PART 1:EXTREME PREJUDICE:THE TERRIFYING STORY OF THE PATRIOT ACT & THE COVER UPS OF 911 AND IRAQ

EXTREME PREJUDICE:

THE TERRIFYING STORY  OF 

THE PATRIOT ACT & THE 

COVER UPS OF 911 AND IRAQ

BY SUSAN LINDAUER

FORWARD 

My law firm defended Ms. Susan Lindauer against federal charges of acting as an unregistered Iraqi Agent in conspiracy with the Iraqi Intelligence Service. I assure you that Ms. Lindauer’s story is shocking, but true. It’s an important story of this new political age, post-9/11. 

As her attorney, I maintained very high legal standards for validating Ms. Lindauer’s claims that she worked as a U.S. Intelligence Asset, supervised by members of the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency. Before agreeing to represent her, I took steps to corroborate her story through independent sources that I considered to be extremely high caliber. Those included former Congressional staff, international journalists, and several U.S. and Scottish attorneys involved with the Lockerbie Trial at Camp Zeist. I know some of these people socially and professionally. Ms. Lindauer’s story checked out. She has an extraordinary personal history, and I believe it’s true. 

Vetting her story was much simplified by the extensive records available in her legal discovery. Those included original documents and transcripts from FBI wire taps of 28,000 phone calls; 8,000 emails; and hundreds of captured faxes that are date and time stamped to prove transmission. When, for example, Ms. Lindauer claims that her CIA handler, Dr. Richard Fuisz, paid her $2,500 in October, 2001 for her work on the 9/11 investigation, she’s got the personal check to prove it. When Ms. Lindauer claims to have delivered papers on Iraq’s probable lack of illegal weapons to the home of Secretary of State Colin Powell, who lived next door to Dr. Fuisz, she’s got the FBI photo copy of the manila envelope to vouch that she did it. She’s also got copies of the original papers with handwritten notes delivered to Secretary Powell the week before his speech at the United Nations, provided by the FBI for her prosecution. 

Her portfolio smartly repudiates claims that Intelligence Assets made no attempt to correct faulty intelligence on Capitol Hill before the War. Indeed, FBI records show that she worked night and day around the clock to do just that. When Republican leaders decided to invent a new story about the 9/11 warnings, Pre-War Intelligence and Iraq’s contribution to the 9/11 investigation, Ms. Lindauer’s activism and her reputation for truth-telling, vis a vis Lockerbie, got in their way. For the deception to succeed, they had to take her down. 

In my opinion as her attorney, Ms. Lindauer was always competent to stand trial, only the Justice Department wanted to avoid embarrassing revelations from her case. 

Brian Shaughnessy 

July 1, 2010

CHAPTER ONE: 

THE WAR ON TRUTH 

He who tells history must tell it for all, not only for himself. 

–Arab saying 

“Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked, and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.” 

–Herman Goering. 

The Nuremberg Trials 1946 

“Hey kid, remember— When they come to kill you, scream your head off.” 

It was an eerie premonition, those last words by my intelligence handler, Paul Hoven, in the doorway of his apartment. Or perhaps it was a matter of fate, predestined and unalterable. Had we all seen the eventuality of this day and laughed our way to the other side of its meaning? Like an outlaw from the old West who understands that eventually he’s got to hang for robbing those trains. Or a spy who knows his life has memorialized too many inconvenient truths. 

Yet when the day arrived, it caught me fully off guard. I heard the heavy pounding on my door early that morning. I wrapped myself in a bathrobe and hurried to the window. A crowd of men in flak jackets had gathered on my front porch. I could see more federal agents in the yard. 

“Susan Lindauer— FBI. Open the door. We have a warrant for your arrest.” 

For a few crucial moments, I was too stunned to act. 

“Open this door immediately. This is the FBI.” 

Actually I couldn’t. Quite mysteriously the door jamb had broken about three weeks earlier. The door swung on the air, so that I had no choice but to barricade it shut with plywood and nails. 1 Among friends I speculated that federal agents cracked the door frame during one of those warrant less searches on the Patriot Act that Congress was so jazzed about. 

Suddenly my paranoia did not appear so irrational after all. I pointed to the other side of my house, and started to back out of my living room. I needed to get dressed. 

That made them very, very angry. 

“WE ARE THE FBI. OPEN THIS DOOR OR WE WILL BREAK IT DOWN.” 

“What? You already broke it. You’re going to break it again?” I shook my head at the FBI agents staring back through my window. “No! You have to come to the side door.” 

I turned on my heels and fled. A stampede of agents raced to the door off my bedroom, as I cautiously pulled it open. A whole team of feds forced their way inside. Now I started shaking. 

“What exactly are you doing here? May I see some identification?” 

“Susan Lindauer, I am Special Agent Chmiel. You are under arrest on the Patriot Act. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say, can and will be used against you in a federal court of law—” 2 

The FBI’s presence in my bedroom hit me like a dirty punch in the gut. At the mention of the Patriot Act, however, I knew this was serious trouble, and it could be scary trouble. Still, I had no idea that my arrest was connected to Iraq or my Pre-War Intelligence activities. I had no inkling what illegal actions the government had clocked against me. I was waking up to make coffee. I was not a bank robber, a drug dealer, or a murderer. I had a couple of minor speeding violations. That’s it. 

My arrest would prove distinctive in two critical ways. 

First, I was one of only three U.S. Assets covering the Iraqi Embassy at the United Nations before the War, granting me vast primary knowledge of PreWar Intelligence as a direct participant in some of the events. I would soon discover that all three of us got arrested as “Iraqi agents” when Congress and the White House decided to cook the intelligence books. 

More notoriously, after Jose Padilla, I was now distinguished as the second non-Arab Americans to discover the slippery and treacherous legal terrain of the Patriot Act. By invoking the Patriot Act against me, the Justice Department used the same tools to smash political dissension against Republican war policy that Congress enacted to break terrorists. The message was simple. Oppose the Grand Old Party and you become an “Enemy of the State.”

It was especially ironic because my line of specialty — for almost a decade— was anti-terrorism. 

The FBI hustled me to a sedan in handcuffs, and we drove off towards Baltimore, gambling it would be out of range of the Washington media. I kept it light, joking about the fingerprint machine that scanned thumb prints straight onto a computer screen. Pretty cool technology, I guffawed. I was waiting for the punch line, confident that somebody extremely high up would quickly receive an angry phone call, telling the FBI they’d made a hugely embarrassing mistake. Obviously they didn’t know who I was. I tried to keep the mood friendly, no hard feelings when they got the order to release me. I was sure the situation would change momentarily. I could be magnanimous for an hour or so. 

Keep dreamin’ baby 

My expectations changed radically and abruptly when Special Agent Chmiel sat me down with a copy of my full indictment. 3 His finger shook slightly as he pointed to the bottom line: 25 years in prison under Federal Sentencing Guidelines. (Mandatory sentencing got set aside and reduced to “recommendations” by the U.S. Supreme Court 4 in December, 2004, nine months after my arrest). A powerful surge of horror exploded in my heart. I stared numb and disbelieving at the rundown of the charges, trying to determine who the hell had ordered my arrest. I felt a jolt like a heart attack when I realized that everybody I ever trusted had betrayed me on a massive scale. 

Stunned, I demanded to know what exactly I had done wrong? The FBI Agent replied glibly that my attorney would explain my criminal actions later. Need I say, that was hardly satisfactory after suggesting I might spend 25 years in federal prison for violating the Patriot Act—a 7,000 page document that I happened to know nobody on Capitol Hill actually read before voting to approve. 

Almost immediately my arrest began to expose the dilemma for defendants on the Patriot Act. If you rob a bank, or smuggle drugs into the U.S., or commit a violent robbery, then the accused person can recognize what actions constitute that particular crime. When a person gets indicted on the Patriot Act, what does that actually mean? What triggers the criminal action which the Patriot Act seeks to punish? I had no idea. The FBI Agent could not explain it either. That struck me as grossly unfair. I mean, if you’re going to spend 25 years in prison, you have a reasonable right to know why. 

The government’s position was not strengthened by the disingenuous nature of the few specific actions detailed by the Justice Department. For example, I was formally accused of “Organizing Resistance to the United States” 5 in Iraq. My mind flashed back to the previous summer, and my brief encounter with an undercover FBI agent, presented as a “Libyan Agent” in the indictment, a false flag to inflame the media. Quite the contrary, I recognized he was some form of American Intelligence—and teasingly, I called him out the way that spooks do. We have our ways of letting each other know that we know, even if someone’s on cover. 

And what plot did we hatch that posed such grave threat to the Occupation? Why, we discussed the critical importance of promoting free elections and free political parties in Iraq, and how Iraqi detainees should not suffer torture or sexual abuse, and should have access to attorneys to protest their detentions by American soldiers. 6 Here the Republican leadership was bragging about the U.S. liberation of Baghdad, while I faced years in prison for supporting genuine democratic reforms and human rights inside the “New Iraq.” It screamed hypocrisy.

Another federal agent interrupted the conversation. They were ready to take me to Court. He warned that a small group of journalists waited outside the building for my perp walk. I would be photographed in handcuffs on my way to Court. 

I saw Paul Hoven’s face framed tight in his doorway that last time we said goodbye— forever, though I didn’t know it yet. The smiles and warmth had gone. I saw him deadly serious now. And I heard him again: 

Scream your head off, Susan! 

Federal agents shoved open the door of the FBI Baltimore office. A huddle of local journalists with a couple of TV cameras rushed into position: 

Scream! 

I took a deep breath, holding it until I got directly in front of them. Then I shouted: 

“I am an Anti-War Activist and I am innocent!” I yelled. “I have done more against terrorism than anybody. Everything I have done was always good for the security of the United States and good for security in the Middle East.” 7 

The FBI Agents grabbed me from behind, and shoved me faster towards a black sedan. They thrust me in the backseat and slammed the door. I gazed out the window into the horrified eyes of a camera man, who followed us when I cried out. 

For one moment, one photo-journalist recognized that something terribly wrong was happening in America. He got a glimpse of the truth, but it was enough. Television footage of my arrest beamed around the world. I know from friends in Canada, France and Taiwan who saw it. He took my story to the White House door, summoning the Washington and international press corps en mass. For one moment, a single camera man showed the White House the force that journalistic freedom can unleash as a check on tyranny. 

For one moment, we almost won. 

Much later media pundits would decry the administration’s policy of crushing dissent in the intelligence community, attacking the patriotism of individuals who opposed the Republican War policy in Iraq. Unhappily, those pundits saw nothing awkward or contradictory about Capitol Hill’s practice of systematically tearing down the CIA to take the blame for “faulty” pre- war intelligence. The Intelligence Community would be demoralized for years afterwards. The GOP would leave it gutted in ashes. 

On the morning of my arrest, I saw with total clarity that I was the first casualty of the Republican War on Truth. I recognized that my indictment was a political smoke-screen to shut me up, because I possessed first-hand knowledge of events that Republican leaders desperately wanted to hide from the American public. Even so, I had no idea how far afield of our Constitution they would go to protect their grip on power. 

What those TV cameras captured in their sound-bite was the head-on collision of my double life as a clandestine, back-channel Asset in counter-terrorism for the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency—and my public life as an AntiWar activist-as seen by friends, neighbors and family. In truth, I was both women. On that fateful morning, I had no idea that construct of duality in my life would prove more difficult for the Court to understand than the prospect of my innocence. Explaining that duality would become my hardest battle. On the morning of my arrest, I had no idea how difficult or frightening that fight would become. 

My FBI Agents sped off to the Federal Courthouse in Baltimore. Shaken by my outburst, they hardly spoke on the drive. I was dumped unceremoniously in the custody of court bailiffs to wait for a court-appointed attorney to fight for my bail. Meanwhile, the Feds skulked off to devise a new strategy for containing the GOP’s “Susan Lindauer problem, ” which was already backfiring on the White House and Capitol Hill. 

In a tiny holding cage, I examined the federal indictment more closely, while I waited for the extradition hearing that would transfer my case to Chief Justice Michael B. Mukasey in the Southern District of New York in Manhattan. 

A metal desk was bolted to the floor with a bench seat. The cage door locked directly behind me, allowing perhaps two feet of standing space. A guard shoved a roll of bread with something like turkey and mayonnaise through a slot in the door, along with some potato chips and a can of soda. I took a bite, and couldn’t eat. 

Locked inside such a claustrophobic space, my breathing got rapid, and I experienced a roller coaster of emotions. I kept thinking to myself how the media would react when they discovered that I had not exaggerated my involvement in anti terrorism. I’d been active since 1993. And here the Justice Department had locked me up in a jail cell like some criminal! What incompetence that the Justice Department didn’t know who I am! Somebody didn’t do his homework!

Or maybe they did. A whisper nagged at the back of my brain. They obviously knew my second cousin on my father’s side was Andrew Card, Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush. And it struck me as highly improbable, extraordinary even, that the Justice Department would admit no prior knowledge of my extensive work in anti terrorism, going back to the first World Trade Center attack in 1993. 

What did my intelligence handler say, when I complained about heavy surveillance that sometimes got excessive or rough? “Don’t get all high and mighty on us, Susan! If they’re not tracking you— based on all of your contacts in the Middle East—they’re not doing their jobs.” 

Oh, they understood what they were doing alright. This was a political hit. I knew first-hand where all the bodies were buried in a graveyard of national security initiatives that looked nothing at all like what Americans were told. Much later, KBOO Radio in Portland, Oregon—part of the vanguard media—wryly observed that I worked for the Company that made the shovels. 

They had to take me out so they could reinvent the truth. It was that simple. 

I looked more closely at the indictment—“Acting as an Unregistered Iraqi Agent” in “conspiracy with Iraq’s Intelligence Service.” 8 Not espionage, I determined quickly. 

That satisfied me somewhat. The Justice Department wasn’t so stupid as to accuse me of trading state secrets, which would be grossly inaccurate. 

But $10,000 from the Iraqis? 9 The Feds understood more than they pretended. Locked in that tiny holding cage, I got so angry that I shouted for a bailiff to protest. I wanted to tell the bailiff the indictment was loaded with excrement. There was no other way to describe it. I had yet to learn that filing criminal charges against an individual was relatively simple. Everybody said you could indict a ham sandwich in New York City. Getting charges dismissed proved infinitely more difficult, however. Federal prosecutors typically do not enjoy confessing publicly that they read the evidence wrong. 

Oh but I would have a few things to say when we got to Court! 

For starters, after 9/11, Israel was the only foreign government trolling to buy national security documents in Washington. Iraq didn’t need them. Baghdad already had the best. They had the most devastating access in the Middle East. Powerful stuff. Israel coveted that access hungrily for what their arch enemy in Baghdad could reveal. If Iraq didn’t have it already, Saddam’s government would know how to get it. 

The real treasure hunt after 9/11 was for financial or banking documents that would expose the cash network for key figures tied to Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Iraqi officials boasted that they had financial documents of extraordinary value that would prove a Middle Eastern connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing and the first strike on the World Trade Center in 1993. If so, Baghdad had not overstated the value of its cache. They wanted to trade that intelligence as part of a comprehensive settlement to lift the sanctions. 

By the summer of 2001, back channel talks with Iraqi diplomats in New York were far advanced, under the watchful eye of the CIA. The peace framework developed from November 2000 through March 2002 10 created an option that defined what future U.S.-Iraqi relations might look like in a post sanctions world— without penalizing the United States for supporting brutal U.N. sanctions for 13 years. It asked critical questions of what Baghdad would give the United States to prove its commitment to behave like a responsible neighbor in the region. 

After 9/11, Baghdad brought these papers to the table. 11 Those papers potentially qualified as the most significant contribution to successful global anti-terrorism efforts by any nation in the world. Baghdad’s intelligence on terrorism was that good. Really, it was the best. 

My U.S. Intelligence handlers had been informed immediately, which sort of explains how Israel would have heard the news. 

And so a Mossad contact had phoned repeatedly while I was on a trip to Iraq, telling my housemate, Allison H— that they would deliver a “suitcase full of cash anywhere in the world to get those documents.” 

“Susan’s traveling in Milan, ” Allison told him. 

“No. She’s not. She’s nowhere in Italy.” 

“But how do you know that? Who are you? Why did she leave Italy?” Allison was floored. 

“Tell her it’s Roy. If she calls, tell her we’ll meet her anywhere in the world. Any city at all. We will come to her. We’ll bring a suitcase full of cash.” 

The truth of my travel itinerary to Baghdad had been concealed from all but a few of my friends in Washington. My CIA handler, Dr. Richard Fuisz, received approximately 30 to 40 phone calls informing him of the dates of my trip, and nagging for payment for a series of outstanding debts, mostly connected to the Lockerbie Trial. Mind you, I was absolutely desperate to receive payment before my departure. I pushed hard to get it. 

I also begged Dr. Fuisz to follow through on Congressional promises of payment for my extensive work on Lockerbie, tied to the hand over of the two Libyans. Leaders in Washington and London had made grand speeches at press conferences, promising spectacular rewards for my work. Unhappily for Assets, those promises were forgotten as soon as the TV cameras packed up. It was all an empty publicity stunt, a public fraud.

Only I was real flesh and blood, and I needed to get paid. I needed to buy groceries. It was Dr. Fuisz’s job as my handler to make that happen—which accounted for the high volume of phone calls before my trip to Baghdad. My urgency and desperation was so great that even the Israelis heard gossip about it. The Mossad acted to fill the gap, while the notorious Beltway Bandits in Washington poached off Black Budget earmarks for the 9/11 investigation. 

And for good cause. 

In Baghdad, I expected to meet top ranking Iraqi officials, in part to discuss the acquisition of those documents—which Iraq would only turn over to the FBI or Interpol—in other words, only credible law enforcement, no spooks. Still, I had the papers in my reach. That whet some appetites in the intelligence community. Just not appetites in the Bush Administration, unfortunately, though I did not understand that in March 2002. 

And so an Israeli agent urged me to name my price. Any price. 

I turned him down after my trip to Baghdad. 

A suitcase full of cash… No matter how badly I needed that money— and I was hanging by a thread financially, at this point — I could never sell documents affecting national security to a foreign government. Cash transactions go on more frequently than anybody wants to admit. Not the sale of U.S. documents, which is strictly verboten and punishable by endless years in prison. Trafficking in foreign documents like those from Baghdad goes on all the time, however. To stay so pure requires a certain naivete that clashes with the ruthless nature of intelligence-gathering. It reflected my own distaste for the Mossad, certainly. With regards to this indictment, however, it might have been my salvation. 

In that holding cage I resolved that I would challenge the Court: If I would not accept a suitcase full of cash from a friendly ally like Israel—non traceable income with no taxes that might add up to a couple million dollars, if the Samsonite luggage was large enough – why oh why would I take $10,000 from the Iraqis—who were desperately cash poor under UN sanctions? Obviously I hadn’t, and no evidence suggested I had. Mercifully, Allison had no spook ties. Nobody could stop her from testifying. 

Oh but pride goeth before the fall, doesn’t it? Israel would have taken the financial records on Al Qaeda. They would have paid any price for them. They would have shut down the financial pipeline to Osama’s network, and stopped the flow of funds used in other attacks today in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mombai, the Philippines and the Anbar Province of Iraq. I was just so pure that I could not allow myself to be “corrupted.” 

I had no idea when I turned down Israel’s generosity that America would refuse to accept such critical intelligence. I could not fathom that Washington would reject documents that would pinpoint the inner workings of Osama bin Laden’s financial network, and incidentally show a pattern of Middle Eastern involvement in the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and the 1993 World Trade Center attack. It left me baffled and bewildered, more so because it was never explained. 

The White House was more interested in launching war in Iraq than protecting our country from terrorism. They would not accept those papers strictly because they came from Baghdad—even though sources in Baghdad promised to deliver those papers promptly to an FBI Task Force, as good faith for its other commitments in our back-channel talks. The United States left that money in circulation. 

Such calculated indifference, despite so much grandstanding after 9/11, broke my heart irrevocably. It qualified as massive public fraud, which endangers our country and the global community to this very day. In the end, that deception destroyed my relationship with the two men I loved and respected most in the world, Paul Hoven and Dr. Richard Fuisz, my “handlers” or “case officers, ” who supervised my work with Libya and Iraq from 1993 to 2002. I would have done anything for either of those men. In the end, I could not understand why my successful efforts to win Iraq’s cooperation with the 9/11 investigation cost me their friendship. And they were prohibited from explaining. In my heart, I have clung to the hope that they were just as perplexed and baffled as I was. 

For truly I was the last to know. 

Israel had always known. 

And so the Mossad tried to acquire the papers directly from me. 

How could Washington have acted so irresponsibly to shun Iraq’s cooperation, with such high stakes in play? In that tiny holding cage, I wanted to shout at the bailiffs, like I’d shouted to myself many times, stupefied by the loss of it.

How could they do such a terrible thing to all of us? They hurt everybody. 

I dared not examine those questions too long. Self pity would not free me from that cage. I would have to hold myself together, and stay focused and calm, if I wanted to wrestle control of the situation. I would have to get over my emotional shock. I could beat the Justice Department, if I kept my wits about me. 

I brought my mind back to the terrible document in front of me—the federal indictment that carried a maximum 25 year prison sentence. 12 

“Acting as an Unregistered Iraqi Agent.” 13 

Fuck you, motherfuckers! 

Straight off the top, I had a worthy and reliable rebuttal to that accusation. For close to a decade, I had performed as a U.S. Asset covering Iraq at the United Nations, with oversight by U.S. Intelligence. I’d been recruited as a back-channel in the early 1990's, because of my anti-sanctions activism. They sent me to the Libya House in May, 1995 and the Iraqi Embassy in August, 1996. They supervised everything I did, debriefing every conversation after my visits to the Embassies. 

We specialized in anti terrorism, and my bona fides were some of the best. Our work in the 1990's set the bar awfully high, as a matter of fact. It would be fairly simple to prove, because I had played a public role in identifying my CIA handler, Dr. Richard Fuisz as a crucial source of knowledge in the bombing of Pan Am 103. My efforts had been well documented during the trial of the two Libyans at Camp Zeist. Scottish attorneys for the Lockerbie Defense could testify to Dr. Fuisz’s intelligence background and our long-established working relationship together. My defense would be much simplified by that validation. 

Wouldn’t it be fun to bust the Justice Department in court! I’d slam prosecutors to the wall for bringing such outrageous charges against me. “Foreign agent, ” indeed. After all my contributions as an Asset, I would never be so generous as to accept a plea bargain in this case. We’d go to trial. I’d make the Prosecutor grovel with apologies to the Court and the media for daring to accuse me of criminal activity. They’d eat crow for this! 

The whole thing struck me as foolish—except the holding cage felt awfully real. 

And what was this accusation: “Conspiracy with Iraq’s Intelligence Service?” 14 

The indictment listed two co-defendants, Raed Noman Al-Anbuke and Wisam Noman Al-Anbuke. I’d never met either of them, nor heard their names spoken. Only later would I learn that the Anbuke brothers were also Assets covering the Iraqi Embassy at the United Nations in New York. The sons of an Iraqi diplomat, they agreed to help the FBI track visitors to the Embassy. Their cooperation had been fairly innocuous, videotaping guests at Embassy events, nothing terribly dramatic. 

The Justice Department had exploited them with promises that the brothers could stay in America after the invasion. When the FBI had no more use for the boys, they got arrested as “Iraqi Agents”—along with another brother and sister accused of no crimes at all. The whole family got thrown in prison at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in Manhattan, in attempt to coerce confessions from the brothers. The tactic of arresting innocent family members on the Patriot Act smacked of Saddam Hussein’s own brutality. It was fairly disgusting. 

I could see now the Justice Department had made a clean sweep, arresting all three of us who covered Iraq at the United Nations before the War. It struck me as awfully convenient that those of us with birds-eye views inside the Embassy should all be gagged and silenced by phony indictments. Meanwhile, Washington officials would be liberated to bombard the air waves with false reports about the mediocrity of our Pre-War Intelligence reporting. 

Such rubbish! 

For my part, I had been a vocal anti-war activist, campaigning aggressively against the invasion on Capitol Hill and at the United Nations, with a trove of documents and FBI wire taps to prove it. For heaven’s sake, I stood formally accused of telling U.S. officials that war would be disastrous. And yet in this New World Order, my indictment on the Patriot Act effectively gagged me from publicly disclosing any part of my warnings to White House officials and members of Congress. While I faced prosecution, those same leaders on Capitol Hill vigorously complained to the public that Assets like me had not come forward. Their verdict was unanimous. My failure to speak was responsible for the war-time catastrophe facing our nation. A very clever strategy! And totally dishonest.

My eye stuck on the first “overt act” of conspiracy. “On or about October 14, 1999, Susan Lindauer aka “Symbol Susan, ” met with an officer of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Manhattan.” 15 

“Symbol Susan?” I rolled my eyes. Somebody at the Justice Department had a sense of humor. I was a “symbol” alright. The Justice Department intended to scare the Intelligence Community out of criticizing the Republican leadership about its war policy. They made a bold example of me, flaunting the brutality that could crush anybody who dissented from Republicans on national security policy. Fine, then. Let them call me “Symbol Susan.” I’m made of tougher stuff than that. While they’re at it, I thought, let them explain in front of a jury how they scapegoated me for accurately forecasting the horrific consequences of this War. Let them show the world how they mistreated those of us who got it right. 

Now that first “overt act of conspiracy” on October 14, 1999 intrigued me very much. It was so long ago, yet so definite and precise. For the first time that morning of my arrest, I smiled. Yes, I was still shell-shocked, but I began to see how easily the indictment could be torn apart. Shredded, really. 

October 14, 1999. Those bastards got that date from me! I reported it to Paul Hoven, one of my intelligence handlers, when I warned him that Iraqi diplomats in New York had requested my help in locating a top Republican official to receive major financial campaign contributions for the 2000 Presidential election. Those poor bastards in Baghdad wanted to shower George Bush with campaign cash, in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, in the hope that once victorious, he would reciprocate by lifting the sanctions. 16 

The sincerity of Iraq’s good will towards the Republican leadership poignantly illustrated the greatest tragedy of the War: Saddam’s government urgently desired to reconcile with the United States, and prove its loyalty as an ally to Washington. Baghdad yearned for days past, when Iraq had been strategically positioned as a buttress to Islamic radicalism in Iran. Then, Baghdad’s progressive views towards women and moderate Islamic attitudes had been highly prized. Alas, in October, 1999, U.S. Intelligence demanded that I block them. My DIA handler, Paul Hoven threatened to bomb Baghdad himself if Iraqi officials gave money to the Republican Party. 17 I described Iraq’s desire to contribute to Republican coffers in two letters to my second cousin, Andrew Card, Chief of Staff to President Bush, on March 1, 2001 and December 2, 2001. That explains how Republican leaders learned of Iraq’s attempt. 

In my holding cage, I scorned them all. See you in court, Mr. Prosecutor! (Not likely!) 

I scanned the indictment a little further —“On or about September 19, 2001, Susan Lindauer met with an officer of the Iraqi Intelligence Service in Manhattan.” 18 

That would be my part in the 9/11 investigation— and me a first-responder, like the fire fighters at Ground Zero, taking appropriate steps to secure Iraq’s cooperation with global anti-terrorism objectives. 

Yet now the Justice Department declared it a crime to contribute to a terrorist investigation? And they dared to cite the U.S. Patriot Act in order to do it? Tell it to a jury, Mr. Prosecutor! While you’re at it, explain that to Congress! 

My confidence grew bolder. I read other dates in January and February, 2002, when I met with Iraqi diplomats at a hotel close to the United Nations. 19 These were marathon sessions to finalize Iraq’s agreement to resume weapons inspections, according to rigorous standards for maximum transparency demanded by the United States, before the matter got handed over to the United Nations. The U.S. demanded that Baghdad agree to weapons inspections “with no conditions, ” the operative phrase for “unconditional surrender.” 20 It was entirely legitimate on my part, supervised by my CIA contacts and designed to guarantee Iraq’s performance. Our back channel dialogue from November 2000 to March 2002 made weapons inspections a successful reality. 21

Gleefully, I noticed that some of the dates in the indictment were flat wrong. I was confident that I could prove I was at my home in Maryland on several of those days. 

As an Asset with a long history of close relationships to Iraqi diplomats, I had a serious advantage over the Justice Department. I understood how they’d jumped to the wrong conclusions. My diplomatic contact in New York had a girlfriend named “Susan, ” a young American who worked at the United Nations. How delicious that the FBI should have gotten us confused! Apparently this Iraqi diplomat had shared some inexpensive lunches with this other Susan, while I was safely tucked 200 miles away in Maryland, out of danger of prosecution. Such poor intelligence! The claws of my Cheshire cat struck back. I would teach the FBI not to mess with Assets cooperating with other Agencies. They would never want to do this again. 

And the coup de gras: “On or about January 8, 2003, Susan Lindauer delivered to the home of a United States Government official, a letter in which Lindauer conveyed her established access to, and contacts with, members of the Saddam Hussein regime, in an unsuccessful attempt to influence U.S. foreign policy.” 

That was actually my 11th letter to Andy Card, Chief of Staff to President Bush. The same letter also got hand delivered to the home of Secretary of State Colin Powell, who lived next door to my CIA handler, Dr. Fuisz. 

Interestingly, the indictment made no mention of the previous 10 letters to Andy Card, outlining the progress of our back channel talks on resuming the weapons inspections. Secretary Powell received several of those reports, as well. 

But by God, the Justice Department finally got something right in its indictment! I had warned my second cousin, Andy Card—and Secretary Powell and members of Congress in both parties— that war with Iraq would prove disastrous for U.S. and Middle East security. Invading Iraq would be simple. Occupation would be brutal. There would be no roses in the streets for American soldiers. We would face an angry and tenacious enemy not afraid to die for God, in order to throw us out of their country. It would raise Iran as a regional power, and fire up an insurgency modeled on Al Qaeda. Here’s an excerpt from that letter to Andy Card that the Justice Department judged to contain treasonous ideology: 

“Above all, you must realize that if you go ahead with this invasion, Osama bin Laden will triumph, rising from his grave of seclusion. His network will be swollen with fresh recruits, and other charismatic individuals will seek to build upon his model, multiplying those networks. And the United States will have delivered the death blow to itself. Using your own act of war, Osama and his cohort will irrevocably divide the hearts and minds of the Arab Street from moderate governments in Islamic countries that have been holding back the tide. Power to the people, what we call “democracy, ” will secure the rise of fundamentalists.” 22 

Mind you, I wasn’t the only one offering up that analysis. Others in the intelligence community, among a few experts interviewed all too briefly on the 24 hour news channels, reached the same conclusions. Kudos to all! We might have been the minority, but we foresaw that Occupation would turn Arab opinion sharply against the U.S. The groundswell of popular support that America enjoyed after 9/11 would be thrown away. Once the international community witnessed the chaos of U.S. mis-management and the brutality at Abu Ghreib, we would be finished as the world’s favorite. The cycle of destruction and death in Iraq would prompt the Arab community to rank George Bush as a greater danger to Arab peoples than Osama bin Laden. Young jihadist fighting Occupation would emerge as heroes defending their peoples against western tyranny.

My letter to Andy Card would become a reality show on the nightly news, known as “Today in Iraq.” 

And they wanted to punish me with prison for daring to tell America’s leaders the truth? For getting it right? I was “Symbol Susan, ” indeed. 

I could not have been prouder. 

I had a broader perspective. I recognized the fear of my enemy. I saw their weakness. And with total clarity, I understood exactly what the Government was trying to hide. 

This was no mistake. 

What pundits could not know was that thirty days before my arrest, I had contacted the senior staffs of Senator John McCain, future Republican Presidential nominee from Arizona, and former Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott of Mississippi. 23 I had formally requested to testify before the newly appointed Presidential Commission investigating Pre-War Intelligence. In fact, I’d practically demanded the right to testify. 

With unbridled enthusiasm, I informed Senate staffers that I was one of the very few Assets “on the ground, ” covering the Iraqi Embassy for seven years. 

If Congress wanted to study Pre-War Intelligence, they had better talk to me. 

From my perspective, Pre-War Intelligence looked pretty outstanding— at least the part that wasn’t politicized and sold as hamburger meat to the American people. I wanted to testify that real intelligence from the field appeared to have been deleted from Congressional talking points. Factions ruled the intelligence community, like any other politically active body, but the dynamic of internal squabbling and debate had been healthy and vigorous in the run up to War. Dissension and debate come with the territory—if you appreciate vitality in democracy. 

Alas, Congress was singing from a different hymn book. Having forced a horribly unpopular war on the American people, they cringed from responsibility for their poor decision making. They vigorously battled to blame Assets for the War. Never mind that from what I sat—behind bars— there was almost no similarity in what Assets told the intelligence community, and what Congress and the White House told the American people that we told the intelligence community. 

In February 2004, I was blissfully in the dark about that strategy to reinvent history. Hearing about the new blue ribbon commission on Pre-War Intelligence, I rushed to inform Senate staffers that I had a great deal to say. 

FBI wire taps captured my phone calls to Senator Lott’s office, including conversations with his Chief of Staff and Legislative Director. What follows is the official FBI transcript for just one of those conversations on the evening of February 2, 2004, this one with Mitch Waldeman, the legislative aide covering Iraq—a few weeks before my arrest. 24 

WALDEMAN: “Senator Lott’s office. Mr. Waldeman speaking.” (Followed by niceties of introduction) 

LINDAUER: “Well, I have enormous respect for Senator Lott. I know you love this country. I am in possession of information which now is turning out to be maybe painful…, very painful to the Republican Party.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph, hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “That’s why I’m coming to you. Um, I was acting as a backdoor between Iraq and the White House…” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “And I happen to know, for example, that Iraq offered for two years to allow the return of weapons inspectors. And after September 11th , for example, they offered to allow the FBI to come to Baghdad to interview human assets in the war on terrorism.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph” 

LINDAUER: “Including al-Anai. And the White House refused to do that, and the White House perhaps misrepresented, ah, you know…” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “Iraq was behaving like an innocent country that did not possess weapons of mass destruction.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “And Iraq was very eager, ah, that Iraq believed it had information on Oklahoma City and that it was able to provide breakthrough information for us that they thought we would reward them for. Now I would not have been doing those interviews. The FBI would have been doing it.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “So the FBI would have determined the real quality of the information…” 

WALDEMAN: “Yeah.” 

LINDAUER: “I’m not trying to say I would have been inserting myself into that. I had been involved in the Lockerbie negotiations, and that’s how I got involved in this.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “Now the question is (slight laugh), and maybe this is something you need to think about. Am I overstating the importance of what I know? I don’t think I am.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “I’m not eager to create a crisis for the sake of creating unhappiness.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “Let’s not say crisis. Let’s not say unhappiness. At the same time, does Congress need to know this? Where are my obligations?” 

WALDEMAN: “Right. Were you working for the Government at the time?” 

LINDAUER: “I’m not on the Secrets Act. However I have been an Asset.” 

WALDEMAN: “Okay. Right. Oh my.” 

LINDAUER: “On the other hand, this was not a failure of U.S. Intelligence.” 

WALDEMAN: “Right.” 

LINDAUER: “And it’s being portrayed that way.” 

WALDEMAN: “Let me ask you. Who else have you spoken with?” 

LINDAUER: “I called Mr. Gotschall first. (another senior staffer in Senator Lott’s office). It’s because of my enormous and profound respect for you, for your office and your integrity and also that you are concerned about National Security. You know, Presidential politics is…” 

WALDEMAN: “Right.” 

LINDAUER: “You know.” 

WALDEMAN: “Messy.” 

LINDAUER: “It’s messy.” 

WALDEMAN: “(Laughs). Right.” 

LINDAUER: “And I’ll tell you something else, Andy Card is the person who received all this information. He is my cousin. So you can be sure he got it.” 

WALDEMAN: “Oh my.” 

LINDAUER: “You can be sure he got it.” 

WALDEMAN: “Okay.” 

LINDAUER: “So we can’t say that the President didn’t know because…” 

WALDEMAN: “Right. How would you recommend we approach this dialogue?” 

LINDAUER: “I was hoping you could tell me.” 

LINDAUER: “Um, I will tell you something else, that Iraq, right before the War, was also offering Democratic reform.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “They were offering to hold elections. The Iranians had made a statement. They were floating an idea that had come from the Iraqis. To allow the United Nations to monitor free elections in Iraq with free opposition parties, free opposition newspapers, ah, free opposition headquarters.” 

WALDEMAN: “Yeah.” 

LINDAUER: “You can argue whether this stuff is good or not, but we always were on the right track. I helped negotiate that, and the things we were negotiating were good things.” 

WALDEMAN: “And you thought that they were substantive, obviously?” 

LINDAUER: “They were substantive.” 

WALDEMAN: “Yeah.” 

LINDAUER: “And there was also, ah, U.S. oil.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “Iraq offered to give the United States the LUKoil contract. The United States could have had all the oil that it wanted.” 

WALDEMAN: “Right.” 

LINDAUER: “It points to a vendetta.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph.” 

LINDAUER: “An obsession with going after Saddam Hussein and the problem is, is that all the real criteria for the war fell apart.” 

WALDEMAN: “Hmph hmph. Hmph hmph. Do you think there’s an opportunity now that the President has called for a commission that some of this will come out?” 

LINDAUER: “No.” 

WALDEMAN: “Part of that?” 

LINDAUER: “They’ll absolutely never let this out. And see, that’s the problem. I feel an obligation to do something. It seems obvious I have to tell. I’m just not somebody who ever reacts on a knee-jerk basis.” 

WALDEMAN: “Well I appreciate you calling. I mean this is (sighs). I guess I would say that just over the course of the past year, I’ve actually heard bits and pieces of similar–” 

LINDAUER: “Hmph hmph.” 

WALDEMAN: “Similar things.” 

LINDAUER: “Probably things that I had done (unintelligible).” 

WALDEMAN : “Ah, maybe.” 

LINDAUER: “Yeah.” 

WALDEMAN: “Maybe. Bits and pieces and ah…Some of it actually. I mean there was some public discussion of ongoing negotiations. There was never really any, any public debate or discussion over the substance of what they potentially led to and…” 

LINDAUER: “Hmph hmph.” 

WALDEMAN: “And so it, I mean, I think there was a general sense that some of that was going on, certainly was going in the past administration, as well.” 

LINDAUER: “Yes.” 

WALDEMAN: “Let me talk with Bill and give you a call.” 

LINDAUER: “Okay, thank you.” 

Hanging up the phone that evening on February 2, I felt excited. It appeared that Senator Lott’s staff probably had received debriefings as our back channel talks progressed on resuming the weapons inspections. Waldeman had some knowledge of the range of Iraq’s peace offerings. Critically, he admitted knowing that our talks originated during the Clinton Administration, which betrayed long term awareness of the project. 25 

Quite rightly I believed I had set a chain of events in motion on Capitol Hill. I envisioned Congressional staff rushing to get subpoenas for my testimony. At worst, I expected to be forced to give closed door testimony, which would strategically restrict public access to knowledge about our comprehensive peace framework before the War. That irked me. I had not decided how I would handle that. 

I was right about the subpoenas, for sure. Within a couple of days of my conversations with senior staff for Senator Lott and Senator McCain, Republican leaders hurriedly convened a grand jury in New York, rushing to subpoena witnesses so they could indict me before I started talking to the media. 

It’s kind of funny, if you’ve got a sick sort of humor. 

The rest, as they say, is history. On March 11, 2004, I got arrested as an “Iraqi Agent.” 26 

FBI Special Agent Chmiel told me the grand jury debated my charges for a full month before handing down my indictment. Ergo, by the FBI’s own admission, my Asset file got turned over to the grand jury just a few days after my request to testify at Congressional hearings. 

For one brief moment in that cage, I sympathized with the Republican predicament. If I had invented such a fabulous lie to justify going into a disastrous War, I would not want anyone to know the truth, either. I especially would not want anyone to know how easily the War could have been avoided altogether. Nor would I want voters to learn about the failures of Republican terrorism policy, thrown up as a bulwark to appease Americans for the cock-up in Iraq. 

I would be afraid of me, too. 

By this time I was composed. I had my legal strategy mapped out, with a list of witnesses sketched on the back of my indictment. 

I vowed to myself that I would fight to the end. 

I almost felt sorry for them.

CHAPTER 2: 

ADVANCE WARNINGS ABOUT 9/11 

“Like Desperados Waiting for a Train…” 

—Guy Clarke 

I was locked in a holding cage, and the truth was locked up with me. 

It wasn’t just Iraq that frightened them. Our team also gave advance warning about a 9/11 style of attack throughout the summer of 2001. And I carried the message. 

That scared them a helluva lot more. 

I thought back to August, 2001 and the crucial weeks before the September 11 strike. 

I was talking by phone to Dr. Richard Fuisz, my CIA handler, about Robert Mueller’s nomination to head the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 27 Our conversation burned my heart as I sat shackled in that tiny cell, waiting for a Judge to throw my bail like I was some criminal. 

Bastards. 

“There’s never been a terrorist investigation that sonofabitch didn’t throw!” It was the day of Mueller’s Senate confirmation hearings. I could not know how accurately I had just nailed the mark. Or that I would be a primary target of the FBI’s next terrorism cover up! 

“Lockerbie, yeah.” Dr. Fuisz agreed with me. “Mueller changed directions when Congress wanted to salvage Syria’s reputation and shift the blame to Libya.” 28 (Mueller headed the Justice Department’s Criminal Division during the Pan Am 103 investigation , a.k.a Lockerbie. 29 ) Dr. Fuisz and I believed that Libya was wrongly blamed for the bombing that exploded over the roofs of Scotland, killing 270 people.[They were innocent,CIA was running drugs on that plane,and it was that activity that allowed the bomb to be put on the plane DC] 

“What else?” 

“The Oklahoma City bombing. Isn’t Mueller one of the key figures who decided Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols acted alone? 30 We all know that’s crap. Why would anyone reward McVeigh’s megalomania as the sole conspirator? Mueller is the Arlen Specter of antiterrorism.” 

“Mueller plays to the politicians. That’s why his nomination will sail through Congress.” Dr. Fuisz told me. 

Admittedly, most Americans would vigorously object to characterizing Mueller as a shrewd political animal. My views are frequently more idiosyncratic than the general public. However, this conversation about Mueller’s confirmation hearing accounts for why I recall the timing of events so precisely, and with such clarity, in the weeks before 9/11. I can pinpoint my actions to the day of the week because of this hearing. 

With regards to the Oklahoma City Bombing, Mueller would reopen the investigation of a possible broader conspiracy in 2005. I could not know that in August, 2001. 31 

“You want me to crash the nomination hearings this afternoon? Lay a little truth on Congress?” 

“No. No, it’s too late for that.” 

“Too late for the hearings? Or too late to stop the attack?” 

“Both, I think.” 

“You think it’s that soon???” 

“I think it could be.” 

It was the 2nd of August, 2001. I was aghast. 

The phone got quiet for a moment. 

“We can’t do nothing, Richard.” 

“Of course not.” 

His snappish reply spoke volumes about the depths of his concern. We’d worked together for seven years by this time, and we could read each other without speaking, if necessary. It would all be communicated in our eyes, messages between us that nobody else could decipher. According to Dr. Fuisz’s way of thinking, anger gained power and force as leverage, when it was controlled and focused. I believed him. He had dealt with some of the most dangerous men on the planet. My relationship with my other handler, Paul Hoven was much more explosive. He pummeled his opponents with expletives. Paul carried a well of rage in his heart from Vietnam. And I was a peace activist turned Asset, covering Iraq and Libya at the United Nations in New York.

It made for some interesting strategy meetings. But Paul and Dr. Fuisz were like older brothers to me. They might growl at me, or treat me like a kid sister who got troublesome. But they never let me down. They shared the jubilation of my victories. They pushed me back if I veered down the wrong track. 

But until September 11 broke our hearts, we were all incredibly close. 

“I’m going to New York. I’ll ask the Iraqis again. I’ll push them hard, Richard.” 

“What? When are you going?” Alarm saturated his words. 

“I’m going this weekend.” 

“No, no, no. This weekend? Don’t go to New York, Susan. Don’t go.” 

“It’s just the weekend. The day after tomorrow. I’ll be up and back.” 

“God damn it. I don’t want you to go— I don’t think that’s wise.” 

“I’ve got to make one last trip. I’ve been pushing Iraq all summer, Richard. I’ve got to find out if they heard anything from Baghdad. After that, I won’t go back.” 

“Yeah, don’t. I don’t want you going back again.” 

“And for God’s sake, Susan, don’t stay overnight. This situation is very dangerous. Get in and get out. Speaking of Mueller’s confirmation—what if this happens before he’s confirmed? There might not be an FBI Director when this goes down. Jesus, what would that mean?” 

“You think this attack might happen before he’s confirmed? Oh fuck. That would be like, the end of August? Or September?” 

“Yeah, it’s definitely possible.” 

“Richard— Am I to understand that you believe this attack is “imminent?” 

“Yes, I do.” 

“What are we going to do? We’ve got to tell somebody.” 

“I don’t know yet.” 

I could feel that tension again. It meant he was thinking. And frustrated. 

“I’ll come by Monday (August 6 th ) as soon as I get back from New York. We’ll figure it out. OK?” 

“Good. OK Listen to me. I’ve told you before. We’re looking for anything at this point. Even something very small. They might drop something that appears totally irrelevant from where you’re sitting. You might not even understand what it means.” 

“I got it. I got it.” 

“No, listen to me. Don’t filter this stuff. Don’t wait to see if you can confirm it. Give it to me. We’ll confirm it. Just get it. Don’t try to figure it out by yourself.” 

“I understand.” 

Our anxiety had been growing since the previous summer. The Lockerbie Trial at a special international court at Camp Zeist in 2000 got us thinking about what the next terrorist strike would look like. The bombings of Pan Am 103 on December 21, 1988, which killed 270 people, and UTA (French airlines) in September, 1989 had been the last attacks involving airplanes before September 11, 2001. Throughout the Trial of the two Libyans, our team worried openly that the pathetic display by Scottish Prosecutors would inspire a sort of “tribute attack” to the success of Lockerbie. 

The problem is that while most Americans refuse to accept Libya’s innocence, terrorist groups have always known the truth. And they can’t figure out why the United States has been protecting the real culprits. 

Famed terrorist Abu Nidal freely proclaimed his role in the bombing of Pan Am 103, 32 on behalf of the Fateh Revolutionary Council. He steadfastly disputed that the two Libyans executed the attack. Translated as “father of the struggle, ” Abu Nidal founded one of the first and most feared global terrorist organizations committed to hijacking airplanes and extorting multi-million dollar ransoms. Nidal was credited with launching terrorist strikes in 20 countries that killed or wounded 900 people over two decades. 33 He joined the civil war in Beirut in the 1980's, teaming up with Islamic Jihad (later known as Hezbollah) and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine— General Command (PFLPGC). After Beirut, he holed up in Libya until 1998. 

After his death in a shoot out with Iraqi Intelligence in Baghdad in July 2002, 34 there was much talk of Nidal’s confession to the Lockerbie conspiracy. His family and friends acknowledged his central role in the bombing of Pan Am 103, and expressed regret that an innocent Libyan had got convicted for Nidal’s crime. 

Britain and the U.S. have refused to accept Nidal’s confession. The question is why? 

The real masterminds of the Lockerbie bombing were professionals, not baggage handlers or airplane ticket agents like Libya’s two men, Abdelbaset Al Megrahi and Al Amin Khalifa Fahima. They played high stakes terror games at the master level through a vast and highly dangerous network of accomplices. Blaming Megrahi, because of prejudice towards his Libyan nationality, was absurd and racist. It surprised nobody when his so-called accomplice, Fahima, got acquitted in January, 2001. The only shocker was that Megraghi did not go free with him.

Scottish prosecutors made such a poor showing at Trial that the failure of the Scottish Court was gossip throughout the Arab world. 

In Dr. Fuisz’s opinion, the politicization of Lockerbie and the weakness of the Court’s forensic evidence carried much greater hazards. In the months before 9/11, Dr. Fuisz frequently bemoaned how the United States had seriously damaged its credibility in terrorist circles, as a consequence of Lockerbie. Terrorist groups now questioned if, for all the mighty resources of U.S. Intelligence, the United States was too stupid to catch the real terrorists. Or else the U.S. was afraid, because the real terrorists are “too big.” 

Either of those beliefs would create a powerful and irresistible provocation for the upcoming generation of jihadis, Dr. Fuisz argued. Younger terrorists watching the Lockerbie Trial would be inspired to launch some sort of tribute to the heroes who came before, and were too great to take down. Tribute attacks are fairly common in those circles. Dr. Fuisz feared this judicial fiasco would be the ultimate temptation. 

On that basis, our team mapped out an extreme threat scenario that the next major attack would most likely involve airplane hijackings or airplane bombings. 

On August 2, 2001, during Robert Mueller’s confirmation hearing, Dr. Fuisz and I suspected our worst strike scenario was about to hit the mark with devastating accuracy. 

None of us wanted to be right. We fervently believed, however, that a major terrorist conspiracy was actively in play. 

I remember it all so vividly, like a home movie playing before my eyes, winding back and starting again. So painful to watch. So disappointing in its aftermath. 

In April, 2001 I received a summons to visit Dr. Fuisz at his office in Great Falls, Virginia. We met weekly anyway. On this occasion, he rang my home and asked me to come straight away. He inquired when I planned my next trip to the United Nations in New York. He wanted to talk before I left, and he wanted me to go soon. 

My back channel to Iraq and Libya existed to communicate messages back and forth from Washington, since those countries had no official ties with the United States. In our unique capacity, my team kept a special line open for intelligence on terrorist activities that Tripoli or Baghdad might uncover, and need to share with the West. Even under sanctions and global isolation, the importance of intelligence to block terrorism was recognized as a necessary exemption to U.S. foreign policy. I was designated as the covert recipient for such communications, heavily supervised by the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency. 

And so I visited Dr. Fuisz immediately. He instructed me to demand that Libya and Iraq must hand over any intelligence regarding conspiracies involving airplane hijackings or airplane bombings. He insisted that I warn Iraqi diplomats that Baghdad would suffer a major military offensive— worse than anything Iraq had suffered before— if the U.S. discovered Saddam’s government had possessed such intelligence and failed to notify us through my back channel. 

Admittedly, I was reluctant to deliver such a harsh message. I have always been an anti-war activist. My opposition to violence on both sides accounted for my success in dealing with the Arabs. I don’t issue threats, only appeals to avoid confrontation and aggression. So on my next trip to New York, I soft pedaled Dr. Fuisz’s message. I asked diplomats to send cables to Baghdad and Tripoli, keeping an eye out for possible airplane attacks. But I made no threats of violent reprisal against either nation. 

When I got home to Washington, I met with Dr. Fuisz, who demanded to know how Iraq particularly responded to his threat. I had to admit that I stopped short of his full message. But I assured him that I had requested their cooperation. 

At that point, Dr. Fuisz became enraged. In all of our years together, I recall no other time that he lost his temper and shouted at me. He stormed up and down the room, letting loose a tirade punctuated with colorful obscenities too profane and violent to repeat. Dr. Fuisz demanded that I must return to New York immediately. I must not be polite or kind. I must tell Iraqi diplomats exactly what he said. “The United States would bomb Baghdad back into the Stone Age, worse than they’ve ever been bombed before, if they discovered a terrorist conspiracy involving airplane hijackings or airplane bombings and failed to notify us. They would lose everything. We would destroy them.” 

Except Richard was more anatomically descriptive. 

There was one more point that Dr. Fuisz was adamant I must communicate: “Those threats originated at the highest levels of government, ” and I quote, “above the CIA Director and the Secretary of State.” 

Those were his exact words. And it was not ambiguous. It could only mean President George Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney or Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. 

Dr. Fuisz was not pacified until I promised to deliver his message with all the force that he communicated. He expressed tremendous satisfaction that I would make sure Iraq understood the warning came from the CIA itself—not from him or me— backed by military and political forces at the highest levels of government “above the CIA Director and Secretary of State.”

The highest geopolitical stakes were in play. 

Right then I recognized that Richard was motivated by more than a desire to check our trap lines on the terrorist circuit. 

Something was moving. In late April, 2001, Dr. Fuisz was already onto it. He fired back proactively to discourage Arab governments from supporting the conspiracy. Without knowing more, I was determined to help. And so, in May, 2001, I returned to New York and delivered that message exactly as he dictated. 

Tension built throughout the summer of 2001. Practically every week, we discussed the 9/11 strike. Only now the threat scenario became more detailed. By June, our focus turned to the World Trade Center. 

It sounds uncanny, but our team understood exactly what was going to happen. Our belief in that target was very precise. We believed the attack would finish the cycle started by Ramzi Youssef in the 1993 World Trade Center attack. We fully expected the modus operenda would be airplanes seized by hijackers and used as trajectory weapons to strike the Towers— We also discussed the possibility that a miniature thermonuclear device might raze the buildings. That’s why Dr. Fuisz wanted me to stay out of New York. Nobody worried that I might get hurt if the Towers collapsed. My handlers worried about exposure to military grade contaminants in the dust or air, including possible radiation. 

Exactly how Dr. Fuisz knew so much, I cannot say. Throughout June and July of 2001, he continued to prod and push hard for any fragment of actionable intelligence from Iraq. After our first conversation in April, he never asked about Libya at all. 

Over and over again, Dr. Fuisz demanded that I threaten Baghdad—not Libya— if the strike occurred . There’s no question that months before 9/11, a cabal of pro-War neo-Conservatives at the top of the government was already prepping the Intelligence Community to accept War with Iraq in the aftermath of the strike. 

As of May, 2001, Iraqi diplomats had an immediate solution. From the opening days of the Bush Administration, Baghdad had agreed to allow the FBI to send an Anti-terrorism Task Force into Iraq—to monitor radical Jihadis that might attempt to exploit Baghdad’s weakened central authority to launch terrorist strikes on its neighbors. The CIA made this demand through my back channel following the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen, in October, 2000. Iraq agreed to show good will towards Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States. 

See how badly CNN and Fox News got it wrong? 

When confronted with the 9/11 scenario, Iraq placated the U.S. masterfully: “Perhaps this would be the appropriate moment for the FBI to start its work—” the diplomat suggested. “If the United States is very worried, the FBI should come right away.” 

The world knows that never happened. At the time, I made excuses that the newly ensconced Bush Administration was still getting its footing on foreign policy. Over the summer, Iraq continued to invite the FBI, as U.S. warnings persisted. And I expressed frustration for the slow learning curve of the Bush Administration, which felt unnatural after eight years of rapid and decisive policy-making by the Clinton White House. 

The 1990's have been called the Halycon Years of U.S Intelligence. From my perspective as an Asset, the arrival of George Bush felt like driving a high performance Maserati after some fool pours lower grade oil into the engine— and it starts clunking and sputtering and seizing up. You don’t know if the car will keep running until the mechanic’s ready to work on the problem— or if the car will die on the street. 

That was Republican Policy on anti-terrorism before 9/11. 

Our problem was the CIA had to keep driving that car no matter what. And we had to block terrorist threats against the U.S, regardless of whether the White House was responsive to warnings about those threats— or not. 

Before 9/11, the answer was “not.” I doubt I was alone in feeling frustrated. 

Throughout June and July, Dr. Fuisz beseeches me not to filter intelligence, or test its accuracy before informing him. During our meetings, he would painstakingly explain how urgently he needed to collect even fragments of actionable intelligence, whether any of it made sense to me or not. He begged me to hold nothing back. He appeared to be frantically searching for anything at all to pre-empt the strike. In fairness, this faction of CIA and Defense Intelligence urgently wanted to block 9/11. 

Our threat of retaliation against Iraq struck me as a high stakes gambit, however. I’d cultivated diplomats at the Iraqi Embassy since August, 1996. These were professionally productive relationships that I would not have destroyed for any reason. Concurrently, our back channel was working to build a comprehensive framework that would secure all U.S. objectives in any post-sanctions period. That included a hefty commitment for Baghdad’s support of global anti terrorism efforts. 

Memories of it break my heart still. 

On August 2nd , I reassured Dr. Fuisz again. 

“I understand what you guys want. I’ve been pushing Iraqi diplomats all summer for intelligence on this attack, Richard. They know what’s up?” 

“Tell those fuckers again. They’ve never been bombed the way we’re going to bomb them. Understand? If they know something, they’d better tell us. Or we will fuck them. They’ve never been fucked like that before. Make that clear.” 

I promised. August 4th would be my last trip to the Iraqi Embassy and the Libya House before that fateful September morning. 

Afterwards, I would ache wondering if I had misinterpreted a subtle cue. If I had pushed my contacts hard enough. If I could have pushed harder for Republicans to get off the dime and send the FBI into Baghdad. Above all, I would regret that I did not go back to New York after early August. For years, I would regard the 9/11 strike as my personal failure. On many black nights I would question if Paul and Richard thought so, too. Those doubts would torment me, as I suspect in my heart it tormented them.

For you see, stopping that attack was my job. I’d been a back channel for anti-terrorism intelligence for years. That was the biggest part of my life. 

And this time I could not do it. 

To all the families, I am very sorry. But Americans would be wrong to conclude that our team did not take that threat very, very seriously. Throughout the summer of 2001, ferreting out actionable intelligence to stop that hijacking conspiracy was our greatest priority. 

To appreciate the gravity with which I regarded Dr. Fuisz’s instructions and paranoia, you must first understand his CIA credentials. 

As a matter of policy, the CIA never acknowledges the identity of its officers. However I received an extensive debriefing on Dr. Fuisz’s background from my other handler, Paul Hoven, at the time of our introduction in September, 1994. If we were going to work together, I had a legitimate “need to know” whom I was dealing with. Over the next eight years, his bona fides got corroborated repeatedly by my Libyan and Arab sources — and by Dr. Fuisz himself. 

Much of his actions in the Middle East were shrouded in secrecy. However, his own curriculum vitae provided some tantalizing clues. 

His company, Folkon Ltd. claimed to “perform diverse services in the Middle East, including Syria and the U.S.S.R. from 1980-1990.” 35 

A second off-shore company called Oil Field Services, Ltd., based in Bermuda, “supplied manpower and technical assistance to the Syrian oil industry from 1989-1990, with offices in Damascus, Syria.” 36 

And finally, Medcom Inc. founded by Dr. Fuisz in 1970 “specialized in medical military training throughout the Middle East and North Africa.” Medcom “trained thousands of Arab nationals in professional skills, ” mostly in Saudi Arabia. 37 

Scratch that surface and Dr. Fuisz had been a top CIA operative in Syria and Lebanon in the 1980's, something he admitted proudly. In private conversations, he described how his team in Beirut coordinated the hostage rescue of AP journalist, Terry Anderson; Anglican emissary, Terry Waite et al in Lebanon. It was Dr. Fuisz’s team that located the make-shift prison cells in the back alleys of Beirut, and called in the Delta Force for a daring rescue. Outrageously the rescue got postponed for several months in the original “October Surprise—” until weeks before the 1988 Presidential election of George H. Bush, Sr. Dr. Fuisz never forgave the CIA for using the hostages in Lebanon as trump cards for politicians in Washington. [Read 1993 book Trail of the Octopus: From Beirut to Lockerbie – Inside the DIA, for a in depth account of this hostage situation DC]

In the urgent search to locate the hostages’ whereabouts, Dr. Fuisz had become a first-hand protagonist to the events building up to the bombing of Pan Am 103. 38 

The CIA fought desperately to block his testimony in the Lockerbie Trial. As a compromise, when Dr. Fuisz gave his deposition at the Federal Courthouse in Alexandria, Virginia, U.S. District Judge White sealed his testimony. 39 The Lockerbie Defense was barred from revealing any part of his deposition inside the United States. It could only be read overseas. 40 

Even so, Scottish solicitors were barred from reviewing the deposition in total, because parts of it are double-sealed. What’s more the Court took the unusual step of prohibiting U.S. attorneys who conducted the deposition in Virginia from conveying critical information of what the double-seal contains to their Scottish colleagues. Thus, Scottish solicitors have no idea of the value of Dr. Fuisz’s testimony. Only a Scottish Judge can unlock it and review the entire document. 

And they should. Because the double seal contains the names of 11 men who participated in the Lockerbie conspiracy. 

Why the cloak and daggers? Because a few weeks after we met in 1994, Dr. Fuisz was declared legally out of reach on national security matters. U.S. District Judge Royce Lamberth issued a definitive court ruling on October 14, 1994 in Washington, DC: “The claims of state secrets privilege asserted by the United States [regarding Dr. Fuisz] shall be and is hereby UPHELD.” 41 

“Information described in the United States’ ex parte, in camera classified submission shall not be subject to discovery or disclosure by the parties during all proceedings in this action, and shall be excluded from evidence at trial.” 

“As the United States deems necessary, U.S. attorneys may attend all depositions and make objections as necessary to protect national security information.” 42 

“Ex parte in camera” applies to an extraordinary category of evidence beyond the sight of defense counsel, presented only for the Judge’s eyes. The defense attorney is not entitled to know that it exists, and cannot dispute any part of its contents. In the early 1990's before the Patriot Act, this special classification was rarely invoked. 

Judge Lamberth’s ruling forever empowered the U.S. government to bar Dr. Fuisz’s testimony on any criminal or civil matter, by invoking the Secrets Act. Only the President of the United States could override the Director of the CIA, in a written memorandum to compel Dr. Fuisz to reveal his knowledge and sources on matters linked to national security, large or small. 43 Neither the Secretary of State nor any member of Congress could override that provision. Even if Dr. Fuisz himself desired to contribute to an official inquiry, he would be prohibited from doing so. 

That would apply to Lockerbie, to any 9/11 inquiry — and to my own criminal case as an accused “Iraqi Agent.” 

Word of Dr. Fuisz’s first-hand knowledge of Pan Am 103—and his strange inability to testify— got reported in Scotland’s Sunday Herald at the height of the Lockerbie Trial, when Scottish families recognized the Crown’s lack of evidence against Libya, and started demanding real answers. 

In May, 2000, Scottish journalist, Ian Ferguson asked Dr. Fuisz directly if he worked for the CIA in Syria in the 1980's. 44 His response was less than subtle. “That is not an issue I can confirm or deny. I am not allowed to speak about these issues. In fact, I can’t even explain to you why I can’t speak about these issues.’ Fuisz did, however, say that he would not take any action against a newspaper which named him as a CIA agent.” 

The verdict was unanimous among my Arab contacts: Dr. Fuisz was a master spy. My own interactions with Dr. Fuisz affirmed his superior intelligence background. So when he commanded that I must compel my Iraqi diplomatic sources to divulge any intelligence of an emerging conspiracy involving airplane hijackings and some sort of aerial strike on the World Trade Center, I took his request very seriously. I had good reason to trust him. 

As it happens, there were extraordinary reasons for Dr. Fuisz’s concern. The “chatter” between terrorist cells monitored by the National Security Agency reached unprecedented levels by May 2001, which accelerated until September 11, 2001. 45 In mid June, an Al Qaeda video became public, in which Osama bin Laden announced, “Your brothers in Palestine are waiting for you. It’s time to penetrate America and Israel, and hit them where it hurts the most.” 46 

July turned out to be pivotal for the 9/11 warnings. 

On July 10, 2001, CIA Director, George Tenet, was so alarmed by a classified debriefing he received on the terrorist threat from Al Qaeda that he marched straight to the White House. A top CIA analyst suggested a major attack was coming in the next few weeks, but cited no specific date. To his credit, Tenet wasted no time providing that information to Condoleezza Rice in writing. He also brought along one of the CIA officers tracking bin Laden, who gave Rice and others an oral debriefing. 47 Former Anti-Terrorism Czar, Richard Clarke strongly endorsed the importance of the report. The CIA officer who gave the briefing said the nation had to “go on a war footing now.” 

More remarkably, the Foreign Minister of the Taliban provided a direct warning to Washington that Bin Laden was preparing to launch a huge strike on the United States. 48 Prior to 9/11, the Taliban received financial support from the U.S. to destroy Afghanistan’s poppy crop, which supplies 85 percent of the world’s opium and heroin. Their warning should have been treated with utmost seriousness. 

Though short on actionable intelligence, U.S. Intelligence was onto the 9/11 plot. Friendly foreign intelligence agencies relayed serious warnings of a late summer, early autumn attack that would utilize airplanes as weapons to attack targets inside the United States. Israel, Jordan and Egypt, all long time collaborators with US intelligence, provided similar warnings of an imminent terrorist strike four weeks prior to 9/11. 

On September 7, 2001, French intelligence sent an urgent message, of an imminent attack using airplanes as weapons inside the United States. 49 

The German press reported that 206 international telephone calls were made from the 9/11 hijackers prior to the attack. The NSA has refused to provide detailed list of the calls, but they were reportedly made to Saudi Arabia and Syria. 50 

Perhaps the most damning indication of prior knowledge about a major upcoming terrorist strike came out of the State Department’s regular warning system to American citizens traveling overseas.

On Friday, Sept. 7, the State Department issued a worldwide alert— “American citizens may be the target of a terrorist threat from extremist groups with links to Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda organization.” That report cited information gathered in May, 2001 as suggesting an attack was imminent. It warned “individuals in Al Qaeda have not distinguished between official and civilian targets.” 51 

As a senior intelligence operative with a specialty in Middle Eastern terrorism since the 1980's, Dr. Fuisz enjoyed privileged access to that sort of raw intelligence data. 

What was missing was actionable intelligence to prevent the attack— who were the terrorists, how many, which airport, what airlines, what flight numbers. 

Just a name. A number. A fragment. All summer Dr. Fuisz pleaded with me exhaustively to bring him anything at all. He swore that if I could get it, the NSA and CIA would bust overtime to flesh it out, so that we could stop the attack. 

By August, that hunt was becoming frenetic. I have physical proof that our team was not the only one ferreting for intelligence the weekend of August 4-5. During a pre-release book tour in Japan, I spoke extensively about our team’s aggressive actions in the critical week after Robert Mueller’s Senate nomination hearing on August 2nd. 

When I returned from Japan, I was astounded to discover the original newsprint edition of the Wall Street Journal dated July 30, 2001— pinned on my desk by a rose quartz paper weight next to my computer, so that it would not get thrown away. The faded 10 year old newspaper was addressed to my boss at the consulting job I held during the summer of 2001. That’s where I phoned Dr. Fuisz on the day of Robert Mueller’s nomination hearing. 

Weeks before 9/11, somebody had gone to the trouble of tracking down where my phone call to Dr. Fuisz originated. That individual “ visited” my office, no doubt seeking any scribbles or papers that I might have left around my desk, which might have provided some clue what our team had discovered about the 9/11 conspiracy so far. 

It’s standard practice to grab a newspaper off a desk in situations like that, as an accurate snapshot with the company’s name, address and date. It’s like a “ proof of life.” 

Yes, it indicates that another intelligence team “ picked the locks ” to get into the office. There’s a time when that sort of thing is necessary. And this would be it! 

The original Wall Street Journal was tucked on my desk too late for inclusion in the first release of Extreme Prejudice. I am revealing it now, because I have been deeply moved by the public’s desire to learn as much of the events before 9/11 as possible. 

That Wall Street Journal, dated July 30, 2001, could only have been grabbed the week of Robert Mueller’s nomination hearing. The newspaper would have been tossed out weeks before the 9/11 investigation kicked off. That’s physical proof that other intelligence teams were aggressively hunting for intelligence to block 9/11, like us. And I’m grateful for that. Our team urgently desired as much help as we could get. 

This was a race to stop violence against the United States—not a competition. All of us gravely worried about what was coming. Our teams are structured to function independently and overlap, but (most of the time) we’re on the same side, with the same shared goals. 

On that note, I take umbrage at the lies invented by NeoConservatives on Capitol Hill after 9/11. The Intelligence Community was accustomed to functioning on a superior and pro-active footing. Until Republicans gutted the intelligence community to impose political conformity in the cover ups of 9/11 and Iraq, U.S. Intelligence had rapid fire reflexes, and a reputation for attracting brilliant case officers. These were creative strategists and problem solvers. They were the best and the brightest. 

Before 9/11, the Intelligence Community was at the top of its game. 

My Iraqi sources just did not have actionable intelligence. On my last trip to New York on August 4, 2001, diplomats threw up their hands. They’d been warned of the consequences for months if something awful happened. Retribution would be swift and severe. None of that changed the hard truth. Iraq had nothing to give us.

In Baghdad’s defense, diplomats protested how the U.S. would demand cooperation, yet take no action to send the FBI. If the CIA thought the conspiracy was real, we had options. Failure to move forward exposed a dysfunction among Washington’s new Republican leadership. Alas, the rest of us had no choice but to work within those limitations. 

But categorically, that was not—I repeat not—the CIA’s fault. 

At our next face meeting on August 6, 2001, Dr. Fuisz was grim. 

Something would have to be done. We needed help. 

Locked in the holding cage of the Baltimore Federal Courthouse—an accused “Iraqi Agent—” I recalled with grief and fury what Dr. Fuisz and I hashed out. 

Above all, I recalled that on August 6— at the same hour on the same day, down at Crawford Ranch in Texas, President Bush was handed a memo from the CIA outlining the severe threat of a terrorist attack by Osama bin Laden’s network on the United States. I’m told President Bush tossed aside the CIA’s Daily Briefing Memo: “Well now, you’ve covered your ass. Let’s go shoot some golf balls.” 

I’m told a video captured the Crawford meeting for posterity. But ten years later I cannot bear to watch it. The laziness and indifference of President Bush and other White House officials, while the rest of us raced to stop 9/11, enrages me to this day. 

Former Clinton adviser, Sidney Blumenthal said, “Richard Clarke urgently tried to draw the attention of the Bush administration to the threat of Al-Qaeda. They do not want it to be known what happened on August 6, 2001. It was on that day that George W. Bush received his last, and one of the few, briefings on terrorism. He told (Clarke) that he didn’t want to be briefed on this again, even though Clarke was panicked about the alarms he was hearing, regarding potential attacks. Bush was blithe, indifferent, ultimately irresponsible... The public has a right to know what happened on August 6, what Bush did, what Condi Rice did, what all the rest of them did, and what Richard Clarke’s memos and statements were.” 

Unaware that President Bush had just blown off the CIA’s explicit warnings, Dr. Fuisz and I decided the best way forward would be to request emergency assistance from the Justice Department. 

It was the week of August 6 – 10. The September 11 strike was a month away. There was plenty of time to block the attack. 

At the instructions of Dr. Fuisz, I telephoned the private office of U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft, consisting of about 20 senior staff members. Quickly I identified myself as the chief U.S. Asset covering Libya and Iraq at the United Nations on anti-terrorism. That way I could make sure the bureaucrat on the other end of the phone would appreciate my special access to high level intelligence as a primary source, which should be weighed carefully before disregarding my call. 

Once I had the staffer’s attention, I made a formal request for Attorney General Ashcroft’s office to “broadcast an emergency alert throughout all agencies of the Justice Department, seeking any fragment of intelligence pertaining to possible airplane hijackings or airplane bombings.” I explained that we believed “a major attack on the United States was imminent, with a high probability of mass casualties.” And we believed “the target would be the World Trade Center, which would suffer some sort of aerial strike.” I provided as many specific detail as I could to help focus the investigation. 

Given the dangers and timing of the attack, I asked that “our request for emergency cooperation should be given the highest priority.” 

Attorney General Ashcroft’s staff advised me to contact the Office of Counter-Terrorism at the Justice Department immediately, and repeat what I had just told them. 

I did so without delay. I repeated the warning in full detail, and requested that any possible information should be submitted immediately. 

Locked in that holding cage in the Baltimore Federal Courthouse, the memory of it was cold and harsh. I seethed with fury. 

I shouted for the bailiffs, so I could yell at them, too. I was hopping mad! 

But I already knew. Our 9/11 warning to the Justice Department was not something Republican leaders wanted American voters to learn about— not with the 2004 Presidential Campaign in play—nor the 2008 Campaign, for that matter. 

Oh yes, I would be gagged through two presidential elections. 

With those calls to the Attorney General’s private staff and the Office of Counter-Terrorism, the U.S. government lost its cover of deniability. If I testified before the 9/11 Commission or any congressional inquiry —the Justice Department would have been forced to admit that some of its own top staff received formal warning about 9/11, along with urgent requests for assistance, when there was still time to coordinate a response, and thwart the demolition of the Towers.

I didn’t stop there. Most Americans would be stunned to know that in mid-August, 2001, our team was so convinced that a 9/11 style attack was “imminent, ” that I took further proactive measures, visiting my second cousin, Andy Card, Chief of Staff to President Bush, to request his intervention at the Justice Department, too. 

I parked on the street outside his house in Arlington, Virginia, and waited in my car, chain smoking for almost two hours. (I quit in 2005.) Occasionally, I could see neighbors peering out of their windows and frowning at me. In my head, I rehearsed what I would tell Virginia police or the Secret Service, if they showed up to investigate this strange car parked outside the home of the Chief of Staff to the President of the United States. 

Unhappily, Andy did not return that afternoon. I finally left without sharing our fears. 

Driving away, I distinctly recall asking myself if I might be making the greatest mistake of my life. Throughout all these years, it is one of my few regrets. 

Oh I see. You prefer the official, sanitized story that nobody in U.S. Intelligence had a clue about the 9/11 conspiracy. 

Is that really more comforting? Let’s see, the greatest intelligence community in the world, with vast technological superiority, was “incompetent” to anticipate 9/11? 

That’s what you think? Sorry to disappoint you. It doesn’t make sense. And it’s not true. 

We knew that a conspiracy was in play. The CIA knew. The Justice Department knew. The Office of Counter-Terrorism knew. 

I know that for a fact— because I told them. (And they told me.) I was arrested to stop me from telling you. 

Symbol Susan, indeed! 

What I could not know, unhappily, is that another intelligence faction was also working aggressively opposite us.— 

Like the copy of the Wall Street Journal that appeared on my desk, a trustworthy source revealed this information after Extreme Prejudice had gone to galleys. 

Late on the night of August 23, 2001, at about 3 a.m. security cameras in the parking garage of the World Trade Center captured the arrival of three truck vans. Visual examination determined the vans were separate and unique from trucks used by janitorial services, including different colors and devoid of markings. More curious, all the janitorial trucks had pulled out of the Towers by about 2:30 a.m—about half an hour before the second set of vans arrived. 

According to my source, who saw the tapes, no vans matching that description had entered the World Trade Center at that extraordinary hour in any of the weeks or months prior to August 23. It was a unique event. 

Security cameras caught the vans leaving the Towers at approximately 5 a.m—before the first wave of Wall Street tycoons arrived to track the Asian markets. 

For the next 10 to 12 nights, the same mysterious truck- vans arrived at the World Trade Center at the same mysterious hour— after the janitorial crews had left the building and before the most fanatic robber barons on Wall Street started their work day. The vans clocked into the parking garage from approximately August 23, 2001 until September 3 or 4, 2001. After that last night, they never appeared at the Towers again. 

The vans were never heard of again, either. The 9/11 Commission was never informed of their surprising presence three weeks before the 9/11 attack. Most of the 9/11 Truth Community has no knowledge of this extraordinary nightly activity, either. 

For all the public’s ignorance, video from the security cameras could be the most significant missing evidence of the 9/11 puzzle. My source was convinced those mysterious trucks transported explosives into the towers, so that an unidentified orphan team could finish wiring the World Trade Center for a controlled demolition. He has stayed quiet to protect his job, his retirement pension and his reputation —knowing that others who spoke up have gotten fired or thrown in prison. Like me. 

Though I was still ignorant of those parking garage tapes, I had plenty to be angry about inside that holding cage, waiting for a Federal Judge to throw my bail. From the moment that holding cage clanged shut behind me, I was furiously aware that my arrest was a crucial part of the 9/11 cover up. They might have triumphed over truth, except the Justice Department hit a snag. 

After my arrest, the FBI quickly discovered that the CIA wasn’t the only party knowledgeable of our team’s 9/11 warnings. I had warned some of my civilian friends about the possibility of a 9/11 style of attack, too — particularly friends with family or professional ties to New York City. 

That’s where the Feds got crossed up. 

A Personal Warning to a Friend 

Dr. Parke Godfrey was one of my closest friends in Maryland, working on his doctoral dissertation in computer science at the University of Maryland in College Park. His family lived in the Connecticut suburbs of New York City. We spoke frequently, socializing a couple of times a week, and shared much of the same political outlook. 52 

Godfrey has gone on to launch a distinguished career as a tenured Professor of Computer Science and Technology at York University in Toronto, Canada. He presents a calm, studied demeanor. He speaks precisely and methodically, choosing his words carefully—what some friends have teasingly compared to Dr. Spock of Star Trek fame. During difficult courtroom questioning, he would frequently pause and take his time to give an accurate, thoughtful response. He proved a superior witness by any measure.

In shattering testimony a mere 1,000 yards from Ground Zero, Godfrey told the Court how several times in the spring and summer of 2001 I warned him that we expected a major terrorist strike that would encompass the World Trade Center. 

In courtroom testimony, Godfrey said I told him that, “a massive attack would occur in the southern part of Manhattan that would involve airplanes and possibly a nuclear weapon.” 53 

He testified that I told him “the attack would complete the cycle of the first bombing of the World Trade Center. It would finish what was started in the 1993 attack.” 

On cross examination, he was more specific, declaring that I warned him in August, the attack was “imminent.” 54 

Equally devastating, Godfrey testified under oath that he told the FBI about my 9/11 warning during a sit down interview in Toronto in September, 2004, a few months after my arrest—and before the 9/11 Commission issued its report. At that point, it was still possible to alert the 9/11 Commissioners about this shattering revelation. 55 

The FBI interview with Godfrey was jointly attended by the Canadian Royal Mounted Police. Asked why a member of the Canadian Police was present at the FBI interview, he replied with a smile: “They were there to assure my protection.” 

Unfortunately, nobody was present to assure mine. 

The fact was I knew too much, and I was starting to talk. That’s why I was sitting in that holding cage waiting for my bail arraignment. 

My arrest came hard and fast after I approached Senator Lott and Senator McCain’s offices, 56 asking to tell the whole saga from start to finish. 

U.S. Intelligence understood exactly what that meant. I would blow the whistle and expose the whole façade. I was their Asset, after all. They’d been supervising my work for many years, and they were intimately familiar with how I operate and what I would reveal. And they knew that my truth would be nothing remotely similar to what Congress and the White House were selling to the American people. 

Perhaps most significantly, from their intelligence profiling, they understood that once I made up my mind to talk, it would be damn near impossible to shut me up. I would find a way to speak, one way or another. That was my nature. 

Only one thing could be guaranteed to stop me. I would have to be “terminated with extreme prejudice—” the operative phrase for destroying an Asset or Intelligence officer, body and soul— usually as an assassination. 

In that holding cage at the Baltimore Federal Courthouse, I had no idea yet how “extreme” that act of prejudice would be. 

Our intelligence war was just getting started. And it would be a fight to the death.

next

Peace Asset 237s

notes

Chapter 1

1 FBI photograph of front door barricaded by plywood 

2 FBI arrest record, March 11, 2004 

3 Federal Indictment for Susan Lindauer, Southern District of New York, codefendants Al Anbuke brothers. 

4 Supreme Court Overturns Sentencing guidelines, Washington Post A-1, Dec 2004 

5 Ibid. Federal Indictment, Southern District of New York 

6 FBI transcript. Meeting with Bassem Youssef, June 26, 2003 

7 Television transcripts NBC News, ABC News, March 11, 2004 

8 Ibid. Federal Indictment 

9 Ibid. Federal Indictment 

10 Andy Card Letters from December 2000 to January, 2003. 

11 Iraq’s response to 9/11, September 21, 2001 

12 FBI charges under Federal Sentencing Guidelines 

13 Ibid. Federal Indictment. 

14 Ibid. Federal Indictment 

15 Ibid. Federal Indictment 

16 Susan Lindauer Letters to Andrew Card dated March 1, 2001 and December 2, 2001 

17 Ibid. Andrew Card Letters 

18 Ibid. Federal Indictment 

19 Ibid. Federal Indictment 

20 Susan Lindauer letter to Andrew Card, December 2, 2001 

21 Susan Lindauer Letters to Vice President Richard Cheney and Andrew Card, December 20, 2000 through December 2, 2001 

22 Susan Lindauer Letter to Andrew Card, January 8, 2001. 

23 FBI Wire Transcripts, phone calls to Senator Lott’s staff, February 2, 2004. 

24 Ibid. FBI Wire Transcripts, February 2, 2004 

25 Susan Lindauer Letter to Vice President Richard Cheney, December 20, 2000. 

26 Ibid. FBI Arrest Report 

CHAPTER 2 

27 Mueller Nomination to head FBI. Washington Post August 3, 2001 

28 “Syria dropped on Lockerbie, ” New York Times. 

29 Official biography of Robert Mueller 

30 Oklahoma City Bombing Revelations, Patrick B. Briley, 2007 Third Terrorist: The Middle Eastern Connection to the Oklahoma City Bombing, Jayna Davis, 2004. 

31 FBI Orders Review of Oklahoma City Bombing Case, March 2005, FBI Archives 

32 “Was Nidal Behind Lockerbie Bombing?” Daily Mail, UK July, 2002 

33 Intelligence Resource Program 

34 Ibid. Daily Mail, UK July 2002 

35 Dr. Richard Fuisz. Curriculum Vitae 

36 Ibid, Fuisz, C.V. 

37 Ibid, Fuisz, C.V. 38 Susan Lindauer ‘s Lockerbie Statement to Kofi Annan, December 4, 1998 

39 Richard Fuisz Deposition, U.S. District Court of Alexandria, Virginia, January, 2000. Law firm of Butera and Andrews. 

40 Ibid, Dr. Fuisz Deposition, January 2000, Scottish Solicitor Edward MacKechnie 

41 [Richard C. Fuisz Civil Action: 92-0941] 

42 [Richard C. Fuisz Civil Action: 92-0941 

43 Letter to Edward MacKechnie, Scottish Solicitor, Lockerbie Trial, July, 2000. 

44 “Lockerbie: CIA Witness Gagged by U.S. Government, by Neil Mackay and Ian Ferguson. Sunday Herald, Glasgow, Scotland, May 28, 2000 

45 U.S. Congress, Oct. 18, 2002 

46 History Commons 

47 Washington Post, Oct. 1, 2006, History Commons 

48 History Commons 

49 Le Figaro, 31 October 2001 

50 BayArea.Com, June 6, 2002 

51 ABC News, September 11, 2001 

52 Dr. Parke Godfrey, Court Testimony, Southern District of New York. June, 2008 

53 Ibid. Godfrey Testimony. U.S. vs. Lindauer, June 2008 

54 Ibid. Godfrey Testimony, U.S. vs. Lindauer, June 2008 

55 Ibid. Godfrey Testimony, U.S. vs. Lindauer, June 2008 

56 Ibid. FBI Wiretaps, Susan Lindauer’s home telephone, February 2, 2004

FAIR USE NOTICE

This site contains copyrighted material the use of which has not always been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. As a journalist, I am making such material available in my efforts to advance understanding of artistic, cultural, historic, religious and political issues. I believe this constitutes a 'fair use' of any such copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the US Copyright Law.

In accordance with Title 17 U.S.C. Section 107, the material on this site is distributed without profit to those who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information for research and educational purposes. Copyrighted material can be removed on the request of the owner.