source NY Post
A DEA agent engaged in an extra-marital affair with a convicted criminal, gave her after-hours access to a drug evidence room, let her listen in on recorded telephone calls, and had sex with her “on numerous occasions” inside his office — but amazingly, was allowed to keep his job and security clearance for years, according to an internal government report.
The officer, who has not been named by officials, admitted to the torrid romance and was eventually fired from the Drug Enforcement Administration following an investigation by the agency’s Office of Professional Responsibility.
Using the pseudonym Grant Stentsen, officials released a report Thursday describing how he initiated the affair with his mistress, identified as Marion Wardman — another pseudonym — and what they did exactly over the course of their relationship.
“The Special Agent admitted to [investigators] that he had, among other things: carried on an extramarital affair with a woman who was a convicted criminal; allowed her after-hours access to a DEA office, including a drug evidence room; allowed her to listen to recorded telephone calls of subjects of DEA investigations; and had sex with her on numerous occasions in the DEA office and his DEA vehicle,” the report says.
The Office of Professional Responsibility first found out about the tryst in 2013 — roughly five years after the forbidden lovers met on the internet — but failed to report it to the agency’s Office of Security Programs, which is responsible for adjudicating security clearances of all DEA employees.
A DEA Administrator at the time, identified as Michele M. Leonhart, was said to have turned a blind eye to the agent’s “serious misconduct” — “inappropriately” intervening to reinstate his security clearance — after being told to do so by then-Acting Chief Inspector Herman “Chuck” Whaley.
The inspector “opposed the suspension of the Special Agent’s security clearance and intended to resolve the matter in a different manner,” according to the DEA report.
“We concluded that Leonhart acquiesced to Whaley’s flawed decision to intervene in the security clearance process, and therefore she shares responsibility for it,” the report says. “We also determined that she did not testify untruthfully to Congress regarding whether she had any impact on the adjudication of agents’ security clearances.”
Investigators from the Security Programs first learned of the agent’s misconduct in 2014, but the agent’s security clearance wasn’t suspended until March 24, 2015. It was then reinstated by Whaley 3 days later.
According to the report, the inspector “stated that the Special Agent’s misconduct merited significant punishment but did not raise national security issues because it did not involve a lack of candor, foreign nationals, or a foreign country.”
The investigation into the agent’s affair was ultimately launched after his mistress called his office in 2013 and alleged that they had been having sex inside the building.
“According to Wardman, she reported Stentsen’s misconduct because she was angry with his response when she told him she was pregnant with his child,” the report says. “Stentsen has denied that he is the father of the child born in February 2014 and, according to the investigations we reviewed, his paternity had not been established.”
The agent was eventually fired from the DEA in March 2016. Leonhart resigned from the DEA a year earlier and Whaley wound up retiring in September 2016.
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D.O.J O.I.G Releases Report on the Actions of Former DEA Leadership in Connection with the
Reinstatement of a Security Clearance
Department of Justice (D.O.J) Inspector General Michael E. Horowitz announced today the
release of a report about the actions of former DEA Administrator Michele M. Leonhart and
former DEA acting Chief Inspector Herman E. “Chuck” Whaley in connection with reinstating
the security clearance of a Special Agent who had committed serious misconduct. The D.O.J
Office of the Inspector General’s (O.I.G) investigation found that while Leonhart did not directly
intervene to reinstate the security clearance, neither did she object when Whaley told her that
he opposed the suspension of the Special !gent’s security clearance and intended to intervene
to resolve the matter in a different manner. We concluded that because Leonhart acquiesced
in Whaley’s flawed decision to intervene in the security clearance process, she shared
responsibility for it.
This matter arose as a result of a prior misconduct investigation of a DEA Special Agent
conducted by the DEA Office of Professional Responsibility (O.P.R) in 2013. During the 2013
investigation, the Special Agent admitted that he had, among other things: carried on an
extramarital affair with a woman who was a convicted criminal; allowed her after-hours access
to a DEA office, including a drug evidence room; allowed her to listen to recorded telephone
calls of subjects of DEA investigations; and had sex with her on numerous occasions in the DEA
office and his DEA vehicle. DEA O.P.R, however, failed to advise DEA’s Office of Security
Programs, which is responsible for adjudicating security clearances of DEA employees, about
the Special agent’s misconduct.
The Office of Security Programs learned of the misconduct in 2014, as a result of a routine
periodic re-investigation of the Special !gent’s eligibility to maintain a security clearance. After
assessing the Special !gent’s conduct in accordance with the applicable security adjudication
guidelines, on March 24, 2015, the DEA Security Programs Manager (S.P.M) suspended the
Special !gent’s clearance, rendering him ineligible for access to classified and other sensitive
information.
Three days later, Whaley instructed the S.P.M to reinstate the Special !gent’s clearance. Whaley
told the O.I.G that he did not believe that the Special !gent’s misconduct raised national security
issues because it did not involve a lack of candor, foreign nationals, or a foreign
country. However, Whaley had never received training on the application of the security
clearance guidelines, he did not determine the full basis of the S.P.M’s suspension decision
before overruling it, and he did not have the authority to adjudicate a security clearance or to
overrule a security clearance adjudication.
Notably, Whaley gave the instruction to reinstate the Special !gent’s security clearance just
one day after the public release of the O.I.G’s March 26, 2015 report entitled The Handling of Sexual Harassment and Misconduct !llegations by the Department’s Law Enforcement Components. Among other things, the O.I.G’s report contained a finding that DE! O.P.R had failed
to refer allegations involving sexual misconduct that raised security concerns to Security
Programs for adjudication, potentially exposing DEA employees to coercion, extortion, and
blackmail, all of which create security risks. Both Leonhart and Whaley had been engaged in
discussions with respect to the O.I.G’s findings and recommendations in the months before the
O.I.G released the March 26 report.
The O.I.G’s investigation also assessed Leonhart’s April 14, 2015 testimony before the House
Oversight and Government Reform Committee regarding which DEA employees are authorized
to suspend or revoke a security clearance. While we concluded that Leonhart’s testimony was
not untruthful, we also determined that there is a lack of clarity within DEA and D.O.J policies
regarding the delegations of authority with respect to security clearance adjudications. Today’s
report therefore makes several recommendations to clarify DEA and D.O.J policies, including by
specifying that the Office of Security Programs will have the final say within the DEA about
whether employee misconduct merits a review and adjudication of the employee’s security
clearance, and that the D.O.J specify that for the purpose of security adjudications, S.P.M's report
solely to the Department Security Officer, and not to other senior officials, who may have
appropriate input in but not overrule the component S.P.M.
Additionally, we believe that this matter and the findings of our March 2015 report illustrate
the need for Justice Department leadership to ensure that all D.O.J security offices obtain and
assess all relevant information related to an employee’s misconduct investigations, if any, when
conducting that employee’s security clearance adjudication. We have therefore transmitted to
the Deputy Attorney General, and released publicly on our website, a separate memorandum
containing two recommendations related to this issue.
The O.I.G will continue to monitor the progress of the D.O.J and its law enforcement components
to address the deficiencies we have identified, and their efforts to implement our
recommendations.
full report here
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