PART 7: SECRET AGENDA:PROJECT PAPERCLIP, THE ARGENTINE CONNECTION,SPIES,SPOOKS,AND LSD

Secret Agenda The United States Government, Nazi Scientists and 

Project Paperclip 1945 to 1990 

By Linda Hunt 

9 

The Argentine Connection 

ARGENTINA was a hotbed of fascism in exile. Nazi fugitives on the run arrived by the boatloads in Buenos Aires, carrying false papers provided by pro-Nazi Catholic priests who helped them travel Vatican escape routes to freedom in South America. Croatian Nazis, Italian Fascists, and a Norwegian Nazi doctor charged with conducting experiments on humans all arrived in Buenos Aires carrying their "irregular" documentation. One talkative Abwehr intelligence officer, Otto Wiedemann, even boasted when he arrived in 1949 that he had been allowed to escape from an American POW camp in Germany after bribing an Army Counter Intelligence Corps officer. "I would never have gotten out of American C.I.C hands, had there not been one second lieutenant who liked $300 more," Wiedemann said.1 

By 1950 Argentina had become tightly linked to the German  scientist project. That connection represents yet another example of how the project expanded as a result of the cold war. The J.I.O.A helped Argentina recruit German scientists and then used the Argentine connection to provide a safe haven for Nazi war criminals. Had it not been for the cold war, Argentina never would have been considered habitable by anyone with democratic ideals. The country was swarming with Nazi war criminals. 

The chief butcher among them was Adolf Eichmann, the S.S officer who was personally responsible for carrying out "the final solution of the Jewish problem." As America's outspoken Ambassador Spruille Braden bluntly stated, "there is no country in the world where the Nazis find themselves in such a strong position as . . . Argentina."2 

The country was run by the smiling despot Juan Peron, characterized by Braden as "one of the few fascist dictators left in the world." In return, Peron looked upon his American adversary with disdain, bragging to supporters that he was going to "throw out the Yankee pig." For a brief moment in history, an explosive personal duel erupted between the two strong-willed men that personified the political expediency brought on by the cold war. Braden was determined to destroy Peron's political career and clean up Argentina's image as a "gangster-governed country."3 

Instead of destroying Peron, the Argentinian was elected president and, with his blonde wife Eva by his side, became the most powerful man in the country. Braden was sent home-replaced by the pragmatic friend of U.S. business, John Bruce, who immediately began to repair the damage by praising Peron as the greatest leader in Latin America. The Nazis were forgotten and Peron's image was transformed by U.S. policy and the press from that of a regressive strongman to a key figure in the collective self defense of the Americas against Communist aggression.4 

America's changing views included a policy to allow German scientists hired by "friendly nations"-including Argentina to legally leave the U.S. zone of Germany and relocate in South America. Having pressured Latin American nations after the war to deport Germans and reduce German influences in their country under the State Department's "Safehaven" program, State was now being asked to approve the Germans' legal migration to South America.5 

General Robert Walsh played a key role in the Argentine connection, as he had in earlier Paperclip plots. It was Walsh who initiated the policy in 1948, when he was reassigned from his position as E.U.C.O.M director of intelligence to the U.S. Air Force representative on the Inter-American Defense Board in Washington. Walsh was already a familiar figure at the I.A.D.B. An I.A.D.B report describes him as "one of the oldest members in point of service in the history of the Inter-American Defense Board." He represented the Army Air Forces at the I.A.D.B's inaugural session in 1942, was A.A.F delegate on the I.A.D.B from 1945 to 1946, and was director of staff from 1948 to 1950. In addition, Walsh formulated the bases of the I.A.D.B's entire military plan when he was head of the U.S. delegation of the I.A.D.B from 1950 to 1952.6 

The I.A.D.B still operates today in a shroud of secrecy, though its current activities certainly would interest Americans. Three of its member nations are headline news-Panama, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. And remember, this is the same I.A.D.B that received an award in 1986 from then Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega when he attended an I.A.D.B conference in Washington. This dubious event occurred while Congress was investigating Noriega's involvement in assassinations and drug trafficking.7 

The I.A.D.B is composed of military officers representing the highest echelons in the defense establishments of the member nations in the Organization of American States (O.A.S), including the United States. The U.S. delegation on the I.A.D.B is officially an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with military officers serving on the board as part of their regular military assignments. Although the I.A.D.B is a separate agency from the OAS, it receives its funding through that organization, which means that there is no public accounting of how that  money is spent. There is also no public accounting of the I.A.D.B's secret activities, since Joint Chiefs of Staff records of the U.S. delegation are exempt from the Freedom of Information Act.8 

In the late 1940's the U.S. delegation on the I.A.D.B was composed of military officers who were directly involved with the J.I.O.A, Paperclip, or other U.S. intelligence operations using Nazis. In addition to Walsh, the I.A.D.B members included: 

• former J.I.O.A Director Francis Duborg, a Navy captain, who served on an I.A.D.B staff committee under an army general from Paraguay; 

• Lieutenant General Alexander R. Bolling, who replaced Stephen Chamberlain as Army director of intelligence and godfather to the J.I.O.A and Paperclip in late 1948, when Chamberlain became commander in chief of the Fifth Army in Illinois; 

• General Edwin Sibert, who was chief of U.S. Army intelligence in Germany and supervised the operation to bring Hitler's spy chief Reinhard Gehlen to the United States in 1945; 

• Army Chief of Staff Omar N. Bradley, who was Bolling's superior and later a guest speaker at an I.A.D.B meeting in 1952, when Bradley was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; 

• Deputy Chief of Staff General Joseph Lawton Collins, who became Army chief of staff after Bradley in 1949; Collins also served on the Joint Intelligence Committee, which oversaw the J.I.O.A's involvement with Paperclip. 

All of these generals were criticized by Congress in 1948 when they were decorated by Peron himself and made honorary members of his armed forces while spending a week in expensive Buenos Aires villas as Peron's guests. Some congressmen thought it was inappropriate for U.S. military officers to accept honorary membership in the armed forces of a Fascist dictator who had collaborated openly with Hitler during World War II 9 

Walsh and other U.S. delegates worked at the I.A.D.B with  Latin American nations, in addition to Argentina, whose dictators harbored Nazi war criminals and used Gestapo tactics to prop up their repressive military regimes. Bolivia, Chile, and Paraguay (and later, Anastasio Somoza of Nicaragua) were all members of the board. Like Noriega, notorious Latin American leaders were flown to Washington and touted as honored guests at special I.A.D.B assemblies held in their behalf. For example, the I.A.D.B's guest on June 19, 1953, was General Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, where Nazi doctor Josef Mengele, the "Angel of Death" in Auschwitz, was allowed to live in peace. Stroessner ruled Paraguay with an iron fist for over three decades until he was overthrown in a coup in 1989. He headed a government that repeatedly has been accused of genocide of ethnic Indians, child prostitution, gross human rights abuse, and heroin smuggling. In addition, in 1961 the I.A.D.B honored Brigadier General Alfredo Ovando Candia of Bolivia, where Klaus Barbie had taken refuge. Ovando, who was army chief of staff at the time, not only knew Barbie but served on the board of Barbie's shipping firm, Transmaritima.10 

With this group of honorees connected to the I.A.D.B, it should not be surprising that the organization declared in one annual report that "the results of the work of this high inter American body is anonymous and silent."11 

Some of those "anonymous" activities began in 1948, when the I.A.D.B implemented a plan to reequip and retrain all Latin American armed forces as a major defense against Soviet aggression. As a result the United States sold Peron $4 million worth of surplus weapons and ammunition. This contrasted sharply with earlier U.S. policy that banned weapons sales to Argentina because Peron already had armed his military with a stockpile of weapons obtained from Nazis during the war and had used those weapons against his political opponents.12 

Part of the I.A.D.B's strategy, in which Walsh played a large part, was to retrain the Latin American armies and air forces in tactics standardized to conform with those of the U.S. military. The Argentine air force included a number of ex-Luftwaffe pilots, including Hitler's flying ace, Hans Rudel. Rudel  was a die hard Nazi who used his personal friendship with Peron to obtain jobs for around one hundred members of his wartime Luftwaffe staff in Argentina's air force. Rudel had paid a Croatian priest in the Vatican to smuggle his Nazi friends out of Germany.13 

Peron's army was even more problematic. Many Gestapo criminals on the U.S. Army's war crimes wanted lists now served in Argentina's army. Wiedemann even talked about them when he first arrived in Buenos Aires. "There are now so many former Gestapo men in the intelligence service here that it is riskier to tell a joke about Argentine Government personages in German than in Spanish," Wiedemann quipped.14 

Braden had charged that the Buenos Aires police force included Gestapo officers who were responsible for the sadistic torture methods used on political prisoners jailed for opposing Peron's regime. The prisoners had been stripped naked, savagely beaten, tortured with prolonged electrical shocks to their genitals, and burned with lighted matches and cigarettes. But when Braden complained about the torture methods, Police Chief Juan Filomeno Velazco, a known Nazi sympathizer, remarked that "the police assign no importance to the so-called Nazi and Fascist tendencies." The legacy of the Gestapo's torture methods would haunt Argentina decades later, when death squads used similar methods to torture and murder thousands of people in the country that is now called the land of the "disappeared."15 

German scientists were in the forefront of the I.A.D.B's plan to revitalize Argentina's defense, and the board urged Latin American nations to pursue the "scientific research of the future." As a result Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, and other Latin American countries accelerated their recruiting of German scientists and other experts who could design new airplanes, tanks, and weapons to defend the Americas.16 

One of Argentina's biggest enclaves of German scientists was headed by Kurt Tank, former director of the Focke-Wulf aircraft factory and well-known fighter plane designer. Peron put Tank back in the jet fighter business at the National Institute for Air Technology at Cordoba. Tank moved into a chalet near the institute so that he could travel the winding mountainous road to work in minutes.17 

Argentina had been actively recruiting scientists in Germany since 1945, but that work was illegal and underground. The U.S. Military Governor of Germany Lucius Clay had to approve exit permits for any German who wanted to leave the U.S. zone in Germany legally: But that did not stop the scientists from quietly sneaking out of Germany through several illegal routes. 

One route involved the I.N.T.R-Service, a Frankfurt travel bureau that was in reality a secret recruiting station for German scientists. One German engineer, Joachim Stauff, contacted I.N.T.R-Service in 1948 to find a job in Argentina. Stauff was told that he could obtain passage to Argentina more expeditiously if he would find a group of German scientists to go there with him. In the meantime Stauff signed a Paperclip contract and boarded a boat for America. During the trip, Stauff tried to convince Peenemunde's General Walter Dornberger and other Paperclip recruits who were on the ship to go to Argentina. Army intelligence agents investigated Stauff's recruiting tactics soon after he arrived in America. Later he was judged a security threat and sent back to Germany.18 

Kurt Tank used another illegal route through Copenhagen, Denmark. He slipped out of Germany in disguise, with a phony name and false papers provided by Peron himself. In Copenhagen a former aide to the German commander in chief in Denmark helped Tank slip through airport security along with more than one hundred other German scientists being smuggled to Argentina. Tank finally arrived in Buenos Aires via Denmark, London, and Lisbon, with microfilm of his fighter plane designs hidden safely in his trousers.19 

Sixty of Tank's colleagues soon joined him by the same illegal route. Hans Schubert was among the first arrivals. Then came the former heads of the Focke-Wulf design offices, Wilheim Bansemir and Paul Klages. Ludwig Mittelhuber came, as did the theoretician Hebert Wolff and Dr. Otto Pabst, the specialist in the dynamics of gases. Heintzelmann arrived to deal with statics, and Wehrse and Plock, specializing in construction materials and questions of workshop techniques. Paul Rothkegal was there with a wide variety of specialists in design and mathematical calculation. They all left Germany illegally and brought their families to live on the mountain slopes near Cordoba and work for Tank at the aeronautical institute.20 

Tank conducted business as usual in Argentina, designing a new high-speed fighter with swept wings based on the Pulqui for the Peron government. The original Pulqui was designed by a Frenchman, Emile Dewoitine, who had fled France to escape trial as a Nazi collaborator. By the time Tank's fighter, the Pulqui II, made its public debut in 1951, he and Peron were close friends. As the designer and test pilot flew the new plane over a cheering crowd, Peron expressed "the gratitude of the nation" to Tank for making a substantial contribution to Argentina's military aviation industry.21 

In 1950 Walsh seized on the idea of not only legalizing exit routes but encouraging Germans to work in Latin America. To work out the plan, Walsh held several meetings with J.I.O.A Director Daniel Ellis, who was a colonel in the U.S. Air Force. The sole purpose was to get the scientists away from the Russians. "From our viewpoint, which the British share, it is a big advantage to have these scientists in the safe areas of the Western Hemisphere, thereby denying them to the Russians," Ellis explained. The plan would provide jobs for a number of scientists whom neither America nor Britain wanted to employ. These included a group of Peenemunde rocket engineers who had fled to the West after working for the Soviets.22 

But the U.S. political adviser in Germany, Robert Murphy, was vehemently against including Argentina in the plan. "Argentina has given asylum to many hundreds, if not thousands, of German specialists," Murphy told the secretary of state. "Quite apart from the problem raised by the infiltration of such elements into an area whose Government is not notably friendly towards the U.S., the question arises as to whether Argentina should be permitted to superimpose legal recruitment of German specialists on top of its large-scale illegal program. "23 

The plan was ultimately approved and became official U.S. policy, despite State's objections. Brazil was given first choice of the scientists on J.I.O.A's list. At least that country had been an ally during World War II, unlike Argentina. The Germans recruited under the program were those whose skills were not desired by the United States or Great Britain. Ellis distributed 250 brochures describing Brazil's job opportunities to Germans on the J.I.O.A list. He also arranged for Army intelligence agents to conduct limited background investigations in order to exclude Communist sympathizers from the employment lists. Ellis considered Nazi background checks irrelevant.24 

Gerhard Schulze, a German engineer in Berlin, was one of the first scientists to leave Germany under the new policy. Schulze had worked in Brazil during the war and wanted to return. Eleven other scientists quickly signed up for the trip. All of them were working as consultants for the U.S. high commissioner in Germany. The group included chemical warfare expert Max Gruber.25 

Other German and Austrian scientists eventually made Latin America their home. Franz Gerlach headed a biological warfare unit at the Bacteriological Institute in Santiago, Chile. In 1945 Gerlach had been fired from his position as director of the Veterinary Epidemiology Institute in Austria because of his wartime Nazi activities. Friedrich Fleischhacker worked in a forging plant in Brazil. And Ferdinand Porsche, the famous designer of Volkswagen's and Panzer (Tiger) tanks, signed a contract with Argentina to produce automobiles on a large scale.26 

Meanwhile, Walsh and the J.I.O.A found an even more sinister use for their Argentine and I.A.D.B connections by arranging a safe haven for a scientist who was a notorious Nazi war criminal. General Walter Schreiber had been chief of the Sanitary Division of the Military Medical Academy-the division that had had jurisdiction over numerous experiments conducted in the camps. Schreiber also had been a member of the Reich Research Council, which had supported, funded, and commissioned these experiments.27 

In one instance, he personally assigned doctors to work on epidemic jaundice experiments at the Sachsenhausen and Natzweiler camps, where prisoners died as a result of being deliberately infected with the disease. On another occasion Schreiber was the senior officer present at a meeting in which Dr. Ding-Schuler was ordered to inject Buchenwald camp prisoners with phenol to see how long it took them to die. Five prisoners were murdered in cold blood this way. "They sat down on a chair quickly, that is without emotion, near a light," Ding-Schuler later confessed. "During the injection they died in a momentary total cramp without any sign of other pain." He notified Schreiber's group in Berlin that the men had died in "about 3/4 second." After confessing to this and other crimes, Ding-Schuler later committed suicide in prison. S.S Brigadier General Joachim Mrugowsky, who also attended the meeting, was convicted at Nuremberg and hanged.28 

Schreiber, on the other hand, was captured by Russian troops in 1945 and held prisoner in various P.O.W camps, including the infamous Lubjanka Prison in Moscow. He attended Antifa schools to undergo Communist indoctrination and was trained to take over as chief of sanitation for the East German police. In 1946 he was taken to Nuremberg to testify before the International Military Tribunal as a Soviet witness for the prosecution. Associate U. S. Prosecutor Alexander Hardy was shocked to see Schreiber, since his name was on a list of two hundred persons implicated in medical crimes who were supposed to be under arrest. Hardy and other American Nuremberg officials told the Soviets that Schreiber was wanted for interrogation and possible trial. But the Soviets quickly took him back to Russia. "I was unofficially informed that he was working on some `hot' assignment for the Russians and that they required his services without interruption," Hardy reported.29 

Two years later Schreiber reappeared in West Berlin and told reporters at a press conference that he had miraculously escaped from his captors. But his arrival in the West was amid rumors that he was a Soviet plant. A former Soviet P.O.W told Army C.I.C agents that Schreiber had cooperated willingly with the Soviets during his capture and that his flight to freedom "was not a flight at all but a mission." Despite this warning, Army intelligence employed him for the next few years as a doctor at Camp King in Oberusal, Germany. He also was a CIA source of information on a project involving the use of drugs in interrogations.30 

In September 1951 the J.I.O.A brought Schreiber to the United States under Paperclip to work for the Air Force School of Aviation Medicine at Randolph Field, Texas, where General Harry Armstrong already was protecting Hubertus Strughold from being exposed to the public. Schreiber was employed in the Department of Global Preventative Medicine to work on military medical problems of survival, nutrition, and sanitation in remote areas of the world.31 

But Schreiber's employment was short-lived as a result of complaints over his mere presence in America. Hardy and former Nuremberg medical investigator Leo Alexander complained to the White House and filed lengthy reports of Schreiber's crimes based on Nuremberg evidence that identified him by name.32 

At the same time, a Ravensbrueck concentration camp survivor told U.S. immigration officials in Boston that she had seen Schreiber during a conference held at the camp to discuss experiments in which she was used as a guinea pig. Janina Iwanska was one of seventy-four female members of the Polish Resistance who were victims of gas gangrene and bone transplant experiments. The women underwent operations in which their legs were split open and deliberately infected with ground glass, wood shavings, and mustard gas. In some cases the bones were completely removed from their legs. Five women died from the experiments, six were shot, and the remainder were crippled for life.33 

Schreiber was one of the biggest Nazi war criminals employed in the entire history of the project. Yet the attitude expressed by J.I.O.A and Air Force officers when confronted with massive evidence of this man's crimes exemplified the anti-Semitism, the callous disregard for U.S. laws, and the total lack of any consideration of morality that plagued Paperclip for decades. One glaring example of this attitude was expressed by General Armstrong, by now the surgeon general of the U.S. Air Force, when he told a group of physicians that "there is no evidence we know of that he is guilty of any crime other than serving his country during the war the same as I served mine." Remember that this is the same man who earlier admitted protecting Strughold and employed Nuremberg defendant Konrad Schaefer when Armstrong was in charge of the aero-medicine division in Texas.34 

By February 1952 the Pentagon was besieged with complaints and bad publicity over Schreiber. Air Force Secretary Thomas Finletter finally told the American public that he had ordered the Air Force to drop Schreiber from its payroll and that the Air Force would "make no further use of him." Finletter also claimed that Schreiber was "under military custody" and expected to "leave the U.S. in a few weeks."35 

The Air Force did not drop Schreiber, his Paperclip contract had expired. And when that contract ended, J.I.O.A Director Benjamin Heckemeyer simply signed him up under a new short-term contract in another J.I.O.A project, called "63." Furthermore, Schreiber was not under military custody, he was in hiding at his daughter's home in California. And despite Finletter's assertion that Schreiber would leave the country, no one quite knew what to do with him. The CIA had squelched plans to send him back to Germany out of fear that he would be kidnapped by the Russians. The commanding officer at Randolph Field, General Otis Benson, was even trying to get him a college teaching job. Benson told numerous universities that Schreiber was the victim of an organized movement of "medical men of Jewish ancestry" and asked them to hire Schreiber. "He is too hot for me to keep here on public funds, but I like and respect the man and hope I can help him in my role as a private citizen," Benson told one university representative.36 

Schreiber settled the problem when he told the Air Force that he wanted to go to Buenos Aires, where his other daughter lived. That is when the I.A.D.B and General Walsh entered the picture. On February 12, 1952, J.I.O.A Director Heckemeyer asked Walsh to help Schreiber find a job so that he could resettle in Argentina. Walsh began working on the problem the very same day, when he attended a special I.A.D.B function held in honor of Argentina's Brigadier Mayor Aristobulo F. Reyes, whom he had known for a number of years. Reyes served as the Argentine delegate to the I.A.D.B from 1945 to 1949 and in 1955.37 

Walsh's collaborator in this scheme was Lieutenant General Charles L. Bolte, who had replaced Walsh in 1948 as director of intelligence at E.U.C.O.M and now was chairman of the I.A.D.B. Walsh and Bolte held several meetings with Reyes to discuss Schreiber's case. They told him that Schreiber could make a valuable contribution to the Argentine government, considering his extensive experience in sanitary engineering and his research in the prevention of disease and epidemics. Of course, they did not mention that Schreiber had obtained his expertise as a result of experiments conducted on concentration camp inmates. Instead, in a memo Walsh portrayed Schreiber as an innocent victim of adverse publicity instigated by Jews in the United States. "Dr. Schreiber apparently had some association with the Nazi regime and I would believe in a completely military capacity," Walsh explained. He told Reyes that Finletter was aware of their negotiations, and as proof of their good faith, Walsh showed Reyes a copy of Finletter's public statement.38 

Reyes returned to Argentina, and after he and a U.S. Air Force officer in Buenos Aires pulled a few strings, the Argentine government approved Schreiber's immigration. On May 22, 1952, Schreiber, his wife, his mother in-law, and his son left New Orleans to resettle in Buenos Aires.39 

But that was not the end of the Argentina-Paperclip connection. By the late 1950's the J.I.O.A was bringing German scientists who worked in Argentina to the United States under Paperclip and National Interest. Glenn Martin aircraft (now Martin Marietta) and Republic Aviation had recruited a large number of former Focke-Wulf aircraft engineers and designers who were part of Kurt Tank's group and brought them back to America. One Focke-Wulf designer had been working for Martin since 1950. Hans Multhopp, a former Nazi party member, designed a jet fighter while working for Focke-Wulf in Bremen during the war that the Russians later developed into the MIG15. After the war Multhopp and other German aviation experts worked at Farnborough, England, contributing to Britain's fighter plane development. Multhopp was brought to the United States in 1950 and became chief scientist at the Martin Baltimore Division. In 1964 Martin proudly displayed another aircraft designed by Multhopp that could take off from the Pentagon courtyard with a 1,000-pound bomb and fly at a speed of 300 miles per hour.40 

In 1957 the chief of personnel for the Army's rocket group in Huntsville, Alabama, which included Wernher von Braun, planned to go on a recruiting trip to Argentina. He asked J.I.O.A officers for their opinions about hiring Tank's group. But the J.I.O.A immediately squelched the idea. "The Germans remaining, with a couple of exceptions, are not outstanding," the J.I.O.A officers replied. They went on to explain that the majority of Tank's group already was working in the United States.41

Secret Agenda The United States Government, Nazi Scientists and Project Paperclip 1945 to 1990 By Linda Hunt 

10 

Spies, Spooks, and LSD 

EDGEWOOD Arsenal, the most secret military base in the country, is located in a secluded area on the Chesapeake Bay twenty miles northeast of Baltimore, Maryland. A high fence stretches for miles around the facility to shield the Army's secret work on chemical warfare from the prying eyes of the American public. The arsenal has always been the Army's center for chemical warfare and the base's original mission has never changed. It is charged with finding out how and why poison gas works; discovering antidotes to its lethal effects; and inventing new, ever-deadlier clouds of poison that bring a swift, painful death.1 

Edgewood was the first American installation to test lethal agents on humans. The experiments began in 1922, when the Chemical Warfare Service created a Medical Research Division charged with providing a defense against chemical agents. Since that time, thousands of military and civilian "volunteers" have been used in experiments with mustard and nerve gas, riot-control agents, LSD, PCP, mescaline, and hundreds of other chemicals, including many that had been rejected by manufacturers for commercial use because they contained deadly poisons, such as dioxin.2 

Some of those experiments were conducted at Edgewood's medical facilities, in isolation rooms with barred windows, padded walls, and furniture bolted to the floor. It was in such a room that Master Sergeant James Stanley was locked in February 1958. The young soldier was based at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and had volunteered to participate in experiments to test protective chemical warfare clothing. Instead Stanley became an unwitting victim of mind-control experiments with psycho-chemicals, including LSD.3 

Stanley remembered sitting across a table from a white coated doctor with two glasses of clear liquid between them. "Here, have a drink," said the doctor, as he handed Stanley one of them. "It's only water, nothing more than what I drink," the doctor promised, knowing full well that it contained LSD. An hour later Stanley thought he had gone insane. His head was filled with terrifying visions and his body seemed to tumble through time and space. Then his mind snapped and sent him into a frenzy of rage.4 

"They told me the next day that I broke down the door and ran down the hall screaming," Stanley recalled. But his misery continued as he underwent three more experiments. In one he was given an even stronger dose of LSD, which made him violently ill. The other experiments were apparently an attempt to induce amnesia. Stanley was injected with an unknown substance and then asked if he knew where he was. The soldier felt as if his body was on fire, and he vaguely remembered telling the doctor that he was standing by a river. The last experiment was more successful at wiping away his memory. "I cannot account for that day at all," Stanley said.5 

The story of Edgewood provides another glaring example of how information about Paperclip is still being covered up today-despite a massive congressional investigation in the 1970's into Edgewood's experiments, and despite legal action Stanley took that by 1986 had worked its way up to the U.S. Supreme Court. For all that, the secret Paperclip connections at the base remain unexposed. 

The fact that Paperclip scientists worked at Edgewood at various times between 1947 and 1966 has been kept a closely guarded secret. Dr. Seymour Silver, who was scientific director of Edgewood during that time, is highly critical of the Paperclip project. "The whole judgment of who to pick, what they did, and who they selected was very faulty, very bad," Silver recalled, adding that none of the scientists were experts on chemical warfare.6 

Kurt Rahr was one of the first Paperclip specialists to arrive at the base. Rahr was young, brash, and had a background in high-frequency electronics. When he arrived in September 1947, he was evading a prison sentence, having been convicted by German courts of bigamy, falsifying papers, using an alias, and lying about his Nazi past. J.I.O.A officers had received numerous reports that Rahr was a compulsive liar and a security threat. His O.M.G.U.S Security Report noted: "Subject should be considered an absolute security threat to the United States."7 

Despite the derogatory reports, J.I.O.A approved Rahr's Paperclip contract and he was assigned to work at Edgewood. Army officers there did not know quite what to do with him. Lieutenant F. E. Van Sickle complained that Rahr made "conflicting statements" about his past, but he brushed them off as evidence of an "unusual imagination." The Army confined his work to unclassified areas, such as repairing equipment and translating Russian documents. In 1948 another German scientist, Hans Trurnit, accused Rahr of being a Communist, and Rahr was sent back to Germany.8 

Trurnit himself arrived at Edgewood in 1947 and went to work in Silver's toxicology laboratory. During the war, Trurnit had joined the Nazi party and four other Nazi organizations. From 1934 until 1940 he was an assistant to the notorious Professor Holzlöhner at the University of Kiel, though Trurnit left the university shortly before Holzlohner became heavily involved in the cold experiments on Dachau prisoners discussed earlier. Trurnit then worked for a short time at the University of Heidelberg before joining the German military medical corps. "He was never in chemical warfare," Silver said. "He went to Stalingrad, got tuberculosis, and was medically discharged out of the Army for a couple of years until the war stopped." While Trurnit may not have been a Nazi ideologue, his wife was. "She was a Hitler lover who couldn't stand a democracy, so she went back to Germany," Silver said in an interview.9 

Another Paperclip scientist, Theodor Wagner-Jauregg, arrived in 1948. He too had been a member of the Nazi party and four other Nazi organizations. Wagner-Jauregg had been chief of chemical research at the Institute for Chemo-therapeutics in Frankfurt, where his research focused on the use of chemotherapy to cure leprosy, tuberculosis, and typhus. After the war Wagner-Jauregg worked on insecticides at the German Society for Pest Control. "His father was Sigmund Freud's antagonist," recalled Silver. The elder Wagner-Jauregg was the famous Austrian psychiatrist whom Freud publicly criticized for treating schizophrenia by injecting patients with malaria virus.10 

Friedrich Hoffmann was the fourth Paperclip scientist to arrive at Edgewood in the late 1940's. He was not a Nazi party member, and although he applied for SA membership, he did not join that Nazi organization either. During the war Hoffmann was a chemist who synthesized poison gases and toxins for the University of Wuerzburg's Chemical Warfare Laboratories and the Luftwaffe's Technical Research Institute located near Berlin. In 1946 he worked as a consultant for the Chemical Section of O.M.G.U.S in Berlin.11 

The German scientists' main job under Paperclip was to test the poison gases that had been invented by the Nazis during the war. Two nerve gases, Tabun and Sarin, were the most deadly agents the American military had ever encountered, and it was essential that new types of gas masks and protective clothing, as well as an antidote to their lethal effects, be developed. Wagner-Jauregg worked on an anti-inflammatory drug for poison gas infections. Hoffmann compiled bibliographies of literature on toxic chemicals, wrote reports, and conducted tests using some of the 10 tons of nerve and mustard gas that had been shipped from Germany to Edgewood and other American arsenals in 1946 . Trurnit worked on physics problems and built a special machine in Silver's lab to measure thin films.12 

To learn how Tabun affected humans, the scientists analyzed data in captured German documents dealing with Tabun nerve gas experiments on concentration camp inmates. One American scientist, Dr. J. H. Wills, used the camp experiment records to determine not only the amount needed to kill a human but the specific effects of Tabun, such as its ability to render a man unconscious within two minutes. Wills's final report noted an obvious conclusion: the "age of the subject seemed to make no difference in the lethality of the toxic vapor."13 

Soldiers at the base were used as the guinea pigs in Tabun and mustard gas experiments conducted in Edgewood's own gassing chamber. In a scene horribly reminiscent of the Nazi death camps, Don Bowen remembered what it was like to sit in the large chamber and breathe the toxic fumes. After being led in, he was told to remove his gas mask at a given signal. As he waited he saw that there were dozens of animals, including dogs, cats, mice and rabbits, locked in cages covered with a clear plastic sheet along one side of the chamber. Then someone slammed the door shut and turned on the gas.14 

"I waited five minutes and took off the mask," he said. The covers were ripped off the animals, and they went crazy. They ran around the cages, screaming, and then slumped onto the floor. "My immediate response was not to breathe. And when I finally did take a deep breath, the gas burned my nose, my lips and throat."15 

Some of the soldiers were seriously injured in the mustard tests. Two were hospitalized after being exposed to mustard gas up to fourteen separate times in the gassing chamber, and many others suffered serious skin injuries, including blistering that took several weeks to heal, after swatches of liquid mustard were taped to their arms. One Edgewood scientist noted in a report that in 1948 several soldiers who had been exposed to low concentrations of Tabun in Edgewood's chamber were "partially disabled for from one to three weeks with fatigue, lassitude,  complete loss of initiative and interest, and apathy." 16 

In 1949 the direction of Edgewood's work abruptly changed. A consultant to the Chemical Division at E.U.C.O.M sent information about an amazing drug, LSD, that caused hallucinations and suicidal tendencies in humans. As a result, Edgewood's L. Wilson Greene seized the idea of conducting "psycho-chemical warfare." He listed sixty-one compounds, ranging from alcohol to mescaline, and speculated that if a small percentage of the enemy's troops or civilian population was exposed to those compounds they would suffer from symptoms of hysteria, panic, seizures, and hallucinations. "There can be no doubt that their will to resist would be weakened greatly, if not entirely destroyed, by the mass hysteria and panic which would ensue," Greene noted in his report. He then suggested that $50,000 be set aside in the 1950 budget to study psycho-chemicals.17 

Ironically, Greene was trying to find a more humane way to wage war-one that would disable an enemy rather than kill him. But the CIA and military intelligence had a more sinister idea. They thought psycho-chemicals could be used as a cold war weapon to control the mind of an individual being interrogated. They suspected that the Soviets already were using brainwashing techniques, including hypnosis and drugs, on P.O.W's and defendants in political trials. During the Hungarian government's trial of Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty in 1949, for example, the cardinal confessed to crimes of treason he apparently did not commit, while sitting with a glazed look in his eyes.18 

The intelligence agencies' key sources of information on anything related to chemical warfare were German or Austrian scientists who had worked for I. G. Farben-the company involved in manufacturing the Zyklon B gas used in concentration camps-many of whom were either in jail or under investigation by Nuremberg prosecutors. For example, Walter Reppe had been the chief chemist for I. G. Farben at Ludwigshaven and was jailed at Nuremberg shortly after the war. U.S. Army officers frequently got Reppe temporarily released from jail or transferred so that he could work on reports for the Army Chemical Corps. On September 14, 1948, Reppe and two of his former I. G. Farben associates were released into Army custody to work on an "opus" on acetylene derivatives. Colonel Patrick Fokers told a FIAT officer that Reppe's release from prison was justified because of the importance of acetylene chemistry to the U.S. Army. A year earlier U.S. Department of Commerce representative Robert Fry had told the State Department that even though Reppe was "very much a Nazi," he wanted to bring him to America under Paperclip. Fry's plans fell through when Reppe was taken to England to work for the British.19 

One CIA source of information about "truth drugs" was Karl Tauboeck, I.G. Farben's leading wartime expert on sterilization drugs. Tauboeck had been the chief plant chemist at I.G. Farben's Ludwigshaven factory, where he specialized in the effects of drugs on animals and humans. After 1942 he devoted his time to research on the plant caladium seguenum, which the S.S planned to use to sterilize mental patients and Jews. The S.S wanted to keep this project secret, Tauboeck said, so that the "priests should not raise hell." Tauboeck testified at Nuremberg that he had recognized the criminal nature of the research and had not pursued it further. Others had, however. Hitler's personal physician, Karl Brandt, admitted that the plant was grown in a hothouse at Dachau and sterilization "experiments were conducted upon concentration camp prisoners."20 

After the war, Tauboeck gave the CIA and the Office of Naval Intelligence information about his secret wartime work on speech-inducing drugs. The Gestapo and Abwehr had been looking for a truth serum made from anabases aphylla plants to use on the German officers suspected of being involved in the plot to kill Hitler. They planned to slip the drug into the officers' drinks at a party, hoping they would confess. But Tauboeck said he could not locate enough plants to carry out the mission.21 

Even with such information in hand, U.S. intelligence agents were tantalized by a number of unresolved questions: What chemical would force a man to reveal his secrets under interrogation? Could a drug cause total amnesia? Was there an antidote that would protect an American P.O.W if the enemy used drugs on him? And the big question that preoccupied both Army intelligence and the CIA: could drugs or hypnosis, or a combination of both, serve as the ultimate mind-control weapon, sufficient to turn a man into a "Manchurian Candidate" (Richard Condon's fictional character who had been brainwashed and reprogrammed into an assassin)? 

A combined CIA-military intelligence project code-named "Bluebird" and later renamed "Artichoke" was set up to find the answers to those questions. Significantly, the key military intelligence agency involved with this project-the Joint Intelligence Committee-had been involved in Paperclip from the beginning. The J.I.C members included U. S. Army Director of Intelligence Alexander Bolling and Brigadier General John Alexander Samford, the chief of Air Force intelligence who later headed the National Security Agency. 

In addition to Bluebird, the CIA also began several mind control projects of its own, including project MK-ULTRA, which involved LSD and other psycho-chemicals. The CIA's experiments eventually resulted in the death of Frank Olson, an Army scientist from Fort Detrick who jumped out of a hotel window after his CIA colleagues secretly slipped LSD into his drink.22 

The link between Edgewood and the CIA was close. Many scientists who worked at Edgewood or under Edgewood contracts were on the CIA's payroll. Paperclip chemist Friedrich Hoffmann was a CIA consultant on psycho-chemicals. Dr. Ray Treichler was simultaneously assistant to the director of Edgewood's Medical Laboratories, the division in charge of human experimentation at the base, and a member of the CIA's Technical Services Staff (T.S.S), which was involved in the covert use of chemicals and germs against specific people. Psychiatrist Harold Abramson was a CIA consultant involved in the Olson case who also worked for Edgewood.23 

At times the CIA used its covert methods on the Edgewood scientists themselves. "Do you know what a `self-sustained, off-the-shelf operation' means?" Silver asked in an interview, referring to the Iran-contra scandal. "Well, the CIA was running one in my lab. They were testing psycho-chemicals and running experiments in my lab, using my people, and weren't telling me. They were spying on us. I said, `You go spy on the enemy, not on us,' and I had the guard throw them out. It was a real off-the-shelf operation."24 

By 1951, in the midst of the Korean War, the Paperclip scientists' primary job was to locate plants and poisons that could be turned into new hallucinogenic mind-control drugs. To find them Silver established an industrial liaison operation that was in contact with every major pharmaceutical company in the world. "We had worldwide reports of any observations that produced peculiar results or death," he said. "If you look for new chemicals, you have to look everywhere-into the Pacific Ocean, or follow a rumor about a Polynesian fisherman who goes into a trance."25 

Paperclip scientist Hoffmann's skills as a chemist and his facility in several languages quickly were put to use. "He was our searcher," Silver said. "He was the guy who brought to our attention any discoveries that happened around the world and then said, `Here's a new chemical, you'd better test it.'" Hoffmann's search led him all over the world. He traveled to foreign universities and visited marine labs and attended conferences in Switzerland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, England, Australia, Japan, and other countries. Toad venom's and poisonous fish from the South Pacific were among the samples that Hoffmann put into his black bag and brought back to Edgewood to be tested, synthesized, and turned into a new lethal agent or psycho-chemical. In Hawaii he found a conch shell that produced a highly active venom which it ejected through a hollow, needle like tooth into its victim. The venom, according to Army intelligence records, caused "paralysis and visual blurring in man and has been responsible for several deaths. "26 

Hoffmann often used the University of Delaware as a cover at international symposiums to hide his connection to Edgewood and the CIA. In fact, Hoffmann had collaborated with William Mosher, the chairman of the university's chemistry department, and another scientist, on an article about marijuana for the Journal of the American Chemical Society. But Mosher's chemistry department itself may have been a CIA front. Mosher had been on the CIA's payroll for years, and another University of Delaware professor, James Moore, was heavily involved in the CIA's MK-ULTRA project as well as being funded openly by the Army Chemical Corps. "We were all being paid by the CIA," Moore said recently. Moore described his department chief as an "opportunist" who used the CIA's funds not only for research but to pay graduate students and generally to build up the university's chemistry program.27 

Bluebird made full use of Hoffmann's discoveries with psycho-chemicals in experiments conducted at Edgewood or the Army intelligence base at Fort Holabird, Maryland. The participation of the CIA and J.I.C in the project was kept hidden by using a University of Maryland contract with Edgewood as a cover. At least a thousand soldiers, including James Stanley, were given up to twenty doses of LSD to test the drug as a possible interrogation weapon-even though Edgewood scientists already knew it could cause serious physical reactions in humans. In particular, Dr. Van Sim, the physician responsible for the human subjects used in Edgewood experiments, had worked at the British Chemical Defense Establishment at ' Porton Down, where similar psycho-chemical experiments were conducted on humans. Shortly after he returned to the United States, Sim warned that results of the British experiments had shown that "during acute LSD intoxication the subject is a potential danger to himself and to others; in some instances a delayed and exceptionally severe response may take place and be followed by serious after effects lasting several days."28 

Nevertheless, test subjects at Edgewood or Fort Holabird were given LSD and other drugs, then subjected to hostile questioning by intelligence officers to deliberately create an extreme state of fear and anxiety. One soldier fought his way out of a locked box in stark terror during a Fort Holabird experiment. Several soldiers were seriously harmed by the tests. One man suffered a grand mal seizure; another went into an acute state of paranoia and had to be hospitalized for a week. Three others developed a history of epileptic seizures after the experiments. Like Stanley, none of the men knew what was happening to him.29 

"I got shot in Korea and I can understand that," said Stanley. "That was part of my job because I was protecting my homeland. But when they give me LSD and use me as a guinea pig, then that is unforgivable."30 

Another phase of the drug project involved interrogation teams, made up of three intelligence officers and a doctor, sent to Europe to assess how psycho-chemicals would work on suspected spies and defectors in a more "realistic" setting. The teams were under orders not to run their tests on Americans. But when a black American soldier, James Thornwell, emerged as a suspect in a document theft case in France, one team showed up to do a job on him. Thornwell later described in horrifying detail how he was locked in a room, pumped full of drugs, and grilled for days by interrogators who screamed obscenities at him. Thornwell later sued the government, claiming that the drugs had turned him into an epileptic. In 1984 Thornwell drowned in his own swimming pool. The coroner who examined him said the accident might have been caused by an epileptic seizure.31 

With Bluebird off and running, Edgewood began preparing for Armageddon amid the chill of the cold war not only by relying on Nazis here at home for their evil experiments but also by tapping the twisted minds of those still living in Germany. As mentioned earlier, U.S. laws governing the American zone of Germany forbade the Germans from doing research on chemical warfare. But that did not stop the Army Chemical Corps or the High Commissioner of Germany, the U.S. organization that replaced O.M.G.U.S, from hiring chemical warfare experts as "consultants" or funding German industries to produce chemical warfare materials for the United States.32 

West Germany came under severe criticism when evidence surfaced in 1989 that German chemical companies had been helping Libya build a chemical warfare plant. In particular, a column written by influential New York Times columnist William Safire referring to "Auschwitz-in-the-Sand" ominously cited the reemergence of "the German problem." But neither Safire nor anyone else mentioned that it was the U. S. government who had put the German chemical warfare experts back to work soon after World War II, under the banner of the American flag.33 

The U.S. agencies' employment of German scientists living in the American zone was an enormous operation. At one point H.I.C.O.G's scientific director, Carl Nordstrom, had at least 150 Germans working for him as consultants. They offered advice or gave U.S. agencies information about their wartime research. At the same time, the Army Chemical Corps employed some thirty German chemical warfare experts to conduct secret nerve gas research for the Chemical Division of E.U.C.O.M: Many of these scientists met with Hoffmann when he traveled to Germany seeking information about psycho-chemicals or other new chemical discoveries. Others, like convicted Nazi war criminal Otto Ambros, were flown to the United States to work as consultants under National Interest for American corporations such as Ambros's employer, the W.R.Grace Company.34 

Former SS Brigadier General Walter Schieber was among the more notorious individuals on the U.S. payroll. One army officer called him "the prototype of an ardent and convinced Nazi who used the Party to further his own ambitions." Nevertheless, he worked for more than a decade for the Chemical Division at E.U.C.O.M, where he was given access to highly classified information about U.S. chemical warfare activities. At one point he even helped the division make nerve gas.35 

Schieber, a chemist, had been in charge of the Nazi Armaments Supply office under Albert Speer during the war. He supervised the seizure of arms factories in France and other Nazi-occupied countries, and later in the war oversaw the Nazi's chemical warfare program. Thousands of civilians were forcibly brought to Nazi Germany to work as slave laborers in armaments factories under Schieber's control. In 1945 he was jailed as a war crimes suspect.36 

Speer was convicted at Nuremberg and sentenced to twenty years in prison, but Schieber saved his skin by serving as a star witness at the Nuremberg trials and writing chemical warfare reports for the U.S. Army while he was still in jail. By 1947 U.S. intelligence agents had decided that Schieber's knowledge of chemical warfare was more important than his Nazi past. "Several obstacles were overcome by American authorities before Schieber's scientific knowledge could be exploited," one Army CIC agent noted. One of those obstacles was removed when U.S. intelligence officers got him released from prison. Within a short time Schieber was making DM 1,000 a month working for the Chemical Division at E.U.C.O.M.37 

Air Force Colonel Donald Putt tried to bring Schieber to Wright-Patterson under Paperclip, but his scheme was squelched by an Army C.I.C investigation of Schieber's involvement with shady characters all over Europe. Schieber had French contacts who had offered him $50,000 for Nazi nerve gas formulas contained in documents he kept in his house. Some of his Swiss friends were arms smugglers who supplied weapons to S.S officers on the run. And Schieber's frequent business dealings with Soviet officials in the eastern zone raised Army C.I.C suspicions that he might be a spy. Schieber himself managed to kill the Army C.I.C's investigation by complaining to H.I.C.O.G's Frank Perkerson that "convoys" of C.I.C agents constantly drove by his house and demanding that the C.I.C's investigation be stopped. Shortly afterward, one C.I.C agent wrote his superior in frustration, complaining that he "never received answers to leads forwarded, information requested or results of Central Registry checks." His investigation was squelched and Schieber continued working for the United States until 1956.38 

The legacy of Paperclip back at home was set now that Edgewood had made its pact with the devil. The drug experimentation project quickly expanded to include psychiatric patients, who were drugged, shocked, and hypnotized in psycho-chemical experiments conducted under Army contracts with numerous universities and other institutions. 

Some of the experiments duplicated those conducted by Nazi doctors in the concentration camps. American psychiatrist Paul Hoch's experiments on mental patients at the New York Psychiatric Institute, where he was working under Edgewood contracts and as a CIA consultant, killed one patient and seriously injured another. Harold Blauer died from an overdose of methyl di-amphetamine, or M.D.A, known on the street as the "love drug," the same day that another patient, a twenty one-year-old girl, went into convulsions after being injected with the same drug. As a federal judge later stated, "no diagnostic or therapeutic purpose for Blauer, himself, was ever intended from the injections." Their sole purpose was to gather data for the Army's investigation of the use of mescaline derivatives for interrogations. Even after Blauer's death, the Army approved additional experiments on patients that included the use of hypnosis, drugs, and a polygraph exam to determine if "a particular personality type might `break' more rapidly under a drug stress than another type" during military interrogations.39 

In short, experiments on our own soldiers at Edgewood mirrored the horror stories that had unfolded in the dock at Nuremberg. Thousands of American soldiers, seven thousand of them between 1955 and 1975 alone, were used as unwitting guinea pigs in the tests. They were gassed, maced, and drugged in the search for the ultimate mind-control weapon.40 

Ironically, one part of the Nuremberg code was established to prevent a repeat of the Nazi atrocities. And the secretary of the Army ordered that the guidelines be followed at Edgewood. "The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential," the secretary directed in 1957. "This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion." The secretary's directive further provided that "in all experiments involving volunteer test subjects, the individuals are thoroughly- informed about all procedures, and what can be expected during each test. "41 

But a 1975 investigation by the Army's inspector general determined that "in spite of clear guidelines concerning the necessity for `informed consent,' there was a willingness to dilute and in some cases negate the intent of the policy." The inspector general's report noted that soldiers who were duped into volunteering to test chemical warfare clothing and gas masks were then secretly given nerve gas, psycho-chemicals, incapacitating agents, and hundreds of other experimental and dangerous drugs. They were given no information about the chemicals used on them in the experiments, no warning that those chemicals might harm them, and no follow-up medical exam to determine whether they had been hurt by the tests.42 

In one series of experiments the Army's search for a chemical that would produce total amnesia led them to Sernyl (S.N.A) -now commonly known as PCP or angel dust-an extremely dangerous drug. S.N.A originated as a general anesthetic but was taken off the market for human use because it caused delirium as patients emerged from the anesthesia. S.N.A is known to produce a delayed psychotic reaction similar to schizophrenia, and long-term effects can include permanent brain damage. Soldiers were given S.N.A orally or in aerosol form while walking on treadmills. The experiment apparently succeeded in producing total amnesia in at least one subject. Two other soldiers had intense "manic" reactions after being given doses of S.N.A with alcohol, and three more collapsed during the experiments.43 

Other experiments involved at least 123 irritant chemicals, including one that had been contaminated with dioxin. These agents included Mace and C.S, an even stronger riot-control agent that causes extreme irritation to mucous membranes. One group of men were subjected to five consecutive aerosol exposures of Mace. They stood inside a gas chamber and were told to take off their gas masks, then resist leaving until the pain became unbearable. Another 1,366 soldiers were exposed to C.S, including some who had the agent dropped directly into their eyes.44 

Steven Bonner was locked inside a padded room at Edgewood and given intravenous injections of CAR 302,688, an extremely potent incapacitating agent. The experiment itself was terrifying for him-Bonner imagined seeing enormous black spiders crawling all over the walls and ceiling of his room. Afterward, his life was cruelly endangered when he was shipped to a combat zone in Vietnam, where he had to fight off flashbacks while on guard duty.45 

In late 1957 Edgewood doctors placed eight glasses of clear liquid in front of Kenneth Loeh and seven other men. Loeh remembered that things got "funny and giggly" before he and the others went outside to march. "It was about this time I began to realize something was wrong." A buzzing started over him, then he saw pulsating circles "like a Looney Tune cartoon. I remember falling out of ranks and walking to the side and telling this guy `I want out of this!' I started feeling the tightness in my chest and the hands going numb." Loeh remembered falling down and hanging onto a soldier's pant leg.46 

It was then that Loeh realized he was no longer a volunteer, but a victim. He tried to scream. "But when my mouth opened I felt like I was swallowing myself. I thought I was going to die. Then I blacked out."47 

Several soldiers suffered grand mal seizures as a result of experiments. One man went into a seizure three hours after having been injected with 2-PAM, a strong incapacitating agent. Another was hospitalized for anxiety, restlessness, and agitation after being given four different compounds, including an intravenous injection of the Soman nerve agent. Another soldier was sent to Walter Reed Army Hospital for psychiatric observation after being given a compound known to cause vomiting, nausea, and dehydration that gave him attacks of anxiety, acute agitation, and hysteria. Still another soldier reported having blood in his urine for at least a year after having been intravenously injected with a compound called EA3834. 48 

Many soldiers felt the residual effects of the experiments long after they left Edgewood. "I have experienced memory loss and my personality has changed dramatically," Bonner said. But that was only the beginning of Bonner's nightmare. His first child was born with multiple birth defects: an open spine, paralysis from the waist down, and water on the brain-all of which Bonner felt were caused by the drugs he was given at Edgewood.49 

One soldier never got a chance to see what the long-term effects were; he committed suicide. Another attempted to commit suicide by slashing his wrists; still another tried to jump off a bridge.50 

The Army's reaction to all of this was to close ranks and cover up information about the experiments. None of the soldiers could find out what had happened to them. Stanley could not understand why he was suffering memory loss and violent outbursts of temper. Thornwell did not know who was responsible for what had happened to him in that room in France. Loeh was hospitalized twenty-eight times for convulsions, and during the night he would constantly see flashbacks of the experiment, forcing him to live through the terror again and again. The Veterans Administration consistently denied him benefits. When Loeh cited the experiments, the Army denied that they had ever taken place.51 

Twenty years would pass before Stanley finally learned the truth. And when he did, his observation about what had happened at Edgewood was chillingly close to the mark. "It was just like nazism to do me that way," he said.52 

He didn't know how right he was. 

next.
Pipeline to the Alamac Hotel 

CHAPTER 9: THE ARGENTINE CONNECTION 
1. Milton Bracker, "Quislings Receive Argentine Refuge," The New York Times, 27 March 1949. 
2. On Eichmann see Wisliceny affidavit, 29 November 1945, Office of U.S. Counsel for Prosecution of Axis Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, vol. 8 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946 48), p. 610. Braden-Peron conflicts: in Gary Frank, Juan Peron v. Spruille Braden: The S t o r y Behind the Blue Book (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, i980). See also Silvano Santander, Juan Domingo Peron y Eva Duarte, agentes del nazismo en las Argentina (Buenos Aires: Editorial Antygua, 1955). 
3. Frank,,3'uan Peron vs. Spruille Braden; and Santander,,~uan Domingo Peron y Eva Duarte. 
4. Ibid. 
5. SANACC 257/36. 
6. For Walsh history with the IADB see "IADB Yearbook 1952." 
7. Noriega-IADB story was reported by the Associated Press, 12 June 1986. Noriega bestowed the Panamanian medal on Lieutenant General John Schweitzer, chairman of the U.S. delegation to the IADB. 
8. The Inter-American Defense Board (Washington, D.C.: IADB, 1987). 298 
9. Milton Bracker, "Peron Decorates General Ridgway, Aides; Awards May Stir Congressional Questions," The New York Times, IS July 1949; "Seven U.S. Generals Honored," The New York Times, 1 September 1948. 
10. For Stroessner visit see "IADB Yearbook 1953." Strcessner's background and Paraguay: in Scott Anderson and Jon Anderson, lnside the League (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986). For Ovando visit see "IADB Yearbook 1961"; for Ovando-Barbie connection see Magnus Linklater, Isabel Hilton, and Neal Ascherson, The Nazi Legacy (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1984). 
11. Quote is from "IADB Yearbook 1953." 
12. For a discussion of policy see Inter-American Military Cooperation Act, 23 June 1947, H.R. 3836, 80th Cong., lst sess. On Barbie see Linklater, Hilton, and Ascherson, Nazi Legacy. 
13. Ladislas Farago, Aftermath (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974); and Inter-American Defense Board. 
14. Milton Bracker, "Anti-Peron Group Pushes Nazi Issue," The New York Times, 25 July 1949. 
15. Department of State, "Consultation Among the American Republics With Respect to the Argentine Situation," memorandum, February 1946, otherwise known as the "Blue Book," RG 59, NARS. This is a State Department-FBI investigation of Argentina's collaboration with Nazis during World War II that Braden used against Peron during elections. See Frank, Juan Peron vs. Spruille Braden. 
16. Farago, Aftermath; and Inter-American Defense Board. 
17. Heinz Conradis, Design for Flight: The Kurt Tank Story (London: MacDonald, 1960). 
18. Memo, Secretary of State to U.S. Political Adviser on German Affairs, 19 September 1947, 862.542/9-1947, RG 59, NARS. 
19. Conradis, Design for Flight; letter, Society for the Prevention of World War III to Under Secretary of State Robert Lovett, 16 April 1948, 862.20235/4-1648, RG 59, NARS. 
20. Conradis, Design for Flight. 
21. Ibid.; "Peron Pushes Industry," The New York Times, 9 February 1951. 
22. See attachments to memo, JIOA Director Daniel Ellis to Robert Spalding, Intelligence Adviser, Department of State, 10 July 1951, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
23. Memo, Robert Murphy to Secretary of State, 18 December 1948, JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
24. See Ellis to Spalding, including attachments. 
25. Schulze is discussed in SANACC 257/28; Gruber and HICOG group are discussed in JIOA Director Daniel Ellis to O. L. De Barenguer Cesar, Notes Notes 299 Brazilian Embassy, 9 February 1951, JIOA memo 263, in JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
26. "Austrian Scientists," IRR dossier, RG 319, NARS. 
27. Walter Schreiber's bio and connections to the Reich Research Council are from Alexander Hardy, "The Case of Walter Schreiber," memorandum, 17 February 1952, in Schreiber's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
28. Ibid. Ding-Schuler quote is from Nuremberg doc. NO-257. 
29. Schreiber's Antifa training: CIC investigation report, 15 December 1949; and Hardy, "Case of Walter Schreiber"-both in the Walter Schreiber JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
30. Minutes of Schreiber's press conference, 19 November 1948, and CIC interrogation of Karl Buesing, 3 December 1948, are in ODI subject file, RG 260, WNRC. For CIA interrogation of Schreiber and other sources see CIA, "Background and Procedures Used in the Preparation of Defendants for Confessions," memo, n.d., John Marks files, NSA. 
31. Brigadier General Otis Benson, Jr., to Commanding General, Air University, 4 June 1951, in JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
32. Hardy, "Case of Walter Schreiber"; and Dr. Leo Alexander to Dr. John Conlin, February 1952-both in the Walter Schreiber JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
33. INS Boston, "Statement of Janina Iwanski," 27 February 1952, in the Walter Schreiber JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
34. Armstrong quote is in memo, Dr. Edward Young, Physicians Forum, February 1952, in the Walter Schreiber JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
35. Finletter release: in Schreiber's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
36. Benson is quoted in memo, Dr. Gaylord Anderson to the Association of Schools of Public Health, 6 February 1952, in Schreiber's JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
37. JIOA Director Colonel Benjamin W. Heckemeyer to Major General Robert L. Walsh, Chairman, L'.S. Delegation IADB, JIOA memo 238, 12 February 1952, in JIOA administrative files, Miscellaneous Correspondence, RG 330, NARS. For meeting of 12 February 1952 to honor Reyes see "IADB Yearbook 1952" and "IADB Yearbook 1955." 
38. For Reyes meetings see Headquarters, USAF to USAIRA Buenos Aires, cable AFOIN-52571, 14 February 1952, and letter, Walsh to Argentine Air Attache, 28 February 1952; Walsh quote is in letter, Walsh to Reyes, 17 March 1952-a11 in the Walter Schreiber JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
39. Schreiber later worked in Paraguay, according to the International Herald Tribune, 21 February 1983; for details of Schreiber's departure for Buenos Aires see letter, JIOA Director Colonel Benjamin Heckemeyer to 300 James Riley, U.S. Immigration, 19 June 1952, in JIOA administrative files, RG 330, NARS. 
40. Multhopp's Nazi party membership and biography are from Agent Report, signed by Sergeant Cornelius Walsh, 22 December 1949, in Hans Multhopp's INSCOM dossier; and "Martin Company Claims Plane Can Fly From Pentagon," Washington Post, 14 April 1964. 
41. On Glenn Martin, Republic Aviation, Kurt Tank, and the ABMA recruiter see memo, Colonel Harlan Holman to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 29 August 1957, in ACSI post-1952 Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC (declassified per author's FOIA request). 

CHAPTER 10: SPIES, SPOOKS, AND LSD 
1. Seymour Hersh, Chemical and Biological Warfare: America's Hidden Arsenal (New York: Doubleday, 1969). 
2. Taylor and Johnson, "Use of Volunteers in Chemical Agent Research." 
3. Author interview with James Stanley. 
4. Ibid. 
5.Ibid. 
6. Author interview with Seymour Silver. 
7. Captain Seth Palagi, "Report of Denazification Procedure," 29 October 1947; and OMGUS Security Report, 25 December 1947-both in the Kurt Rahr JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
8. Lieutenant F. E. Van Sickle, "Memorandum for Post Intelligence," 23 March 1948; Trurnit accusation: CSGID to EUCOM, cable WAR-87364, 30 September 1947-both in the Kurt Rahr JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS. 
9. Colonel John Wood, Security Report by Employing Agency, 29 March 1948, in the Hans Trurnit INSCOM dossier D184062; and Silver interview. 
10. Theodor Wagner-Jauregg's background is from his JIOA dossier, RG 330, NARS; and Silver interview. 
11. Information on Friederich Hoffmann: INSCOM dossier 215327144. 
12. "The History of Captured Enemy Toxic Munitions in the American Zone, European Theater, May 1945 to June 1947," Office of the Chief of Chemical Corps, Headquarters, EUCOM; and Silver interview. 
13. J. H. Wills and I. A. DeArmon, Medical Laboratory Special Report No. 54 (Army Chemical Center, November 1954). 
14. "The Army's Human Guinea Pigs," Freedom, August 1979. 
15. Ibid. 
16. National Research Council, Possible Long-Term Health Effects of Notes 301 Short-Term Exposure to Chemical Agents, 3 vols. (Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1984); see vol. 2, p. 36, for mustard experiments. Tabun reference: in L. Wilson Greene, "Psychochemicial Warfare, A New Concept of War," Army Chemical Center report, August 1949. 
17. Greene, "Psychochemical Warfare." 
18. John Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate (New York: McGraw Hill, 1980). 
19. Memo, Colonel Pauick Fokers to Major P. M. Wilson, FIAT, 14 September 1948, in Walter Reppe INSCOM dossier D60608. 
20. Interrogation of Karl Taubceck, September 20 and 21, 1945, M1019, RG 238, NARS; and Taubceck INSCOM dossier XE187079. 
21. Ibid. Tauboeck's CIA connection is from CIA Inspector General Report, 1951, in John Marhs files, NSA. 
22. Marks, Manchurian Candidate. 
23. Ray Treichler's position at Edgewood is noted in "Edgewood Arsenal Quarterly Historical Report," 17 March 1958 and May 1958 (obtained under the FOIA). Hoffmann's CIA connections are in his INSCOM dossier; other individuals' CIA connections are noted in Marks, Manchurian Candidate. 
24. Silver interview. 
25. Ibid. 
26. Ibid.; "Trip Reports," in Friederich Hoffmann's INSCOM dossier. 
27. Friederich Hoffmann, William A. Mosher, and Richard Hively, "Isolation of Trans-O6-Tetrahydrocannabinol From Marijuana," Journal of the American Chemical Society, 20 April 1966; author interview with James Moore; and Marks, Manchurian Candidate. 
28. See "Bluebird/Artichoke" documents in G-2 "Top Secret" Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC; and Van Sim, "Trip Report," February 1956 (obtained under the FOIA). 
29. Lieutenant Colonel David McFarling, "LSD Follow-up Study Report," U.S. Army Medical Department, 1980 (obtained under the FOIA). 
30. Stanley interview. 
31. Information on interrogation teams: in "Project Derby Hat" INSCOM dossier. On the Thornwell case see Thornwell v. U.S., 471 F. Supp. 344 (D.D.C., 1979); and Thornwell INSCOM dossier HE05255. 
32. Minutes of JIOA Liaison Officers Meeting, 15 November 1949, G-2 "Top Secret" Paperclip files, RG 319, WNRC. 
33. William Safire, "The German Problem," The New York Times, 2 January 1989. 
34. JIOA Liaison Officers Meeting, 15 November 1949. 
35. Army officer quote on Schieber and nerve gas reference are in Schieber INSCOM dossier D231194. 302 
36. Schieber discusses his Armaments Supply Office activities in "Interview with Waltet Schieber," Nuremberg doc. NO-1298, 8 February 1947, and Nuremberg doc. PS-104; arrest report is in Schieber INSCOM dossier. 
37. Released from prison reference is in Agent Report I-421, 7970 CIC Group, 9 September 1949; Lieutenant Colonel Merellat Moses to 7970 CIC Group, 23 March 1948; and cable, Lieutenant Colonel M. C. Taylor to OMGUS, 26 April 1948-a11 in the Walter Schieber INSCOM dossier. 
38. French attempt: Agent Report I-421, 9 September 1949; spy suspect and arms: Agent Report, 19 December 1949; CIC agent quote: Special CIC Agent Richard Scutt, Agent Report I-421, 14 December 1949-a11 in Walter Schieber INSCOM dossier. 
39. Blauer information is from records of his daughter's lawsuit, Barrett v. U.S., 660 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y., 1987) (hereafter cited as Barrett). Martin Lee and Bruce Shlain, Acid Dreams (New York: Grove Press, 1985), p. 38; Amedeo S. Marrazzi, "Trial of EA 1298 at New York State Psychiatric Institute," report to Edgewood's scientific director, 15 January 1953; repon, Sidney Maltiz, Acting Principal Research Psychiatrist, New York State Psychiatric Institute, to Van Sim, 16 February 1956; and Van Sim, "Trip Report," February 1956-a11 in Barrett. 
40. Statistics on experiments: from National Research Council, Possible Long-Term Health Effects. 
41. Taylor and Johnson, "Use of Volunteers in Chemical Agent Research." 
42. Ibid. 
43. National Research Council, Possible Long-Term Health Effects, vol. 2, pp. 52-53, 64, 65, and 67-68. 
44. Ibid., p. 248 (dioxin), 135, 156, and 163. CS experiments: "Operation Black Magic," Edgewood Arsenal report, January-May 1959.
45. Bonner v. U.S., CIV 81-16 3 (E.D.N.C., 1981) (hereafter cited as Bonner). A complete report of Bonner's experiment is contained in Stuart Karger, "Incapacitating Dose of CAR 302,668 in Man, and Efficacy of Physostigmine as an Antidote," Edgewood Arsenal Technical Memorandum 114-20, August 1968. 
46. Jim Santori, "Private War of Ken Loeh," Southern Illinoisan, 20 December 1981. 
47. Ibid. 
48. Reference to grand mal seizures is in McFarling, "LSD Follow-up Study," pp. 2 and 35; other effects are noted in National Research Council, Possible Long-Term Health Effects. 
49. Bonner. 
50. McFarling, "LSD Follow-up Study" (suicide attempts), pp. 21 and 53. Notes Notes 303 
51. For Army denials see Loeh v. U.S., CIV 77-2065-B (S.D. Ill., 1977). 
52. Stanley interview.