PART 1 OF 2: THE 200 MAN MOSSAD SPY RING THAT OPERATED IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2000 AND 2001

MEMORANDUM TO THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE 

I am an international corporate lawyer, writing to you today about a matter of public policy that is relevant to the circumstances surrounding, and our preparedness for, the catastrophic attacks on September 11, 2001. I do not know whether the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks (the “Commission”) or the Senate and House Committees on Intelligence (the “Committees”) have had the opportunity to consider these issues carefully. If so, I hope this memorandum will be helpful. If not, I respectfully urge them, in accordance with the mandate of the Commission’s charter and in the exercise of the Committees’ responsibilities, to investigate the facts and resolve the questions presented. 

I regret that this memorandum comes to the Commission after the publication of its Final Report this past July (the “Commission’s Final Report”). As will become evident, however, it has taken some time to assemble the facts from the raw data and other information set forth in available governmental and other reports and relevant documents in the public record. Moreover, and in any event, the need to examine and resolve the compelling issues presented here outweighs the mere appearance of completeness by putting a permanent end to the Commission’s work.

It is far more important, to all of us, that the Commission’s work be accurate and complete or, at the very least, that the Commission urge that these questions be explored and resolved by another panel as independent, distinguished and objective as itself. Both the Senate and House Committees should endeavor to explore and resolve these issues as well. 

1. General Preliminary Conclusions 

This memorandum, on the basis of the information set forth below, the Exhibits hereto and the reports and other documents cited herein, comes to the following general preliminary conclusions. The confirmation or effective rebuttal of these conclusions can be arrived at only by a public inquiry and a thorough examination of all necessary and appropriate witnesses and all relevant documentary and other evidence. A detailed summary of these tentative conclusions is set forth at pages 49 to 52. 

I emphasize at the outset that the purpose of this memorandum is not to accuse any individual or individuals (excluding the hijackers themselves), or any company, of any unlawful act or any other act harmful to the United States. That will be the task of others only after, and solely if justified by, the determination of all the relevant facts in the course of the public inquiry.--

1. In the months leading up to September 11, 2001, the Israeli DEA Groups 1 were spying on the United States.2 They were at the same time keeping Arab groups in our country under surveillance, including the future hijackers and other FBI suspects in the catastrophic attacks of September 11. The base of operations for both the Israeli DEA Groups and the future hijackers of the World Trade Center Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane was in and around Hollywood, Florida.

2. During the same period, the Israeli New Jersey Group was keeping under surveillance Arab groups in Bergen and Hudson Counties, New Jersey, across the Hudson River from Manhattan, including the future hijackers of the Pentagon Plane, whose center of operations was also in Bergen and Hudson Counties. The Israeli New Jersey Group appears to have been aware, before they occurred, that hijackings had been planned by Arab terrorists, as evidenced by their jubilation when the World Trade Center was first struck, by the North Tower Plane. The leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group, who has fled the United States for Israel, is included, along with the names of the hijackers and FBI suspects, on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List. 

3. The Israeli Government, through its external security agency, Mossad, warned the United States in August 2001 that an impending catastrophic attack on our soil was being planned by Arab terrorist cells located in the United States. The warnings were the result of the Israeli Groups’ surveillance of the future hijackers in this country. 

4. The Mossad warnings were too vague and too late to have enabled the United States to take any action to prevent the imminent attacks at unspecified locations in the U.S., or to detain the individuals who were planning them.

5. Why the Israeli government decided not to share with us all the critical information they had, and the extent of that information, is a subject for the public inquiry. They may have thought some sort of warning prudent in the event their surveillance activities later became a matter of public knowledge. But any energetic Israeli effort to assist the United States in preventing the attacks would not have served their strategic interest, in view of the disastrous effect those attacks were likely to have on the relationships between the United States and the Arab world. As a leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group said when he was arrested on the afternoon of September 11, “We are Israeli. We are not your problem. Your problems are our problems.”

6. Whether and to what extent the CIA, though surely not aware of the plans of the future hijackers before the attacks, might have been aware of or condoned the Israeli Groups’ surveillance of Arab groups generally in the United States prior to September 11 is a further question that must be explored in the course of the public inquiry. The CIA’s explanation of why two future hijackers were placed on a Watchlist in August 2001, as set forth in the Commission’s Final Report, is implausible and may have been designed to conceal the Israeli warnings. This consideration, along with other important factors discussed below, opens the door to a thorough investigation of this issue as well.

2. Imperatives and Priorities

It need hardly be observed that the demands of justice and national security, and the rights of the victims and their survivors, require that our first imperative, as a nation, be to find and bring to justice Osama bin Laden and his coadjutors, as well as other members of al Qaeda, and all others who bear responsibility for the horrendous loss of life on that terrible September day. That work is of course the charge of our political,intelligence, defense, military and defense establishments and our judiciary.[dumb lawyer,the bad guys are the subject of your inquiry D.C]

The Commission’s task is a collateral and subordinate one--to investigate the circumstances surrounding and our preparedness for the September 11 attacks, in the hope that we can prevent one from ever happening again. This is the charge of the Committees as well. This memorandum, therefore, while it naturally stresses, for the benefit of the Commission and the Committees, the present issues relating to surveillance and disclosure, before and at about the time of the attacks, should not be mistaken as any effort to place the blame for the cause of our suffering on anyone but al Qaeda and its members, or to weaken the resolve of our country in finding, capturing and punishing those who have brought so much misery to so many of us.[grow a pair dude,the effort is to assign CORRECT blame D.C]

3. The DEA Report

In June 2001, the Office of Security of the Drug Enforcement Administration (the “DEA”) issued a long report (the “DEA Report”) describing in precise detail the attempts of approximately 125 or more nationals of a foreign country, most posing as art students, “to penetrate several DEA Field Offices in the continental United States.” Many of these individuals also visited the residences of numerous DEA officials and “other agencies’ facilities and the residences of their employees.” The DEA Report states that “these incidents have occurred since at least the beginning of 2000, and have continued to the present.” They were ongoing activities in the summer of 2001. A copy of the DEA Report is attached as Exhibit A. 

4. The Israeli DEA Groups

Virtually all of the scores of individuals questioned or detained by the DEA and other federal and local law enforcement authorities were citizens of the State of Israel. They were generally organized in groups of eight to 10 people, with a single team leader (the “Israeli DEA Groups”). They usually worked, individually or in pairs, carrying makeshift art portfolios. They visited scores of DEA offices, laboratories and houses or apartments, ostensibly to offer or show the paintings or prints in the portfolios for sale or promotion to DEA personnel. 

a. Backgrounds in Intelligence, Electronic Intercept And Communications Units

While Israel has compulsory military service, many of those questioned by U.S. authorities had served in the military intelligence services or in electronic or communications units of the Israeli army. Thus, for example, Lior Baram 3 of Plantation (near Hollywood), Florida, questioned by the DEA on January 22, 2001, had served two years in Israeli intelligence working with classified information; Dilka Borenstein,4 questioned by INS at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (“D.F.W Airport”) on March 27, 2001, was a “recently discharged” military intelligence officer; Marina Glikman,5 questioned at DFW Airport on or about May 1, 2001, worked for an Israeli software company with expertise in hand-held computer technology and had served as an Israeli military intelligence officer; Tomer Ben Dor, also questioned at D.F.W Airport on that day,6 worked for an Israeli wiretapping company and had served in an Israeli military unit that was “responsible for” Patriot missile defense. 

The DEA’s Office of Security concluded that the Israelis “may well be engaged in organized intelligence gathering.”7 A spokesman for the Immigration & Naturalization Service (the “INS”) stated that dozens of these Israelis were expelled from the United States (from California, the Midwest, Florida and other states). “No one has tallied the total,” he said.8 The expulsions were usually for visa violations.

The leaders of the Israeli DEA Groups included Itay Simon (arrested on April 14, 2001 in Irving, Texas), recently discharged from the Israeli army where he had done classified work for the Israeli military.9 Mr. Simon coordinated recruiting for the groups and served as an intermediary between five individuals in Israel and the U.S. operation.10 Another leader was Michael Calmanovic (also arrested in Irving on that day), who rented a number of apartments in Irving, Texas occupied by 25 Israelis.11 Mr. Calmanovic was a recently discharged electronic intercept operator for the Israeli military.12 As stated in the DEA Report, traveling about the U.S. to sell paintings “seemed not to fit the background”13 of many of the individuals in question. 

A third principal was Hanan Serfaty (or Sarfati), a team leader residing in Hollywood, Florida. When questioned by the DEA in Tampa, Florida, on March 1, 2001, he had in his possession bank deposit slips amounting to more than $100,000 from December 2000 through the first quarter of 2001, and withdrawal slips for slightly less than that amount during the period. Mr. Serfaty served in the Israeli military between the ages of 18 and 21, but refused to disclose to the DEA his activities between the ages of 21 and 24, including his activities since his U.S. arrival at age 23 in 2000.14 Another was Peer Segalovitz of Tamarac, Florida (about 20 miles west of Hollywood—see MAP 1), an active officer in an Israeli special forces battalion who commanded 80 men in the Golan Heights. He was detained in Orlando on May 3, 2001.15 
 

b. Connections to Israeli Wiretapping and Telecommunications Companies

Tomer Ben Dor (mentioned above), another Israeli of interest to the DEA, was an employee of Nice-Systems Ltd., an Israeli company specializing in systems and solutions for detecting, locating, monitoring, evaluating and analyzing voice communications and other transmissions from a variety of sources--activities commonly known as wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping. Nice-Systems’ U.S. subsidiary, Nice Systems Inc., is located in Rutherford, New Jersey 16, adjacent to East Rutherford where five members of the Israeli New Jersey group were arrested on September 11. When Mr. Ben Dor was interrogated by the INS at the D.F.W Airport in May 2001, an inspection of his bags revealed a printout containing a reference to a file entitled “DEA Groups.”17 

One member of the Israeli DEA Groups, Michal Gal, who was arrested in Irving, Texas,18 was released on a $10,000 cash bond posted by Ophir Baer, an employee of Amdocs, Inc. an Israeli telecommunications firm with operations in the United States. The Amdocs employee described Mr. Gal as a “relative”.

Messrs. Calmanovic and Simon (above) were arrested by the INS for their role in the Israelis’ art selling activities without the necessary visas. They were held on $50,000 bond,19 which was subsequently posted, though the DEA Report does not say by whom. Six members of the Israeli DEA Groups appear to have been using cell telephones that were purchased by a former Israeli vice consul in the United States.20

c. Israeli Surveillance of U.S. Government Offices, Laboratories 

and Residences 

and Other Strategic Areas

During the first five months of 2001 (and including a few calls in 2000), the Israeli DEA Groups went to a total of about 57 DEA locations (28 offices and 29 residences), primarily in the southern United States 21, ostensibly offering to sell or solicit an interest in paintings. These included 25 DEA offices and three laboratories: the DEA’s Southwest Laboratory near San Diego (and the residence of its Director),22 the DEA’s Southeast Laboratory in Miami (and the residences of three of its chemists),23 and the DEA’S South Central Laboratory (or property adjacent to it), as well as the residences of one of its chemists and another employee.24 One Israeli asked to visit the house of a DEA employee “to match the frame to his furnishing,” an offer the employee declined.

Members of the Israeli DEA Groups were also discovered taking photographs of a DEA office building and parking lot in Orlando, Florida,25 and on an active runway of the Volk Field Air National Guard Base at Camp Douglas, Wisconsin.26 An Air Force alert was issued from Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma City concerning possible Israeli intelligence gathering at the base.27 Israeli personnel were also found taking a photograph of the house of a special agent of the Environmental Protection Agency in Denver, Colorado,28 and “diagramming” the inside of an office building of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms in Lexington, Kentucky.29 

d. Spying on the United States

The Israeli DEA Groups were clearly spying on the Drug Enforcement Agency, and thus upon the United States. Many individuals in the DEA Groups may have been trying to do no more than sell paintings (albeit in violation of their visa status and thus unlawfully), but the total number of visits to DEA offices, laboratories and residences precludes any characterization of these efforts as a commonplace sales endeavor.30 The DEA Report speculates that the spying by the Israeli DEA Groups was related to an ongoing ecstasy investigation.31 In the course of an earlier ecstasy investigation, the DEA feared its communications systems had been compromised.32

One of the difficulties in analyzing the DEA Report is that it is reactive. The bulk of it records the activities of the Israeli DEA Groups when they call upon or attempt to infiltrate DEA offices, laboratories or residences. The DEA did not generally seek them out, keep them under surveillance, or otherwise try to find out what they were doing, other than making calls on and photographing or diagramming the facilities of the DEA and other governmental agencies. 

When the DEA Report was prepared, however, the DEA and the INS were of course unaware of the extensive activities and operations in the United States of the future September 11 hijackers and their suspected collaborators, whom the Israeli DEA Groups appear to have had in their sites as well. Why the Israeli DEA Groups would be engaged in both activities, where their spying on the DEA would clearly raise suspicions among U.S. law enforcement authorities, is unclear. It may well have been an effective distraction of others from or “cover” for their primary objective. This question is discussed further below at p. 43. 

e. Israeli Surveillance of Arab Groups, the Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects

Israel’s Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks, commonly known as Mossad, is the Israeli agency responsible for its external security. A few days after September 11, Israeli intelligence officials reported that two senior experts of Mossad had warned the United States in August 2001 that large-scale terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland were imminent. They also informed U.S. officials of the existence of a cell of as many as 200 terrorists preparing the operation.33 

One highly placed investigator stated later that fall that there was evidence linking the Israeli DEA Groups to the gathering of intelligence about the September 11 attacks. He refused to disclose the evidence, however, since it was classified. A highly regarded American journal that broadly covers Israeli affairs reported in December 2001 that the Israeli DEA Groups were spying on Islamic networks in the United States linked to Middle East Terrorism.34 

There was no implication in these reports that the Israelis were involved in planning for or carrying out the September 11 attacks. Rather, it was suspected that the Israelis gathered advance information about the attacks and decided not to share it. “What investigators are saying is that that warning from Mossad was nonspecific and general.” 35[B.S,they are implicated by their actions the day of the events,the vans with the murals around New York,and their fleeing of the country after the fact.Also those 'investigators'(and I say that lightly) know the damn truth,that the fires did not take down the towers.That is why they have to hold to the nonsense of the fires,because they cannot put the supposed 19 in the towers wiring the place,but they could place Mossad there DC]

f. Hollywood, Florida: The Operating Base of the Israeli DEA Groups

The locus of the most important operations of the Israeli DEA Groups was the area in and around Hollywood, Florida: 

“The majority of the incidents have occurred in the southern half of the continental U.S. with the most activity reported in the state of Florida. . . . Hollywood . . . seems to be a central point for these individuals with several having addresses in this area.”36 [Emphasis supplied.]

At the very time the DEA was setting down these words, in June 2001, just two or three months before the September 11 hijackings, 15 of the 19 future hijackers were also living in Hollywood, nine in the town itself and six in surrounding towns (see Exhibit B and MAPS 1 and 2). Hollywood, for months, had been and would continue to be the staging ground for the hijacking of the World Trade Center Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane. Among the Israeli groups, more than 30 lived in the Hollywood area, 10 in Hollywood itself. They were not only spying on the DEA but, in all likelihood, were keeping the future hijackers under surveillance as well. This appears to be the tragic riddle the DEA, unaware of the future hijackers’ existence, was unable to solve. 

Hanan Serfaty, stopped and questioned by the DEA as noted above on March 1, 2001, lived in Hollywood. Another leader, Legum Yochai, lived in Miami. One of the five members of the Israeli New Jersey Group arrested on September 11 (see below) lived in Miami Beach. Lior Barram, the former Israeli intelligence officer, though stopped at a DEA facility in Houston (Texas may have been a DEA-Group training area as noted below) lived in Plantation, Florida, about 10 miles west of Hollywood. Peer Segalovitz, the Israeli special forces lieutenant, and his brother lived in Tamarac, just north of Fort Lauderdale. Akyuz Sagiv, a former bodyguard to the Israeli army’s top-ranking general, appears to have lived in Hollywood or in Coral Springs. For the precise location of the relevant towns in the Hollywood area, see MAP 1.

5. The Future Hijackers and FBI Suspects 

a. Operations in Hollywood, Florida 

It is clear that Hollywood was the core of operations for the future hijackers and their collaborators. All of the hijackers of three of the four aircraft that were commandeered on September 11 lived in Hollywood or its immediate environs in the months leading up to the hijackings.37 These included all of the hijackers of American Airlines Flight 11 from Boston, which crashed into the World Trade Center’s North Tower (the “North Tower Plane”), who lived in Hollywood itself. They were Mohamed Atta (the pilot), Abdulaziz al Omari, Waleed al Shehri, Wail al Shehri and Satam al Suqami.38

Two of the four hijackers of United Airlines Flight 93 from Newark, which crashed in Pennsylvania (the “Pennsylvania Plane”), Ziad Jarrah (the pilot) and Ahmed al Nami, also lived in Hollywood. Two of the five hijackers of United Airlines Flight 175 from Boston, which crashed into the World Trade Center’s South Tower (the “South Tower Plane” and, collectively with the North Tower Plane, the “World Trade Center Planes”), Marwan al Shehhi (the pilot) and Mohand al Shehri, lived in Hollywood as well. The two remaining hijackers on those planes, Fayez Banihammad and Hamza al Ghamdi on the South Tower Plane, and Saeed al Ghamdi and Ahmed al Haznawi in the Pennsylvania plane, lived in Delray Beach.

Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, overall leaders of the hijackers and hijackers of the Pentagon Plane, had addresses in both Bergen County, New Jersey and in Hollywood and Delray Beach, respectively. Many of the above future hijackers had Hollywood addresses interspersed with or within hundreds yards of the members of the Israeli DEA Groups, as shown on MAP 2.

b. Timing of Operations of Both Groups in the Hollywood Area

i. Hijacker Timelines

The Commission has in its possession two “hijackers timelines” which appear to trace the future hijackers’ movements in the periods leading up to September 11. They were compiled by the FBI and are dated November 14 and December 5, 2003.39 The FBI has confirmed that it prepared, edited and declassified the hijackers timelines for the Commission, and that any decision to release them would be the Commission’s alone.40 Thus far, however, the Commission has declined to release them.

There are, nevertheless, a number of hijacker timelines, prepared by individuals or groups, that are generally available. One of those timelines, entitled the Annotated Timeline of the 9/11 Hijackers for Researchers, dated May 13, 2002 (the “Hijacker Timeline”), represents that it has been compiled from public sources and is used as a reference here. It is available at FreeRepublic.com.41 The Hijacker Timeline, though dated in a number of respects (it was issued a year and a half before the FBI’s hijackers timelines), appears generally consistent with publicly available U.S. government reports on the hijackers’ movements, including information from the FBI’s hijackers timelines to the extent discernible from citations in the Commission’s footnotes, the Commission’s Staff Statements, the Joint Committee Report, other governmental reports, and accounts in the established press.

ii. Israeli DEA Groups

As to the timing of the operations of the Israelis in Florida, the Israeli DEA Group led by Hanan Sarfaty was stopped in Tampa on March 1, 2001 as noted above, and at that time provided their Hollywood-area addresses to DEA agents.42 Sarfaty said that he had arrived in the United States “approximately” one year earlier but, as noted above, refused to state what he had been doing since that time (or for the two prior years since he had left the army). Another group based in the Hollywood area, led by Peer Segalovitz, was stopped on May 3, 2001, and provided their addresses. Segalovitz had arrived in the United States on January 17, 2001.43

iii. Future Hijackers

As to the hijackers, a number of them had lived in the Hollywood area or elsewhere in Florida well before 2000/2001. Hani Hanjour, the pilot of the Pentagon Plane and a member of the New Jersey hijacker group, had lived in the Hollywood area for a time in 1996 (in Miramar, a few miles southwest of Hollywood (see MAP 1).44 Saeed al Ghamdi had lived in Daytona Beach for several years in the 1990's, and Waleed al Shehri had taken flight lessons there in 1997.45 Mohamed Atta had also lived in Daytona Beach in the mid-1990's.

In mid-2000, the leaders of the Florida hijackers arrived in Florida to prepare for the hijackings, and were followed in 2001 by their subordinates.46 Thus, Mohamed Atta, Marwan al Shehhi and Ziad Jarrah arrived between May and June 2000. All of them attended flight school in Venice, Florida, not far from Fort Myers where the Hollywood Israeli DEA Groups were later found operating. Although the Israeli DEA Groups were questioned in Fort Myers by DEA agents a few months after the hijackers had left for Hollywood,47 the reactive nature of the DEA Report makes it difficult to track the timing of the Israeli Groups’ movements except when they were spying on the DEA or to the extent they disclosed their movements, as they sometimes did, to DEA or INS agents or other law enforcement authorities.48

Atta and al Shehhi were in the Hollywood area by the end of December 2000, when they took flight training courses in Opa-Locka, about 15 miles southwest of Hollywood.49 Ziad Jarrah took flight training courses the following month (in January 2001) in Virginia Gardens, about 20 miles south of Hollywood (see MAP 1).50

Atta and al Shehhi settled permanently on the east coast of Florida, somewhere in the Hollywood area, in mid to late February 2001.51 They procured a mailbox address on Sheridan Street in Hollywood some time early in the year.52 Ziad Jarrah returned to Hollywood from abroad in April.53 The pilots’ subordinates arrived in the area at various dates between March and June.

c. Activities of Both Groups in Oklahoma

Oklahoma City and Norman (about 15 miles south of Oklahoma City) were also an important locus of activity for the future hijackers. Mohamed Atta and Marwan al Shehhi had toured the Airman Flight School in Norman at the end of June 2000.54 Zacarias Moussaoui, a suspected potential hijacker, moved to Norman in February 2001 to take flight lessons at Airman. In May Moussaoui had considered joining the future hijackers in Hollywood and inquired about flying lessons at the Pan Am International Flight School in Miami.55 In August 2001, however, he left for the Pan Am flight school in Minnesota, where he raised suspicions and was arrested.56

Five other individuals on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List lived in Norman, including at least two roommates of Moussaoui, Hussein Alattas and Mukkaram Ali.57 Nawaf al Hazmi had also been in Oklahoma. He was, as the Commission and the Committees know, an important leader of the hijackers and an attendee at meetings in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia (see below). On April 1, 2001 al Hazmi was stopped for speeding on Interstate 40 in western Oklahoma, apparently headed for Oklahoma City and Moussaoui in Norman.58

The Israeli DEA Groups were also active in Oklahoma City during the spring of 2001. On March 28, 2001, the day following a DEA midnight raid near Dallas (described further below), an Israeli DEA Group on their way to Oklahoma City arrived at D.F.W Airport from Frankfurt. In a scene reminiscent of the keystone cops, and under clandestine DEA and INS surveillance, they tried to avoid being detected as a group and followed. The three arriving Israelis were Yoni Engel, Yotam Dagai and Or Alroei. Alroei was an associate of Michael Calmanovic. Engel was a former Israeli company commander.

The three Israelis were traveling with an American, Eli Rabinovitz. After clearing customs they met with an unidentified woman on the curb and then temporarily split up. Rabinovitz stayed with the woman while Engel, Dagai and Alroei walked down the sidewalk to the next terminal. A van with California plates and registered in the name of a used car auction house pulled up to the curb and, as Dagai ducked into the second terminal, Engel and Alroei got in, and it quickly left. The van returned in a few minutes. Dagai emerged from the terminal and climbed in. The van sped away again, only to return a third time to pick up Rabinovitz before finally leaving the airport.59

On April 4, Engel, Dagai and Alroei were next questioned in St. Louis, where the headquarters of Amdocs, the Israeli communications software company, are located.60 They had visited Oklahoma City at the same time (between April 1 and April 4) Nawaf al Hazmi was there presumably to meet with Moussaoui. They told INS agents that they had traveled to Dallas from New York City and not, as the DEA and INS knew, on a flight from Frankfurt.61

On April 30, 2001, an Air Force alert was issued from Tinker Air Force Base, in Oklahoma City, concerning a "possible intelligence collection effort being conducted by Israeli Art Students."62 On May 17, four Israelis were reported in the Midwest City area (between Oklahoma City and Norman). They stated they were there to promote Israeli art. They were charged with visa violations, and were booked into the Oklahoma City jail at the instance of the INS. Bond was initially set at $25,000 each. All four requested voluntary departure from the United States.63

d. Dallas: A Probable Training Area for the Israeli DEA Groups

An unusually large number of Israeli DEA Group members were located in Irving, Texas (near Dallas), an area that does not appear to have been frequented by the future hijackers or by many FBI suspects (see Exhibit B). Texas, however, and in particular Dallas and Irving, appears to have been an important staging area and training ground for the Israeli DEA Groups, given the presence there of

(a) key liaisons between senior recruiting personnel in Israel and the Israeli DEA Groups in the United States,

(b) DEA and INS surveillance of Israeli DEA Group arrivals at D.F.W Airport,

(c) the considerable telecommunications sophistication and expertise of DEA Group associates in Dallas and

(d) large numbers of Israeli DEA Group personnel, many of whom were expelled from the United States after a midnight raid conducted by the DEA and the INS.

As we have seen, Tomer Ben Dor, stopped by the INS and the DEA at the D.F.W Airport in May 2001, worked for an Israeli wiretapping company and had with him a computer program referring to “DEA Groups.” He was traveling with Marina Glikman and Zeev Miller, both computer programmers for an Israeli software company. They were both vague and inconsistent about their travel plans.64 Michal Gal, who had an address in Edgewater, New Jersey, the base of the Israeli New Jersey Group and not far from the headquarters of Mr. Ben Dor’s company, had a relationship with Amdocs, another telecommunications company. 

Michael Calmanovic and Itay Simon, both of Dallas and Los Angeles, were the principal links between the Israeli operation in the United States and five Israeli DEA Group recruiters in Israel.65 The DEA and INS conducted a midnight raid on the Israeli DEA Groups’ apartment complex in Irving on the night of March 26-27, 2001, and expelled 13 of their members from the United States on March 31, 2001.66 Their transportation out of the country was arranged by the Israeli Embassy.67

Exhibit B lists the names of members of the Israeli DEA Groups and of the future hijackers and FBI suspects located in Hollywood, Florida (see again MAPS 1 and 2); in Hudson and Bergen Counties, New Jersey (MAP 3); in Oklahoma City/Norman, Oklahoma; in San Diego; in Los Angeles; and in Dallas; all during the period leading up to September 11. The map of the United States attached as MAP 4 shows all of these locations, and illustrates as well the presence of both groups during the period in Wichita, Kansas;68 Louisville and Lexington, Kentucky;69 Atlanta,Georgia;70 Tampa 71 and Venice/Fort Myers,72 Florida, and Arlington/Fredericksburg, Virginia.73 

6. Reports Concerning the Surveillance Activities of the Israeli DEA Groups

As noted above, almost immediately after September 11, credible reports emerged of Israeli warnings, in August 2001, of an imminent large-scale terrorist attack on the United States. One television network reported in a four-part series in December 2001 that

“Investigators suspect that the Israeli [DEA Groups] may have gathered intelligence about the attacks in advance, and not shared it. A highly placed investigator said there are ‘tie-ins.’ But when asked for details, he flatly refused to describe them, saying ‘evidence linking these Israelis to 9-11 is classified. I cannot tell you about evidence that has been gathered. It’s classified information.’”74

The Forward, the highly respected American journal, at first discounted Fox’s account,75 but in an article three months later reported that:

“Far from pointing to Israeli spying against U.S. government and military facilities . . . the incidents in question [the activities of the Israeli DEA Groups] appear to represent a case of Israelis in the United States spying on a common enemy, radical Islamic networks suspect of links to Middle East terrorism. . . Allegations involved . . . Israelis claiming to be art students who had backgrounds in signal interception and ordnance.”76 [Common enemy my ass D.C]

It is very difficult to believe, based on the existing evidence and the location of their common central operating bases, that these Groups, who were clearly spying on the DEA and the United States, and were keeping under surveillance Islamic groups in the U.S. with links to Middle East terrorism, were not tracking the future hijackers and their collaborators as well.

7. Northeastern New Jersey—Another Vital Center of Operations for Both Sides

a. Hudson and Bergen Counties: The Operating Base of the Israeli 

New Jersey Group

While the Israeli DEA groups were active in Hollywood and elsewhere in the United States, another group of Israelis (the “Israeli New Jersey Group” and, collectively with the Israeli DEA Groups, the “Israeli Groups”) was operating in Hudson and Bergen Counties in northeastern New Jersey. The Israeli New Jersey Group appears to have been unknown to federal and state law enforcement authorities until September 11, 2001.

On that day, immediately after the first aircraft, the North Tower Plane, crashed into the World Trade Center, a resident of Bergen County, New Jersey, just across the Hudson River from lower Manhattan, became alarmed when she saw a group of men celebrating “on the roof of a white van in the parking lot of her apartment building.”77 She wrote down the license number of the van and called the police. The police were told that the men were “posing, dancing and laughing against the background”78 of the disaster, which could be plainly seen across the river. The men were “smiling and exchanging high-fives.”79 An FBI alert was promptly issued:

“Vehicle possibly related to New York terrorist attack. White, 2000 Chevrolet van 80 with New Jersey registration with 'Urban Moving Systems' sign on back seen . . . at the time of first impact of jetliner into World Trade Center. Three individuals with van were seen celebrating after initial impact and subsequent explosion. FBI Newark Field Office requests that, if the van is located, hold for prints and detain individuals."81

The men were five Israeli citizens, Sivan Kurzberg (the driver of the van), Paul Kurzberg, Yaron Shmuel, Oded Ellner and Omer Marmari. The van was finally stopped in East Rutherford, New Jersey at 3:56 P.M. The driver and passengers were arrested by Sergeant Rivelli and Officers DeCarlo and Yannacone of the East Rutherford Police Department.

The local police were soon joined by other law enforcement authorities. Sivan Kurzberg was asked several times to come out of the van but, fumbling with a black leather pouch, refused to do so. Officer DeCarlo then forcibly removed him. The FBI agents who arrived on the scene or were otherwise involved included Kevin Donovan, Daniel O’Brien and Robert F. Taylor, Jr. The FBI ultimately took control of the individuals, the evidence in the van, and the investigation.

Sources close to the investigation said they found in the van “maps of the city . . . with certain places highlighted,” adding that “it looked like . . . they knew what was going to happen.”82

Yaron Shmuel lied to the police as to where the men were at the time of the World Trade Center attacks, saying that they were on the West Side Highway in New York (not celebrating across the Hudson in New Jersey). He gave his address as 1345 Drexel Avenue in Miami Beach, Florida (not far from Hollywood). Mr. Ellner was carrying $4,700 in a sock-like sack. Sivan Kurzberg told the police at the time of his arrest-- 

“We are Israeli. We are not your problem. Your problems are [now?] our problems. The Palestinians are the problem.”83

All of the men were handcuffed, placed on the grass and given Miranda warnings. A sixth member of the Group, Dominik Suter of Fair Lawn, New Jersey, also an Israeli national and the owner of Urban Moving, was later questioned by the FBI at the company’s offices in Weehawken. The FBI searched Urban Moving's premises for several hours, and removed boxes of documents and a dozen computer hard drives.84

b. The Leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group Flees to Israel and 

Becomes an FBI Suspect

When the FBI attempted to interview Mr. Suter once more a few days later, he had fled the United States for Israel along with his family.85 According to the New Jersey State Division of Consumer Affairs, Urban Moving’s premises were closed on September 14, 2001. On December 7, 2001 a New Jersey judge allowed the state to seize its property. Early in 2002, the New York Department of Transportation revoked Urban Moving’s license to do business in that state.86[Innocent people do not run D.C.]  

Dominik Suter is included on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List, along with Mohamed Atta and the other hijackers and suspects, under that name and two others he has apparently used, Omit Suter and Omit Levinson.87 He is given two addresses in New Jersey, his apparent residence in Fair Lawn and an address in Jersey City, very close to that of a number of other FBI suspects.88 Though he had fled, Mr. Suter’s name did not appear on the October 2001 FBI Suspect List. This may be because in early October 2001 the FBI was unaware that Urban Moving was operating in the same area as the future hijackers of the Pentagon Plane and visiting hijackers from Florida including Mohamed Atta (see below).

c. Hudson and Bergen Counties: The Staging Ground for the Future 

Hijackers of the Pentagon Plane

It soon became apparent, however, that Hudson and Bergen Counties were the second most important locus of the future hijackers’ U.S. operation and was the staging ground for the hijacking of the Pentagon Plane. The May 2002 FBI Suspect List shows, unlike its October 2001 predecessor, that all five future hijackers of the Pentagon Plane, Khaled al Mihdhar, Nawaf al Hazmi, Salem al Hazmi, Majed Moqed 89 and Hani Hanjour (the pilot) lived or had mailing addresses or were otherwise active in towns closely interspersed, within about a four-mile radius, with the towns of the Israeli New Jersey Group (Weehawken, Jersey City, Fair Lawn and Rutherford). The future hijackers’ towns included Paterson,90 Fort Lee,91 Totowa,92 Hoboken 93 and Elmwood Park.94 There were also FBI Suspects in Jersey City,95 Harrison,96 Seacaucus and Hackensack.97 See MAP 3.

Atta, al Omari, and Ahmed al Ghamdi, though based in Hollywood and (al Ghamdi) Delray Beach, Florida, were among the hijackers who had addresses in Paterson, Fort Lee and Elmwood Park as well as in South Wayne. Up to six or more of the hijackers appear to have lived on Union Avenue in Paterson at one time or another between March and August 31, 2001.98

d. The FBI’s Conclusion: The Israeli New Jersey Group were Mossad Intelligence Operatives Spying on Local Arabs in Hudson and Bergen_Counties

[Or they were handling the arabs and setting them up as patsies for 911 D.C]

There have been a number of press reports in the United States on the Israeli New Jersey Group, most notably in the Forward. In the same article that reported on the Israeli DEA Groups, the Forward states that the nature of the FBI’s review of the case changed after the names of two of the five Israelis appeared on a CIA-FBI database of foreign intelligence operatives. This has been confirmed by a former chief of operations for counter-terrorism with the CIA.99 At that point, the FBI launched a foreign counter-intelligence investigation. All five of the men underwent polygraph tests, one of them seven times. At the end of that investigation, the FBI concluded that the Israeli New Jersey Group had been conducting a surveillance mission for Mossad, and that Urban Moving served as a Mossad front.100 They further concluded that the Israelis were “spying on local Arabs.”101

8. Inadequate Israeli Warnings 

in August 2001

As noted above, almost immediately after September 11, reports emerged of Israeli warnings, in August, that major terrorist attacks were imminent. On September 16, 2001 the Daily Telegraph (London) reported that Israeli intelligence officials said that they--

“warned their counterparts in the United States last month that large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland were imminent. . . . 

 . . . Two senior experts with Mossad, the Israeli military intelligence service, were sent to Washington in August to alert the CIA and FBI to the existence of a cell of as many of 200 terrorists said to be preparing a big operation.

They had no specific information about what was being planned but linked the plot to Osama bin Laden and told the Americans that there were strong grounds for suspecting Iraqi involvement."102[What a load of horse dung D.C.]

The Los Angeles Times reported on September 20, 2001 that a “high-ranking U.S. law enforcement official” confirmed that--[Writer means high ranking U.S. official shilling for Israel D.C]

“FBI and CIA officials were advised in August that as many as 200 terrorists were slipping into the United States and planning ‘a major assault on the United States . . . .’ 

The advisory was passed on by the Mossad. . . . It cautioned that it had picked up indications of a ‘large-scale target’ in the United States and that Americans would be ‘very vulnerable’, the official said.[And the 5 dancers just got lucky picking the target to dance at D.C.]

It is not known whether US authorities thought the warning to be credible, or whether it contained enough details to allow counter-terrorism teams to come up with a response. But the official said the advisory linked the information ‘back to Afghanistan and [exiled Saudi militant] Osama bin Laden.’”103 

Fox News also reported on May 17, 2002 (and apparently also on September 14, 2001)104 that— 

“based on its own intelligence, the Israeli government provided ‘general’ information to the United States in the second week of August that an al Qaeda attack was imminent.”

Neither the Commission in its Final Report or in its Staff Statements nor the Joint Committee Report specifically mentions any such warning from the Israeli government. These Statements and Reports do, however, defer to our intelligence community’s desire to safeguard and maintain the secrecy of its “sources and methods”. These are likely to have included Israeli warnings and the Israelis’ own sources. But in view of the dramatic questions raised by the Israeli Groups’ activities in the United States in the months leading up to September 11, these sources and methods now need to be disclosed.

As shown in the tabular comparison in Exhibit E, the accounts of Mossad’s warnings in August bear the unmistakable imprints of authenticity. Mossad’s warnings were reported by the Daily Telegraph and others right after September 11, well over two years before the Joint Committee’s report and the publication of the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) of August 6, 2001. Yet they bear a remarkable similarity to both the Joint Committee’s description of “all-source reporting” and the PDB’s account of “clandestine, foreign government and media reports and recent FBI information.” The key differences, as shown in Exhibit E, are Mossad’s warning that

(a) the attacks were imminent,

(b) they were to take place on the U.S. mainland, and

(c) 200 terrorists were in the United States to carry them out.

Mossad also alone warned of “suspected Iraqi involvement,” though this of course has never been established and is generally considered to be untrue.

That we did receive warnings of this general nature from Mossad seems more than likely. But the real issue, again, is, given the extensive surveillance by the Israeli Groups of U.S. Arab groups and, in all likelihood, of the future hijackers in their central bases of operation and elsewhere in the United States, were not the Israeli Groups, or some of their members, aware of what was going to happen in advance? Is this not dramatically shown by the behavior of the Israeli New Jersey Group the morning of September 11? And if so, did the Israeli government decide not to provide us with enough information to stop them?

As noted in the next section, the Israelis may have given us warning in late August 2001 of the presence in the United States of Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi, resulting in the CIA’s having them placed on the State Department’s Tip off Watch list.105 Or this may have been part of the Israeli warnings earlier in August. In either case, the CIA’s and the Commission’s explanation of how these two future hijackers came to be Watch listed, which makes no mention of Israeli warnings, is highly confusing and, as we shall see, in the end difficult to believe. Even so, the Israeli warning as to the two men would have come too late, for we now know that they were then or soon hiding in an obscure motel in Maryland, from which they did not emerge until September 11.106

One television documentary cited above (which did not have access to or study in any detail the documents, lists, reports and other information set forth herein, or even any knowledge of the existence of the Israeli New Jersey Group), has put the relevant question bluntly, in the form of a question, an answer and a rhetorical question 

“What about this question of advanced knowledge of what was going to happen on September 11? How clear are investigators that some Israeli agents may have known something?”

“It’s very explosive information, obviously, and there’s a great deal of evidence that they say they have collected none of it necessarily conclusive. It’s more when they put it all together. A bigger question, they say, is how could they not have known?” [Emphasis supplied.]107

9. The Watch listing of Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi 

in August 2001

There was yet another press report of Mossad warnings in August 2001, which appeared in Die Zeit in October 2002. The report stated that the names of Mihdhar and Hazmi were given to the CIA by Mossad on August 23, resulting in their Watch listing on August 24.108 Although the report is based upon unspecified “documents obtained by Die Zeit”, it is interesting given the contemporaneous (just after September 11) and credible reports of August Mossad warnings cited above. Collectively the reported warnings appear to offer the most likely reason for the Watch listing of these two future hijackers in August 2001.

The Commission and its Staff, however, make no mention of any Israeli warnings, and take the position, undoubtedly adopting the CIA’s public stance, that it was solely a series of reviews beginning in May 2001 that led to the Watch listing. But as we shall see, this account is both difficult to follow and hard to believe. In any event it shows that no real action was taken to Watch list Mihdhar or Hazmi until late August, after the Israeli warnings appear to have been received.

The issue is important because any downplaying of Israeli warnings, whether done in order to conceal their or our “sources and methods” or for other reasons, draws attention away from the major question of the adequacy of the Mossad warnings and the surveillance role the Israeli Groups played in the United States in the months leading up to September 11. I shall try to restate the Commission’s and its Staff’s (and the CIA’s official) explanation of the Watchlisting here. 

a. “John”, “Mary”, “Jane” and “Alice”

In the spring of 2001 there were reported threats of terrorist attacks on U.S. interests abroad as noted more particularly in the first column of Exhibit E. According to the Commission’s Staff, in May of that year, a CIA officer called only “John” (to protect his identity) in Staff Statement No. 10 and in the Commission’s Final Report “wondered where the attacks might occur.”109 John’s spontaneous interest was said to have been prompted by his recollection that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been present at a Kuala Lumpur meeting in January 2000. It was suspected the attack on the U.S. vessel Cole in October 2000 had been planned at that meeting.[I wonder if 'John' knows that the damage to the USS Cole was caused by a torpedo shot from a dolphin sub? DC]

So in the month of May 2001, the story continues, John and a woman at the CIA (whom we shall call “Alice” here), reviewed the CIA’s cable traffic concerning the Kuala Lumpur meeting. Alice reportedly discovered that the CIA had learned, in March 2000 (though they had never shared this information with the FBI), that Mihdhar had a U.S. visa and that Hazmi had come to Los Angeles shortly after the Kuala Lumpur meeting. John did nothing at all, however.

Two months later, at a time when the focus was still on threats to U.S. interests outside the United States)110 in late July or some time in August, John asked “Mary”, an FBI agent detailed to the CIA, to review the cable traffic one more time. It is unclear what inspired John to resume that work. He is said to have recalled or discovered that Khallad, a dangerous al Qaeda operative, had been identified as one of those who attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting. But John was not particularly concerned, and told Mary to do the work in her spare time. 111

On August 21, 2001, Mary is said to have discovered a bit more than Alice supposedly had in May: Hazmi had come to Los Angeles, as was known, but Mihdhar had used his visa to come as well, along with Hazmi, in January 2000. Working with Jane, an FBI agent assigned to the CIA, Mary also discovered that Mihdhar had left the United States later in 2000, but had just returned, on July 4, 2001. Because of Mary’s discoveries, Mihdhar and Hazmi were placed on the Watchlist.

b. The Uncertain, Untranslated, Unwitnessed, Unremembered and Erroneous Identification of Khallad

As the Commission’s Staff has said of this route to the Watch list, “the details are complex.”112 They are also serendipitous to the point of undermining their credibility. 

In the first place, John is said to have recalled or discovered that Khallad had been identified from a photograph in January 2001, by a joint FBI/CIA source, as an attendee of the Kuala Lumpur meeting in January 2000. The FBI agent said to have been present at the January 2001 meeting, however, was unaware, apparently because of language problems, that any such identification had ever been made.113 Moreover, “the CIA officer [himself--who supposedly conducted the interview] does not recall this particular identification [at all] and thus cannot say why it was not shared with his FBI colleague.”114 As we have seen, Alice, who was said to have “reviewed the cables” in May, “took no action regarding these cables.” Neither did John. Indeed, the Commission’s Staff noted that Alice “cannot [even] recall this work.”115 The Commission deleted the words regarding Alice’s loss of memory from its Final Report without explanation.116

This untranslated, unwitnessed and forgotten identification that so inspired John to return later in the summer to the work forgotten by Alice seems to have been just as elusive. The joint source had been said in (someone’s) report to be less than certain (or “ninety percent certain”)117 that the man in the photograph shown him was Khallad. And indeed, although both the Commission’s Final Report and its Staff Statements fail to tell us so, the purported identification itself later proved to be false. The man was not Khallad.118 So Khallad had not been identified, and until after September 11 his everyday appearance remained as much a mystery as the purported meeting with the joint source that supposedly so inspired John on his way to the Watchlist before the Mossad warnings in August.

As noted above, when Alice’s “work” was effectively taken up late in August, the U.S. presence (or likely presence) of Mihdhar and Hazmi was again discovered and, on August 24, 2001, both men were placed on the Watch list. As noted above, they were then safely secluded and never found.

d. William (of Ockham)

John, Mary, Jane and Alice may all have been hard at work in Washington, and made a contribution,119 but Occam’s razor 120 leads us a far straighter course to the Watchlist by way of the Mossad warnings in August, the likely result of the surveillance activities of the Israeli Groups and their (inadequate) warnings. Both Mihdhar and Hazmi, hijackers of the Pentagon Plane and leaders of the entire hijacker group, would easily have fallen under the surveillance of the Israeli New Jersey Group in Hudson and Bergen Counties, and of the Israeli DEA Groups in San Diego and (in the case of Hazmi) in the Hollywood area and possibly in Oklahoma. And it was only after the Mossad warnings were received that the CIA, finally, on August 27, 2001, told the FBI that Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the United States.121

10. Why the Israeli Groups?

It is not necessary at this early stage of inquiry into these events to speculate on the original rationale for the U.S. activities of the two Israeli Groups. A study of that question will best be undertaken in the course of the public inquiry. But a few thoughts may lend some perspective to the question.[Lets see if this lawyer's thoughts dare ask the question,I doubt it,but lets see D.C.]

It may be that originally the Israeli DEA Groups did little more than sell art (though illegally and in violation of their visas). Once the need or usefulness of keeping Arab groups under surveillance in the United States became apparent to the Israeli government, it may have viewed these art salesmen and their vans as ideal groups and vehicles into which to insert sophisticated agents with telecommunications, wiretapping or electronic eavesdropping equipment and intelligence expertise. 

The vans in the operations of both Israeli Groups 122 were able to move about neighborhoods without raising undue concern. The “art students” in the Israeli DEA Groups were using their vans as sometime door-to-door salesmen. The personnel of Urban Moving Systems, the Mossad front, were ostensibly driving about northeastern New Jersey towns in their van (or vans) to help people move—a familiar suburban sight. 

With ample room for personnel and electronic equipment, the vans were ideal vehicles for electronic eavesdropping.123 The extent to which Nice Systems, the Israeli wiretapping company for which Tomer Ben Dor worked (the Israeli with the reference to “DEA Groups” in his computer files) will be a matter for the public inquiry. Nice Systems was ideally suited to provide equipment and expertise to the Israeli New Jersey Group because its U.S. headquarters were located in Rutherford, New Jersey, near the center of the Group’s operations (MAP 3). 

The future hijackers were frequent users of land lines and cell telephones and thus were ideal subjects for electronic surveillance. Mihdhar regularly telephoned a terrorist facility in the Middle East from the United States.124 Both Mihdhar and Hazmi were “constantly on their cell phones.”125 Mohamed Atta made calls to Madrid from Coral Springs 126 and used his cell phone to call lodging establishments in Florida.127 Ramzi Binalshibh, a plot leader based in Hamburg, frequently called Atta,128 Shehhi 129 and Moussaoui 130 from Hamburg. Jarrah made hundreds of phone calls from Florida 131 and Hanjour, Hazmi and other hijackers made 75 calls in two days 132 to locate apartments,flight schools and car rental agencies for the New Jersey hijackers (of the Pentagon Plane).

As to the Israeli DEA Groups’ surveillance of the DEA, it is difficult if not impossible to learn from the public record, at this time, the precise nature of the information they were seeking from that agency. The DEA itself was not sure then, and it may not know to this day. The DEA had its own concerns about the Israeli DEA Groups relating to previous drug investigations, as noted above. Perhaps these concerns were well-founded. Perhaps the Israelis were using these units in part as a training ground (on our soil) for future agents, or were interested in learning the DEA’s methods for tracking drug traffickers and their money, a potential source of funding for terrorist groups.[Yeah and for the funding of black-ops by intelligence agencies like the Criminally Insane Association, and Mossad. D.C.]

But in all likelihood the selling of art and (though far riskier) the DEA spying were covers for their more important work of keeping Arab groups under surveillance in the United States. This activity appears ultimately to have led the Israelis to the future hijackers, and forced upon them unwelcome decisions as to how much, and when, they should tell the United States of what they had learned.[LED?More like they put those 'hijackers' in place,hell I am not convinced there were ANY 'Arabs' on those 4 planes,just as easy to be all 200 mossad agents,some posing as 'arabs',for the charade played out across America,which they use for cover after the events,'see we were watching them and we told you'.No evidence of Arabs getting on any of the planes,just the 'official story'.No need for hijackers when you put the people to sleep with gas,and fly them remote control DC]

11. The CIA’s Role and Responsibilities

Finally, it is possible that the CIA was aware that the two Israeli Groups were tracking suspected Arab groups on our soil, but remained unaware until after September 11 that they had come across the future hijackers. There is presently little evidence of the CIA’s possible knowledge of the Israeli Groups’ activities, beyond the sheer scope and magnitude of the Israeli DEA Groups’ operations in the U.S., the CIA’s general unwillingness to share information with the FBI, as outlined in the Commission’s Final Report, and, perhaps, the brazenness of the Israeli New Jersey Group on September 11. The CIA’s clumsy reconstruction of the miraculous work of “John”, “Mary”, “Jane” and “Alice”, which appears designed to point away from the Israeli warnings, also raises legitimate questions.

The CIA was prohibited by law from engaging in field intelligence operations inside the United States. They may have been reluctant to cooperate with the FBI because of the burdensome constraints of constitutional protections benefiting potential defendants. They may also have regarded the Israelis as unusually effective because of their familiarity with Arab culture and their common understanding of the Arabic language.133[This lawyer acts like he sees it as no big deal that Israel was spying in our country,they had no business here dude.DC]

A leading Israeli newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, reported in the fall of 2002 that prior to the September 11 attacks, when members of the Israeli DEA Groups were being detained or arrested across the United States, the CIA “actively promoted their expulsion.”134 The implication in that article was that the CIA was simply being careless, not trying to spirit the Israelis safely out of the country. But at this point we cannot be certain. The CIA may have been eager to protect the surveillance activities of the Israeli Groups a whole in an operation that, ultimately, failed to protect us. Any delegation on the part of the CIA of its responsibilities abroad to foreign agents in the U.S. would, of course, have been unlawful. It would also have rendered our country particularly vulnerable because, as suggested above, the interests of the Israeli government and its agents are not necessarily consonant with our own.

The CIA also failed to press for the continuing detention of the members of the Israeli New Jersey Group after their arrest on September 11. After three months the men were released and returned to Israel, even though their names had appeared in our own counter-intelligence data base, at least two of them were suspected Mossad agents, and their leader had fled to Israel on or about September 14—only to be placed on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List a few months later.

The CIA is mentioned but once in the DEA Report, in connection with the Israeli DEA Groups’ effort to penetrate the DEA’s Southwest Laboratory near San Diego,where Mihdhar and Hazmi were living.135 What role the CIA then played does not appear. It is clear that the DEA Report was itself inspired by the DEA’s own bewilderment by the very existence of the Israeli DEA Groups, by the scope of their operations throughout much of our country, by their overwhelming numbers, and by their expertise.

The Forward article cited above states that the operations of the Israeli Groups heightened tensions between Washington and Israel— 

“not because of the operations’ [Arab] targets but because Israel reportedly violated a secret gentlemen’s agreement between the two countries under which espionage on each other’s soil is to be coordinated in advance.”136 

The real question today, however, appears to be whether the “gentlemen’s agreement” did indeed prevail here and, because we lacked adequate warning from our surrogates who were keeping the Arabs under surveillance, helped bring us to disaster. 

The tragedy of the DEA Report becomes evident only after sifting through all the twists and turns of its raw data, often dull, sometimes disquieting, and reading for one last time the struggle of its authors to find a rational explanation in the introductory paragraphs. Today in retrospect, the DEA Report, written in June 2001, seems in effect a cry for help.

The public inquiry into these events must include an examination into whether the CIA may have been aware of, or promoted or condoned, the surveillance by the Israeli Groups of suspect Arab groups in the U.S.

12. Detailed Summary

Set forth below is a detailed summary of the tentative conclusions reached in this memorandum, which amply illustrate the urgent need for a public inquiry into the activities of the Israeli DEA Groups and the Israeli New Jersey Group. The inquiry must include, without limitation, the examination of members of the Israel Groups and related persons; officials of the Israeli government and certain of its agencies, including Mossad; FBI suspects, agents of the DEA, the INS and the FBI; certain local law enforcement officials; agents of the CIA (in camera to the extent required); other intelligence sources cited by the public press to the extent possible; the boxes of documents and computer hard drives (referred on page 29) seized by the FBI from the Israeli New Jersey Group; and of all other relevant documents, reports, communiques and information.--

1. The Israeli DEA Groups were spying on the Drug Enforcement Agency and thus upon the United States. The DEA itself has concluded that they were probably engaged in organized intelligence gathering on our soil.

2. A highly regarded American journal knowledgeable about Israeli affairs, has concluded

(a) based on its own sources, that the Israeli DEA Groups were spying on radical Islamic networks suspected of links to Middle East terrorism, and

(b) based on the representations of a former American intelligence official regularly briefed on these matters by law enforcement officials, that

(i) at least two members of the Israeli New Jersey Group were Mossad operatives,

(ii) Urban Moving, the company used by the Israeli New Jersey Group, was a front for Mossad and its operatives, and

(iii) the Israeli New Jersey Group was spying on local Arabs.

3. The intelligence sources of a substantial American television network report that the Israeli DEA Groups may have gathered information about the September 11 attacks in advance, and not shared it with the United States. One investigator said that evidence linking the Israeli DEA Groups to such intelligence gathering was classified and could not be disclosed. 

4. The Israeli DEA Groups were comprised of 125 or more Israelis operating on our soil. Their leaders and apparent associates included military commanders and experts with military backgrounds in intelligence, electronic intercepts and telecommunications.

5. The wiretapping and intelligence expertise of members of both Israeli Groups, and the use of vans in local neighborhoods where the future hijackers were planning the attacks, and the extensive use by the hijackers of cell phones and land lines, made the Israeli Groups ideally suited to gather information regarding the hijackers’ plans.

6. The principal operation of the Israeli DEA Groups was located in and around Hollywood, Florida, the central training and staging ground for the hijacking of North and South Tower Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane. The addresses and places of residence of the members of the Israeli DEA Groups in Hollywood itself were within hundreds of yards those of the future hijackers.

7. The operations of both the Israeli New Jersey Group and the hijackers of the Pentagon Plane were centered in Hudson and Bergen Counties in New Jersey, within a common radius of about six miles.

8. All five celebrating members of the Israeli New Jersey Group arrested on September 11 were aware, when the North Tower Plane struck the World Trade Center, based on their immediate reaction to the attack and the information said to be contained in their van, that the attack had been planned and carried out by Arab terrorists.

9. After being questioned by the FBI on September 11, the leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group immediately fled the United States to Israel. His name and aliases appear, along with those of the hijackers and other FBI suspects, on the May 2002 FBI Suspect list.

10. Israeli intelligence officials have reported that two senior officials of Mossad warned the United States in August 2001 that as many as 200 terrorists on American soil were planning an imminent large-scale attack on high visibility targets on the American mainland. One press report states that in August Mossad provided the CIA with the names of future hijackers Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi.

11. The CIA’s explanation of how Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s names were placed on the Watch list through the spontaneous efforts of CIA and FBI agents is not only difficult to follow but, as the sole reason for the Watch listing, hardly credible.

12. Mossad’s own information appears to have come from its sources inside the United States. All of the facts and circumstances set forth in this memorandum appear to show that Mossad’s two likely sources of information were: (a) the Israeli DEA Groups, comparable in number to that of the Arab suspects and who appear to have tracked the future hijackers in their central places of operation and in other states, and (b) the Israeli New Jersey Group, operating through their Mossad front in another principal locus of operations of the future hijackers, two of whom were Mossad agents, and five of whom appeared immediately aware of the origin of the attacks on September 11.

13. While little direct evidence supports the contention that the CIA was aware of or condoned the Israeli Groups’ tracking of Arab terrorist groups in the United States prior to September 11, the CIA’s pressing for the expulsion of members of the Israeli DEA Groups when they were detained before September 11, their failure to cooperate with the FBI, their circuitous explanation of how the above two hijackers were placed on the Watchlist, and other relevant considerations require that the issue be taken up as a part of the public inquiry into these painful events. 

 Gerald Shea

 

 
next...

The DEA Report 

footnotes

1 Capitalized terms used initially in this memorandum without definition have the respective meanings later specified.

2 As shown in this memorandum, the evidence establishing this fact appears to be conclusive. 

3 DEA Report, paragraph 69, p. 20; paragraph 5, p. 48. (the Indexing Section of the DEA Report beginning on p. 48 is separately numbered). 

4 DEA Report, paragraph 46, p. 13; paragraph 104, p. 56.

5 DEA Report, paragraph 53-56, pp. 16-17; paragraph 120, p. 57. 

6 Ibid. Mr. Ben Dor was apparently not an “art salesmen”, but possessed a document relating to these groups. Ms. Glikman was an associate of Mr. Ben Dor (see below). 

7 DEA Report, p. 1. 

8 Government Tracks Israeli Art Students by Connie Cass (AP), March 9, 2002. 9 DEA Report, paragraph 50, p.14; paragraph 107, p. 56. 

10 DEA Report, paragraph 48, p. 12

11 DEA Report, paragraph 49, p 12; paragraph 106, p. 56. 

12 DEA Report, paragraph 50, Pages 14-15. As stated in paragraph 50, Mr. Calmanovic also had an address and telephone number in Studio City, California, related to other DEA case files. 

13 DEA Report, p. 2. 

14 DEA Report, paragraphs 80-81, pp. 24-25; paragraph 39, P. 50. 

15 DEA Report, paragraphs 96-100, pp. 29-30; paragraph 66, p. 53. Paragraph 66 of the Indexing Section lists Segalovitz as a former officer in the Israeli Special Forces. Paragraph 97 in the body of the text states that he “has the rank of Lieutenant” and specifies his military ID number. 

16 Annual Report on Form 20-F of Nice-Systems Ltd., as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on June 24, 2002. 

17 DEA Report, paragraph 54, pp. 16-17. 

18 Mr. Gal told the DEA he would be staying in Edgewater, New Jersey, which is near the center of operations of the Israeli New Jersey Group (see MAP 3). 

19 DEA Report, paragraph 50, p. 14.

20 Un Réseau d’Espionnage Israélien a été Démantelé aux Etats-Unis, by Sylvain Cypel, Le Monde, March 2, 2002.

21 The DEA facilities and residences were located in 15 states: Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah and Virginia, and in Washington, D.C.

22 DEA Report, paragraphs 153-54, p. 41.

23 DEA Report, paragraphs 160-64, pages 42-43.

24 DEA Report, paragraphs 165-67, 169, pages 44-45.

25 DEA Report, paragraph 95, p. 28.

26 DEA Report, paragraph 178, p. 47.

27 DEA Report, paragraph 175, p. 46.

28 DEA Report, paragraph 172, p. 46.

29 DEA Report, paragraph 71, p. 21.

30 I do recall that a student (though in fact, none of the Israelis was a student, as established in the DEA Report) can make a good deal of money selling things on foot. During the summer following my sophomore year at Yale I sold encyclopedias door to door with Maynard Jackson, who drove the “van” in our operation, his black Pontiac convertible. Maynard was at B.U. Law School at the time. Each day I spoke to about 30 people at their doors and managed to make all or part of a sales presentation to about four families. So during the period (about 65 working days over a total of 10 weeks) I spoke to about 1,950 people at the door, made a presentation to about 260 families, and sold 25 to 30 sets. Not once, however, did I make a sale to any federal governmental official, nor, to the best of my recollection (a) did any of our groups, nor (b) did we ever make even a presentation to any such official. Nor, of course, did we ever call upon any federal offices, laboratories or military air bases, or photograph anything at all, not even, to my present dismay, Maynard himself.

31 See DEA Report, p. 1. Peer Segalovitz was asked about and confirmed that he “was aware of Israeli Organized Crime involvement in drug smuggling and weapons smuggling.” DEA Report, paragraph 98, p. 29.

32 Transcript of Fox News Telecast, December 14, 2001.

33 The October 3, 2001 FBI Suspect List (the “October 2001 FBI Suspect List” (Exhibit C), contains the names of about 350 suspects.

34 For a fuller account and analysis of these reports, see p. 32.

35 Transcript of Fox Television News telecast, December 12, 2001.

36 DEA Report, p. 1

37 The hijackers of the fourth plane, which crashed into the Pentagon, were based in New Jersey (see p. 26 below)

38 FBI Suspect List, dated May 22, 2002 (the “May 2002 FBI Suspect List”), which is attached as Exhibit D. Both FBI Suspect Lists appear to have been inadvertently released by European Exchange Control authorities, the first by the Finnish authority (Associated Press, October 12, 2001) and the second in Italy by the Ufficio Italiano dei Cambi. Wail al Shehri appears on the October 2001 FBI Suspect list but, presumably mistakenly, not on that of May 2002. 

39 See the Commission’s Final Report, e.g., note 55 to Chapter 5, p. 43, and note 46 to Chapter 7, p. 519.

40 Telephone conversation with Ms. Whitney Blake of the FBI in August 2004.

41 To obtain the accurate page citations in the Hijacker Timeline, a reader may need to insert page numbers in that document.

42 DEA Report, paragraph 76 ff., p. 24.

43 DEA Report, paragraph 96 ff. p. 28.

44 Hijacker Timeline, p. 6. 

45 Boston Globe, September 15, 2001.

46 REPORT OF THE JOINT INQUIRY INTO THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 –BY THE HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, S. REPT. NO. 107- 351 107TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION H. REPT. NO. 107-792, December 2002 (the “Joint Committee Report”), pp. 135ff. See generally, Daily Telegraph (London), September 20, 2001.

47 DEA Report, paragraphs 90-94, pp. 27-28. See MAP 4.

48 See, e.g. the statements of one of the Israeli DEA Groups as to their movements through Oklahoma at DEA Report, paragraph 52, p. 16.

49 Joint Committee Report, p. 136.

50 Joint Committee Report, p. 137.

51 Hijacker Timeline, p. 20.

52 Hijacker Timeline, p. 23.

53 The Wall Street Journal, September 18, 2001.

54 Hijacker Timeline, p. 64.

55 Hijacker Timeline, p. 25.

56 Hijacker Timeline, p. 37. 

57 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 2,5.

58 Hijacker Timeline, pp. 22-23; Die Zeit, October 1, 2004. 

59 DEA Report, paragraphs 51-2, pp. 15-16.

60 DEA Report, paragraph 43, p. 12.

61 DEA Report, paragraph 52, p. 16.

62 DEA Report, paragraph 175, p. 46.

63 DEA Report, paragraph 176, pp. 46-7.

64 DEA Report, paragraph 54-5, pp. 16-17.

65 Statement of an expelled Israeli to Officer Michael L. Bush of the INS on March 31, 2001. DEA Report, paragraph 48, p. 14.

66 DEA Report, paragraphs 39-44, pp. 12-13.

67 DEA Report, paragraph 45, p. 13.

68 DEA Report, paragraph 52, p. 16. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 9, 20.

69 DEA Report, paragraph 63, pp. 18-19; paragraph 71, p. 21. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 7, 20 and 21. 

70 DEA Report, paragraph 2, p. 3; paragraph 125, pp. 35-6; paragraph 132, p. 37. Hijacker Timeline, pp. 3, 19, 20, 33. Commission Final Report, n. 72 to Chapter 7, p. 523, referring to the (unavailable) FBI Hijackers Timeline, dated December 5, 2003.

71 DEA Report, p. 2; paragraphs 76-89, pp. 24-27. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 6,7. Committee Joint Report, p. 143.

72 DEA Report, paragraphs 90-94, pp. 27-28. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 7, 8, 9, 11, 16, 18.

73 DEA Report, paragraphs 138-42, pp. 38-40. May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 1, 6, 11.

74 Transcript of Telecast of Fox Television News, December 12, 2001.

75 Israel Calls Fox’s Spy Reports ‘Baseless’, by Marc Perelman, the Forward, December 21, 2001. 

76 Spy Rumors Fly on Gusts of Truth, Americans Probing Reports of Israeli Espionage, by Marc Perelman and Forward Staff, the Forward March 15, 2002.

77 Transcript of ABC News telecast, June 21, 2002.

78 Statement of Steven N. Gordon, Esq., counsel for the five members of the group, as reported in Yediot America on November 2, 2001.

79 Ibid.

80 Vans of various makes were also, of course, the common means of transportation for the Israeli DEA Groups, and Chevrolet vans were used by Israeli DEA Groups in New York, Dallas, Chicago and San Diego. DEA Report, paragraph 113, p. 33, paragraph 26, p. 9; paragraph 21, p. 8; and paragraph 119, p. 35, respectively.

81 As quoted in the Bergen (New Jersey) Record, September 12, 2001. The men may have been witnessed celebrating twice, in separate locations, once at the time of the impact of the North Tower Plane and a second time when both towers were burning. Compare the FBI statement with the ABC transcript, supra, n. 72, and the statements of the Israelis’ counsel in Yediot America, November 2, 2001. 

82 Bergen (New Jersey) Record, September 12, 2001.

83 The question in brackets is my own. The quotation, and the above related details of the arrest of the five members of the Israeli New Jersey Group, are all as set forth in greater detail in the Preliminary and Supplemental Police Reports of the arresting officers of the East Rutherford, New Jersey Police Department, dated September 11, 2001.

84 NJ Locations Searched In Connection With Terror Attacks, Associated Press, September 14, 2001. 

85 Transcript of ABC News telecast, June 21, 2002; the Forward, March 15, 2002, op. cit., note 76. 

86 Ibid.

87 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pages 17 and 21.

88 See MAP 3.

89 No address is given on the October 2001 FBI Suspect List for Majed Moqed and his name is omitted, presumably in error, from the May 2002 FBI Suspect List. But Moqed appears to have been known by May 2002 to have lived in the hijackers’ Paterson apartment.

90 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 3, 4, 6, 7, 14. Hijacker Timeline, pp. 22, 27, 30, 41.

91 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 3, 4, 5, 7, 14. Hijacker Timeline, pp. 22, 39.

92 Hijacker Timeline, p. 41

93 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, p. 9. 

94 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 5, 7.

95 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, pp. 10, 15, 16, 17, 19. Hijacker Timeline, p. 53.

96 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, p. 10.

97 May 2002 FBI Suspect List, p. 7.

98 Hijacker Timeline, p. 22. Commission Final Report, p. 230. The May 2002 FBI Suspect List provides a variety of Union Avenue addresses, including the address specified in the Hijacker Timeline. The Commission’s Final Report (p. 230) does not place any Pentagon Plane hijackers in Paterson until May. Other sources place them there in March, when Hanjour and Salem al Hazmi are said to have signed the lease for the Paterson apartment. Hijacker Timeline, p. 22; Connecticut Post (Bridgeport), March 6, 2002 (preparatory hijacker meeting in March in Fairfield, Connecticut just before the move to Paterson)

99 See transcript of ABC News telecast, June 21, 2002.

100 Marc Perelman, op. cit., March 15, 2002. The Forward’s source was a former American intelligence official who said he was regularly briefed on the investigation by two law enforcement officials acting independently.

101 The Forward’s source in the March article also said the five men were released (Suter had fled to Israel) because “they did not know anything about 9/11.” But this statement needs to be weighed in the light of the men’s demeanor and statements, and the statements of local law enforcement officials, on September 11, 2001, the inclusion of Mr. Suter on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List, and the revelations on that List that Hudson and Bergen Counties were a critical center of operations for the future hijackers and FBI suspects as noted above. The FBI was also under pressure from U.S. political figures to release the members of the Israeli New Jersey Group, including Richard Armitage of the State Department and two New York Congressmen. Senior U.S. Officials Join Effort To Free 5 Israelis Held in Brooklyn, Ha'aretz News, October 29, 2001. 

102 Israeli security issues urgent warning to CIA of large-scale terror attacks, by David Wastell in Washington and Philip Jacobson in Jerusalem, Daily Telegraph, September 16, 2001.

103 Officials Told of 'Major Assault' Plans, By Richard A. Serrano and John-Thor Dahlburg, Los Angeles Times, September 20, 2001. The L.A. Times retracted its story the next day, reporting that the CIA (not the source of the story) later flatly denied the statements, and that the Times’s source, the “high-ranking law enforcement official,” had based his account solely on what he read in the newspapers! The L.A. Times retraction referred to a “British newspaper account,” presumably the Daily Telegraph article. The U.S. law enforcement official’s account, however, as quoted above, said that Mossad had warned of a single “large-scale target” and had warned that the Americans would be “very vulnerable.” Neither statement was included in the Daily Telegraph article. The U.S. official’s account also made no specific mention of an “imminent” attack, and none at all of any “strong grounds for suspecting Iraqi involvement,” both reported by the Daily Telegraph. 

104 Fox did not specify its source, and I have not been able to locate its piece of the “14th” to which Fox referred in a telecast of December 12, 2001.

105 As the Commission has noted, this would not in any event have prevented Mihdhar and Hazmi from flying, but would have precluded them from obtaining visas, which they already had (they were both here). Staff Statement No. 2, p. 8.

106 Hijacker Timeline, pp. 38-9. 

107 Transcript of dialogue between Brit Hume and Carl Cameron, Fox Television News, December 12, 2002. 

108 Deadly Mistakes by Oliver Schrömm, Die Zeit, October 1, 2002.

109 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, p. 7; Commission Final Report, p. 267.

110 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, at p. 4: “On July 2 [,2001] the FBI Counterterrorism Division sent a message to federal agencies and state and local law enforcement agencies that . . . stated, ‘the FBI has no information indicating a credible threat of terrorist attack in the United States.’”

111 The Commission’s Staff and its Final Report say only that John spontaneously asked Mary to pick up Alice’s work in late July. But it was not until late August, at about the time of the reported Mossad warnings, that Mary supposedly discovered on her own that Mihdhar was in the United States. Staff Statement No. 10, p. 8; Commission Final Report, p. 270. The Joint Committee Report (p. 151) states that John’s interest was rekindled in July by his discovery of a cable indicating that Khallad had been present at the Kuala Lumpur meeting, but neither the Commission’s Staff nor its Final Report mentions such a cable. The discovery of the cable apparently prompted John to call Khallad a “major league killer” though the Commission (p. 268) suggests that this remark exhibited John’s concerns in May. Whatever John wrote, he wasn’t worried in July, as shown by what he is said to have told Mary.

112 Staff Statement No. 10, p. 5.

113 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, p. 6: “This is an example of how day-to-day gaps in information sharing can emerge even in a situation of goodwill on all sides. The information was from a joint FBI/CIA source. The source spoke essentially no English. The FBI person on the scene overseas [i.e., the agent who is said to have attended the meeting] did not speak the languages the source spoke. Due to travel and security issues, the amount of time spent with the source was necessarily kept short. As a result, the CIA officer usually did not simultaneously translate either the questions or the answers for his accompanying FBI colleague, and friend.”

114 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, p. 7; Commission Final Report, p. 267. The Commission itself in its Final Report, almost hilariously (because it does not explain why the CIA agent had no recollection of this event), has added to the speculative litany of reasons why the FBI agent did not recall any identification of Khallad. “The FBI agent also may have been absent from the room when the identification was made. The source had brought a sheaf of documents with him that the FBI agent left the room to copy while the interview of the witness continued. Because of the circumstances of the interview site, the agent would have been absent for a significant period of time. In addition, the case officer was frequently given photographs from a broad range of CIA stations to show to this particular witness. He did not focus on the purpose of showing the photographs; he was only concerned with whether the source recognized the individuals.” Commission Final Report, p. 537, n. 62. The CIA officer who also has no recollection of any identification of Khallad, is, of course, said (a) to have spoken the source’s language, (b) not to have left the room, and (c) to have known why he was seeking the identification 

115 Ibid. Perhaps to bolster the hapless Alice, the Commission’s Final Report gives a name to another agent, “Dave”, who was mentioned but unnamed in Staff Statement No. 10. Dave seems to have done little more than try to find out whether another Cole suspect, Fahd al Quso, attended the Kuala Lumpur meeting.\

116 Compare Staff Statement No. 10, p. 7, third full paragraph, lines 1 and 2, with Commission Final Report, p. 267, last line.

117 Commission Staff Statement No. 10, p. 6; Commission Final Report, p. 266.

118 Joint Committee Report, p. 154: “In the days following the September 11 attacks [t]he Bureau . . . learned that the January 2001 photo identification of Khallad by the joint FBI/CIA asset had been mistaken. The person thought to be Khallad was actually Nawaf al Hazmi.” Khallad is now said to have finally been identified, but only after September 11, from another photograph taken at the meeting. 

119 For example, both Khallad (under an alias—though he was presumably already Watchlisted) and another attendee at Kuala Lumpur were also Watchlisted on August 24. Commission Final Report, Chapter 8, note 76, p. 538.

120 “Pluralitas non est ponenda sine neccesitate" or "Don’t posit a plurality of reasons unless it’s necessary” are the words of the medieval English philosopher William of Ockham (or Occam) (ca. 1285- 1349). Occam’s razor, or his principle of parsimony, or unnecessary plurality, may be said to hold that, when confronted with several implausible explanations and a more probable and simpler one, one should choose the latter.

121 Hijacker Timeline, p. 40.

122 Only one van, that stopped on September 11, has been identified as used by the Israeli New Jersey Group. We do not yet know (a) whether Urban Moving Systems had a number of vans, (b) how many of its employees worked in vans beyond the five arrested on September 11, or (c) whether any of its employees fled to Israel along with Dominik Suter. 

123 As we have seen, both Israeli Groups used Chevrolet vans. The Israeli DEA Groups’ vans (to the extent identified) also included a GMC Safari van, a GMC full-size custom van, a Ford van, a Dodge mini-van, and unspecified panel vans. See generally the DEA Report.

124 Joint Committee Report, p. 17.

125 Hijacker Timeline, p. 10.

126 Hijacker Timeline, p. 28.

127 Commission Final Report, p. 228.

128 Commission Final Report, p. 245 

129 Commission Final Report, p. 244. 

130 Ibid. 

131 Commission Final Report, p. 225. 

132 Joint Committee Report, p. 187. 

133 See the Joint Committee Report, p. xvii: “At home, the counterterrorism effort suffered from the lack of an effective domestic intelligence capability. The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al Qaeda and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States. . . . These problems greatly exacerbated the nation’s vulnerability to an increasingly dangerous and immediate international terrorist threat inside the United States.”

134 Mark Lefet in Yedioth Ahronoth, October 2, 2002, commenting on the October 1, 2002 Die Zeit article referred to in note 108. Die Zeit had said nothing of any CIA support for the expulsion of detained members of the Israeli DEA Groups. 

135 DEA Report, paragraph 119, pages 34-35: “The San Diego Division is currently working with the FBI, Department of State, and CIA personnel on advancing this investigation. Five names were retrieved from DEA and FBI sources and [run] through INS. There were hits on three Israeli individuals who entered the U.S. on non-immigrant tourist visas.”

136 The Forward, op. cit., March 15, 2002.