Tuesday, December 11, 2018

THE REVOLUTION WAS...THE NEW DEAL...AND IS TRUMP SELLING A REBOOT?

I have had this nagging thought for awhile now,and after what I would call a confirmation dream of getting fired last night, for straying from the narrative, I will throw it out there. Is it Trump's job to use his skills from 'The Art of The Deal',to sell America on a new 'New Deal(reset)'? Garet Garrett in my humble opinion has left us the seminal work on just what The New Deal was.I believe it wise that every American read,and decide for themselves where the New Deal has left us with regard to the banks and The State.Below you have the lead in,and the first 3 problems of his revolution.


The Revolution Was
By Garet Garrett

There are those who still think they are holding the pass against a revolution that may be coming up the road. But they are gazing in the wrong direction. The revolution is behind them. It went by in the Night of Depression, singing songs to freedom. 

There are those who have never ceased to say very earnestly,
"Something is going to happen to the American form of government if we don't watch out." 

These were the innocent disarmers. Their trust was in words. They had forgotten their Aristotle. More than 2,000 years ago he wrote of what can happen within the form, when
"one thing takes the place of another, so that the ancient laws will remain, while the power will be in the hands of those who have brought about revolution in the state." 

Worse outwitted were those who kept trying to make sense of the New Deal from the point of view of all that was implicit in the American scheme, charging it therefore with contradiction, fallacy, economic ignorance, and general incompetence to govern. 

But it could not be so embarrassed and all that line was wasted, because, in the first place, it never intended to make that kind of sense, and secondly, it took off from nothing that was implicit in the American scheme. 

It took off from a revolutionary base. The design was European. Regarded from the point of view of revolutionary technique it made perfect sense. Its meaning was revolutionary and it had no other. For what it meant to do it was from the beginning consistent in principle, resourceful, intelligent, masterly in workmanship, and it made not one mistake.

The test
came in the first one hundred days. 

No matter how carefully a revolution may have been planned there is bound to be a crucial time. That comes when the actual seizure of power is taking place. In this case certain steps were necessary. They were difficult and daring steps. But more than that, they had to be taken in a certain sequence, with forethought and precision of timing. One out of place might have been fatal. What happened was that one followed another in exactly the right order, not one out of time or out of place.

Having passed this crisis, the New Deal went on from one problem to another, taking them in the proper order, according to revolutionary technic; and if the handling of one was inconsistent with the handling of another, even to the point of nullity, that was blunder in reverse. The effect was to keep people excited about one thing at a time, and divided, while steadily through all the uproar of outrage and confusion a certain end, held constantly in view, was pursued by main intention. 

The end held constantly in view was power. 

In a revolutionary situation mistakes and failures are not what they seem. They are scaffolding. Error is not repealed. It is compounded by a longer law, by more decrees and regulations, by further extensions of the administrative hand. As deLawd said in The Green Pastures, that when you have passed a miracle you have to pass another one to take care of it, so it was with the New Deal. Every miracle it passed, whether it went right or wrong, had one result. Executive power over the social and economic life of the nation was increased. Draw a curve to represent the rise of executive power and look there for the mistakes. You will not find them. The curve is consistent. 

At the end of the first year, in his annual message to the Congress, January 4, 1934, President Roosevelt said: "It is to the eternal credit of the American people that this tremendous readjustment of our national life is being accomplished peacefully." 

Peacefully if possible—of course. 

But the revolutionary historian will go much further. 


Writing at some distance in time he will be much less impressed by the fact that it was peacefully accomplished than by the marvelous technic of bringing it to pass not only within the form but within the word, so that people were all the while fixed in the delusion that they were talking about the same things because they were using the same words. Opposite and violently hostile ideas were represented by the same word signs. This was the American people's first experience with dialectic according to Marx and Lenin. 

Until it was too late few understood one like Julius C. Smith, of the American Bar Association, saying: "Is there any labor leader, any businessman, any lawyer or any other citizen of America so blind that he cannot see that this country is drifting at an accelerated pace into administrative absolutism similar to that which prevailed in the governments of antiquity, the governments of the Middle Ages, and in the great totalitarian governments of today? Make no mistake about it. Even as Mussolini and Hitler rose to absolute power under the forms of law . . . so may administrative absolutism be fastened upon this country within the Constitution and within the forms of law." 

For a significant illustration of what has happened to words—of the double meaning that inhabits them— put in contrast what the New Deal means when it speaks of preserving the American system of free private enterprise and what American business means when it speaks of defending it. To the New Deal these words—the American system of free private enterprise —stand for a conquered province. To the businessman the same words stand for a world that is in danger and may have to be defended. 

The New Deal is right. 

Business is wrong. 

You do not defend a world that is already lost. When was it lost? That you cannot say precisely. It is a point for the revolutionary historian to ponder. We know only that it was surrendered peacefully, without a struggle, almost unawares. There was no day, no hour, no celebration of the event—and yet definitely, the ultimate power of initiative did pass from the hands of private enterprise to government.[1933,March DC] 

There it is and there it will remain until, if ever, it shall be reconquered. Certainly government will never surrender it without a struggle. 

To the revolutionary mind the American vista must have been almost as incredible as Genghis Khan's first view of China—so rich, so soft, so unaware. 

No politically adult people could ever have been so little conscious of revolution. There was here no revolutionary tradition, as in Europe, but in place of it the strongest tradition of subject government that had ever been evolved—that is, government subject to the will of the people, not its people but the people. Why should anyone fear government? 

In the naive American mind the word revolution had never grown up. The meaning of it had not changed since horse-and-buggy days, when Oliver Wendell Holmes said: "Revolutions are not made by men in spectacles." It called up scenes from Carlyle and Victor Hugo, or it meant killing the Czar with a bomb, as he may have deserved for oppressing his people. Definitely, it meant the overthrow of government by force; and nothing like that could happen here. We had passed a law against it. 

Well, certainly nothing like that was going to happen here. That it probably could not happen, and that everybody was so sure it couldn't made everything easier for what did happen.

Revolution in the modern case is no longer an uncouth business. The ancient demagogic art, like every other art, has, as we say, advanced. It has become in fact a science—the science of political dynamics. And your scientific revolutionary in spectacles regards force in a cold, impartial manner. It may or may not be necessary. If not, so much the better; to employ it wantonly, or for the love of it, when it is not necessary, is vulgar, unintelligent and wasteful. Destruction is not the aim. The more you destroy the less there is to take over. Always the single end in view is a transfer of power. 


Outside of the Communist party and its aurora of radical intellectuals few Americans seemed to know that revolution had become a department of knowledge, with a philosophy and a doctorate of its own, a language, a great body of experimental data, schools of method, textbooks, and manuals—and this was revolution regarded not as an act of heroic redress in a particular situation, but revolution as a means to power in the abstract case. 

There was a prodigious literature of revolutionary thought concealed only by the respectability of its dress. 

Americans generally associated dangerous doctrine with bad printing, rude grammar, and stealthy distribution. 

Here was revolutionary doctrine in well printed and well written books, alongside of best sellers at your bookstore or in competition with detectives on your news-dealer's counter. As such it was all probably harmless, or it was about something that could happen in Europe, not here. A little communism on the newsstand like that might be good for us, in fact, regarded as a twinge of pain in a robust, somewhat reckless social body. One ought to read it, perhaps, just to know. 

But one had tried, and what dreary stuff it had turned out to be! 

To the revolutionary this same dreary stuff was the most exciting reading in the world. It was knowledge that gave him a sense of power. One who mastered the subject to the point of excellence could be fairly sure of a livelihood by teaching and writing, that is, by imparting it to others, and meanwhile dream of passing at a single leap from this mean obscurity to the prestige of one who assists in the manipulation of great happenings; while one who mastered it to the point of genius— that one might dream of becoming himself the next Lenin. 

A society so largely founded on material success and the rewards of individualism in a system of free competitive enterprise would be liable to underestimate both the intellectual content of the revolutionary thesis and the quality of the revolutionary mind that was evolving in a disaffected and envious academic world. 

At any rate, this society did, and from the revolutionary point of view that was one of the peculiar felicities of the American opportunity. The revolutionary mind that did at length evolve was one of really superior intelligence, clothed with academic dignity, always sure of itself, supercilious and at ease in all circumstances. To entertain it became fashionable. You might encounter it anywhere, and nowhere more amusingly than at a banker's dinner table discussing the banker's trade in a manner sometimes very embarrassing to the banker. Which of these brilliant young men in spectacles was of the cult and which was of the cabal— if there was a cabal—one never knew. Indeed, it was possible that they were not sure of it among themselves, a time having come when some were only playing with the thought of extremes while others were in deadly earnest, all making the same sounds. This was the beginning of mask and guise. 

The scientific study of revolution included of course analysis of opportunity. First and always the master of revolutionary technique is an opportunist. He must know opportunity when he sees it in the becoming; he must know how to stalk it, how to let it ripen, how to adapt his means to the realities. The basic ingredients of opportunity are few; nearly always it is how they are mixed that matters. But the one indispensable ingredient is economic distress, and if there is enough of that the mixture will take care of itself.

The Great Depression as it developed here was such an opportunity as might have been made to order. The economic distress was relative, which is to say that at the worst of it living in this country was better than living almost anywhere else in the world. The pain, nevertheless, was very acute; and much worse than any actual hurt was a nameless fear, a kind of active despair, that assumed the proportions of a national psychosis. 

Seizures of that kind were not unknown in American history. Indeed, they were characteristic of the American temperament. But never before had there been one so hard and never before had there been the danger that a revolutionary elite would be waiting to take advantage of it. 

This revolutionary elite was nothing you could define as a party. It had no name, no habitat, no rigid line. The only party was the Communist Party, and it was included; but its attack was too obvious and its proletarianism too crude, and moreover, it was under the stigma of not belonging. Nobody could say that about the elite above. It did belong, it was eminently respectable, and it knew the American scene. What it represented was a quantity of bitter intellectual radicalism infiltrated from the top downward as a doctorhood of professors, writers, critics, analysts, advisers, administrators, directors of research, and so on—a prepared revolutionary intelligence in spectacles. There was no plan to begin with. But there was a shibboleth that united them all: "Capitalism is finished." There was one idea in which all differences could be resolved, namely, the idea of a transfer of power. For that a united front; after that, anything. And the wine of communion was a passion to play upon history with a scientific revolutionary technic. 

The prestige of the elite was natural for many reasons; but it rested also upon one practical consideration. When the opportunity came a Gracchus would be needed. The elite could produce one. And that was something the Communist Party could not hope to do. 


Now given—

(1) the opportunity,

(2) a country whose fabulous wealth was in the

modern forms—dynamic, functional, non-portable,

(3) a people so politically naïve as to have passed a

law against any attempt to overthrow their

government by force—and,

(4) the intention to bring about what Aristotle

called a revolution in the state, within the frame

of existing law—

Then from the point of view of scientific revolutionary technic what would the problems be? They set themselves down in sequence as follows: 

The first, naturally, would be to capture the seat of government. 

The second would be to seize economic power. 

The third would be to mobilize by propaganda the forces of hatred. 

The fourth would be to reconcile and then attach to the revolution the two great classes whose adherence is indispensable but whose interests are economically antagonistic, namely, the industrial wage earners and the farmers, called in Europe workers and peasants. 

The fifth would be what to do with business— whether to liquidate or shackle it. 

(These five would have a certain imperative order in time and require immediate decisions because they belong to the program of conquest. That would not be the end. What would then ensue? A program of consolidation. Under that head the problems continue.) 

The sixth, in Burckhardt's devastating phrase, would be "the domestication of individuality"—by any means that would make the individual more dependent upon government. 

The seventh would be the systematic reduction of all forms of rival authority. 

The eighth would be to sustain popular faith in an unlimited public debt, for if that faith should break the government would be unable to borrow, if it could not borrow it could not spend, and the revolution must be able to borrow and spend the wealth of the rich or else it will be bankrupt.

The ninth would be to make the government itself the great capitalist and enterpriser, so that the ultimate power in initiative would pass from the hands of private enterprise to the all-powerful state. 

Each one of these problems would have two sides, one the obverse and one the reverse, like a coin. One side only would represent the revolutionary intention. The other side in each case would represent Recovery— and that was the side the New Deal constantly held up to view. Nearly everything it did was in the name of Recovery. But in no case was it true that for the ends of economic recovery alone one solution or one course and one only was feasible. In each case there was an alternative and therefore a choice to make. 

What we shall see is that in every case the choice was one that could not fail:

(a) To ramify the authority and power of executive government—its power, that is, to rule by decrees and rules and regulations of its own making;

(b) To strengthen its hold upon the economic life of the nation;

(c) To extend its power over the individual;

(d) To degrade the parliamentary principle;

(e) To impair the great American tradition of an independent, Constitutional judicial power;

(f) To weaken all other powers—the power of private enterprise, the power of private finance, the power of state and local government.

(g) To exalt the leader principle. 

There was endless controversy as to whether the acts of the New Deal did actually move recovery or retard it, and nothing final could ever come of that bitter debate because it is forever impossible to prove what might have happened in place of what did. But a positive result is obtained if you ask: Where was the New Deal going? 

The answer to that question is too obvious to be debated. 

Every choice it made, whether it was one that moved recovery or not, was a choice unerringly true to the essential design of totalitarian government, never of course called by that name either here or anywhere else. 

How it worked, how the decisions were made, and how acts that were inconsistent from one point of view were consistent indeed from the other—that now is the matter to be explored, seriatim.

PROBLEM ONE: 
TO CAPTURE  THE  SEAT  
OF GOVERNMENT

There was here no choice of means. The use of force was not to be considered. Therefore, it had to be done by ballot. That being the case, and the factor of political discontent running very high, the single imperative was not to alarm the people. 
Image result for images of Senator Taft 1933
Senator Taft says that in the presidential campaign of 1932 "the New Deal was hidden behind a program of economy and state rights." 

That is true. Nevertheless, a New Dealer might say: "How could we tell the people what we were going to do when we ourselves did not know?" And that also may be true—that they did not know what they were going to do. 

Lenin, the greatest theorist of them all, did not know what he was going to do after he had got the power. He made up plans as he went along, changed them if they did not work, even reversed them, but always of course in a manner consistent with his basic revolutionary thesis. And so it was with Hitler, who did it by ballot, and with Mussolini, who did it by force. 

There was probably no blueprint of the New Deal, nor even a clear drawing. Such things as the A.A.A. and the Blue Eagle were expedient inventions. What was concealed from the people was a general revolutionary intention—the intention, that is, to bring about revolution in the state, within the form of law. This becomes clear when you set down what it was the people thought they were voting for in contrast with what they got. They thought they were voting :

For less government, not more;
For an end of deficit spending by government, not deficit spending raised to the plane of a social principle, and,
For sound money, not as the New Deal afterward defined it, but as everybody then understood it, including Senator Glass, formerly Secretary of the Treasury, who wrote the money plank in the Democratic party platform and during the campaign earnestly denounced as akin to treason any suggestion that the New Deal was going to do what it did forthwith proceed to do, over his dramatic protest.

Image result for images of FDR IN 1932
The first three planks of the Democratic Party platform read as follows:

"We advocate:

"1. An immediate and drastic reduction of governmental expenditures by abolishing useless commissions and offices, consolidating departments and bureaus and eliminating extravagance, to accomplish a saving of not less than 25 per cent in the cost of Federal government ....


"2. Maintenance of the national credit by a Federal budget annually balanced ....

"3. A sound currency to be maintained at all hazards." 

Mr. Roosevelt pledged himself to be bound by this platform as no President had ever before been bound by a party document. All during the campaign he supported it with words that could not possibly be misunderstood. 

He said:
Image result for images of FDR IN 1932
"I accuse the present Administration (Hoover's) of being the greatest spending Administration in peace time in all American history—one which piled bureau on bureau, commission on commission, and has failed to anticipate the dire needs or reduced earning power of the people. Bureaus and bureaucrats have been retained at the expense of the taxpayer. . . . We are spending altogether too much money for government services which are neither practical nor necessary. In addition to this, we are attempting too many functions and we need a simplification of what the Federal government is giving to the people." 
This he said many times. 

Image result for images of FDR IN 1932
Few of the great majority that voted in November, 1932 for less Federal government and fewer Federal functions could have imagined that by the middle of the next year the extensions of government and the multiplication of its functions would have been such as to create serious administrative confusion in Washington, which the President, according to his own words, dealt with in the following manner:

"On July eleventh I constituted the Executive Council for the simple reason that so many new agencies having been created, a weekly meeting with the members of the Cabinet in joint session was imperative.... Mr. Frank C. Walker was appointed as Executive Secretary of the Council." 

Fewer still could have believed that if such a thing did happen it would be more than temporary, for the duration of the emergency only; and yet within a year after Mr. Roosevelt had pledged himself, if elected, to make a 25 per cent cut in Federal government by "eliminating functions" and by "abolishing many boards and commissions," he was writing, in a book entitled On Our Way, the following:
Image result for images of FDR IN 1932
"In spite of the necessary complexity of the group of organizations whose abbreviated titles have caused some amusement, and through what has seemed to some a mere reaching out for centralized power by the Federal government, there has run a very definite, deep and permanent objective." 
Few of the majority that voted in November 1932 for an end of deficit spending and a balanced Federal budget could have believed that the President's second budget message to Congress would shock the financial reason of the country, or that in that same book, On Our Way, he would be writing about it in a blithesome manner, saying:


"The next day, I transmitted the Annual Budget Message to the Congress. It is, of course, filled with figures and accompanied by a huge volume containing in detail all of the proposed appropriations for running the government during the fiscal year beginning July 1,1934 and ending June 30,1935. Although the facts of previous appropriations had all been made public, the country, and I think most of the Congress, did not fully realize the huge sums which would be expended by the government this year and next year; nor did they realize the great amount the Treasury would have to borrow." 

And certainly almost no one who voted in November, 1932 for a sound gold standard money according to the Glass money plank in the platform could have believed that less than a year later, in a radio address reviewing the extraordinary monetary acts of the New Deal, the President would be saying: "We are thus continuing to move toward a managed currency." 

The broken party platform, as an object, had a curious end. Instead of floating away and out of sight as a proper party platform should, it kept coming back with the tide. Once it came so close that the President had to notice it. Then all he did was to turn it over, campaign side down, with the words: "I was able, conscientiously, to give full assent to this platform and to develop its purpose in campaign speeches. A campaign, however, is apt to partake so much of the character of a debate and the discussion of individual points that the deeper and more permanent philosophy of the whole plan (where one exists) is often lost." 

At that the platform sank. 

And so the first problem was solved. The seat of government was captured by ballot, according to law.

PROBLEM TWO: 
TO SEIZE  ECONOMIC POWER
This was the critical problem. The brilliant  solution of it will doubtless make a classic chapter in the textbooks of revolutionary technique.  In  a  highly evolved money economy, such  as  this  one, the shortest and surest road to economic power would be what?   It would be control of money, banking,  and credit. The New Deal knew that answer. It knew also the steps and how to take them, and above all, it knew its oppor­tunity.

It arrived  at the seat of government in the midst of that well known phenomenon called a banking crisis, such as comes at the end of every great depression. It is like the crisis of a fever. When the banks begin to fail, pulling one another  down, that  is the worst that can happen. If the patient  does not die then  he will recover.  We were not going to die. The same thing had happened to us  before, once or twice in every twenty years, and always before the cure had brought itself to pass as it was bound to do again.

In his inaugural address,  March 4, 1933, the Presi­dent declared that the people had "asked for discipline and direction under leadership"; that he would seek to bring  speedy action "within my Constitutional au­thority"; and  that  he hoped the "normal balance  of executive and legislative authority" could be main­tained, and then said: "But in the event that Congress shall fail ... and in the event that the national emer­gency is still critical ... I shall ask Congress for the one remaining instrument to meet the crisis--broad executive power to make war  against the emergency, as great  as the power that  would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe."

It is true  that  people wanted action.  It is true  that they were in a mood to accept any pain-killer, and damn the normal balance of authority between the executive and legislative authority. That was an emotional state of mind  perfectly  suited  to a revolutionary   purpose, and the President took advantage of it to make the first startling exposition of New Deal philosophy. Note his assertion of the leadership principle over any other. Discipline under leadership. Note the threat to Con­gress-"in the event that Congress shall fail." But who was to say if the Congress had failed? The leader, of course. If in his judgment the Congress failed, then, with the people behind him, he would demand war powers to deal with an economic emergency.

The word emergency was then understood to mean what the dictionaries said it meant-namely, a sudden juncture  of events demanding  immediate  action. It was supposed to refer only to the panic and the banking crisis, both temporary.

But
what it meant to the President,  as nobody then knew, was a very different thing.  Writing a year later, in his book, On Our Way, he said:  "Strictly speaking, the banking crisis lasted only one week. ... But the full meaning of that  word emergency related to far  more than banks; it covered the whole economic and there­fore the whole social structure of the country.  It was an emergency that went to the roots of our agriculture, our commerce, our industry; it was an emergency that has existed for  a whole generation  in  its  underlying causes and for three-and-one-half years in its visible effects. It could be cured only by a complete reorganiza­tion and measured control of the economic structure....  It called for a long series of new laws, new adminis­trative agencies. It required separate measures affect­ing different subjects; but all of them component parts of a fairly  definite broad plan."

So, what the New Deal really intended to do, what it meant  to do within the Constitution if possible, with the collaboration of Congress if Congress did not fail, but with war powers if necessary, was to reorganize and control the "whole economic and therefore the whole social structure of the country." And therein lay the meaning-the only consistent meaning-of a series of acts touching money, banking and credit which, debated as monetary policy, made no sense whatever.

The  first step, three  days before the new Congress convened, was an executive decree suspending all activ­ities of banking throughout the country. Simply, every bank was shut up. The same decree forbade, under pain of fine and imprisonment, any dealing in foreign  ex­change or any transfer of credit from the United States to any place abroad,  and  that  was to slam  the  door against the wicked rich who might  be tempted  to run out.

The  second step ·was an  act  of  Congress,  saying, "Acts of the President  and Secretary of the Treasury since  March  4, 1933,  are  hereby  confirmed  and  ap­proved."

That  made everything legal after  the fact: and  it was the first  use of Congress as a rubber stamp. The same act of Congress provided that no bank in the Federal Reserve System should resume business except subject to rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of the Treasury, gave the President absolute power over foreign exchange and authorized the Federal government  to invest public funds  in private bank stock, thereby  providing banks with new capital owned by the government.  And that  was the act that authorized the President to require people to surrender their gold. Congress did not write any of these acts. It received them  from  the White House  and  passed them.

The third step was a decree by the President  requir­ing  all  persons and corporations whatever to divest themselves of gold and hand it over to the government. The  law authorizing him to do that had fixed the penalty of non-compliance at a fine equal to twice the value  of  the  gold. The  executive  decree added  the penalty of imprisonment.

In view of further intentions not yet disclosed it was imperative  for the government to get possession of all the gold. With a lot of gold in private hands its control of money, banking, and credit could have been seriously challenged.  All that  the government asked for at first was possession of the gold, as if it were a trust. For their gold as they gave it up people received paper money, but this paper money was still gold standard money-that is to say, it had always been exchangeable for gold dollar for dollar, and people supposed that it would be so again, when the crisis passed. Not a word had yet been said about devaluing the dollar or repudi­ating the gold standard. The idea held out was that as people surrendered their gold they were supporting the nation's credit.

This  decree  calling  in  the  gold  was  put  forth on April 5. There was then an awkward  interlude.  The Treasury was empty. It had  to sell some bonds.  If people knew what was going to happen  they might hesitate to buy new Treasury bonds. Knowing that  it was going to devalue the dollar, knowing that it was going to repudiate  the gold redemption clause in its bonds, even while it was writing the law of repudiation, the government nevertheless  issued and sold to the people bonds engraved as usual, that is, with the promise of the United States Government to pay the interest and redeem the principal "in United States gold coin of the present standard of value."

The  fourth step was the so-called Inflation Amend­ment attached to the Emergency Farm Relief Act. This law made sure that the Treasury need not be caught that way again. It forcibly opened the tills of the Federal Reserve Bank System to three billions of Treasury notes, authorized three billions of fiat money to be issued in the President's discretion, and gave the President  power in his own discretion  to devalue the dollar by one-half.

The fifth step was the act of repudiation. By reso­lution June  5, 1933, the Congress repudiated  the gold redemption clause in all government obligations, saying they should be payable when due in any kind of money the government might see fit to provide; and, going further, it  declared  that   the  same traditional  re­demption clause in all private contracts, such, for ex­ample, as railroad  and other corporation bonds, was contrary to public policy and therefore invalid.

The sixth step was a new banking act giving the Federal government power to say how private banks should lend their money, on what kinds of collateral and in what proportions, and the arbitrary power to cut them off from credit with Federal Reserve Banks. This arbitrary power to cut them off from credit was a strangle hold, and it was gained by changing  one little word in the country's organic banking law. From the beginning until then the law was that a Federal Reserve Bank "shall" lend to a private bank on suitable security. This word was changed to "may." Thus a right became a privilege and a privilege that could be suspended at will.

The seventh step-and it was the one most oblique -was to produce what may be described as monetary pandemonium. This continued for six months. To understand it will require some effort of attention.

When by the Inflation Amendment the dollar was cut loose from gold it did not immediately fall. That was because, in spite of everything, it was the best piece of money in the whole world. Well then, when the dollar did not fall headlong of its own weight the government began to club it down, and the club it used to beat it with was gold.  In the President's words the procedure was like this: "I am authorizing the Recon­struction Finance Corporation to buy newly mined gold in the United  States at prices to be determined from time to time after consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the President. Whenever necessary to the end in view we shall also buy or sell gold in the world market. My aim in taking this step is to establish and maintain  continuous control.  This is a policy and not an expedient."

Each  morning  thereafter the  Treasury  announced the price the government  would pay for gold in paper dollars, one day 30 paper dollars for one ounce of gold, the next day 32 dollars, two days later  34 dollars, and so on; and not only the newly mined gold in this country  but  anybody's  gold anywhere in the world. 

Thus day by day the President and the Secretary of the Treasury determined the value of gold priced in American paper dollars, or the value of American paper dollars priced in gold, which was the same thing; and how they did it or by what rule, if any, nobody ever knew.

The spectacle of a great, solvent government paying a fictitious price for gold it did not want and did not need and doing it on purpose  to debase the  value of its own paper currency  was one to astonish  the world.

What did it mean? Regarded as monetary policy it made no meaning whatever. But again, if you will regard it from the point of view of revolutionary tech­nic, it has meaning enough.

One effect was that  private  borrowing and lending, except from day to day, practically  ceased.  With the value of the dollar being posted daily at the Treasury like a lottery number, who would lend money for  six months or a year, with no way of even guessing what a dollar would be worth when it came to be paid back?

"No  man outside of a lunatic  asylum,"  said  Senator Glass, "will loan his money today on a farm mortgage." But the New Deal had a train of Federal lending agencies ready to start. The locomotive was the Recon­struction Finance Corporation. The signal for the train to start was a blast  of propaganda  denouncing Wall Street, the banks and all private owners of capital for their unwillingness to lend. So the government, in their place, became the great provider of credit  and capital for all purposes. It loaned public funds to farmers and homeowners to enable them to pay off their mortgages; it loaned also to banks, railroads, business, industry, new enterprise, even to foreign bor­rowers. Thereby private debt was converted into public debt in a very large and popular way. It was popular because the government, having none of the problems of a bank or a private lender, with no fetish of solvency to restrain it, with nothing  really to lose even though the money should never come back, was a benevolent lender.  It loaned public money to private borrowers on terms and at rates of interest  with which no bank nor any  private lender could compete; and the effect was to create a kind of fictitious, self-serving necessity. The government could say to the people, and did say to them : "Look. It is as we said. The money changers, hating the New Deal, are trying to make a credit famine. But your government will beat them."

In a Fireside Chat, October 22, 1933, the President said: "I have publicly asked that foreclosures on farms and chattels and on homes be delayed until every mort­gagor in the country  shall  have had full opportunity to take advantage of Federal credit. I make the further request,  which many  of  you know has  already been made through the great Federal credit organizations, that if there is any family in the United States about to lose its home or about to lose its chattels, that family should  telegraph  at  once either to the Farm Credit Administration or to the Home Owners Loan Corpora­tion in Washington requesting their help.  Two other great agencies are in full swing. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation continues to lend large sums to industry and finance, with the definite objective of making easy the extending of credit  to industry, com­merce and finance."

The other great lending agency to which he referred was  the  one that dispensed Federal credit  to  states, cities, towns, and worthy private organizations for works of public and social benefit. In the same Fireside Chat he urged them to come on with  their  projects. 

"Washington," he said, "has the money and is waiting for the proper projects to which to allot it."

Then began to be heard the saying that  Washington had become the country's  Wall Street,  which was liter­ally true.  Anyone wanting credit for any purpose went no longer to Wall Street but to Washington. The trans­fer of the financial capital of the nation to Washington, the President  said, would be remembered, as "one of the two important happenings of my Administration." What  was the source of the money? Partly it was imaginary money, from inflation. Largely it was the taxpayer's money. If the government lost it the tax­payer would have to find it again. And some of it, as the sequel revealed, was going to be confiscated money. By this time the New Deal had got control of the public purse. The Congress had surrendered control of it by two acts of self-abnegation. One was the Inflation Amendment and  the  other was  an  appropriation of $3,300,000,000 put into the hands of the President to do with what he liked as the architect  of recovery.

All through the commotion of these unnatural events one end  was held steadily in view, and that was a modern version  of the act for which kings had been hated and sometimes hanged, namely to clip the coin of the realm and take the profit into the king's revenue.

The eighth step was the act of confiscation. At the President's request the Congress, on January 30, 1934, passed a law vesting in the Federal government abso­lute title to all that gold which people had been obliged to exchange for gold standard paper dollars  the year before, thinking as they did that it was for the duration of the emergency only and that  they were supporting the nation's credit. They believed the statement issued at the time by the Secretary of the Treasury, saying: "Those surrendering the gold of course receive an equivalent amount of other forms of currency and those other forms  of currency  may  be used for  obtaining gold in  an equivalent amount when authorized for proper purposes." Having by such means got physical possession of the gold, it was a very simple matter for the government to confiscate it.  All that  it had to do was to have Congress pass a law vesting title in the government.

The ninth and last step was to devalue the dollar. In his message to Congress asking for the law that con­fiscated the gold the President said: "I do not believe it desirable in the public interest that  an exact value be now fixed."  Nevertheless, on January 31, 1934, the day  after   the act  of confiscation was  passed, he did fix the exact value of the dollar at  59 per cent of its former  gold content.  The difference,  which was  41 cents in every dollar of gold that had been confiscated, was counted as government profit and took the form of a free  fund  of two billions in the Treasury, called a stabilization fund, with which the President could do almost anything he liked. Actually it was used to take control of the foreign exchange market out of the hands of international finance.

Control of money, banking, and credit had passed to Washington. Thus problem number two was solved. 

The reason for giving so much attention to it is that it was the New Deal's most brilliant feat; and certainly not the least remarkable fact about it was the skill with which criticism  was  played into  making its fight  on false and baited ground.  Each step as it occurred was defended, and therefore  attacked, on ground of mone­tary policy, whereas  the  ultimate meaning  was  not there at all.

Consider first the logical sequence of the nine steps; consider secondly that  if  national  recovery had been the end in view many alternative steps were possible, whereas from the point of view of revolutionary technique these nine were the imperative steps and the order in which they were taken was the necessary order.  Then ask if it could have happened that  way by chance.

Not even a  New Dealer any longer maintains that the four  steps directly  involving  gold,  namely,  the seizure of it, the repudiation of the government's gold contracts,  then the confiscation of the gold, and lastly the devaluation  of the dollar, were necessary merely as measures toward  national  recovery. In the history of the case there is no more dramatic bit of testimony than that of Senator Glass, formerly Secretary of the Treasury, who in April, 1933, rose from a sick bed and appeared  in the Senate  to speak against the Inflation Amendment.  He said: 

"I wrote  with  my own hand  that  provision of the national   Democratic  platform   which  declared  for  a sound currency  to be maintained  at  all hazards.... With nearly 40 per cent of the entire gold supply of the world, why are we going off the gold standard?  With all the earmarked  gold, with all the securities  of ours they hold, foreign governments could withdraw in total less than  $700,000,000 of our gold, which would leave us an ample fund of gold, in the extremest  case, to maintain gold payments both at home and abroad.... To me the suggestion  that  we may devalue  the  gold dollar 59 per cent means national  repudiation. To me it means dishonor.   In  my conception of it,  it  is im­moral. ... There was never any  necessity for  a gold embargo. There is no necessity for  making statutory criminals of citizens  of  the  United States  who may please to take their property in the shape of gold or currency out  of the  banks  and  use it for  their  own purposes as they may please. We have gone beyond the cruel  extremities of the  French,  and  they made it  a capital crime, punishable at the guillotine, for any tradesman or individual citizens of the realm to dis­criminate in favor of gold and against their printing press currency.  We have gone beyond that.   We have said that  no man may have his gold, under penalty of ten years in the penitentiary or $10,000 fine."

And when the "gold cases" went to the United States Supreme Court--the  unreconstructed court--the judg­ment was one that  will be forever  a blot on a certain page of American history.  The Court said  that  what the government had done was immoral but not illegal. How could that be? Because the American government, like any other government, has the sovereign power to commit an immoral act. Until then the American gov­ernment  was the only great  government  in the world that  had never repudiated  the word engraved  upon its bond.


PROBLEM THREE: 
TO MOBILIZE BY PROPAGANDA 
THE FORCES OF HATRED
"We must hate," said Lenin. "Hatred is the basis of Communism." It is no doubt the basis of all mass excitement. But Lenin was not himself the master propagandist. How shall the forces of hatred be mobilized? What are the first principles? These are questions that now belong to a department of political science. 

The first principle of all is to fix the gaze of hatred upon one object and to make all other objects seem but attributes of that one, for otherwise the force to be mobilized will dissipate itself in many directions.

This was expounded by Hitler in Mein Kampf, where he said:
"It is part of the genius of a great leader to make adversaries of different fields appear as always belonging to one category. As soon as the wavering masses find themselves confronting too many enemies objectivity at once steps in and the question is raised whether actually all the others are wrong and their own cause or their own movement right. . . Therefore a number of different internal enemies must always be regarded as one in such a way that in the opinion of the mass of one's own adherents the war is being waged against one enemy alone. This strengthens the belief in one's own cause and increases one's bitterness against the attackers." 
How in a given situation to act upon this first principle of strategy is a matter to be very carefully explored. You come then to method and tactics, studies of the mass mind, analysis of symbols and slogans, and above all, skill of manipulation.

Lasswell and Blumenstock, in World Revolutionary Propaganda, define propaganda as
"the manipulation of symbols to control controversial attitudes." Symbols they define as "words and word substitutes like pictures and gestures." And the purpose of revolutionary propaganda "is to arouse hostile attitudes toward the symbols and practices of the established order." 

It may be however that people are so deeply attached by habit and conscience to the symbols of the established order that to attack them directly would produce a bad reaction. In that case the revolutionary propagandist must be subtle. He must know how to create in the mass mind what the scientific propagandist calls a "crisis of conscience." Instead of attacking directly those symbols of the old order to which the people are attached he will undermine and erode them by other symbols and slogans, and these others must be such as either to take the people off guard, or, as Lasswell and Blumenstock say, they must be "symbols which appeal to the conscience on behalf of symbols which violate the conscience."

This is an analytic statement and makes it sound extremely complex. Really it is quite simple. For example, if the propagandist said, "Down with the Constitution!"—bluntly like that—he would be defeated because of the way the Constitution is enshrined in the American conscience. But he can ask: "Whose Constitution?" That question may become a slogan. He can ask: "Shall the Constitution be construed to hold say it is." And that creates an image, which is a symbol. He can ask: "shall the Constitution be construed to hold property rights above human rights?" Or, as the President did, he may regretfully associate the Constitution with "horse-and-buggy days." 

The New Deal's enmity for that system of free and competitive private enterprise which we call capitalism was fundamental. And this was so for two reasons, namely: first, that its philosophy and that of capitalism were irreconcilable, and secondly, that private capitalism by its very nature limits government. 

In Russia capitalism, such as it was there, could be attacked directly. The people were not attached to it in any way. In this country it was very different. Americans did not hate capitalism. They might criticize it harshly for its sins, most of which were sins of self-betrayal, but its true symbols nevertheless were deeply imbedded in the American tradition; and, moreover, a great  majority of the people were in one way or another little capitalists. To have said, "Down with capitalism!" or, "Down with free private enterprise!" would have been like saying, "Down with the Constitution!" The attack, therefore, had to be oblique. 

In his first inaugural address, March 4, 1933, the President said: "Values have shrunk to fantastic levels; taxes have risen; our ability to pay has fallen;... the withered leaves of industrial enterprise lie on every side; farmers find no market for their produce; the savings of many years in thousands of families are gone. More important, a host of unemployed citizens face the grim problem of existence, and an equally great number toil with little return.... Yet our distress comes from no failure of substance. . . . Nature still offers her bounty. Plenty is at our doorstep, but a generous use of it languishes in the very sight of the supply. Primarily this is because the rulers of the exchange of mankind's goods have failed, . . . have admitted their failure and have abdicated. Practices of the unscrupulous money-changers stand indicted in the court of public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men. . . . They know only the rules of a generation of self-seekers.... Yes, the money-changers have fled from their high seats in the temple of our civilization. 

We may now restore that temple to the ancient truths. The measure of that restoration lies in the extent to which we apply social values more noble than mere monetary profit." 

There was the pattern and it never changed. The one enemy, blameable for all human distress, for unemployment, for low wages, for the depression of agriculture, for want in the midst of potential plenty—who was he? The money-changer in the temple. This was a Biblical symbol and one of the most hateful. With what modern symbol did this old and hateful one associate? With the Wall Street banker, of course; and the Wall Street banker was the most familiar and the least attractive symbol of capitalism. 

Therefore, capitalism, obliquely symbolized by the money-changer scourged out of the temple, was entirely to blame; capitalism was the one enemy, the one object to be hated. But never was it directly attacked or named; always it was the old order that was attacked. The old order became a symbol of all human distress. "We cannot go back to the old order," said the President.

And this was a very hateful counter symbol, because the old order, never really defined, did in fact associate in the popular mind with the worst debacle in the history of capitalism. 

It was never the capitalist that was directly attacked. Always it was the economic royalist, the brigand of the skyscrapers, the modern tory—all three hateful counter symbols. The true symbols of the three competitive systems in which people believed were severely let alone. The technique in every case was to raise against them counter symbols. Thus, against the inviolability of private property was raised the symbol of those who would put property rights above human rights; and against all the old symbols of individualism and self-reliance was raised the attractive counter symbol of security. 

To bring hatred to bear upon the profit motive there were two techniques. One was to say, as the President said in his first inaugural, that social values were more noble than mere monetary profit, as if in any free scheme you could have social gains without plenty of mere monetary profit; the other was to speak only of great profits, as if in a free profit and loss system you could have little profits and little losses without big profits and big losses.

It is not unnatural for people to think envious thoughts about large profits, and envious thoughts are very easy to exploit, as every demagogue knows. But no government before the New Deal had ever deliberately done it. In a home-coming speech to his Dutchess County neighbors, in August, 1933, the President explained why it had seemed necessary for the New Deal to limit personal liberty in certain ways. It was to make all men better neighbors in spite of themselves; and as if this were no new thing he said: "Many years ago we went even further in saying that the government would place increasing taxes on increasing profits because very large profits were, of course, made at the expense of the neighbors and should, to some extent at least, be used for the benefit of the neighbors."

Large profit as such becomes therefore a symbol of social injury, merely because it is large; moreover, it is asserted that large profit had long been so regarded by the government and penalized for that reason. Of all the counter symbols this was the one most damaging to the capitalistic system. Indeed, if it were accepted, it would be fatal, because capitalism is a profit and loss system and if profits, even very large profits, are socially wrong, there is nothing more to be said for it. But it was a false symbol, and false for these three reasons, namely: first, there is no measure of large profit; second, large profits are of many kinds and to say simply that large profits are "of course made at the expense of the neighbors" is either nonsense or propaganda, as you like; and, in the third place, the history is wrong. 

When the Federal government many years ago imposed a graduated income tax—that is, taxing the rich at a higher rate than the well-to-do and taxing the poor not at all, the idea was not that large profits or large incomes were gained at the expense of one's neighbors, not that the rich were guilty because they were rich. The idea was to impose taxes according to the ability to pay. The well-to-do could afford to pay more than the poor and the rich could afford to pay more than the well-to-do, and that was all. 

What made it all so effective was that this was the American people's first experience with organized government propaganda designed "to arouse hostile attitudes toward the symbols and practices of the established order"—and that, if you will remember, was the most precise definition of revolutionary propaganda that Lasswell and Blumenstock could think of in their scientific study of World Revolutionary Propaganda.

Problems 4-9

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