PART 6:SECRET AGENDA:OPERATION PAPERCLIP,THE DOSSIERS&CIA DIRTY TRICKS IN THE "NATIONAL INTERESTS"

Secret Agenda The United States Government, Nazi Scientists and 

Project Paperclip 1945 to 1990 

By Linda Hunt 

7 

The Dossiers 

WHEN State Department representative Samuel Klaus entered the room, he immediately sensed that the military officers were about to gang up on him. For a long time Klaus had had the feeling that the men on the J.I.O.A Governing Committee were laying plans in his absence. Now it seemed to him that one of those schemes was about to be hatched.1 

He was the odd man out among those sitting around the table at the Pentagon. Nearly all members of the J.I.O.A and G-2 Exploitation Branch were there: J.I.O.A Governing Committee chairman Bosquet Wev; J.I.O.A Director Colonel Thomas Ford; G-2's Exploitation Branch chief Montie Cone and his superior, Lieutenant Colonel H. B. St. Clair; J.I.O.A member Francis Duborg; and a few men Klaus had not met before. 

Hilldring

The purpose of this February 27, 1947, meeting was ostensibly to obtain Klaus's stamp of approval on a list of Germans the J.I.O.A wanted to move through the pipeline. Over the past year Klaus had asked Ford repeatedly to give him names of all Paperclip scientists living in America, but Ford had refused. Klaus also had been unable to obtain a list of Germans on order. Even Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring had complained to the assistant secretary of war about the runaround they were giving Hilldring.2 

Now a list was lying on the meeting-room table, but Ford was deliberately hiding it from Klaus's view. Ford then demanded that Klaus sign a waiver giving entry visas to the Germans on a list he was not even allowed to see. "I told him that of course I could do no such thing and that certification presupposed that the Department should have an opportunity to pass judgement of some kind before affixing its signature," Klaus later angrily noted in a memo.3 

Ford told him that the list was classified and the State Department was not entitled to see it. Then Ford issued an ultimatum along with a McCarthyite threat. "Ford stated in various ways that if I did not accept the paper on behalf of the State Department he would give the information to several senators who would take care of the Department," Klaus wrote.4 

The J.I.O.A had a good reason for wanting to keep the lists secret, and it had nothing to do with classified information. At the time of the meeting, Wev and Cone were sitting on a powder keg. They had just received 146 investigative reports from Europe and nearly all of them were derogatory. They knew that the Germans' Nazi backgrounds violated the policy that Truman had signed. The O.M.G.U.S Security Report on the scientists disclosed allegations that Zobel and others had participated in experiments on humans, the Axsters had mistreated foreign laborers, Salmon had torched a synagogue, and S.S member Debus had turned a colleague over to the Gestapo. Other men were accused of various crimes including theft and sexual perversion. Many had been early members of the Nazi party, the S.S, or the S.A.5 

Wernher von Braun's report had been one of the first to arrive. The O.M.G.U.S Security Report noted that von Braun was considered an ardent Nazi and a security threat to the United States. His records indicated that he had been a major in the S.S,having joined the S.S at the personal behest of SS chief Himmler in 1940,a student at an S.S riding school, and a Nazi party member since 1937. The J.I.O.A had sent his report back to Germany and asked U.S. intelligence officers there to verify von Braun's political background and report any extenuating circumstances surrounding his S.S membership.6 

Klaus had not seen the reports, and since the J.I.O.A withheld the complete list of names, he was unable to investigate the Germans on his own. The J.I.O.A was supposed to give Klaus dossiers on the 334 Paperclip specialists living in the United States, who officially were considered enemy aliens under military custody. The O.M.G.U.S Security Report would be the key document in the dossiers, since it summarized the Army intelligence background investigations and judged whether or not an individual was an "ardent Nazi" and a security threat to the United States. Klaus already had received files on ten men who worked for Colonel Putt, but, unbeknownst to him, the files had been carefully censored. The file that Klaus received on Albert Patin, for example, did not include his admission to having used five hundred Jewish women and other innocent people as slave laborers.7 

Nevertheless, Klaus was suspicious of the J.I.O.A's methods, and his concerns heightened after the meeting. First he learned that the J.I.O.A had expunged information about his confrontation with Ford from the meeting minutes that were submitted to J.I.O.A's superiors in the Joint Intelligence Committee. Then he learned that Georg Rickhey had been returned to Germany for trial in the Dora case. Klaus thought the Rickhey incident represented a serious security problem. "That the Department's security fears were not baseless was recently demonstrated when a war criminal, wanted for war crimes of a bestial kind, was found here among these scientists, to be returned to Germany," he remarked.8 

Animating the cabal of military officers who opposed Klaus was a mind-set that would not hesitate to lie, violate President Truman's policy, or smear reputations to achieve its ends. The intelligence officers subscribed to the cold war philosophy. As they saw it, deceiving and undercutting one stubborn State Department official were certainly among the almost limitless means justified by the grand goal of containing communism. 

Such convictions tend to endure. To this day Colonel Cone defends the project and the officers' actions. "Perhaps some mistakes were made that weren't rectified. I'm not aware of any, but I am convinced that we advanced our own interest greatly by this program," Cone said recently. "From a military point of view, we knew that these people were invaluable to us. Just think what we have from their research-all our satellites, jet aircraft, rockets, almost everything else."9 

Wev was outspoken and impatient with anyone who opposed his views of what was good for America. The Navy captain frequently used Director of Intelligence Chamberlin as a sounding board for memos that attacked his enemies so fiercely that Cone had to tell him several times to tone down his fiery rhetoric. While Wev admitted that Truman's policy banned ardent Nazis from Paperclip, he felt that State's emphasis on "picayune details" such as S.S records was absurd. Communism, not nazism, was the problem. To Wev, being forced to investigate the Germans' Nazi pasts was comparable to "beating a dead Nazi horse."10 

By July 1947, the J.I.O.A and State were deadlocked in an angry battle over immigration. Wev sent Chamberlin a scathing memo accusing Klaus of "sabotaging" the immigration process. He emphasized that it was imperative that "the most positive and drastic action possible be taken in order to break the impasse which currently exists." Wev expressed his concern that returning the Germans to Europe, where they could be used by potential enemies, "presents a far greater security threat to this country than any former Nazi affiliations which they may have had or even any Nazi sympathies which they may still have."11 

Then J.I.O.A and G-2 began to play hardball against Klaus. Wev and Cone complained to right-wing congressmen that Klaus was impeding the entire German scientist program. Their complaints also were leaked to friendly reporters who smeared Klaus's name in the press. At the same time they were concealing allegations that some of the Paperclip specialists had been accused of complicity in murder and other war crimes.12 

In July, Klaus recommended to his superiors that the State Department withdraw from the J.I.O.A Governing Committee. He thought continued participation in J.I.O.A was unwise because "we were being stopped by some of their activities over which we had no control." Klaus and the State Department already were being unfairly blamed in the press for refusing to give the scientists visas. "Apparently we were placed in J.I.O.A solely because someone assumes that by this device permanent immigration visas would be issued . . . over the counter on demand," he said. "This is fundamentally unpleasant." Klaus recommended that State handle the project internally in its Office of Controls, which was responsible for the Visa Division, counterintelligence, and security.13 

Hamilton Robinson, State's director of the Office of Controls, was put in charge of the Paperclip problem. Robinson had been a law associate of John Foster Dulles when Dulles was the Republican foreign policy adviser, and a legal adviser to the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, which had originated Paperclip policy. He was also a carbon copy of Klaus in his suspicions of the military officers. Robinson immediately sent five dossiers back to the J.I.O.A and demanded that the officers give him more information about the specialists' Nazi pasts.14 

The situation soon turned into a full-blown crisis for the J.I.O.A. The entire Visa Department was upset over the dossiers they had seen thus far. Samuel Cummings was furious when he discovered discrepancies between what the specialists said about their Nazi pasts and actual Nazi records from the State Department-run Berlin Document Center. Another visa official, Rebecca Wellington, thought the military was lying and told the officers she took their statements about national security interests with "a grain of salt."15 

State Department officials were not the only ones complaining about Paperclip. F.B.I Director Hoover constantly was reminding J.I.O.A officers that he thought members of the Nazi party were security threats. And the F.B.I planned to conduct its own investigation of all Paperclip personnel. 

The idea of a full-scale F.B.I investigation made the J.I.O.A officers shudder. The F.B.I's own files already acknowledged that rocket technician Hans Giesecke had more to hide than just his S.S membership. Members of Giesecke's family, who had lived in the U.S. during the war, had been under F.B.I investigation for Nazi espionage activities. The investigations were part of the FBI's massive wartime assault on the pro Nazi German-American Bund, which resulted in the prosecution and deportation of German-born Nazi Bund leader Fritz Kuhn and others. FBI agents had staked out, photographed, and investigated Giesecke's parents, who were active Bund members in Portland, Oregon, and his brother Oscar, a Bund leader in Chicago. One undercover agent had attended weekly pro-Nazi rallies held in a back room at Earle's Cafe in downtown Portland. Speakers included radical leaders of the Silver Shirts, who patterned themselves after the S.A. The agent learned that Giesecke regularly sent his parents anti-Semitic Nazi pamphlets from Germany which were distributed at the Bund meetings in Portland.16 

It is important to remember that the American public was unaware of the scientists' sordid Nazi pasts. And Army public relations officials brazenly lied to them about it. For example, the Army's Intelligence Division had claimed that "no `big' Nazis" were employed under Paperclip. Furthermore, the military told the American public that it had followed Truman's policy and barred ardent Nazis from the project. The Army defined "ardent Nazis" as those who had joined the Nazi party before Hitler came into power in 1933, Nazi party leaders, those convicted by denazification courts, and those accused or convicted of war crimes.17 

Despite the Army's propaganda, vocal critics of Paperclip nearly blew the lid off the J.I.O.A's cover story that the scientists had all been "carefully screened." Cone still views these critics with disdain. "There were elements in the country that were violently opposed to Paperclip, and they could stir up quite a lot of trouble," Cone recalled. "We had real problems with them." Rabbi Wise stepped up his campaign to oust the Axsters from America. Members of the American Federation of Scientists (A.F.S) complained directly to President Truman that the Germans were not the eminent scientists the military claimed they were.18 

Reporter Drew Pearson repeatedly published stories raising disturbing questions about the military's false claim that it was following the rules. In one story that caused an uproar among high officials in Washington, Pearson reported that Carl Krauch, who had helped set up I. G. - Farben's factory at Auschwitz, had been recruited into Paperclip. At the time Krauch was sitting in a Nuremberg prison awaiting trial as a Nazi war criminal. Dwight Eisenhower, then chief of staff, ordered Director of Intelligence Chamberlin to give him a full report after he heard about Pearson's story. Chamberlin and Colonel Hagood gave Eisenhower a brief history of the project and Hagood assured the general that all of the Germans had been carefully screened.19 

The ideological battle lines were drawn between the intelligence officers and their critics. From then on, the fight was hard-and dirty. The officers gathered men of like mind to their side, held closed-door meetings with right-wing congressmen, and used the Army's enormous illegal domestic spy operation under Chamberlin's Military Intelligence Division (G-2) to spy on, investigate, and harass their critics. 

G-2's operation was a powerful weapon that had been tooling up for Armageddon since the 1920's, when G-2 agents engaged in strikebreaking and ran private vigilante networks under Chamberlin's predecessor, World War I intelligence chief Colonel Ralph H. Van Deman. G-2 increased its domestic surveillance of American citizens during World War II, when its activities included bugging First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt's room in a Chicago hotel. This surveillance, which brazenly violated Americans' civil rights, continued nonstop for decades. G-2 agents engaged in countless unauthorized wiretaps, break-ins, and a spy operation that included a collection of eight million personal dossiers running the gamut from supporters of Senator Eugene McCarthy's presidential campaign to the Weathermen. The operation finally was exposed by a former intelligence agent in 1970 and shut down after a four year congressional probe.20 

In the late 1940's reporters who wrote stories critical of Paperclip were among G-2's prime targets-especially Drew Pearson. "He was a real troublemaker," remarked Cone. Pearson's telephone was bugged and he was spied on and investigated for years.21 

Another reporter became a target when his article in the New Republic incensed G-2 officers in Cone's Exploitation Branch. Seymour Nagan's story "Top Secret: Nazis at Work" questioned the rationale of congressmen who worried about Communists infiltrating defense plants when four hundred Nazis with top-secret clearances worked on sensitive defense projects throughout the country. Nagan's story noted that some sources were afraid to talk because of "fear of reprisals." But it was Nagan who became the focus of attention when Cone initiated an investigation of him the same day his story hit the newsstands. Cone told an agent that Nagan's story "may cause trouble" and that he should read it and find out what he could about the reporter. "DON'T ask P.I.D nor F.B.I nor US Branch," Cone warned the officer, "see if elsewhere you can dig up something on him for a blueslip." The officer eventually managed to "dig up" Nagan's personal telephone number and home address.22 

The American Federation of Scientists was another target. First, intelligence agents tried-and failed-to prove that the group was a Communist front. Then, agents posing as A.F.S members attended meetings to collect information about the group's activities. In one instance Edward Wetter, chief of the Intelligence Division's Chemical and Biological Warfare section, attended an A.F.S meeting in Philadelphia posing as a member. After the meeting, Wetter gave G-2 agents lists of names, notes of conversations, and other information about the group.23 

The problem with the incriminating security reports, however, still had not been solved. J.I.O.A officers knew they could not get the reports past State. J.I.O.A Deputy Director Walter Rozamus sent Cone a copy of O.M.G.U.S's derogatory report on Adolf Thiel, summarized Thiel's Nazi past, and directed Cone's attention to the paragraph in Truman's policy "which indicates that active Nazis are not qualified under the Paperclip Program." Rozamus noted that Thiel's report described him as a security threat because of his long-time active membership in several Nazi groups. Thiel had joined the Hitler Youth at age seventeen, the SA at age eighteen, and the Nazi party when he was twenty-three.24 

The solution was very simple. If State would not approve immigration due to derogatory O.M.G.U.S reports, the J.I.O.A would change the reports to expunge derogatory information, in direct contravention of the president's policy. Furthermore, J.I.O.A officers knew they could rely on their counterparts in Germany to help them do the job. 

The Intelligence Division of the European Command ran Paperclip in Germany, under the directorship of Walsh, who was stationed in Berlin. The Paperclip office operated out of the Intelligence Division's headquarters in Heidelberg, under Deputy Director Colonel Robert Schow, who would become assistant director of the C.I.A in 1949 and assistant chief of staff for Intelligence in 1956. A.C.S.I was the Army intelligence agency under which Cone's counterparts operated in the 1950's. Schow and his assistants, Colonel William Fagg and Colonel C. F. Fritzsche, signed many of the O.M.G.U.S Security Report forms. Some investigators were borrowed from O.M.G.U.S's Public Safety Branch, the denazification division. Military Governor Clay was commander in chief over both E.U.C.O.M and O.M.G.U.S.25 

The plot to change the records was discussed during a J.I.O.A Governing Committee meeting on November 14, a meeting that Klaus did not attend. Rozamus mentioned that many O.M.G.U.S reports listed individuals as security threats with what appeared to be insufficient data. Cone said the reports needed to be changed. "Someone should be sent from here to Europe to fully inform them there as to just what is wanted," Cone told the group. In the meantime, the officers withheld from the State and Justice Departments dossiers that contained derogatory information.26 

Four days after the meeting, Rozamus sent Cone the dossiers of seven individuals who were wanted for denazification trials because of their Nazi activities, warning: "It is not considered advisable to submit any of the enclosed dossiers to the Departments of State and Justice at this time." Wernher von Braun's dossier was one of those enclosed. Rozamus said that von Braun's O.M.G.U.S Security Report "indicates that he is regarded as a potential security threat to the United States and he will be wanted for denazification trial in view of his party membership. " 27 

Anton Beier's dossier also was withheld. Beier's S.S records, which were over two inches thick, became such a hot item that G-2 classified the entire file "Top Secret." Beier had been in charge of assembling rocket testing stands at Peenemunde and now worked for the Army at Fort Bliss. His O.M.G.U.S Security Report noted that he "was an ardent Nazi and judging from the cap device on his SS uniform, was a member of the Death Head Division." He had been a platoon leader in the S.S from 1933 until 1945. There was much consternation among the intelligence officers after they discovered that Beier's S.S records from the Berlin Document Center included a photograph showing Beier decked out in full S.S uniform.28 

On November 28 Rozamus sent three more incriminating dossiers to Navy intelligence, quoted the paragraph in Truman's policy that barred ardent Nazis from the project, and said: "In view of this it is believed that there is little likelihood that the above scientists can be immigrated if the Theater Security Reports are forwarded to the State Department in their present form." Rozamus told the Navy that the J.I.O.A intended to ask European Command to "reevaluate" the O.M.G.U.S reports to revise the ardent Nazi classification, "since such classification is a bar to immigration."29 

The dossiers were those of Willi Heybey, Hermann Kurzweg, and Ernst Winkler, who worked on the Navy's wind tunnel project in White Oak, Maryland. Kurzweg, who had been chief of the wind tunnel project at Kochel, Germany, was judged by O.M.G.U.S to be an "ardent Nazi" because he had been a member of the S.S Elite Guard from 1934 until the end of the war. Heybey had been a long-time member of the S.A. Winkler had been a member of the S.A from 1933 until 1939, the Nazi party, four other Nazi organizations, and the counterespionage branch of Abwehr intelligence.30 

The same day that Rozamus returned those dossiers to the Navy, G-2's Cone told the J.I.O.A that he recommended they ask the Intelligence Division in Europe to review and change the reports because they were having a negative effect on the scientists' immigration. Cone identified six individuals whom O.M.G.U.S classified as security threats and said that none were "politically active."31 

The list included former Mittelwerk V-2 rocket technicians Guenther Haukohl and Hans Friedrich. Haukohl was judged by O.M.G.U.S to be an "ardent Nazi" because he had been a member of the SS from 1933 to 1939, the SA, the Nazi party, and two other Nazi organizations. Friedrich had joined the Nazi party in 1932,a year before Hitler came into power and actively participated in S.A election propaganda and party processions. In 1947 Friedrich was still touting Hitler's leadership as a positive force in Nazi Germany. "The entire living standards of the people rose, unemployment disappeared and most men seemed to be happier," Friedrich said in a sworn affidavit. No one asked Dora survivors if they had been happy working as slave laborers under Friedrich and Haukohl in the underground hell known as Mittelwerk.32 

The cover up began in earnest on December 4, 1947, when J.I.O.A Director Wev sent a lengthy memo to E.U.C.O.M Director of Intelligence Walsh and asked that the O.M.G.U.S reports of fourteen individuals, including Wernher von Braun, "be reviewed and that new security reports be submitted where such action is deemed appropriate." Wev made it clear that there was "very little possibility" that the State or Justice Departments would approve the immigration of any individual who was classified as a potential or actual security threat. "This may result in the return to Germany of specialists whose skill and knowledge should be denied other nations in the interest of national security," Wev told Walsh.33 

In his memo Wev repeated Cone's assertion that the O.M.G.U.S reports were "unrealistic," since none of the specialists had been politically active. The list included Friedrich and Haukohl, former S.S platoon leader Beier, and Major Hamill's chief spy at Fort Bliss, Herbert Axster, who was accused of starving foreign laborers by O.M.G.U.S investigators. Theodor Benzinger, who had been arrested as a Nuremberg war crimes suspect and was now working for the Navy, was also on the list. Wev even noted references submitted in behalf of Werner Gengelbach that described him as "devoted to his family" and "always reliable and humane." Wev considered the statements to be evidence of Gengelbach's nominal Nazi status and asked that the report be revised to reflect them.34 

One O.M.G.U.S officer was outraged at Wev's request and refused to become involved in the coverup. "This headquarters should not revise merely to circumvent the rules set forth by the State and Justice Departments," Robert Bruce told his superiors. Bruce refused to change the reports on Gengelbach and Adolf Thiel because O.M.G.U.S denazification officers believed that their early membership in the Nazi party and numerous other Nazi affiliations were evidence of considerable political incrimination that made them security threats.35 

He also refused to change Heinrich Kliewe's incriminating security report, thereby unwittingly squelching a secret intelligence plot to lure Kliewe out of the French zone of Germany and send him to the United States under Paperclip. Kliewe had been chief sanitary officer of the Wehrmacht, in charge of human experimentation for Hitler's biological warfare program. In 1946 he was judged merely a "follower" of nazism and fined DM 2,000 by a denazification court on the basis of favorable statements made by alleged anti-Fascists in his behalf. But later, O.M.G.U.S Public Safety officers discovered that some of the statements were entirely false and actually had been made by Kliewe's close friends, who were well-known ardent Nazis. A retrial was ordered and a warrant was issued for Kliewe's arrest. Nuremberg prosecutors also wanted him detained as a witness in the Nuremberg medical atrocities case. But Kliewe escaped arrest by slipping over the French zone border, where he joined other biowarfare experts on the run.36 

Bruce was furious that the J.I.O.A planned to include Kliewe's falsified statements, which were attached to his O.M.G.U.S Security Report, as well as statements claiming that Gengelbach was "reliable and humane," in dossiers sent to the State and Justice Departments. "Even the highly incriminated can produce good evidence with extreme ease," Bruce complained. O.M.G.U.S investigators had learned that in addition to statements made in behalf of Kliewe and Gengelbach, two hundred others that were submitted in defense of Paperclip specialists also were authored by close friends and contained false or misleading information.37 

Nevertheless, the J.I.O.A officers soon began to receive bundles of O.M.G.U.S security reports signed by Schow's executive officer in the Intelligence Division-all changed from "ardent Nazi" status to "not an ardent Nazi." Colonel Fagg and other intelligence officers had even signed most of the reports on the same day. The reports included numerous records of former S.S members. Beier's twelve-year S.S membership was excused by saying he was a mere "opportunist." Eckert, who had admitted attending S.S meetings, was "not an ardent Nazi," according to the revised O.M.G.U.S report. Later, one officer involved in sanitizing the reports noticed glaring discrepancies between Friedrich Wazelt's report about his S.S activities and the actual S.S records, but he brushed it off and said, "I don't think it's worth checking on."38 

Originally Wernher von Braun's September 18, 1947, report noted, "Subject is regarded as a potential security threat by the Military Governor." But five months later his new report said that since von Braun had been in the United States more than two years, if his conduct had been exemplary, "he may not constitute a security threat to the U.S." No information was placed in his dossier about his withholding information from the Army concerning the maps he mailed to Dornberger in London.39 

Axster's first O.M.G.U.S Security Report stated:"He should ideologically speaking-be considered a potential security threat to the United States." Six months later Axster's report was changed, despite additional incriminating information that had been obtained by investigators in Europe regarding Axster's treatment of laborers. Nevertheless, Axster's revised report concluded: "Subject was not a war criminal and was not an ardent Nazi. The record of Herbert Axster as an individual is reasonably clear and as such, it is believed that he constitutes no more of a security threat than do the other Germans who have come to the U.S. with clear records in entirety."40 

Wilhelm Eitel, who had fled Berlin in 1945, worked for the Navy in a nuclear plant in Norris, Tennessee. His O.M.G.U.S Security Report originally had judged him to be an "ardent Nazi." Atomic Energy Commission security agents had expressed concern about Eitel's presence at the plant and his access to A.E.C workrooms. The Berlin police still had not closed the case of his wife's suicide. And Navy investigators had tracked down some of the Jewish scientists who had been fired from the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in 1933 as a result of Eitel's compliance with Hitler's policies against Jews. One of those scientists had ended up in a concentration camp. Others told investigators that the famous chemist Fritz Haber had quit the K.W.I and fled to England rather than comply with the policies.41  

Despite the incriminating evidence, Eitel's O.M.G.U.S Security Report was changed to read that he was "not an ardent Nazi." During a meeting where Eitel's Nazi past was discussed, one Navy intelligence officer said, "it is admitted that while he was undoubtedly an adherent of Nazi ideology, even to the point of enthusiasm, it is felt that he is hardly the type of individual who would purposely and with malicious intent engage in activities to the extent attributed to him in statements" by the former K.W.I scientists. The officer concluded that the Navy considered Eitel to be a preeminent scientist and a valuable asset whose "previous political views appear to be of secondary importance at this time. "42 

The effect of the cover up involved far more than merely whitewashing the information in the dossiers. Serious allegations of crimes not only were expunged from the records, but were never even investigated. Regarding the specialists at Wright-Patterson, allegations against Theodor Zobel and Ernst Eckert, and Albert Patin's own admission that he had utilized slave labor, were never investigated. Statements from their friends or colleagues were simply put into their files as evidence that they were not ardent Nazis. Furthermore, none of the dossiers of the Mittelwerk group at Fort Bliss contained a shred of evidence that the Dora trial-had ever taken place. At the very least, Major Eugene Smith's interrogations were relevant documents that should have been scrutinized by the State and Justice Departments when considering whether an individual such as Arthur Rudolph should be given a visa and, later, U.S. citizenship.43 

The cover up was almost perfect. But for it to succeed, the intelligence officers had to get rid of their opponents in State. The whitewashed dossiers never would pass the scrutiny of either Klaus or Robinson. Less than two months after Wev first told European officers to change the reports, the officers' right-wing friend in Congress began to wage a full scale battle against the State officials. Congressman Fred Busby, from Illinois, was the perfect man for the job. Like Senator Joseph McCarthy, Busby was an extremist who used sympathetic members of the press and congressional committees as the public red-baiting platform for his effort to singlehandedly clean out the "subversive elements" in State.44 

Much of the information that Busby used in his smear campaigns came from the Chicago Police Department's notorious intelligence unit known as the "red squad." The squad's activities included compiling dossiers and conducting illegal surveillance, break-ins, and terrorist-style raids that violated the civil rights of thousands of American citizens. The squad operated for decades in collaboration with G-2's illegal domestic spy operation and the Legion of Justice, a Chicago-based right wing terrorist group.45 

On March 10, 1948, Busby hauled Robinson before a House subcommittee, where the congressman wove a tale based on innuendo in an attempt to show that Robinson was "incompetent" in his job and had associated with a second cousin who Busby said was an alleged Communist. Eleven State Department officials already had been fired as a result of the McCarran rider to an appropriations act, which allowed the secretary of state to discharge any employee deemed to be a security risk. Busby wanted Robinson to be the twelfth, but subcommittee members shut down the hearings. "There was no substance," said Congressman John W . McCormack of the allegations against Robinson. "The only card-bearing organization of which he was a member was the Young Republicans Club of New York City. I think that is a mighty good American organization. "46 

Busby was forced to resign from the subcommittee because of his antics. But that did not stop him from attacking Robinson and Klaus in news broadcasts over NBC radio. "It's another chapter in a story of how a few minor officials in the State Department have succeeded in blocking a program of high military importance," reported NBC's Ned Brooks. He said the State Department had refused to give the German scientists visas even though Truman had approved Paperclip. Quoting Busby as his source, Brooks identified Klaus by name as being "the man most influential in sabotaging the program." A later broadcast blamed Robinson for the "ax work."47 

On March 25, 1948, Busby lashed out again at the "sinister figures" in the State Department in a long speech in Congress. According to Busby, the State Department was infiltrated with Communists and Robinson had refused to go along with Busby's plan to fire employees accused of disloyalty. But Robinson's biggest crime, Busby said, was that he was in charge of a "clique" in the Visa Department, including Klaus and others, that had "sabotaged" the German scientist program. In Busby's view, all of these "fellow travelers" were at the root of the State Department's problems.48 

Busby's campaign succeeded, and not just in the short term. With Robinson's resignation two days after Busby's speech, the last State Department watchdog was gone, leaving the J.I.O.A conspirators free to proceed unimpeded with their scheme to circumvent Truman's policy. 

Beyond these immediate effects, the smear campaign of which Busby was the mouthpiece left the historical record biased against the two State Department officials who strove to uphold the very policy they were accused of obstructing. Klaus, who died a few years after his losing battle with the J.I.O.A officers, never was able to erase the undeserved stain on his record, a stain that endures to this day. More than twenty years after the events in question, Klaus still was being castigated for being, in historian Clarence Lasby's term, the "one man" in the State Department who was holding up progress. And to date, no history of those events has called to account those in the J.I.O.A, in Congress, and in the press who plotted against this lonely, engaging figure with integrity and who dragged his name through the mud.49 

On May 11, 1948, Director of Intelligence Chamberlin met with FBI Director Hoover and convinced him to change the FBI's long-standing policy that anyone with a record of Nazi party membership should be considered a security threat. Chamberlin told Hoover that immigration was the only way to successfully deny a "gold mine of brains" to the Russians. Regarding the specialists' Nazi pasts, although Chamberlin admitted that some were affiliated with nazism, he told Hoover that "none were active participants of the party or its political activities."50 

After the meeting, Chamberlin told the J.I.O.A officers the good news. FBI Director Hoover had volunteered to meet personally with the attorney general to eliminate bureaucratic red tape in order to expedite the visas. Hoover was on their team.51 

As a result of whitewashed files, many Paperclip personnel would obtain visas, and later American citizenship, on the basis of false or misleading information in dossiers that the J.I.O.A officers submitted to the State and Justice Departments. By 1949, J.I.O.A officers bypassed the O.M.G.U.S security evaluations entirely in most cases. J.I.O.A Director Daniel Ellis told a screening panel his reasoning behind that decision: "This action should be taken in view of the apparent inability of O.M.G.U.S to supply security evaluations on a wholesale basis."52

8 

CIA Dirty Tricks in the 

" National Interest " 

THE cold war led to a major expansion of the German scientist operation. Heretofore, Paperclip was limited to German and Austrian scientists who worked for the U.S. military. But beginning in the summer of 1947, a new J.I.O.A project lifted those constraints. Code-named "National Interest," the individuals brought to the United States under this program ran the gamut from Nazi scientists, including a convicted Nazi war criminal, to East Europeans involved in CIA covert operations overseas. The sole standard for these transfers was that they be deemed in the national interest. 

National Interest operated on two levels. The more visible level included the cases of German or Austrian scientists employed by universities, defense contractors, or private industry. Their entry was considered to be in the national interest simply because it kept them from going to work for the Russians. 

The second level was heavily cloaked in secrecy, and for good reason. The C.I.A and military intelligence used the project to bring intelligence sources or other assets to the United States, where they were given a safe haven in exchange for their services. In 1948 many of these individuals were of interest to the Office of Policy Coordination (O.P.C), the early covert action arm of the C.I.A, given the authority by Truman to conduct what is known in the intelligence trade as "dirty tricks." To put it bluntly, Project National Interest provided the escape mechanism to a haven in the United States that O.S.S chief William Donovan had wanted President Roosevelt to approve in 1944.1 

National Interest policy assumed that all of these persons normally would have been barred from entry under U.S. immigration laws because of past Nazi or Communist party membership. Therefore, their entry was facilitated by the ninth proviso of the U.S. immigration law, which gave the attorney general the authority to admit cases with military implications or those affecting national security. The C.I.A cases were covered by a section in the C.I.A Act of 1949, which allowed U.S. entry of up to one hundred individuals a year "without regard to their inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws. . . ." The J.I.O.A Governing Committee approved the entry in the C.I.A cases and passed the names on to the attorney general for approval.2 

The aliens in National Interest, like those in Paperclip, were sent to Canada and reentered the United States as resident aliens. Numerous historians and journalists have told the now famous story of how Wernher von Braun and other Paperclip scientists were sent to Canada or Mexico and then reentered America. Yet not one has so much as mentioned the illegality of this or that Canadian officials were furious about it, since entry into Canada of these Nazis violated their own immigration laws. 

In 1947, for example, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (R.C.M.P) reported that they had been duped by U.S. officials into believing that the Nazis' backgrounds were such as to allow their entry under Canadian laws, when in fact the opposite was true. "Some of these people are admitted members of the Nazi party and others, I am informed, have criminal records," one R.C.M.P officer reported after conducting his own investigation. In addition, the Canadians suspected that U.S. and British intelligence falsified background checks sent to the R.C.M.P of Nazi scientists and "defectors" who were resettled in Canada in the 1950's. Following a 1981 investigation, Canadian officials uncovered evidence that some of these men were Nazi war criminals. As a result the Canadians thoroughly distrusted background checks conducted by the C.I.A and British intelligence. "No foreign agency should be considered a `reliable source' in the sense that its reports can be accepted uncritically," a RCMP report noted.3 

Prevailing myth has it that the first group in National Interest, the German scientists, were employed solely because of their scientific expertise. But there were other reasons as well. First, defense contractors and universities could hire German scientists for substantially less money than they could American employees. Salary statistics show that the Germans signed contracts for approximately $2,000 a year less than their American counterparts received in comparable positions. Of course, the Germans were unaware of the salary discrepancy, since they had earned even less money in West Germany. The J.I.O.A, however, took advantage of the situation by promoting cheap salaries to convince corporations to participate in the project. Second, because of the Joint Chiefs of Staff connection with the National Interest project, German scientists could obtain necessary security clearances more easily than could American scientists. Defense contractors looking for new employees to work on classified projects found this aspect of National Interest to be particularly advantageous. By 1957, more than sixty companies were listed on J.I.O.A's rosters, including Lockheed, W. R. Grace and Company, CBS Laboratories, and Martin Marietta.4 

Originally the J.I.O.A was concerned that National Interest would compete with Paperclip. This problem was solved by offering the military the first option to hire a German scientist on the J.I.O.A's list. If the military was not interested in the individual, his name was added to the J.I.O.A's National Interest roster and his services were offered to universities or corporations. The J.I.O.A figured that it would be easy to keep private employers from hiring Paperclip scientists away from the military, since the J.I.O.A could pull their federally funded research or defense contracts if they got out of line.5 

The scientists who worked for universities or corporations were originally "sponsored" by either the Department of Commerce or the Department of Defense (Army, Air Force, or Navy). The Department of Commerce even sent its own recruiters to Germany. However, other than providing some help with the paperwork, this sponsorship was irrelevant: the individuals worked for and were paid by the universities or companies. The sponsorship did provide a way to meet J.C.S policy requirements of having some connection with the military or another governmental department. In the case of the second group, the sponsor provided a convenient cover to conceal the C.I.A-O.P.C connection.6 

National Interest placed German scientists at major universities in research or teaching positions, regardless of their Nazi pasts. Even the U.S. Office of Education helped the J.I.O.A send fliers to universities all over the country touting the advantages of hiring the Germans on federally financed research projects, since they could obtain security clearances more easily than Americans. The University of Texas, Washington University School of Medicine in St. Louis, Missouri, and Boston University were among the participants.7 

The universities never even questioned whether Nazi professors might impart a skewed view of democracy or otherwise harm young students. And university officials certainly were aware that these men were Nazis, since their Nazi affiliations were noted on their resumes. In 1948, a representative of the University of North Carolina told the J.I.O.A how pleased he was to have three Germans, including engineer Adolf von Hoermann, working at the university and thanked the J.I.O.A for its representations that the Germans had been screened. The J.I.O.A's screening had revealed that von Hoermann was "a convinced adherent of the National Socialistic ideology" and had been a member of the Nazi party and four other Nazi organizations during the war.8 

Still, there were angry disputes between American employees and Germans who still adhered to virulent Nazi views. One incident occurred at the Bechtel Corporation, where synthetic fuels expert Leonard Alberts worked under National Interest. Alberts had been a member of the S.S, the Nazi party, the S.A, and two other Nazi groups. He also had been a Gestapo informant in the Victor Works plant where he worked during the war. His job, as chief counterespionage agent for the Abwehr, was to uncover "spies and saboteurs" among the foreign forced laborers working at Victor and report them to the Gestapo. After he was brought to America under National Interest, Alberts changed jobs four times in two years as a result of American co-workers' complaints about his ardent nazism.9 

The dispute at Bechtel occurred when the company learned that Alberts had failed to mention his S.S and Abwehr connections on his forms. Alberts claimed that he did not recall his Nazi memberships, since "such matters were entrusted to my secretary." Bechtel officials also gave the FBI a pile of complaints from Alberts's co-workers and an Army security officer, Major Robert Humphries, who accused Alberts of being a security threat. Humphries told the F.B.I that Alberts "was and is a Nazi" and warned that he was "capable of dealing with Russia or any other group which would pay for his technical knowledge." Despite these complaints, the J.I.O.A disregarded Humphries as being "opinionated" and transferred Alberts to Blaw-Knox in Pittsburgh. By then the F.B.I had collected even more unfavorable reports on Alberts's character and pro-Nazi stance. J.I.O.A officers eventually helped Alberts obtain permanent residency, despite derogatory reports, because they were afraid he would work for the Russians if returned to Germany.10 

National Interest was merely an entry mechanism to get the person here first, ask questions later. Because of that, there was a potential for an even greater internal security risk with these cases than with Paperclip, which at least provided some semblance of military custody. In addition to hard-core Nazis, National Interest cases included former members of the Communist party and the Italian Fascist party. 

One German was an accused Nazi spy who, though brought to the United States to work for a New York optical company, promptly disappeared once he arrived. This should have come as no surprise, considering Goerz Langfeld's track record. Langfeld had lived in America in the late 1930's and worked for Eastman Kodak in Rochester, New York. The F.B.I suspected that Langfeld and several top U.S. businessmen were meeting with a notorious Nazi spy, who later was convicted of espionage. Langfeld left America in 1941, and reports of his wartime activities are conflicting. Langfeld claimed on one form that he had gone to Tokyo as a "tourist." On another he said he had returned to Nazi Germany and joined the Luftwaffe. Yet another story was that he had worked for the German Naval headquarters in Berlin. One thing is certain: in late 1945 Army C.I.C agents thought he looked suspicious and threw him in jail. He was caught wearing a British uniform, brandishing a gun, and carrying falsified papers, including identity cards under several names. Langfeld escaped soon after his arrest and, under yet another alias, obtained a job at the Office of Military Government for Bavaria's film division. By the time he was brought to the United States in 1952 his records revealed that he had used at least five different aliases.11 

Even convicted Nazi war criminals were accepted under the project. Otto Ambros's case is by far the most brazen example of how National Interest circumvented U. S. immigration laws. The fact that W. R. Grace and Company, headed by J. Peter Grace, employed Ambros as a consultant for decades is well known. But newly declassified J.I.O.A and U.S. Army documents shed new light on this sordid affair.12 

During the war, Ambros was a director of I.G. Farben, the chemical company that owned a firm that manufactured Zyklon B, the gas used to kill millions of Jews in the camps. Ambros took part in the decision to use Zyklon B in the gas chambers and personally selected Auschwitz as the site of an I.G. Farben factory, which he later managed, because Auschwitz concentration camp prisoners could be used as slaves in the factory. Nuremberg trial witnesses recalled the deplorable conditions under which Auschwitz prisoners were forced to work at Ambros's I.G. Farben Auschwitz plant. "Thrashings, ill-treatment of the worst kind, even direct killings were the fashion," testified Rudolf Vitek, both a physician and an Auschwitz inmate. "The murderous work speed was responsible for the fact that while working many prisoners suddenly stretched out flat, turned blue, gasped for breath and died like beasts."13 [No gas chambers,so hard to gas people without them D.C]

I.G. Farben also manufactured nerve gas that was used in poison gas experiments on Auschwitz prisoners. These experiments, conducted in secret laboratories at I.G. Farben factories, were used to determine how fast nerve gas would kill Allied soldiers. The helpless victims of these experiments died instantly. According to British intelligence, Ambros and other I.G. Farben officials "justified the experiments not only on the grounds that the inmates of concentration camps would have been killed anyway by the Nazis, but also . . . that the experiments had a humanitarian aspect in that the lives of countless German workers were saved."14 

Ambros was found guilty of slavery and mass murder at Nuremberg, but he was sentenced to a mere eight years' imprisonment. Chief prosecutor Josiah DuBois regarded the sentence as "light enough to please a chicken thief" and was so outraged that he wrote a scathing book about the men he called The Devil's Chemists. The J.I.O.A had no such qualms and kept Ambros's name on J.I.O.A hiring lists-even during his imprisonment. These lists were significant, since they contained the names of German scientists who had been cleared for employment under various J.I.O.A and British projects. In addition, these Germans' families received benefits, including food supplements, not available to average German citizens.15  

In 1951, General Clay's successor, the High Commissioner of Germany (H.I.C.O.G), John McCloy, released from prison many convicted Nazi war criminals, including Ambros. The Nazi chemist immediately was hired as a consultant by Grace, Dow Chemical, and other American companies, as well as the U. S. Army Chemical Corps under a consultancy project that was run administratively in Germany by H.I.C.O.G-conveniently the same agency whose chief had just set Ambros free. The full details of Ambros's consultancy with the U.S. military are unknown. The effect of that work, however, is abundantly clear. During the time that Ambros was a consultant, the chemical corps, using Auschwitz documents as a guide, conducted the same type of poison gas experiments that had been done in the secret I.G. Farben laboratories. This time, however, the experiments were conducted at Edgewood Arsenal, Maryland, and the unfortunate guinea pigs were more than seven thousand American soldiers.16 

In the 1950's Grace repeatedly tried to get the State Department to issue Ambros a visa but was turned down because he was a convicted Nazi war criminal. Then National Interest entered the picture, as it provided a way to bring otherwise excludable individuals to the United States under the attorney general's waiver provision. According to State sources, the Justice Department approved Ambros's entry and he visited the United States at least three times.17 

The C.I.A's tremendous influence on National Interest and Paperclip has been ignored prior to this book. The C.I.A was formed as a separate intelligence agency as a result of the National Security Act of 1947. A year later, the Office of Policy Coordination began operating as the C.I.A's covert action arm, headed by Frank Wisner, formerly chief of O.S.S operations in the Balkans during World War II. Wisner's O.P.C operated out of the State Department, which proved highly advantageous to the intelligence agents running Paperclip. His considerable influence in the State Department meant a more favorable climate, particularly since Samuel Klaus and other Paperclip detractors had been forced out of the picture. In addition, Wisner handled the C.I.A investigations of individuals brought to America under all J.I.O.A projects. Considering the well publicized facts surrounding the C.I.A's own use of Nazi war criminals, it should not be surprising that the C.I.A name checks reported "no derogatory information."18 

Wisner also helped the J.I.O.A obtain visas for Paperclip scientists. For example, in February 1948 Director of Intelligence Stephen Chamberlin met with Wisner to discuss J.I.O.A's problems with Klaus and the Visa Department. Chamberlin told Wisner that around 350 Germans were still living in the United States under military custody, but they could not become permanent residents without State Department approval. "This condition has resulted in an unfavorable reaction on specialists' morale," Chamberlin said. He asked Wisner to accelerate the visas and to support J.I.O.A's efforts to change Paperclip policy to enable the Germans to get visas before their arrival in America.19 

Less than a month later the State Department notified the J.I.O.A that it would accelerate its processing of visas in the Paperclip cases. The new director of the Visa Department, Herve L'Heureux, also issued instructions to consuls in Germany that only major Nazi leaders would be barred from obtaining visas. By 1949 Paperclip scientists began to obtain visas prior to their arrival in the United States.20 

The National Interest project provided a way to slip military or C.I.A intelligence assets into the country. The C.I.A group involved defectors or individuals who possessed information of significant intelligence value. J.I.O.A officers passed on the names of the C.I.A group to the attorney general for final approval. "We just did the paperwork," recalled retired U.S. Army Colonel Bernard Geehan, who served on the J.I.O.A from 1953 to 1957. But that approval process was crucial, because the law was designed to admit people who otherwise would be inadmissible. As one C.I.A attorney admitted in 1979, the provision allowing the C.I.A to bring a hundred persons to the United States waived all grounds of exclusion, so theoretically, drug traffickers or persons convicted of serious crimes could be admitted into the country under the law. The sole consideration for entry was that the aliens had performed significant services for the United States or had the potential for performing those services in the future. In some instances those services included working in C.I.A covert operations overseas.21 

Some of these aliens had escaped to the West via an "underground railway" operated by a special unit of intelligence agents in Berlin. "We get some hot customers, hot with the breath of the Russian pursuers on their necks," one unidentified agent told The New York Times in 1947. The agents smuggled scientists, politicians, intelligence sources, and other individuals through Eastern Europe, using various modes of transportation and disguises to sneak them past Russian guards to the American or British zones of Germany.22 

The aliens' backgrounds were varied. Some were Germans employed by U.S. intelligence at Camp King in Germany. Others were former Italian Fascists, including a wealthy businessman whom the J.I.O.A was reluctant to approve for U.S. entry because his dubious business methods already had been an obstacle to negotiating a consultancy contract with the U.S. Air Force. Many were defectors, such as General Izydor Modelski, former military attache with the Polish Embassy in Washington. Another defector, Peter Pirogov, was a Soviet Air Force officer who flew a jet plane out of the Ukraine to Austria, where he crash-landed and turned himself over to the Americans. According to J.I.O.A records, the U.S. Air Force sponsored Pirogov's U.S. entry under National Interest. He then worked as a consultant for the Air Force and as a scriptwriter for the C.I.A-funded Radio Liberty.23 

There was also a group of Finnish soldiers who wanted to form an underground guerrilla team to fight the Communists in their homeland. The Finns originally had sought asylum in Sweden and secured a transit visa to the United States en route to Venezuela. Upon arrival in America, they offered to join the armed forces. On October 21, 1947, J.I.O.A Deputy Director Walter Rozamus notified the State Department that the Finns had been approved for admission under National Interest. Finns then went to Canada, reentered the country, and enlisted in the U.S. Army.24 

One of the Finns, Alpo Marttinen, wrote to former O.S.S chief Donovan and asked that his group be transferred to the Intelligence Division in order to carry out a scheme that they had told Donovan about when they first arrived in the United States. The scheme included secretly recruiting a cadre of two thousand Finnish officers to be used to fight a guerrilla war against Soviet troops in Finland. "The first and foremost step in this campaign," Marttinen wrote, "would be to assist in the escape and to offer asylum to such persons whose services either in the underground activities or in war itself would be of most value." He explained that anti-Communist Finnish army officers living in exile in Venezuela and other countries were well qualified to fight this war, since they knew Scandinavian and Russian languages and terrains, were experts in winter warfare tactics, and were familiar with Soviet fighting methods.25 

The idea was passed on to Major General Alfred Gruenther, chairman of the J.C.S, who asked several individuals for their comments. Most military officers thought the idea sounded too much like recruiting mercenaries. As one colonel put it, this cadre of guerrilla warriors might include "a large sprinkling of free-booters, criminals and petty racketeers." But the idea appealed to George Kennan, head of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, and architect of the political theory of Soviet containment. "We believe that Mr. Marttinen's project has merit and that a beginning should be made to carry it out," Kennan wrote to Gruenther. "It would seem advisable to start the project with these men and gradually to build it up as a top-secret undertaking." Soon, more Finnish soldiers began to arrive directly from Venezuela and other countries under Project National Interest. The influx continued well into the 1950's. Marttinen and other Finns trained with the U.S. Army winter warfare unit.26 

National Interest also included Russian and Eastern European scientists who either had worked in Nazi Germany or had escaped to the West after the war. Alexander Papkow, for example, had been one of the first Russian physicists to work on nuclear fission. In 1943 Papkow moved to Germany and worked as a Russian translator for German intelligence and as a scientific assistant to Professor Walter Bothe at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Heidelberg. Originally Papkow was going to be brought to the United States, but an investigation by Army C.I.C agents had raised suspicions about Papkow's wife and her Soviet connections. Army C.I.C agents normally kept the scientists on J.I.O.A lists under surveillance. In Papkow's case Army C.I.C stakeouts gathered information about Papkow's emigre contacts that was used in an investigation of Soviet emigre espionage networks operating in the U.S. zone of Germany.27 

The most interesting aspect of National Interest is the services some individuals actually performed for U.S. intelligence. The National Interest roster tells the story of nearly every early C.I.A-O.P.C covert operation that took place in the late 1940's. Under National Interest, U.S. immigration laws were juggled to allow some of them to travel in and out of the country with no questions asked. Two examples are enough to show the pattern. 

One case was Teodor Manicatide, brought to the United States after being involved in a botched coup d'etat in Romania in late 1946. According to Robert Bishop, an American intelligence agent stationed in Bucharest at the time, the coup was planned by Lieutenant William Hamilton and Major Thomas Hall of the Strategic Services Unit (S.S.U). The full story of this operation still is unknown. And one key question that remains unanswered is whether anyone, especially the president, authorized the S.S.U officers' deliberate attempt to topple a foreign government. The S.S.U was an early War Department unit created basically as a caretaker agency for the disbanded O.S.S clandestine intelligence agencies until the C.I.A was formed in 1947.28 

In Bishop's account of this debacle, Hamilton and Hall recruited factions of dissident political groups in Romania to form a resistance movement against the Communist-backed Romanian government. The recruits included leaders of the National Peasant party, the strongest political opposition party in Romania, with a track record of having tried to overthrow the country's Nazi-puppet government in 1944. The American officers held meetings to plot a coup which they promised to finance with sixty thousand gold coins and support with arms and supplies. Manicatide served as Hamilton's translator at the meetings. The problem was, the meetings were held in the worst locations imaginable if the idea was to keep this plot secret from Russian intelligence agents. "A bar room, a garden restaurant, or a quiet place in the suburbs would have been foolproof by comparison," Bishop noted sarcastically. One meeting was held in an American officer's home located near the Russian Embassy. Another took place in a bombed-out palace that, as Bishop observed, was well known to Russian agents as being "a nest of reactionary activities." Hamilton and Hall were so incompetent as to have stenographic notes taken of the plots discussed at these meetings. Of course, the Russians soon obtained a copy of the notes, arrested the Romanians, and conducted show trials at which the stenographic notes were used as evidence.29 

Manicatide, J.I.O.A's National Interest subject, was given political asylum in the American Military Mission while being tried in absentia at the show trials. It is not known whether Manicatide unwittingly became ensnared in the activities of these renegade U.S. intelligence officers or if he took a more active role other than working as Hamilton's translator. Either way, it did not matter to the Romanian court, which considered his mere association with Hamilton enough evidence to convict him for participating in the. plot. According to an account in The New York Times on November 20, 1946, of the sentencing of ninety-four persons on trial, Manicatide "was sentenced to life imprisonment on the grounds that he accompanied a Lieutenant Hamilton of the American Military Mission to a National Peasant congress." Manicatide was then smuggled out of Romania and provided with a haven in the United States under National Interest.30 

The next case on the National Interest covert action roster involved an Italian immigrant, Angelica Balabanoff, who helped the C.I.A secretly instigate a major upheaval in the Italian government that laid the groundwork for the successful election of C.I.A-backed candidates in 1948. Here the C.I.A, with the help of Wisner and other individuals, conducted full-scale clandestine political warfare. The C.I.A's dirty tricks were financed by $10 million in cash obtained from the U.S. Treasury's Exchange Stabilization Fund, which consisted of captured Nazi assets, including money and valuables that the Nazis had stolen from Jews. Ironically, Samuel Klaus originally had helped locate this loot while working on the Safehaven project, designed to stop Nazis from smuggling their assets out of Germany. The C.I.A funneled millions of dollars to Italian centrist political candidates. Circumstantial evidence indicates that C.I.A money backed Italy's Premier Alcide de Gasperi and a group of right-wing Socialists headed by Giuseppe Saraget. The C.I.A also financed media blitzes in the Italian press, supported armed goon squads used to intimidate voters, and published leaflets that smeared Communist candidates as being Fascists and sex perverts. The money was funneled through various fronts, including the Vatican, which is known to have helped smuggle numerous Nazi war criminals, including Klaus Barbie, to South America.31 
https://exploringrealhistory.blogspot.com/2017/07/part-1-operation-gladiothe-unholy.html
In the 1970's U.S. congressmen investigating the C.I.A's secret involvement in Italy's affairs were led to believe that the C.I.A's operation had begun in 1948. In fact, the Balabanoff plot had begun a year earlier, in January 1947. Balabanoff was a former leader of the Italian Socialist and Labor movement who lived in New York as a resident alien. Because she was a former Communist, she risked being judged inadmissible to the United States if she traveled to Italy and then tried to reenter America. The National Interest project not only provided her reentry with no questions asked but allowed her to come and go between the United States and Italy at will in order to participate in this scheme.32 

Raymond Murphy, the State Department's special assistant to the director in the Office of European Affairs, explained the reasoning behind the Balabanoff operation during a J.I.O.A Governing Committee meeting on October 20, 1947. "This government is trying to evoke a response along democratic elements in Europe to organize resistance against the engulfment of their countries by an internal Communistic machine," Murphy said. Murphy told J.I.O.A officers that Balabanoff, working in close cooperation "with certain officials of the American Embassy at Rome," had helped cause an upheaval and split in Italian politics that strengthened the C.I.A-backed Right Wing Socialists party headed by Giuseppe Saragat. Balabanoff made numerous speeches in Italy and held press conferences in the United States that publicized C.I.A-backed candidates. These trips were made possible by juggling U.S. immigration laws under National Interest.33 

By 1948 the cold war had escalated National Interest and revitalized Paperclip. Washington already was full of rumors of war when General Lucius Clay sent his now-famous telegram from Berlin warning that war with the Soviets might be imminent. According to military historian Steven Rearden,"Evidence suggests that the idea of the telegram may have originated with Lt. Gen. Stephen J. Chamberlin." At the time, Director of Intelligence Chamberlin was desperately trying to salvage Paperclip. In February 1948, he told Wisner about his concern over the Army's "considerable burden of maintaining custody." The Army wanted to shut Paperclip down because there was no money to continue surveillance and other custodial duties over Paperclip scientists.34 

The same month, Chamberlin went to Berlin and cautioned Clay as to the pitiful state of readiness of U.S. forces, the fact that military appropriation bills were pending before congressional committees, and the need to rally the public to support increased military expenditures. Chamberlin then asked Clay to sound an alarm to galvanize support. At first Clay insisted that his intelligence reports. showed nothing to arouse suspicion about the Soviets, but later he decided to send a message to Washington. The primary purpose of Clay's telegram, according to the editor of Clay's papers, "was to assist the military chiefs in their Congressional testimony; it was not, in Clay's opinion, related to any change in Soviet strategy. "35 

On March 5 Clay sent Chamberlin the cable expressing his belief that war with the Russians might be imminent. "Within the last few weeks, I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitudes which I cannot define but which now gives me a feeling that it may come with dramatic suddenness," Clay told Chamberlin. The fact that Clay's telegram went on to say that his opinion was not supported by data or hard evidence went unnoticed.36 

Clay's "war warning," as it later was referred to in the Pentagon, hit Washington like an earthquake. Within hours Chamberlin and the assistant secretary of defense had briefed Secretary of Defense James Forrestal on the contents of Clay's message. By evening the word had reached the top echelons of the Navy and Air Force. Within a few weeks Forrestal had a full-blown war scare on his hands. "Papers this morning," Forrestal wrote in his diary, "are full of rumors and portents of war." The New York Times reported: "Top Military Men Urge U.S. To Arm to Show We Would Fight for Freedom," while Clay, trying to undo the damage, told reporters that he was "not the least bit apprehensive" and that "much too much is being made of this." Clay's comments went unheeded in Washington, where, during a Senate hearing, Secretary of the Navy John Sullivan announced that submarines "belonging to no nation west of the `iron curtain' have been sighted off their shores." Ignoring the lack of evidence, the Washington Times Herald headlined the disclosure: "Russian Subs Prowl West Coast Waters."37 

The significant effect of Clay's cable on J.I.O.A projects previously has been ignored by historians and journalists who falsely assumed that the projects ended in the late 1940's. In fact, the resulting war scare escalated National Interest to such an extent that by 1950 U.S. intelligence was smuggling Eastern Europeans with false identities through immigration to Canada, where they were resettled. Later one Royal Canadian Mounted Police officer was shocked to discover that six files of incriminating information had been destroyed and replaced by a "false docket" on a Yugoslavian war crimes suspect who had been sent to Canada by U.S. intelligence. "I would be interested to know how the decision for destruction was reached for it is an action similar to the destruction of police files on Nazis in South America," the RCMP officer told his superior. British intelligence, which ran an identical project, also dumped their so-called "defectors" on Canada, as they had done with Nazi scientists. Canada's undersecretary of state recalled in November 1954 that Canada took in "`British exagents' who were not in fact defectors as originally understood." A Canadian government investigation determined that many of these "ex-agents" were alleged war criminals or Nazi collaborators.38 

The false war scare also invigorated Paperclip as the military received additional funds needed to keep the project going. Paperclip had been operating under a new policy that was supposed to eliminate the project's procurement phase. But J.I.O.A Director Bosquet Wev aptly pointed out in a meeting that the J.I.O.A never interpreted that to mean the end of Paperclip altogether. "In my mind there was no thought given to any ultimate termination date in this thing and the policy was a procedure to go on until such time as a peace treaty with Germany was signed or until the thing just petered out of its own accord," Wev said. As this book reveals, Paperclip finally "petered out" around 1973.39 

An "escape clause" in the policy allowed the J.I.O.A to procure scientists if certain conditions were met, such as a need for skilled workers for projects funded after the new policy went into effect. In the midst of the war scare, one Air Force officer remarked in a J.I.O.A meeting that the "looming war psychology" in Washington had made the Department of Defense more receptive toward Paperclip. The Air Force believed that now it would be easier for the military to obtain money for new projects and bring more Paperclip scientists to America.40 

Ultimately, the overall effect of the war scare on Paperclip was dramatic. The project's focus suddenly shifted toward one goal-to get German scientists out of Europe and away from the Russians by any means possible, even if that meant smuggling them to South American countries, such as the Argentine "Fourth Reich" of Juan and Eva Peron.

next
The Argentine Connection (S.96)

notes

Chapter 7: The Dossiers 
1. JIOA meeting is from Samuel Klaus, "Memorandum for the File," 27 February 1947, State fiche, RG 59, NARS. 
2. Ibid.; for Hilldring complaints about JIOA see Samuel Klaus, "Memorandum for the Files," 26 February 1947, State fiche, RG 59, NARS. 
3. Ibid. 
4. Ibid. 
5. Lieutenant Colonel Montie Cone to JIOA, memo regarding 146 reports, 8 May 1947, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
6. Memo discussing von Braun is in JIOA Director Thomas Ford to USFET, 3 March 1947, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
7. Samuel Klaus, "Meeting," 5 June 1946, State fiche, RG 59, NARS. 
8. On JIOA expunging information see Samuel Klaus, "Memorandum to Secretary JIOA, Regarding Meeting of February 27, 1947," 5 March 1947; on Rickhey see Samuel Klaus, "German Scientist Program," 17 July 1947-both in State fiche, RG 59, NARS. 
9. Author interview with retired Army Colonel Montie Cone. See also Hunt, "Nazi Coverup." 
10. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists"; JIOA Director Bosquet N. Wev to Major General Stephen J. Chamberlin, 2 July 1947, G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
11. Ibid. 
12. For Wev and Cone's complaints to congressmen see Samuel Klaus, "Memorandum," 9 July 1947, State fiche, RG 59, NARS. 
13. Memo, Samuel Klaus to Mr. Eddy, 13 March 1947; Samuel Klaus, "German Scientist Program," 17 July 1947-both in State fiche, RG 59, NARS. 
14. Robinson biography: House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, State Department, Subcommittee hearings, 80th Cong., 2d sess., March 10 and 12, 1948. 
15. Author interview with Samuel Cummings; and Rebecca Wellington letter to author. 
16. Hans Giesecke's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS; and microfilm investigative records of Portland Bund, OHS. 
17. Colonel R. F. Ennis, "Press Release on Project Paperclip," correspondence, Public Relations Division, 20 February 1947; and letter, Major Notes 291 General F. L. Parks to Colonel George Eyster, 21 May 1947-both in G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
18. Cone interview; AFS complaints to Truman: in "Our Scientists Say, `Send Nazis Home,' " Washington Daily News, 24 March 1947. UPI story: USFET to General Parks, War Department, cable SX-2691, 27 Feb ruary 1947, in JIOA administrative files, Cables, RG 330, NARS. Regarding Axsters: Delbert Clark, "Nazis Sent to U.S. as Technicians," The New York Times, 4 January 1947. 
19. Pearson story about Krauch: in cable, War Department, Intelligence Division, WDGS, 11 March 1947, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. See also "Outline for Briefing General Eisenhower on German Scientists Exploitation Program," 11 March 1947; and "The High Points of Conference on Paperclip," meeting held on March 11 and 12, 1947, between General Chamberlin and the chief of staff, the secretary of war, and the assistant secretary of war, with Lieutenant Colonel Hagood briefing-both from G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
20. Key sources on Army intelligence domestic spy operations are in Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Report on Military Surveillance of Civilian Politics, 93d Congress, lst sess., 1973; Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Military Surveillance, hearings 93d Congress, 2d sess., 1974; Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Army Surveillance of Civilians: A Documentary Analysis, 92d Cong., 2d sess., 1972; and Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, no. 94-755. For an overview of military intelligence domestic spy operations see Frank J. Donner, The Age of Surueillance (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980). 
21. Cone interview; and Tyler Abell, ed., Drew Pearson Diaries (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974). 
22. Seymour Nagan, "Top Secret: Nazis at Work," New Republic, 11 August 1947; and memo, "Subject: Seymour Nagan," 11 August 1947, G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
23. Regarding AFS: Colonel R. F. Ennis to Public Relations Division, 3 March 1947; and report by Edward Wetter, chief of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Section, Scientific Branch ID, "Public Meeting on Bi ological Warfare," 5 March 1947-both in G-2 Paperclip files, 400.112 Research, RG 319, WNRC. 
24. JIOA Deputy Director Walter Rozamus to Chief, Exploitation Branch, 17 October 1947, JIOA administrative files, NARS. For more on Adolf Thiel see his JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
25. Major General Robert LeGrow Walsh bio is from the U.S. Air Force; Major General Robert Schow bio is from CMH; Brigadier General William Fagg bio is from the U.S. Air Force. 292 Notes 
26. JIOA Governing Committee Minutes of Meeting, 14 November 1947, G-2 Paperclip "Top Secret" files, RG 319, WNRC. 
27. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists"; and JIOA Deputy Director Walter Rozamus to Exploitation Branch, 18 November 1947, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
28. Anton Beier's Berlin Document Center SS card, Meldebogen, and other reports are in Beier's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
29. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists"; JIOA Deputy Director Walter Rozamus to Captain Francis Duborg, ONI, 28 November 1947, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
30. Herman Kursweg's OMGUS Security Reports, signed by Colonel C. F. Fritzsche, 10 July 1947; and 16 February 1948, are in Kursweg's JIOA dossier. Willi Heybey's OMGUS Security Report, signed by Colonel C. F. Fritzsche, 16 February 1948; and Heybey's SA membership, noted in Meldebogen, are in Heybey's JIOA dossier. Ernst Winkler's OMGUS Security Report, signed by Colonel Robert Schow, 18 November 1946; and by Colonel W. L. Fagg, n.d., and Winkler's SA and other Nazi memberships, noted in Meldebogen, are all in his JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
31. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists"; and memo, Lieutenant Colonel Montie F. Cone to JIOA, 28 November 1947, JIOA 4079, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
32. Ibid.; Guenther Haukohl's OMGUS Security Report, signed by Colonel C. F. Fritzsche, 27 October 1947 and 10 February 1948, are in Haukohl's IRR dossier, RG 319, and his JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. Hans Friedrich statements about Hitler are in Affidavit, 14 May 1947, in Friedrich INSCOM dossier XE222767. 
33. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists"; and JIOA Director Bosquet N. Wev to Director of Intelligence, EUCOM, 4 December 1947, JIOA 4102, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
34. Ibid. 
35. Memo, Robert W. Bruce, Office of Military Government (for Hess) to Commanding General, EUCOM, 12 May 1948, G-2 "Top Secret" Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
36. Ibid.; Heinrich Kliewe's OMGUS Security Report, 11 February 1948, says that Kliewe "was an ardent Nazi. Records available to this headquarters indicate that subject is likely to become a security threat to the United States." The OMGUS Security Report, biography, and memos about the controversy over denazification are in Kliewe INSCOM dossier H8049883. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Anton Beier's OMGUS Security Report, signed by Colonel C. F. Fritzsche, 30 September 1947 and 12 February 1947, are in Beier's JIOA Notes 293 dossier. Ernst Eckert's OMGUS Security Report, signed by Colonel C. F. Fritzsche, 10 February 1948, is in Eckert INSCOM dossier D024720. Information on Friedrich Wazelt is in Security and Immigration Dossier Check Sheet, signed by M. B., 14 February 1950, in Wazelt's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
39. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists"; Wernher von Braun's OMGUS Security Report, signed by Colonel C. F. Fritzsche, 18 September 1947 and 18 September 1948, are in von Braun's FBI file and INSCOM dossiers D8022816 and XE185780. 
40. Hunt, "U.S. Coverup of Nazi Scientists"; and Herbert Axster's OMGUS Security Report, signed by Colonel C. F. Fritzsche, 18 September 1947 and by Colonel W. L. Fagg, 12 May 1948, are in Axster's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
41. Wilhelm Eitel's OMGUS Security Report, signed by Colonel W. L. Fagg, 7 September 1948, and AEC comments, from Security Report by SponsoringAgency, 16 April 1948, are in Eitel's JIOA dossier and INSCOM dossier XE061886. 
42. Wilhelm Eitel's HICOG Security Report, signed by Colonel Charles Adams, 25 November 1948, is in Eitel's INSCOM dossier. 
43. For friends' statements see files in the Ernst Eckert JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS, and INSCOM dossier D024720. Theodor Zobel's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS and INSCOM dossier B8008094. 
44. Information on Busby and his tactics is in House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, State Department. 
45. Busby discusses the Chicago Police Department in ibid. The "red squad" is discussed in Donner, Age of Surveillance. 
46. House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, State Department; Representative McCormack quote is from Congressional Record, 15 May 1952, p. 5266. 
47. Ned Brooks, NBC radio script, 25 March 1948, in JIOA adminisuative files, RG 330, NARS. 
48. Busby speech is in Congressional Record, 25 March 1948; he repeats the charges in Congressional Record, 15 May 1952. 
49. On Robinson quitting: Congressional Record, 15 May 1952; Klaus interview; and Lasby, Project Paperclip. 
50. Hoover meeting: Lieutenant General S. J. Chamberlin to Major General George McDonald, 11 May 1948; and Assistant Secretary USAF to Secretary USAF, 13 May 1948-both in G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
51. Ibid. 
52. JIOA Director Daniel Ellis to JIOA Screening Panel, JIOA 3473, 2 September 1949, G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 

Chapter 8: CIA DIRTY TRICKS IN THE "NATIONAL INTEREST"
1. CIA-OPC cases are in State/National Interest Cases (NIC), JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
2. Procedures for admittance notes that the ninth proviso is used if they are "inadmissible" under U.S. law. See JIOA Director Daniel Ellis to Navy, Air and Army Chiefs of Procurement, JIOA memo 2758, 16 Novem ber 1950, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. The CIA "hundred persons act" is sec. 7 of the CIA act of 20 June 1949, 50 USC 403h. 
3. Rodal, "Nazi War Criminals in Canada," chap. 7 and notes. 
4. For an example of JIOA's sales pitch see JIOA Director Daniel E. Ellis to Dr. Ernest Hollis, U.S. Office of Education, 31 January 1950, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. Company lists are in JIOA post-1952 administrative files (declassified per author's FOIA request), RG 330, NARS. 
5. JIOA Director to Chief, Special Procurement Section, Intelligence Division, 17 October 1949, G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
6. Most CIA-OPC cases were "sponsored" by State, but the military did sponsor some of them-for example, Air Force cases involving Soviet defectors. See NIC files, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
7. Memo, John Russell, U.S. Office of Education, to College and University Administrators, 28 March 1950, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
8. Robert Rice, University of North Carolina, to Colonel Laurin Williams, WDGS, 13 February 1948, G-2 Paperclip files, 400.112 Research, RG 319, WNRC; and report by Wilhelm Krauledat, Intelligence Branch, U.S. Army, 26 July 1947, in Adolf von Hoermann's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
9. Leonard Alberts's Nazi memberships: see Berlin Document Center report, 2 September 1947; and counterespionage activities, Humphries's quote, and other reports, especially a summary of the investigation from Bechtel Corporation records-all in Alberts's IRR dossier EZ012128, RG 319, NARS, or his JIOA dossier, RG-330, NARS. 
10. Ibid. 
11. For fake ID cards and other information on Langfeld see Gcerz Langfeld INSCOM dossier XE208037; "Hitler's Agent Ensconced in Westchester," New York Herald Tribune, 1 August 1940 identifies Langfeld as being seen at the home of Nazi agent. 
12. For a summary of Grace-Ambros history see Joe Conason, "The Corporate State of Grace," Village Voice, 12 April 1983. 
13. Krauch; and Nuremberg document NI-4830. Notes 
14. Bridsh report and quotes are in Senate Committee on Military Affairs, Subcommittee hearings, 79th Cong., lst sess., 1945, pursuant to S. Res. 107 and 146, Elimination of German Resources for War, pt. 10, p. 1276. 
15. Josiah DuBois, The Devil's Chemists (Boston: Beacon Press, 1952). See also Joseph Borkin, The Cnme and Punishment of IG Farben (London: Andre Deutsch Ltd., 1979); references to JIOA objectives lists are in Otto Ambros INSCOM dossier XE021877; and W. R. Grace on JIOA company lists are in JIOA post-1952 administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
16. For lists of Edgewood Arsenal contracts with W. R. Grace and dozens of other companies and universities see "Index to Classified Edgewood Arsenal Records," in U.S. Army custody, WNRC. 
17. Hunt, "Nazi Coverup." 
18. Example of Wisner CIA report is in Herbert Axster's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. CIA-OPC complicity with Nazi war criminals is discussed in Loftus, Belarus Secret, and Simpson, Blowback. OPC history: in Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Final Report, no. 94-755. 
19. Memo, General Stephen Chamberlin to Frank Wisner, 18 February 1948, G-2 Paperclip files, 400.112 Research, RG 319, WNRC. 
20. Regarding State accelerating visas see JIOA Director Bosquet Wev to Navy, Army, Air Intelligence Divisions, JIOA memo 891, 17 March 1948, in G-2 Paperclip files, 014.33, RG 319, WNRC. For results of the meeting with H. L'Heureux see JIOA Deputy Director C. Welte to JIOA Director, 1 June 1948, G-2 Paperclip files, 014.32 Research, RG 319, WNRC. 
21. For discussions of the second clause in National Interest policy, involving aliens other than Germans employed in civilian agencies, "in consideration of exceptional services," see JIC 282/38, JIC memo 285; further discussion on defming the second part of the policy clause is in CCS 334 (G12-44) S. 10-both in RG 218, NARS. Author interview with retired Army Colonel Bernard Geehan. For CIA counsel's comments on CIA hundred persons act see House Committee on the Judiciary, Efficiency of the INS, 96th Cong., lst sess., 31 October 1979. 
22. "Mikolajczyk Got Secret Unit's Aid," The New York Times, 4 November 1947. 
23. For Poles: regarding Jan Kolendo see JIOA Director R. D. Wentworth to H. L'Heureux, JIOA memo 3038, 27 July 1949, and regarding Lieutenant General Izydor Modelski see JIOA Director Daniel Ellis to L'Heureux, JIOA memo 3857, 22 September 1949, both in JIOA administrative files, State/NIC, RG 330, NARS. For Italians, especially Secondo Campini, see Brigadier General Walter Agee to JIOA, 3 May 1950, JIOA 296 Notes administrative files, AF/NIC, RG 330, NARS. Peter Pirogov, Why I Escaped (London: Harvell Press, 1950); and Pirogov records, JIOA AF/NIC files, esp. letter, Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford to JIOA Deputy Director James Skinner, 8 December 1950, regarding how the Internal Security Act held up Pirogov's admission under normal process "by reason of his membership in the two Soviet youth organizations," JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
24. JIOA Deputy Director Walter Rozamus to H. L'Heureux, JIOA memo 3535, 21 October 1947, JIOA administrative files, 383.7 Immigration, RG 330, NARS. Finn proposal and correspondence of Donovan, Gruenther, Kennan, and others are in P and O 091.714 TS (sec. 1, case 1), RG 319, NARS. JIOA records on Finns are in JIOA administrative files, State/NIC, RG 330, NARS. See box 26 for personal immigration information on all Finns, including Kurt Saarela, who jumped ship in Norfolk, Virginia, in 1947. 
25. Letter and attached proposal, Alpo Marttinen to General William Donovan, 29 February 1948 in P and O 091.714 TS (sec. 1, case 1), RG 319, NARS. 
26. Ibid. For later Finn arrivals see State/NIC files in JIOA administrative records, boxes 26 and 33-for lists, entry dates, and a JIOA conference with State in 1950 regarding Finns illegally residing in the United States. 
27. For Army CIC reports and other information on Papkow see Alexander Papkow INSCOM dossier F8011971. 
28. Robert Bishop and E. S. Crayfield, Russia Astride the Balkans (New York: McBride, 1948). 
29. Ibid. 
30. Information on Manicatide: in NIC files, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. Court sentence noting Manicatide by name is in "Rumanians Sentence 82 in Treason Trial," The New York Times, 20 November 1946. 
31. CIA activities in Italy were first disclosed in Representative Otis Pike, "Special Supplement: The CIA Report the President Doesn't Want You to Read," Village Voice, February 16 and 22, 1976. See also William Corson, The Armies of Ignorance (New York: Dial Press,1977); and Simpson, Blozvback. 
32. Balabanoff case: discussed in Minutes of JIOA Governing Committee Meeting, 20 October 1947, G-2 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
33. Ibid. Regarding Saraget, de Gespardi, and general information on the split see The New York Times, January 6-9 and 12, 1947 (regarding Balabanoff speaking), and 14 January 1947. See also "Denounces Communists," The New York Times, 23 December 1947, for an example of Notes 297 Balabanoff assailing the "fascist tactics" of Communists in the American press. 
34. Steven Rearden, The Formative Years (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office,1984), p. 281; General Stephen Chamberlin to Frank Wisner,l9 February 1948, G-2 Paperclip files, 400.112 Research, RG 319, WNRC. 
35. Lucius Clay, The Papers of General Lucius D. Clay, ed. Jean Edward Smith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974). 
36. Ibid., pp. 568-69 (telegram). 
37. Rearden, Formative Years; and Richard Freeland, The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1972). 
38. Rodal, "Nazi War Criminals in Canada." 
39. Wev quote is in Minutes of JIOA Governing Committee Meeting, 11 February 1948, G-2 Paperclip files, 400.112 Research, RG 319, WNRC. 
40. "Looming war" comment: in JIOA Liaison Officers' Conference, 20 July 1950, G-2 "Top Secret" Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. Paperclip policy limiting procurement is SWNCC 257/33.