PART 7:ROOSEVELT'S ROAD TO RUSSIA: TEHRAN &QUEBEC II

ROOSEVELT'S ROAD TO RUSSIA

By GEORGE N. CROCKER

Earth is sick And Heaven is weary, of the hollow words Which States and Kingdom! utter when they talk Of truth and justice. 

WORDSWORTH

Chapter XIII 

TEHERAN 

DR. EDUARD BENES, the last and tragic president of the First Republic of Czechoslovakia, visited Moscow on December 12, 1943, eleven days after the Tehran Conference. To his nephew and close associate, Bohus Benes, he reported his observations. "I recall," the latter relates, "how President Benes was astonished when, visiting Moscow shortly after Teheran, he found Stalin jubilant."1 

The Russians tickled Dr. Benes' ethnic pride by telling him he could now be sure that the Slavs would eventually rule Eurasia. "Stalin did not tell Dr. Benes that, at Tehran, Churchill and Roosevelt secretly consented to Red Army liberation of Czechoslovakia." Voicing the postwar bitterness of a tortured people, Bohus Benes speaks plainly: "General Patton was stopped from liberating Czechoslovakia by General Eisenhower acting on instructions from Washington as a result of Tehran and Yalta. Patton had to stand by while Nazis were shooting Czechoslovakians until three days later the Reds came in. Can you imagine that Czechoslovakians felt for the second time they had been betrayed by decisions behind their back and lost faith in democracy? ... President Benes also told me how astounded he was when ... President Roosevelt told him to advise Stalin that 'he could have his Baltic states,' though nothing should be published about it." 

The Poles were especially worried about Tehran. It was inevitable that the future of Poland would be discussed, yet no Pole was invited. Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the prime minister of the exiled government of Poland, was not granted an interview by President Roosevelt until June 6, 1944, six months after the conference. The fourth-term campaign was looming, and the Polish spokesman had to be quieted for a few months more. "I haven't acted on the Polish question because this is an election year," Roosevelt said to him.2 He held out hope, and his manner to his visitor was one of great courtesy. "I later learned," writes Mikolajczyk sadly, "that Roosevelt had only a few months before agreed to turn over to Stalin the huge section of Poland that the Red Army had invaded while an Axis partner." When this Polish statesman came to write his book on these events, he could find no more apt title than The Rape of Poland. 

What, indeed, did happen at Tehran? Why did Dr. Benes find Stalin so jubilant? The basic reason is that the Russian dictator learned something at Tehran-something very joyous for him. He discovered that he had the President of the United States dans sa poche(in his pocket), as the French would say. 

Some things remain hidden to this day. That the Atlantic Charter (Points One, Two, and Three in particular) was treated as so much rubbish by the three Caesars who confronted each other around the green baize table in the Russian Embassy at Tehran is known beyond conjecture or surmise. But some of the furtive military arrangements-which had grave consequences-are still being tossed about like hot potatoes by the people who had to execute them. And the precise words spoken by the triumvirate, the unguarded comments, and the air of cynicism, conspiracy, and contempt for the millions of human beings whom they were preparing to push around, which must have pervaded their discussions because it is inherent in their works, have only partially seeped through the wall of secrecy. When in April, 1953, Senator William F. Knowland demanded the opening of the official files on Tehran, the State Department promised to make them public before June 30, 1955.3 They remain locked up. It is probable that some of the more embarrassing, if not heinous, details will not see the light of day until after the deaths of a number of people now living. 

And yet, as a direction marker for what was to follow, Tehran was perhaps more important than the more publicized Yalta. It was at Tehran that the basic decisions which later took concrete and appalling form at Yalta were plotted.·It was at Tehran that it first became evident that Stalin, not Roosevelt, was to shape the peace. 

So closely guarded were some of the Tehran decisions during the last months of the war that even so highly placed a person as Vice-President Truman (Senator at the time of the Conference) was unaware of them and of their Yalta sequels and was hurriedly briefed on these secret agreements by Harry Hopkins when he was projected into the Presidency in April, 1945. By then, he was already a prisoner of Roosevelt's folly. 

Significantly, the Communists in the United States were never in doubt about the decisive import of what had taken place. Getting their newest line through an international grapevine, they quickly announced that Tehran had changed the world. It had generated, they said, a new atmosphere in which Communists could work unreservedly with Washington. Earl Browder, then chief boss of the American Communist Party, whom Roosevelt had released from jail (for a passport fraud) on a White House pardon, arranged a Madison Square Garden mass meeting in New York on May 25, 1944, where he bellowed to fifteen thousand Communists that Tehran had supplied the pattern for the postwar world. Later, he elaborated the theme in a book Tehran and After, issued·and widely exploited by the Communist party. 

We now know that President Roosevelt maintained a secret liaison with Browder. One Josephine Adams, an artist, acted as a courier between the two men. She relayed information, and even documents, between them, conveying to each the views·of the other. She saw Roosevelt between thirty-eight and forty times during the three year period preceding his death. The meetings were held either at the White House or at Roosevelt's Hyde Park home. (Years later, Miss·Adams so testified under oath before a subcommittee of the United States Senate.) 4 Browder has confirmed this, taking obvious pride in the fact that he presented his "views on world events" to the President by this device and adding that the President "appreciated the service I gave him."5 

The salient fact that emerged at Tehran was that President Roosevelt had been grotesquely wrong in his confident assurance that he could "handle" Stalin. It was easy for him to assume, in the fawning atmosphere of Washington, that he had but to meet the Russian, "turn on" his famous personality, and have his way. When they met, he was in for a rude awakening. He found Stalin, says Sherwood, "much tougher than he had expected and at times deliberately discourteous."6 It was Stalin, not Roosevelt, who did the handling. 

Stalin, with Georgian cunning, had deliberately waited until he could take a threatening tone with Roosevelt and Churchill before consenting to meet them in a summit conference. He was prepared to drive a hard bargain now. As for Roosevelt, he had already lost the psychological hour for bargaining. But that was not his technique with Stalin, and never had been. 

The dramatis personae of the Tehran meeting lifted it to the eminence of high theater. There was Stalin, the mystery man, flanked by Molotoy and Voroshilov. This incredible figure, who had already won a place in history alongside Ivan the Terrible,had at last stepped from the shadows. The world was to take his measure, when pitted against the West's top statesmen. 

In contraposition was Winston Churchill. So deep seated was his detestation of Communism that he had once lost an election to the House of Commons by over stressing the issue. But he was an opportunist, capable of bizarre switches and turns and flights from principle when he thought it was to Britain's gain. By a sardonic twist of fate, this man, with his un-sleeping awareness of the Russian peril, had been destined to be one of Moscow's saviors when Hitler stood on the brink of conquest in 1941. What unvoiced thoughts passed through his fertile mind as he sat opposite the Communist dictator at Tehran, with the unctuous American President at his side holding the balance of power, can be imagined. 

The third principal was Franklin D. Roosevelt. This.was his great hour, and he played his role for all it was worth. "If there was any supreme peak in Roosevelt's career," says Sherwood, "I believe it might well be fixed at this moment, at the end of the Tehran Conference." With his weakness for self-hypno. sis, Roosevelt no doubt persuaded himself that he accomplished something good at Tehran. History has regretfully handed down a different verdict. [ YEAH, no kidding DC]

Stalin, with his unerring judgment of men, quickly sensed that Roosevelt was the weak link of the Big Two. He set about at once to establish an entente. Pleading his concern for the President's safety, he invited Roosevelt to move out of the American Legation into the heavily guarded Russian Embassy compound. Roosevelt accepted, whereupon Stalin ostentatiously turned over·the main villa to him and moved with his staff to one of the smaller buildings. The President and his party were now under the Russian microscope. The servants who made their beds and cleaned their rooms were all members of the highly efficient N.K.V.D, the Soviet secret police.7

Fifteen minutes after Roosevelt arrived in his new quarters, Stalin came to call. It took no perspicacity to discern that the President was fairly bursting to please him. Roosevelt talked about various parts of the British colonial empire in a way which made plain his detachment from Churchill. Then he had a new bonbon to offer. By the end of the war, he said, the American and British merchant fleets would have achieved such proportions that they would be more than·two nations could possibly need and he felt that some of these ships should be made available to the Soviet Union.8 Naturally, to Stalin, who had his own long-range plans for Communist penetration into Southern Asia, the Middle East, and Africa and inroads into world trade, all of this was music with a lovely melody. It meant that Roosevelt could be counted upon not only to help make the Soviet Union the dominant land power in Europe and Asia but also to enhance her stature as a maritime nation. 

The dictator was in a mood to impress. Hopkins noted that he was dressier now, wearing a uniform with gold epaulets, each bearing a large white star fastened with a red pin. Harriman has said that Stalin, in greeting Harry Hopkins at Tehran, displayed more open and warm cordiality than he had been known to show to any foreigner.9 This hard-shell specimen, this Tartar whose flinty eyes hinted the Mongolian admixture in his blood, this tyrant who had starved the Kulaks and cut down with callous savagery every human obstacle in his rise to power, was hardly an affectionate type, but he was shrewd enough to know a friend when he saw one. No doubt his pleasure at seeing Hopkins at Tehran was sincere. 

Playing upon the President's vanity, Stalin hurried to propose that Mr. Roosevelt be chairman of the sessions. Churchill agreed. At the first plenary session, the chairman welcomed Stalin, Molotov, and Voroshilov as "new members of the family circle." After painting this weird picture of a family circle, which should have brought laughs but did not, he proceeded to predict that the three nations would work together in close co-operation "for generations to come." 

When Stalin spoke, he got down to military business fast. He said it would be "unwise" for his Western allies to "scatter forces" in operations throughout the eastern Mediterranean, and he pooh-poohed the idea of their moving northward in Italy or into the Balkan area. He wanted the cross-Channel invasion of France (OVERLORD) to be the preoccupation of his allies in 1944, and he wanted some American and British forces taken out of Italy and sent into southern France to supplement it. Then he turned to the war against Japan. He said Russia would come into that one when Germany was finally defeated. He then added a remark that most Americans probably would have considered sheer impudence. "We shall be able by our common front to beat Japan," said Stalin.10 

That night, the President was host at a dinner for Stalin, Molotov, Churchill, Eden, Kerr, Hopkins, Harriman, and three interpreters, at which the six Filipino cooks he had brought with him displayed their talents. The conversation was that of men giddy not only with the martinis, the vodka, and the champagne, which flowed profusely, but also with sheer power; for these men commanded almost all the naval forces of the world, three-quarters of its air power, and land armies numbering nearly twenty million men. Stalin set the tone. He spoke contemptuously of the French nation and of what he called its "ruling class"; he said the Germans must be given harsh treatment permanently; and he said a big chunk should be handed over to Poland. Feeling his way, he did not spell out what aggrandizement he had in mind for the Soviet Union, beyond a categorical remark that he would keep the Baltic States of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, which his armies had seized. 

The next day, Churchill sent a message to Roosevelt suggesting that they have lunch together preparatory to the second plenary session. Roosevelt sent back his regrets. But he did have a private confab that afternoon with "Uncle Joe."·We have accounts of this tete-a-tete from son Elliott, who was present with his father, and from Sherwood, who had access to the President's logbook. If anything was needed to convince Stalin that he was fortunate enough to be dealing with an infatuated Don Quixote, this meeting must have sufficed. 

Roosevelt seems to have done most of the talking. He brought nods of approval from Stalin when he told of his missionary work with Chiang Kai-shek at Cairo-how he had exerted pressure to have Communists brought into the Chinese government. As they talked about the Far East, Stalin held his cards close to his chest; he gave out nothing. Roosevelt then asked Stalin if he cared to discuss the future peace of the world. This question nonplussed the Russian, for his mind was attuned to concrete situations, not airy abstractions. He replied that there was nothing to prevent them from discussing anything they pleased, whereupon Roosevelt sprang his idea of "The Four. Policemen." He conceived a United Nations organization consisting of an Assembly, an Executive Committee, and an enforcing agency which he termed "the Four Policemen." The Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and China were to comprise this constabulary. Little nations threatening the peace would be handled by blockades and embargoes. A major threat to world peace would arise if a large power made a gesture of aggression; in this case, said Roosevelt, the Four Policemen would send an ultimatum to the threatening nation, and, if the demands were not immediately met, they would bomb and, if necessary, invade that nation. 

There is no evidence of any discussion of the possibility that the offending aggressor might be one of The Four Policemen. It must have been obvious to Stalin that Roosevelt's world was a phantasmagoria. He encouraged the delusion and was quite willing to be a policeman. 

Stalin went into the second plenary session later that afternoon so sure of Roosevelt's captivity that he permitted himself to be blunt toward Churchill to the point of rudeness. With his usual persistence, the Prime Minister started talking about the eastern Mediterranean area. Sharply, Stalin said he wanted to talk about OVERLORD; Turkey, Rhodes, Yugoslavia, and even the capture of Rome were not important enough. Churchill made a last, gallant effort, but Roosevelt went along with Stalin. OVERLORD, coupled with an attack in southern France; Stalin knew what he wanted and that is what he got. 

It was obvious at Tehran that both Stalin and Voroshilov recognized General Marshall as a friend.11 Marshall, it will be remembered, had plugged for a diversion into southern France at the First Quebec Conference. This was precisely what Stalin had been prescribing, for it relegated the amphibious forces in the Mediterranean to a distant corner of Europe (from the Russian viewpoint) and away from the Balkans, and it headed British/American troops away from the eastern half of Europe. The geopolitician MacKinder had written that he who rules eastern Europe commands the heartland, he who rules the heartland commands the world island, he who rules the world island rules the world. As Chester Wilmot points out,·"there was a long-term political strategy behind the Russian desire for the Allies to concentrate on Western Europe and the Western Mediterranean.,'12 At Tehran, Churchill was disgusted to find that General Marshall, taking his cue from Roosevelt and Hopkins, had joined forces with Stalin. The President told his son Elliott after this session: "If there's one American general that Winston can't abide, it's General Marshall."13 

The President·made another remark to Elliott, in the privacy of his apartment, which reveals how susceptible he was to Stalin's purposes: 

Trouble is, the P.M. is thinking too much of the post-war, and where England will be. He's scared of letting the Russians get too strong.14 

It was quickly apparent to the Russians at Tehran that Roosevelt, unlike the British delegation, had arrived with a supine, trust-Russia mind. Had Roosevelt stood firmly with Churchill, it would have been possible, even at this late date, to block Stalin's rapacity. The die had not yet been cast. The German army, though retreating, was still on Russian soil, five hundred miles from the borders of Germany proper. American and British military, air, and naval strength, still uncommitted, was overwhelming and could strike where it chose. But Roosevelt did not stand firm with the Prime Minister. He affected the flattering role of middleman between two contenders. Actually, he always leaned Stalin's way. Churchill, thus isolated, was forced to capitulate. At every turn, Stalin had Roosevelt's open or tacit support for his determination that on V-E Day there should be no British or American troops in eastern Europe to challenge his plot for a Communist hegemony. 

(One American. who soon protested vigorously was General Mark Clark, commander of the u.s. Fifth Army in Italy. He made a strong plea to General Marshall for an invasion of the Balkans, in spite of the Tehran decision.15 It was, of course, in vain. General Clark has written: 

A campaign that might have changed the whole history of relations between the Western world and the Soviet Union was permitted to fade away.... Not alone in my opinion, but in the opinion of a number of experts who were close to the problem, the weakening of the campaign in Italy in order to invade Southern France, instead of pushing on into the Balkans, was one of the outstanding mistakes of the War.... Stalin knew exactly what he wanted ... and the thing he wanted most was to keep us out of the Balkans.... It is easy to see, therefore, why Stalin favored ANVIL at Tehran 16) 

After Stalin had bludgeoned his way through the second plenary session, he was host at dinner. Hopkins' notes record that during this dinner, the Prime Minister asked Stalin an important question. He wanted to know what territorial interests Russia might have in the future. Stalin was quoted as having replied: "There is no need to speak at the present time about any Soviet desires-but when the time comes, we will speak."17 This chilly closure of the subject had ominous portent, but there is no evidence that it caused Roosevelt the slightest discomfort.[Roosevelt goddamn brain dead DC] 

This Russian banquet was a raucous bout at which serious subjects were discussed in a rolling gunfire of toasts as course after course was washed down with vodka and champagne. Harry Hopkins lasted only halfway through. Whenever tension ran high between the British and the Russians, Roosevelt would achieve a superficial truce by rushing in with a breezy wisecrack. 

However, one of his jokes fell flat (although it has won a kind of notoriety because both Churchill and Elliott Roosevelt saw fit to include it in their memoirs). Stalin rose and proposed a blood-curdling toast. The strength of the German army depended, he said, upon fifty thousand high officers and technicians. His toast was a salute to shooting them "as fast as we capture them, all of them." 

Churchill was horrified. Quick as a flash, he was on his feet; his face and neck were red, says Elliott Roosevelt, who was present. He announced that British conceptions of law and justice would never tolerate such butchery. Into this breach stepped President Roosevelt. He had a compromise to suggest. Instead of executing fifty thousand, perhaps "we should settle on a smaller number. Shall we say 49,500?" 

All the Russians at the table roared with laughter. So did the Americans, who were obliged to show proper appreciation for their chief's humor. The Prime Minister, shocked as much by F.D.R.'s flippancy as by Stalin's barbarity, left the table. That joke-or was it a joke ?-was too grim. 

Amiability was restored the next day, which was Churchill's sixty..ninth birthday. It was climaxed with a dinner party to which all the military and civilian conferees were invited. "I think about a hundred toasts and speeches must have been given that night," General H. H. ("Hap") Arnold remembered.Is Again, because of Roosevelt's attitude of deference, Stalin was accorded the right to be sarcastic and cagey and to collect valuable information while giving out none. In his mild way, General Arnold writes, "I am not so sure we were as successful in discovering what·the Russians wanted as they were in finding out what our objectives were." 

Actually, Roosevelt and Hopkins already knew. The secret prospectus Harry had carried in his pocket at the Quebec Conference the previous August .. was unequivocal. Not only was Russia to "dominate Europe," but she was also to be assisted and propitiated by the United States in every possible way. Furthermore, at Roosevelt's dinner two nights before, Stalin had made it· plain that he had in mind carving up both Germany and Poland. 

Perhaps that is why, the next day, before the last plenary session, at which the Polish question was to come up, the President went into a private talk with Stalin and Molotov. If he had taken a copy of the Atlantic Charter into this meeting and required Stalin and Molotov to reread it, he would have been fulfilling a pledge and duty. But such was not his purpose. It was not to plead for the Poles; it was to plead for himself. He felt it necessary to acquaint Stalin with the facts of American politics, particularly with the fact that there were six or seven million Americans of Polish extraction, and others of Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian origin, all of whom had the same votes as anyone else.19 (This meant, in terms of practical politics, that any decisions which would be offensive to these groups would have to remain secret at least until after the Presidential election of 1944.) Stalin said he understood the problem. (No doubt he did; yet a few months later, Roosevelt, then exercising his blandishments on the democratically minded Mikolajczyk, recounted with great amusement: "You know, I mentioned the matter of our forthcoming American elections to Stalin, and he just couldn't understand what I was talking about."20) 

Having thus prepared Stalin, Roosevelt was now ready to retreat to the sidelines and pretend to look the other way while the Polish nation was placed on the sacrificial altar-with public announcements of the bloody deed to be withheld until he had coasted in safely to a fourth term as President. 

What was to be done about Poland was a sort of ethical test of the Allies in this war. The British had based their declaration of war on Germany in 1939 upon Hitler's violation of the Polish frontier. The territorial integrity of Poland was the moral justification for plunging into war. The war would degenerate into a monstrous, historic fraud if the Allies themselves were to enact a new rape of unhappy Poland.Yet this was exactly what happened. 

The background of the Tehran discussions was important. In the preceding April, Stalin had broken off relations with the Polish government-in-exile in London, following the Polish demand for an International Red Cross inquiry into the Katyn Forest massacre. The 'Germans had revealed that the bodies of fifteen thousand Polish officers had been found in the Katyn Forest, slaughtered by the Russians. Stalin was furious at the thought of a Red Cross inquiry and demanded that the London Poles deny the truth of the charge. When they refused, he repudiated them.

Premier Mikolajczyk, realizing that the future of Poland was at stake, endeavored to enlist the support of the Americans and British for the coming struggle for freedom. Hoping to put his case before President Roosevelt·before the latter met Stalin, he offered to come to North Africa to see him en route to Tehran. Roosevelt had dodged him repeatedly and now would not give him an appointment. A last, desperate wire sent to Cairo brought from Roosevelt a reply through an American charge d'affaires. The President asked Premier Mikolajczyk to rest assured that he had made an extensive study of the Polish situation and was fully prepared to present the Polish case at the meeting with Stalin.21 

When the discussion of Poland took place at the last plenary session, Roosevelt did not take part.22 Neither did he utter dissent to the formula which was evolved for the dismemberment of Poland. Stalin had a cut-and-dried plan. Eastern Germany, as far as the Oder River, was to be taken from the Germans and given to Poland, and the eastern half of Poland, which had been seized by Stalin while he was an accomplice of Hitler in 1939, was to be ceded to the Soviet Union. This was a bitter potion for Churchill to swallow. However, abandoned as he was by Roosevelt, he was powerless to stand up to the high-riding dictator. The resulting agreement, a shameful betrayal of the Polish people and a clear-cut violation of the Atlantic Charter, remained a secret until at Yalta, thirteen months later, it was ratified with little change. History knows that on the afternoon of December 1, 1943, in the Russian Embassy at Tehran, the Polish Republic was secret!y partitioned by a Russian, an·Englishman, and an American. Forty-eight per cent of the land of Poland was to be torn away and given to the Soviet Union.23 

No Pole was present. There was no talk of plebiscites, of the will of the people, of justice, of compensation to the inhabitants,of legal rights, of moral rights. It was a naked power deal. Roosevelt did not lift a finger to prevent it and must be deemed to have acquiesced. Reading Churchill's memoirs, one is struck by the casualness-and the callousness-with which these Moguls of the twentieth century wielded the cleaver. Ancient cities were picked off like the wings of butterflies. "I was not prepared to make a great squawk about Lvov." And "Stalin then said that the Russians would like to have the warm-water port of Konigsberg." 

It would seem that man, panoplied with power, is incorrigible. He mouths his pretensions of virtue and compassion, and a credulous world listens, and even believes; but with a change of time and company and mood, his natural recidivism cuts loose. So it happened at Tehran. 

It was late in the afternoon at this last meeting by the time the dissevered body of Poland was hauled away. Stalin then asked: "Are there any other questions?" President Roosevelt already knew there was something else dear to Stalin's hopes; it was the permanent debilitation of Germany. Obligingly, he replied: "There is the question of Germany."24 Stalin was ready.. He said he would like to see ·Germany split up. Like an echo, quick agreement·issued from the President's lips. 

Actually, Roosevelt was ready with a proposal, which he had not shown to Churchill. He said he was throwing it on the table as a basis of discussion. It was a plan to split the German nation into five separate, autonomous states: Prussia (minus its eastern province); Hanover and the Northwest; Saxony and the Leipzig area; Hesse-Darmstadt, Hesse-Kassel, and the section south of the Rhine; and Bavaria, joined with Wiirttembergand.Baden. The malice of the project was that the richest industrial area of Germany-the Ruhr, the Saar, the port of Hamburg, and the Kiel Canal-should be taken away outright and turned over to the.United Nations. No plan was better calculated to wipe out Germany as a major nation, Balkanize the Continent, and facilitate Russian domination. 

When Roosevelt started expounding this fantastic scheme, Stalin, with a grin, cut in to remark that Churchill was not listening because he was not inclined to see Germany split up. But Churchill listened, and he was staggered by what he heard. Restraining himself, he retorted: "If I might use the American idiom, I would say that the President has 'said a mouthful.'" 

Churchill was historian enough to know that to do what Roosevelt was proposing would leave central Europe a festering sore. In fact, although he favored treating Prussia sternly, his mind was running toward the amalgamation of the rest of Germany with a Danubian confederation to form a large, German led buffer power in the heart of Europe. This, he thought, would be more conducive to peace. He was, of course, conscious of the Red peril. He did not say so, but no doubt Stalin knew what was in his mind. 

The President's "mouthful" was chewed over for a while, with Stalin liking it, Churchill reluctant, and Roosevelt agreeing warmly with everything Stalin said. The Russian had a secret reason to be elated. It suited his strategy to have the United States identified in the German mind as the architect of German ruin; and Roosevelt's fatuous haste to take the initiative at Tehran to design a Carthaginian peace could be used to good political advantage by Communist propagandists in the crucial years ahead. 

Nothing came of it at the time. The question was referred to the European Advisory Committee in London, to Churchill's relief. The President, undismayed, continued to contemplate all-out revenge upon post-Hitler ·Germany, and he was to come up with an even more vindictive proposal the following September at the Second Quebec Conference.

When Churchill published his memoirs, he ended his chapters on the Tehran Conference with this wail of remorse and this prophecy: 

The Polish frontiers exist only in name, and Poland lies quivering in the Russian-Communist grip. Germany has indeed been partitioned, but only by a hideous division.... About this tragedy, it can only be said, "'IT CANNOT LAST." 

Has the importance of Tehran been exaggerated? It was a spectacular encounter of three extraordinary political personalities, but was it historically significant in the sense that the conversations of Alexander I, Castlereagh, Metternich, von Hardenberg, and Talleyrand at Vienna upon the downfall of Napoleon were significant? The balance of power they fabricated in 1815 was broadly operative in Europe for one hundred years, down to the outbreak of World War I. 

The conclusion is inescapable that the Tehran Conference is not just of passing interest as part of the cacophony of World War II. It was a calamity of historic proportions. Wilmot erred, if at all, only on the side of moderation when he wrote, in The Struggle tor Europe: 

Even before Tehran it was inevitable that the enforcement of "Unconditional Surrender" upon Germany would leave the U.S.S.R. the dominant power in Eastern Europe, but it was by no means inevitable that Russian influence would extend deep into Central Europe and the Balkans. After Tehran, it became almost a certainty that this would happen. Thus. the Tehran Conference not only determined the military strategy for 1944, but adjusted the political balance of post-war Europe in favor of the Soviet Union.25 

The more indirect consequences are unfolding as each year passes. The piper has not yet been·paid. 

After the conference, Roosevelt admitted that he had found Stalin tough and stiff and that at first he had made "no personal headway." Back in Washington, he related to Frances Perkins that he had worked for three days to make Stalin laugh and had ended up calling him "Uncle Joe."26 To an extrovert like Roosevelt, this was a major success, even though he had had to use the Prime Minister of Great Britain as the butt of the jokes that finally brought guffaws from "Uncle Joe." He had concluded that Stalin was "getatable," to use his term, but in the Rooseveltian sense, a man had been "gotten at" when he evidenced a liking for Roosevelt. In the case of Stalin, the recipe had been a simple one: he had sided with the dictator.on every issue and had not once crossed him. 

So as we contemplate the Tehran atmosphere and decisions in the light of what followed, it is easy to perceive that this conference was the point in the war where. the control of events passed into Stalin's hands. The responsibility must be ascribed to Roosevelt. His psychological aberration was such that in spite of Stalin's bludgeoning tactics and cynicism and in spite of the sordidness of the price he, Roosevelt, was willing to pay, he could believe that he was purchasing a relationship from which the concomitants of genuine friendship could be expected to flow. We must either judge that he was too smug to doubt this or that he was using his high place to push a monstrous fraud when, upon his return home, he made a world-wide broadcast on Christmas Eve from Hyde Park in which he alluded to Stalin in these words: 

He is a man who combines a tremendous, relentless determination with a stalwart good humor. I believe he is truly representative of the heart and soul of Russia; and I believe that we are going to get along very well with him and the Russian people,very well indeed. [Delusional mofo who sold half of Europe into Stalin's hands without the consent of the people he betrayed DC]

Nobody knew the American people better than Franklin D. Roosevelt. This language-trailing off into its folksy amiability -was most carefully chosen to popularize an impression that Stalin was a good fellow ("stalwart good humor"), that he was a representative ruler who did what his people wanted him to do, and that Soviet aims for the future were compatible with the ideals for which the American people had been told the war was being fought. This was a compound of three falsehoods, yet wafted over the air by the voice of the President of the United States, it gained wide currency. The innuendo that lurked in his speech, that he, Roosevelt, by his skill at Tehran, had won the golden key to lasting friendship with the Soviet Union, would serve him decisively in the forthcoming campaign for a fourth term, for the American people would be loath to dispense with the services of an emissary who appeared to have such winning ways at the council tables of the world. Having secretly compromised himself and the future tranquility of Europe and Asia at Cairo and Tehran and having torn up the Atlantic Charter in a clandestine conspiracy to gratify a brutal, power lusting tyrant who already had along record of crimes, he now permitted himself to lull his countrymen, in fact the whole world, into a specious sense of security. 

The biographer delving into the Tehran episode is in for a dismal experience. So unsavory a performance it was, both morally and strategically, that the myth makers and canonizers usually shun it altogether or give an expurgated account. This first meeting with Stalin brought out in high relief the weaknesses that flawed the character of the charming Roosevelt. Stalin, the cold percentage player, took the measure of these weaknesses and moved in quickly for the kill. After Tehran, the disaster of Yalta and its galling aftermath followed with the relentlessness of a Greek tragedy. 

But first there was to be another "Big Two" conference, again in the lovely Canadian city of Quebec. This one the myth makers and the canonizers avoid as they would the pox. For here, Franklin D.Roosevelt did indeed, by almost universal recognition of those who know what happened, reach the nadir of folly, if not depravity[It gets worse?,lets find out right now DC]

Chapter XIV 

QUEBEC II 

WE KNOW NOW that Mr. Hull, the Secretary of State, and Mr. Stimson, the Secretary of War, were horrified by what happened at the OCTAGON Conference in Quebec in September, 1944- At that time, their "stupefaction" (to use Hull's own word) was made a White House secret, and it was quickly deemed expedient to let the conference go down in history as one of the minor decision points of the war. Actually, it was the scene of one of the most damning blunders of Franklin D. Roosevelt's career blunder inspired by a Svengali-like figure in the administration who was later to be identified by the F.B.I. as a key member of the Washington Communist spy ring. Although Roosevelt partially extricated himself from the blunder, thanks to the frantic rescue work of Hull and Stimson, his Quebec decision almost delivered postwar Germany entirely to Communism. 

Nine months had passed since Tehran. Events had moved with dizzy speed. At Quebec, the Big Two sat down together in the realization that the war was won. OVERLORD had been a stupendous success, and the Anglo-American armies were poised at the Siegfried Line. Russia had pushed the German invaders off Russian soil, and its battle-flushed armies were now at the Vistula in Poland. It was no longer a question of victory. It had become a question of what. the so-called Allies would do with their victory. 

In this intoxicating climate, some of Roosevelt's most intimate advisers began to lose their heads. One of these was Henry Morgenthau, the long-time Secretary of the Treasury and the President's Dutchess County neighbor. From the beginning, Henry Morgenthau had looked upon World War II as a punitive expedition to punish Hitler and the Germans for persecuting the Jews. He was close to those powerful circles, largely centered in New York City, which were demanding a Carthaginian peace. Since Roosevelt was in the middle of his fourth-term campaign, running against Thomas E. Dewey, the governor of New York, and since New York was a pivotal state in the coming election, the moment was politically propitious for Mr. Roosevelt to evidence a special regard for the opinions of Henry Morgenthau. So when the leaders of these "groups," as Hull calls them, caught the President's ear and asked him to invite Morgenthau to the Quebec Conference, he was "induced." To the country's surprise, the Secretary of the Treasury was called to Quebec. 

Morgenthau, never considered a strong figure and lightly regarded in the administration, even by Roosevelt, had come under the influence of a Treasury economist named Harry Dexter White (his parents were Jacob and Sarah Weit when they emigrated to America from Russia). White had an indefatigable drive and a facile brain. After teaching at Harvard University and Lawrence College, he had entered the Treasury Department in an obscure role in 1934. Moving up the departmental ladder, he had won Morgenthau's confidence early in the war period and was entrusted with a series of important missions. He became Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, which, under a figure.. head such as Morgenthau, was a post from which he could wield influence throughout the Washington bureaucracy. On the eve of Quebec, he was in full charge of all operations of the Treasury Department pertaining to foreign affairs. With his astute mind, he had easily established intellectual mastery over his chief, and when, on the night of September 4, 1944, a week before the conference began, Morgenthau dined with Secretary of War Stimson to propound his plan for postwar Germany, he brought Harry Dexter White, who had drafted it, to dinner with him.1 Stimson immediately saw trouble ahead. Indeed, this was the beginning of the most violent single interdepartmental struggle of Stimson's career. 

The success story of Harry Dexter White is, of course, one of the bizarre phenomena of the Rooseveltian dispensation. This vulpine character, whose signature placed many men in the government and brought fat promotions to others, was a traitor. On November 8 and December 4,.1945, only a little more than a year after the OCTAGON Conference, the F.B.I. transmitted memorandum to the White House identifying him as a Soviet informant. The F.B.l. reported that he was part of the Silvermaster ring. For years he had been supplying Russia with confidential information.2 Later, White was publicly named by both Elizabeth Bentley and Whittaker Chambers, former Soviet spy couriers, as one of their Washington contacts. While his case was being probed, he died under mysterious circumstances. Subsequent revelations verified his treachery, which is no longer an issue. 

This was the man who sold Henry Morgenthau the so called Morgenthau Plan for the pastoralization of Germany, which was to be the crowning achievement of the second Quebec Conference. That the President of the United States fell into this transparent Communist trap demonstrates the wild irresponsibility with which he was conducting American foreign policy in these final months of the war. The supple sycophants who write obeisant biographies of Roosevelt nimbly shun the episode,hoping to expunge it by silence. Sherwood, compelled at least to mention it, makes an off hand allusion to the "notorious" Morgenthau Plan, but he charitably refrains from telling his readers what it was. 

Morgenthau presented his plan to President Roosevelt on September 6 at a meeting attended by Hull and Stimson. The three met again with Mr. Roosevelt on the ninth. On the eleventh, the conference was to begin in Quebec. These last few days saw a vigorous battle between Hull and Stimson on the one hand, and Morgenthau on the other, for the President's decision. Both Hull and Stimson considered Morgenthau's proposal barbaric and disastrous, and they warned the President against it in strongly worded memorandum. 

The Morgenthau Plan, in brief, was to strip, pillage, and so destroy Germany that it would be permanently converted into "a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in character." Speaking of the Ruhr "and surrounding industrial areas" to a total of over thirty thousand square miles, Morgenthau (or, in reality, Harry Dexter White) had written: "This area should not only be stripped of all presently existing industries but so weakened and controlled that it cannot.in the foreseeable future become an industrialized area.... All industrial plants and equipment not destroyed by military action shall either be completely dismantled or removed from the area or completely destroyed, all equipment shall be removed from the mines and the mines shall be thoroughly wrecked."3 

But that was not all. Even more diabolical punishment was prescribed for the German people and their children and grandchildren. First, a list was to be made of Germans who were to be shot at once upon apprehension and identification. Second, the entire German population was to be held down to a standard of living no higher than bare subsistence. 

To Hull, this was "blind vengeance." It was blind because "it was striking at all of Europe.... The Treasury recommendation that the German mines be ruined was almost breath-taking in its implications for all Europe, because various other countries relied upon German coal for their industries."4 As for turning Germany into a pasture, Hull argued: "Seventy million Germans could not live on the land within Germany. They would either starve or become a charge upon other nations. This was a scheme that would arouse the eternal resentment· of the Germans. It would punish all of them and future generations too for the crimes of a portion of them. It would punish not only Germany but also most of Europe." 

Stimson was horrified at the idea of turning "the center of one of the most industrialized continents in the world" into a nonproductive "ghost territory." "I cannot conceive," he told the President, "of turning such a gift of nature into a dust heap."5 The proposal to hold the German population to a bare subsistence level seemed downright immoral to him. "This would mean," he argued, "condemning the German people to a condition of servitude in which, no matter how hard or effectively a man worked, he could not materially increase his economic condition in the world." 

How a plot of such pre-medieval vindictiveness could be seriously considered by supposedly "liberal" twentieth-century statesmen is not easy to understand. Even the passions of war could not, in a civilized age, rescue it from the charge of depravity. Harry Dexter White, of course, along with his Soviet prompters, wanted the Morgenthau Plan because it would wreck the economy of western Europe. This was part of the program of militant Communism.. 

There was another Machiavellian twist to the proposal. By inducing the Americans and the.British to father this "cataclysmic plan for Germany," as Cordell Hull described it, these conspirators could turn the hate of the German people against the Western democracies for years to come. Moscow foresaw a turn of the German masses to Communism, with the Soviet Union looming in their eyes as the lesser of two evils. From any angle, the Morgenthau Plan could bring nothing but loss to the United States. 

At his meetings with Morgenthau, Hull, and Stimson before going to Quebec, President Roosevelt was noncommittal, although his remark that "Germany could live happily and peacefully on soup from soup kitchens" evinced to Stimson the shallowness of his attitude. Actually, Roosevelt was not a well man. Sherwood, who saw him in the White House just after the Quebec Conference after having not seen him for several months, writes: "I was shocked by his appearance. I had heard that he had lost a lot of weight, but I was unprepared for the almost ravaged appearance of his face."6 Secretary Stimson was worried about the President's state of body and mind. He wrote in his diary on September II, the day the conference began: "I have been much troubled by the President's physical condition.... I rather fear for the effects of this hard conference upon him. I am particularly troubled ... that he is going up there without any real preparation for the solution of the ... problem of how to treat Germany. So far as he has evidenced it in his talks with us, he has had absolutely no study or training in the very difficult problem which we have to decide."7 

This entry in Secretary Stimson's diary-it is not extravagant to say-may be the most trenchant observation penned during the entire war period. He knew, as did any person informed on the ethnography and the economy of Continental Europe, that the German question would be as vital after the war as it was before, if not more so, and that to treat it either casually or emotionally would prove an expensive folly. Roosevelt was now going forth to deal with this question. And here we have a member of the Cabinet, fresh from intimate White House talks,writing sorrowfully in his private diary that the President was going to Quebec "without any real preparation" and that he had "absolutely no study or training" in the problem. 

Harry Dexter White was thoroughly prepared. Through the red network of treachery, he had received his orders from Jacob Golos, a high Russian official in America who directed a number of Communist cells in the American government and was one of the ghostly manipulators of two espionage rings which encircled the White House. The Communist apparatus knew, of course, that Henry Morgenthau was the weak reed who could be used for their purpose and that White, his "assistant," was the perfect agent for the job. 

Neither Hull nor Stimson was at Quebec. Generals and admirals were in abundance, but the ball had long since passed to the statesmen. It was they who could lengthen the war and fumble the peace. Germany was on the verge of collapse, and as for Japan, Admiral Leahy, who was with the President at Quebec, writes: "By the beginning of September, Japan was almost defeated through a practically complete sea and air blockade."8 At a propitious moment, Henry Morgenthau put before Mr. Roosevelt a paper containing the main features of the Morgenthau Plan. The President took his pen and wrote at the bottom: "O.K.-F.D.R." 

At·first, Prime Minister Churchill was violently opposed, but Morgenthau was armed with two weapons. One was an argument and the other was a bribe. The argument was the kind the British always find hard to resist. Britain, said Morgenthau, would inherit Germany's Ruhr business, her iron and steel markets, and would be rid of a competitor forever. The bribe, or quid pro quo) as Hull chooses to call it, was an offer of credits to Britain totaling six and one-half billion dollars. 

Both Hull and Stimson give this explanation of Morgenthau's coup in inducing Churchill to initial the Plan, too; and in his memoirs, Churchill himself declares he did so only because "the President, with Mr. Morgenthau-from whom we had much to ask-were so insistent." He then proceeds to wash his hands of the plan. Plainly, he initialed it at Quebec with his fingers crossed, never expecting as monstrous a program as the "pastoralizing" of Germany to be carried out. But he did want-and he did get-the six and one-half billion dollars for his country. [must be the biggest bribe in history DC]

The same two men had signed a very different document three years before. It was the Atlantic Charter, which had pronounced that the United States and the United Kingdom would endeavor "to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access, on equal terms, to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity." Both being opportunists, Roosevelt and Churchill were not ones to be hedged in by solemn words, even their own. The Atlantic Charter had been the expedient of its hour. Now they paid no more heed to it than they did to the rainfall in Afghanistan. 

Returning to Washington after the conference, Henry "the Morgue," as the·President playfully called him, came rushing to Stimson and Hull to gloat. He was, writes Hull, "wildly enthusiastic over what he had accomplished." Harry Dexter White was at his side. Hull was furious. "This whole development at Quebec, I believe, angered me as much as anything that had happened during my career as Secretary of State." He went to the White House and told the President bluntly that Morgenthau's plan would wipe out everything in Germany except the land and that this meant that only 60 per cent of the German population could support themselves on German land and that the other 40 per cent would die. He added that he was satisfied the British had acquiesced at Quebec only to get Morgenthau's help in obtaining the six and one-half billion dollars Morgenthau had dangled before them.9

Mr. Roosevelt, skilled tightrope-walker that he was, said little during this conversation, but he pricked up his ears when Hull hinted that it would injure him politically, in the middle of the election campaign, if it became known to the country as a whole that he espoused such a plan. His refuge was to play dumb. He told Hull that he had not actually committed himself to Morgenthau's proposals. "In fact," Hull records, "he did not seem to realize the devastating nature of the memorandum of September 15 to which he had put his 'O.K.-F.D.R." 10 

Hull's conclusion was that Roosevelt "had not understood the meaning of what he had agreed to at Quebec." This is doubtful, and Churchill's account fails to bear it out. The document they initialed was short, simple, and clear. Hull had taken Roosevelt's remarks to him at face value, a mistake which the trusting Secretary of State made frequently. Dismayed by the President's insouciance, Hull saw an immediate danger. His memoirs explain his worry: "If the Morgenthau plan leaked out, as it inevitably would-and shortly did-it might well mean a bitter-end, German resistance that could cause the loss of thousands of American lives."11 

Mysteriously, the press got wind of what had happened. The reaction was hostile, with·many newspapers violently attacking Morgenthau and the President for reportedly backing him. Only the Communist organ, the Daily Worker, leaped to praise them. Mr. Roosevelt, reaching the conclusion that he had made a false step, kept the actual document, with its "O..K.-F.D.R.," out of the hands of the press. Excitedly, he telephoned Secretary Stimson (who had, "to preserve his self-respect," as he put it, sent the President a strong message of protest) and began to backtrack. He told Stimson that he "didn't really intend to try to make Germany a purely agricultural country" but that England was "broke" and he wanted to get her "more business" after the war.12 Naturally, this did not mollify Stimson, who could read plain English. 

Stimson lunched with Mr. Roosevelt on October 3 and brought the subject up again. The President "grinned and looked naughty and said 'Henry Morgenthau pulled a boner.' " He then rambled on about Germany in a way which he evidently thought would be pleasing to Stimson. To the latter, he appeared "very tired and unwell," and he seemed not to know, or was pretending not to know, the import of the paper he had initialed at Quebec. Finally, Stimson, in exasperation, read to him verbatim from the document itself: "This program  is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily agricultural and pastoral in its character." Right after these words came the sentence "The Prime Minister and the President were in agreement upon this program." Roosevelt and Churchill had taken their pens and placed their initials within an inch of this affirmation of their accord. Nothing could have been clearer or more serious. 

Although Roosevelt had been over the same ground with Secretary Hull a few days before, he feigned surprise when Stimson finished reading and looked up. Stimson's diary describes this incredible performance thus: 

He was frankly staggered by this and said he had no idea how he could have initialed this; that he had evidently done it without much thought.13 

This was the man who fancied himself indispensable to represent his country at international conferences at this critical moment in history and who was running for a fourth term as President. 

As a result of the entreaties by Hull and Stimson, the Morgenthau Plan was temporarily shelved. The President did not publicly repudiate it, just as he had never publicly announced it, but on October 20, he privately ordered that detailed planning for the treatment of Germany be halted. Careful to give no affront to Morgenthau and the latter's political confederates, in his campaign speeches he did not commit himself beyond promising that the German people were "not going to be enslaved." "Enslaved" was a word one could take as one chose. 

As Hull feared, the leakage to the press was disastrous, for nothing could have been more ill timed, in its psychological impact upon the German people, than Morgenthau's devilish coup at Quebec in September of 1944. Up until then, there was a fair chance, supported by intelligence reports, that Germany might discontinue its resistance to the Americans and British while holding the Russians at bay in the east in order to avoid the frightful fate of a Russian occupation. This could have shortened the war by months and could have averted the spawning of a malignant Communist East Germany that was to plague Europe for years into the future. 

Once the Anglo-Americans allowed themselves to be cast as destroyers more vengeful than the Russians, however, this hope went glimmering. As Eisenhower's troops lunged at the Siegfried Line, Herr Goebbels used the Morgenthau Plan as a rallying cry to the German people to put up a last-ditch resistance. This they did, for seven more months of horror,months in which American airmen flattened and burned hundreds of German plants and factories, cities and towns, which American taxpayers would one day be called upon to help rebuild in order to correct the imbalance in Europe which, by a monumental miscalculation, their "victory" had achieved. 

Morgenthau persisted, and in 1945, he wrote a book, with White's aid, expounding the Plan. White earned new laurels, and power, by playing the leading role in the Bretton Woods Conference, which set up the International Monetary Fund, and he was slated to be the first executive director of the Fund when the F.B.I. revelations wrote finis to his career. 

As events transpired, the fetid breath of the Morgenthau Plan polluted the air of central Europe for about three years of abortive, partial implementation, which proved to be as costly as it was absurd. Harry Dexter White's triumph in the capture of Roosevelt's mind was by no means short lived, for the spirit of Quebec prevailed at Yalta, too. And the momentum of hate and destruction was hard to stop. 

By 1948, the U.S. Military Government reported that 767 factories in the British, French, and American zones of Germany had been dismantled and sent away to the victorious countries, mostly to Russia, some to Britain and France, and none to the United States.14 During this time, the United States was spending six billion dollars on food, clothing, shelter, and care for destitute, conquered people and the uprooted hordes who had fled westward in the path of the Red Army. With one hand we were destroying central Europe's means of subsistence; with the other we were supporting it at the expense of the American taxpayer. This farce stemmed back through Roosevelt to Morgenthau and Harry Dexter White. The Truman administration eventually gathered the courage to confess that it was suicidal, and the dismantling ground to a halt in 1949.15 Not only was Germany helped to rise from the rubble, but the time was soon to come when.she would be implored to rearm and American weapons would be pressed into German hands. 

This was the sequel, ironic though it was. If excuses are looked for, they are hard to find, for there is nothing of the fortuitous, the incalculable, in this chain of happenings. The concatenation of events was grounded in the attitudes which· dominated the White House until the day Franklin D. Roosevelt died and which spilled over, as an inescapable legacy, into the early days of his successor's administration. Yet in the fall of 1944, Roosevelt would have excoriated any reporter who might have had the temerity to ask him at a press conference if he thought it possible that within a decade we would be laying the foundations for a new German army to help save western Europe from the threat of conquest by Russia. Hitler had already predicted this more than once, and each time, Roosevelt had fumed with anger. 

"A prudent man foreseeth the evil," says the Bible. Franklin D. Roosevelt was preoccupied looking for something pleasant in his crystal ball. He saw it. It was his own reelection. No other President had had a third term, much less a fourth. He was lucky, in that his young opponent in this campaign, Thomas E. Dewey, fatuously hoped to coast into the Presidency on the slogan "It's time for a change!" and hardly attacked him at all. While frustration and a feeling of disfranchisement gripped millions in the electorate, the seasoned old trouper, his physical deterioration concealed and his long series of diplomatic blunders magnanimously spared from public debate, managed to win again in November. Thus he came to the last lap on his road to Russia.

next and last
Yalta

notes
CHAPTER XIII 
1. From the text of address delivered to the Commonwealth Club in San Francisco on April 17, 1953. 
2. Mikolajczyk, Ope cit., 59. 
3. See U.S. News & World Report (November 4, 1955),60. 
4. Proceedings of Internal Security Subcommittee, released to the press on February 26, 1957. 
5. Statement to the press (International News Service), February 26, 1957. 
6. Sherwood, Ope cit., 798. 
7· Ibid., 776. 
8. Ibid.,777- 
9. Ibid·,781• 
10. Ibid.,779. 
11. Ibid., 783- 
12. Wilmot, Ope cit., 140. 
13. Elliott Roosevelt, Ope cit., 184. 
14. Ibid., 185. 
15. General Mark Clark, Calculated Risk (Harper, 195°),358. 
16. Ibid., 348-5°' 
17. Sherwood, Ope cit., 790. 
18. Arnold, Ope clt.~ 469. 
19. Sherwood, Ope cit., 796. 
20. Mikolajczyk, Ope cit., 59. 
21. Ibid., 47. 
22. Sherwood, Ope cit., 797. 
23. Mikolajczyk, Ope cit., 96. 
24. The discussion on Germany is described in Churchill, Closing the Ring, and Sherwood, Ope cit. 
25. Wilmot, Ope cit., 142. 
26. Perkins, Ope cit., 70, 71.

CHAPTER XIV 
1. Stimson and Bundy, Ope cit., 569. 
2. For a resume of the F.B.I. disclosures, see the New York Times of Novelnber 18, 1953. See also Burnham, Ope cit., and Whitehead, Ope cit. 
3. Stimson and Bundy, Ope cit., 574. 
4. Hull, Ope cit., 1606. 
5. Stimson and Bundy, Ope cit., 572. 
6. Sherwood, Ope cit., 821. 
7. Stimson and Bundy, op. cit., 575. 8. Leahy, Ope cit., 259. 
9. Hull, Ope cit., 1617. 
10. Ibid., 1618. 
11. Ibid., 1614. 
12. Stimson and Bundy, Ope cit., 580. 
13. Ibid., 581. 
14. Utley, Ope cit., 64. 
15. Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany (Knopf, 1959)·