only imagine how I savored the imaginary moment. 

And how did we know this ‘other Susan’ was the real cheeseburger fiend? Because September 8 was three days before 9/11. Witnesses would testify that I stopped visiting New York several weeks before 9/11. 162 They would testify that I warned friends and family to stay out of New York City, too. The CIA had not yet decided they wanted me dead. They were still trying to keep me alive. Thus, on September 8, I was tucked at home in Maryland, safe from terrorists and federal prosecution. 

Critically, this innocuous receipt for a cheeseburger guaranteed that my Defense would have the right to introduce our 9/11 warnings to the Court! There was no way the Prosecution could keep it out!! Hence, I flatly barred my attorney from pushing to drop that charge. 

I also had a hard alibi for September 13, 2001. When the FBI broke open the hard drive of my computer, they discovered that somebody created a letter to Andy Card at the White House, at exactly the time of day that I was supposedly sitting in that restaurant with Salih Mahmoud. 163 The date and time stamp on the visa receipt proved it was impossible for me to have traveled to New York for the lunch, except in a time warp. Or perhaps a magic carpet! 

Did I mention that New York City lies 214 miles from my home in Takoma Park, Maryland? 

Later, staff at the Bureau of Prisons speculated that perhaps a friend snuck into my house and posed as me, creating the letter to Andy Card as an alibi, while I conducted the meeting in New York. (And you guys think I’m paranoid!) 

It added to the pleasure of my jury fantasy. After all the trouble, I hope it was a good burger! I think New York City owes me one on the house! Hell, they should name a cheeseburger after me on Wall Street, for all the trouble they caused me! And by God, it better have American cheese! Or maybe pepper jack! That’s spicy enough! 

All of which explains why I wear my indictment with a peculiar sort of pride. The indictment proves beyond any doubt that I definitely functioned as a “First-Responder” to the 9/11 tragedy. I confess wholeheartedly that I appeared at the scene of the crime, even if the FBI got all its facts and dates wrong. Without question, I visited my embassy contacts in New York right after 9/11. 

But if I wasn’t that “other Susan” eating cheeseburgers with Salih Mahmoud, then what exactly did I contribute to the 9/11 investigation? And why would the U.S. government be so frightened, that I would be arrested and gagged from disclosing it? 

Where do I start?

Brace yourselves. 

Iraq’s efforts to contribute to the 9/11 investigation were far more substantial than Republican leaders wanted to acknowledge to the American people. 

With tragic irony, I strongly believe the Republican leadership’s refusal to accept Iraq’s assistance has resulted in long term damage to the War on Terror, with dire consequences for future security. In my opinion, the Republican failure has left a back door wide open for another major terrorist strike on the United States. 

And let me tell you why.

Iraq’s Official Response to 9/11: 

Frustration and the 

Oklahoma City Bombing 

Immediately after 9/11, Iraq was much more frustrated and reluctant to contribute than Libya. 

First of all, Iraqi diplomats in New York and Baghdad numbered among the very few in the world who possessed direct knowledge that America’s top leaders unequivocally expected 9/11 in its precise construction and modus operendus.

How did they know? Because I told them. Our team pushed Baghdad hard to supply details of the conspiracy from May, 2001 onward. And we threatened them with a massive retaliatory attack if they failed. In Iraq’s eyes, that strained our credibility. In back channel communications from Baghdad, Iraqi diplomats challenged me sternly: 

“Obviously you knew the attack was coming, because you kept telling us about it.You should have stopped it, Susan—instead of blaming us today.” 

“Why didn’t you stop it?” 

“We will tell you why. You didn’t stop it, because you’ve been planning to attack us all along. This is your excuse. That’s why the United States let (9/11) happen!” 

“You didn’t want to stop it.” 

“Your government allowed this to happen to its own people, so you could declare war on us. And now you complain!” 

Iraqi diplomats nailed it. 

They also guessed, probably correctly, that their old enemy, Israel’s Mossad, gave the CIA intelligence about the attack —and the Mossad now sought to lay blame at their door. 

To Baghdad’s way of thinking, that made perfect sense. That did not make Iraqi diplomats sympathetic, however. Most Americans will not like to hear this. But any sort of debriefing requires candor. Otherwise it’s worthless. So I will say it straight up— Iraqi diplomats got incensed by our outrage over the 9/11 strike. 

“This bombing, it happens every day all over the world. And Americans don’t care! Other families suffer. Other homes are destroyed. Schools are bombed. Commerce is disrupted. This is the way. It is your way.” 

“This is what America does to other countries. You drop the bombs! Now you are suffering, too, and you’re angry. Well, damn your hypocrisy!” 

On my first trip to New York on September 18, those were the sentiments of Iraqi diplomats. What else could we expect after running 20,000 sorties over Iraq’s sovereign air space by this time? And that clock would keep running on the sanctions and no fly zones for an additional 18 months, until the U.S. invasion. 

The problem was that Baghdad possessed vast amounts of exactly the sort of raw intelligence and sourcing that the U.S. required to launch a muscular and effective counter-strike on Al Qaeda. Say anything else about Saddam— his government had phenomenal tracking on terrorist cells throughout the Middle East, particularly with regards to Islamic agitators. My handlers and I were specially convinced that Baghdad would have access to bank accounts or financial records— the greatest prize of all after 9/11.

If Saddam didn’t have it already, he could get it. And that was exactly the sort of premium intelligence the U.S. needed most. 

The problem was getting the stuff handed over to us. 

Immediately after 9/11, I began badgering my diplomatic contacts by phone. I urged Iraqi officials to express condolences for the 9/11 families. And I pushed hard for cooperation with the 9/11 investigation, especially with regards to identifying Al Qaeda operations and financial mechanisms. Dr. Fuisz and I had very precise conversations about what sort of documents would be worthwhile to lay hold of. 

On September 18, 2001 —one week after the 9/11 attack—I headed to New York to meet my diplomatic contacts. 164 Libya was generous in its condolences for the 9/11 victims and their families, noting the international scope of suffering. 

Iraq was scathing.Baghdad caught on with lightning speed that the U.S. government was remarkably silent about its advance knowledge of the attack. Diplomats were also sharp on point that their great tormentor, the United States, urgently required Baghdad’s help to achieve the most substantial results. 

Our need galled Iraqi diplomats. They stressed that New York had no authority to grant my request. The decision would have to come from the highest levels of government in Baghdad. From Saddam himself. Or Tariq Aziz. Diplomats in New York would take no action until authorization was received. “Oh no, no, ” I shook my head. “You must push Baghdad hard. The global community demands a rapid reply.” 

And that’s what we got. 

Very late on the night of September 21, 2001, my diplomatic contact, Salih Mahmoud, phoned my home in Maryland with an urgent request that I should return to New York as quickly as possible to receive the official response from Baghdad. 165 

Early the next morning, on September 22, I jumped in my car and hit Interstate 95, heading north to Manhattan through Delaware and New Jersey. At my speeds, it’s about 3 ½ hours in each direction, a long day after meetings, but always productive. 

When I got to New York, my meeting with Salih Mahmoud took place inside the Embassy. I wanted to gather as much feedback from other diplomats as possible. Also, the spooks could audiotape meetings inside the embassy, standard practice during a crisis. In this situation, Langley would have the capability to authenticate my reporting, and they could add to the analysis. So it was necessary for the conversation to stay inside the embassy. Unhappily for federal prosecutors, I would have resisted any suggestion to move our meeting to a restaurant.

Salih was late arriving. Apparently he was enjoying lunch with his girlfriend, the “other Susan.” That’s a lunch I dearly wish I could have shared with them, since I am ultimately the one who paid for it. And it cost a great deal more than $31.85, I can tell you now. 166 

Immediately Salih handed me a written, decoded statement. What follows is the official verbatim transcript from Baghdad on September 21, 2001 in reply to my request for cooperation after 9/11, including grammar and parenthetical comments. 167 (See Appendix) The brackets are my own insertions: 

1. If the request had been made in different circumstances, it would have been possible for us to agree or go along with it. 

2. With the continuation of U.S. and U.K. aggression and the tense atmosphere in The United State of America against Iraq, any step to be taken by Iraq might be interpreted in a harmful manner to Iraqi reputation and to the keenness of Iraq to maintain its dignity. 

3. Despite of that, all the points proposed by you [meaning me, Susan Lindauer] reflect the real Iraqi position. 

4. If U.S. declared that it intends to halt (stop) the air raids against Iraq (or such things like this) in order to concentrate on other Matters, the situation would be different (better). 

5. However, we are prepared to meet any American official in a covert or non-covert manner to discuss the common issues.

6. In any case, Iraq has suffered from terrorist and its leaders, including his excellency, Mr. President has been a target to many assassination attempts, in addition to the attempt to assassinate Mr. Tariq Aziz in first of April, 1980. In fact, he was injured, as well as some Iraqi leadership members who suffered from such terrorist acts. 

7. Iraq demonstrated a good faith towards U.S.A. in 1993 after Oklahoma Trade Center previous accident, and informed American government through Iraqi interest section in Washington that it (Iraq) was prepared to provide U.S.A. With Some Information about the perpetrators of 1993 accident, if American side would send a delegate to Baghdad. But the American side dealt with our offer improperly and they said to Us (Iraq) to deliver this information. That means eventually they rejected to meet us. 

8. This is the Iraq official position.

Reading over it, I jumped on the references to Oklahoma City and the first World Trade Center “accident” in 1993. 168[Oklahoma was 1995,in 7 it read Oklahoma Trade Center,I changed it,and then went back because of what follows. DC]

My eyes got big. I was immediately glad that we stayed at the Embassy. I began by asking some disarmingly simple questions. I tried to avoid questions that would arouse excitement or cause Salih to alter his story to please me. I wanted to know exactly how the paper arrived. Who had access to it? Whether the Ambassador or other senior diplomats in New York possibly might have edited it? 

Above all, did the document that arrived actually use the word “Oklahoma?” Or had Salih guessed? 

It was important that he should not be afraid to correct a mistake, if he’d made one. 

Salih replied candidly. The message had arrived in code. He deciphered the paper himself. Nobody else was authorized to lay hands on it. So the message originated wholly in Baghdad, without amendment of its political content by diplomatic staff in New York. 

Salih assured me that it came from the “top of the government, far above the Foreign Minister. Nobody would be authorized to change it without facing serious troubles.” 

I suspected that meant Saddam Hussein or Tariq Aziz. And finally, yes, the coded message from Baghdad included a cipher for “Oklahoma.” Salih faithfully swore that he had checked the document carefully. It was not a mistake on his end in New York. 

I pressed a little harder. Did he understand the geography of the United States? Did he understand that Oklahoma was not part of Manhattan, but more than 1,500 miles away? These were two separate locations? It could be an innocent mistake by someone who lacked knowledge of American geography. Both of them had suffered horrific terrorist attacks. 

“Yes, ” he replied. “We know they are two separate cities. I know it, and Baghdad knows it. We know they had two separate ‘accidents.’” 

“I think the message refers to both of them, ” Salih leaned back on the sofa, and kicked his feet up on the coffee table, suddenly conspiratorial. 

“I understand that it is still possible for you to receive this information This door is not closed. If we give it to you, Susie, there is no problem. When you give it to America, they’re going to say that we have it. With the tensions between us, Baghdad fears taking any action that would expose us to harm. You’ve been threatening us for months, Susie.” 

“If you had not threatened us, we would not be so concerned now.” 

“Why didn’t you stop the attack, Susie? You told us about it. We learned about it from you.Obviously you know more than anyone. So how can you blame us? Perhaps you should not look so far away.” 

“Baghdad has to consider all of these things.” 

“But this message is very positive, ” Salih insisted. 

“Baghdad would be ready to cooperate if our interests are not damaged. Then you can have whatever you want. I see no problem. I think you will get it.” 

Here you see the value of an Asset.

Iraqi diplomats confided this information to me—not Washington Those were my relationships that prompted a remarkably fast response from Baghdad, with a three day turn around from September 18 to September 21, followed by a meeting on September 22. Iraq trusted me as the point person, though they had no trust for the United States whatsoever. And they would do favors for me— which I would request on behalf of those greater needs. Expecting that, the CIA would leverage my relationships and network of contacts for its own advantage. That’s how our back-channel worked. 

Baghdad’s official response to 9/11 was communicated in a letter to Andy Card, Chief of Staff to President Bush, dated September 24, 2001. 169 That letter faithfully records the dates of my visits to the Iraqi Embassy on September 18 and September 22, proving nothing was concealed from the White House or Dr. Fuisz, who received copies of all my reports to Andy Card, and prompt debriefings on top of that. 

Despite all of my troubles, I stand by my conclusion to Andy Card: “Iraq has remained silent against the accusations playing in the media not out of malice, but because of frozen communications. I believe Iraq does not know how to speak to the United States, so that you can hear what they are saying, because they are so traumatized.” 170

“They are frightened of an irrational U.S. response — because they’ve seen the previous Administration retaliate with attacks inspired by fuzzy data, or inadequately researched speculations, usually to distract from some media scandal or other. That’s why the Iraqis—and some others, frankly—are freezing up, and the common peoples of some Islamic nations have voiced a distrust of the information against Bin Laden. (They see it) as political justification for a witch hunt against an old enemy.” 

“To regain credibility, in this first situation you are going to be held to a higher standard of scrutiny from the Arab Street. You’ve got to show this is not the same… old cynical leadership. They respect your strength, there is no question. But they also must respect your judgment, so that you retain all of your moral authority.” 

“And so I urge the Administration to hit your mark, but keep your focus tight. Don’t use excuses to expand the circle of targets. Everyone in Europe and the Middle East will see through you, and your actions will only diminish America’s moral justification.” 

There was no hostility in my comments, and I was correct on all accounts. Yet this letter would become a focal point of my five year legal battle over whether I performed as an “Iraqi Agent—” and deserved to spend 10 to 25 years of my life in prison— for delivering such prescient advice to the White House. 171 

Fortunately I did not know that yet. I seized on Baghdad’s claims about the Oklahoma City Bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center attack vigorously. 

In the next weeks, I returned to New York frequently to investigate what exactly Iraq offered the United States. I was convinced that intelligence cache would possess exceptional value. 

Intriguingly, Iraqi diplomats in New York and Baghdad swore their documents proved active Middle Eastern participation in both the Oklahoma City bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center attack. Senior diplomats, including a delegation from Baghdad, insisted the evidence was irrefutable that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols had not acted alone, but in fact received technical guidance and financial assistance from pre-Al Qaeda forces, sometimes called the “Inter-Arab” group, before 9/11. 

As the chief U.S. Asset with ties to the Embassy, Iraq was mine to chase. Anything from Baghdad would have to come through me. Only three of us covered Iraq at the United Nations —and the other two Assets were brand new after 9/11, and in their mid-20s. They had no experience with this sort of work. By contrast, I had several major projects in play already— including a special project in support of U.S. anti-terrorism policy. 

FBI Task Force Invited to Baghdad 

Months before 9/11, a major platform was already on the table that would have dramatically enhanced the United States’ pursuit of terrorists seeking sanctuary inside Iraq. Our team had persuaded Iraq to authorize an FBI Task Force to conduct terrorism investigations inside its borders, with the right to interview witnesses, and most controversially, the right to make arrests. We just needed authorization from the White House to implement the agreement. 172 

The idea for an FBI Task Force emerged after the strike on the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen in October, 2000. 

A year before 9/11, Iraqi diplomats provided advance warning about a major terrorist attack targeting the port facilities at Aden, Yemen. Iraq’s warning came just 10 days before the attack on the U.S.S. Cole linked to Osama bin Laden. 

Intelligence about the conspiracy came through my back channel, with an emergency summons to visit the Iraqi Embassy. Diplomats informed me that Baghdad had swiftly deported a Saudi national after discovering that he was conspiring to attack a port facility elsewhere in the Middle East. Iraqi diplomats protested they would never dare to arrest a foreign national— a Saudi most of all— for fear of international reprisals. There would be too much controversy. Even cracking a major terrorist conspiracy harmful to the Saudi royal family would not be sufficient for Iraq to act, because of repercussions from the international community. It would not be feasible under any circumstances. 

Diplomats protested that they could only deport the jihadi, and notify us. The Iraqi diplomat was quite emphatic, however.The Saudi man traveled on to Yemen after leaving Iraq’s territory. 

Without delay, I notified Dr. Fuisz and Hoven that the Port of Aden in Yemen might be targeted for attack. 

On a rapid turn around trip to New York, I quickly warned Yemen’s Deputy Ambassador at the United Nations, Mr. Al Sindi, of the threat. Yemen had served as a non-permanent member of the Security Council during Lockerbie, and we’d become friendly. For awhile Mr. Al Sindi visited me socially in Washington, and took me out for dinners in Georgetown. So when I described the terrorist scenario over dinner in New York, he took my warning to heart. 

Regrettably the warning came too late to stop a small boat laden with explosives from ramming the U.S.S. Cole, while it docked for refueling five days later. 

But Iraq gave a chilling explanation for the logic behind the conspiracy. Apparently, the Saudi terrorists hoped to alienate the local population from Yemen’s central government and the United States. They hoped Yemen’s leadership would be so disorganized in responding to the strike that Washington would be provoked to impose some sort of sanctions as punishment. That would cause hardship for the local people, costing support for the West and Yemen’s central government authority. 

Such vicious logic enraged Baghdad. 

But their evil logic was significant. Terrorists hoped that alienated rural communities could be persuaded to embrace a sort of freedom fighter/insurgency amalgamation. Seizing on that rage, Saudi rebels could burrow deep into Yemen’s rural villages, and launch attacks on Saudi oil fields, across the border. Thus, Yemen would become a Saudi Rebel base for destabilizing the Saudi Royal family.

Yemen is scrabble poor. Tribal families in the border lands bitterly resent the extravagance of their Saudi neighbors, and perceive them to have seized Yemen’s historic territory, in order to expand their wealth. Some of those rural tribes would definitely welcome raids on Saudi oil fields. No doubt they would enjoy sharing the wealth brought by Saudi Rebels, too. 

In short, the U.S.S. Cole attack was predatory and opportunistic, pure and simple. The terrorists sought to create hardship for the Yemeni people, so that it could profit strategically from their misery and isolation. 

The Saudi group in question would soon have a notorious name, and a more infamous reputation: Al Qaeda. The attack on the Port of Aden in Yemen would launch a major effort by this Al Qaeda group to achieve dominance in global terrorist circles. 

Knowing all of that, my warning had been two-fold:1) notifying Yemen’s Deputy Ambassador Al Sindi of the possible attack on the Port of Aden, and 2) discussing strategies for cooperation, so Yemen could hit the ground running and satisfy U.S. authorities. 

If they couldn’t stop the attack, at least Yemen would be braced for U.S. investigation tactics. And so, five days later, when a small boat laden with explosives rammed the USS Cole, Yemen was not caught wholly off guard. 

Demands for an FBI Task Force in Baghdad erupted out of the CIA’s frustration over Iraq’s impotence to thwart foreign terrorists from setting up shop inside its borders. 

Baghdad complained bitterly that it had no desire to provide sanctuary for Islamic groups—which Saddam’s government despised. However, young jihadis arrived at their borders regardless, attracted by perceptions of the lack of central authority in Iraq. Correctly or not, terrorists believed the international community would hinder Iraq’s ability to police its territory. They sought to exploit that weakness. However, once they arrived, they found no friend in Saddam. They posed a genuine threat to his secularism, and risked stirring up fanaticism among his poverty-weary people. Saddam’s government was already weakened. He did not relish any outsider taking advantage of the porous desert to set up camp inside his country.

The bombing of the USS Cole was a frustrating reminder of those complications. Iraq’s complaints were legitimate, unfortunately. Iraq could not arrest foreign nationals without provoking an international crisis. Nobody wanted Baghdad to reverse that policy. Yet clearly something had to be done. 

Immediately after the attack on the USS Cole, Dr. Fuisz gave instructions that I should corner Iraqi diplomats with our demand to allow the FBI or Interpol to set up shop inside Iraq. If Baghdad could not control the entrance and movement of terrorists inside its borders, who might be attracted by perceptions of Iraq’s flagging security under sanctions, as diplomats insisted, then the international community should be allowed to provide additional safeguards. 

Remarkably, by late February, 2001, Baghdad agreed— eight months before 9/11. 

Regrettably, for all the tough talk on terrorism, Republican leaders took no action on the security arrangement. 

And so another critical safeguard was missed in the months before 9/11. 

Tragedy gave the U.S. a second chance. 173 I was convinced a Task Force would provide a windfall of intelligence for global counter-terrorism efforts, and so I renewed my push for Baghdad to allow the FBI (or Interpol or Scotland Yard) to operate inside its borders. It was a logical demand. Given new disclosures about the cache of documents establishing a Middle East link to the Oklahoma City bombing and 1993 World Trade Center attack, the FBI seemed best positioned to execute a rapid turn around. They could acquire all of the available financial documents in one throw, as opposed to what I could get piecemeal from Iraqi diplomats. The FBI could act immediately to subpoena bank accounts, and move rapidly to seize suspicious funds. They could also deploy teams of law enforcement to chase down terror suspects. 

The FBI would get the glory. That accounted for some hostility at CIA towards the project. However, given the dynamics, it seemed appropriate for law enforcement to take a lead role, as the most effective means of putting that intelligence to rapid use. 

There was just one foreseeable problem: Dr. Fuisz warned that it might take a directive from Congress to bring the CIA and FBI together, because of longstanding hostility between the two agencies. 

That proved to be the greatest understatement of all.

CHAPTER 9: 

IRAQ’S CONTRIBUTION TO 

9/11 INVESTIGATION, 

PART II

After 9/11, everything moved into high gear, making rapid progress on all fronts with Iraq. For the first months after the attack, 9/11 looked like it might become a catalyst for great good. If War was unavoidable in Afghanistan, a full arsenal of peace options flanked the troops in Iraq. 

My projects had been underway for a full year. Now we rallied to the finish line.

Weapons Inspections 

Iraq’s Ambassador to the United Nations, Dr. Saeed Hasan formally welcomed the return of weapons inspectors to Baghdad as of November, 2000. 174 Still, there was a striking disconnect in concerns on both sides. 

Foremost for the U.S., there had been much talk of Iraq’s national pride and past insults by Australian Richard Butler’s inspection teams. That worried the CIA. Even the slightest risk of confrontation, once inspectors were deployed on the ground, made U.S. Intelligence wary of accepting Iraq’s invitation. The CIA feared Baghdad would abruptly refuse to cooperate with “excessive demands” for access to possible weapons sites, and the entire operation would be jeopardized. 

The CIA was adamant. Iraq must agree to weapons inspections “with no conditions.” That was the operative phrase. It meant no qualifying factors, CIA jargon for “unconditional surrender.” Iraq would have to brace its people for the most rigorous standards of compliance in the history of disarmament verification, with maximum transparency a n d five minute access— long enough to find a key and open the door. The U.S. also wanted the right to interview scientists outside the presence of Iraqi officials— a demand that intimidated Iraqi scientists, who feared Washington would twist their words to manipulate the media.

There was obviously deep distrust on both sides. That much was widely reported. 

On the Iraqi side, concerns were strikingly different. Iraqi diplomats welcomed inspections from the end of the Clinton Administration— two years before they kicked off. 175 But senior diplomats agonized over what would happen next—once the U.S. and Britain discovered no weapons caches or production facilities at any of the inspection sites. What mechanism would protect Iraq— and require the U.S. to validate the results—once Iraq’s disarmament was thoroughly verified? How would the U.S. and British governments react when their weapons fantasy turned out to be a hysterical delusion? 

Iraq understood the concept of pride. They understood that London and Washington had a heavy personal stake in the inspection results. The U.S. had pounded its breast, and declared before the world that Iraq was hiding illegal weapons caches. Washington would have to save face somehow, when its theory proved entirely wrong. Iraqi diplomats spent a lot of time debating and fretting over how to get the trapped giants out of their corner. 

That’s what ultimately convinced me Iraq possessed no weapons of mass destruction. Iraq actively worried how Washington and London would handle the embarrassment of defeat.That revealed a lot. 

Another thing, as of November 2000, as the Presidential vote count was underway in Florida, top Iraqi officials swore U.N. inspections could resume in a few weeks. So while the U.S. and Britain publicly chastised Iraq for withholding access to sites, in back channel negotiations Iraq was throwing the door wide open. Baghdad was eager to act as a friendly host, insisting inspectors would be well treated, whereas the United States dug in its heels and balked. That in itself was a blaring admission that Washington and London recognized the outcome would embarrass the West. 

Above all, Iraq made clear it wanted friends. All of Iraq’s future trading partners were eager to put their reconstruction contracts into play. They gave Baghdad the same ultimatum. Baghdad must accept inspections before everyone could get on with business. They hated sanctions, too. They desired a new chapter of friendly relations with Baghdad. But there was no way to surmount disarmament verification. 

And so, over and over, Iraq assured the White House and CIA that Baghdad would welcome U.N. inspectors to finish their job. 

That’s a total contradiction of what the international community was told. 

Cooperation with the 

Global War on Terrorism 

Another great contradiction was Iraq’s so called “lack of cooperation” with global. anti-terrorism policy. Congress had no idea what it was talking about, suggesting Iraq embraced any sort of terrorist philosophy. Throughout the 1990's, Iraq was one of Washington’s best sources on counter-terrorism. Our back-channel existed first and foremost as a back door to receive that intelligence. And Baghdad was always enthusiastic to contribute, regardless of sanctions. Congress had nothing to fear. 

Support for global anti-terrorism was motivated by Baghdad’s secular identity, and its determination to keep a tight rein on radical fundamentalists inside its borders. Baghdad flatly abhorred the notion that it willingly provided sanctuary to aspiring terrorists. Quite the contrary, Saddam would have liked to arrest all young jihadi types, so they could rot in prison. On that point, Saddam shared a lot in common with former Vice President Dick Cheney. 

It must be understood that Saddam restricted his definition of “terrorism” to craven acts of violence or sabotage for the purpose of disrupting political or economic interests. Saddam’s government did not consider “acts of liberation” to constitute terrorist assaults— like the Palestinian fight against Israeli Occupation. Baghdad never shared intelligence on “freedom martyrs.” Quite the opposite, those jihadist received special protection and financial support from Saddam’s government, which never wavered all those years. 

Washington and London should have thought hard about Iraq’s commitment to liberation ideology before sending U.S. soldiers into Baghdad. 

In Iraq, opposition to Infidel Occupations is a form of religion. 

But Saddam was supremely paranoid about religious zealots ready to commit acts of violence in the name of Islam against Arab governments. They would come to Iraq eager to attack the United States, or (mostly) Saudi Arabia, expecting to receive a sympathetic audience. Saddam would throw them right out, howling in protest, through our diplomatic back channel, that sanctions acted like a magnet for those groups to the detriment of the Gulf Region. 

Saddam hated them more than we did. 

“You don’t want them in your country!” Diplomats complained. “Why should we allow them in ours?” 

“If we discover jihadis who want to attack Saudi interests, do you think we can arrest them? No! We would like to help protect the Saudis. But the International Community would never allow it! They would never forgive us! So what can we do?” 

The problem was that Baghdad was right. Young Islamic radicals recognized that Saddam’s government had limited options for handling the influx. So they came in as visitors, and kept a low profile for a few months, until they could resist no longer. At that point, they would come into confrontation with Iraqi authorities, who would quickly ship them off to a new outpost. 

Deportation was the only option. 

Against that backdrop, our push to get an FBI or Interpol Task force into Iraq won rapid approval after the U.S.S. Cole bombing in October, 2000. 

Iraq only hesitated long enough to insist that any terrorists identified by the FBI would hail from Syria, Jordan or Lebanon. Baghdad swore they would not be homegrown in Najaf or Mosul. Officials insisted their country was a transit point only. Saddam feared what their fanaticism could inspire among his people, so he squashed them hard. Saddam wanted them gone. 

By February, 2001, Baghdad agreed— nine months before 9/11. After 9/11, the agreement had to be re-validated. Baghdad correctly feared that any intelligence sharing might be portrayed by Washington as an admission of guilt, as opposed to positive cooperation, like Pakistan, Jordan or Egypt. 176 Iraq desired to be respected like any other nation contributing responsibly to this problem. Their fear was not unreasonable. 

But given Iraq’s history of cooperation, it was fairly simple to persuade them. I just had to keep the Task Force on the table until we could get it implemented. 177 Without a doubt, it was a serious and meaningful effort. All of us presumed the FBI would send its best and brightest agents, who would act aggressively to hunt out terrorists hiding in Iraq. They would have the right to interview witnesses and conduct investigations. Most controversially, they would have the right to arrest terror suspects. This was the mother lode.

Revelations that Iraq possessed documents proving a Middle Eastern link to the Oklahoma City bombing hit me totally by surprise. The Oklahoma bombing in April, 1995 preceded my first visit to the Iraqi Embassy by 16 months. 

But wait a minute, I can hear you thinking. That was Timothy McVeigh’s gig, right? Didn’t he go to his execution by lethal injection, swearing that he acted alone? 

Yes, he did. And a lot of smart people think McVeigh lied, including former CIA Director, James Woolsey, 178 and McVeigh’s own attorney, Steven Jones. 

And yours truly. 

My handler, Paul Hoven was an expert on the Oklahoma City bombing, which killed 168 people, including 19 toddlers and infants 179 at a nursery school on the ground floor of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building. Hoven studied the detonation pattern and architectural designs of the building,which convinced him explosives had been strategically placed in stairwells and/or elevator shafts. He found it most peculiar that employees of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (A.T.F) had not shown up for work the day of the bombing, as if they’d got advance wind of the attack. As for who might have conspired with McVeigh, Hoven studied the “skinhead” angle, the Aryan Nation connection, revenge for Ruby Ridge and the tragic conflagration at Waco, Texas. He understood all the different contributing factors. However, Hoven also gave strict instructions that I should grab anything at all that hinted of Middle Eastern involvement. 

It strained logic to think that Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols acted alone. 

Think about it from a practical level. Building a bomb of that detonation force requires massive sophistication and expertise in storing and mixing dangerous chemicals;maximizing detonation capability; storage of the completed bomb; and technical planning for delivery—all without triggering a premature detonation. 180 

Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols were ambitious, yes. But in all probability, inexperienced bomb-makers would blow themselves sky high before they got so “lucky” as to create a bomb of that magnitude, and protect its separate components until delivery and detonation.

This was a bomb capable of destroying a nine story building, and laying it to waste in concrete rubble, after all. There’s some difficult chemistry here. 

Some of us strongly believe that McVeigh and Nichols must have received technical guidance for the job. Travel and supplies required financial assistance, as well. 

There’s a remarkable documentary film that lays out this argument called “Conspiracy? The Oklahoma City Bombing.” I strongly recommend it. For a more in depth and devastating analysis, I also recommend “Third Terrorist: The Middle Eastern Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing” by Jayna Davis and “Oklahoma City Bombing Revelations, ” by Patrick B. Briley. 

“Conspiracy?” does a beautiful job reexamining the facts about Oklahoma City, including recaps of the eye witness observations by 10 men and women, who claim to have spotted Timothy McVeigh with a young, Middle Eastern man at the Murrah building on April 19, 1995—minutes before the explosion. 

Three employees of the Ryder shop, where McVeigh rented the truck, swore independently under oath that two men entered the store together, identified as Timothy McVeigh and an unknown Arabic man in his mid-20's. The truck was rented from a small store in a small town, with a limited number of daily transactions —not a busy shop. So there was no confusion two days later when the FBI showed up after the blast. All three employees agreed. Two men rented that truck. One of them appeared Middle Eastern. 181 

Likewise, two Middle Eastern looking males were spotted sprinting at break neck speeds away from the Murrah building, and jumping into a dark truck a couple of minutes before the explosion. Speeding away, they almost ran over a woman four blocks away. 

As former CIA Director Woolsey told film makers, “The number of witnesses puts the burden of proof on those who say there was no foreign involvement of any kind.” 182 

Here’s the bombshell: Terry Nichols’ passport showed that he traveled to the Philippines five times from 1990 to 1995, ostensibly to collect his “mail order” bride. But after the wedding, Nichols returned to the Philippines unaccompanied by his wife. 

Strikingly, Terry Nichols and Ramzi Yousef both visited Southwestern College in the Philippines, a notorious recruiting ground for the Islamic Abu Sayef, during the same months, from November, 1994 to January, 1995. That would be Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center attack, who went into hiding in the Philippines from 1993 until his capture in 1995. 183 

More curiously, a police informant visually identified Nichols as having attended a meeting with Ramzi Yousef, at which bomb building and detonation strategies were discussed—the missing technical assistance for the Oklahoma City Bombing. Nichols apparently introduced himself as “the farmer.” (Back home in Kansas, Nichols was indeed a farmer.) 

By the way, the 1993 World Trade Center attack relied on the same M.O. as the Oklahoma City Bombing– a Ryder truck loaded with fertilizer explosives and ammonium nitrate.

And the shoe drops. 

That’s an awful lot of coincidence. That two notorious terrorists would inhabit the same Islamic University campus for several months, meet to talk shop in late 1994 and early 1995, then apply the same bomb building techniques— without conspiring on the Oklahoma City attack four months later in April 1995 — strains credulity. 

My handler, Paul Hoven studied the Oklahoma City investigation exhaustively, and he thought it was a cover up— a la Arlen Specter and the single bullet theory in the John F. Kennedy assassination. In his megalomania, Timothy McVeigh even loathed sharing credit with Terry Nichols. As such, his reliability could be considered highly questionable, as far as identifying co- conspirators. 

And now Baghdad swore it possessed documents proving a Middle Eastern connection to Oklahoma City and the 1993 World Trade Center attacks! 184

Well, I wanted to see what Iraq had. Anybody else doing credible anti-terrorism would want to see it, too. It would be irresponsible not to examine it closely! 

And so I returned to New York frequently to investigate what Iraq was offering. Diplomats responded enthusiastically to my questions. They made additional inquiries to Baghdad, and received confirmations that the documents pertained to both the Oklahoma City bombing and the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. 

And what’s the primary (known) link between those two attacks? Ramzi Yousef. 

Could it be that Iraq possessed financial documents tied to him? 

As one Iraqi diplomat traveling with a delegation from Baghdad put it, “We don’t think this will be valuable to the United States, we know this will be valuable to your efforts.” 

If it related to Ramzi Yousef, that would be a phenomenal understatement!

Iraq’s contribution was priceless. It might outline the whole Al Qaeda spider web of illicit financing from its earliest days! 

A picture of these documents began to emerge, which excited me very much. Reports from Baghdad clarified that in its treasure trove, Iraq was holding banking and financial records from the early to mid 1990's. 

It was exactly what Dr. Fuisz and I hoped for. Such a cache would have incalculable value from the standpoint of tracking the pipeline of Al Qaeda finances. Identifying even a single bank account would allow a back trace on all funds moving from other accounts. Some monies would involve legitimate transactions. Others would not. Either would yield intelligence on even more accounts. Gaining that intelligence could have resulted in the seizure of tens of millions of dollars that otherwise continue to circulate internationally to this day. 

Tracing this spider network of cash from the Middle East to New York and Europe to the Philippines and Indonesia would have disrupted a whole river of finances, keeping this global terrorism network afloat in “happy cash.” I call it happy cash, because most of it comes from heroin trafficking—a cash crop that produces $3 billion in revenue for Taliban fighters in Afghanistan.

An astounding 85 percent of the world’s heroin supply comes from Afghan opium production. All global drug cartels draw from those fields. The Islamic religion has nothing to do with it. Those are drug profits. And that’s where terrorists get their money. 

Iraq offered a way to identify that network and stop it, effectively. 

Baghdad had just one stipulation: They would only hand over those documents to the FBI or other international law enforcement agency— not the CIA. They wanted to support legitimate terrorist investigations— not get swallowed in the miasma of intelligence. I sympathized enormously. The Intelligence Community might easily identify something unpopular in a document, and bury it forever. 

From my perspective, Iraq’s concern demonstrated the integrity of the documents. They were “results oriented only, ” not for show.

That should not have been a problem. It fit perfectly with our first objective of getting an FBI Task Force into Baghdad. The FBI would find a lot to keep them busy. 

I took one more precaution: I told Iraqi officials that if the documents truly pertained to Oklahoma City, then the Chief of Police of Oklahoma City would very likely travel to Baghdad with the FBI to receive the documents. I explained the Police Chief was like a tribal leader, who would know the families of the Oklahoma bombing personally. He would probably go to church with them—just like Iraqi tribal leaders attended mosque with families in their own community. The Chief of Police would be personally insulted—and Iraq’s reputation for cooperating with anti-terrorism goals would be smashed for all of the future— if he arrived in Baghdad and the documents proved to be worthless. He would be ashamed to go home to face the families. The United States would never forgive Baghdad. (And nobody would ever forgive me!) 

Many times I urged diplomats that it would be better to abandon their claim than to create false hope for those families. I gave them plenty of opportunities to back out. 

Nothing scared Iraqi diplomats into backing off their claims. 

By November, 2001 our teams’ efforts were shaping up to a brilliant success on several fronts. 

Our team was riding high to victory. That’s when I made an extraordinary discovery. 

Saddam Hussein was a romantic. 

There was a man at the Iraqi Embassy. Oh yes, there had to be one. 

Our affair started back in 1997, one of those teasing romances. Only like everything else in my life, my liaisons proved slightly more colorful and dangerous in the end. 

Mr. A—— was dark tall and dashing, in his mid 30's. He had a muscular build. And he was incredibly sexy, with a mustache and a great wide mischievous smile, quite playful. 

For all those years, it was fairly predictable that whenever the U.S. bombed Baghdad, I would visit Iraq’s Embassy. Any number of times, I dropped by, while the United States engaged in military action. I would be inside the embassy, while Secret Service Agents or security guards would be posted outside, depending on the severity of the confrontation. 

Late one of those nights, during a major bombing raid on Baghdad, Mr. A——swept me up in his arms. We slow danced for the better part of an hour, in the greeting room of the Embassy. I kicked off my high heels, and danced in my stocking feet. There was no music. So he sang Iraqi love songs to me, which occasionally he stopped to translate.

Outside the embassy, Secret Service agents were posted on the street to stop any conflicts with angry Americans that might escalate hostilities between the two countries. Through the window, I could observe their reactions. It was a cold and rainy night. They looked slightly shocked, as they stared back through the glass. 

Our affair was incredibly romantic. And ever so slightly dangerous. 

Now four years had passed since my friend got ordered back to Baghdad. It was November 28, 2001, and I was visiting the embassy for a meeting with other diplomats. 

When I looked up, I saw my old lover, larger than life, standing in the doorway watching me, a haunted smile on his face. 

My heart stopped for a moment. Then I jumped up from the couch in mid-conversation with another diplomat. 

I grabbed him and kissed him without any thought for the reaction.There was a gasp around us, I recall, and a few shocked expressions. And some embarrassed laughter. 

As it turned out, Mr. A ——was traveling as part of an Iraqi Delegation to New York after 9/11. And he was carrying a message from Iraq’s top Leadership. 

A message for me. 

A decision to resolve all outstanding obstacles to peace had been reached in Baghdad. The haggling was over. At this meeting on November 28, 2001, 185 my friend was authorized to communicate Iraq’s acceptance of all parts of the CIA’s demands. 

Strikingly, Saddam chose my old lover to courier the message. 

The substance of the agreement was relayed to Andy Card and Dr. Fuisz in a letter dated December 2, 2001. 186 It made our peace framework official, final and complete: 

Most notably, as of the November 28, 2001 in New York, Iraq agreed to resume weapons inspections “with no conditions—” the operative phrase sought by the CIA. 187 That committed Baghdad to the most rigorous standards of compliance demanded by the United States, with maximum transparency and swift access to all sites, including the rights to interview scientists outside the presence of Iraqi authorities. 

When I heard this, I cheered out loud and threw up my arms in a “V” for victory. We had worked so hard for those three little words—“with no conditions.” It appeared so simple. Yet it meant so much. It required that Iraq would not equivocate in its commitment to the inspections. Iraq would accept what had to be done, without complaint. 

That meant everything. 

Secondly, once more Iraq authorized an FBI, Scotland Yard or Interpol Task Force to operate inside Baghdad, with full rights to conduct terrorist investigations, interview witnesses and make arrests. The FBI would have authority to review all documents and financial records, proving a Middle Eastern link to the 1993 World Trade Center attack and the Oklahoma City bombing. 188 

In a further show of good faith, Iraq granted the FBI immediate authorization to interview Mr. Al-Anai, the Iraqi diplomat from Prague who allegedly met with Mohammad Atta, the alleged mastermind of 9/11 in April or May, 2001. 

My Iraqi friend, Mr. A assured me that he had personally interviewed Al Anai, who denied that such a meeting ever occurred. Mr. A— extrapolated that Al Anai was a secular leaning Muslim, who would not have sympathized with Islamic radicalism in any regard. He drank. He smoked. He chased women. However, the Iraqi Embassy agreed that FBI agents would have permission to speak with Al Anai one on one, and hear it for themselves. 189 

That was significant Earlier that very day, November 28, 2001, future Republican Presidential hopeful John McCain had demanded that Iraq come clean on this alleged meeting in Prague. On ABC’s Nightline, McCain issued a fierce demand for Iraq’s cooperation with the 9/11 investigation, with special rights for law enforcement to interview Mr. Al Anai. 190 Two weeks later, on December 9, 2001, Vice President Cheney repeated the accusation on “Meet the Press.” 191[Now did you catch that? Both of these pieces of pond scum ALREADY knew that access had been granted by Iraq,yet they spoke a different message to the American people,like Iraq was not cooperating. DC]

It was a done deal before Vice President Cheney opened his mouth. Baghdad agreed to the FBI interview on the very same day that Senator McCain issued the first demand. 

White House Chief of Staff Andy Card was notified of Iraq’s agreement to that effect by December 2, 2001—one week before Vice President Cheney added his voice to the outcry. 192 From the sidelines, it appeared Cheney was grand-standing to maximize the impact when America was informed that Iraq had capitulated to Republican leaders. But Republicans knew they’d already scored. 

Stunningly, despite all of that posturing by top Republican brass, no action was taken on Iraq’s offer. The demand to interview Al Anai was another false flag —part of the cynicism with which politicians in Washington began to manipulate the emotional tragedy of 9/11 for their own political advantage. 

Likewise, Washington refused to accept Baghdad’s treasure cache of financial documents on early Al Qaeda. Instead the Justice Department seized bank accounts of legitimate Islamic charities engaged in community building— feeding widows and orphans, financing hospitals and schools— which offset the hopelessness and despair that foments into alienation and violence. 

Seizing those charity funds does not— I repeat, does not— interrupt the flow of finances circulating through terrorist pipelines. Any politician in Washington who goes on CNN or FOX News Channel to claim otherwise has just proved he’s a fool! 

As the Asset responsible for securing Iraq’s cooperation, I was appalled by the deception— and not for the last time, unfortunately. So much of 9/11 was a circus performance of political grandstanding. It was all showmanship and spectacle. I just didn’t know it yet. 

Third on our agenda,and a particularly great victory for the United States, Iraq promised U.S. Oil Corporations would be guaranteed exploration and development contracts on equal par with Russia and France. The United States would not be penalized for supporting U.N. sanctions, or its many acts of military aggression. 

Already some first tier oil concessions had been granted to Russia’s LUKoil and French oil corporations. Iraq would not violate its prior commitments.However, effective immediately, the U.S. could bid for 2nd tier and 3rd tier concessions on those projects. And in the future, the U.S. oil would receive lucrative first tier contracts for all exploration and development projects. 193 U.S. companies would likewise receive special preference for all oil equipment purchases for production and pipeline construction. 

Fourth, another huge win for the CIA—Baghdad agreed that U.S Corporations could return to Iraq in all economic sectors, and function at the same market share as they enjoyed prior to the 1990 Gulf War. U.S. corporations would suffer no penalties for the decade of cruel U.N. sanctions on Baghdad. “Dual use” production would still be controlled. (Again, given that my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz testified before Congress about U.S. corporations that supplied weapons to Iraq before the first Gulf War, there was no worry that he would neglect that concern.) 194

As an additional show of friendship, Iraq offered U.S corporations preferential reconstruction contracts for Iraq’s hospitals and health care system, including pharmaceutical supplies and medical equipment. U.S. telecommunications corporations would also receive priority contracts. All of it amounted to tens of billions of dollars in long term corporate revenues— jobs and major profits for shareholders. 195

During my trip to Baghdad, officials added another tempting carrot to this bundle: Iraq would guarantee the purchase and import of one million American manufactured automobiles every year for 10 years. That would have a secondary benefit of creating market density for U.S. automotive spare parts. The upshot would be thousands of high-paying union jobs in the economically distressed Rust Belt of the American Heartland—Ohio, Michigan and Indiana. 

That deal would have saved the U.S. automobile industry. In turn, the domino effect would have saved the Detroit and Michigan economies and housing market. At the very least it would have cushioned other blows. 

It would be a lot to gain. And a lot to lose. 

Last and finally, Iraq agreed to cease firing on U.S. and British fighter planes patrolling the no-fly zone over northern and southern Iraq for 30 days before any direct talks occurred, or before a comprehensive settlement got implemented. If the U.S. would consent to resolve the outstanding issues, Iraq would demonstrate its good faith with this ceasefire, effective immediately. 196 

And so it came to pass that on November 28, 2001 — fully 16 months before the Invasion— Iraq agreed to the full scope of demands put forth by the CIA. Every possible U.S. objective would be protected, once sanctions got lifted.

I was elated. We had accomplished something momentous for the 9/11 investigation and for peace in the Middle East overall. I expected our team to be supremely praised by the White House, bipartisan members of Congress and the Intelligence Community. America’s leaders had defined the objectives, after all. Our team met the challenge to fulfill them. It was a stunning victory. 

Our success was reported to Andy Card in a letter dated December 2, 2001, and copied to Dr. Fuisz. 

Given the ramifications of the Peace Framework, it would have been extraordinary not to tell the White House. Indeed, why would I have done so much work without reporting it? What would be the point? My actions depended on communication to the CIA, in order to validate our progress. Moreover, my handlers swore numerous times the Intelligence Community would be irresponsible not to pay attention. That’s their job. Denying it would be the ultimate perjury. Anyone standing in front of a Judge, swearing so under oath, would be guilty of obstruction of justice. They could face prison time for that. And believe me, I would demand maximum sentencing. 

The end was in sight. But I wasn’t quite finished. 

The Christmas Holidays were fast upon us. That would put a hold on action. Still, I expected the White House and CIA to act shortly after the New Year.

Come spring-time, various Congressional offices, Democrats and Republicans alike, confided in private audiences on Capitol Hill that they received intelligence debriefings about the success of our talks. 

I was in the home stretch. Leaving nothing to chance, in January and February, 2002, I held marathon sessions with Iraqi diplomats in New York. 197

Now our discussions turned to an examination of conflicts in previous inspections. The U.S. claimed certain Iraqi behaviors aggravated perceptions of noncompliance. For the sake of future success, every problem situation from the past was studied and picked apart exhaustively with diplomats. 

Iraq had to agree to do everything differently. Diplomats had to clarify specific changes that would be made, point by point Nothing was left to chance. 

Once again, I can prove the meetings occurred, because the Justice Department cited them in my indictment— though most of the dates are wrong. 

Surveillance photographs provide irrefutable evidence that the U.S. (and possibly British) intelligence shadowed us in January and February, 2002. 198 [As I am reading this chapter,I cannot help but have visions of Carter Page(he of more recent 'intelligence news" dancing around in my head DC]

We met at a small hotel close to the United Nations. Our meetings could not be conducted in an open setting, like a restaurant or bar. Our conversations ran so late into the night that it was impossible to return home to Maryland. 

Half an hour after checking in, like clockwork, the noisy elevator would stop at my floor, and a man and woman would get out and enter the room directly next to ours. It happened every time. That reassured me the Intelligence Community was fully alert. Though I could not know which alphabet agency was surveiling us, I was confident the spooks were tracking our meetings closely. More comically, at the very start, I suspect the U.S. alphabet agencies hoped to confine us to a single room at the hotel. Diplomats and I returned after a few weeks hiatus to find an astonishing sight: The bed was unmade, the blanket tousled exactly as I left it three weeks earlier. A half empty liter of Diet Coke sat on the table, and the trash was still piled with leftovers from our take-out chicken dinner. Maid service had not cleaned that room in three weeks. And nobody else had slept there. 

Iraqi diplomats and I took one look at that hotel room and rapidly leapt to the same conclusion. The room had to be loaded with bugs. The spooks must have showed up an hour after I left, because they’d interrupted the cleaning services. They must have quarantined the room, and reserved it exclusively for us. How considerate!(The Iraqis demanded another room immediately). 

Was I paranoid? Perhaps. Candidly, this was the hottest spook party in town. If you wanted to know what Iraq was up to after 9/11, you had to get inside this room—with us— to find out. 

The CIA required this to get done right. They had a legitimate responsibility to secure the integrity of the weapons inspections process and everything else— Nothing could be left to chance. If it was going to happen, it had to be done right. 

Weapons inspections didn’t just “happen to work.” They were made to succeed because of rigorous planning and 17 months of upfront effort, which made the difference. 

Whatever else you think of the CIA—on Iraq, the agency fulfilled its obligations to the highest degree. These men are warriors who built a strong and reliable framework for peace. It was comprehensive and proactive, covering all possible areas of U.S. interests. It was not flimsy; it was not idealistic. It was constructed to be demanding and rock solid.[Up until this statement about the CIA Working for peace,I find Susan's account to be truthful DC] 

I categorically deny that I or my fellow Assets engaged in criminal activity. The obvious proof of surveillance photographs 199 prove the U.S. side was fully informed by me when and where those meetings would take place. I was not operating alone. After 9/11, nobody suggested I should break off engagement. Later my Defense Intelligence handler, Hoven, told the FBI he spoke with me 50 to 60 times after 9/11. 

After those marathon sessions, by mid-February, it was time to hand over Iraq’s agreement to the United Nations. I grabbed it up, and delivered it myself to the Security Council, and a wider circle of Embassies known to deplore the crippling sanctions. My actions are fully substantiated by faxed documents to Ambassadors all over the U.N. 200

I am deeply proud to have done so. It’s pointless for my detractors to deny, since the FBI supplied evidence from wire taps to prove it in court. 

Most perplexing, Ambassadors and senior diplomats at the United Nations would only act once they saw Iraq was already committed to the weapons inspections agreement. Until preliminary talks guaranteed success, they would take no action to help solve the problem. Except for the courageous leadership of Ambassador Hasmy Agam of Malaysia 201—willing to guide and mentor the rising generation of diplomats, whom he assigned to liaison with me—they would not risk any of their own political capital to find a solution. No diplomat would lift a tea finger to make it happen. It had been the same with Lockerbie. 

Attitudes changed with lightning speed forty eight hours after receiving my faxes detailing Iraq’s agreement to inspections “with no conditions.” The Security Council declared it was time for direct dialogue with Baghdad. They invited Iraq to send a delegation to New York, March 8-9, 2002 to hammer out technical language for the agreement. 202 As long as Iraq agreed to Washington’s rigorous standards of compliance, the United Nations would draft up language pronto. 

My work was almost done. There was just one thing left. Then my 18 month project to resume the U.N. weapons inspections would be finished. 

I scheduled a trip to Baghdad the first week of March, 2002, 203 flying home the first day of talks in New York. 

A great deal was at stake. I had a tremendous personal investment in the success of the talks. It would have been disastrous if Baghdad backed off its commitments. 

In any event, the CIA understood my travel plans. I categorically deny that I would have traveled anywhere in the Middle East of all places, without making sure the Intelligence Community could find me if I got into trouble. Some particularly dangerous people did not appreciate my efforts. 

That’s one time complaints about my paranoia hit the mark dead on. 

My trip to Baghdad had a second purpose to explore how far my relationship with my old diplomatic lover, Mr. A— could evolve, if at all.

It struck me as a grand gesture that Saddam chose my lover to courier his message. In the paranoia of the intelligence world, there’s no such thing as “coincidence.” If this particular diplomat showed up in New York, given our past romance, it signified that Saddam was using him for some purpose. The question was what purpose. For sure, nobody trusted Saddam. 

There was an element of danger given our past. I could not afford any mistakes. His safety would become my highest priority. Special precautions would be required to protect him.. There was no danger— Yet. I would have to watch out for it. 

There was ugliness on my end, too. I have bitter memories begging Dr. Fuisz for payment of the debts I accrued during the Lockerbie talks. It shocks Americans to discover that in those days, Assets only received compensation after completing a project. 

Every one of my projects was considered extraordinarily difficult— Lockerbie was judged impossible. Most Assets would give up, because it was so hard. That accounts for why the CIA withheld rewards until a project’s completion. 

That doesn’t mean there wasn’t money. Dr. Fuisz received $13 million from emergency “black budget” appropriations for the 9/11 investigation several weeks after the attack. I was visiting his office, when the glorious news arrived in a phone call.

By this time, Congress owed me a tidy fortune for my successful contributions to Lockerbie, the U.S.S. Cole, and as-sundry Terrorism projects all the way back to the 1993 World Trade Center attack. 

As my handler, Dr. Fuisz controlled my access to funding, though notably, he had no direct contact with Iraq or Libya himself. And so immediately I requested part of that money. Payment was not only for my sake, but for my Iraqi friend in Baghdad. He would be risking his life, if Saddam decided he had become overly friendly with the FBI Task Force on Terrorism. On my trip to Baghdad, I wanted to provide the strongest possible incentive to inspire his cooperation. He would have been worth every dollar, if I could persuade him to help. 

Knowing about that pot of money—$13 million, folks— I leaned hard on Dr. Fuisz for cash right up to the date of my departure.That’s what Congress intended it for, right? 

A third of that money could have achieved all of our goals in Iraq, with ample funding left over, including payment for Dr. Fuisz, Hoven and myself. By comparison, the 9/11 Commission got $11 million for its entire investigation into the attack. 

Dr. Fuisz had other plans. He was building a mega-mansion in Virginia, a stone’s throw from CIA headquarters. He wanted it all.

Later on, the FBI and the Prosecutor would float the extraordinary suggestion that I had not contacted Dr. Fuisz at all. I didn’t ask for any money. I just ran off to Baghdad! 

Yeah, sure I did! 

Blissfully ignorant of my twisted future, on my visit to Baghdad I received assurances from the Foreign Ministry that Iraq was fully committed to the success of the weapons inspections. 204 By the time I finished meeting with Dr. Saeed Hasan— now Deputy Foreign Minister and a personal friend, I was delighted that all of our back-channel efforts had succeeded so magnificently. 

Now it got very interesting. My old diplomat friend was now a senior member of Iraq’s Intelligence Service, called the Mukhabarat. He was authorized to act as a liaison in Baghdad to the new FBI Task force. However, Saddam’s professed desire to cooperate with U.S. anti-terrorism policy could not alter the reality that the FBI and CIA would demand much more than Saddam’s government might be inclined to give. The FBI would not limit its focus to Saddam’s targets. They would have eyes open at all times. 

Any real progress might be hazardous to Mr. A—s life, if Saddam perceived he was too close to the Americans. Or some jihadi might take him out. 

From the outside it looked so easy. Yet it was fraught with danger. 

Suffice it to say that I made a very special appeal for his help. And my outreach was rewarded. My friend agreed to put himself at great personal risk, in order to aid the FBI (or Interpol or Scotland Yard) in identifying terrorist targets moving inside Iraq. He promised to advise us when they arrived; where they stayed; whom they met; and their activities. Some of those people would be despised by Saddam. But a few might enjoy special protection, which my friend would have to overcome. 

I was elated! Once I got home, I expected to receive commendations heaping praise on my cleverness and resourcefulness in developing this Agent at the top of Iraq’s Intelligence Service, no less. That’s a pretty big deal—if you “count on one hand the number of agents inside Iraq, ” 205 as former CIA Director George Tenet told Congress. 

As proof of his performance, my friend’s first act of assistance was to identify a group of Jordanians, who fled into Iraq for medical treatment the first week of March, 2002. Apparently they had suffered war injuries fighting in Afghanistan. Mr. A— said they could not go home to Jordan, on threat of immediate imprisonment. 

One jihadist in particular was a monster, Mr. A— claimed. The timing and description match the young Abu Musab al Zarqawi, infamous for orchestrating a massive bombing campaign against the U.S. Occupation that murdered hundreds of Iraqi citizens and U.S. soldiers. 206 Hundreds of bombings, kidnappings and beheading's would be carried out against the U.S. Occupation under his banner. 

It’s factually known that Zarqawi arrived in Baghdad seeking medical care for a war injury sustained in Afghanistan the first week of March, the same time as I did. More recently, some intelligence has pushed back Zarqawi’s arrival to May, 2002. That’s nonsense revisionism to protect Republicans from criticism of this lost opportunity to arrest him. It’s typical of the careless, self important prognostications flowing through the corporate media these days. They are factually wrong. 

My friend told me the jihadi was a young man of craven violence urgently sought by Jordanian authorities. As my friend put it— “Some men are animals. This man is the worst I have ever seen. He belongs in a cage, and he should stay there.”

My friend offered to deliver him to the FBI Task Force. Iraqi Intelligence expected him to create serious problems wherever he went. They were anxious to hand him over to U.S. custody. Appallingly, the U.S. would not take him. 

I also gave my friend a list of terrorists tied to the Pan Am 103 bombing, aka Lockerbie, including famed terrorist, Abu Nidal. I asked Mr. A— to exert his power to arrest Nidal if he showed up in Baghdad.

In July 2002, Iraqi police stormed a building where Nidal lived, and the world learned that the fabled terrorist died in a hail of gunfire fighting off arrest — or perhaps committed suicide, as Iraqi police closed in. 

Immediately after his death, Nidal’s friends and family in Lebanon talked openly of his involvement in the Lockerbie bombing, and his regret that an innocent Libyan man, Mr. Abdel Bassett Megrahi had been sentenced to life in prison for Nidal’s crime. 207

My Iraqi friend played an instrumental role in arranging Nidal’s capture. 

By any measure, my trip to Baghdad was enormously successful. If U.S. ambitions to hunt out terrorists in Iraq were at all sincere, this strategically placed Iraqi Intelligence Officer would have had phenomenal value. 

Appallingly enough, during my indictment, I faced bitter recriminations and threats of prison time for the actions I took to win him over, and protect him in Baghdad. Those attacks show how cheap the U.S. holds the lives of foreign helpmates. Congressional leaders and the upper echelons of U.S. Intelligence ought to think hard about endorsing such a message. It certainly makes us look very bad. 

I feel that I deserve an apology.

Democracy Initiative 

By far, the most fascinating development on my trip to Baghdad emerged quite unexpectedly at lunch with a member of Saddam’s Revolutionary Counsel at the “Iraq Hunting Club.” 

Throughout the lunch, the Senior Iraqi official was identified only as “His Excellency.” Asked a couple of times for his name, his entourage replied with a smile– “We have told you. You may call him “Excellency.” 

“That is his name?” 

“Yes.” 

Through photos and video broadcasts of Saddam’s cabinet meetings, I have visually identified him, I believe, as an attendant to Saddam at Revolutionary Council meetings, carrying papers and leaning over the Iraqi Leader for his signature. That adds a tantalizing quality to “His Excellency’s” surprise query at this luncheon. 

“What value would the United States place on Democratic Reforms in Iraq, as far as lessening tensions between our two countries?”

According to “His Excellency, ” “maybe Saddam would not be there. He might be gone.” The mere suggestion shocked me so much that I wondered if possibly Saddam was dying. Otherwise speculation about his future would be treasonous. Dictators typically don’t like underlings talking about the succession to their regimes. People get killed for conversations like this. 

Registering my astonishment, “His Excellency” assured me that Saddam was preparing to assume a more distant role in government, and would support the development of democratic institutions that promote power sharing. 

An activist for democracy myself, I responded enthusiastically, citing the European Union’s push for democratic reforms in Turkey, as a precondition for EU membership. Still, I expected only a symbolic or token proposal of Iraq’s commitment to reform. I was astonished, therefore, by the depth of thoughtfulness and the creativity of problem solving contained in Iraq’s proposal. Their package of democratic reforms was obviously well considered. 

Critically, it must be stressed that this proposal was floated a year before the Invasion—and months before the U.S. publicly threatened a military assault on Baghdad. 

It laid a path for regime change without resorting to violent warfare and Occupation. 

Safeguarding the Exiles 

According to His Excellency, Iraqi officials had devised a highly original plan to safeguard Exiles returning from London, Tehran and Detroit, so that they could join the political process. 208 

Iraq would invite the international community to reopen their Embassies in Baghdad, which His Excellency observed are “sovereign territory” of those countries. He stressed that Baghdad could not attack or arrest anyone inhabiting those Embassies, as violence against an Embassy constitutes an act of war against the home country, or near to it. 

His Excellency suggested Iraqi Exiles could return home to Baghdad, and take up housing in those protected domiciles. Iraq would allow Embassies to beef up security for their protection, and would allow them to take over neighboring houses to expand their compounds sizably. This was still Iraq. Eminent domain prevailed over individual rights to property. 

The Exiles would be granted safe passage to their Party headquarters around Baghdad, and to other meeting points. Security provided by the embassies would guarantee their safety inside the country. 

Establishing Political Parties 

and Party Headquarters

Upon returning to Iraq, the Exiles would have the right to establish political parties, including opening party headquarters around the country. 209 They would have the right to publish opposition newspapers, and possibly a television or radio station. His Excellency stressed that the latter would depend on the United Nations’ willingness to amend or lift the sanctions, which tightly controlled and restricted media development inside Iraq. However, Saddam was prepared to share some oil revenues with the Exiles to promote their activities, so long as the level of funding did not negatively impact food and medicine for the Iraqi people. 

In conclusion, His Excellency suggested that former U.S. President Jimmy Carter might head an international delegation to monitor future elections in Baghdad. 

Jimmy Carter supervises election monitoring teams all over the world. He would never tolerate voter fraud in Baghdad or anywhere else. The international community could have trusted that such an eminent observer, of such renowned integrity, would safeguard this “new democracy” in Iraq, in a substantial and effective way. 

The flow of conversation at the Iraqi Hunting Club that afternoon astonished me. The man was talking treason. Merely to suggest that Saddam might forfeit control over every facet of the government could be punishable by firing squad. Upon consideration, I questioned if Saddam might be terminally ill, and stepping back from the daily regulation of government. That might make him more accepting of the inevitability of public grasping for power, and open to plotting out the transition. 

After the invasion proved that Saddam was not terminally ill, I concluded that he had behaved in the fashion of a survivor. He recognized his time had come, and he set about developing a strategy for implementing the inevitable, so that he would not be destroyed by it, but would find a proper balance and sanctuary for himself and his family. 

Whatever motivated this conversation, it was a brilliant and creative opening for Democracy, the likes of which Iraqis never got from George Bush. This plan laid the foundations for major political reforms, and the creation of sociopolitical institutions necessary for a transition to pluralism, without requiring a military deployment or aggravating sectarian strife. It’s a blueprint worthy of attention in other conflict zones. 

Back at the Al Rasheed Hotel, I checked the internet, and discovered the Lockerbie Appeal was finalized, too. The legal challenge on behalf of Abdel Basset Megraghi, the one Libyan convicted of bombing Pan Am 103, had failed in the Scottish Courts. There was nothing more Dr. Fuisz or I could contribute to the Lockerbie case. 

That meant my work with Libya was over, too. Libya’s future appeared bright and dynamic, according to what I saw, with a cadre of (mostly) British Intelligence jumping in to carry forward. 

I felt satisfied and content. I considered that my work as an Asset was essentially over— with mostly good results all around.

It was March, 2002— one year before the invasion. Winter was ending in Maryland, where I live in the suburbs of Washington DC, a few miles from Capitol Hill. When I returned home from Baghdad, the world looked ahead to peace and prosperity in the Middle East. I watched CNN and MSNBC, much amused, as pundits and Statesmen strutted before the TV cameras to prattle about my baby—the return of U.N. weapons inspection teams to Iraq.

After such a long labor, I was at peace to watch them.

next
BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS 918s

Footnotes
CHAPTER 8 
146 Ibid. “CIA could count Iraqi Agents on one hand, ” Washington Post 
147. Ibid. “CIA could count Iraqi Agents on one hand, ” Washington Post 
148. FBI Report, U.S. vs. Lindauer and Anbukes 
149. FBI Evidence, photos and video, U.S. vs. Lindauer and Anbukes 
150. FBI Evidence, Anbuke brothers’ pay stubs and IRS tax filings 
151. John McCain, ABC News NIGHTLINE, November 28, 2001 
152. Vice President Richard Cheney, “Meet the Press, ” December 9, 2001 
153. Susan Lindauer Letter to Andy Card, July 2001, Committee for Global Preservation of Trade 
154. Ibid. Lindauer Letters to Andy Card December 20, 2000 through January, 2003
155. Ibid. Lindauer Letters to Andy Card. 
156. Osama Bin Ladin, Jihad Fatwa, April, 1998 
157. FBI Evidence, letters, U.S. vs. Lindauer and Anbukes, May 1998 
158. FBI Evidence, Interview with Paul Hoven. U.S. vs. Lindauer 
159. James Risen and Tim Weiner, the New York Times, October 30, 2001, “Three New Allies Help CIA in its Fight Against Terror.” Subheading: “Since Sept 11, CIA officials have opened lines with intelligence officials from several nations that Washington has accused of supporting terrorism.” 
160. Federal Indictment, U.S. vs. Lindauer 
161. FBI Evidence, visa receipts from Viand Restaurant in New York, September, 2001 
162. Court testimony and Affidavit, Dr. Parke Godfrey, June 2008 
163. FBI Evidence, record of file creation on computer hard drive, U.S. vs. Lindauer 
164. Andy Card Letter, September 24, 2001. (ii) Federal indictment U.S. vs. Lindauer 
165. Ibid. Andy Card Letter, September 24, 2001 
166. Ibid. FBI evidence, restaurant receipt September 22, 2001 
167. Official Response from the Government of Iraq to 9/11. September 21, 2001. 
168. Ibid. Official Iraqi Response to 9/11 attack.(ii) Lindauer letter to Card, Sept 24, 2001. 
169. Ibid. Andy Card Letter, September 24, 2001 
170. Ibid. Andy Card Letter, September 24, 2001 
171. Ibid. Federal Indictment U.S. vs. Lindauer 
172. Ibid. Lindauer Letters to Andy Card. 
173. Lindauer Letters to Andy Card, September 24, 2001 and December 2, 2001 

Chapter 9
174. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card and Vice President-elect Cheney, December 2000 
175. Ibid. Lindauer Letters to Andy Card, Dec. 2000 through January, 2003. 
176. Ibid. Official Iraqi Response to 9/11. 
177. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001 
178. Documentary Video: “Conspiracy? The Oklahoma City Bombing.” History Channel, A & E Productions, 2001. 
179. Oklahoma City Bombing Revelations, Patrick B. Briley, 2007 
180. Oklahoma City Bombing Revelations, Patrick B. Briley, 2007 
181. (i) “Conspiracy? The Oklahoma City Bombing” (ii) Oklahoma City Bombing Revelations, Patrick B. Briley, 2007 (iii) Third Terrorist: The Middle Eastern Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing, Jayna Davis, 2004. 
181. Ibid. Conspiracy? The Oklahoma City Bombing” 2001 
182. Ibid. Conspiracy? The Oklahoma City Bombing” 2001 
183. Ibid. (i) “Conspiracy? The Oklahoma City Bombing” 
184. Ibid. Official Iraqi Response to 9/11. 
185. Susan Lindauer Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001. 
186. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001 
187. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001 
188. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001 
189. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001 
190. Ibid. John McCain, ABC News NIGHTLINE, November 28, 2001 
191. Ibid. Vice President Richard Cheney, “Meet the Press, ” December 9, 2001 
192. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001 
193. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001. 
194. Congressional Testimony of Dr. Fuisz on U.S. Corporation that supplied Iraq with SCUD mobile missile launcher. 1992. (ii) Correspondence of Rep. Charlie Rose. 
195. Ibid. Letters to Andy Card, Dec. 2000 through Jan. 2003 
196. Ibid. Letter to Andy Card, December 2, 2001 
197. Federal Indictment, U.S. vs. Lindauer 
198. FBI Evidence, Surveillance photos possible NSA Source, February, 2002 
199. Ibid. FBI Evidence. Surveillance photos, February 2002. U.S. vs. Lindauer 
200. Ibid. FBI Evidence. Fax sheets to U.N. Security Council announcing peace framework and Iraq’s consent to weapon inspections ‘with no conditions.” 
201. FBI Evidence. Collection of phone transcripts, emails, letters from Rani Ali, diplomatic adviser to Ambassador Hasmy Agam from May, 2000 through December, 2002, concluding with introduction to his successor, Mr. Norzuhdy. 
202. Washington Post. March 7, 2002. 
203. Ibid. Federal Indictment, U.S. vs. Lindauer Indictment, U.S. vs. Lindauer 
204. Susan Lindauer Letter to Kofi Annan, March 17, 2002. 
205. Ibid. Washington Post. 
206. Global Security, Bio of Musab Al Zarqawi 
207. Ibid. “Was Nidal Behind Lockerbie Bombing?” Daily Mail, UK 
208 (i) Susan Lindauer Letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell, January 27, 2003 (ii) Susan Lindauer Letter to Syria’s U.N. Ambassador Wehbe, February 2, 2003. 
209 (i) Susan Lindauer Letter to Secretary of State Colin Powell, January 27, 2003 (ii) Susan Lindauer Letter to Syria’s U.N. Ambassador Wehbe, February 2, 2003.