Conjuring Hitler How Britain and
America Made the Third Reich
By Guido Giacomo Preparata
6
America Made the Third Reich
By Guido Giacomo Preparata
6
Conclusion
Yet it is necessary…to feign, greatly, and to dissemble, for men are so
simple, and so prone to obey the exigencies of the moment, that he who
deceives will always find someone ready to be deceived.
Machiavelli, The Prince (XVIII, 3)
‘E sono tanto semplici gli uomini…’
The elimination of the German menace of 1900 cost Britain dearly: her
empire, her military and economic strength. Yet the English-speaking idea,
the imperial creed, and the cultivation of the oligarchic bent were all traits
that she bequeathed upon her natural, insular heir: they live on in the
American establishment. Britain’s was a conscious decision; she knew the
risks involved.
The present geopolitical policy of the United States is a direct and wholly
consistent continuation of the old imperial strategy of Britain. It is that
unmistakable cocktail of aggression, subversion and mass murder waged at
the vital nodes of the landmass, from Palestine and Central Asia to the gates
of China, in Taiwan and Korea, that seeks to undermine any movement
towards a confederation of nations capable of turning the continental base
into a Eurasian league of socio-political cooperation and defense (against
Anglo-American assault).
It took two world conflicts to destroy the German threat. World War I
was a conventional siege in which the British empire sacrificed roughly
1 million men – the first bloodletting that shook the establishment to its
foundations. In the second round, which was necessary given that World
War I had in fact left the Fatherland unscathed, no such effusion would
have been tolerable – Britain would sacrifice 400,000 soldiers in World War
II. So deception was employed on a major scale to trip the Nazis into the
inescapable war on two fronts.
That such was the intention at Versailles may not be doubted – the
astonishing prophecy of Veblen is there to attest it. Though this is not to
say that schemers of the Round Table expected the engineers of the Final
Solution. As has been argued throughout this book, they rather conjured
a reactionary movement that could then be attracted into the Russian
swamp. Which was sinister enough.
The position of Bolshevik Russia is assuredly one of the greatest enigmas
of the affair. Even its origin is most mysterious. But one thing is certain:
never, either during the interwar period or even in the course of the Cold
War, did the Soviet Union play directly against the West – that is why
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat thought it ‘an imaginary foe.’ Rather, it
appeared to mimic the slow motions of an enormous circus bear, whose
tamer was elsewhere – a buttress in the Orient that slumped studiously,
shifting its weight around to keep the Eurasian union in check. Otherwise
the Trebitsch affair, the German-Bolshevik ‘secret’ entente, the terrorist
agitprop of the K.P.D, the sabotage of the common front with the German
Socialists for the ultimate benefit of Hitler, the extraordinary massacre of
the leadership of the Red Army, and Stalin’s appeasement, are inexplicable:
Stalin played always in line with the geopolitical designs of Britain. Besides,
the Bolsheviks owed virtually everything to the West: the deposition of the
Czar, the timing of Rasputin’s death, the political void after Kerensky, the
slush funds – German and otherwise – the double-crossing of the Whites,
capital equipment, giant investments, military know-how…
When the hyperinflation climaxed in 1923 the natural candidate for
leading the Radikalisierung at home came in full view. Of all the rabblerouser's
of Germany, Hitler was not only the most charismatic but also the
most fervently pro-British: for Britain he was almost too good to be true. That
Professor Karl Haushofer was the inspiration for Hitler’s British fancy is by
no means unwarranted. And Haushofer was himself a mysterious character,
of whom we should know infinitely more.*
What is certain, however, is
the idiocy behind the claim that Hitler assembled the Nazi philosophy and
geopolitical plans in the raving solitude of his disarrayed bedroom.
*
Like Prisoner No. 7 of the Spandau fortress – the man said to be Rudolf Hess – in
1987, Haushofer, too, seemed to have been assassinated, along with his wife, by the
British Secret Services on the ides of March of 1946 (for instance, this presumption
has reappeared in Martin Allen’s The Hitler/Hess Deception, p. xviii).
The Wall Street Crash triggered by Norman was the signal that Germany
had in fact completed her first informal Five-Year- Plan; thereafter it became
a foregone matter that Hitler would become Chancellor. Yet Germany
was more resilient than what the British stewards could have imagined:
throughout Weimar she would never give the Nazis more than 1 out of 3
votes, and that only under the most catastrophic of social circumstances.
But by 1933, with further ‘tightening from outside,’ the circle was closed.
The weave of Britain’s interaction with the Nazis consisted in fact of
one of history’s most astounding exploits of choral dissimulation, which
unraveled for more than a decade (1931–43). The problem, however, was that this was no swanky gimmick but a deliberate tampering with forces
that were ‘other’ – and Veblen, again, intuited this eerie drift as early as
1915. Britain courted fire and in the end wished for a holocaust – which
came. That of the war, and that of the Jews.
The ‘Bolshies’ took the shock of the German offensive and paid with
20 million dead, half of them civilians. This was probably a price that
Tukhachevsky was not willing to see his people pay. Nor should it ever be
forgotten that 3.5 million German civilians had perished by the end of
this game.
If it is true that the British stewards intrigued at Versailles to conjure a
reactionary movement that would feed on radicalism and be prone to seek
war in the East; if it is true that the Anglo-Americans traded heavily with
and offered financial support to the Nazis, continuously and deliberately
from the Dawes loans of 1924 to the conspicuous credits via the Bank
of International Settlements in Basle of late 1944;1 if it is true that the
encounter in Cologne of January 4, 1933, in von Schröder’s manse was the
decisive factor behind Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor; if it is true that
such financial support was accorded to make Nazism an enemy target so
strong as to elicit in war a devastating response – retribution that would
make the Allied victory clear-cut and definitive; if it is true that appeasement
was a travesty since 1931; if it is true that Churchill refused deceitfully to
open a western front for three years, during which the expectation was that
the Germans would find themselves so hopelessly mired in the Russian
bog as to make the British closing onslaught from the West as painless as
possible; and if it is true that Hess brought with him to Britain plans for
evacuating the Jews to the island of Madagascar, for such was the last policy
pursued by the German government before adopting the Final Solution – 2
a plan which clearly was given no sequitur; if all the foregoing is true, then
it is just to lay direct responsibility for incubating Nazism and planning
World War II, and indirect responsibility for the Holocaust of the Jews, at
the door of the Anglo-American establishment.
Clearly, the last 60 years have been devoted by the restless and most
faithful archivists of the empire, seconded by a legion of no less devout
academics, publicists and film-makers, to deny each of the above statements
in the most categorical fashion.
To begin, Veblen’s review is literally ignored: on Versailles Keynes is still
the adopted ‘classic.’
‘It is of course an exaggeration,’ we read in textbooks, ‘to claim that
the Dawes loans set in motion foreign lending by the United States…’;3
rather, these loans are depicted as a yet another wave of little nest eggs from America in search of a good yield, and some ‘corporate greed’ on the
side – but nothing more.
The Crash and the crisis? Those, intimated an acclaimed Nobel Prize
winner, were but the product of the ‘somewhat fortuitous combination of
structural factors and monetary policy errors.’4
On the other hand, we are also told that the collapse of the gold exchange
standard and the surreal devaluation of the pound were due
to ‘an inescapable error…of the British who knew not the size of the
problem they labored under’:5 that is to say that the British Governor was
too ‘intermittently ill’ to be able to look after his messy construction, and
‘even when well, he was distracted by other pressing matters…’6 Yet one
wonders what those ‘other pressing matters’ could be...
Thus of Montagu Norman – admittedly the greatest central banker of the
modern era, who spent a quarter of a century leading the most powerful
financial outfit of his age – we should be satisfied with a caricature featuring
him as psychopathic Scrooge of the old school, with only a shaky grasp of
modern financial dynamics.
Von Schröder? Schröder counts for nothing, we hear: ‘he was merely a
partner in a medium-sized provincial bank…’7
As to that revolting show known as British ‘appeasement’ of Hitler,
they tell us it was the misguided policy of an ‘imbecile Foreign Office’8 that
sought to combine ‘morality and expediency’ in reaching an agreement
with what, alas, proved to be an intractable interlocutor.9 And the latter day
trumps of the Peace Party who deliberately prolonged the war to gain
time? Their cynicism is excused on the grounds that the empire was fighting
for its own survival, 10 when in fact it was sacrificing millions to extricate
itself from the bloody mess it had forged since 1919.
And the Wehrmacht: was it indeed a strong, luxury item, fitted to
its teeth with materials of the highest quality? Of course not, retorted
the ‘American’ Schacht: ‘Foreign investigations – some conducted with
extreme accuracy– on Germany’s financing of warlike expenditure have
shown unanimously how thoroughly inadequate our rearmament, and
thereby how insubstantial the attending financial outlay has been.’11 This
is from the self-apologetic post-war production of the individual who,
for his sixtieth birthday in 1937, had been hailed by the hebdomadary
publication of the German army, the Militär-Wochenblatt, as ‘the man who
made the reconstruction of the Wehrmacht possible.’12 And the damage
the Wehrmacht could inflict did not escape the record, irrespective of the
falsehoods that Schacht hawked, lying and recanting ignominiously at
Nuremberg to save his skin and the name of his protectors. He hid behind the following lies: (1) The Nazis came to power by means of self-financing,
(2) the army was of a shoddy make, (3) the Hitlerites violated the economy,
and (4) the Nazi economic experiment was a failure as a whole.
The professional literature on the topic has latched onto the Schachtian fabrications with fervor: of the German army it is still said that it was ‘a chaos of competing organizations,’ worsened by ‘Hitler’s paranoid style.’13 Nazi work creation, instead, is described as a ‘fragmented’ and ‘decentralized’ endeavor, which owed nothing to Nazi leadership other than ‘coercion.’14 Even the obvious commentary to the steep, sudden boost that Germany experienced after January 1933 in employment, production, and welfare – namely, that such an exceptional recovery after so much misery was a willed feat propitiated by the financial elites of Germany and Anglo-America in collusion with the Hitlerites – has been drowned in a preposterous and interminable debate as to whether, in fact, the Nazi boom was more the bitter fruit of luck than of deliberate intervention and efficient economics.15
It naturally behooves the establishment to circulate the old superstition that there had been a ‘fortuitous turnaround in the second semester of 1932,’16 a ‘natural economic upswing,’ whose wind, so the fantasy goes, Hitler luckily caught in his own sails. This noxious fable disposes in one blow of all the thorny issues that bristle in the biennium of 1932–33: namely, the foreign financing of the Nazis, their rigged election to the Chancellery, and the decisional forces behind the full-blown resumption of economic activity under the Third Reich.
Moreover, Nazi economics, fueled by its potent blend of free enterprise, communitarian appeal, industrial brilliance, deep ecology, re-distributive policies, anti-plutocratic invective, hi-tech virtuosity, tight regulation, monetary swiftness, and efficient planning, is clearly a phenomenon that comforts no one: neither the Liberal apologists of business nor the doctrinaires of the Left, and not even the anarcho-reformers of regionalism – it is a deep embarrassment for it features too many traits that are dear to them all and is thus better left unmentioned, or at the very least, distorted.
All the more so as the Allies had sunk massive investments in the Third Reich. And this was not done for the cynical sake of profits, but in view of the future reconstruction of Germany under the American aegis – the clubs were already gazing two steps ahead. That Hitler, in time, would lose the war, was understood – and this despite the reprieve the Nazis were afforded by such economic ‘help.’ Eventually, in 1949, when Germany was torn along the East–West divide, the new Federal Republic was not asked to pay any reparations in cash: it surrendered in kind a mere 4 percent of its industrial capacity. The securities of the German absentees were temporarily sequestered by the occupying Command; the giant industrial combines of the past were broken into smaller concerns and reintegrated into the Common Market of Europe, which was, by way of the new clearings, the IMF, and Marshall Aid, solidly anchored to the outlets of the American empire. Now Washington had Germany and the Meditarranean, along with the Pope, whose absolution it bought by refurbishing the bank of the Vatican with millions of dollars earmarked for pro-American action.17
And the Shoah? The Anglo-American elites vetoed the Schacht Plan of late 1938. In May 1939, the United States – the future home of much Holocaust museology – would not even offer sanctuary to 1,000 wealthy Jews whom Hitler had allowed to ship out of Hamburg.18 Nothing came out of the Madagascar Plan, and when the SS penetrated the Russian forests, Churchill allowed them in fact, for his own ends, three long, uninterrupted years to set out on their ‘task,’ presumably knowing the intentions of the black squads even before they began.19
The sheer amount of lies perpetrated by the Anglo-American establishment against its public in order to preserve the myth that World War II was a ‘good’ war, won for a just cause, is incalculable. The proof lies in the myriad of classified files documenting the vital phases of this intrigue, which to this day remain unavailable to the public eye – for reasons of ‘national security,’ they say.
In sum, the Allied elites have told a story. The story that the Germans have always been disturbers of the peace; they disturbed it once and were punished for it, although a little too harshly. Out of such blundering castigation, an evil force materialized out of nowhere – a force whose evil greatly exceeded the petty severity of the Allies that caused such evil to emerge despite themselves. And, the story goes, the evil of this force grew to be such that a violent global conflict became necessary to uproot it.
More than a cock-and-bull story, this is an insult. And what is worse, every day more and more people, for the sake of psychological tranquility, choose to believe it. Because individuals, as the loathsome Machiavelli put it in his ‘classic’ vademecum for subhuman conduct, are ‘simple’ and willing to trust the word of the constituted authorities. Constituted authorities, which we think embody our will, when in truth they are nothing but high battlements hiding oligarchy and lies, both of which must come to an end.
THE END
Notes
http://cnqzu.com/library/Philosophy/neoreaction/Guido%20Preparata/Conjuring%20Hitler%20-%20How%20Britain%20and%20America%20made%20the%20Third%20Reich.pdf
The professional literature on the topic has latched onto the Schachtian fabrications with fervor: of the German army it is still said that it was ‘a chaos of competing organizations,’ worsened by ‘Hitler’s paranoid style.’13 Nazi work creation, instead, is described as a ‘fragmented’ and ‘decentralized’ endeavor, which owed nothing to Nazi leadership other than ‘coercion.’14 Even the obvious commentary to the steep, sudden boost that Germany experienced after January 1933 in employment, production, and welfare – namely, that such an exceptional recovery after so much misery was a willed feat propitiated by the financial elites of Germany and Anglo-America in collusion with the Hitlerites – has been drowned in a preposterous and interminable debate as to whether, in fact, the Nazi boom was more the bitter fruit of luck than of deliberate intervention and efficient economics.15
It naturally behooves the establishment to circulate the old superstition that there had been a ‘fortuitous turnaround in the second semester of 1932,’16 a ‘natural economic upswing,’ whose wind, so the fantasy goes, Hitler luckily caught in his own sails. This noxious fable disposes in one blow of all the thorny issues that bristle in the biennium of 1932–33: namely, the foreign financing of the Nazis, their rigged election to the Chancellery, and the decisional forces behind the full-blown resumption of economic activity under the Third Reich.
Moreover, Nazi economics, fueled by its potent blend of free enterprise, communitarian appeal, industrial brilliance, deep ecology, re-distributive policies, anti-plutocratic invective, hi-tech virtuosity, tight regulation, monetary swiftness, and efficient planning, is clearly a phenomenon that comforts no one: neither the Liberal apologists of business nor the doctrinaires of the Left, and not even the anarcho-reformers of regionalism – it is a deep embarrassment for it features too many traits that are dear to them all and is thus better left unmentioned, or at the very least, distorted.
All the more so as the Allies had sunk massive investments in the Third Reich. And this was not done for the cynical sake of profits, but in view of the future reconstruction of Germany under the American aegis – the clubs were already gazing two steps ahead. That Hitler, in time, would lose the war, was understood – and this despite the reprieve the Nazis were afforded by such economic ‘help.’ Eventually, in 1949, when Germany was torn along the East–West divide, the new Federal Republic was not asked to pay any reparations in cash: it surrendered in kind a mere 4 percent of its industrial capacity. The securities of the German absentees were temporarily sequestered by the occupying Command; the giant industrial combines of the past were broken into smaller concerns and reintegrated into the Common Market of Europe, which was, by way of the new clearings, the IMF, and Marshall Aid, solidly anchored to the outlets of the American empire. Now Washington had Germany and the Meditarranean, along with the Pope, whose absolution it bought by refurbishing the bank of the Vatican with millions of dollars earmarked for pro-American action.17
And the Shoah? The Anglo-American elites vetoed the Schacht Plan of late 1938. In May 1939, the United States – the future home of much Holocaust museology – would not even offer sanctuary to 1,000 wealthy Jews whom Hitler had allowed to ship out of Hamburg.18 Nothing came out of the Madagascar Plan, and when the SS penetrated the Russian forests, Churchill allowed them in fact, for his own ends, three long, uninterrupted years to set out on their ‘task,’ presumably knowing the intentions of the black squads even before they began.19
The sheer amount of lies perpetrated by the Anglo-American establishment against its public in order to preserve the myth that World War II was a ‘good’ war, won for a just cause, is incalculable. The proof lies in the myriad of classified files documenting the vital phases of this intrigue, which to this day remain unavailable to the public eye – for reasons of ‘national security,’ they say.
In sum, the Allied elites have told a story. The story that the Germans have always been disturbers of the peace; they disturbed it once and were punished for it, although a little too harshly. Out of such blundering castigation, an evil force materialized out of nowhere – a force whose evil greatly exceeded the petty severity of the Allies that caused such evil to emerge despite themselves. And, the story goes, the evil of this force grew to be such that a violent global conflict became necessary to uproot it.
More than a cock-and-bull story, this is an insult. And what is worse, every day more and more people, for the sake of psychological tranquility, choose to believe it. Because individuals, as the loathsome Machiavelli put it in his ‘classic’ vademecum for subhuman conduct, are ‘simple’ and willing to trust the word of the constituted authorities. Constituted authorities, which we think embody our will, when in truth they are nothing but high battlements hiding oligarchy and lies, both of which must come to an end.
THE END
Notes
http://cnqzu.com/library/Philosophy/neoreaction/Guido%20Preparata/Conjuring%20Hitler%20-%20How%20Britain%20and%20America%20made%20the%20Third%20Reich.pdf
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