PART 10;OPERATION GLADIO:THE UNHOLY ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE VATICAN,CIA AND THE MAFIA

CHAPTER 19

KILLLINGS AND KIDNAPPING

The main reason why De Pedis is buried in the Basilica of Sant’Apollinare, is that it was he who put an end to attacks by the band (and not only) against the Vatican. These pressures by the Banda were due to money on loan to the Vatican, through Calvi's Banco Ambrosiano and never returned. After the Orlandi fact, even though all the money was not returned De Pedis, who was building for himself a future in the upper middle class, worked through reference prelates, to stop the violence. Among the things asked in return for this mediation, there was also the guarantee of being buried (in a distant death) there in Sant’Apollinare. 

—Antonio Mancini, bagman for the 

Banda della Magliana, La Stampa, July 27, 2011 

Calvi's death was first ruled a suicide by a coroner's jury in London. But the verdict was quickly quashed and a second jury declared it was unable to decide between murder and suicide. The investigation continued for many years. The Italian detectives remained convinced that the banker must have been killed. At the time of his demise, Calvi was sixty-two years old and overweight. He suffered from poor eyesight and pronounced vertigo. To commit suicide, he would have had to overcome impressive obstacles. As Peter Popham explained in the Guardian: 

In the pitch darkness he would have had to spot the scaffolding under the bridge, practically submerged in the high tide, stuff his trousers and pockets with bricks, climb over a stone parapet and down a 12-foot-long vertical ladder, then edge his way eight feet along the scaffolding. He would then have had to gingerly lower himself to another scaffolding pole before putting his neck in the noose and throwing himself off.1 

In 1998, Calvi's body was finally exhumed and a coroner determined that the man who had been known as “God's banker,” indeed, had been murdered. 

THE STRANGLER SPEAKS 

In the wake of this decision, Francesco “Frank the Strangler” Di Carlo, the heroin traffic manager for the Sicilian Mafia, testified that he had been approached to kill Calvi by members of the Corleonesi crime family under capo Giuseppe “Pippo” Calò, the “mob's cashier.”2 Interviewed in 2012, the notorious supergrass (British slang for “informer”) said: 

I was in Rome and received a phone call from a friend in Sicily telling me that a certain high-ranking mafia member had just been killed. I will never forget the date because of this: it was 16 June 1982—two days before Calvi was murdered. The friend told me that Pippo Calò was trying to get hold of me because he needed me to do something for him. In the hierarchy of Cosa Nostra, he was a general; I was a colonel, so he was a little higher up, my superior. 

While I finally spoke to Pippo, he told me not to worry, that the problem had been taken care of. That's a code we use in the Cosa Nostra. We never talk about killing someone. We say they have been taken care of. 

Calvi was naming names. No one had any trust in him anymore. He owed a lot of money. His friends had all distanced themselves. Everyone wanted to get rid of him. He had been arrested and he had started to talk. Then he had tried to kill himself by cutting his wrists. He was released, but knew he could be rearrested at any time. He was weak, he was a broken man. 

I was not the one who hanged Calvi. One day I may write the full story, but the real killers will never be brought to justice because they are being protected by the Italian state, by members of the P2 Masonic lodge. They have massive power. They are made up of a mixture of politicians, bank presidents, the military, top security and so on. This is a case that they continue to open and close again and again but it will never be resolved. The higher you go, the less evidence you will find.3 

Di Carlo, on another occasion, said that Vincenzo Casilo and Sergio Vaccari, two members of the Camorra with ties to P2, had received the contract for Calvi's murder from Calò and Licio Gelli.4 Casilo and Vaccari were killed by a car bomb shortly after their return to Milan. In case Casilo had engaged in some pillow talk, his mistress—Giovanna Matarazzo, a nightclub dancer—was murdered in her apartment by Camorra assassins.5 

THE KILLING CREW 

Mannoia

Giuliano

The ordering of Calvi's death by Calò and Gelli was verified by other high-ranking mob figures, including Francesco Marino Mannoia and Luigi Giuliano, who served Stefano Bontade. The two Mafiosi testified that Ernesto Diotallevi, a leader of Banda della Magliana, also took part in the hit.6 Diotallevi, like Danilo Abbruciati, worked closely with Flavio Carboni in smuggling drugs and arranging assassinations. After the Calvi affair, Diotallevi and Carboni continued to do business with the I.O.R by laundering drug money through the Camillian, a religious order dedicated to serving the sick and dying.7 

It was only to be expected that members of Banda della Magliana would emerge from the shadows of Blackfriars Bridge. No murder by contract group had been more useful to P2 and the commanders of Operation Gladio. The street gang from northern Rome came to the fore of organized crime in Italy with the kidnapping and murder of Italy's Prime Minister Aldo Moro, who sought to form a coalition government with Italy's Communist Party,8 and the murder of journalist Carmine Pecorelli, who published an article that made the connection between P2 and Moro's fate.9 By 1982, the Banda's hit list had come to include: 

Judge Emilio Alessandrini, the Milan magistrate who initiated the probe into the activities of Calvi, the I.O.R, and Banco Ambrosiano; Giorgio Ambrosoli, who presented testimony to the financial police concerning Michele Sindona's financial dealings with the Vatican and Gelli's Masonic lodge; Lt. Col. Antonio Varisco, head of Rome's security service, who was investigating the activities and membership of P2; and Boris Giuliano, the Palermo police deputy superintendent, who had spoken with Ambrosoli about Sindona's laundering of drug funds through the I.O.R.10 

In addition to the killings, the Banda was responsible for detonating a bomb at the home of Enrico Cuccia, managing director of Mediobanca, who had witnessed Sindona's threat to the life of Ambrosoli, and for the attempted hit on Roberto Rosone, the deputy chairman of Banco Ambrosiano. After participating in the murder of Calvi, the gang tossed Giuseppe Della Cha, an executive at Ambrosiano, to his death from the top floor of the Milan bank. Della Cha was preparing to provide documents to Italian investigators that established the Vatican's ownership of the United Trading Corporation of Panama and the other dummy companies.11 

IRREPARABLE DAMAGE 

Licio Gelli 

But the killings could not repair the damage caused to Operation Gladio by the Ambrosiano affairs and the obstinate Pole on the papal throne. After the publication of the P2 list on March 17, 1981, Licio Gelli was forced to flee the country. News of the generals, admirals, parliamentarians, Italian cabinet members, industrialists, police officers, secret service officials, and ecclesiastical dignitaries who belonged to P2 had been published before, most notably by Mino Pecorelli in his newsletter Osservatore Politico. Many mainstream reporters had dismissed such stories as scabrous examples of yellow journalism. For this reason, the discovery of the P2 list at Gelli's villa jolted the Italian press into an awareness of the reality of the sinister lodge and its intent to gain control of the government. The discoveries by the carabinieri became headline news throughout Italy and central Europe. The fears of the CIA came to full fruition. John Paul II's refusal to shore up the losses of the Vatican's shell companies had resulted in the exposure of P2, the raid on Stibam, and the collapse of Arnaldo Forlani's Christian Democratic government.12 

This exposure prompted General Alberto Dalla Chiesa of the carabinieri to come to the realization that the Red Brigades were a puppet organization of right-wing militants, that these militants were being manipulated by P2, and that P2 fell under the command of S.I.S.M.I. He also uncovered evidence that the funding for P2 and its strategy of tension was coming from a heroin pipeline that had been established between Sicily and the United States, along with a letter from Aldo Moro that mentioned the presence of “NATO guerrilla activities” on Italian soil. When Dalla Chiesa reported these findings to the prime minister, Andreotti went white in the face. His worst fears were coming true. Operation Gladio was beginning to unravel.13 

On May 1, 1982, General Dalla Chiesa arrived in Palermo as the new Prefect of Sicily. Two days later, he met with Ralph Jones, the US consul, and informed him that the Gambino-Inzerillo-Spatola Mafia clan and P2 were involved in a heroin-smuggling racket netting a yearly profit in excess of $900 million.14 Word was passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the extended Gambino crime family in New York and New Jersey were put under constant surveillance. On September 3 the general and his thirty-two-year-old wife were gunned down and killed on Via Carini by a team of six assassins.15 

ON SACRED GROUND 

One month after Calvi's death, commissioners from the Bank of Italy appeared at the I.O.R to confront Archbishop Marcinkus about his part in the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano. Most of the $1.75 billion remained missing and Marcinkus had issued the letter of patronage, acknowledging the Holy See's ownership of the eight dummy corporations that consumed the cash. In response to the commissioners’ questions, Marcinkus produced the counter letter, signed by Calvi, which stated that whatever happened to Banco Ambrosiano and the eight corporations mentioned in the patronage letter, the Vatican “would suffer no future damage or loss.” The Archbishop then showed the commissioners to the door, informing them that neither the Bank of Italy nor the Guardia di Finanza possessed any jurisdiction within the sanctified walls of Vatican City.16 But the Italian government maintained pressure on the Holy See for full disclosure of its involvement in the Ambrosiano affair. “The government,” said Italy's treasury minister Beniamino Andreatta after meeting with Marcinkus, “is waiting for a clear assumption of responsibility by the I.O.R.”17 While the waiting continued, the Italian press ran daily articles about the Vatican and its relationship with the Sicilian Mafia and P2. Rome's daily newspaper La Repubblica began to publish a cartoon strip called “The Adventures of Paul Marcinkus.” 

To quiet matters, Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the Vatican's secretary of state, proposed the creation of a six-man commission to make an investigation into the Vatican's involvement in the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano: three were to be named by the Vatican and three by the Italian Ministry of the Treasury. The Italian government complied with the proposal. The results, as expected, were inconclusive. At the end of October 1982, the Vatican officials ruled that Holy Mother Church had no interest in the dummy corporations and had not been involved in the plot to drain the bank of its wealth, while the three treasury officials ruled otherwise.18 

PROOF OF GUILT 

Dissatisfied with the findings, Ambrosiano's creditors continued to mount pressure for a settlement, since most of the $1.75 billion had vanished within a black hole created by the Vatican's shell companies. The Italian government was left with no option save to mount a criminal investigation to determine whether the Holy See had been the culprit in a shell game that had caused the financial ruin of thousands of families throughout Italy. Documents were unearthed in the records of the Banca del Gottardo in Switzerland that the Vatican, indeed, had set up and controlled the dummy corporations to plunder the assets of the Milan bank. One, dated November 21, 1974, and signed by Vatican officials, was a request for the Swiss bank to open accounts on behalf of its newly created company: United Trading Corporation of Panama.19 

Other documents found within other banks revealed more acts of fraud by the Holy See. One document showed that the I.O.R had received two deposits from Banco Andino of Peru on October 16, 1979. The deposits were for $69 million each. When the deposits matured in 1982, Banco Andino asked for its money back. But the Vatican Bank refused, saying that the United Trading Corporation of Panama now owned the money and the I.O.R had no control over it.20 

Still the Pope refused to acknowledge the Vatican's ownership of the companies, for fear such an admission would reveal that the Bride of Christ was no longer pure and without blemish but had engaged in wanton acts of covetousness and greed. The impasse would have to be addressed by another decisive act. 

GONE GIRL 

On June 22, 1983, Emanuela Orlandi, the fifteen-year-old daughter of a Vatican employee, disappeared without a trace while on her way to her home in Vatican City from a music lesson at the Pontifical Institute of Sacred Music, a building attached to the Basilica of Sant’Apollinare in the heart of Rome.21 She was last seen entering a dark gray BMW with a well-dressed man, whom witnesses said bore a striking resemblance to Enrico “Renatino” De Pedis, the acting head of Banda della Magliana.22 Investigators later discovered that the BMW belonged to Flavio Carboni.23 

Two weeks later, the Orlandi family received a call from a man with a heavy American accent, who said, “We have taken the citizen Emanuela Orlandi only because she belongs to the Vatican State. We are not a revolutionary or terror organization; we have never described ourselves as such; we consider ourselves people interested only in liberating [would-be papal assassin] Ağca. The deadline is July 20.”24 He identified his organization as the Turkish Anti-Christian Liberation Front, a group unknown to Turkish intelligence. The caller said that he would leave an important message regarding the demands of his organization with the Vatican. 

Several days later, Ercole Orlandi, Emanuela's father, paid a visit to Monsignor Dino Monduzzi, prefect of the Pontifical House, to see if the message had arrived. The prelate at first said no—no one within the Vatican had heard from the kidnappers. Thanks to persistent questioning by Mario Meneguzzi, Emanuela's uncle, Monsignor Monduzzi finally admitted that there had been a call and a message. “But absolutely nothing they said or wanted could be understood,” the prefect insisted.25 

Between July 10 and July 19, the “American” made other calls, some directing the press to locations where they found notes and taped messages from Emanuela. On July 20, the mysterious caller contacted ANSA, Italy's national news wire service, to say, “Today is the last message before the deadline of the ultimatum expires.”26 

REQUESTS DENIED 

Throughout the investigation, SISDE (Italy's domestic intelligence service) found the Vatican strangely uncooperative and unwilling to share their conversations with “the American.” Vincenzo Parisi, the deputy head of SISDE, came to believe that the Holy See had shrouded the Orlandi case by a campaign of sophisticated disinformation. The messages and calls from the representative of the Turkish organization, Parisi said, were episodes of “playacting” to distract attention from the real heart of the matter.27 In his confidential report on the mysterious caller, Parisi wrote: “Foreigner, very possible of Anglo-Saxon culture; high intellectual and cultural level; familiar with the Latin tongue and, it follows, of Italian; member (or in close contact) with the ecclesiastical world; serious, ironic, precise, and orderly in composure, cold, calculating, full of himself, sure of his role and strength, sexually amorphous; has lived a long period of time in Rome, knows very well all the city zones that have something to do with his activity; well informed about Italian judicial rules and above all the logistical structure of the Vatican.”28 

The S.I.S.D.E official went on to write that it was “highly plausible” that the kidnapping of Emanuela was committed by someone “inside the ecclesiastical hierarchy and order,” who was closely connected to organized crime figures.29 Parisi managed to provide this profile because of an intercept that the Italian police had placed on a phone line within the Vatican after the caller demanded access to Secretary of State Casaroli. But Parisi was unable to listen to the conversations between the “American” caller and Cardinal Casaroli. The tapes, along with the intercept, mysteriously vanished from the Holy See.30 

At Parisi's insistence, the carabinieri tapped the telephone of Raul Bonarelli, the second-highestranking officer within the Vatican's Central Office of Vigilance. In one taped conversation with other Vatican officials, Bonarelli said that he had sent boxes of documents on the Orlandi case to the office of Cardinal Casaroli. Parisi and his fellow magistrates sent requests to the Holy See asking permission to interview Casaroli, members of his staff within the Secretariat, and members of the Office of Vigilance about the content of the internal documents. All the requests were denied.31 

EXTORTION ATTEMPT 

At the end of July, ANSA reported, “In the Vatican, the prevailing opinion is that the people responsible for the kidnapping belong to the world of common crime and that the proposal for an exchange with Ağca is just an excuse to extort considerable sums of money [from the Vatican] in exchange for the girl to throw investigators off track.”32 The money, Judge Rosario Priori, a leading magistrate in the case, concluded, belonged to members of Banda della Magliana, who had deposited it with Marcinkus and Calvi only to be left with a kidnapped girl as means of obtaining repayment. The judge estimated that the amount owed to the gang was in excess of $200 million.33 

TESTIMONY OF TRAMPS 

Years later, Antonio Mancini (“Nino the Tramp”), a bagman for De Pedis, said that his boss had arranged the kidnapping in order to recoup the millions it had lost in the collapse of Ambrosiano. “There was money that had gone missing,” Mancini told a reporter from La Stampa, “and the choice was between dropping a cardinal by the roadside or striking someone close to the pope. We chose the second option.”34 Mancini added, “What Judge Priori says about the Orlandi kidnapping is the absolute truth, what puzzles me is the figure of $200 million. Knowing the amount of money that flowed into the gang's activity and especially the money made by the ‘Testaccio’ group [the division of the Banda under De Pedis], I think that $200 million is an insufficient sum.”35 

Critical insight into the possible fate of Emanuela came from Sabrina Minardi, the former lover of De Pedis and high-class call girl. Emanuela, she testified, had been kidnapped by De Pedis, who held her at an apartment on the coastal town of Torvaianica, not far from Rome. Archbishop Marcinkus, Ms. Minardi said, visited Emanuela several times while the school girl remained in captivity. The victim, she continued, was eventually killed and chopped into pieces, and the remains were cast into a cement mixer.36 

In a 2010 interview with Gianluca Di Feo of L’Espresso, Ms. Minardi said that she had ongoing sexual relations with Roberto Calvi and Archbishop Marcinkus. She claimed that she had received a villa in Monte Carlo from Calvi, while Marcinkus provided a Vatican position for one of her relatives. Ms. Minardi added that she had provided Marcinkus with a steady stream of prostitutes and had delivered to him large sums of cash from De Pedis in a Louis Vuitton bag. “I left him the money,” she said, “but I kept the bag.”37 

As a result of Ms. Minardi's testimony, Roman prosecutors arrested three underworld associates of De Pedis for kidnapping and murder: Sergio Virtù, Angelo Cassini, and Gianfranco Carboni.38 She had identified them as individuals who had assisted De Pedis in arranging the kidnapping and contacting the Vatican with the terms for her release.39 

THE PAY-OFF 

Eventually, the investigating magistrates obtained evidence that the Vatican had made the payoff to the Banda in a circuitous manner. In the fall of 1983, L’Opera Francesco Saverio Oddasso, a Roman Catholic society dedicated to the works of St. Francis Xavier, sold a luxurious villa surrounded by twenty-four thousand square meters of gardens on the outskirts of Rome to Enrico Nicoletti, the “treasurer” of the Banda, at the rock bottom price of 1.2 billion lire ($860,000). Seven years later, the property was appraised at 27 billion lire. The sale had been engineered by Cardinal Ugo Poletti, the Vicar of the Diocese of Rome and a member of P2.40 Nicoletti transformed the villa into a nightclub called the House of Jazz, which received substantial loans from the I.O.R.41 

Thanks to the sale of the villa, Cardinal Poletti emerged as a leading figure in the case of the missing girl. Poletti, at the time of the kidnapping, had received a great deal of adverse publicity because of his membership in P2 and his alliance with Licio Gelli. He had also received criticism for his advancement of the cause of Opus Dei, a secretive Catholic sect that had served to establish Gladio units throughout Europe.42 As the Vicar of Rome, he presided over the Basilica of Sant’Apollinare, where De Pedis remained a member in good standing.43 He stood in a unique position to resolve the matter of Emanuela Orlandi and the Banda's demand for repayment of its drug money. 

A SORDID SCENARIO 

By 1983, when the villa was sold, most investigators, including Judge Parisi, had come to the conclusion that the kidnapping case revolved around sex and the problem of pedophilia that was mounting within the Holy See. If the matter was simply financial, Archbishop Marcinkus would have provided the restitution. If the matter was political, the resolution would have been made by Cardinal Casaroli, the Secretary of State. But the extortion appeared to revolve around a considerably more sinister episode. Rumors had been rampant about Archbishop Marcinkus's taste for young girls and for sex parties within his private apartments.44 A scenario was gradually compiled that served to explain the kidnapping, the Vatican's attempts at obstruction, and Cardinal Poletti's participation in the payoff. Emanuela, by this account, had been sexually molested by Marcinkus. When the Banda received news of the incident, they kidnapped the girl in order to blackmail the IOR head for the money they had lost through Ambrosiano. Exposure of the statutory rape would have been devastating in the wake of the Sindona episode, the P2 headlines, the collapse of the Vatican's shell companies, and the strange death of Roberto Calvi. Emanuela represented a $200 million baby. Marcinkus, after personally verifying that the girl was in the Banda's custody, worked through P2 and Cardinal Poletti—not to secure Emanuela's immediate release but to ensure her perpetual silence.45 

BOXES OF BONES 

On February 2, 1990, Enrico De Pedis was gunned down and killed on Via del Pellegrino in Rome. He was buried in a diamond-studded tomb within the Basilica of Sant’Apollinare, a place reserved for popes and cardinals.46 Perhaps the gangster merited such hallowed interment. He had participated in the killing of Calvi, made peace between the Vatican and the mob by accepting a real-estate deal as a cash settlement, and prevented a fifteen-year-old schoolgirl from creating a scandal that would have rocked the foundation of Holy Mother Church. His place among the saints and ecclesiastical dignitaries was sanctioned by Cardinal Poletti.47 

In 2006, an anonymous caller to Chi l’ha Visto (“Who Has Seen Them?), an Italian current-events program, said, “Do you want to solve the Emanuela Orlandi case? Then look inside the tomb of De Pedis.” On May 14, 2010, Italian forensic examiners opened the tomb in response to widespread public demand. They discovered that the body of De Pedis remained “well preserved.” He remained dressed in a dark blue suit with a black tie. Next to his coffin they also found nearly two hundred boxes of bones, which appeared to date from pre-Napoleonic times. They remain under examination.

CHAPTER 20

WORKS OF GOD

Archbishop Marcinkus had a beautiful apartment in Rome, very comfortable. And then he had lots of young female housekeepers, very young, who needed to make frequent confessions. 

Licio Gelli, interview with Philip Willan, 

The Vatican at War, 2013 

On May 24, 1984, a “good will payment” of $250 million was made by the Vatican to Ambrosiano creditors at the headquarters of the European Trade Association in Geneva.1 The money for the reparation came from a mysterious deposit made in the IOR by Secretary of State Casaroli in the amount of $406 million.2 The source of the cash was Opus Dei (“Work of God”), a deeply conservative Catholic organization that had amassed an estimated $3 billion in assets.3 In its efforts to prop up the papacy after the damage wrought by the IOR, the organization assumed the lira debt of parochial banks within the Ambrosiano group, including Banca Cattolica del Veneto, Credito Varesino, and Ambrosiano itself (which launched an ill-fated attempt to return from financial ashes as Nuovo Banco Ambrosiano).4 

In exchange for these benefactions, John Paul II granted the sect recognition as a “personal prelature.” This status ensured that the secret society would answer only to the pope and the pope alone. No local bishop could discipline or sanction it. Overnight, Opus Dei emerged as a global ecclesiastical movement without a specific diocese. No organization within the history of the Roman Catholic Church, save the Society of Jesus, had been granted such power.5 

OPUS DEI 

Founded in 1928 by Josemaría Escrivá, a Spanish priest and lawyer, Opus Dei is a movement in which members adhere to “the Way,” a rigorous daily order prescribed by Escrivá that includes Mass, devotional readings, private prayer, and physical mortification (self-flagellation with whips and chains) to subdue the flesh. The “numeraries”—single lay members—within the order make a “commitment of celibacy” and live within “centers.” They maintain private sector employment and donate their income to the movement—opting to live on a modest stipend. The “supernumeraries” are married couples who maintain the Way together within their private domiciles. The movement also includes “associates”—single people who cannot live in centers because of other obligations, such as caring for their elderly parents—and “cooperators”—single or married individuals who contribute a lion's share of their income to Opus Dei but have not yet adopted the “divine vocation” of daily spiritual regimentation.6 Despite Opus Dei's espousal of an intransigent obedience to Catholic doctrine, the movement violates a cardinal tenet of canon law by remaining a “secret society,” like Freemasonry. Opus Dei does not publish its membership list and members, according to the movement's 1950 constitution, are forbidden to reveal their adherence to the movement without the express permission of their superiors.7 

FOUNT OF FASCISM 

Much of what is known about the sect comes from John Roche, a professor at Oxford University, who left the order and broke his pledge of secrecy. In an essay titled “The Inner World of Opus Dei,” Roche writes, “Internally, it is totalitarian and imbued with fascist ideas turned to religious purposes, ideas which were surely drawn from the Spain of its early years. It is virtually occult in spirit, a law unto itself, totally self-centered, grudgingly accepting Roman authority because it still considers Rome orthodox.”8 

By 1984, when the reparation was made, Opus Dei had become a $3 billion enterprise, controlling six hundred newspapers, fifty-two radio and television stations, twelve film companies, and thirtyeight news agencies.9 Prominent Americans who became affiliated with the movement included CIA director William Casey, William Simon of Citicorp, Francis X. Stankard of Chase Manhattan, and Sargent Shriver (a former Democratic candidate for vice president). David Kennedy of Continental Illinois, albeit a Mormon, became a conspicuous friend of the sect, since his bank was a leading shareholder of an Opus Dei bank in Barcelona.10 

THE CIA FUNDING 

Because Opus Dei was vehemently anticommunist, in 1971 the CIA began to funnel millions into its coffers to thwart the growth of liberation theology in Latin America. Much of this money ended up at the Chilean Institute for General Studies (IGS), an Opus Dei think tank. The members of IGS included prominent lawyers, free-market economists, and executives from influential publications. The leader of IGS was Hernán Cubillos, founder of Qué Pasa, an Opus Dei magazine and publisher of El Mercurio, the largest newspaper in Santiago and one that received CIA subsidies. The coup against the democratically elected regime of Salvatore Allende was planned within the corridors of the Chilean think tank. After the coup, IGS technocrats became the new cabinet ministers, and Cubillos emerged as a foreign minister.11 

Throughout the 1980s, the CIA made use of Opus Dei's milites Christi (“soldiers of Christ”) as a primary force in Poland. The numeraries and supernumeraries provided ongoing support for Solidarity, which, by some accounts, reached nearly $1 billion by the end of the decade. Opus Dei also organized courses, seminars, and conferences to indoctrinate Polish teachers, scholars, and economists in the tenets of Western democracy and the plans of a unified Europe (as envisioned by the Council on Foreign Relations and the Trilateral Commission) in the wake of the imminent collapse of the USSR.12 How much money the CIA provided to Opus Dei remains a mystery. The CIA refuses to release any records regarding its relationship to the secret sect, on the grounds that any disclosure would undermine “national security.”13 

As plans got underway for Opus Dei to take control of the Vatican's finances in order to ward off a future debacle, the CIA was forced to bring closure to other matters, including the case of Michele Sindona, the man who knew too much. 

PRESIDENTIAL PLEAS 

In a letter of September 1, 1981, Sindona had petitioned President Reagan for a presidential pardon. In the letter, the Mafiosi reminded Reagan that he had served as a central figure in the “Western anticommunist struggle” and had purchased the Rome Daily American on behalf of the CIA “to prevent it from falling into the hands of the left.” The Mafia financier further informed the president that he had worked with Graham Martin, the US ambassador to Italy, to create a media center that would produce an ongoing flood of anticommunist propaganda. As a result of this effort, P2 gained control of Corriere della Sera, Italy's leading daily newspaper, and the entire Rizzoli publishing group.14 “I have only fought for democracy and justice,” Sindona wrote, “and for this I have been persecuted.” He ended the letter with the caustic phrase, “And this is what happens to a friend of the United States!” and the closing, “Respectfully yours, Michele Sindona.”15 

David Kennedy, Nixon's former secretary of the treasury and Sindona's longtime friend, personally delivered the letter to the White House. Eleven months later, Sindona, who had been transferred from a lockup in Springfield, Missouri, to the federal prison in Otisville, New York, received a reply from President Reagan's lawyer, Fred F. Fielding. “Thank you very much for your petition,” Fielding wrote. “I have taken the liberty of forwarding your material to Mr. David Stephenson, Acting Pardon Attorney.”16 

Sindona waited over a year for a response from Stephenson. When no word came, he took pen in hand and dashed off a note to former president Richard Nixon. Sindona reminded Nixon of their many meetings and of the financial help he had provided Nixon in the struggle against communism. “I now turn to you for assistance,” he wrote.17 Sindona received no reply. He next asked Randolph Guthrie, Nixon's former law partner, to approach the former president on his behalf. Once again, his plea was ignored. Nixon had told Gutherie that any assistance he offered Sindona would only further damage his public image.18 

FOLLOWING THE TRAIL 

In addition to twenty-five years in prison for his role in the collapse of Franklin National, Sindona had been sentenced on April 20, 1981, to two and a half years for bail jumping and perjury. Johnny Gambino, Rosario Spatola, Vincenzo Spatola, and Dr. Joseph Miceli Crimi were named as unindicted co-conspirators.19 In the course of the bail-jumping investigation, John Kenney and his team of federal prosecutors retraced the route of the “kidnapping,” and discovered that Sindona had spent several weeks at the villa of Rosario Spatola's father-in-law in Torretta, not far from Palermo. The Spatolas, the prosecutors came to realize, were one of the four Mafia families forming a transatlantic colossus. The Cherry Hill Gambinos were another. This explained the participation of John and Rosario Gambino in the staged abduction. The Inzerillos, the closest of all Sicilian clans to Stefano Bontade, were the third. Bontade was a member of P2 and his brother-in-law Giacomo Vitale (another Freemason) had arranged Sindona's travel. The fourth were the Di Maggios of Palermo and southern New Jersey.20 

SINDONA'S FAMILIA 

In Palermo, Kenney and company came to learn that Salvatore Inzerillo, Sicily's leading heroin smuggler, served as the capo di tutti capi of this extended crime family—a position he assumed after Rosario Di Maggio died of a heart attack. Inzerillo and his sister were married to Spatolas. Salvatore's Uncle Antonio, along with his cousin and namesake in New Jersey, were married to Gambinos. His cousin Tommaso was a brother-in-law of John Gambino, who was married to a different Gambino. The Sicilian clan inhabited the Passo di Rigano section of Palermo. The American clan lived in Cherry Hill, New Jersey.21 Describing the inner dimensions of the four families, Italian prosecutor Giusto Sciacchitano wrote: 

These four families…form a single clan unlike anything in Italy or the United States—the most potent Family in Cosa Nostra. John Gambino is the converging point in the United States for all of the group's activities in Italy, and the final destination for its drug shipments. Salvatore Inzerillo has emerged as the Gambino brothers’ principal interlocutor, the central personage in Sicily, with myriad interests and heavy capital investments…Rosario Spatola is just below them in the structure.22 

Stefano Bontade was an integral member of the clan. Through his ties with P2, the extended family gained the protection of Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti and, in turn, the CIA.23 

THE DRUG BUST 

During his stay in Sicily, Kenney and his fellow prosecutors received word of Salvatore Inzerillo's latest heroin shipments to New York. They contacted agents of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), who intercepted five kilos of heroin, packed in talcum powder, meant for John and Rosario Gambino. The next shipment came from Sicily inside a truckload of lemons, which were then driven to Milan, where the ninety-one pounds of heroin were packed inside a cargo container filled with Italian pop music albums and shipped off to the Gambino brothers in the Big Apple.24 

When the second shipment reached the United States, the police moved in on the Gambinos. In March 1980, John and Rosario were arrested in their restaurant, Valentino's, for alleged participation in an international heroin-smuggling operation. They were acquitted of those charges—but more than sixty members of the Sicilian Mafia were eventually convicted in the case.25 

INZERILLO'S END 

The bust produced profound repercussions in Sicily. A substantial amount of the confiscated heroin belonged to the Corleonesi, the crime family of Calogero Vizzini (“Don Calo”), which was now headed by Luciano Leggio and Salvatore “Toto” Riina. The two capos demanded compensation for their loss, but Salvatore Inzerillo refused to cough up a dime. As Men of Respect, Leggio and Riina were bound to retaliate. Stefano Bontade was gunned down on April 23, 1981, while stopped at a traffic light in his Alfa Romeo. Salvatore Inzerillo was next. He was murdered on May 11 as he was about to step into his bulletproof car, after leaving the house of his mistress. What followed was a bloodbath. During 1981 and 1982, more than two hundred members of the Inzerillo extended family became victims of the lupara bianca (“white shotgun”—a killing done in such a way that the body is never found), while the Corleonesi suffered no casualties.26 

Thanks in part to the antics of Sindona, the clan had lost the protection of the Italian government and the overlords of Gladio. By the end of 1982, seventy-two Men of Respect with ties to Salvatore Inzerillo went on trial in Palermo, and warrants were issued for over fifty more soldati (soldiers) and business associates, including Sindona. To top it off, the multibillion dollar Gambino-InzerilloSpatola holdings were seized by the state.27 

LOSS OF FAMILY 

Sindona had lost his family, and matters for the Mafia financier continued to get worse. In addition to the charge of operating a $600 million-a-year heroin business between Sicily and the United States, he was charged with illegal possession of firearms, using a false passport, and violating currency regulations. To top it all off, he was also indicted for ordering the execution of Giorgio Ambrosoli, the chief bank investigator who tried to uncover the Vatican's connection to the Mafia.28 On January 25, 1982, Sindona was indicted in Palermo, Sicily, along with seventy-five members of the Gambino, Inzerillo, and Spatola crime families. The indictment sprang from his ill-fated faked kidnapping and the trail he had blazed for investigators to follow—a trail that led from New York to Palermo. 

In the fall of 1982, after the raid on Gelli's villa and the collapse of Banco Ambrosiano, Sindona finally broke and began to prattle from his cell at Otisville. He told Jonathan Beaty, a reporter from Time, “Money was given to political parties. But money was sometimes under the table. Calvi feared his trips to South America because the Communists, the Cubans, knew that Calvi with Gelli were building rightist strength in South America. That was our goal.” Sindona went on to talk not only about the Vatican's subversive attempts to gain control of Ambrosiano but also about his involvement in P2 and the secret society's support for right-wing guerrilla units.29 

TAKING THE BAIT 

Alarms were sounded. The CIA dispatched Carlo Rocchi, one of its Italian agents, to monitor Sindona's behavior within the federal prison. Rocchi gained the Mafia financier's trust by presenting him with an affidavit from the Department of Justice. The affidavit said that Rocchi was a “reliable person” and that President Reagan was prepared to grant Sindona a “full pardon.”30 

Sindona could not believe that such an affidavit from a “reliable” government official would be bogus. He took the bait and refrained from making further statements until September 24, 1984, when the US Justice Department issued the order for his extradition to Milan. Upon hearing the news, Sindona went ballistic. He said, “If I finally get there, if no one does me in first—and I've already heard talk of giving me a poisoned cup of coffee—I'll make my trial into a real circus. I'll tell everything.”31 

On September 25, Sindona was transported to the Rebibbia prison in Rome, where he was placed in the maximum-security cell that had been occupied by Mehmet Ali Ağca. Five days later, he was moved to the Casa Circondariale Femminile in Voghera, on the outskirts of Milan, where he became the sole male inmate in a women's prison.32 Voghera, a maximum-security facility, was trumpeted as a “supercarcere” or “super-prison.” Barely four years old, it was the first fully electronic penitentiary in Europe.33 

SPILLING HIS GUTS 

While awaiting trial, Sindona made contact with Nick Tosches, an American journalist who penned articles for the New York Times, Rolling Stone, and the Village Voice. When the reporter arrived at Voghera, the caged don began to spill his guts. He spoke of matters that never before had been revealed to the press, including the US government's protection of the drug trade and how they had allowed “dirty money to accumulate in the hands of a few men.” Sindona maintained that US agencies, such as the President's Commission on Organized Crime, functioned not to find dirty money but rather to “create it.” He added that such agencies often captured “intermediaries in the drug trade,” but never the real “crime lords,” who had become “the world's establishment.”34 

Sindona spoke of Gelli, P2, and the fear of an Italian Communist dictatorship that gave rise to the strategy of tension. He said that he sent regular reports on developments within the Italian Communist Party to US ambassador Martin and the White House.35 And he talked about the Vatican and the I.O.R's involvement in laundering dirty money: 

If you wish, you can go right now to Milan or to Rome with $1 million, $10 million in cash, with me or some other Italian who knows his way around. In a matter of minutes, we would find any number of persons or organizations offering us their services to transfer the money abroad, in nero, without risk. Ten minutes later, you would have confirmation that your money has been credited to you, in the currency of your choice, in Switzerland, Austria, or the Bahamas, minus a service fee…. 

The pope's bank, the I.O.R, had been involved in such services since its founding. In general, the I.O.R catered to other banks, whose more privileged clients sought the added security and secrecy offered by Vatican channels. 

The I.O.R would open a running account with the Italian credit bank that wanted to export lire in nero. The client of the Italian bank would deposit the lire in cash in that account, and the I.O.R would credit to him abroad, in the currency and the bank of his choice. In the process, the I.O.R would deduct a commission that was slightly higher than the going rate. 

The Banca d'Italia and the other authorities never interfered, as they were convinced that the Holy See, if pressed, would respond that, being a sovereign foreign government, it was not under obligation to furnish any information to Italy.36 

But Sindona was not completely candid with Tosches. Still clinging to the hope that the powerful political leaders he had served, including Prime Minister Andreotti, would effect his release, he did not speak of his pivotal roles in such enterprises as establishing the heroin trade between the Sicilian and American Mafias, implementing the strategy of tension with the millions of dollars he had received from Ambassador Martin, creating massive financial holes for the disappearance of billions in cash, commissioning the killing of Giorgio Ambrosoli, and planning his own bizarre kidnapping. He also neglected to mention his long-standing ties with the CIA in a covert operation called Gladio. It was best, he thought, not to play all his aces. 

TRUSTING A MOLE 

Weeks before his trial for fraudulent bankruptcy, Sindona began to receive visits from P2 members who, no doubt, reminded him—once again—of his oath of secrecy to the lodge and of how the Masonic society was able to arrange Gelli's miraculous escape from the Champ-Dollon prison in Switzerland. Sindona became subdued and underwent a change of mind about turning his trial into a “circus.”37 When the trial began on December 12, 1984, the Mafia financier requested it proceed without his presence in the courtroom. The strange request was granted.38 On the Ides of March 1985, he was sentenced to twelve years in prison. The prosecutor, Guido Viola, calling Sindona “one of the most dangerous criminals in judicial history,” had asked for fifteen years.39 

Sindona's trial for the murder of Ambrosoli began on June 4, 1985. It would drag on for nine months, since the lead witness William Arico, whom Sindona had hired to make the hit, had died during an alleged “escape attempt” from a New York jail. In a letter to Rocchi dated February 5, 1986, Sindona wrote, “I want to talk about scandalous matters that constitute grave moral and penal irregularities about which I have remained silent until now to maintain the professional reserve to whom I have always wished to be faithful.”40 Rocchi responded by writing, “Let the great battle against you-know-who begin and let me have all the necessary documents. Take care not to forget anything, neither the national aspects nor the USA ones.”41 Sindona, still unaware that Rocchi was a CIA agent, surrendered all of his notes and documents. Rocchi patted the prisoner on the shoulder and gave him solemn assurance that his release was imminent, despite the verdict in the murder trial. Sindona believed him. 

“THE TORTELLINI IS GOOD” 

When Tosches paid a visit to the prison on May 8, he saw immediately that Sindona looked much better than he had in the fall. “His brown eyes were bright,” the reporter noted, “and he had obviously gained some needed weight.” He expressed no fear of the verdict and offered no lament of his fate. Instead, he patted his stomach and said, “The tortellini is good in this town.”42 

On March 18, 1986, Mercator Senesis Romanam Curiam (“the leading banker of the Roman Curia) was sentenced to spend the rest of his life in prison.43 He was sent back to the prison at Voghera. Three television cameras were installed in Sindona's solitary cell to monitor his every move. A cadre of twelve guards, working in shifts of two, kept watch over him night and day. His food was prepared in a special kitchen by chefs under stringent supervision.44 

“MI HANNA AVVELENATO!” 

On March 20, Sindona rose from his cot to take breakfast. As always, his plastic plate and pressed foam coffee cup were sealed. It was eight-thirty. He carried the coffee cup with him through the door that led to the toilet. Minutes later, the Mafia don emerged from the bathroom, his shirt covered with vomit, his face convulsed with horror. “Mi hanno avvelenato,” he screamed. “They have poisoned me!”45 

These were his last words. Sindona was rushed to a nearby hospital, where he was found to be in an irreversible coma. A lethal dosage of potassium cyanide was detected in his blood. That afternoon a priest administered extreme unction. Forty-eight hours later, Michele Sindona—the man known as “St. Peter's banker”—was dead.46 

His death was only to be expected. The Gladio agents possessed the keys to every prison. They could manage the escape of Ağca from a cell in Turkey and Gelli from a jail in Switzerland. They could arrange the jailhouse deaths of Henri Arsan of Stibam and General Santovito of SISMI. And they could poison the coffee of a celebrated Mafiosi who remained in solitary confinement within a maximum-security prison. 

ARCHBISHOP'S ARREST WARRANT 

There were more matters for damage control. The goodwill payment to Ambrosiano creditors from the coffers of Opus Dei did not close the criminal probe of the massive bank collapse. On February 26, 1987, the investigating magistrates concluded that the Vatican Bank had acted as an umbrella for Roberto Calvi's illicit transactions, that it owned a substantial share of Banco Ambrosiano as well as the dummy corporations, and that it was responsible for the theft of $1.75 billion. Arrest warrants were issued for the three top IOR officials: Archbishop Paul Marcinkus, Luigi Mennini, and Pellegrino del Strobel.47 

The arrests were not made. To protect its officials, the Vatican pointed to Article 11 of the Lateran Treaty of 1929 that served to regulate matters between the Holy See and Italy. The Article stipulated that there should be no interference by the Italian government in “the central institutions of the Catholic Church.” Italy's highest court upheld this stipulation and ruled that Marcinkus and his two associates could not be arrested and brought to trial in Italy. The three Vatican bankers remained safe from extradition within the sanctity of the Sovereign State of Vatican City.48 

Marcinkus remained under papal protection until 1991, when he took up residence in Sun City, Arizona. Italian authorities throughout the next decade attempted to persuade US officials to return the Archbishop to Italy so he could face a jury. But such efforts proved fruitless. The US Justice Department made the strange ruling that Marcinkus possessed a Vatican passport and could not be extradited to Italy even though his crimes took place on Italian soil. No one in the CIA wanted the Gorilla to testify in court about his ties to P2 and the Sicilian Mafia, nor about the transfer of funds to Solidarity, the opponents of liberation theology, and the right-wing regimes in Latin America. And so, he stayed sheltered from justice not within Vatican City but Sun City, Arizona, where he joined a prestigious country club, played daily rounds of golf, and smoked expensive cigars.49 He died of undisclosed causes on February 20, 2006. 

THE GOLD BARS 

In 1987 Licio Gelli turned himself over to Swiss authorities in South America, claiming that he was at “the end of his tether” and suffering from heart problems. He surrendered only after negotiating the terms of his return to Italy. He would be charged only with financial offenses. After serving less than two months behind bars, Gelli complained of deteriorating health and was released on parole. In 1992 he was sentenced to eighteen years in prison for his involvement in the Ambrosiano affair. The sentence was reduced to twelve years upon appeal.50 

For the next six years Gelli remained under house arrest (detenzione domiciliare) at his luxurious villa in Tuscany. In 1998, when the police came to transport him to a public facility, Gelli disappeared again. In the villa, police discovered 363 pounds of gold bars buried in patio flowerpots among his geraniums and begonias. The grand master of P2 had stolen the gold from the Yugoslavian government while operating the ratlines for the Nazis.51 

THE NEW ORDER 

In the reorganization of the Vatican finances under Opus Dei that got underway in 1989, a new five- member supervisory board of “lay experts” was set up at the IOR. Its president was Angelo Caloia, head of the Mediocredito Lombardo bank. The vice president was Philippe de Weck. The other three were Dr. José Sánchez Asiaín, former chairman of Banco Bilbao; Thomas Pietzcker, a director of the Deutsche Bank; and Thomas Macioce, an American businessman. The new managing director of the IOR was Giovanni Bodio, also from Mediocredito Lombardo. 

Caloia and Bodio were associated with Giuseppe Garofano, the onetime chairman of Montedison and president of Ferruzzi Finanziaria S.p.A., Italy's second-largest industrial firm. Garofano, an Opus Dei supernumerary, served with Caloia on the Vatican's Ethics and Finance Committee until 1993, when he was arrested in connection with a $94 million political kickback scheme. Known as Clean Hands, the scheme involved the kickback millions flowing through the “Saint Serafino Foundation,” an account Garofano set up at the IOR. José Sánchez Asiaín was a disciple of Bishop Álvaro del Portillo, who served as the general president of Opus Dei. 

Although Thomas Macioce may not have been a member of Opus Dei, he shared its reactionary ideology. Macioce was a knight of the Sovereign Military Order of Malta, along with Secretary of State Haig, CIA director Casey, Treasury secretary William Simon, Licio Gelli, former CIA director John McCone, Prescott Bush Jr. (brother of George H. W. Bush), President Reagan's national security advisor William P. Clark, deputy CIA director General Vernon A. Walters, and Count Alexandre de Marenches (the founder of the Safari Club).52 

Thomas Pietzcker was a last minute replacement for Hermann Abs, the head of the Deutsche Bank and Pietzcker's boss. Abs had been forced to resign from the committee due to the outcry from the Simon Wiesenthal Center in Los Angeles about his role as “Hitler's banker” and a director of IG Farben, which ran its own slave labor camp at Auschwitz. After the war, Abs was placed in charge of allocating funds from the Marshall Plan to German industry. This position made him a pivotal figure in the establishment of Gladio. Abs, like Macioce, was a knight of the SMOM.53 

The finances of Holy Mother Church were now in the hands of a secret Catholic society that remained in the service of the CIA and a clandestine group of global economists.

to be continued...

CHAPTER NINETEEN: KILLINGS AND KIDNAPPING 
1. Richard Cottrell, Gladio: NATO's Dagger at the Heart of Europe (Palm Desert, CA: Progressive Press, 2012), p. 233. 
2. Nick Pisa, “Mafia Wanted Me to Kill Calvi, Says Jailed Gangster,” Telegraph (UK), December 11, 2005, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/1505250/Mafia-wanted-me-to-kill-Calvi-says-jailed-gangster.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
3. Tony Thompson, “Mafia Boss Breaks Silence over Roberto Calvi Killing,” Guardian (UK), May 12, 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2012/may/12/roberto-calvi-blackfriars-bridge-mafia (accessed May 24, 2014). 
4. Pisa, “Mafia Wanted Me to Kill Calvi.” 
5. Tom Behan, The Camorra (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 108. 
6. Staff report, “Mafia Murdered Banker over ‘Bungled Deal,’” The Scotsman (Edinburgh), January 11, 2006, http://www.scotsman.com/news/uk/mafia-murdered-banker-over-bungled-deal-1-1106155 (accessed May 24, 2014). 
7. Jules Gray, “The Banco Ambrosiano Affair: What Happened to Roberto Calvi?” European CEO. March 20, 2014, ww.europeanceo.com/finance/2014/03/the-banco-ambrosiano-affair-what-happened-to-roberto-calvi/ (accessed May 24, 2014). 
8. Joseph Ferrara, “Caso Moro e Banda della Magliana,” Storia, June 9, 2010, http://www.vuotoaperdere.org/dblog/articolo.asp? articolo=135 (accessed May 24, 2014). 
9. Umberto Zimari, “I Misteri della Banda della Magliana,” Associazione Culturale L'Indifferenziatio, August 19, 2012, http://www.lindifferenziato.com/2012/08/19/i-misteri-della-banda-della-magliana-parte-2/ (accessed May 24, 2014). 
10. Carlo Cane, “I Segreti della Banda della Magliana,” RAI-TV, October 14, 2012, http://www.lastoriasiamonoi.rai.it/puntate/italiantabloid/843/default.aspx (accessed May 24, 2014). 
11. Ibid. 
12. George Russell, “Italy: A Grand Master's Conspiracy,” Time, June 8, 1981, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,922552,00.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
13. A. G. D. Maran, Mafia: Inside the Dark Heart (New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2010), Kindle edition. 
14. Paul Hoffman, “Italy Gets Tough with the Mafia,” New York Times, November 13, 1983, http://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/13/magazine/italy-gets-tough-with-the-mafia.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
15. Maran, Mafia: Inside the Dark Heart. 16. Nick Tosches, Power on Earth: Michele Sindona's Explosive Story (New York: Arbor House, 1986), p. 246. 
17. Ibid. 
18. Malachi Martin, Rich Church, Poor Church (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1984), p. 71. 
19. David Yallop, In God's Name: An Investigation into the Murder of Pope John Paul I (New York: Bantam Books, 1984), p. 305. 
20. Laura Colby, “Vatican Bank Played a Central Role in Fall of Banco Ambrosiano,” Wall Street Journal, April 27, 1987. 
21. Yallop, Power and the Glory, p. 470. 
22. Philip Willan, The Vatican at War: From Blackfriars Bridge to Buenos Aires (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse LLC, 2003), Kindle edition. 23. Fabrizio Cacca, “Sequestro Orlandi, Ecco L'auto,” Corriere della Sera, August 14, 2008, http://www.corriere.it/cronache/08_agosto_14/sequestro_orlandi_3ce7cffe-69ce-11dd-af27-00144f02aabc.shtml (accessed May 24, 2014). 
24. Tobias Jones, “What Happened to the Missing 15-Year-Old Vatican Citizen Emanuela Orlandi?” The Spectator (UK), June 22, 2013, http://www.spectator.co.uk/spectator-life/spectator-life-life/8936841/gone-girl/ (accessed May 24, 2014). 
25. Willan, Vatican at War. 
26. Jesus Lopez Saez, El Dia de la Cuenta: Juan Pablo II, a Examen (Madrid: Meral Ediciones—Comunidad de Ayala, 2005), http://www.comayala.es/index.php/en/libros-es/el-dia-de-la-cuenta-ingles-texto (accessed May 22, 2014). 
27. Willan, Vatican at War. 
28. Saez, El Dia de la Cuenta. 
29. Ibid. 
30. Yallop, Power and the Glory, p. 470. 
31. Ibid., p. 471. 
32. Willan, Vatican at War. 
33. Giacomo Galeazii, “L'ex della Magliana: ‘Si Siamo Stati Noi a Rapire la Orlandi,’” La Stampa (Rome), July 24, 2011, http://www.lastampa.it/2011/07/24/italia/cronache/l-ex-della-magliana-si-siamostati-noi-a-rapire-la-orlandinPsZflW8etENQHZpwgB60I/pagina.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
34. Galeazii, “L'ex della Magliana.” 
35. Ibid. 
36. Willan, Vatican at War. 
37. Gianluca Di Feo, “Sabrina Minardi Ricorda: Le Me Scopate con Roberto Calvi e Monsignor Marcinkus,” L'Espresso (Rome), September 24, 2010, http://www.dagospia.com/rubrica-3/politica/sabrina-minardi-ricorda-le-mie-scopate-con-roberto-calvi-e-monsignormarcinkusla-compagna-del-18855.htm (accessed May 24, 2014). 
38. Staff Report, “Caso Orlandi: C'e un Indagato e L'ex Autista di Renato De Pedis,” La Repubblica (Rome), March 10, 2010, http://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2010/03/10/news/indagato_emanuela_orlandi-2586765/ (accessed May 24, 2014). 
39. Staff Report, “Caso Orlandi: Inquirenti in Vaticano Qualcuno sa Verita,” Libero Quaridiano. It., August 2, 2012, http://www.liberoquotidiano.it/news/972431/Caso-Orlandi-inquirenti-in-Vaticano-qualcuno-sa-verita-.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
40. Willan, Vatican at War. 
41. Antonio Beccavia, “Nicoletti, Branchiere della Banda Magliana: ‘Due Papa Mi Hanno Voluto Bene,’” Domani (Rome), March 5, 2010, http://domani.arcoiris.tv/nicoletti-banchiere-della-banda-della-magliana-%E2%80%9Cdue-papi-mi-hanno-volutobene%E2%80%9D/ (accessed May 24, 2014). 42. Staff, “The Process of the Canonization for Jose Marie Escriva,” Opus Dei, March 2, 2006, http://www.opusdei.us/enus/article/the-process-of-canonization-for-josemaria-escriva, accessed May 24, 2014. 
43. Austen Ivereign, “Secrets of the Tomb,” America, August 23, 2010. 
44. Cottrell, Gladio, p. 268. 
45. Ibid. 
46. Nick Pisa, “Italians Find Mystery Bones in Tomb Linked to Vatican Scandal.” Telegraph (UK), May 12, 2012, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/italy/9263996/Italians-find-mystery-bones-in-tomb-linked-to-Vatican-scandal.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 47. Ibid. 

CHAPTER TWENTY: WORKS OF GOD 
1. Malachi Martin, Rich Church, Poor Church (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1984), p. 75. 
2. Betty Clermont, The Neo-Catholics: Implementing Christian Nationalism in America (Atlanta: Clarity Press, 2009), p. 88. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Philip Willan, The Vatican at War: From Blackfriars Bridge to Buenos Aires (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse LLC, 2003), Kindle edition. 
5. David Yallop, The Power and the Glory: Inside the Dark Heart of John Paul II's Vatican (New York: Carroll and Graf, 2007), p. 447. 
6. James Martin, S. J., “Opus Dei in America,” America, February 25, 1995, http://americamagazine.org/opus-dei (accessed May 24, 2014). 
7. Jordan Bonfante, “The Way of Opus Dei,” Time, April 16, 2006, http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1184078- 3,00.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
8. John Roche, “The Inner World of Opus Dei,” Opus Dei Awareness Network (ODAN), September 7, 1982, http://www.odan.org/tw_inner_world_of_opus_dei.htm (accessed May 24, 2014). 
9. Martin A. Lee, “Their Will Be Done,” Mother Jones, July/August 1983, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/1983/07/their-willbe-done (accessed May 20, 2014). 
10. Ibid. 
11. Ibid. 
12. Robert Hutchinson, Their Kingdom Come: Inside the Secret World of Opus Dei (New York: Macmillan, 2006), Chapter Seven, “The Polish Operation,” http://www.american-buddha.com/lit.kingdomcome.29.htm (accessed May 24, 2014). 
13. Henry T. Cason v. Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, May 30, 2011, http://www.citizen.org/documents/Cason-v-CIA-memorandum-of-law.pdf (accessed May 24, 2014). 
14. Paolo Biondani and Andrea Sceresini, “Mister President, My Name Is Michele Sindona,” L'Espresso (Rome), March 9, 2012, http://www.dagospia.com/rubrica-3/politica/mister-president-my-name-is-michele-sindona-a-babbo-morto-sbuca-una-lettera-inviata- 36484.htm (accessed May 24, 2014). 
15. Andrea Sceresini, “Berlusconi: Obama = Sindona: Reagan,” G. Q. Italia, May 26, 2011, http://www.gqitalia.it/viralnews/articles/2011/5/silvio-berlusconi-a-obama-come-michele-sindona-a-ronald-reagan-in-italia-giudici-di-sinistra (accessed May 24, 2014). 16. Nick Tosches, Power on Earth: Michele Sindona's Explosive Story (New York: Arbor House, 1986), p. 254. 
17. Ibid., p. 255. 
18. Ibid. 
19. Luigi DeFonzo, St. Peter's Banker: Michele Sindona (New York: Franklin Watts, 1983), p. 258. 
20. Claire Sterling, Octopus: The Long Reach of the International Sicilian Mafia (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 200. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid. 
23. John Dickie, Cosa Nostra: A History of the Sicilian Mafia (London: Coronet, 2004), pp. 423–24. 
24. Jim Barry, “Roger and Me,” City Paper (Philadelphia), September 6, 2001, http://archives.citypaper.net/articles/090601/news.underworld.shtml (accessed May 24, 2014). 
25. Ibid. 
26. Sterling, Octopus, pp. 209–210. 
27. Ibid., p. 201. 
28. DiFonzo, St. Peter's Banker, p. 259. 
29. Jonathan Beaty, “A Forcibly Retired Moneyman,” Time, September 13, 1982, http://content.time.com/time/subscriber/article/0,33009,951807-1,00.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
30. Willan, Vatican at War. 
31. Yallop, Power and the Glory, p. 148. 
32. Tosches, Power on Earth, p. 8. 33. Ibid., p. 15. 
34. Ibid., p. 86. 
35. Ibid., p. 165. 
36. Ibid., pp. 125–26. 
37. Yallop, Power and the Glory, p. 148. 
38. Reuters, “Sindona's Trial Is in Absentia,” New York Times, December 13, 1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/12/13/business/sindona-s-trial-is-in-absentia.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
39. Tosches, Power on Earth, p. 8. 
40. Willan, Vatican at War. 
41. Ibid. 
42. Tosches, Power on Earth, p. 15. 
43. Roberto Suro, “Sindona Gets Life Term in Murder Case in Italy,” New York Times, March 19, 1986, http://www.nytimes.com/1986/03/19/business/sindona-gets-life-term-in-murder-case-in-italy.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
44. Tosches, Power on Earth, p. 8. 
45. Ibid., p. 277. 
46. Ibid., pp. 277–78. 
47. Wilton Wynn, Keeper of the Keys: John XXIII, Paul VI, and John Paul II—Three Who Changed the Church (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 172. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Sherman Skolnick, “The Enron Black Magic—Part Four,” Skolnick Reports, January 27, 2002, http://www.rense.com/general19/swind.htm (accessed May 24, 2014). 
50. BBC News World Service, “Report on Calvi Autopsy Returns Spotlight to Vatican Bank Scandal,” October 16, 1998. 
51. Staff Report, “The Fascist's Banker,” Albion Monitor, November 2, 1998, http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/62/269.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
52. Group Watch, “The Knights of Malta,” Vox News, November 1991, http://www.voxfux.com/features/knights_of_malta_facts.html (accessed May 24, 2014). 
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