Borderline Security
A chronicle of reprisal, cronyism and corruption
in the U.S. Customs Service
By Bill Conroy
6
Green Quest
U.S. Customs: "The More They Have on You, the More They Can Control You"
On the surface, a U.S. Customs agent in Houston appears to have made all the right moves to scale the agency’s career ladder.
But some Customs officials familiar with the agent’s track record claim his advancement up the command chain epitomizes the dysfunctional management culture plaguing U.S. Customs. They point out that the Houston agent was promoted despite his past record of being the primary target of an Internal Affairs corruption probe in the 1990's and later being part of a bungled sting operation that cost the government some $600,000.
The agent in question was one of the targets of a corruption probe by Customs Internal Affairs in the 1990's, according to the sources. The probe centered on the Currency Narcotics Enforcement Team (C.N.E.T), an undercover unit tasked with setting up stings on money-laundering operations carried out by drug traffickers.
The suspect agent (who will be referred to as Mr. S) was never charged with a crime as part of the investigation. However, Mark Conrad, former resident agent in charge of Customs’ Internal Affairs office in Houston, contends that bureaucratic stonewalling at headquarters undermined the probe.
“Whatever investigation was done ultimately would never be fruitful because of (the overzealous) oversight from headquarters,” alleges Conrad, who oversaw the Internal Affairs investigation of C.N.E.T.
At the time of the probe, the Houston-based C.N.E.T, which was still in operation after Customs merger with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), was part of Customs investigative arm, and included both Customs agents and local law enforcement officers.
Dean Boyd, a spokesman for Customs, dismisses the claim that headquarters thwarted the Internal Affairs investigation into C.N.E.T. He contends further that C.N.E.T has been an extremely successful undercover operation.
“If someone is of the opinion that the investigation (into C.N.E.T in the 1990's) was hampered or railroaded, we invite that person to bring forth hard evidence as proof,” Boyd says.
Despite the fact that, as part of the agency’s vetting process, Customs agents can be denied promotions based only on allegations of wrongdoing, Mr. S was put on a career fast-track, agency sources claim. He was later promoted to a supervisory role with Green Quest, a Treasury Department-sponsored task force.
Green Quest was established in October 2001 and charged with ferreting out illegal financial schemes used by terrorists groups. (However, shortly after the Department of Homeland Security was put in place in early 2003, the Green Quest task force was disbanded.)
Boyd stresses that no criminal charges or administrative sanctions have ever been issued against Mr. S.
While a Customs agent in Houston, the individual “was investigated thoroughly and there was no evidence found that (Mr. S) committed any wrongdoing,” Boyd adds.
Still, given the serious allegations that prompted the probe, some law-enforcement sources question the wisdom of promoting Mr. S to a supervisory position on a national counter-terrorism task force.
“It is ridiculous that we have an agent out there under this cloud of suspicion,” Conrad says. “The agent should be cleared or (forced to resign) from the service. The individual is entitled to resolution with finality.”
Customs spokesman Boyd counters that Mr. S has cleared every hurdle with respect to the allegations and that dragging the accusations up again only serves to unfairly “tarnish” the agent’s reputation.
“I’d like to think there is still due process in the world,” Boyd says.
The undercover portion of the investigation into C.N.E.T’s operations was in place for about two years, until the end of 1992, and involved a female undercover agent. The “overt” part of the case (ie. interviews and program audits) was not completed until 1997 or so, according to law-enforcement sources. The investigation was called “Operation Accountable.”
Those leading the investigation allegedly were hampered by Customs headquarters in Washington, D.C. Conrad claims that agency brass took too long to make decisions and that they over-scrutinized every level of the investigation.
“Our hands were tied until we got the approvals, and usually by then it was too late,” Conrad asserts.
Consequently, Conrad contends, the investigation of Mr. S could never succeed.
Customs sources confirm, though, that another agency employee was eventually convicted of bribery-related charges as a result of the investigation into the Houston C.N.E.T unit.
The C.N.E.T unit has an incentive to continue making cases as its operations are funded from money gathered through its stings, Customs sources explain. Drug money brought in the door as part of a C.N.E.T sting is deposited in a Houston bank, a cut taken by the government, and the balance moved into designated accounts that are controlled by the targets of the sting – such as drug traffickers. The goal is to follow the money trail and make cases against the kingpins.
Some sources contend that Customs’ leadership wanted the Internal Affairs investigation into C.N.E.T to fail. A successful probe would have been embarrassing to the agency and would have put in jeopardy a lucrative cash-cow operation that served to generate positive media coverage.
Boyd discounts such reasoning as idle speculation, adding that, “if someone does have hard evidence … we’d certainly like to see it.”
Regardless of why the probe failed, Conrad argues that there is no excuse for Customs’ failure to keep its promise to the agent who was put undercover to expose the alleged corruption within C.N.E.T.
That agent was brought on board by Internal Affairs with the guarantee that if the undercover operation, and her identity, were compromised, she would be transferred from the C.N.E.T unit to Internal Affairs. When the undercover operation was exposed in late 1992, however, Customs management dragged its feet on the transfer, according to sources familiar with the case. As a result, the agent found herself stranded in the C.N.E.T unit, exposing her to potential retribution from the targets of the Internal Affairs probe.
“She got shafted,” Conrad claims.
In 1993, Customs personnel in Houston—out of concern for the agent’s safety—ultimately intervened unilaterally and moved the agent over to the Internal Affairs unit.
Bouncing checks
The Internal Affairs probe in the 1990's was not the last time controversy would visit the Houston C.N.E.T unit. In 2000, the unit ran into another problem involving some $600,000 in third-party checks put into play as part of an undercover money-laundering sting, sources reveal.
Mr. S allegedly served as one of the undercover agents in the check case.
“The (Customs) agents were apprised that … an alleged money launderer residing in Buenos Aires, Argentina, was in possession of bank checks drawn on U.S. banks and that these checks were in some form or fashion proceeds of drug trafficking,” states an internal Customs memo. “(The individual) wanted these checks laundered and was willing to pay a fee for the laundering service.”
The checks, with the help of confidential informants, were deposited in a Houston bank as part of the money-laundering sting, according to agency sources.
“Once the checks were deposited in (the operation’s) undercover account, and after the checks cleared, funds were wire transferred to a bank account, in Miami, Florida, controlled (by the money launderer),” the internal Customs memo states.
However, after the sting was played out, checks started bouncing. According to the internal Customs memo, the checks bounced due to “insufficient funds, altered amounts, and/or altered endorsements, and stop-payment procedures.”
In the end, the government was stuck with the bill to cover the bad checks, sources familiar with C.N.E.T contend.
A Customs insider characterized the loss of the proceeds as “sheer stupidity,” but no criminal charges were brought against anyone.
Boyd says the incident was thoroughly investigated, adding that to “characterize it as ‘sheer stupidity’ or in any way criminally negligent is simply inaccurate.”
“It was a learning experience for (those involved), but there was no finding of any criminal or administrative wrongdoing,” Boyd stresses.
Mr. S, who was at the center of attention in both the C.N.E.T Internal Affairs probe and the botched check sting, was subsequently bumped upstairs, to a supervisory role with an national task force called Green Quest.
Boyd stresses that the agent was in no way “fast-tracked” into his post at Green Quest, but rather was chosen as the most qualified for the role after going through a competitive selection process.
Back on track
Independent of the concerns raised about Mr. S’s promotion, some law enforcement sources question whether units like C.N.E.T should even exist. Sources familiar with the Houston undercover unit allege that a lot of money was churned through its sting operations in the 1990's, with little to show in the way of major seizures or cases being made against drug-cartel kingpins.
Backers of undercover units like C.N.E.T claim, though, that they play a key role in gathering intelligence on drug traffickers and in disrupting their money laundering schemes.
“It’s a controversial method of undercover work,” says Charles A. Intriago, a former federal prosecutor and director of Moneylaundering.com, an online publication. “... These operations (such as C.N.E.T) can result in money laundering going on longer than it needs to be.”
“If the money laundered by the government through these operations is buried in some foreign country, and there’s no chance of getting it back, then it becomes a legitimate concern.”
In recent years, however, sources stress that the C.N.E.T unit in Houston has operated with integrity and efficiency, as a result of staffing, bookkeeping and other operational reforms put in place following the scrutiny brought to bear on the unit in the recent past.
Double standard
Still, C.N.E.T’s past woes and the promotion of the agent allegedly linked to those controversies prompts some observers to accuse Customs brass of fostering a double standard. They claim the management culture—even with Customs’ merger into the Department of Homeland Security—protects a chosen few, regardless of their actions, while penalizing others, regardless of their qualifications.
“I have seen this pattern over and over again,” alleges Washington, D.C.-based attorney Ron Schmidt, who has handled a number of lawsuits against federal law-enforcement agencies. “The motive is to protect the organization at all costs. To some degree, it seems, the more they have on you, the more they can control you. Some people who move up the ladder seem to have a lot of baggage.”
Schmidt is not the only attorney throwing darts at Customs’ management culture. Phoenix attorney Jeffrey Arbetman represents a Customs agent who claims he was removed from a counter-terrorism task force about a month after the Sept. 11 terror attacks. At the time, the task force was conducting a major investigation related to 9/11.
Customs asserts that the agent, who has years of counter-terrorism experience, was yanked from the FBI-led task force because he didn’t follow procedures—a charge Arbetman says is bogus.
Supporting Documents:
Redacted memo on CNET activities (638 kb PDF)
Note: Acrobat Reader needed to view PDF documents
“Customs claims he (the agent) broke some rules, but we have documentation and testimony that shows that is not true, including testimony from the FBI,” says Arbetman, who is a former federal prosecutor.
Arbetman contends the real reason the Arizona Customs agent was removed from the task force is because his supervisors were retaliating against him for filing an age discrimination complaint.
“Whatever Customs’ agenda was, the fact is that they took (this agent) off a critical counter-terrorism task force at a crucial time in this country’s history,” Arbetman adds. “It was wrong morally and legally.”
7
Quid Pro Quo
U.S. Customs Boss: "Anybody Who Files a Discrimination Complaint is a Disloyal Employee"
The fact that the U.S. Customs service’s upper management has a take-no-prisoners approach to battling Equal Employment Opportunity (E.E.O) discrimination lawsuits is not surprising, if the word of a former assistant commissioner of Customs is to be trusted. From 1993 through 1997, Walter Biondi served initially as Customs’ assistant commissioner of Internal Affairs and then as assistant commissioner of Enforcement and Investigations – two of the highest posts in the service.
Under questioning in a 1999 legal deposition, Biondi describes the hardened attitude adopted by the upper ranks of Customs management with respect to E.E.O filings. In the deposition, Biondi recounts what then Deputy Commissioner of Customs Sam Banks told a group of Customs managers at a 1997 conference:
“He (Banks) told the senior managers present who were complaining about the E.E.O program and E.E.O complaints, who were complaining about the time it took to deal with E.E.O complaints, that things were going to change, that he was not going to be as easy as (the retiring Customs Commissioner George Weise) was in resolving E.E.O complaints. People were going to have to fight to the bitter end. ... There was applause from the group that was there. It is what they wanted to hear.”
Biondi also testified about what Commissioner Weise had told him about another meeting, which Weise attended in late 1996 or early 1997 with then Treasury Undersecretary for Enforcement Raymond Kelly and Treasury Deputy Assistant Secretary Elizabeth Bresee. At this meeting, Kelly said that “anybody who filed an E.E.O complaint against their agency is a disloyal employee, should be shown no favor and treated accordingly,” Biondi states in the deposition, recounting what he was told by Weise.
Biondi went on to testify that when he asked Weise if anyone spoke up to point out that such a policy was not appropriate, Weise replied, “Given that he was the Undersecretary of the Treasury, nobody said anything.”
In 1998, Kelly became commissioner of U.S. Customs; Bresee later became the Treasury Assistant Secretary for Enforcement.
“Thus, officials at the highest levels of the Department of Treasury, in effect, ordered retaliation throughout Treasury’s law enforcement bureaus against those who filed E.E.O complaints,” assert pleadings in the class-action lawsuit filed in May 2002 by Hispanic Customs agents.
Another glimpse of the attitude senior Customs officials have toward the agency’s Hispanic employees can be found in a July 1999 report from the House Appropriations Committee. That report took issue with a portion of a U.S. Treasury Department report that stated the following:
“Most serious, however, is the belief that (Customs) inspectors who are hired locally, particularly along the Southwest border and assigned to the local ports of entry, could be at greater risk of being compromised by family members and friends who may exploit their relationships to facilitate criminal activities. Although they could not offer any solid evidence, Customs officials express a real apprehension over the possibility that individuals are attempting to infiltrate Customs by seeking jobs as inspectors for the sole purpose of engaging in corrupt and criminal behavior.”
The members of the House Appropriations Committee blasted that passage, stating for the record that “the committee takes strong exception to any implication that individuals of Hispanic background are particularly susceptible to corruption and expects the Customs Service to address unsubstantiated bias by senior Customs officials ….”
U.S. Customs spokesman Dennis Murphy stressed at the time that the report in question was drafted by Treasury, not Customs. Until late 2002, the Customs Service was under the jurisdictional umbrella of the U.S. Treasury Department.
Although Murphy could not provide any specific details on how Customs dealt with the request by the Appropriations Committee to “address unsubstantiated bias,” he did say Customs formed some high-level committees “to address recruitment and retention, particularly of minorities.”
Murphy also added, “I know there were briefings provided for members (of Congress) who were interested in this issue with regard to what the facts are and what we are doing.”
Apparently, though, those briefings failed to satisfy the concerns of all members of the Appropriations Committee. In the summer of 2000, the House committee again revisited the issue, expressing continued concern with Customs’ efforts to address the implication that Hispanic Customs employees were somehow more prone to corruption.
In a July 2000 report to the entire House, the Appropriations Committee stated the following:
“Customs offered but failed to provide the committee evidence supporting these views, and statistics provided by Customs did not support the allegation described in the (Treasury) report. In addition, written responses from B.A.T.F, D.E.A, F.B.I and the Secret Service indicated that these agencies did not agree with the concern that such local hiring (along the Southwest border) posed a greater risk of individuals being compromised.“Although Treasury and Customs now agree that the passage from the report did not reflect accurately their beliefs or practices, the committee is concerned that Treasury has been slow in taking steps to communicate this to senior managers and others involved with Customs integrity issues. The committee continues to take strong exception to any implication that individuals of Hispanic background are particularly susceptible to corruption and directs Treasury and Customs to contest any such unsubstantiated bias by senior Customs officials….”
The apparent inaction by Customs may betray an arrogance on the part of the agency’s entrenched bureaucrats that makes them feel immune even to the edicts of Congress and other high-level government officials. A number of Customs insiders point to the fact that in the early 1990's a Blue Ribbon Panel was appointed by Carol Hallett, commissioner of Customs during the first Bush administration, to review integrity and management issues within the agency. The faults uncovered by that Blue Ribbon Panel are strikingly similar to the concerns that still plague Customs today with respect to cronyism and retaliation.
Among the panel’s conclusions were the following:
We found that the Customs Service lacks a clear whistle blower policy. As a result, employees do not understand their rights and managers are confused and frustrated in dealing with the process. Our recommendations call for the issuance of clear whistle blower guidelines for employees and supervisors, expeditious investigation of allegations, and strong sanctions against supervisors who retaliate against those reporting wrongdoing.The panel found a general sense among employees, supervisors and managers throughout the Southwest Region that discipline has been unevenly applied within the enforcement organization. Here again, the “old-boy” network was seen as responsible for either selective protection or harsh punishment. The panel’s recommendations in this area call for new measures to: ensure and standardize the reporting of misconduct; provide for objectivity in the conduct of investigations; and, pinpoint managerial accountability in disciplinary actions.In conclusion, the panel’s findings cannot be mitigated or dismissed. They represent the unanimous opinion of its members. The recommendations contained in this report are intended to provide Customs with a comprehensive plan to correct problems that have been identified.
The brass ring
The U.S. General Accounting Office (G.A.O) issued a report in September 2001 that sheds additional light on the management culture within U.S. Customs. The report examined a 1998 request by the Department of Treasury that sought special permission for Customs to add up to 10 law enforcement positions under something called Schedule A hiring authority. These new positions were to be in addition to the 300 Schedule A posts already approved for Customs.
Schedule A hires are exempt from the competitive civil-service hiring mandates – which means management can chose who they want to appoint to these positions. Schedule A appointments are designed to allow an agency to appoint individuals to positions for which it is not practical to use a competitive hiring system.
However, Schedule A also can be subverted to perpetuate a good-ol’-boy hiring system if it is used by top management as a means of appointing their cronies to career civil-service jobs.
The Office of Personnel Management (O.P.M) approved Treasury’s 1998 request for the additional Schedule A slots for Customs. Treasury had argued for the positions by telling O.P.M that “due to the sensitive nature” of the positions, it was not practical to fill them through the traditional merit-based approach.
“In using the Schedule A authority between September 1998 and January 2001, Customs made nine appointments to various positions – such as law enforcement and public affairs specialists and a strategic trade adviser,” the G.A.O report states. “The circumstances surrounding five of the nine appointments can, in our opinion, give the appearance of inconsistency in the application of Schedule A appointment authority or possible favoritism toward former political employees.”
In the case of three of the supposedly unique Schedule A appointments, “identical positions were ultimately advertised and examined in the competitive service,” the G.A.O report states. This occurred despite the fact that the 10 Schedule A positions requested for Customs were promoted as being “impracticable to advertise and competitively examine.”
Two other Schedule A appointments went to non-career personnel in Customs’ Senior Executive Service (S.E.S) “several days before the Presidential transition,” the G.A.O report states. “The timing of such actions can give the appearance of political favoritism,” the report adds.
Greasing the wheels
In some circles, political favoritism is viewed as the grease on the wheels of U.S. democracy. It should be no surprise then, to discover that in a federal agency as large as Customs, there is plenty of grease to go around.
That principle appears, to some observers, to have played itself out in the case of one former Customs executive, Charles Winwood.
Winwood spent 30 years with Customs, reaching the top spot in the agency as acting commissioner for eight months in 2001.
Winwood retired from Customs as deputy commissioner in early May 2002. A couple of weeks later, he landed a job as senior vice president of border security with Sandler & Travis Trade Advisory Services Inc. (S.T.T.A.S) – a Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm specializing in customs issues and international trade.
“Winwood joins a number of former senior Customs officials at the firm, including three other past deputy commissioners (of the U.S. Customs Service) – Samuel H. Banks, Michael H. Lane and Alfred R. De Angelus,” states a press release by S.T.T.A.S announcing Winwood’s hiring. “This seasoned team of customs experts, combined with S.T.T.A.S proven business procedures and proprietary technology, will ensure that governments’ and companies’ supply chains operate efficiently.”
The STTAS press announcement is actually modest in outlining the firm’s track record of hiring former U.S. Customs employees.
According to the consulting company’s Web site (http://www.strtrade.com), as of late 2002, some 24 former Customs employees, including Winwood, Banks, Lane and De Angelos, worked for S.T.T.A.S or its sister firm – Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg P.A., an international trade and customs law firm.
In addition, in 2001, two individuals from the affiliated firms were part of the 20-member Treasury Advisory Committee on Commercial Operations of the U.S. Customs Service. Those individuals were De Angelus of S.T.T.A.S and Gilbert Lee Sandler, a senior partner in the Sandler, Travis law firm.
The advisory committee members are appointed by the Secretary of Treasury. The committee’s charge is to advise the Secretary on matters related to Customs’ commercial operations.
Also in 2001, coincidentally, Customs made a billion dollar-plus decision with respect to its commercial operations. In April of that year, then Acting Commissioner of Customs Winwood announced that the agency was awarding a $1.7 billion Customs Modernization Prime Integration Contract to a group of companies led by I.B.M Global Services. Included in that group of companies was S.T.T.A.S, which will provide “global trade and customs expertise” to the contract team – dubbed the e-Customs Partnership, according to a press announcement issued by Customs at the time.
The e-Customs Partnership is charged with developing an Automated Commercial Environment (A.C.E) system for Customs “to dramatically streamline Customs’ commercial processing systems,” the press announcement states. Essentially, the modernization project involves developing and implementing a new tech infrastructure for Customs, including computer systems and software, that can more effectively handle the agency’s growing commercial, enforcement and administrative duties.
Winwood counts his work on the A.C.E contract while at Customs as among his most important achievements, according to a mini-profile of the former acting commissioner published in the April 2002 agency-sponsored newsletter U.S. Customs Today. That pride bubbled forth in testimony Winwood gave on July 17, 2001, before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means.
“The e-Customs Partnership is a team of top-notch companies and highly qualified professionals who have successfully executed large information systems projects similar to this one in the past,” Winwood told the House subcommittee.
Winwood’s career track definitely qualifies him as an expert in customs issues who might be an attractive hire for a firm like S.T.T.A.S. But Winwood’s enthusiasm over the A.C.E contract is not shared by everyone.
A May 2002 report by the U.S. Government Accounting Office described the $1.7 billion A.C.E investment as a “high-risk endeavor.”
The major reasons are as follows, according to the G.A.O report:
- “The system’s size, performance parameters and organizational impact make it technically and managerially complex.”
- “Customs fell far short of key commitments in its first spending plan (for ACE) because it severely underestimated costs. (Actual costs were 90 percent higher than projected.) This track record casts doubt on Customs’ ability to meet future commitments.”
- ”Despite progress, Customs still lacks important acquisition management controls.”
- ”Customs recently decided to compress the time frame for delivering the system from 5 to 4 years.”
Robert Bonner, who was confirmed as commissioner of Customs in September 2001, only a few months prior to the G.A.O report’s release described A.C.E as “an important project for Customs and an important project for the business community,” in testimony before a House Appropriations subcommittee.
“The successful and timely design, implementation and funding of A.C.E is a priority of the U.S. Customs Service,” Bonner stated in his Feb. 27, 2002, testimony. “I believe that A.C.E is so important to our country’s security and the future of trade facilitation that I have set a goal that the system be completed within 4 years….”
Since the spring of 2002, the G.A.O reports that Customs has made efforts to address some of the concerns raised over ACE. But Customs is still not out of the woods, according to the G.A.O.
“Customs has made progress in implementing some, but not all, of our recommendations,” G.A.O spokesman Richard Stana told a House subcommittee in June 2003. “Moreover, because Customs is in the early stages of acquiring A.C.E, many challenging tasks remain before Customs will have implemented full A.C.E capability.”
Whether A.C.E turns out to be a boondoggle remains to be seen.
Supporting Documents:
Blue Ribbon Panel report on Customs (1.3 mb PDF)
Government Accounting Office report on Schedule A hiring at Customs (182 kb PDF)
GAO report on Customs’ ACE system (740 kb PDF)
2001 statement of acting commissioner of Customs before House Ways and Means Committee
Congressional comments regarding Customs integrity issues pertaining to Hispanic employees (664 kb PDF)
Regardless of A.C.E’s ultimate fate, any suggestion that a quid pro quo relationship exists between Customs and S.T.T.A.S and its affiliated law firm is dead wrong, according to Ron Gerdes, a senior member of Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg and a former assistant chief counsel for the U.S. Customs Service.
To set the record straight, Gerdes stresses that De Angelus was appointed to the Treasury Advisory Committee prior to joining S.T.T.A.S. In addition, the committee membership for 2002 did not include De Angelus or Sandler.
(However, Thomas G. Travis of Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg was a member of the committee in 2002.)
Gerdes also contends that the former Customs employees hired by STTAS and Sandler, Travis, Rosenberg have been brought on board because they are the best people for the job.
“When I was there at Customs, I made the best decisions I could given the facts,” he explains. “My point of view here is the same. If you’re looking to hire someone (from the government side), do you want an individual who rolled over for you or someone who impressed you with their abilities? I want someone who can think and analyze a situation.”
8
Reckless Driving
A Widow's Grief and Five-Year Search for Answers from U.S. Customs
The desert sky was clear, the temperature a mild 66 degrees at half past high noon on Tuesday, March 3, 1998. A slight breeze was blowing out of the southwest as Customs agent Allan Sperling piloted a green 1996 Jeep over the washboard surface of the packed-dirt road. Sperling’s partner, Gary Friedli, was in the passenger’s seat, belted in snugly.
Ahead of them was a cloud of dust and the tail end of an 18-wheeler, a grey Kenworth hauling a belly-dump trailer eastbound on Geronimo Trail Road. The two federal agents were en route to a ranch just outside Douglas, Ariz. – a desert border town of about 15,000 people located some 120 miles south of Tucson and just north of Agua Prieta in Mexico. The agents were responding to a report of drug-smuggling activity in the area.
“(Sperling) stated as they got through the ‘S’ curves, he told Gary (Friedli) to look up at the crest of this hill and look up ahead of them real well, and make sure nobody is coming so they could pass (the truck),” states a 1998 report prepared by the Cochise County Sheriff’s Department. “They both looked and saw nothing was coming….”
Photos: Cochise County, Ariz. Records Department
Sperling had run out of road. Sperling pulled the Jeep into the left lane to pass. The tractor-trailer veered to the right slightly, opening up a wider passing lane for the Jeep. Sperling punched the gas pedal. Suddenly, the truck swung back to the left, heading for a private drive on the other side of the road.
The Jeep smashed into the turning truck’s gas tank. The SUV’s right side crashed into the trailer. Friedli’s head slammed against the window frame, creasing the metal. The truck dragged the contorted Jeep some 70 feet before coming to rest.
“The 1996 Jeep Cherokee received extensive front-end damage, particularly at the right side,” the Sheriff’s Department accident report states. “The windshield was completely cracked. (The Jeep’s) roof received induced damage as it impacted the tractor. (The Jeep) also received damage to its rear passenger door as the tractor trailer (dragged) it in a northerly direction. The outer portion of this door was torn off partially by the trailer pushing northbound.”
Later in the accident report:
“(Sperling) recalled impacting the vehicle and the next recollection he had was being stopped and him looking over at Gary (Friedli). ... He recalled being in the vehicle; Gary is lying down in the seat in a position where his head was between the driver and passenger’s seat. (Sperling) was able to hear him breathing and his chest was rising and falling. ...”
Sperling was saved by the vehicle’s lone airbag, suffering a dislocated shoulder and some cuts and bruises. There were no witnesses to the accident. Friedli was carried on a gurney to an ambulance and later airlifted to University Medical Center in Tucson, where he died the next day due to his massive head injuries. He never regained consciousness.
The Cochise County Sheriff’s Department accident report determined that the Jeep was traveling at about 63 mph when it collided with the semi-truck, which was traveling at an estimated 10 mph. That’s quite a stretch from what Sperling told the Sheriff’s Department deputy investigating the accident.
When the investigating deputy asked for an estimate of speed at the time he started passing the truck, “Sperling advised that he was doing approximately 40 to 45 miles per hour when he was coming up through the ‘S’ curves,” the Sheriff’s Department report states. “Allan (Sperling) applied his brakes to pace behind (the truck) until he was sure it was clear to pass him and estimated (his speed at) approximately 25 to 30 miles per hour.”
Sperling told Customs Internal Affairs investigators later that “a flying object inside the (vehicle) struck him on the head during the collision and caused a laceration requiring approximately 14 stitches to close,” according to an Internal Affairs report of investigation. “Special Agent Sperling said this blow to his head might have affected his perception of the events before and after the collision.”
The Sheriff’s Department investigation concluded that Sperling had “exceeded the lawful speed limit as per the state and county mandates.” The report indicated that the Jeep had surpassed the “45 mph” speed limit at the site of the crash by about 18 mph.
The Sheriff’s Department submitted the findings to the Cochise County Attorney for enforcement. No citations were issued. The County Attorney’s office declined to prosecute the case.
Friedli’s wife, Dorene Kulpa-Friedli, a senior intelligence analyst with Customs in Douglas at the time, was suspicious of the events surrounding the accident and what she perceived as inconsistencies in the Sheriff’s Department accident report. For example, the Sheriff’s Department report reflected that the speed limit at the accident site was 45 mph. However, Kulpa-Friedli discovered that a road sign posted at the stretch of Geronimo Trail Road where the collision occurred showed the speed limit to be 35 mph.
Kulpa-Friedli also knew there was bad blood between her husband and Sperling.
“I know exactly how my husband (Gary Friedli) felt about Allan Sperling,” Kulpa-Friedli later told a Customs Internal Affairs investigator. “And he did not like the way Allan Sperling treated him. ... Allan would say, you know, kind of treat him like he was the junior, you-don’t-know-nothing agent, you know. ... Gary did not appreciate somebody patronizing him….”
Kulpa-Friedli told the investigator that she didn’t believe the rocky relationship between her husband and Sperling had anything to do with the accident. However, she did raise several concerns with Customs Internal Affairs concerning the accident, among them that Sperling’s reckless driving might have caused her husband’s death.
“Because of this (Sheriff’s Department) report, the way it’s written … it does look like Allan Sperling holds a large amount of responsibility for the accident,” Kulpa-Friedli asserted during an interview with a Customs Internal Affairs agent.
Kulpa-Friedli was interviewed on June 11, 1998, at her request, as part the initial Customs Internal Affairs investigation into the accident that killed her husband. As head of the Customs Office of Internal Affairs in Arizona, James “Breck” Ellis oversaw that investigation, which was concluded in October 1998, about six months after the accident.
But Kulpa-Friedli wasn’t made privy to the findings of that investigation at the time. In fact, she waited another a year for Customs to provide her with some answers, but all she got, in her view, was a runaround. Finally, she took her concerns to Congressman Frank Wolf, R-Va., writing him a letter to bring the issues surrounding her husband’s death to his attention. Kulpa-Friedli’s letter to Congressman Wolf is dated May 25, 1999.
The letter to Wolf
Dear Congressman Wolf,On March 3, 1998, my husband, U.S. Customs Service Special Agent Gary P. Friedli, assigned to the resident agent in charge (R.A.I.C), Douglas, Arizona, was a passenger in a vehicle driven by another Customs agent, Allan Sperling. Agent Sperling made several fateful choices that day which resulted in the death of my husband. On a dry, two-lane dirt road east of Douglas, Agent Sperling tried to pass, at a high rate of speed, an 18-wheel gravel tractor-trailer that was making a left hand turn into a driveway. Agent Sperling was arrogant and reckless – he gambled with my husband’s life and lost. Agent Sperling drove right into the cab of the tractor trailer. As I came to know, there was no lights, no siren, no emergency, and no rush.While I watched my husband of six and a half months die in the hospital on March 4, I received very little information about what happened. Gary’s parents were visiting in Arizona at the time, so they saw their son die. This was a life-destroying and life-altering experience for me, our daughter, and for Gary’s family and friends.In the weeks and months afterward, as the Cochise County Sheriff’s Office conducted its investigation and the Customs Service conducted its own Internal Affairs investigation, we continued to receive bits and pieces of information about the car crash from the head of the R.A.I.C (Customs’ resident agent in charge) office, Greg Rabeler – in retrospect, the alarm bells started to go off even back then.After approximately six weeks of waiting, we received a copy of the official Sheriff’s Office report of the car crash. As Gary’s parents and I read the report, we could not believe what we were reading! The story that was in the police report was not the story that Mr. Rabeler had told me at the hospital. Mr. Rabeler told me [as he and I were sitting alongside Gary in the Intensive Care Unit] ... Mr. Rabeler told me that Agent Sperling was going 50 miles per hour and that they were not doing an enforcement action. [I understood this to mean they were not involved in a high speed chase.] Mr. Rabeler did not tell me or my in-laws at the time, or later, that Agent Sperling ran into the tractor trailer. Also, Mr. Rabeler later denied telling me that Agent Sperling was driving 50 miles per hour. The truth about the car crash was already being pushed to the side. And a further note, when the Customs Service announced Gary’s death and the surrounding circumstances, the agency indicated that they were responding to possible smuggling activity and that the tractor trailer turned into Agent Sperling’s government vehicle.As we continued to read the report, specifically, the crash reconstruction information and the interview of Agent Sperling, we were outraged! Even with the multitudes of questions raised in the police report, the responsibility for the car crash was crystal clear. I attempted to contact the Sheriff’s investigator … to ask questions about the information so that we were not misreading the report, but he never returned the telephone messages that I left. I have attached a copy of the report without any of my notations or any further commentary on the report information as I would like you to draw your own conclusions. [Once you have read the report, I am available to discuss the discrepancies and questions raised throughout the report.]After I went back to work [I am a senior intelligence analyst with the Customs Service] in Arizona, I began receiving information from other Customs employees about Agent Sperling’s past driving history. I was told even by my own husband before he was killed that Agent Sperling was in other car crashes. I contacted the Customs Internal Affairs Office and insisted that I be interviewed because I wanted all of this information on the record and investigated. I was not interviewed until June 1998, after I was transferred back to the Washington, D.C., area.On May 16, 1998, my in-laws and I had a meeting with the Customs special agent in charge (S.A.I.C), Tucson, Awilda Villafane, just prior to leaving Arizona. Mr. Greg Rabeler was also in attendance at the meeting. [He had recently received a promotion to associate S.A.I.C, second in command to Ms. Villafane, and now worked in Tucson.] We wanted to discuss the Internal Affairs process and to voice our concerns about the contents of the official police report. Ms. Villafane admitted that she had not read the report, only a synopsis. When discussing the circumstances of the car crash, Ms. Villafane indicated that Gary had a choice of getting into the car or not; that he should have said that he had a report to get finished or that he had a meeting to go to. In other words, Ms. Villafane told us that Gary was responsible for his own death; he should have lied to get out of going with Agent Sperling. Ms. Villafane also had the audacity to say that this was “God’s will.” It was obvious that Ms. Villafane, as the head of the Arizona district, wanted no responsibility for the death of my husband.Towards the end of the meeting, I asked Ms. Villafane to disseminate a memorandum to the Arizona district offices to remind the agents, and others, that they are to follow the Customs’ driving policy and to make safety a top priority. Ms. Villafane declined to do so. I then asked her to help us contact the state of Arizona about putting “Do Not Pass” signs at the designated “Truck Cross” areas. She declined and said that we were on our own. Lastly, I asked her if she could look into driver retraining courses for the agents. [This is due to the high-speed chases that the agents become involved in from time to time.] Ms. Villafane was noncommittal on this subject.After I was transferred back to Virginia on May 20, 1998 [where Gary and I both lived for several years], I periodically checked throughout the summer on the status of the Customs investigation with the Internal Affairs investigator in Tucson. When Raymond Kelly became commissioner of Customs on Aug. 5, I spoke with the commissioner about making sure that the best possible investigation was conducted by the Customs Service. The commissioner indicated that he would look into the matter and would get back to me.In October 1998, Gary’s parents received a telephone call from Mr. William Keefer, the assistant commissioner of the Office of Internal Affairs. According to my in-laws, Mr. Keefer said that he was given the responsibility of looking into the Customs investigation of the car crash. Mr. Keefer agreed with my father-in-law’s, indeed all of ours, assessment that the reconstruction facts and Agent Sperling’s official interview did not match.In December 1998, I contacted Mr. Keefer, introduced myself as Gary’s wife and that I wanted to know the status of the investigation. Mr. Keefer also indicated that he received no derogatory information regarding Agent Sperling’s past driving record. I indicated that I was told differently and that there was supposed to be documentation to that effect. Mr. Keefer said that he would look into it and if there was no documentation for prior incidents, that would be a different “can of worms.” Mr. Keefer asked me to give him time to check into this matter.On May 7, 1999, my in-laws and I met with Mr. Keefer at Customs Headquarters to discuss the death of my husband. Due to the Privacy Act, Mr. Keefer indicated that the only thing he could tell us was that “administrative action has been taken.” To explain the process, Mr. Keefer said that once Headquarters reviewed the completed field investigation, the report would go to a three-member Discipline Review board for a recommendation, and then a “senior official” would make the final disciplinary decision. He also said that we could write a Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I.A) letter to request a copy of the (Internal Affairs) investigation, including requesting Agent Sperling’s … disciplinary records. However, Mr. Keefer warned us that we may or may not be able to receive any or all of the report. He said to send the F.O.I.A letter directly to him and that he would send it to the Office of Chief Counsel for processing. Furthermore, I asked if I was able to get a copy of the investigative report and I found something wrong or missing, do I have the right to appeal. He said yes. If we found any new information, Customs could reopen its investigation into the matter.My in-laws and myself gave the U.S. Customs Service ample time to conduct a thorough investigation and to mete out the appropriate disciplinary action – terminate Agent Sperling as a Customs Service employee. Based on our opinion of the original police report, Agent Sperling is responsible for my husband’s death [based on recklessness and negligence], he seemingly violated Customs’ driving policy and misused a government vehicle, and he violated Arizona traffic laws. According to my sources, Agent Sperling is still on the job.With regards to the state of Arizona, I am appalled that Agent Sperling was not charged with violating ANY Arizona criminal and/or traffic laws: reckless and/or negligence (in driving), causing the death of another person, speeding, disobeying traffic signs, and operating a vehicle in an unsafe manner. A law enforcement officer is not above the law and is accountable just like the rest of us are if we break the law.... Congressman Wolf, as a constituent in your district, I am requesting you and your staff to please inquire and investigate into the circumstances surrounding the death of my husband, Gary P. Friedli. I am greatly concerned that the Customs Service has not or will not hold Agent Sperling accountable or responsible for Gary’s death, and will not give Agent Sperling the corresponding punishment – the loss of his job. It is the ONLY punishment that is acceptable to us. As they were on duty, I cannot even hold Agent Sperling civilly liable because of workers’ compensation laws.... My husband, as a federal law enforcement officer killed in the line of duty [and one of the officers honored at the 1999 National Police Week], deserves justice. The truth needs to be told and it is not there. Gary died unnecessarily and for absolutely no reason other than Agent Sperling’s arrogant, reckless and negligent driving.Thank you for your time and attention.Sincerely,Dorene A. Kulpa-Friedli
Congressman Wolf took Kulpa-Friedli’s plea seriously. He wrote a letter on July 19, 1999, to David Williams, the Inspector General for the Department of Treasury. It is the job of the Office of the Inspector General (O.I.G) to investigate cases of alleged mismanagement and corruption within the Department of Treasury’s ranks.
“I am writing on behalf of one of my constituents, Mrs. Dorene Kulpa-Friedli, regarding the death of her husband, Special Agent Gary P. Friedli,” Wolf writes in the letter. “Mr. Friedli was killed in an automobile accident (that occured on March 3, 1998) in Arizona. The nature and ramifications surrounding his death are extremely troubling….
“I have contacted many agencies in regard to this matter, and feel that your office may be helpful in bringing forth some form of resolution and closure.”
Internal affairs
By the end of July 1999, about two months after Kulpa-Friedli had sent her letter to Congressman Wolf, Treasury O.I.G had launched an investigation. That probe was concluded in January 2000.
After the O.I.G report was completed, Customs launched a second investigation into the accident, conducted by its Internal Affairs Special Investigative Unit. That second Customs probe was completed in July 2000. Customs provided a copy of that report to Kulpa-Friedli. She obtained the initial Customs Internal Affairs report on the accident, as well as the Treasury O.I.G report, through Freedom of Information Act requests.
As a result, by December 2000, nearly three years after her husband’s death, Kulpa-Friedli, with the help of a U.S. congressman, had the truth unfolded before her. What she discovered was like a plot line for a Shakespearean tragedy.
The initial Customs Internal Affairs investigation into Friedli’s death, the one completed in October 1998 and overseen by James “Breck” Ellis, found that Sperling had done nothing wrong. The report also indicated that Sperling’s blood was not tested for the presence of alcohol or drugs after the accident because it “was not warranted.”
Sperling was allowed to return to work.
“The Cochise County Sheriff’s Department found that SA (Sperling), the driver of the government-owned vehicle, exceeded the posted speed limit by approximately 18 miles per hour and that the driver of the truck had moved to the right side of the roadway just prior to making a left turn,” states a synopsis of the initial Internal Affairs report findings. “No citations were issued. The Cochise County Attorney’s Office declined criminal prosecution. No additional evidence was found to substantiate misconduct on behalf of the Customs employees involved.”
However, both of the follow-up investigations, which were prompted by Kulpa-Friedli’s persistence in seeking out the truth, found that Sperling was to blame for the accident that caused Gary Friedli’s death.
“... The preponderance of evidence indicates that Allan Sperling, who has a documented history of reckless and aggressive driving, operated his G.O.V (government vehicle) in an unsafe manner at the time of the subject accident. Sperling’s actions would have significantly contributed to the death of Special Agent Friedli,” states the Treasury O.I.G report.
The findings of the second Customs Internal Affairs investigation were equally damning of Sperling’s actions.
The report concluded that “Sperling’s excessive speed was the primary cause of the fatal collision.
“Consequently, the allegation that Special Agent Sperling, as the operator of the G.O.V, negligently and improperly operated his G.O.V, by failing to maintain necessary control, is substantiated,” the second Customs report states.
Both investigations also made note of Sperling’s prior bad driving record.
“From 1992 to 1997, while employed by the U.S.C.S (U.S. Customs Service), Sperling was involved in five documented vehicle accidents, four of which were on duty,” states a report of investigation prepared by Treasury O.I.G. “In one accident, which occurred at night on Geronimo Trail Road (also the location of the Friedli accident), Sperling was traveling at approximately 80 mph when he struck a cow.”
The second Customs probe stated that of the 15 agents and law enforcement personnel questioned about Sperling’s driving history, 11 said he was “a very aggressive driver.” Nine of those 11, according to the report, indicated that Sperling “routinely drove extremely fast during work-related situations that did not require an emergency response.”
During the course of the O.I.G investigation, Greg Rabeler, the resident agent in charge of the Douglas office at the time of the accident, denied knowing that Sperling had a history of reckless driving. Rabeler also denied that he helped to cover up another of Sperling’s alleged blunders.
From the Treasury OIG report:
During the course of the subject investigation, several U.S. Customs Service (U.S.C.S) sources advised O.I.G agents that Sperling had “lost” a government-owned horse while on a “camping trip.” Further, the sources stated that the incident was inaccurately documented by supervisory personnel as a “training exercise” to cover the loss by Sperling.When questioned regarding the purpose, authorization and circumstances that pertained to the above incident, Sperling provided the following information.Sperling stated that during May of 1996, he was in charge of the office “horse program.” Sperling explained that the Douglas R.A (resident agent office) had four horses which “were not used in some time,” and that he felt the animals needed “conditioning.” Without authorization (emphasis added), utilizing his personally owned truck and trailer, Sperling said he transported two of the horses to Lake Knoll, Payson, AZ, approximately six hours from the Douglas R.A. ... Sperling claimed to be accompanied by three friends, and said that there were no U.S.C.S personnel on the trip. Sperling said that the horse became “tangled” in its lead line, and that he cut the rope to prevent the animal from injuring itself. At that point, Sperling said the horse “took off running” and that he spent the rest of the day attempting to locate the animal.Sperling stated that upon his return to Douglas, he notified R.A.I.C (Resident Agent in Charge) Rabeler of the above incident, at which time he (Sperling) received a “good ass-chewing.” Sperling could not recall submitting a memorandum at the time of the incident, but did recall completing a “board of survey” on a later date, claiming the horse as lost. ...When questioned why he did not submit a memorandum reporting the incident, Sperling replied, “I don’t know.” Further, when questioned about the report that a memorandum he submitted regarding the incident had been destroyed and rewritten by R.A.I.C Rabeler, Sperling replied, “I have no knowledge of that.”
Contradiction
Raebeler’s version of the story was a bit different, however. Rabeler told the O.I.G investigators that he had approved Sperling’s “request to train the subject horse,” and denied rewriting a report to cover for Sperling.
Supporting Documents:
Letter to Friedli’s widow from Commissioner of Customs (189 kb PDF)
“When informed that Sperling had contradicted his statement about receiving authorization to use the subject horse, Rabeler replied, ‘If that’s all you got, take your best shot,’” the O.I.G report states.
The O.I.G report concluded that Sperling did use a government-owned horse without permission, lost the animal, and then failed to document the incident properly. The report also concluded that “U.S.C.S (U.S. Customs Service) supervisory personnel gave Sperling preferential treatment, to include providing misleading statements to the U.S.C.S Office of Internal Affairs.”
For his part, Ellis explained away the shortcomings of the initial Internal Affairs investigation into Friedli’s death, which he oversaw, by saying that personnel in the Douglas Customs office “were not forthcoming,” according to the Treasury OIG report. “Ellis also said his office began to feel ‘pressure from headquarters’ to complete the investigation.”
O.I.G did refer its findings to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Tucson. However, the U.S. Attorney declined to prosecute “in lieu of administrative action by the U.S.C.S.”
And that was the rub for Kulpa-Friedli. Despite all the findings of wrongdoing in three of the four investigations, Sperling kept his job.
On December 5, 2000, Kulpa-Friedli received a letter from Customs Commissioner Raymond Kelly.
“As you are aware, Treasury’s Office of the Inspector General conducted an additional investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of your husband, U.S. Customs Special Agent Gary Friedli,” Kelly states in the letter. “Subsequent to the receipt of the Inspector General’s report, I requested a thorough review of that report. These results were provided to the Discipline Review Board (D.R.B) along with all the previous investigative materials. The D.R.B was tasked to review and assess the entire case. However, after consultation with the Office of Chief Counsel, it was found that further action in this matter was prohibited because disciplinary action had already been taken.
“... While this may be of little comfort to you and your family, I can assure you that we’ve done everything possible to review all the evidence and the decisions made in the case. In the end, I am constrained by the law to take no further action,” Kelly’s letter concludes.
When contacted, Sperling declined to comment on the case.
Kulpa-Friedli says she was never told what type of “disciplinary action” was meted out to Sperling. “I did get an anonymous call from someone who said Sperling was issued a letter of reprimand,” Kulpa-Friedli adds.
Pressing on
Kulpa-Friedli refused to give up. She decided to go public with her husband’s case.
“Family members deserve to know the truth, no matter what that truth is,” says Kulpa-Friedli. “To have a cover-up or people lie to you just adds to the pain.”
The media picked up the Friedli story in the spring of 2001, which helped prompt a congressional inquiry by Sen. Chuck Grassley, R-Iowa, who was then chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.
“I plan to look into this (Arizona) case and into the broader questions it raises,” said Grassley in a prepared statement at the time. “The broader questions are whether Customs agents are adequately investigated for allegations of wrongdoing in the course of duty and whether they’re adequately disciplined when wrongdoing is substantiated.”
In late April 2001, Grassley’s office fired off a letter to Acting Customs Commissioner Charles Winwood and to Paul O’Neill, the secretary of the Treasury, asking for a full accounting of the investigation into Agent Friedli’s death. However, by June of 2001, Grassley’s office had backed off the case.
“Senator Grassley has pretty much closed his involvement with the Friedli case, unless there are any new developments that warrant his attention,” says Jill Gerber, a spokeswoman for the senator.
Grassley sent a letter to Acting Customs Commissioner Winwood on June 26, 2001, reflecting the senator’s intention to put the Friedli case on the back burner.
Grassley’s letter
Dear Acting Commissioner Winwood:The Senate Committee on Finance [Committee] is committed to overseeing the United States Customs Service [Customs] to ensure that it performs its responsibilities efficiently and effectively. In discharging the Committee’s oversight responsibilities, I have written to you on two occasions [April 30 and May 24, 2001] to request information from Customs regarding its investigation of the recent and unfortunate death of Special Agent Gary P. Friedli.As you are aware, Special Agent Friedli was on a non-emergency assignment when the government car in which he was the passenger and which was driven by Customs Special Agent Allan Sperling crashed into a tractor trailer it was trying to pass while speeding in excess of 20 mph over the speed limit at the time of the accident on a dirt road with limited visibility. The Committee’s investigation sought to determine whether Customs followed its internal procedures in investigating this fatal car accident and in recommending disciplining for Special Agent Sperling.In conducting congressional oversight, the Committee has endeavored to hear several perspectives on the underlying facts of the accident and subsequent investigations of those facts. The Committee’s efforts include meetings with representatives from the Department of the Treasury, Inspector General’s Office and Customs’ Office of Internal Affairs. The Committee has also reviewed numerous written materials from various sources, to include documentation that Customs produced in response to the Committee’s requests for information relating to the underlying car accident as well as Customs’ subsequent investigations, disciplinary procedures, and penalty guidelines.The Committee’s review of the information, considered in its entirety, leads me to form two primary conclusions. First, I believe that Customs has undertaken great efforts to ensure the integrity of its internal investigations, beginning in 1999 when it fundamentally restructured Internal Affairs, and I applaud Customs’ efforts in this regard. In addition, I believe that Customs must remain vigilant in conducting its internal investigations to ensure that no agent receives preferential treatment, and in maintaining consistency in its disciplinary recommendations.Accordingly, I request written annual reports from Customs beginning for the present fiscal year [i.e., the first report will cover that period between Oct. 1, 2000 and Sept. 30, 2001] and for the next fiscal year [i.e., the second report will cover that period between Oct. 1, 2001 and Sept. 30, 2002] regarding the status of closed cases involving allegations of misconduct and criminal activity within Customs and any discipline imposed. I am only interested in those cases that are investigated by Internal Affairs and dealt with by the Disciplinary Review Board. I request that these reports contain the following information: the grade level, work address, and a general description of the primary work responsibilities of the Customs employee at issue; the general nature of the allegation/s; the internal guideline or criminal statute at issue; the recommended discipline, where applicable; and the discipline imposed, where applicable. These reports should also include any modifications to Customs’ disciplinary rules, regulations or internal guidelines and the reason for such modification from this date forward, or since the date of the last periodic update.In closing, I want to reiterate my appreciation of Customs’ commitment to judicious and timely internal investigations of allegations of misconduct and criminal activity. I look forward to receiving Customs’ initial report by the end of November 2001. Also, I look forward to continuing to work with you and Customs to help fulfill this commitment.Sincerely,Charles E. GrassleyRanking Member
U.S. Rep. Frank Wolf likewise backed off the Friedli case, pending any new developments, according to Judy McCary, director of constituent services for the congressman.
McCary concedes that she remains puzzled as to why Customs appears to have gone to such great lengths to protect a field agent like Sperling – when other agents around the country have received harsh discipline for far less serious offenses.
“I always thought there was something odd about this case,” she says.
McCary adds that given the current environment, with the war on terror, “to a certain extent, we have to keep people in place” in government.
“We can’t have a Saturday night massacre,” she adds. “But long-term, we have to change the culture and weed out the bad apples.”
Kulpa-Friedli exhibits far less patience with the whole affair.
“All this stuff going on at the time (of my husband’s death), it just sickens me that it’s only starting to come out all these years later,” she says. “I think Gary’s death is only the tip of the iceberg.”
Kulpa-Friedli adds that it troubled her even more to learn that in the fall of 2003, according to the Army News Service, Sperling was among a team of special agents dispatched to Iraq to help U.S. soldiers train Iraqi border guards in investigative techniques and ethics.
“It surely was something to read that he is teaching ethics…,” Kulpa-Friedli adds.
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