PART 2:BORDERLINE SECURITY: REPRISAL,CRONYISM,CORRUPTION IN US CUSTOMS SERVICE

Borderline Security

A chronicle of reprisal, cronyism and corruption 

in the U.S. Customs Service

By Bill Conroy

@http://www.narconews.com/nntv/

4 

"The Racist Manifesto"

Whistle blowers are not the only victims of Customs’ good-ol’-boy management style. One Hispanic U.S. Customs inspector stationed along the nation’s southwest border describes the work environment at the federal agency as being similar to the plot of Animal Farm – a 1945 satire of Stalinism penned by George Orwell.

Paraphrasing a passage from the book, the inspector says that when it comes to opportunity within Customs, “Everyone is equal. It’s just that some are more equal than others.”

The bite of that comment underscores the frustration felt by many Hispanic Customs investigative agents and uniformed inspectors, according to a number of agency employees interviewed. In many cases, the employees asked that their names not be used in print because they feared Customs management would retaliate against them.

Along with the charges of inequities in the workplace, sources within Customs also have stepped forward to blow the whistle on what they claim are startling examples of abuse of power within the federal agency.

The sources allege that Customs management has condoned a policy of shredding records used in disciplinary actions in order to keep those documents away from union officials.

The records are called “briefing papers,” according to a legal deposition taken in the fall of 2000 as part of an employee disciplinary hearing involving Hispanic Customs Agent Miguel Contreras.

The briefing paper provides members of Customs’ Disciplinary Review Board (D.R.B) with, among other facts, a synopsis of the case against an employee, proposed charges, the range of potential penalties as well as the disciplinary history of that employee.

“Once we get through the D.R.B process, the briefing (papers), we put those in a shredding bin. ... We have been told that after the (disciplinary review) board has made its presentation, you collect them back (the briefing papers) and then put them in the bin,” states a Customs employee-relations specialist in the legal deposition. “I have been told they (Customs management) didn’t want the union to get their hands on them (the briefing papers).”

The disclosure of the document-shedding practice prompted some strong reactions at the time from individuals who deal with Customs regularly. The allegation even led to a government investigation in the spring of 2001, according to an official with the League of United Latin American Citizens (L.U.L.A.C).

Thomas Allison, a former Customs agent and an attorney who has represented Hispanic Customs agents in discrimination litigation, says the alleged policy of shredding briefing papers, “even if it is limited to just that set of documents, can have serious implications on promotion and disciplinary matters.

“It’s a problem if they are destroying those documents, because they are destroying proof,” Allison adds.

Jim Watkins, media spokesman for the National Treasury Employees Union (N.T.E.U), which represents uniformed Customs employees such as inspectors, says the union is “very concerned about the shredding of documents.”

“When we go into a case involving allegations of disparate treatment, these documents (the briefing papers) are relevant information and should be made available,” he adds. “It’s hard to believe they are shredding them.”

Colleen M. Kelley, national president of NTEU, adds that “if there is a spin being put into these briefing papers to prejudice a case, then it surely would be a major concern.

“If we were involved in a case where we knew this was going on (documents being shredded), we would do everything we could do legally to stop it,” Kelley adds. “... Clearly, nothing should be shredded that is used in a case.”

Dennis Murphy, a spokesman for Customs in Washington, D.C., responded to the shredding allegations by saying, “We don’t operate that way. They (Customs employees) are getting their due process. That’s how we operate.”

Officials with the civil-rights group L.U.L.A.C, which conducted its own investigation of the document-shredding and the Laredo drug-seizure falsification allegations, have a different take on the situation.

“LULAC is extremely concerned about all of the allegations made with respect to document shredding and false reports,” says L.U.L.A.C spokeswoman Julie Marquez. “We are concerned with the shredding of documents in order to keep them away from the union, because this represents a blatant attempt to obstruct the lawful performance of union activities.”

Marquez adds that she was questioned in late April 2001 by an investigator from the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of the Inspector General (O.I.G). She says the meeting with the O.I.G investigator concerned allegations that Customs officials are shredding records used in disciplinary actions in order to keep those documents away from union officials.

“There is an official investigation underway, and we (LULAC) have been contacted and interviewed by an investigator from OIG,” Marquez asserts. “The investigation is related to the matter of document shredding, which we are concerned about because of the impact that type of activity has on the ability to compile data to show disparity of treatment as well as patterns of racial profiling within Customs.”

The O.I.G issued a report on its findings in the document-shredding investigation in December 2001. The report concluded that U.S. Customs Labor Employee Relations (L.E.R) personnel, prior to 2000, were not retaining the “briefing papers” in case files.

“... L.E.R staff recognized that not including the briefing paper as part of the employees’ case file was problematic,” the O.I.G report states. “In the fall of 2000, L.E.R management made the decision to include the briefing paper in the employees’ case file.”

Since that time (through the date of the O.I.G report) L.E.R personnel were able to “recover 284 briefing papers associated with the 339 cases brought before the D.R.B,” according to the O.I.G report. A total of 55 briefing papers were not recovered.

The OIG report did not address the reason why the briefing papers were being shredded, nor did it explore the issue of whether such activity compromised the integrity of any cases brought before the DRB.

The document-shredding practice is only the tip of the iceberg, though, in the ongoing battle between Hispanic Customs agents and the federal law-enforcement agency.

The letter

In the late 1990's, an anonymous letter was sent to Customs headquarters by a Customs agent in El Paso, Texas. The letter was addressed to Raymond Kelly and sent to headquarters in the spring of 1998, about three months before Kelly was sworn in as Commissioner of Customs. On September 29, 1998—nearly two months after Kelly took over the helm at the agency—an Internal Affairs unit from Customs headquarters was dispatched to the El Paso office to investigate the allegations made in the letter.

Copies of the anonymous letter and the subsequent Customs investigative report were obtained from L.U.L.A.C. In addition, related legal documents were obtained in which the anonymous letter writer is identified as Special Agent Sean Mulkearns.

In the correspondence, Mulkearns makes a series of unsubstantiated charges concerning a group of Hispanic Customs agents working in the El Paso Customs Office of Internal Affairs. Mulkearns is Caucasian, and the individuals referred to in the missive as “Mexican Mafia” are Hispanic Customs agents.

Among the accusations made in the letter are the following:

“There are a number of agents/supervisors which have banded together into what the … office calls the ‘Mexican Mafia.’ These agents have gravitated to the Office of Internal Affairs. They have and are pursuing what can only be called ‘vendettas’ against a number of agents. ... Many of these vendettas started years ago but these Mafia agents never forget.”

Later in the letter:

“All of these ringleaders/agents (the Mexican Mafia) have started their careers, either as patrol officers, inspectors, or El Paso police, in the El Paso office’s jurisdiction. They have significant ties and dealings with smugglers. Some rumors state that some smugglers are in their close family relations, but that information is closely guarded. They have positioned themselves to know when one of their ‘OWN’ relatives or close friends is being investigated and to snuff out any competition. ... They (the Mexican Mafia) have gravitated to and infiltrated the Office of Internal Affairs (in Customs’ El Paso office) in a slow and progressive manner.”

Later in the letter:

“I believe if these rogue agents (the Mexican Mafia) are allowed to solidify into a ‘Hit Team’ in I.A (Internal Affairs), it will eventually lead to physical violence and possibly someone being shot.”

Mulkearns at one point refers to the Hispanic agents as a “band of low lifes” and says they should be forced to submit to polygraph tests. “If they refuse to submit, then they should be transferred—with no hope of returning to the El Paso area,” Mulkearns’ letter states.

“I have always believed that nothing sanitizes better than shining the light of day onto it,” the letter concludes.

It is signed (spelling as it appears in the letter): “Sempre Fi, a Good/Honest Customs Agent.”

In response to the letter, and under the watch of Commissioner Kelly, an Internal Affairs unit was flown to El Paso to investigate the charges in Mulkearn’s letter.

The findings of the investigative unit, called a “Flying Squad,” according to the their report, were as follows:

• The agent who wrote the letter admitted under oath that he “wrote the letter because he/she did not get selected for an agent position” in Internal Affairs (I.A) at the El Paso office. “During (Mulkearns’) debriefing on Oct. 8, (he) stated that (he) was ‘pissed off’ at the time (he) wrote the letter primarily because (he) applied for a position with I.A El Paso and was not selected.”
  
  
• Mulkearns admitted under oath that he “embellished some of the information/allegations contained in the anonymous letter.”
  
  
• Mulkearns admitted under oath that he “included false information in the anonymous letter.”
  
  
• Mulkearns admitted under oath that “the anonymous letter contained information/allegations that were hearsay, speculation and the perception of certain individuals who do not like some of the (Hispanic agents).”

“The Headquarters Internal Affairs/Flying Squad (investigation) did not reveal any evidence of misconduct by Office of Internal Affairs/El Paso personnel as described in the anonymous letter … (and) could not corroborate any of the allegations delineated in the anonymous letter,” the investigative report states.

Despite this fact, and an admission in the investigative team’s report that it was “identified early in the investigation” that “many of the allegations were identified as rumor, speculation or unfounded,” the investigation proceeded “in an effort to determine if there was a perception that Internal Affairs/El Paso agents were targeting Office of Investigations/El Paso personnel.”

“Although the (Hispanic agents) voiced their disgust with the allegations and their resentment for the label ‘MEXICAN MAFIA,’ the agents conducted themselves in a courteous and professional manner throughout the … investigation,” the investigative report states.

In addition, even though he admitted under oath that he “embellished” and included “false” information in the correspondence sent to Kelly, Mulkearns was given an opportunity by the investigative unit to rewrite the letter.

Even after the rewrite, the allegations were determined to be unfounded, according to the investigative report, which concluded by stating that “no further investigation by the Headquarters Internal Affairs Flying Squad is anticipated.”

L.U.L.A.C spokeswoman Julie Marquez claims Mulkearns “received a plum duty station assignment” in the wake of the investigation." In addition, Marquez says Hispanic agents who were the targets of Mulkearns’ letter were dispersed to different posts within the Customs Service—as was requested in the letter.

Other sources within Customs also verified this information.

“We have never seen a more hateful, racist document come from a department of the government,” Marquez says. “... I think this letter, this racist manifesto, and how it was handled is really reflective of the mindset of the management of Customs and how it has used its Hispanic agents.”

Customs officials in Washington, D.C., did not provide comment on the letter incident. However, the Customs’ Flying Squad investigative report states: Internal Affairs’ “current policy requires that all allegations, including anonymous information, be investigated and that (Internal Affairs) employees are not immune to this process.”

An e-mail was sent to Commissioner Kelly by a Hispanic agent from Customs’ San Diego field office just weeks prior to the Internal Affairs Flying Squad descending upon El Paso to investigate the letter-writing incident. The e-mail draws out in vivid terms the concerns of Hispanic agents within the agency.

Excerpts from the e-mail, dated Sept. 10, 1998, follow:

Historically, the (U.S. Customs) Office of Investigations has been controlled by a certain group which is perpetuated by cronyism, favoritism, nepotism and the exclusion of minorities. The result of this corrupt system of promotions and selections often enough is the appointment of an individual, not based on experience, training and competence, but on favoritism and membership in exclusive circles. This reflects the lack of professionalism, integrity and dedication to the mission of the Office of Investigations (O.I), and the fostering of sycophancy and self interest/promotion.

... I am sure that you will be bombarded with counter arguments to my observations made in this message, but I beg you please consider the bottom line. There are four S.A.C (special agent in charge) positions in the Southwest border, all of which have a huge Mexican American population, and none of which have a Mexican American S.A.C. The vast majority of undercover work and development of actionable information is done by Mexican American agents. Most Mexican American agents in O.I are assigned to the Southwest border offices. Are we not qualified to lead? Or, are we not part of the controlling faction in O.I? Are we only good enough to be subordinates and not leaders?

... I am deeply concerned that we are facing a moral bankruptcy of leadership in the Office of Investigations. Persons in power seem truly to believe that their authority and leadership derive strictly from the position they encumber, rather than from the integrity, knowledge, experience and dedication that you find within the heart and mind of the individual, and not in any position description. Leadership must be kept strong by strong people, not weakened by cronyistic appointments and incompetence.

The photographs

Despite the risks inherent in standing up to a powerful federal agency like Customs, individuals within the agency continue to put their careers on the line for what they perceive as matters of justice and self-respect, according to agency observers.

One individual who stepped forward is Samuel Rivas St. John, a Customs inspector based in Washington, D.C.

The photographs above and below are of Charles Winwood at a 1994 staff luncheon at U.S. Customs headquarters in Washington, D.C. Copies of the Tex-Mex Fiesta flyer were posted around Customs’ headquarters building to promote the luncheon. Winwood is the individual wearing the sombrero

St. John decided to tangle with the top brass at Customs in the mid-1990's when he filed an Equal Employment Opportunity (E.E.O) discrimination complaint over what he describes as a racist incident. Federal E.E.O statutes, which are enforced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C), make it illegal to discriminate against employees or job applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, disability or age.

St. John’s E.E.O battle with Customs, which lasted some seven years, had its genesis at a 1994 staff party held at Customs headquarters in Washington, D.C. St. John alleges that Charles Winwood went out of his way to belittle Hispanics by attending the luncheon event dressed in the stereotypical sombrero and serape of a Mexican peon.

At the time, Winwood was a senior Customs executive. He later rose through the ranks of Customs, taking over the agency’s top spot in January 2001 with the retirement of Commissioner Raymond Kelly.

Winwood’s rising-star status within Customs, however, did not dissuade St. John from speaking out against him in what St. John deemed a matter of honor. In a May 1998 letter written to then-Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, St. John states:

“I have enclosed photographs of one of your senior executives, Mr. Charles Winwood, assistant commissioner, Office of Strategic Trade, in which Mr. Winwood demonstrates the agency’s attitude toward Hispanics, in this case Mexican-Americans. Mr. Winwood decided to wear a sombrero and serape in order, in his words, ‘to look like a Mexican’ for a TexMex luncheon sponsored by his office. ... I am of Hispanic descent, and I am very proud of my heritage. When I see such displays of blatant insensitivity, especially from a senior executive, it is impossible to ignore or just pass it off as an isolated incident. I have filed a formal complaint on this matter….”

Even though the photographs were taken a number of years ago, they have retained a long shelf life, according to several Customs insiders familiar with the incident.

“They have had a life of their own…,” concedes Customs spokesman Dennis Murphy.

Those who raise concerns about the photographs do so in the context of the large number of Hispanics employed by Customs. Prior to being merged into the Department of Homeland Security in 2003, some 3,900 of Customs’ roughly 20,000 employees were Hispanic.

“This is a stereotype we’ve been fighting for years to erase from the American psyche—a picture of a Mexican peon taking a nap with a bottle of tequila. It’s equivalent to someone putting on black face,” says L.U.L.A.C’s Julie Marquez. “It’s having fun at the expense and pain of another cultural group that you don’t understand. It’s insensitive, and he (Winwood) needs to look inward if he fails to see the pain it causes.”

In defense of Winwood’s behavior, Murphy stresses that the incident occurred as part of a “let-your-hair-down” office party for employees at Customs headquarters in Washington, D.C.

“This happened to be a Southwestern theme lunch, and he (Winwood) put on a sombrero and poncho,” Murphy explains. “His intent was to build office camaraderie.”

St. John stresses, though, that Winwood was the only one dressed “in costume” for the luncheon.

“(Winwood’s) costume shows insensitivity to Hispanics,” stresses attorney and former Customs Agent Tom Allison. “It’s like the Frito Bandido commercial. Here’s some guy dressed in a costume that Mexicans find offensive in order to make fun of them. It’s insensitive and it shows up in everything they (the top management of Customs) do.”

Murphy confirms that someone at the 1994 luncheon did complain about Winwood’s behavior. That resulted in an investigation into the incident by the Treasury Office of Inspector General (O.I.G). “They (O.I.G) determined that no (disciplinary) action was necessary,” Murphy adds.

Murphy says he cannot explain why no one else was dressed in a costume. He stresses, though, that there were Southwestern-theme decorations and Mariachi performers at the party. In addition, he says Winwood subsequently made a general apology stating that he did not intend to offend anyone.

However, that apology was of very little consolation to St. John—who contends he was subjected to retaliation and was passed over for promotions after filing his discrimination complaint concerning the incident. In a second letter sent to Treasury Secretary Rubin in June 1998, St. John states:

“The bottom line is that this incident did take place and it was a disgraceful and unpardonable offense by a senior Customs executive. ... For (Winwood) to parade around the Customs headquarters building in a serape and sombrero to ‘look like a Mexican’ as Mr. Winwood stated, is absolutely deplorable and cannot be brushed off with just an apology. This is a senior Customs executive we are talking about. ...”

St. John adds that  the flyer distributed to Customs employees promoting the 1994 luncheon was equally disturbing in that it includes a demeaning drawing of a Mexican bandit and it makes reference to Poncho and Cisco—also considered belittling characterizations of Mexicans.

As evidence of the uphill struggle St. John endured, he points out that his complaint was fought tooth and nail by Customs and was still pending a hearing before an E.E.O judge some seven years after it was initially filed. St. John says his E.E.O case was finally settled in September 2001. The settlement terms are confidential, he adds.

No Fault

St. John’s long, contentious battle with Customs is not unique. E. William Velasco, who served as the acting assistant commissioner of Internal Affairs for the Customs Service before retiring in May 1999, paints a bleak picture of the culture within the agency as well.

Velasco, who is Hispanic, says he attained a high position within Customs, “but I had to fight and scratch all the way there, and I had to file EEO actions repeatedly.

“I endured discrimination there (in Customs) for many years; it goes back 15 to 20 years,” adds Velasco, who retired from Customs in 1999. “I made the best qualified list (for jobs) numerous times, and I was never promoted. Finally, I had enough of it and I decided to file through E.E.O.”

Velasco adds that he “was privy to a lot of high-level meetings” in his executive role with Customs.

“Frankly,” he says, “the mentality was that there was no way they (Customs) were going to give in to anyone. They were not concerned with right or wrong. They were concerned about giving in. The issue was whether they (Customs) would be found at fault.”

Customs Agent Romeo Salinas learned that reality first-hand. A jury in a federal court case in Laredo awarded Salinas $1 million in actual damages in June 2000. The jury found that Customs failed to promote Salinas in retaliation for that agent’s prior E.E.O filings. Despite the hefty jury verdict, under the law, the statutory maximum Salinas was entitled to recover was $300,000 in damages.

During the trial, Salinas’ attorney, Ronald Tonkin of Houston, called as a witness a former assistant commissioner of Customs, who provided testimony detailing the retaliatory culture within the U.S. Customs Service. In addition, 10 other former and current Customs employees testified that they, too, had suffered retaliation from Customs officials.

According to Tonkin, immediately after the jury award, the government filed a motion seeking to reduce the judgment in the Salinas case to nominal damages. Tonkin says the government’s attorney proposed to him that Salinas should receive only $10,000 in damages. In addition, Tonkin says “a couple of days after the jury made its decision, my client (Salinas) was suspended (from his Customs job) for two days.

“Even when it’s a clear-cut case, Customs will continue to fight it by filing more appeals,” says Tonkin, who is a former federal prosecutor. “In my client’s case, it has already cost $180,000 in expenses (as of June 2000) and attorney’s fees, and Customs is still fighting it. They (Customs) try to bury you in paperwork and spend an inordinate amount of time and money fighting these things.”

In January 2001, the judge in the Laredo case ruled in favor of Salinas, granting him the maximum amount of compensatory damages, $300,000, as well as ordering the government to cover back pay, medical expenses, attorney’s fees and court costs. Tonkin adds, though, that the U.S. Attorney’s Office appealed the U.S. District Court judge’s ruling.

The federal appeals court ultimately remanded the case back to the district court on the issue of compensatory damages and Salinas agreed to accept the suggestion of the appeals court for a $150,000 settlement. In addition, the final judgment required Customs to provide Salinas with, in round numbers, $38,000 in back pay, plus $9,000 in interest; $16,000 for past medical expenses; $157,000 in attorney’s fees; and $26,000 in court costs — plus another $5,000 in attorney’s fees to conclude the case.

However, as of year-end 2002, Tonkin said Customs had still not provided Salinas with proper notification of a promotion he had earned, nor had the agency made good on the back pay and interest due.

The foot-dragging by the agency prompted Tonkin to fire off the following threat in a letter to the deputy assistant commissioner of Customs:

“In the event that I do not receive in WRITING … verification that the above items have been addressed and that the necessary steps have been taken to comply with the judgment, you will leave me no alternative but to bring on a motion for contempt of the District Court for your failure … to comply with the judgment,” wrote Tonkin in the letter.

Several months later, the government finally fulfilled the terms of its settlement with Salinas.

Throwing rocks

Ricardo Sandoval, the resident agent in charge of the Customs Office of Investigations in El Centro, Calif., in July 2000 won a U.S. Court of Appeals case in which Customs was challenging a 1998 lower court’s finding that he had been the victim of discrimination and retaliation. In that lower-court case, Sandoval raised allegations that a neo-Nazi ring was operating inside the Customs Service in the San Diego area. The case stemmed from an incident in 1992 in which Sandoval’s first-line supervisor in the Office of Internal Affairs in Calexico, Calif., ordered him to investigate a complaint that involved a white supervisor assaulting a black officer.

Legal documents filed in federal court in Washington, D.C., in May 2002 in a related class-action discrimination lawsuit against Customs describe the rock-throwing incident as follows:

Several white Customs managers had thrown rocks at Ken Lakes and it appeared to be racially motivated. One of the perpetrators wore a Nazi Swastika ring. Evidence was developed showing that these Customs managers collected Nazi memorabilia and they had scrawled swastikas on lockers and elevators in Customs buildings.

Sandoval came to believe that a neo-Nazi group was behind the incident. He reported it to his superiors and recommended that it be referred to the United States Attorney’s Office for prosecution as a “hate crime” under the civil rights statutes. His request was denied and he was told that Customs would send out a memo saying inspectors should not throw rocks at black employees.

Sandoval ignored his superiors and reported the results of his investigation to the United States Attorney’s Office, where the case was referred to the Justice Department’s hate crimes unit in Washington, D.C.

Thereafter, Agent Sandoval’s upgrade to GS-14 (rank) was denied and he was not selected for the Internal Affairs/Office of Enforcement rotation. He did not receive temporary acting supervisory assignments. Based on the foregoing, Agent Sandoval filed an E.E.O complaint alleging discrimination and retaliation.

In 1998, a California federal jury awarded Sandoval $200,000 for discrimination and retaliation. Several jurors said they believed that corruption and discrimination may be systemic within the Customs Internal Affairs unit where Sandoval worked in 1992.

“He (Sandoval) has been under investigation for frivolous things for years,” says Sandoval’s attorney in the California case, David Spivak. “It’s all retaliation.”

Spivak adds that Customs fought the award of attorney’s fees in relation to Sandoval’s 1998 case. In addition, Customs took nearly a year to make good on the damages awarded to Sandoval after the appeals court ruled in his favor in July 2000.

“The EEO process with respect to Customs is a shambles,” Velasco says. “... Once this issue gets outside that building in Washington, the truth will come out.”

5 The Hydra

One Customs Agent Accidentally Shot Another: Guess Which Agent Got promoted?

Customs Agent John Yera stood in the parking lot of a Holiday Inn hotel on June 25, 1991. He was wearing a wire and working an undercover operation targeting two Colombian drug smugglers.

Yera was in the parking lot for an exchange of 100 kilos of cocaine. The U.S. Attorney and Yera’s group supervisor had instructed him to get the Colombian suspects to handle the cocaine, which was stashed in the trunk of a car.

Unfortunately, Yera’s supervisor failed to brief him on how or when the take-down team would approach the scene to make the arrests. Yera also found out later that the agents monitoring his wire did not speak Spanish.

As result, Yera, along with the suspects, were caught off guard when the take-down team suddenly converged on the parking lot. Among the first on the scene was Group Supervisor Phillip Shields, who raced in with his car, his gun drawn, his finger on the trigger.

Shields hit the brakes and shifted the vehicle into park. In the process, his gun accidentally discharged. The bullet ripped through Yera’s back, hitting his spine just above his waist—leaving Yera paralyzed from the stomach down.

In a segment aired nationally in 1999 on the ABC-TV news-magazine show “20/20,” Customs Commissioner Raymond Kelly stated the following: “John Yera is clearly a hero, and we should be championing people like John Yera. He certainly has done the job we asked of him. He’s doing excellent work now in our cyber-crimes smuggling center.”

Despite the commissioner’s public praise of Yera, the paralyzed agent wasn’t getting a hero’s welcome behind the scenes. In fact, the careless actions of his supervisors in the botched drug bust as well as the treatment he received from Customs in the wake of the shooting compelled Yera to join in a class-action discrimination lawsuit filed by Hispanic agents against Customs.

“Had sufficient care been taken to ensure that a Spanish-speaking agent was monitoring the undercover wire, Agent Yera would not have been injured,” states the class-action litigation filed in federal court in Washington, D.C., in May 2002. “Similarly situated non-Hispanic agents who speak English during undercover assignments are not treated in a similar fashion. The lack of concern here is reflective of the discriminatory animus against Hispanic special agents.”

The lawsuit goes on to point out that none of the supervisory agents involved in the botched undercover operation were disciplined. “In fact, Customs promoted Phillip Shields, the supervisory agent who shot John Yera,” the lawsuit states.

In the wake of the shooting, Yera spent about two years in rehabilitation. “During this time, he was forced to stay in a hotel for a year until handicapped accessible housing could be obtained for him,” the class-action lawsuit states. “The Customs Service denied him per diem allowance for this entire period. The added financial burden piled insult on injury.”

Among the other problems confronted by Yera after the shooting included having to endure delay after delay—waiting nearly a year and half—to get approval from Customs’ management to telecommute to his job, according to attorney Tom Allison, who was involved in the early stages of the class-action litigation. Yera sought permission to work from a computer at home because occasionally the pain from his injury or inclement weather make it impossible for him to get into the office.

“While assigned to the Cybersmuggling Center in 2002, Agent Yera and another Hispanic agent were speaking Spanish,” the 2002 class-action complaint states. “Customs Program Manager Claude Davenport told them both that they should stop speaking Spanish and speak ‘American.’”

Ironically, according to the litigation, Davenport had previously asked Yera to help translate some Spanish documents.

“People sometimes don’t always like the truth,” says one Customs agent who asked not to be named. “But the truth is, Customs did this to him (Yera), and they don’t seem to care. Until you’ve been a victim of discrimination, maybe you can’t realize how much it hurts and pulls in your gut, and makes you feel alone.”

Class action

Charges that U.S. Customs engages in racial profiling by subjecting a disproportionate number of minorities to searches at airports led to congressional hearings in the spring of 1999.

Similarly, Senate and U.S. Treasury probes were launched in 1999 into allegations that the agency’s internal discipline system was wracked with problems, including lax enforcement, favoritism and inadequate follow-up. Customs officials also were accused of retaliating against whistleblowers who reported wrongdoing.

In the wake of the publicity and scrutiny, officials with Customs, including Commissioner Raymond Kelly, promised Congress and the public that the problems would be fixed.

“While instances of corruption in Customs are few … we may not have always done a good job in responding to allegations of misconduct. That is changed,” Assistant Commissioner of Customs William Keefer told a Senate committee in May 1999.

However, like the mythical Hydra, a beast that sprouts two new heads for every head severed, the problems within the federal agency continue to multiply, according to a number of current and former Hispanic Customs agents.

Those agents decided to strike at the heart of the beast by banding together to expose what they allege is a machine-style system of management within Customs that is dominated by a good-ol’-boy network of powerful Anglos who are perpetuating a culture of institutionalized racism.

To that end, as of September 2000, several dozen former and current Hispanic Customs agents had paid a $225 retainer to the law firm pressing an Equal Employment Opportunity (E.E.O) class-action complaint against Customs, according to Thomas Allison, who represented the agents in the litigation.

“If it was shown through congressional hearings that Customs was racially profiling citizens, why is it hard to believe the agency is racially profiling its own employees?” asks one Hispanic Customs agent who asked to remain anonymous. “Eventually, I’ll retire, but what happens to the people who remain? The animal (racism) will still be there eating everything up.”

The class-action discrimination complaint, which was launched in March 1995 by Special Agent Miguel Contreras, had grown to encompass a class of some 400 active and retired agents in the offices of Investigations and Internal Affairs by the spring of 2002.

The original complaint alleged that the Customs Service’s “policies and practices toward Spanish-speaking agents, specifically regarding how they are assigned, have a negative impact with respect to training, promotions and discipline.”

Allison stresses, though, that the case was fought tooth and nail every step of the way by Customs officials. He says it took five years of legal battles finally to move the E.E.O case to the discovery phase.

“We’ve run into a brick wall with every decision made in this case being appealed by Customs,” Allison says. “Frankly, they (the appeals) have been a waste of time on everyone’s part. If there’s a problem in Customs, it’s in everyone’s best interest to look into it and get it resolved.”

In addition to the alleged stonewalling, the agents participating in the case, Allison asserts, have lived in fear of retaliation from the agency. Allison took the case all the way through the E.E.O process. Then, in 2002, another lawyer, Ron Schmidt of Washington, D.C.-based Shaffer, Rapaport & Schmidt, stepped in to take on the next phase of the battle.

Schmidt, whose firm has since merged with New York City-based Garvey Schubert Barer, moved the class-action complaint into federal court in May 2002. The lawsuit names eight Hispanic agents as plaintiffs who claim they are suing Customs as representatives of a class of more than 400 active and retired agents.

The lawsuit filed in federal court in Washington, D.C., like the E.E.O action, alleges that Customs has engaged in a pattern of discrimination against Hispanic agents. That discrimination, which the lawsuit claims dates back to the 1970's, manifests itself in differential treatment as it relates to promotions, transfers and assignments, awards and bonuses, training, and discipline.

“The (lawsuit) further alleges that the Customs Service maintained a hostile work environment, retaliated against agents for asserting their EEO rights and discriminated against them by denying foreign-language pay awards,” states a press release issued by Schmidt.

In addition to back pay and compensatory damages, the Hispanic agents ask the court to grant a permanent injunction requiring Customs to cease and desist “from continuing to engage in the illegal and discriminatory conduct…,” the lawsuit states.

The litigation was still pending in federal court as of early 2004.

Another court filing related to the class-action case illustrates the insidious nature of the alleged racism that the Hispanic agents are seeking to expose. The related filing asserts that Customs was among the three federal law-enforcement agencies that were previously “the subject of congressional hearings in connection with the `Good O’ Boy Roundup,’ and all had agents attending or organizing the event. All (three agencies) have tolerated an atmosphere of discrimination, harassment and retaliation for at least three decades.”

The Good O’ Boy Roundup was an annual party held in the backwoods of Tennessee that was marked by blatant racist activity. The other two agencies involved in the 1995 congressional hearings were the U.S. Secret Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (B.A.T.F)—both also part of the Treasury Department at the time.

“On July 11, 1995, a newspaper article appeared on the front page of the Washington Times entitled, Racist ways die hard at Lawmen’s retreat—Annual ‘Good O’ Boy Roundup’ cited as evidence of ‘Klan Attitude’ at B.A.T.F,” states a March 2002 court filing by the law firm of Shaffer, Rapaport & Schmidt. “... The article detailed allegations of racist misconduct by personnel of the B.A.T.F and other federal law enforcement agencies at an annual retreat outside Ocoee, Tenn.”

The court pleading continues as follows:

“... The tape (of the event) was shocking. It showed a ‘Nigger check point’ sign at which, ostensibly, cars were checked to determine whether blacks were trying to attend the Roundup. Another sign asked, ‘Any niggers in that car?’ There were also Confederate flags posted at the event.

“In his testimony (before the Senate Judiciary Committee in July 1995) B.A.T.F Director John Magaw … acknowledged that racist activity had taken place at the Roundup every year it occurred since 1985. Director Magaw described to the committee some of the activities at the Roundup, including a skit that was put on in which a person dressed as a Ku Klux Klansman simulated performing sodomy on a person with a blackened face.”

Customs contends the allegations raised in the Hispanic agents’ class-action lawsuit are without merit. The agency asserts that the claims in the complaint are not supported statistically. The federal law-enforcement agency stresses further that Hispanic agents have received the number of promotions to supervisory and management positions that would be expected as part of a race-neutral system.

In a prepared press statement issued May 23, 2002, concerning the class-action case, Customs states the following:

The U.S. Customs Service is proud of its diverse workforce, which includes a significant number of Customs special agents of Hispanic ancestry. The allegations of this lawsuit, that Customs has discriminated against Hispanic Customs agents, are without merit and are not supported by statistical evidence.

... For the past seven years, the U.S. Customs Service has been defending a class-action complaint by plaintiff Miguel Contreras and his attorneys before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C). This complaint was filed by Agent Contreras on behalf of a class of the agency’s Hispanic special agents. The case was scheduled for a five-week trial before an administrative judge beginning June 10, 2002. In preparation for this trial, the parties were ordered to prepare and submit a statistical analysis supporting their respective cases by May 10, 2002. On that date, instead of filing the report as ordered by the judge, the plaintiff’s attorneys requested dismissal of their case from the E.E.O.C and filed a lawsuit in federal district court in the District of Columbia.

While the U.S. Customs Service supports all employees’ rights to avail themselves of any and all appropriate systems to lodge a complaint or grievance, and takes all allegations of discrimination very seriously, the action to withdraw from the seven-year E.E.O.C proceeding and today’s press conference (announcing that decision), indicate an apparent desire by the plaintiff’s attorneys to try this case in the media, not in the courtrooms.

In the case of Agent Miguel Contreras, according to some Customs observers, the agency appears to have gone to extraordinary lengths to ensure the price of pursuing such litigation is taken “very seriously”—specifically by other agents seeking to file similar claims in the future.

“Concern over retaliation by Customs has been ongoing for us,” stresses attorney Allison. “Look at what happened to Contreras; his participation (in the class-action case) we believe led to severe disciplinary action. ... The problem is that in (Customs’) offices of Investigation and Internal Affairs, there is a very centralized system of strong managers who promote who they want, and when they don’t like someone, those people suffer, and where they suffer is in the assignments they get.”

Retaliation

By most measures, Agent Miguel Contreras was living out the American dream—until he decided to tangle with the brass at Customs.

Contreras immigrated to the United States from Mexico when he was 12. He worked as a laborer in the farm fields of Arizona and California to support himself and later worked his way through college.

After serving as a local police officer in Michigan for several years, Contreras landed a job as a special agent with the U.S. Defense Investigative Service in San Diego. Two years later, in 1983, he became a special agent with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service in San Francisco.

Contreras went on to work as a special agent with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (D.E.A) and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (B.A.T.F) before joining the Customs Service in 1988 as a special agent.

Throughout his career, Contreras has been in the thick of dangerous undercover work, a fact that is apparently not unusual for Hispanic Customs agents. The Hispanic agents’ class-action lawsuit filed in May 2002 in Washington, D.C., spells it out this way:

“Hispanic special agents are often assigned to undercover (operations) without proper training or adequate back-up support. The Customs Service subsequently devalues undercover work and Spanish-language-related investigative activities in terms of promotions (and) awards. ... As a result of the Customs Service’s use of such methods of assigning cases, Hispanic special agents are assigned to fewer high-profile cases, receive cases that are not career-enhancing, and are disproportionately tasked to undercover work and other Spanish-language-related duties than are similarly situated white non-Hispanic special agents.”

In addition, the lawsuit claims, Hispanic agents, compared to their fellow Anglo agents, are more likely to be assigned to the Southwest border and Puerto Rico. Hispanic agents also are more likely to be stationed at small offices “and therefore are less likely to receive the diverse work experience necessary for promotion,” the class-action lawsuit alleges.

In Contreras’ case, over the course of his career at Customs, he has been assigned to a number of undercover operations in California and Michigan. One of those operations involved infiltrating a Colombian drug ring in Detroit, which he did successfully, resulting in the arrest and conviction of several individuals on charges of drug trafficking and money laundering.

However, as appears to be the case for many other Hispanic agents, Contreras’ successful undercover work for Customs came at a steep price for his own career. “The inordinate amount of undercover and Spanish-language-related duties he (Contreras) was assigned adversely affected his opportunity to obtain the diverse experiences necessary for promotion,” the class-action lawsuit alleges.

Despite the obstacles, Agent Contreras continued to work hard and advanced through the ranks at Customs. By 1995, he had been promoted to a field management position: resident agent in charge (R.A.C) for the El Centro, Calif., Internal Affairs office. That same year he filed his class-action E.E.O complaint against Customs. From that point on, Contreras’ problems at Customs began to escalate.

Between 1996 to 2002, Contreras applied for 40 higher-level positions, frequently making the best-qualified list for the posts, but was never interviewed for any of the jobs.

“In most cases, white special agents with similar or less experience or qualifications were selected,” states the Hispanic agents’ class-action lawsuit.

After battling Customs for some five years on the EEO front, in 2000 Contreras found himself demoted in rank and stationed at a small Customs office in Yuma, Ariz.

By the spring of 2002, Contreras—then a senior special agent with the Office of Investigation in Yuma—was out of work after being placed on administrative leave.

Contreras points out that he was suspended in the wake of informing his supervisors that he was taking anti-depressant medication. Contreras also had filed a workers’ compensation claim against Customs, alleging that the agency had caused his depression.

Contreras’ supervisors would later claim he was unfit for duty because he was an alcoholic, a charge Contreras contends they trumped up to justify their actions.

As part of the administrative leave, Contreras’ gun, government car, office keys and credentials were taken away from him. Contreras was then ordered to undergo a series of psychiatric examinations. About three months after those examinations were completed, Contreras received a letter from Customs:

“In September 2002, you underwent an agency-directed psychiatric fitness-for-duty examination. The results of the examination indicated that you are not medically fit for full duty as a U.S. Customs Service Criminal Investigator, to include carrying firearms. Agency representatives are currently conducting a job search to determine if there is an appropriate position available within the scope of your medical restrictions….”

The letter also encouraged Contreras to explore disability retirement options.

As of early 2004, Contreras was still battling to overturn Customs’ decision. He points out that his medical doctor and psychologist both gave him the green light to return to work as an agent. In his view, Customs railroaded him to undermine his credibility in the class-action lawsuit.

A Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A) request was sent to Customs in November 2001 seeking all records maintained by the agency on Contreras since 1994 that are related to “Merit Systems Protection Board, Equal Employment Opportunity (E.E.O) and whistle blowing activity and proceedings.” More than two years after the request was made, Customs had still not produced any of the records.

However, Richard Anthony, a Customs staffer charged with reviewing documents related to FOIA requests, says there are about eight boxes of material containing some 25,000 pages of documents that are under review in relation to the Contreras FOIA request.

“This certainly is not normal,” Anthony says.

The trail of alleged retaliation against Contreras between 1995 and 2002 is marked by numerous career-threatening actions taken by Customs.

The Hispanic agents’ class-action lawsuit sheds some light on the agency’s treatment of Contreras:

• “In July 1998, Agent Contreras was investigated for theft of government property and unauthorized use of government property when he and another Hispanic special agent posted a message in T.E.C.S (the Treasury Enforcement Communications System) regarding his class action complaint.”
  
  
• “In October 1999, Special Agent Contreras was served with a letter of removal for allegedly divulging confidential information to his secretary regarding her son’s involvement in drug activities. Agent Contreras had received information that the woman’s son was going to be killed by members of a drug organization. Agent Contreras appealed this action to the Merit Systems Protection Board (or M.S.P.B, which hears and decides appeals of personnel actions taken against federal employees).”
  
  
• “In June 2000, Agent Contreras settled his M.S.P.B appeal by agreeing to accept a reduction in grade (rank) to GS-13 in exchange for all pending charges being expunged from his personnel file. During negotiations, Customs attorney Dylan Medina suggested that Contreras could obtain better terms if he would dismiss his class-action suit. Contreras refused to compromise the interests of the class.”
  
  
• “In 2000, Special Agent Contreras also was investigated by the Department of Treasury’s Inspector General because his cousin was married to an alleged drug smuggler. His last contact with the cousin was at a family funeral in 1995.”
  
  
• “In 2002, the acting S.A.I.C (special agent in charge in Arizona) served Special Agent Contreras with a ‘Letter of Caution’ because Contreras granted an interview to the Hispanic newspaper, ‘Bajo El Sol,’ for an article dealing with his rise from migrant farm worker to customs special agent criminal investigator. In the article, Contreras advised young people to ‘stay away from drugs and violence, and to try and find ways to succeed and be happy through formal education.’”

Contreras is not the only agent participating in the class-action lawsuit against Customs who has been the victim of alleged retaliation by the agency. Ruben Gonzalez, associate special agent in charge (A.S.A.I.C) of Customs’ Houston Office of Investigations, also paid a price for testifying in the spring of 2002 in an E.E.O deposition in Washington, D.C., regarding discrimination against Hispanic agents.

“When (Gonzalez) returned to the Houston, Texas, Office of Investigations where he serves as the GS-15 A.S.A.I.C, Gonzalez discovered that he had been replaced and that a GS-14 special agent had been put in an acting position as the A.S.A.I.C,” states the Hispanic agents’ class-action lawsuit. “Special Agent Gonzalez … was told that a GS-14 was put in charge because the special agent in charge did not know when Gonzalez would return from Washington. This action was retaliatory…. Agent Gonzalez’s secretary knew his itinerary and he could easily have been reached by cell phone.”

The Houston incident was far from the first time Gonzalez had run into career setbacks at Customs. From 1994 to 2001, Gonzalez applied for more than 34 GS-15 and Senior Executive Service (SES) positions. He made the “best-qualified” list for every GS-15 post he sought, “yet he was never interviewed for any of them,” according to the class-action lawsuit. When he finally did receive a promotion, he was forced to move his family from the East Coast to Houston.

The treatment dished out to agents Contreras and Gonzalez stands in sharp contrast to the treatment of Customs employees like the supervisor in Laredo who was accused of falsifying drug-bust records; or Sean Mulkearns, the author of the so-called “racist manifesto” directed at Hispanic agents in the El Paso Customs Office of Internal Affairs. Sources within the agency also point to another egregious example of disparate treatment with respect to disciplinary action. The case involves a supervisory special agent in Customs’ Office of Investigation.

An agent under the supervisor became suspicious of the supervisor’s use of a computer in the office dedicated to conducting child-pornography investigations. After compiling substantial evidence that the supervisor was likely using Customs equipment to view pornography, the special agent sent a letter in August 2000 to Customs Office of Internal Affairs to report the supervisor’s activities.

The end result, according to sources, is that the supervisor received a two-week suspension. The letter sent by the agent is reprinted below. Names and locations have been removed to protect the identities of the parties involved.

Internal memo

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DATE: August 22, 2000

TO: U.S. Customs Service, Office of Internal Affairs

SUBJECT: Inappropriate use of U.S. Customs Service equipment

I feel that it is my responsibility to report something that has been occurring in the … office of the U.S. Customs Service, Office of Investigations, for an extended period of time. I am not making this report due to any personal dislike or bad feelings against the individual involved. On the contrary, I think of the individual as a friend, but I feel that certain things that he has been doing need to be reported. To follow is, to the best of my knowledge, a chronological course of events that I have witnessed. Please understand that some of the dates are approximations since I am only now thinking back on them, having failed to see their true importance at the time that they occurred.

On Aug. 1, 1998, I transferred to the … office from the … office of the U.S. Customs Service, Office of Investigations. After working in the office for a few months, I began to notice that Supervisory Resident Agent (S.R.A) A.A would frequently work at a computer maintained in a common area of the office. Initially, I didn’t think that it was unusual for S.R.A A.A to work on that specific computer since it was a “stand-alone” (not connected to the Treasury Enforcement Communications System) computer used by the whole office to do miscellaneous work. I first began to notice that every time that S.R.A A.A used the computer, he turned the computer monitor screen at an angle so that people passing by could not readily see what he was doing on the computer. I then remembered that the computer had Internet access for utilization in a child pornography Internet operation that Senior Special Agent (S.S/A) B.B was actively working. I began to wonder if S.R.A A.A was using the computer to access the Internet….

Shortly after developing my suspicions, in approximately November 1998 to January 1999, I noticed S.R.A A.A once again using (the stand-alone) computer with the screen turned at an angle. After S.R.A A.A finished using the computer, I opened the computer’s Netscape Internet browser program. I checked the browser history and found that Internet pornography sites had been accessed during the time that S.R.A A.A was sitting at the computer. I then checked the browser history again after approximately two more times when S.R.A A.A was utilizing the computer and found the same results. S.R.A A.A utilized the (stand-alone) computer in the above described manner on a regular basis so there was not a long time between developing my suspicions and confirming them.

Initially, after my discovery, I thought that maybe S.R.A A.A was assisting S.S/A B.B with his child pornography Internet operation. In approximately January 1999, I told S.S/A B.B what I had recently discovered and asked him if S.R.A A.A was assisting him with his operation. S.S/A B.B advised me that S.R.A A.A was not assisting him with his operation and that he too had previously made the same discovery as I. S.S/A B.B stated that he discovered that S.R.A A.A was accessing Internet pornography as early as nearly the beginning of when the office first got Internet access. According to S.S/A B.B, S.R.A A.A was utilizing both (the stand-alone) computer as well as the … computer in S.S/A B.B’s office to access Internet pornography sites. S.S/A B.B advised me that for a long time he had been concerned that S.R.A A.A’s actions would jeopardize his child pornography Internet operation. S.S/A B.B also advised me that he was concerned that if it was ever discovered that someone was accessing Internet pornography on (an office) computer that he would be the one blamed. S.S/A B.B stated that he had been accumulating evidence of S.R.A A.A’s actions so as to protect himself from such blame. S.S/A B.B explained that he could prove that he was not the one accessing the pornography because he had browser log records (cache records) that he had maintained showing that the Internet sites were accessed from his computer on days that he was on annual leave or out of the office.

From approximately January 1999 to the summer of 1999, I noticed, on a regular basis—approximately every few days—S.R.A A.A utilizing (the stand-alone) computer with the monitor turned at an angle. I also noticed, on a less frequent basis, S.R.A A.A utilizing S.S/A B.B’s (office) computer in the same manner. I occasionally checked the Internet browser history for the times that S.R.A A.A was at (the stand-alone) computer and confirmed that Internet pornography sites had been accessed.

In the summer of 1999, the … office received two new lap-top computers. S.R.A A.A took one of the lap-top computers and hooked it up to the Internet in his office. Since then, I have noticed, on an almost daily basis, S.R.A A.A utilizing the lap-top computer in his office with the screen turned away from the door. I have not confirmed that S.R.A A.A has utilized the lap-top computer in his office to access Internet pornography sites, though it is my suspicion that that is what he is doing when he has the screen turned away from the door.

From approximately the summer of 1999 to May 2000, I continued to observe S.R.A A.A utilizing (the stand-alone computer) and S.S/A B.B’s computer, as well as the lap-top computer. In the same manner as described above, S.S/A B.B advised me on several occasions that he had confirmed that S.R.A A.A was continuing to access Internet pornography sites on his computer when he was on annual leave or out of the office. S.S/A B.B also noticed that, after using his or (the stand-alone) computer, S.R.A A.A had started attempting to erase the cache records. According to S.S/A B.B, S.R.A A.A had also changed the Netscape browser history retention date from thirty (30) days to one (1) day.

On May 9, 2000, while in … to effect an arrest warrant, S.S/A B.B, S.S/A C.C, and myself, were discussing events in (our) office. S.S/A C.C had worked in the same office as S.S/A B.B and S.R.A A.A prior to transferring to a different office. S.S/A B.B mentioned to S.S/A C.C that S.R.A AA regularly accesses Internet pornography sites on the (office) computers. S.S/A C.C advised S.S/A B.B that he already knew that S.R.A A.A did that kind of stuff; that he was doing it when S.S/A C.C was working in (the office). According to S.S/A C.C, Special Agent (S/A) D.D was also aware of S.R.A A.A’s Internet activities.

On May 10, 2000, after learning that S.S/A C.C and S/A D.D had known about S.R.A A.A accessing Internet pornography sites on the Internet for years, I discussed with S.S/A B.B and S/A E.E the need to advise the Office of Internal Affairs about S.R.A A.A’s activities. S.S/A B.B and S/A E.E both agreed that something needed to be done because the problem seemed to be getting worse.

On July 6, 2000, I learned that S.S/A B.B was resigning his position as senior special agent with the U.S. Customs Service in order to enter into private business.

On July 7, 2000, S.S/A B.B, S/A E.E, and myself again discussed the need to report S.R.A A.A’s activities to the office of Internal Affairs. S.S/A B.B advised that for some time he had also noticed something else that he considered to be unusual. S.S/A B.B explained that he had noticed that often times when he would come into work on a Monday morning, the conference room chairs and television would be arranged differently than when he left on the previous Friday evening, even though he was the last one to leave the office on Friday. According to S.S/A B.B, on those suspect Monday mornings, a chair would be pulled up in front of the television/V.C.R and the conference room blinds would be closed.

On July 10, 2000, S.S/A B.B advised me that, being the last person out of the office on the previous Friday night, he made sure to notice that the conference room shades were open and that the chairs were pushed up to the table. On that morning (Monday), when he came in to work, he noticed that the conference room shades were closed and that a chair was pulled up in front of the television/VCR. Later that day, while cleaning out his office, S.S/A B.B found a mail-order pornographic video tape placed on a shelf in a dresser in his office, within easy reach of the conference room. S.S/A B.B stated that he had never seen the pornographic tape before and was sure that it was not any type of evidence belonging to any case he had or was currently working. S.S/A B.B believed that someone had been coming into the office during the weekends and viewing this and possibly other pornographic video tapes in the conference room.

On July 20, 2000, after having been told that on the previous day S.R.A A.A had spent a lot of time on (the stand-alone) computer with the monitor turned at an angle, I checked the Internet cache record and found that several pornographic Internet sites had been visited on the previous day. I copied the cache to a floppy disk for future reference.

On July 21, 2000, S.S/A B.B provided to me a plastic bag filled with computer floppy disks containing cache records, as well as print-outs of cache records and pornographic images accessed on the Internet from his and (the stand-alone) computer. The records span a time frame of early 1998 to present (August 2000).

On July 25, 2000, and July 26, 2000, after S.S/A B.B’s last day at (the office), S.R.A A.A destroyed a large amount of pornographic video tapes, computer disks and pictures that had been maintained by S.S/A B.B as part of his child pornography operation. Since that date, I have not witnessed any incidents in which S.R.A A.A has accessed pornography on the Internet.

I realize that my observations, as outlined above, should be verified by someone other than myself. I am in possession of the above-mentioned documentation that was provided to me by S.S/A B.B, and I am confident that you will find that it supports my allegations. I am of course concerned about maintaining anonymity, especially since the individual against whom I am making these allegations is my direct supervisor. I therefore ask, if at all possible, to please keep my identity and this document as confidential as possible.

Sincerely….

next 

Next in Chapter 6:

A Customs agent in Houston is put on the fast-track promotion path. His climb up the agency ladder occurs despite his past record of being the primary target of an Internal Affairs corruption probe in the 1990's and later being part of a bungled sting operation that cost the government some $600,000.

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